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Executive Digest Compilation
Executive Digest Compilation
Executive Digest Compilation
The Constitution prohibits a President from having the highest position twice but he is not considered as
having two terms if he does not win the elections.
Facts:
Former President Estrada won the presidency in the 1998 elections but was later on ousted by former
President Arroyo in which he was not able to finish his term. He sought to run again in 2010. Pormento opposed
such candidacy and filed a petition for Estrada’s disqualification which was denied by the 2nd division of the
COMELEC. His motion for reconsideration was also denied by the COMELEC en banc. Pormento filed for
certiorari on May 7, 2010 but he did not file for any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction thus Estrada was able to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in May 10, 2010 where he garnered the second highest
number of votes.
Issue: Whether Estrada violated the Constitution when he ran for president in the May 10, 2010 elections.
RULING:
NO. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran in the May 2010 elections. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” will be premised on a person’s second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of
legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court
in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly
elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his “reelection” will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then
President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty
applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President,
and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over
said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on
October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these
representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
RULING:
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection
by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation
merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to
claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to
receive the salary of the position.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
Facts:
Former President Estrada was impeached for allegations of wrong doings eventually amounting to graft and
corruption. In the impeachment proceeding before the Senate, 11 senators were sympathetic towards the president
and they succeeded in suppressing the evidence against Estrada which led to an uproar within the Senate. The PNP
and AFP eventually withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at the EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for
snap elections to be held with the local and congressional elections where he said he would not be running thus the
SC declared that he constructively resigned from his post. Arroyo became the President in lieu of him. Estrada filed
for prohibition with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting further
proceedings in cases filed against him until his term as president ends. He also wishes to be declared the President
still albeit the fact that he is only temporarily unable to discharge his duties.
Ruling:
NO. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule
is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such
but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
Richard Gloria v. CA
● Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the president, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity
from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely
those of a department secretary. Moreover, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where
there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in
1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of
the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to
security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the President,
in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.
Held:
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not
against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to
MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President
Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment
is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in
the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is
temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration.
Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent.
As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its
protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which
are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA
555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it
cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in
effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta.
Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order
for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
119903. August 15, 2000)
Facts:
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). Thereafter, President
issued Executive Order 464, ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation
under the constitution. Section 2 in relation to 3 of the said executive order states that Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads shall secure prior consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers,
adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid
of legislation. As a result, Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo et al., all claiming to
have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition
that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for violating the power of inquiry vested in Congress being hence,
unconstitutional.
Issue:bWhether Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 contravene the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Ruling:
YES. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of
prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President
that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the
privilege. Executive privilege is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to
the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption
from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of
executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President
the power to invoke the privilege. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation extends even to executive officials and the
only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri, as the former Director of NEDA, was invited by the respondent Senate
Committees to appear and testify on matters involving the controversial ZTE-NBN deal. Neri testified that he was
offered a bribe to accept the deal, but did not accept such as instructed by the President. When he was further asked
on the details of the matters he discussed with the President about the NBN Project, Neri, invoking executive
privilege, refused to answer particularly three questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
When called again to testify in another hearing, Neri refused upon orders of the President, invoking executive
privilege. Thus, he was arrested for contempt of the Senate.
Issue: Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege.
Ruling:
YES. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition
that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to
enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance
with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected. The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to
be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
EMILIO A. GONZALES IIIv.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and
represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY.
CARLITOD. CATAYONG
G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority
to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Facts:
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza), and four others were charged criminally and administratively for
Grave Misconduct. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III (Gonzales) requested all relevant documents and evidence in
relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Upon the
recommendation of Gonzales, a decision in the administrative case finding Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman with the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Mendoza and his fellow police officers filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision. The
motion remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) found that Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed
serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine months without any justification. The inaction is gross,
considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-
taking.
The Office of the President issued a resolution, after due investigation, finding Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and meted out
the penalty of dismissal from service.
Major General Carlos F. Garcia and his family were charged with Plunder and Money Laundering before
the Sandiganbayan. The government, represented by petitioner Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Barreras-
Sulit), sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement.
The House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the Plea Bargaining
Agreement which in effect recommended to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service
and the filing of appropriate charges.
The Office of the President initiated an investigation against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her written
explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the
administrative disciplinary proceeding against her.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
YES. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-
podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided;
instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part thereof must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing
of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature, which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in
the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would
exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers'
real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL
ARROYO
G. R. NO. 191002, MARCH 17, 2010, J. BERSAMIN
In reversing the Valenzuela ruling, the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII is now deemed
inapplicable to the appointments in the judiciary.
Facts:
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners De Castro, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting,
submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17,
2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not
extend to appointments in the Judiciary. In support thereof, the OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary (specifically in this case the
upcoming Chief Justice position).
Ruling:
NO. We reverse Valenzuela. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,
among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment
is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines
the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this
Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular,
Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the
submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill
the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a
former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the
appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the
imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power,
and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII
prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Such interpretation even turned out to be
conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that
Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like
Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely
distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what
Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable.
SEPARATE OPINION:
J. BRION, CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
The Disputed Provisions
In my view, the provisions of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation from what the whole contains. In
considering the interests of the Executive and the Judiciary, a holistic approach starts from the premise that the
constitutional scheme is to grant the President the power of appointment, subject to the limitation provided under
Article VII, Section 15. At the same time, the Judiciary is assured, without qualifications under Article VIII, Section
4(1), of the immediate appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, i.e., within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy. If both provisions would be allowed to take effect, as I believe they should, the limitation on the
appointment power of the President under Article VII, Section 15 should itself be limited by the appointment of
Members of the Court pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(1), so that the provision applicable to the Judiciary can be
given full effect without detriment to the President’s appointing authority. This harmonization will result in restoring
to the President the full authority to appoint Members of the Supreme Court pursuant to the combined operation of
Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1).
Viewed in this light, there is essentially no conflict, in terms of the authority to appoint, between the
Executive and Judiciary; the President would effectively be allowed to exercise the Executive’s traditional
presidential power of appointment while respecting the Judiciary’s own prerogative. In other words, the President
retains full powers to appoint Members of the Court during the election period, and the Judiciary is assured of a full
membership within the time frame given.
I concluded that the appointment of a Member of the Court even during the election period per se implies
no adverse effect on the integrity of the election; a full Court is ideal during this period in light of the Court’s unique
role during elections. I maintain this view and fully concur in this regard with the majority.
In any case, let me repeat what I stressed about Valenzuela which rests on the reasoning that the evils
Section 15 seeks to remedy – vote buying, midnight appointments and partisan reasons to influence the elections –
exist, thus justifying an election appointment ban. In particular, the "midnight appointment" justification, while fully
applicable to the more numerous vacancies at the lower echelons of the Judiciary (with an alleged current lower
court vacancy level of 537 or a 24.5% vacancy rate), should not apply to the Supreme Court which has only a total
of 15 positions that are not even vacated at the same time. The most number of vacancies for any one year occurred
only last year (2009) when seven (7) positions were vacated by retirement, but this vacancy rate is not expected to
be replicated at any time within the next decade. Thus "midnight appointments" to the extent that they were
understood in Aytona will not occur in the vacancies of this Court as nominations to its vacancies are all processed
through the JBC under the public’s close scrutiny. The institutional integrity of the Court is hardly an issue. If at all,
only objections personal to the individual Members of the Court or against the individual applicants can be made,
but these are matters addressed in the first place by the JBC before nominees are submitted. There, too, are specific
reasons, likewise discussed above, explaining why the election ban should not apply to the Supreme Court. These
exempting reasons, of course, have yet to be shown to apply to the lower courts. Thus, on the whole, the reasons
justifying the election ban in Valenzuela still obtain in so far as the lower courts are concerned, and have yet to be
proven otherwise in a properly filed case. Until then, Valenzuela, except to the extent that it mentioned Section 4(1),
should remain an authoritative ruling of this Court.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. In order to determine whether the
renewal of an ad interim appointment violates the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution we must distinguish those which weredisapproved from those which were by-passed, for the by-
passed reappointment is valid and allowed while the disapproved is not and can no longer be renewed.
FACTS: On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on
February 2, 2008. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. Consequently, On
June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same
positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. Congress adjourned before the
Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo
renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions.
Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag filed the instant petition questioning the appointments Matibag
claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
Issues:
1. Whether the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution.
2. Whether the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same
positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim
appointment is utterly without basis.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were
extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General
Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
2. NO. We must distinguish those which were disapproved from those which were by-passed. An ad interim
appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The
disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the
appointing authority of the President. On the contrary a by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new
ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and
such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do
not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad
interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the
appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on
February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. The
continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office
expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 of HON. MATEO A. VALENZUELA AND HON.
PLACIDO B. VALLARTA
The prohibited appointments contemplated by Article VII section 15 not only applies to the executive
department but also to appointments by the president to the members of the judiciary. Nonetheless, as an exception
appointments to the judiciary can be made during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
Facts:
The Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta and others were appointed by the president as RTC judges and to
other judicial positions during the prohibited period contemplated by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution in light of
the upcoming elections. The President expressed the view that "the election-ban provision Article VII, Sec. 15
applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of government," the whole article
being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'" He also observed that further proof of his theory "is the fact that
appointments to the judiciary have special, specific provisions applicable to them" citing Article VIII, Sec. 4 [1] and
Article VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he "firmly and respectfully reiterate his request for the Judicial and Bar
Council to transmit the final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy in order to complete the
appointments. On the contrary, Chief Justice Narvasa is of the contrary view, CJ Narvasa claims that the election
ban provision also applies to appointments in the judiciary. Faced by an important and ripe constitutional question,
hence, the Court En banc was called to decide on the instant Administrative matter.
Issues:
1. Whether during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article
VIII.
2. Whether the President can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of
public service.
Ruling:
1. NO. The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution "two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" - the President is neither
required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only
once every six years.
In view of the general prohibition in Art. VII, sec.15, One interpretation that immediately suggests itself is
that Section 4(1), Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a particular one; that is to say,
normally, when there are no presidential elections - which after all occur only every six years - Section 4(1), Article
VIII shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but when (as now) there are
presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any
appointments. The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an authority on Constitutional Law
and himself a member of the Constitutional Commission, is "In order not to tie the hands of the incoming President
through midnight appointments."
In the ultimate analysis of the provision, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types
of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to
those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are
declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section
15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the
proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his
bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming President. Therefore, the appointments by Hon. Valenzuela and Vallarta by the
President during the prohibited period is deemed void.
2. YES. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. To be sure, instances may be conceived
of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the
Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the court be so reduced that it will have no quorum
or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a
case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII. The
appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May
14, 1998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of
the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or
influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is
no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the
ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments
made within the period of the ban.
It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7,
Article VII thereof.
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in Sulu. A task
force was created by the ICRC and the PNP. The local group convened under the leadership of Governor Abdusakur
Mahail Tan. He organized the Civilian Emergency Force, a group of armed male civilians coming from different
municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. Later on, Governor Tan issued Proclamation 1-
09 declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the
PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and
other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Jamar M. Kulayan, et. al filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether Governor Tan can exercise the calling out powers of a President.
Ruling:
NO. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the
police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations. Moreover, in the discussions of the Constitutional
Commission, the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in
emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided
by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations. But as a civilian agency of
the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he
is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA et al.
When the act of the Secretary of Finance is in pursuance of a mandate as an agent of the congress and not
as the president’s alter ego the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary
of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Facts:
R.A. No. 9337 or the VAT law provides that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 %).
Petitioner Escudero, et al. claims that any recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be
brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter.
Issue: Whether the President notwithstanding the mandate of R.A. 9337 can easily brushed aside the
recommendation by the Secretary of Finance on the assumption that the latter is a mere alter ego of the President.
Ruling:
NO. When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means that as
head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an
advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and,
in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is subject to the direction of the President."
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such
instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to
properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a
projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter
or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.
DENR v. DENR employee
G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency Doctrine]
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec.
Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal
City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of
the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII
Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same.
MEWAP no digest
FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion" &
General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreed to return to
barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1,
2003 thru Proc NO. 435.
Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights,
interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society.
Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens
freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly
ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that
S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there
exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does
not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads because
"overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the
constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same
S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers
and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state of rebellion
is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive
exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion
Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions standing of
petitioners
ISSUES:
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not the proclamation
calling the state of rebellion is proper
RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas &
PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez "… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself
which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim
to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief,
which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in
the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato
"These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the
case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional
questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of
the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may
bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental importance"
regarding constitutional questions in this particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided
in the Consti on giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the
proclamation of the state of rebellion.
2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual
controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading
review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also
declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise
of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only
criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with
Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the evolution
of executive power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in
In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become
more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the
plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State." This, plus Marcos v Manglapus on
residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain status,
argue towards the validity of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any
legal significance for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple
declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions that the military and police
authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the
Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances
so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of
rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or
not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted to
exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration
constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to
S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to
or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 &
18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
Lacson Vs. Perez 357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as
General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly
effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against
them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they
are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were
issued against them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders
allegedly effected by the same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the
police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until
May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless
arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time
because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible
for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting
officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing
any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio
must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their
alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any
crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which
Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with
their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners
without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001
siege of Malacañang.
Ampatuan v. Puno
Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.”
She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO
273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued
AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”,
referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition
under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as
these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regional
government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred
and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the
President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under the
Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions
Held:
1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity
in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec.
2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong
named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-
Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.
2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And
she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in
her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
xxx
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need
for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination
was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court
said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then
this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out
the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They
simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the
takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore
and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the
two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action.
She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and
the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the
Court must respect the President’s actions. (Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
David v. Arroyo
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled
all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally
permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune,
which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and
write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP
1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it
cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually
a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because
it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP
1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.
HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still
in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can
take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed
was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of
PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor
a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune
without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can
declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it
for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the
calling out power of the president by the president.
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et. al vs Office of the Executive Secretary, et. al.
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on
July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo
of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for
ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a
function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners
submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary
international law.
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they
have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.
Issue: W/N the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence; or
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even
without the signature of the President.
Held:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign
policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides
a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by
the executive.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a
treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This
Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the
Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from
the State to its creditors.
Facts:
Jinggoy Estarda delivered a privliege speech in the Senate to reveal that some Senators, with him, have
been given an additional P50 Million for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. Responding to
this, Secretary Abad issued a statement explaining that the funds for these were part of the DAP, a program designed
to hasten economic expansion. This DAP have been sourced from savings which comes from the pooling of
unreleased and the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also meant for slow-moving programs amd projefcts.
Aruallo then brogutht the case to the Court alleging that the DAP is unconstitutional alleging that its implementing
arm direcrted the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of government agencies and offices with low levels of
obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.
Ruling:
NO. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as
the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could
appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the
act by which Congress "designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the
money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some
individual purchase or expense.
In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization
prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers
to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of
debt or dues from the State to its creditors.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the
execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan
like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The
pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not
involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by
Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under
Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
