Jewish Law

Over the past fifty years, archaeological excavations in Israel have unearthed about half a dozen ancient synagogues that were in use at different points in time between the first century BCE through the outbreak of the Bar-Kochba rebellion early in the second century of the Common Era.  In close proximity to each of these synagogues, a mikveh (ritual bath) has been discovered.  In contrast, no mikvaot have been discovered adjacent to any of the dozens of later synagogues that have been excavated and studied, with only one or two possible exceptions. 
At this point it is impossible to determine exactly when mikvaot ceased to be built in connection with synagogues, as the archaeological record reports very little about synagogues of the late second - early third century CE.  From an archaeological perspective, it is clear that at least from the second half of the third century, synagogues began to be built without regard for proximity to mikvaot.
Talmudic sources make no mention of a requirement to build mikvaot adjacent to synagogues. To date, no satisfactory explanation has been given for the evident connection between the synagogue and the mikveh in the early period, and the disappearance of such a connection in later periods of synagogue history. The objective of this paper is to present and explore a possible interpretation of this puzzling phenomenon.
  During the Second Temple and Mishnaic Periods, a rabbinical enactment was in effect requiring mikveh ablutions prior to engagement in Torah study and prayer for individuals who had experienced seminal emission. Careful study of the Talmudic sources reveals that this enactment was nullified early in the Amoraic Period, sometime during the second quarter of the third century CE.
It would appear that the mikvaot built adjacent to the earlier synagogues were intended for this precise function, serving visitors to the synagogue who required ritual ablutions prior to Torah study and prayer.  Once the rabbinical enactment regarding these ablutions was nullified, there was no longer need for such mikvaot, and hence the absence of mikvaot in proximity to the later synagogues.

השאיפה לטהרה עמדה במוקד התרבות הדתית של יהודי העת העתיקה ועיצבה את תמונת עולמם, אורחות חייהם ויחסיהם החברתיים. קבוצות שונות הציעו דרכים למימוש חיי טהרה וכרכו בה גאולה עצמית ותיקון קוסמי.


הספר טהרה וקהילה בעת העתיקה: מסורות ההלכה בין יהדות בית שני למשנה מציע תיאור מקיף של תחום הטהרה, אופייה ותכליתה בעולמם של יהודי בית שני בכלל, ובפרט בתורתם של הפרושים. על רקע תפיסות מתחרות, המופיעות בספרות קומראן ובברית החדשה, הציעו הפרושים חלופה משלהם לחיי טהרה שבה נכרכו מסורת בדלנית ואידאולוגיה חברתית. מקורות התקופה משרטטים אורח חיים מעורר מחלוקת הממוקד בהגנה על הגוף במקום על הקודש, ובשליטה על הטומאה במקום שעבוד לעוצמתה הקוסמית. מדיניות הפרושים הוסיפה ועיצבה את דמותן של ההלכה והקהילה גם לאחר החורבן, ותורתם הניחה את היסודות לפעילותם של התנאים בתוך הקשרים חברתיים משתנים. ניתוח ביקורתי של תולדות מסורות ההלכה בתחום הטהרה במשנה ובתוספתא חושף את תהליכי התפרקותה של התרבות הדתית הקדומה והתגבשותה של תורת החכמים.

The concern for purity shaped Second Temple Judaism, and its significance expanded far beyond the limited realm of the Temple. The fear of impurity shaped daily conduct, stood at the heart of ideological disputes and formed the contours of Jewish society. The question how to ensure ritual and moral purity was of cosmic dimensions, and therefore determined the dividing lines between the main parties of Jewish society in Palestine. The Qumran sect developed the notion of the defiling sin, and Jesus was viewed by his followers as the ultimate purifier. Against these alternatives, this book offers a comprehensive analysis of the purity policy in the teachings of the dominant Pharisees. Early rabbinic traditions alongside anti-pharisaic sources uncover a controversial policy focused on the body and not on the purity of the Temple. They provided purification to wider social circles, while preserving its role in maintaining their own status. The book further demonstrates the fundamental change of religious life and social practices from the Second Temple period through the rise of the rabbinic movement, which offered a new version of ritual purity and community. A close analysis of the halakhic traditions in rabbinic literature reveals the gradual disintegration of the ancient religious culture and the emergence of the rabbinic culture within new social contexts.

The Relationship of Law to Society in Deuteronomy:
“The Draft Constitution” (Deut 16:18–18:22) as an “Ideal Type”

This article demonstrates the overlooked contribution of the ancient Near East to the development of constitutional law.  The legal corpus of Deuteronomy provides a utopian model for the organization of the state, one that enshrines separation of powers and their systematic subordination to a public legal text—the “Torah”—that delineates their jurisdiction while also ensuring their autonomy.  This legislation establishes an independent judiciary while bringing even the monarch under the full authority of the law.  This legislation departs from all previous models, whether those extant in the legislation of the ancient Near East or ancient Israel itself.  Two of its cornerstones are fundamental to the modern idea of a constitution: (1) clear division of state powers into separate spheres of authority; and (2) the subordination of each branch to the authority of the law.  This legislation was so utopian that it seems never to have been implemented; instead, idealism rapidly yielded to political pragmatism.  Nonetheless, Deuteronomy’s draft constitution makes a powerful statement about the broader function of law within society, while also providing a corrective to the secular and Graeco-Roman bias of more standard models of constitutional legal history.

N.B. The interested reader is invited to turn to the expanded and more fully annotated Hebrew version of this article, to appear in the volume Ma'or va-Shemesh: History, Philosophy, Lore and Legacy, edited by Levi Cooper, Ariel Evan Mayse and Zvi Mark (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, forthcoming).

The system of Israeli rabbinical courts has been recognized in Israeli law as an official judicial system of the state, and it has special authority to litigate matters of marriage and divorce for all Jewish residents of Israel. This reality, in which a halakhic institution operates by virtue of a secular law, has far-reaching consequences for the manner in which the rabbinical courts operate. In addition to clear advantages, there are also complex problems.
Over the years, a substantial portion of issues related to family law have not been left within the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts. It appears that in recent years a backlash of a new type has been developing by the rabbinical courts. Some of the rabbinical judges are adopting problematic halakhic positions in order to restore to the rabbinical courts' authorities that have been denied to them by Israeli law or by the civilian courts.
In the present paper, I show a critical examination of one halakhic tool of this type. Simply put, according to some dayanim if the wife takes the entirely legal step of approaching a civil rather a rabbinical court regarding a matter having to do with her rights in a dispute, this will result in her being deemed obligated to be divorced. I show that the arguments adduced by the dayanim indicate that their rulings are agenda-driven: they are, to a significant degree, innovative, and their use of the halakhic sources they cite is quite problematic.

The distribution of powers between the state and religious groups plays an important role in shaping how controversies over multicultural toleration and women's rights under religious law can be resolved. Some structures encourage dialogue while others make it difficult. In Israel, the presence of multiple systems of personal religious law limits the possibilities for the transformation of discriminatory religious laws. There is no civil marriage or divorce in Israel. When the modern State of Israel was created, exclusive power over family law disputes involving Jewish citizens was placed in the hands of rabbinical courts. This arrangement has been called one to retain the 'status quo'. However, it was not a continuation of Jewish tradition or of the arrangements in place during the long period of Ottoman rule in Palestine. It reflected strengthened powers that had been given to rabbinical courts during the period of the British Mandate for Palestine. This article will trace the ways in which British policies for colonial rule and the interests of Jewish religious leaders coalesced to create a regime of religious family law that is resistant to feminist demands for change.

Is there a Jewish version of the theory of “just and unjust wars” found among Christian theologians? Some say “no” and some say “yes,” and their answers seem to depend upon their notion of what counts as an authentic interpretation of the classical Jewish (principally halakhic) sources. So what is an “authentic” or valid interpretation of those sources? This article, written primarily for a Reform rabbinical audience, briefly surveys the theological and halakhic literature and discusses some of the major approaches to “the” hermeneutical question: how do we go about establishing validity in legal and halakhic interpretation?

כאשר שניים מתקשרים בחוזה עלול הדבר להסב הפסדים לאדם שלישי. האם יש נסיבות שבהן פגיעתו של החוזה באינטרס של אדם שלישי מצדיקה התערבות לטובתו? כיצד ראוי לאזן בין עקרון חופש החוזים לבין הגנה על אינטרסים של בני אדם שלישיים העלולים להיפגע מן החוזה? על פי הניתוח המוצע במאמר, שיטות משפט מודרניות מתמודדות עם תופעה זו באמצעות הסדרים מקומיים בכמה ענפי משפט ספציפיים. לעומת זאת, במשפט העברי ניתן למצוא התמודדות עקרונית ושיטתית עם תופעת החוזה לרעת אדם שלישי. לפיכך, המשפט העברי יכול לשמש מקור השראה לפיתוח מודל של דוקטרינה מודרנית של חוזה לרעת אדם שלישי. מודל זה יעניק יתר שיטתיות להסדרים הקיימים בשיטות משפט בנות זמננו, ויאפשר גיבוש מענה למקרים בעייתים אחרים שאינם נופלים תחת הסדרים אלה. בד בבד הדיון התאורטי של המשפט המודרני יכול להעשיר את הבנתנו את יסודות גישתו של המשפט העברי
גופו.

Borrowed from a psychological theory, the principle of ‘separation-individuation’ refers to a developmental phase in which a subject develops sense of differentiation from her past or present origins and sense of autonomous selfhood and independency. The article suggests viewing the typology of anomist and legalist religions not as a consistent phenomenology but rather in relation to the above principle and the need to differentiate and create a religious self-identification.

המאמר בוחן את הדיון ההלכתי על היחס הראוי בין סיכון חיילים בצד אחד
לבין סיכון אזרחים בצד האחר בלחימה. הניתוח בפרק הראשון חושף מגוון
דעות רחב ומחלוקות עמוקות בסוגיות רבות העומדות ביסודם של דיני
הלחימה. הפרק השני מציג את מגוון הדעות בכמה שאלות ספציפיות. מעיון
בשני הפרקים יחדיו עולה כי אין קשר הכרחי בין העמדות בשאלות-היסוד
לבין ההכרעות בשאלות הלכה למעשה: בעלי עמדות זהות יכולים לחלוק
בהכרעה, ולהפך. שני הפרקים והעיון המשלים בפרק השלישי מפריכים את
הדימוי שלפיו יש הסכמה נרחבת בחברה הישראלית לגבי שאלות-היסוד,
לגבי ניסוח השאלות המוסריות והמעשיות ולגבי הדרכים לפתירתן של
דילמות כאלה. החיבור גם מאתגר את אופן ההצגה של עמדת ההלכה בשיח
הישראלי, ומעלה תהיות על אופני ניהול השיח התרבותי, הפוליטי והמשפטי
– הן מצד המדינה ומוסדותיה והן מצד הקהילות הדתיות ומנהיגיהן

On a societal level Philo argues for a ius talionis based on values of equality, life itself, and health. The first principle results in democracy as the best political system. It also implies that every killing is unjust, including killing in war, as every person who kills in effect gives him or herself a higher value than his or her victim. The second principle implies that when a life is willingly taken, it must be retaliated against—by the death of the offender. In some cases, Philo also considers an intentional assault on someone’s health as murder, especially when the principle sign of life, the ratio (nous), is thereby lost. The condition for the culpability of murderers or potential murderers is in every case the intention to kill. This intention also includes incitement to murder and attempted murder.
On a religious level there is only the one God. God is the creator and the guarantee of the world order (logos) which includes and effectively amounts to natural law. Every offence against God is an offence against this order and cannot be redeemed, and the offender should be completely erased. However, as men are shaped in the image of God, they are, to some extent, also godly. Killing the image of God is, thus, killing a part of God in some way. At the societal level, the victim is to be recompensed by means of the death penalty for the murderer. However, at the religious level, the murderer has broken the law of nature—offended God’s image, and God himself—and must be eradicated, to preserve the goodness inherent in God’s work. To repeat the words of Philo once again:
"The term murder or manslaughter is used to signify the act of one who has killed a human being but in real truth that act is a sacrilege, and the worst of sacrileges."
(Philo, Spec. Laws 3.83; trans. Colson, LCL)

A legal system may be prone to limit its jurisdiction, so that its laws will apply exclusively only within its territorial borders. In an alternate conception, a legal system may opt to apply its laws extraterritorially, so that its citizens will be bound to them in any place they find themselves. The theoretical foundations of these two conceptions of law are deeply distinguished from each other. It is within this jurisprudential framework that this article explores anew the transition from the biblical (Pentateuchal) conception of law, to the conception of law found in the writings of the mishnaic rabbis. Towards its end, the article examines this legal difference on the background of a parallel theological transition. By revealing the possible relationships between these two transitions it becomes clear that theology and law are intertwined.

The concept of right stands at the very center of our legal universe. An imaginary alternative legal universe might have similar legal norms to ours, except that they are centered on the concept of duty. Is there any significant difference between these two legal universes? The Hohfeldian assumption of complete correlativity between rights and duties might imply that the difference between these two universes is merely a matter of rhetoric. This article, however, argues that a rights-based legal world would presumably be significantly different from a legal world based upon duties. For this purpose, the article examines the way in which contradictory norms are resolved. A rights-based system decides cases of contradictory norms according to a process that is different from that used by a duty-based system. The article is devoted to examining the roots of this difference, its significance and its social implications. Alongside the discussion of the classical and modern legal sources from the Western legal tradition, the article contains a comparative discussion of Jewish law sources, which demonstrates a typical example of a duty-based legal system.

The great similarity between the Jewish and Islamic legal systems in criminal policy, the quality of executions, and the functioning of the Jewish and Islamic Jurisprudence have led some to believe that Islamic law has adopted Jewish law in the death penalty.
Comparative studies in these two religions show In general, Islam endorses Judaism in many execution laws, and in many other executions, such as animal executions, rude juvenile executions, and non-Jewish executions, it is completely against the Jewish law.
In fact, Islamic law does not merely establish a system independent of Jewish law but merely reform it. These Islamic reforms to Jewish law are often in the details, and have usually lowered the penalties.

The present book studies the foundations and criminal purposes of the Jewish and Islamic law for the death penalty, by using the Torah and the Talmud, and Islamic sources, including the Qur'an and Jawaher al-Kalam.
* Language: Persian

החובה לנהוג בתום לב נחשבת אחת הסוגיות המשפטיות המרכזיות והמשפיעות של זמננו, במשפט הפרטי בכלל ובדיני החוזים בפרט. ברם דומה כי היקף הכתיבה בתחום עומד ביחס הפוך למידת הבהירות שהושגה בנוגע למשמעותו של המושג; אלפי העמודים שהצטברו לא הצליחו לפזר את הערפל מסביב לשאלה: תום לב מהו. מאמר זה מוקדש לעיון בהיבט המושגי והמינוחי של תום הלב, כלומר משמעותו של המושג וזיקתו למטבע הלשון שנבחר לייצגו. במוקדו השוואת דרכיהן המינוחיות השונות של שתי שיטות משפט החולקות שפה משותפת – המשפט הישראלי והמשפט העברי – וזאת לאור דילמות מושגיות העומדות במוקד הדיונים על עקרון תום הלב. עמידה על היחס הפנימי ועל "חלוקת העבודה" שמקיימים שני המונחים שקבע בהקשר זה המשפט העברי ("ועשית הישר והטוב" ו"כופין על מידת סדום") בינן לבין עצמן, ושבינן לבין המונח הישן-חדש שיצר המשפט הישראלי ("תום לב"), תסרטט תמונה מקיפה של המארג המושגי-מינוחי המורכב שהעברית מציעה לנו ושאנו עדיין רחוקין מלמצותו.

Many Jewish and Muslim women in New Jersey too often suffer grave consequences of litigating with husbands who want to punish them for seeking divorce or for demanding their financial marital rights. Such malevolent husbands often use their unilateral right to dissolve the marriage in a religious context as a tool to abuse their wives or extract a more favorable financial settlement from them. The resulting injustice must cease. Jewish and Muslim women must be given a remedy in our civil courts to dissolve the chains of religious matrimony and to permit them to move on and remarry without fear of forfeiting their financial rights. To that end, we strongly recommend that the New Jersey Legislature adopt a measure that would mandate the removal of barriers to remarriage upon the entry of a final judgment of civil divorce. We hold out as an example New York's model. In every action for divorce or annulment filed there, each party must file a sworn statement that he or she will remove all barriers to the other's remarriage. If either party fails to do so, the other spouse can petition the court to seek enforcement. The New York statute is gender-and religion-neutral and has withstood several constitutional attacks.