Dialogue, 25

ISSN: 1164-8147 Revue Internationale d'Arts et de Sciences Medjunarodni Casopis za Kulturu, Umetnost i Nauku International Journal for Arts and Sciences Internationale Zeitschrift für Kunst und Wissenschaft VOLUME 7 Paris, printemps/spring 1998 DOSSIER Kosovo & Metohia Notes on the Kosovo Problem and the International Community Diana Johnstone Kosovo-Metohija: Origins of a Conflict and Possible Solutiona Dusan T. Batakovic The Kosovo and Metohia Problem and Regional Security in the Balkans Predrag Simic Der Kosovokonflikt: Bemerkungen und Fragen Georges Pomphrey Les sanctions, à quoi servent-elles ? Dragas Keseljevic, Marko Krstic et Djordje Radovanovitch Documents La loi de non-retour de 1945-1946 Slobodan Milosevic: Speech on the Field of Kosovo (1989) Kosovo-Albanians Memorandum Inter -Serbian dialogue on Kosovo: A proposal Opening Statement, Washington Hearing On Kosovo Repression and Violence Senator Alfonse D'Amato Arts Les illustrations dans ce numéro: Bojana Maksimovic No 25 Revue trimestrielle d'arts et de sciences Paris, printemps 1998 Volume: 7, N°: 25 Prix: 60 F Publié par: Association DIALOGUE c/o Titre 47 bis, Avenue de Clichy 75017 Paris President: Vlastimir Stojanovic Coéditeur: Editions du Titre Imprimé par: Editions du Titre 47 bis, Avenue de Clichy 75017 Paris Dépôt légal: Mars 1998 ISSN: 1164-8147 Commission paritaire: N° 74219 Copyright © DIALOGUE, 1998 Directeur et rédacteur en chef: Dragan Pavlovic Rédacteurs associé: Dusan Batakovic * Gérard Caron * Egon Ciklai * Louis Dalmas * Diana Johnstone * Raymond Kent * Boris Lazic * Djordje Maksimovic * Goran Nikolic * Zlatomir Popovic * Spasa Ratkovic * Slobodan Soja * Matthias Steinle * Radivoj Stanivuk * Zeljan Schuster * Roland Vasic Administration: Nikola Sujica, France * Miro Urosevic, Allemagne Conseil de Rédaction: Mojsije Abinun, littérature, France * Milovan Danojlic, littérature, France Dejan Djokic, RU * Zlatko Glamocak, arts, France * Mirko Govedarica, sociologie, France * Dejan Kocovic, France * Jovanka Konjikovic, architecture, France * Djordje Konjikovic, France * Vesna Levkovic, droit, France Djordje Levkovic, biologie, France * Bratislav Milanovic, littérature, Yougoslavie * Nikola Milenkovic, littérature, France * Vladimir Milicic, EU * Sima Mraovic, biologie, France * Nenad Petrovic, littérature, RU Negovan Rajic, littérature, Canada * Nikola Samardzic, histoire, Yougoslavie * Charles Simic, littérature, EU * Vlastimir Stojanovic, droit, France* Gordana Sujica, architecture, France * ThomasTodorovic, sociologie, Japan * Nina Urosevic, Allemagne Traducteurs: Velimir Popovic * Harita Wybrands ________________________________ DIALOGUE Directeur fondateur (1992-1997): Dr. Bogoljub Kochovich ------------------------------------------Publiée avec le concours du Centre national du livre. ______________________________ Service abonnement Servis pretplate Subscription Service Argentina: Egon Ciklai, Guillermo Rawson 2729 IVB, 1636 Olivos, Prov. de B. Aires. Canada: Dusan Pavlovic, 4564 Avenue Coolbrook, Montreal, Qué, H3X 2K6. France: Nikola Suica, 20, rue Jean Colly, 75013, Paris. Suisse/Schweiz: Katarina Veljanovic, Chemin de la redoute 32, 1260 Nyon, (Genève). United Kingdom: Miss Deborah Danica Mager, 88 Henniker Road, London E15 1JP U. S. A.: Desa Tomasevic Wakeman, 2471 Cedar Street, Berkeley, CA 95708. Yugoslavia: Djordje Maksimovic, Cvijiceva 24, 11000 Beograd Les articles ne reflètent pas nécessairement les opinions de la rédaction . DIALOGUE on Internet: http://www.bglink.com/business/dialogue Avis aux auteurs “Dialogue” est une revue trimestrielle des idées, plus précisément de toutes les idées. Comme le contenu d’un numéro se veut très varié et englobera tout ce qui se réfère, au sens le plus large aux sciences humaines et naturelles, à la culture et aux arts, les auteurs devraient être conscients que peu de lecteurs sont experts dans tous ces domaines. Il faudra éviter les expressions techniques inutiles; là où l’utilisation de ces expressions sera nécéssaire, il faudra en donner une explication détaillée lors de la première utilisation. Les manuscrits devront être proprement dactylographiés, avec un double interligne et uniquement en recto. La rédaction pense que la langue est un outil de communication. Si la forme elle-même est l’objet que l’on veut communiquer, ce texte doit être soumis pour publication dans la partie littéraire de notre revue. Les “analyses” et les “commentaires longs”, ainsi que les articles originaux seront examinés par plusieurs membres (le plus souvent par 2 à 3 personnes) du Comité de rédaction ou de Conseil, parmi lesquels certains habitent en dehors de l’Europe. Le délai de transmission d’un pli postal peut ainsi aller de 3 à 7 semaines. Pour cette raison, les auteurs devront avoir en vue que le contenu des articles devra rester d’actualité même 6 mois après leur envoi à la Rédaction de la revue. 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Il est souhaitable qu’ils n’excèdent pas 7 pages de la revue. Les auteurs devront s’arranger pour que le titre de l’article en décrive correctement le contenu. L’article doit débuter par un court résumé (100 à 130 mots). Le titre et le résumé seront traduits en français et en anglais. Un ou deux paragraphes (introduction) devront aider le lecteur qui ne serait pas expert du sujet traité, à le comprendre. Le texte devrait se terminer par une conclusion courte. Dans le cas de conclusion à plusieurs éléments, il faudra la limiter aux plus importants. Les références à la littérature seront mentionnées à la fin de l’article par ordre de citation dans le texte. Les notes ne se référant pas à la littérature sont également permises. Il est recommandé aux auteurs de ne pas essayer de prouver (dans le cas idéal) plus d’un fait, et cela en utilisant des arguments déjà acceptés comme des données scientifiques démontrées. 4. Articles originaux. Ce seront des exposés argumentés sur des nouvelles vues des problèmes avec, éventuellement, des solutions originales. La structure et la longueur de l’article seront similaires aux “analyses et commentaires longs”. 5. Commentaires des lecteurs. Ce sont des commentaires plus longs (maximum 2 pages) ayant la structure d’un article, mais n’approfondissant pas trop le sujet traité. Un “résumé” n’est pas nécessaire, mais les citations de littérature seront clairement énoncées. 6. Lettres des lecteurs à la rédaction. 7. Actualités. Compte - rendus sans analyse profonde, à propos des événements culturels et scientifiques, ou des nouveaux livres parus aussi bien en Yougoslavie que dans le reste du monde, mais qui strictement parlant ne sont pas du domaine de la littérature (1 page maximum par compte - rendu). 8. Littérature et arts. Prose et poésie. Les créations littéraires originales non encore publiées (maximum 10 pages de la revue). Exceptionnellement il sera possible de faire paraître des contributions littéraires plus longues en plusieurs séquences ou des fragments d’un livre. Peinture et arts plastiques. Des reproductions (3 à 5 pages de la revue). International Sommaire Dans ce numéro/About this issue Editorial Kosovo: A Few Facts (Diana Johnstone) 3 5/8 11 Articles Notes on the Kosovo Problem and the International Community Diana Johnstone 13 Kosovo-Metohija: Origins of a Conflict and Possible Solutiona Dusan T. Batakovic 41 The Kosovo and Metohia Problem and Regional Security in the Balkans 57 Predrag Simic Der Kosovokonflikt: Bemerkungen und Fragen Georges Pomphrey 87 Les sanctions, à quoi servent-elles ? Dragas Keseljevic, Marko Krstic et Djordje Radovanovitch 95 Documents La loi de non-retour de 1945-1946 (Commentaire de 1989 et textes de 1945 et 1946) 101 Slobodan Milosevic: Speech on the Field of Kosovo (1989) 109 Kosovo-Albanians Memorandum (To the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group Meeting in London) 114 Inter -Serbian dialogue on Kosovo: A proposal 120 Opening Statement, Washington Hearing On Kosovo Repression and Violence Senator Alfonse D'Amato 131 sommaire N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 1 International sommaire (cont.) Arts Les illustrations dans ce numéro: Bojana Maksimovic 134 La vision poetique de Dante d'apres M. Pejovic Thomas Todorovic 137 Esquisse pour ma vie sans mensonge Milivoje Pejovic 145 Pisma Dijaloga Lettres de Dialogue / Dialogue Letters (DANS L'EDITION "ABONNEMENT") Sadržaj Privatizacija u Srbiji i "medjunarodna zajednica" Slobodan Vukovi} 149 Domorodka opsena Nikola Milenkovi} 163 Mar{ po led! Bo‘idar Violi} 176 Uputstva autorim 178 SVEDO^ANSTVA O PRO[LOSTI (Dimitrije \or|evi}, Portreti iz novije srpske istorije) Du{an T. Batakovi} 182 Readers should note that articles appear in Dialogue with minimal editorial intervention, whether in style or content. While authors are requested to follow certain basic stylistic guidelines, Dialogue lacks the means to enforce stylistic conformity. Precedence goes to content over form and to the interest of an argument over its formal presentation. *** La rédaction signale que les articles qui paraissent dans Dialogue n’ont subi qu’un minimum d’intervention éditoriale, qu’il s’agit de forme ou de fond. Dialogue n’a pas les moyens d’imposer l’uniformité de présentation pourtant demandée aux auteurs. Priorité est donnée à l’intérêt d’un argument plutôt qu’à la forme de sa présentation. 2 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International DANS CE NUMERO... Ce numéro de DIALOGUE est consacré au problème du Kosovo. Deux remarques s’imposent. L’objectif fondamental de DIALOGUE est de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des problèmes pour favoriser l’éventuelle nécessaire réconciliation entre tous ceux qui sont destinés à partager l’espace de ce qui était la Yougoslavie pendant la plupart du vingtième siècle. Ce but exige d’écarter tout parti pris national, religieux ou ethnique. Toute solution raisonnable doit se baser sur l’appréciation des faits et des points de vue divergents. Depuis que l’attention du monde s’est tournée vers la région du Kosovo début mars 1998, les médias et les responsables politiques de ce qu’on appelle “la communauté internationale” ont épousé jusqu’à la caricature une interprétation des événements favorable aux thèses des sécessionistes albanais les plus extrèmes. Ainsi ont-ils effectivement poursuivi le démantèlement de cet idéal d’une société multi-culturelle qu’ils prétendent vouloir défendre, tout en bloquant le dialogue qu’ils réclament par moments. Retrouver un équilibre perdu exige de pencher ne fût-ce qu’un instant dans l’autre sens. Ce numéro de DIALOGUE donne donc priorité aux aspects et aux analyses du problème du Kosovo qui actuellement se trouvent pratiquement exclus de la discussion publique. Une deuxième remarque s’impose à nos lecteurs français, auxquels nous présentons nos excuses pour le fait que des textes en langue anglaise dominent ce numéro. Ce regrettable déséquilibre linguistique s’explique à la fois par l’urgence de publier et par notre manque de moyens. Il reflète aussi le fait que, de plus DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 3 International en plus, c’est dans la langue anglo-américaine qu’est décidé le sort des peuples des Balkans, qu’on le veuille ou non. ___________________________________________________________ ABOUT THIS ISSUE... This issue is devoted to the problem of Kosovo. DIALOGUE is fundamentally committed to a serious examination of problems free of all national, religious or ethnic prejudice, in the conviction that greater understanding is the necessary basis for peace and reconciliation among all those who live side by side in what was called Yugoslavia for most of this century. Reasonable solutions must be based on recognition of the facts and of different viewpoints. Since world attention was drawn to Kosovo in early March 1998, media and political leaders of what is called “the international community” have uncritically adopted a one-sided interpretation of events favorable to the most extreme ethnic Albanian secessionist claims. In this way they have in effect further discredited the viability of their proclaimed ideal of “multi-cultural society” and blocked the very dialogue they claim at times to demand. The attempt to restore a lost balance requires leaning at least momentarily in the other direction. This issue of DIALOGUE therefore gives priority to aspects and analyses of the Kosovo problem which are almost wholly excluded from current public discussion. No genuine dialogue, no lasting peace is possible without first recognizing the very complex nature of the problem. Facts must be established as the basis for value judgments. Our only ambition is to contribute to this effort. 4 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International DIALOGUE Volume 7, N° 25 Paris Printemps 1998 EDITORIAL Negotiations of all sorts often founder on differences between the parties in their perception of what is fair. In this respect, mediation by a third disinterested party can be quite helpful. However, at present, instead of a mediator, who would try to help the parties reach agreement but has little or no power, the Kosovo problem seems to involve an interested arbitrator with considerable power to impose a solution. International mediation and even military intervention is being demanded and this demand is highly controversial. First, in principle, interested parties should not mediate (i.e. act as mediators), according to the UN Charter. Many political analysts qualify the USA as interested in the matter of the Balkans. The military presence of NATO forces, installations and networks in the region of Southeastern Europe is clear proof of the intense interestedness of the USA and should disqualify it as unsuitable to act as mediator in conflicts in that region. Second, the situation in Kosovo is fundamentally different from that in Bosnia. Bosnia was the scene of armed conflict from the moment it declared its independence as a State, and this could have partially justified the presence of armed observers. Kosovo is formally recognized by the international community as a part of Serbia, and the problem is essentially political rather than military. There is no legal basis for NATO involvement. A request for mediation by truly disinterested — and preferably distant — UN Member States,, if agreed by both sides, would be most appropriate. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 5 International Recently, however, disorders have been occurring involving attacks on the police by armed groups of ethnic Albanians belonging to a “liberation army” which has quite probably been set up by some foreign power or powers in order to be used to justify further foreign intervention in the Yugoslav lands. The risk that minor armed conflicts could inflame the whole region may be cited to justify NATO deployment and to disqualify non-military observers or UN forces. The European Union does not appear able to oppose US arbitration (in spite of the fact that the USA is an interested party whose interests may even diverge from those of EU Member States in the region), which makes final success of US involvement in the region via NATO virtually inevitable. The fact that the events in Kosovo and Metohia result from application of a policy of extremely generous minority rights in communist Yugoslavia has serious implications for consideration of human rights issues. These events will probably force the question to be raised as to whether minority groups should benefit from any special rights at all (minority rights). The question would probably have to be seriously reexamined and weighed against other less rapid but much safer measures such as furthering justice, ensuring nondiscrimination and protecting individual rights. Moreover, it will become clear that, if it is maintained that in principle a State should be based essentially on ethnicity, this will lead to permanent conflicts. With the facilitation of transport and communications, the mixing between neighbouring populations is going to increase and crises concerning frontiers and interstate clashes may become more frequent, instability more general and peace much more rare. The concept of ethnic States will continue to be used to justify political claims of dubious moral value, such as: nonacceptance of majority rule even if that rule is equitable and just, the right to break up an association without adequately satisfying partners who suffer loss from the breakup, the demand for the benefits of an association while refusing to accept the burdens, and so on. Of course, ethnic problems which are present in many European countries 6 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International seriously affect the issue and make the matter more complicated. Will force be used in Europe this time? Or will economic blockades and sanctions be used instead? In either case (as the example of Iraq illustrates), political regimes which are the ostensible target may be perpetuated, while whole populations are in fact held responsible and forced to pay. Jet, instead of blindly insisting on ethnic discrimination, promoting democratic values, multi-cultural tolerance, and social justice would be not only more wise but also, simply, more human. Surprisingly, it has become common to accept without much concern a quite foolish assumption that there exist places (even in Europe itself!) where human rights are violated so much that the armed overthrow of such regimes is increasingly demanded as a form of “humanitarian intervention”. Military intervention with important “collateral damage” would be, it is maintained, justified without asking those who are deprived of those “human rights” whether they would prefer to die themselves during that intervention, as part of the inevitable "collateral damage", so as to permit future generations to enjoy, presumably, greater “human rights”. Human rights? Dragan Pavlovic DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 7 International EDITORIAL Toutes sortes de négociations achoppent sur les divergences entre les parties à propos de ce que ces dernières croient juste. A cet égard, la médiation d’un tiers désintéressé peut être d’un grand secours. Aujourd’hui cependant, plus que d’un médiateur qui tenterait d’aider les parties à s’accorder mais qui ne disposerait que de peu ou pas de pouvoir, le problème du Kosovo semble relever d’un arbitre intéressé, doté du pouvoir considérable d’imposer une solution. La médiation internationale est réclamée et cette revendication est une source de difficultés. 1 - Selon la Charte des Nations Unies, des parties intéressées ne peuvent intervenir en médiateurs. De nombreux analystes politiques considèrent les USA comme intéresse en matière de Balkans. La présence militaire des forces, des installations et des réseaux de l’OTAN dans l’Europe du sud-est est une preuve évidente de l’intérêt de l’Amérique pour cette région, et devrait la disqualifier en tant que médiatrice des conflits qui s’y déroulent. 2 - La situation dans le Kosovo est fondamentalement différente de celle en Bosnie. La Bosnie a été la scène d’un conflit armé dès l’instant où elle a déclaré son indépendance et tant qu’Etat, et ceci pouvait justifier en partie la présence d’observateurs armés. Le Kosovo est officiellement reconnu par la communauté internationale comme faisant partie de la Serbie, et le problème est par essence plus politique que militaire. Il n’existe aucune base légale à un engagement de l’OTAN. La demande d’une médiation par des Etats membres de l’ONU désintéressé - et de préférence éloignés - serait tout à fait appropriée. Récemment, cependant, des désordres se sont produits comprenant des attaques de la police par des Albanais armés appartenant à une “armée de libération” très probablement mise sur pied par une ou plusieurs puissances étrangères, de façon à justifier une nouvelle intervention extérieure sur les 8 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International territoires yougoslaves. Le risque que des conflits localisés puissent enflammer toute la région peut être invoqué pour justifier un déploiement de l’OTAN et disqualifier les observateurs civils ou les forces de l’ONU. L’Union européenne ne semble pas capable de s’opposer à l’arbitrage américain (en dépit du fait que les USA sont une partie intéressée dont les intérêts peuvent même être différents de ceux des Etats membres de l’UE dans la région), ce qui rend le succès final de l’engagement américain via l’OTAN pratiquement inévitable. Le fait que les événements en Kosovo-Metohie résultent de l’application, dans la Yougoslavie communiste, d’une politique de droits minoritaires extrêmement généreuse, entraîne de sérieuses conséquences en ce qui concerne la question des droits de l’homme. Ces événements nous obligeront probablement à nous demander si les groupes minoritaires doivent se voir attribuer des droits spéciaux quelconques (droits minoritaires). La question devra sans doute être sérieusement réexaminée à la lumière d’autres mesures moins rapides mais plus sûres, telle que le renforcement de la justice, l’assurance de la non-discrimination et la protection des droits de l’individu. De plus, il va devenir de plus en plus évident, si le principe de fonder les Etats sur une base ethnique est maintenu, que ce dernier sera la source de conflits permanents. Avec l’accès plus facile aux transports et aux communications, le mélange de populations voisines va se développer, multipliant les crises de frontières et les affrontements d’Etats, accroissant l’instabilité et raréfiant les possibilités de paix. Le concept d’Etats ethniques continuera à servir de justification à des revendications politiques de douteuse valeur morale, telles que le refus de l’autorité majoritaire, même si cette autorité est équitable et juste, le droit de rompre une association sans contrepartie satisfaisante pour les associés lésés par rupture, l’exigence des avantages d’une association sans acceptation des charges, et ainsi de suite. Sans compter les problèmes ethniques de bien d’autres pays européens, qui influent sur la situation et la rendent encore plus complexe. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 9 International Va-t-on cette fois-ci avoir recours a la force en Europe? Ou va-t-on se rabattre sur les blocus économiques et les sanctions ? Dans tous les cas (comme le montre l’exemple de l’Irak) les régimes politiques qui sont les prétendues cibles sont pérennisés, alors que des populations entières sont en fait rendues responsables et forcées à en payer le prix. De façon surprenante, il est devenu monnaie courante d’accepter à la légère l’idée folle qu’il existe des endroits (même en Europe !) où les droits de l’homme sont violés au point qu’on réclame de plus en plus souvent le renversement des régimes comme une forme “d’intervention humanitaire”. L’intervention militaire, accompagnée d’importants “dommages accessoires” serait, dit-on, justifiée sans qu’on prenne la peine de demander à ceux qui son privés de ces “droits de l’homme” s’ils ont envie de mourir pendant l’intervention, victimes de l’inévitable “dommage accessoire”, pour permettre aux générations futures de jouir de “droits de l’homme” supposés plus étendus... Droits de l’hommes ? Dragan Pavlovic 10 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International F. R. Yugoslavia Belgrade KOSOVO: A Few Facts Kosovo & Metohia KOSOVO AND METOHIA. The area of the present-day Autonomous Province of Kosovo consists of two separate geographic entities. The first is Kosovo, a valley between Pristina and Drenica, 84 km long and about 14 km wide, densely populated, with significant agricultural and mineral resources and a network of important regional transport connections. The other is the territory known as Metohia (in medieval times metoh was the term for the holdings of the monasteries), which the Albanians include in a broader area called Dukagyin. It is about 80 km in length and over 40 km in width, and, compared with Kosovo, is primarily agricultural. The area of the Autonomous Province is 10,887 sq. km., which is 12.3 percent of the area of Serbia and 10.6 percent of the total area of DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 FR Yugoslavia. Its population is 1,954,747 or 20.5 percent of the total population of Serbia, that is 19 percent of that of FR Yugoslavia. According to the last reliable census in 1981, ethnic Albanians (an important frontier minority - a frequent phenomenon in Europe) made up 77.4 percent of the population, while Montenegrins and Serbs accounted for 14.9 percent. Kosovo and Metohia were at the heart of the medieval Serbian Kingdom which, after the 1389 battle at Kosovo Polje (the “Field of Blackbirds “), was conquered in the mid fifteenth century by the Ottoman Empire. Five hundred years of Ottoman rule, based on sharp social, economic and legal distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims, created deep cleavages between the ethnic and religious communities 11 International inhabiting the same territories. Upon final liberation from Ottoman rule in the First Balkan War of 1912, the Kosovo region became part of Serbia, whereas Metohia became part of Montenegro. As such, both areas became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the first Yugoslavia) at the end of the first World War. During the Axis occupation during World War II, when Yugoslavia was dismembered, most of Kosovo and Metohia was attached to Albania, then an Italian fascist protectorate. In 1944 Kosovo and Metohia were returned to Serbia and constituted for the first time as a separate administrative district. Subsequent constitutional (1968, 1971, 1974) and demographic changes under communist rule (due to the extremely high natality rate but also due to important immigration from neighbouring “ultra communist” Albania) tended to strengthen ethnic Albanian irredentist tendencies. The extremely high degree of autonomy granted Kosovo within the Republic of Serbia by the 1974 Constitution encouraged ethnic Albanian nationalist leaders to consider the territory as essentially an ethnic entity, one which could be detached from Yugoslavia. These aspirations culminated in the secessionist 12 demonstrations of 1981, which led to violent clashes with the police. In the late sixties and throughout the decades that followed, the ethnic Serb inhabitants of Kosovo increasingly complained to Belgrade that they were being pushed out of the province. Long concealed by Titoist rule, the situation of the Serbian minority in Kosovo became a key political issue only when the postcommunist power struggle started in the late 1980s, when Slobodan Milosevic ostensibly came to their defence. This emotional issue facilitated the parliamentary revocation in 1989 of the extremely high degree of provincial autonomy accorded by the 1974 Constitution - a measure also considered necessary for postcommunist liberalization reforms. Ethnic Albanian leaders rejected this change and began a boycott of official Serbian institutions, along with the establishment of their own parallel institutions. Followed by a majority of the ethnic Albanian population, this boycott widened the gap between the ethnic communities in Kosovo. D. J. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Notes on the Kosovo Problem and the International Community Diana Johnstone ________________________________________________ RESUMÉ. L’enjeu essentiel du conflit au Kosovo c’est le statut politique du territoire et son maintien dans un État (la Serbie) pluriculturel. Les nationalistes albanais mène la lutte pour détacher ce territoire au nom de leur majorité démographique, rejetant ainsi la coexistence pluri-culturelle. La réaction quasi-unanime de ce qu’on appelle “la communauté internationale” au drame du Kosovo est révélateur de l’évolution du monde de l’après-guerre froide. Les exigences contradictoires de cette “communauté” groupée autour de la puissance des États-Unis (soutien formel au principe de l’intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, tout en incitant par leur parti pris affiché les nationalistes albanais à poursuivre leur lutte) attisent les conflits ethniques, dont l’inextricabilité servira finalement à justifier, au nom de la défense des droits de l’homme, l’intervention politique, économique et éventuellement militaire (de l’OTAN). Les mensonges circulés pendant des années selon lesquels les intellectuels de l’Academie serbe auraient prôné la “purification ethnique” dans le “Memorandum” de 1986 (dont les passages souvent incriminés sans être lus sont ici cités dans le texte) ainsi que l’ignorance volontaire des projets de compromis (ici mentionnés) ont préparé l’opinion pour l’interprêtation d’une action de police - certes brutale mais largement provoquée - comme le début de la “purification ethnique”, voire du “génocide”. Ainsi suit l’appel aux sanctions qui en appauvrissant encore davantage la Serbie rendra la marge de compromis et de réconciliation encore plus étroite. Enfin, l’intervention au nom des droits de l’homme risque de n’être qu’un prétexte pour gérer un chaos que la communauté internationale aurait largement contribué à créer. Dans le conflit autour du statut politique du territoire du Kosovo, le côté albanais jouit de l’avantage décisif d’une stratégie qui depuis des années fait appel à cette intervention, tandis que le côté serbe s’y oppose. Ce droit de l’intervention, mis en pratique dans les Balkans, pourra par la suite être appliqué à d’autres régions d’intérêt stratégique ou économique, DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 13 International dès qu’une minorité ethnique préfère l’appartenance à “la communauté internationale” à celle de l’État où elle se trouve. ______________________________________________________ I - Outside Intervention At news of violence in Kosovo, the main question immediately raised in the European Union (EU) and the United States by editorialists, commentators and politicians has been, "what can, what should we do about it?" Outside intervention in the Balkans is a very old story. However, its recent revival in terms of a universal moral imperative owes much to two recent developments: - Television coverage focusing especially on violent manifestations of problems, creating the impression, or illusion, that "everybody knows what is happening". - The existence of a single world superpower, the United States, with its extensions in NATO, "the West", the "international community", and the organizations it dominates (usually including the United Nations, not to mention the OSCE, the World Bank, the IMF, etc.). Such concentration of power creates the impression that "the international community" is potentially able, through use of primarily American military power, to achieve by force whatever it decides to do. The corollary of this assumption is that people, or at least governments, which fail to interfere are "guilty" of complicity in the "crimes" being committed. This mixture of image and power has radically devalorized the role of discreet diplomatic mediation, which is by nature neither visible nor forceful, and is easily portrayed as craven and lacking in moral resolve. The issue for the international community is presented in terms of wielding "carrots" and especially "sticks", rather than in terms of understanding and reconciling the fears, interests and possibilities of the populations directly involved. A third development, which follows naturally, is the deliberate political exploitation of the first two — the media 14 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International coverage and the potential of the U.S. and its subsidiary allies to intervene militarily. It is now possible, notably, for a secessionist or irredentist movement to hope to achieve its aims primarily, if not solely, by mobilizing these two forces. This is a lesson of the Yugoslav situation. Regarding Kosovo, the basic political issue is the status of the province of Kosovo-Metohija as a part of Serbia (in turn a part of rump Yugoslavia) or as an independent State free to become part of a Greater Albania. The two sides in this political conflict have opposing strategies which are totally and intimately linked to the issue of international intervention. * The entire strategy of the ethnic Albanian side in the past decade has been based on mobilizing international support, first political and eventually military, on behalf of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. This is an elaborated, longterm strategy with clear aims and clear methods of achieving them. It is vigorously supported by the Albanian diaspora, notably in Germany, the United States and Turkey. The ethnic Albanian demand for secession is not at all, as commonly portrayed, a reaction to repression by Slobodan Milosevic. It was there first. It draws on a century-old nationalist movement which from its inception has turned to outside powers for decisive support in the realization of its objectives. This aspiration, like all the other centrifugal forces let loose in former Yugoslavia, received major encouragement from the international community’s recognition in the winter of 199192 of the right of Slovenia and Croatia to unnegotiated secession as independent, essentially ethnically defined, States (1). In 1988 and 1989, Yugoslavia and Serbia made constitutional changes revoking the extremely extensive autonomy accorded the Autonomous Province of Kosovo by the 1974 Constitution. The international community has uncritically condemned these changes, accepting their characterization as an instrument of Serbian oppression. Three factors have been commonly ignored: however unwelcome to the ethnic Albanian leaders, these changes were widely supported in DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 15 International Serbia as necessary to enable the realization of the economic liberalization reforms; they were enacted legally; and they left intact the political rights of ethnic Albanians as well as a considerable degree of regional autonomy. One can only speculate to what extent, without the prospect of decisive outside intervention on their behalf, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo might have tried to make use of the existing legal framework. They could, for instance, have voted to fill 42 of the 250 seats in the Serbian parliament with their representatives. Instead, boycotting participation in the institutions and political life of the Serbian State has led the ethnic Albanian population into a sort of internal secession, denounced to foreign sympathizers by those who have instituted it as "apartheid". Meanwhile, the successful boycott of the Serbian schools has produced a generation of ethnic Albanians whose educated members speak English better than Serbian and are thus much better prepared to win international support than to communicate with Serbian neighbors. * The Serbian government, in contrast, has had no visible strategy other than to keep the international community at bay by insisting that the Kosovo problem is an "internal affair". This is too static a policy to deserve to be called a strategy, in fact. Milosevic has used the ethnic Albanian boycott of Serbian elections to bolster his party’s parliamentary majority with the Kosovo seats, but this is no more than a short-range political advantage. The fact that in all the other conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia, the international community has taken the anti-Serb side, and that even after Dayton the "outer wall of sanctions" was maintained only against Serbia, ostensibly as pressure to "solve the Kosovo problem", is enough to convince Serbs that however little they have to hope for from Milosevic, they have nothing to hope for from the "international community" either. * The nature of these conflicting strategies leads to a structural bias in favor of the ethnic Albanians on the part of the international community, that is, of its influential compo16 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International nents: the United States government first of all, which is virtually invited by ethnic Albanian leaders to come in and take over; NATO, whose new mission can be practiced and enhanced; and all the numerous governmental and nongovernmental organizations which find in the troubles of former Yugoslavia a perfect laboratory and justification for the extension of their own operations. What is actually being done by the international community in regard to Kosovo resembles very much what was done in the first stages of the wars of Slovenian and Croatian secession. At first, the United States took the position that it opposed the breakup of the existing nation of Yugoslavia, but rapidly added the proviso that it would oppose any use of force by that nation’s armed forces to prevent the breakup. These contradictory signals both gave the green light to Belgrade to reject secession and encouraged the secessionists to go ahead with their plans, while the resulting confusion, and hesitancy, within the Yugoslav Armed Forces, hastened desertion by both officers and soldiers and the formation of irregular armed militia along ethnic lines. The same pattern is being repeated in regard to Kosovo. The U.S.-led international community is officially opposed to independence for Kosovo, but is also opposed to use of force by Belgrade to disarm the increasingly violent secessionists. While ostensibly accepting Belgrade’s sovereignty, this ambiguous position has encouraged secessionists to provoke armed encounters which are promptly and vehemently blamed on the Serbs. Serbia has for years been subjected to extremely severe sanctions — economic and even cultural — continued to this day by an "outer wall" (unilaterally imposed by the U.S. with European consent) that keeps it out of international organizations. Serbia is an international pariah, its people largely invisible except for the glimpses selected by unsympathetic international news media. Since compromises are most easily made from positions of strength, the continued pressure and threats weakening Serbia are scarcely conducive to largesse. The occasion statements by U.S. officials reproving DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 17 International "violence" on the part of Albanian Kosovo separatists are toothless and in no way balance the demands on Belgrade to solve the Kosovo problem "or else". It takes two parties to reach a compromise. When pressure is put only on one side to compromise, there is absolutely no incitement to the other party to do so. At present, the Albanians can be reasonably sure that if the situation is allowed to deteriorate, the inevitable Serbian repression will only strengthen their position visà-vis the international community. At present, the ethnic Albanian nationalist leaders are demanding international intervention sight unseen, convinced as they are — and with good reason — that they have won the international community to their side. Serbs reject it for essentially the same reason. Certainly nothing could be more welcome than a truly fair and unbiased international mediation. An even better solution would be the emergence in Serbia of leaders from both the Serbian and ethnic Albanian communities with the ability to reach out to each other in the manner of a Nelson Mandela. Unfortunately, there is as yet no sign of the triumph of such wisdom (2). If anything, the bullying pressure being applied on one side only, combined with a deliberate impoverishment of the country which leaves no margin for generosity, works against such a dynamic. II - Who Belongs in Kosovo? The presumed fact that 90% of the population of Kosovo is ethnic Albanian (3) is increasingly cited as an implicit justification of their separatist demands by people in Europe and America who would never draw such a conclusion regarding the presence of large ethnic concentrations in other countries, starting with their own. The fact that Kosovo was the cradle of the medieval Serbian kingdom is noted without sympathy as a quaint archaism by Western commentators who seem more im18 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International pressed by the claim of ethnic Albanians to be the successors of the ancient Illyrians, the first inhabitants of the Western, and who recently have even been adopting ethnic Albanian place names and terminology (4). Albanian nationalists cherish identification with the unknown Illyrians because they feel it gives them a stronger right to be there than the Slavs who settled there as farmers in the 6th century. Serbian historians regard the Albanian claim of descent from the Illyrians as plausible but irrelevant, inasmuch as both Serbs and Albanians have inhabited the area for many centuries (5). Historians readily acknowledge that Albanian feudal lords, who at the time were Christians enjoying equal rights within the Serbian medieval state, fought alongside Serbian knights at the battle of Kosovo in 1389. The conflict between Serbs and Albanians developed three centuries later, following the mass exodus from Southern Serbia in 1690 of Christians (including Albanians), who were resettled by the Habsburg monarchy in its border lands, the Krajina, as a result of wars between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The mountaineers who resettled the plains of Kosovo in the 18th century were actively converted to Islam by the Turks, who regarded their Christian subjects, not without reason, as potential subversives in alliance with the Catholic Habsburgs (6). From that time on, various outside powers have found it in their interest to accentuate differences and conflicts between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians. The ethnic Albanians who had converted to Islam by the 19th century gained privileges (to bear arms, serve in the administration and collect taxes) denied the Christian population. Such privileges stood in the way of development of an Albanian nationalism parallel to the 19th century Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian national liberation movements. When Albanian feudal lords did revolt, it was rather to try to retain these privileges than to achieve an independent State of equal citizens. This historic difference has had ideological consequences. Because they were deprived of equal rights under Ottoman rule, the Serb leaders adopted an egalitarian politiDIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 19 International cal philosophy borrowed from France as appropriate to their national liberation struggle in the 19th century. This meant advocacy of a state of equal citizens enjoying equal rights. The practice certainly did not always live up to the principles. But there is a significant and practical difference between a nation that proclaims principles of equal citizenship and one that does not. The tradition is there to be encouraged — which is not accomplished by dogmatically denying its existence. The coexistence of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo raises the question of the terms of a multi-ethnic state. The Republic of Serbia defines itself, in Article 1 of its Constitution, as "a democratic State of all the citizens who live in it", without reference to ethnic identity, in contrast to Croatia or Macedonia. Serbia is in fact the most multi-ethnic State in the Balkans; one third of its citizens are non-Serbs, with rights equal to all others. Serbs from other countries cannot automatically claim Serbian citizenship, in contrast to Croats living in Bosnia, for example, who vote in Croatian elections. Formally at least, the ethnic Albanian residents of Kosovo have more citizenship rights in Serbia than the many ethnic Serb refugees who have flooded into Serbia from Croatia and Bosnia since the collapse of Yugoslavia. But they refuse to exercise them. Rights that are spurned wither away. The fact that Serbia is suffering from international sanctions is an incentive to leave it. Montenegro, a country historically "more Serb than Serbia", has elected (admittedly with votes of ethnic Albanians) a new President who is taking his distance from Belgrade, to the applause of the "international community" which dangles the prospect of lucrative investments before a government which might deprive Serbia of its last access to the Mediterranean. The desire to escape from the hardships visited on Serbia is even strengthening separatist impulses among the Serbian ethnic majority in Voivodina. In short, the policy of punishing Belgrade is leading to the further disintegration of the last truly multiethnic country in the Balkans — all in the name of "multiethnicism". This centrifugal movement can only produce endless 20 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International conflict and flight from the troubled region. III - What is the Danger of "Ethnic Cleansing"? Given recent precedents, international armed intervention is most likely to be drawn into Kosovo by public perception that Serbs are engaging in "ethnic cleansing" and must be stopped and punished. Such a perception has been being anticipated and prepared for years. The preface to a 1993 book (7) predicted that: "One can expect that ... the Belgrade regime, frustrated but not thoroughly defeated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be tempted to open up another theatre of war, most obviously in Kosovo, which would become one more victim of military aggression and ‘ethnic cleansing’." Five years later, Madeleine Albright was saying substantially the same thing. At the 9 March London meeting of the "Contact Group", Ms Albright compared Serbian police actions in Kosovo to "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia and declared: "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serb authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia". The logic of such predictions is neither political nor strategic, but psychological, of a Manichean type: the wicked "greater Serb" will take out "frustration" suffered in Bosnia by inflicting "ethnic cleansing" on Kosovo. This is the type of reasoning that flows naturally from ethnic stereotypes, in which one ethnic group is demonized, that is, is portrayed as enjoying evil action for its own sake. Given the widespread adoption of that stereotype concerning the Serbs, there was always a great probability that the inevitable clashes in Kosovo would be interpreted by international media as yet another instance of Serbian "ethnic cleansing" of non-Serbs. Still, it was surprising to see how quickly a police action — brutal but limited — targeting armed rebels was characterized as "ethnic cleansing" and even "genocide" by editorialists and politicians. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 21 International Ethnic cleansing and the "Memorandum" of the Serbian Academy The various ethnic separatisms that have won their pieces of former Yugoslavia have found it useful to blame the wars of secession in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on a supposed deliberate project to create a "Greater Serbia". Under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, this "aggression" is said to have followed a program for ethnic cleansing set out in a 1986 Memorandum written by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade. The notion that the "Memorandum" was a sort of "Mein Kampf" of "Greater Serbia" has received such acceptance that it even shows up in a French text-book for advanced high school students: "Ethnic cleansing: theory elaborated [mise au point] by members of the Belgrade Academy of Sciences and advocating ethnic homogenization of the territories of former Yugoslavia inhabited by Serbs, by using terror to drive out the other populations to allow definitive annexation of these territories by Serbia." — Pierre Milza & Serge Berstein, Histoire terminale, Hatier, 1993, p.330. It is therefore relevant to look at the passages in that infamous but largely unread "Memorandum" which deal with Kosovo and which include its only references to "ethnic cleansing". They also are the passages which go farthest in what could be considered "Serbian national pathos", the earlier part of the document consisting of a more prosaic analysis of Yugoslavia’s economic problems. In its most controversial section, the draft document (the Memorandum was published in draft form by its political enemies in 1986, the better to denounce it) took up recent complaints by the dwindling Serbian minority in Kosovo that they were being driven out of the province by acts of hostility from the ethnic Albanian majority, which at the time enjoyed political control. The "Memorandum" denounced what it 22 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International called "the physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija". It described the Albanian nationalist demonstrations which began in 1981, a year after Tito’s death, as the declaration of "a very special but total war" against the Serbian people. "The Albanian nationalists, the political leaders of Kosovo, with well-defined tactics and a clear objective, have begun to destroy inter-ethnic relations founded on equal rights, for which Serbs had fought hardest in Kosovo and Metohija. The autonomous region, at the favorable moment, obtained the rank of autonomous province, then the status of ‘constituent part of the Federation’ and benefits from greater prerogatives that the rest of the Republic to which it formally belongs. The next step of the ‘escalation’, the Albanization of Kosovo and Metohija, has been prepared in perfect legality. In the same way, the unification of the literary language, of the name of the nation, of the flag and of the schoolbooks with those of Albania following Tirana’s instructions, was done in a way quite as open as the border between the two countries. Plots which ordinarily are carried out in secret were fomented in Kosovo not only openly but ostentatiously." The "Memorandum" predicted that unless a fundamental change was made meanwhile, in ten years there would be no more Serbs in Kosovo, but rather "an ethnically pure Kosovo". If, it warned, "genuine security and equality under the law for all peoples living in Kosovo and Metohija are not established, if objective and lasting conditions are not created favoring the return of the people driven out, that part of the Republic of Serbia will become a European problem with very grave consequences. Kosovo represents a key point in the Balkans. Ethnic diversity in many territories of the Balkans corresponds to the ethnic composition of the Balkan peninsula and the demand for an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo is not only a heavy and direct threat to all the peoples who are in a minority there but, if achieved, it will set off a wave of expansion threatening all the peoples of Yugoslavia..." However excessive this description of the situation may DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 23 International have been, it clearly was not the elaboration of a "theory" advocating ethnic cleansing of other peoples by Serbs, but rather the expression of a fear that Serbs would be "ethnically cleansed" from Kosovo by the Albanian majority there. The political conclusions that could be and in fact were drawn from the arguments put forth in the "Memorandum" were quite simply the constitutional changes enacted two years later to revoke the extreme autonomy granted in 1974 (8). Whether they are described as "terrorists", "freedom fighters" or, more neutrally, guerrillas, it is undeniable that armed bands exist in Kosovo, have carried out armed attacks and have declared their intention to carry out more. There is no government in the world that could stand back and allow such groups to operate unhindered. Sympathizers with the ethnic Albanian movement commonly present it as an exemplary non-violent resistance to oppression, in the tradition of Gandhi, and explain the recent turn to violence by impatience resulting from the failure of the international community to reward the peaceful leadership of Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosova (LDK). This is of course an idealized over-simplification of a more complex and ambiguous situation. It is indeed true that Mr. Rugova has opted for non-violence, as a part of his strategy of winning international support. However, it is not true that the turn to violence is only a recent development. First of all, in a region prone to violence, the Albanians have traditionally been even more associated with recourse to arms than any of their neighbors, excepting perhaps the Montenegrins. Nonviolence is thus perhaps too recent an innovation to be totally credible, especially since the contemporary movement itself, before producing Rugova’s LDK, had already begun in a more militant mould. The guerrillas of the "Kosova Liberation Army", the UCK (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves), are a continuation of a decades-long underground movement. "The roots of the underground groups reach far back to the sixties and seventies", according to an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung by Stephan Lipsius (9). "The oldest of the organizations currently active both in Kosovo 24 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International and abroad is the ‘Kosova People’s Movement’ (LPK). It was founded in German on 17 February 1982 as the ‘People’s Movement for a Kosova Republic’ (LPRK). This was not a new founding, but rather a merger of the following four previously independent underground organizations: the ‘National Liberation Movement of Kosova and of the Other Albanian Regions of Yugoslavia’ (LNCKVSHJ), the ‘Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosova’ (OMLK), the ‘Communist Marxist-Leninist Party of the Albanians in Yugoslavia’ (PKMLSHJ) as well as the ‘Red Popular Front’ (FKB)." "The political goals of the LPK include unification of all Albanians in former Yugoslavia, that is in Kosovo, Macedonian, Montenegro and South Serbia, in a common State. Contrary to the non-conspiratorially active Kosovar parties headed by the LDK, the LPK does not basically reject violence as a means of political conflict. The LPK calls for political and financial support to the UCK, but so far does not take part in armed ambushes or bomb attacks." UCK communiques and announcements are published in the LPK paper Zeri i Kosoves, leading to speculation that the LPK is the political arm of the UCK, according to Lipsius. Next to the LPK and the UCK is a third underground organization in Kosovo. Least is known about this one. It is the ‘National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova’ (LKCK). It was founded on 25 May 1993 in Pristina. Some founding members of the LKCK had left the LPK out of political differences or personal animosities with the LPK party leadership. Officially the reason for the split was the growing programmatic rapprochement between the LPK and the LDK. Contrary to the strictly non-violent policy of the LDK, the LKCK demanded militant action against the Serbian rulers. In addition the LCKC is for a State unifying all Albanian-inhabited regions of former Yugoslavia with Albania, that is for construction of a Greater Albania. The LKCK does not support the existence of the self-designated ‘Kosova Republic’. The LKCK has a political and a military arm, the socalled ‘LKCK Guerrilla’. Contrary to the UCK, the LCKC DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 25 International Guerrilla has not yet undertaken military actions or attacks. The reason is that for the LKCK, the time for application of the entire Kosovar military potential has not yet come. The second general assembly of the LCKC proposed a Four-Phase Model for the ‘Liberation of the occupied areas’. The first phase is marked by political education work in the population and structural preparation. In the second phase begin armed individual actions, while the third phase will see the unification of the LCKC, the LPK and the UCK as the ‘National Front for the Liberation of Kosova’. The joint military actions undertaken in the third phase should lead in the fourth phase to popular uprising and total mobilization of all forces. According to information from LCKC circles, we are now in the second phase. And meanwhile, thanks in part to the collapse of order in Albania last year, the Kosovar rebels are better armed than ever. There are unconfirmed rumors that the guerrillas of the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (UCK) in the Drenica region are threatening aircraft with stinger missiles, and that this is why the police undertook to try to recapture control of the region in the first days of March. If the UCK do not yet have "stinger" missiles, put into general circulation by the US via Afghan Muslim guerrillas in the 1980s, they soon will have. It is wellknown that the Albanian irredentist movement is financed not only by taxing its own people but also by drug-smuggling through the Balkans, notoriously in the hands of ethnic Albanian clans (10). Buying light arms is no problem. While Rugova traveled freely between his Pristina headquarters and Western capitals winning support for his nonviolent struggle, the violent phase of the struggle got underway. In 1996, there were 31 political assassinations in Kosovo. The targets were Serb officials but also ethnic Albanians condemned as "collaborators" — the better to destroy the last bridges between the two communities. The pace quickened in 1997, with 55 assassinations. While Rugova was claiming that the UCK was a figment of Serb propaganda, guerrillas raided eleven police stations in coordinated attacks in September 1997 before making a first public appearance, armed, 26 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International uniformed and masked, before a crowd of 20,000 at a funeral on 28 November 1997. In January 1998, a UCK statement issued in Pristina announced that the battle for unification of Kosovo with Albania had begun. The number of killings escalated, with 66 killed before the massive Serbian police operation against guerrilla bases in the Drenica region in early March 1998. No government on earth could be expected to remain passive in the face of armed bands that have claimed 152 lives in a little over two years — least of all the government in Washington. It would be hard to find a precedent for the United States’ threat to impose heavy sanctions and freeze the foreign assets of the legitimate government of a country faced with such an armed insurgency unless it withdraws its police forces and leaves the rebels unmolested. What is "ethnic cleansing"? While everybody is against it, few seem interested in understanding its real meaning and causes as the basis for combatting it. The prevalent attitude, in the depoliticized public consciousness of the 1990s, is to see it as a sort of pure evil, an expression of racist or ethnic hatred which surges from "the darkness of the human soul" (rhetoric of a speech by U.S. Vice President Albert Gore) for no reason. The only remedy envisaged is punishment. In the Balkans, "ethnic cleansing" is rarely a proclaimed policy. A notable exception is the Croatian Ustasha movement’s deliberate policy of eliminating Serbs and other minorities from the lands of Croatian "historic rights" which it controlled during World War II. Croatian extremists in the Ustasha tradition have taken up both the theory and the practice in Tudjman’s Croatia. The Tudjman regime has not openly adopted the theory but has tolerated the practice, with the result that Croatia has in fact been "ethnically cleansed" of the vast majority of its Serbian population in the most thorough and successful operation of the kind in the former Yugoslavia. The international community has not punished Croatia. On the contrary, the Zagreb government has been substantially rewarded by membership in international organizations and foreign investment, both denied Serbia. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 27 International In general, ethnic cleansing, that is, the expulsion of members of a different ethnic group from a disputed area, arises from fear that their presence will serve to justify rival claims for political control of that territory. Nothing is better designed to stimulate such fears than the prospect that from now on, an ethnic group claiming a local majority represents a threat of secession from the country in which it finds itself. Once the international community gave its assent to the unnegotiated disintegration of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia into ethnically-defined States, the struggle was on for control of territory along ethnic lines. In this struggle, Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians have all accused their territorial rivals of "genocide". These accusations reflect both genuine fears and political calculation, and outsiders should be prudent in echoing such inflammatory terms. In the West, emphasis on "genocide" by analogy with totally different historic situations has obscured the primary political cause of "ethnic cleansing": fear that the presence of members of a politically organized ethnic group will be used to support territorial claims. The presence on the small territory of Kosovo of two armed camps indeed threatens to lead to a bloody and terrible conflict. In the propaganda skirmishes leading up to such a conflict, the Serbs have once again lost the labelling battle. Their label for their armed adversaries, "terrorist", has been reluctantly endorsed by US proconsul Robert Gelbard, before being dropped as soon as Serbian authorities acted accordingly. On the other hand, the ethnic Albanian label for Serbian actions, "ethnic cleansing", has been taken up at the highest level of the international community, as well as by a chorus of commentators and petition signers. The notion that early denunciation of ethnic cleansing will help to prevent massacres is probably dead wrong. On the contrary, such highly-charged overstatement contributes to emotional polarization, to mutual fear and suspicion, to suppositions about NATO intervention, and above all to the sort of desperation on both sides that can lead people to commit desperate and terrible acts. 28 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Leaders of both the Serbian state and the ethnic Albanian nationalists have proclaimed their willingness to accept cohabitation between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians. The wiser course is to accept this declaration of principle on its face value and to consider any acts contrary to this principle as deviations from mutually accepted principles. IV - Are the Serbs Willing to Compromise? Dobrica Cosic, Serbia’s leading novelist, often characterized as the spiritual father of the national revival, proposed partition of Kosovo-Metohija as a way of solving the conflict between Serbs and Albanians (11). As President of Yugoslavia in 1992 and 1993, Cosic raised the possibility on various occasions, such as when speaking to the foreign affairs committee of the European Parliament in Brussels on March 30, 1993, without arousing any interest. Cosic described (12) Kosovo as "a European question of the first rank. Nevertheless, up to now, neither the European Community nor the CSCE have found the right way of helping to resolve the Albanian-Yugoslav and the AlbanianSerb problem." He attributed this to "the fact that the problem of Serbo-Albanian relations has been misrepresented and reduced to a problem of human rights." This meant that "the central factor" was being "studiously overlooked: the aspiration of Yugoslav Albanians to unite with Albania and create a ‘Greater Albania’." The secessionist ambition of the Albanian nationalist movement is the very essence of their human rights demands. From that ambition flows a behavior of obstruction in every sphere of social live: politics, culture, public education, the economy, media. For the problem is not that the Albanians are deprived of cultural, political or other rights; the problem is that they have these rights but refuse to exercise them. They boycott en bloc the society in which they live; they do not recognize it. The issue is not about opening the schools: they are open. The DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 29 International issue is that they insist that the curriculum in those schools be borrowed from the Albanian State and that they issue diplomas in the name of the ‘Republic of Kosovo’. "I consider as a great misfortune the fact that the Albanians have excluded themselves from political life and that they do not take advantage of their autonomy. They have all the civil and political rights needed for constituting themselves as an autonomous community. That is officially guaranteed. "The whole world, all the human rights champions are saying that the Albanians have been banned from the schools. That is a pure lie! They are the ones who refuse to attend the schools governed by the program of the Serbian state, which nevertheless guarantees them courses in Albanian history and culture and the use of their language. They insist on schools paid and maintained by the Republic of Serbia but where the curriculum and schoolbooks come from Albania and the diplomas would bear the heading, ‘Republic of Kosovo’!" "The human rights argument is no longer anything but an ideological weapon used by the secessionists and their foreign protectors in view of realizing their national ambition: the union of all Albanians in a single State. And so long as they will not have achieved that end, the question of human rights in Kosovo-Metohija will continue to be heated up and Serbia will remain indicted by the international community. It will not do us a bit of good to point out that the Albanians benefit from national and human rights such as no other national minority enjoys. [...]Kosovo will be Serbia’s malignant tumor which will exhaust her economically, block her development and threaten her territorially by demographic expansion." The military dangers were clear five years ago. Cosic was aware of "precise information on the existence of 60 to 70,000 Albanians organized in paramilitary units in Kosovo. This is an army ready to go to war the day when Mr. Rugova, Mr. Berisha or some other Albanian is through with the soothing rhetoric that they serve up to the CSCE." Yugoslavia was even then being isolated and crushed by sanctions, and 30 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International even threatened with military intervention if they "commit aggression" in Kosovo — that is, on their own territory. If the Serbian army should move to oppose secession, Cosic wondered: "will they send missiles to raze our cities and airports?" In such a dilemma, Cosic concluded it was necessary to satisfy the national aspirations of both the Serbian and Albanian peoples by a "peaceful and fair territorial division". This offer having found no takers on the Albanian side, there is no present sign of its being actively pursued by the Serbs either. In itself, it may well be a fair proposal. However, it encounters two types of objections. * The Western "international community", starting with the United States, has vetoed it for reasons of analogy and precedent. Partitioning Kosovo would go contrary to the policy adopted to justify recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, considering ex-Yugoslavia’s internal boundaries as inviolable. This policy is the very basis for branding Serbia as the "aggressor" in Croatia and in Bosnia and therefore cannot be easily abandoned. Moreover, if Kosovo were partitioned, why not Macedonia, where Albanians are concentrated in the Western areas and would also demand to join "Greater Albania"? * The danger of setting such a precedent also worries Serbs. Suppose ethnic Albanians, thanks to their much higher birthrate, attained a majority in some other part of Serbia. Would they demand secession there too? The "Greater Albania" project includes more than Kosovo. Where if ever would it all end? Privately, a number of Serbs would welcome some sort of negotiation which would "save the monasteries" and cut losses. But how? Various compromise proposals have been put forth by independent Serbian intellectuals. One such proposal is published in this issue of DIALOGUE. In another, Professor Predrag Simic of the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade has suggested that the Autonomy Statute of Trentino-South Tyrol in Northern Italy, long a scene of irredentist unrest among the German-speaking, forDIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 31 International merly Austrian inhabitants, could serve as a European model for resolving the Kosovo crisis. This and other independent proposals could be considered "trial balloons" which could be taken up at the official level should they ever meet with the slightest sign of interest on the Albanian side. So far, however, this has not been the case. Encouraged by their image as victims of Serbian oppression, enjoying strong support from Western governments and human rights organizations, Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian nationalists have no incentive to settle for anything less than their ultimate goal: Greater Albania. V - Human Rights The attitude of the international community toward the Yugoslav disaster has been characterized throughout by confusion between national rights and human rights. It is unclear to what extent this confusion is accidental or deliberate in Western countries, where the concept of "national rights" is variously appreciated according to political tradition (with significant differences between the United States and Germany, for instance). The readiness in the United States, in particular, to consider denial of separatist ethnic rights as violation of human rights represents a mutation that may not be unrelated to the confusion in the American left, in particular, resulting from the critique of universal values and the rise of "identity politics". Regarding the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, what sort of civil society is being built in the context of the long militant nationalist struggle? Some positive effects may be assumed. Literacy has certainly been vigorously encouraged by a movement which, since its inception in the late 19th century, has been led by literature professors looking for a country to go with a language only recently transposed from the oral tradition. The rise in general literacy must also be beneficial to the status of women. On the other hand, this is a society closed in 32 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International on itself, obsessed with its own identity. Its human rights organizations are concerned with the human rights of ethnic Albanians. All questions of democratization and political direction are put off in expectation of the "independence" that is supposed to solve them all. The political modernization and democratization of the Albanian people in the Balkans remains a legitimate and unfulfilled aspiration. Had they used their political rights under the Serbian Constitution, they could have elected an important number of representatives to the Serbian Parliament, and altered the political balance of power in Belgrade. Instead, they have missed out on contributing to the beginnings of multi-party democracy in Serbia and seriously crippled its development. Massive ethnic Albanian abstention has ensured Milosevic’s party of a majority it might otherwise have lost. It is highly doubtful that holding parallel elections for ethnic Albanians only, resulting in unanimous election of an unchallenged leader, Ibrahim Rugova, and of election of a "parliament" which has never functioned, provides a better initiation into democratic political practice than could have been gained by using the official elections to further the interests of the Albanian people of Kosovo within the Serbian Republic (13). The situation of ongoing ethnic hostility is bad for all sides. Each is likely to care less and less about what happens to the "others". In early March, the Serbian raid on the rebel base at Prekaz had not ended before the Clinton administration announced measures to "punish" Belgrade for its "violence" and began to pressure other governments to join in imposing new economic and diplomatic penalties on Yugoslavia. Given the absence of similar reaction to, for instance, Turkey’s use of "disproportionate force" in its raids against Kurdish rebels, such reprimands can carry little moral weight with Serbs. How many innocents perished in Panama in the United States extraterritorial raid to arrest a foreign head of state in his own country? How many women and children died in Waco, Texas, in a police raid on a group which was armed, but which DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 33 International had not — in contrast to the ethnic Albanian guerrillas in Prekaz — claimed dozens of assassinations? The double standard employed is so blatant, that the uniquely severe reaction of the international community cannot appear to most Serbs as an expression of genuine deep concern for human rights, but rather as part of a longstanding political campaign to isolate and fragment their country. Nevertheless, regardless of any and all hypocrisy and ulterior motives on the part of outside accusers, it is more than likely that acts of police brutality occurred in the course of that and related raids on guerrilla bases, if only because acts of brutality are all too usual in such circumstances. Unfortunately the chorus of indignation and calls for punishment led by Madeleine Albright can only make it harder for Yugoslavs who are concerned about high standards of respect for human rights to demand an accounting from their government. Nevertheless, some have done so. Following its own investigations in the Drenica region in early March, the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) reported that its findings "contradict Serbian police reports on the number of dead and the locations and circumstances in which they were killed" and urged the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs to give reporters and representatives of humanitarian and human rights organizations access to the area and thereby enable the public to be provided with full, accurate and timely information. "The indications that the persons killed, wounded or arrested were connected with the attacks on police must be presented to the public", the HLC stated in a communiqué, pointing out that it is "in Serbia’s best interest to immediately institute an inquiry" into the circumstances of the death of Kosovo Albanians in police actions, including exhumation of the remains for forensic examination. It would be in keeping with traditional practices for human rights advocacy groups in other countries to support such demands from local Serbian organizations, as a means of strengthening democratic civil society and the rule of law. This is in fact the sort of work done by Amnesty 34 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International International, whose own reports from Kosovo in early March 1998 were reasonably precise, factual and balanced, relating charges made by both sides and noting which had not been substantiated or confirmed. The reactions to events in Yugoslavia display a major difference of approach to human rights questions, of considerable political significance. What can be considered the traditional Amnesty International approach consists broadly in trying to encourage governments to enact and abide by humanitarian legal standards. It does so by calling attention to particular cases of injustice, excessive severity or violation of legal norms. It thereby participates, through outside moral support, in various internal struggles for the advancement of humanitarian legal standards, in alliance with whatever local forces are engaged in such combat. The approach of Human Rights Watch and above all of its affiliate, the Vienna-based International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, is quite different. Aaron Rhodes, executive director of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, displays none of the scrupulous concern for facts which is the hallmark of Amnesty International. He deals in sweeping generalities. In a column for the International Herald Tribune (14), he wrote that Albanians in Kosovo "have lived for years under conditions similar to those suffered by Jews in Nazi-controlled parts of Europe just before World War II. They have been ghettoized. They are not free, but politically disenfranchised and deprived of basic civil liberties". The comparison could hardly be more incendiary, but the specific facts to back it up are absent. At least in the case of Yugoslavia, the Helsinki and Human Rights Watch approach differs fundamentally from that of Amnesty International in that it clearly aims not at calling attention to specific abuses that might be corrected, not at reforming but at discrediting the targeted State. By the excessive nature of its accusations, it does not ally with reformist forces in the targeted country so much as it undermines them. Its lack of balance, its rejection of any effort at DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 35 International remaining neutral between conflicting parties, contributes to a disintegrative polarization rather than to reconciliation and mutual understanding. It therefore contributes, deliberately or inadvertently, to a deepening cycle of repression and chaos that eventually may justify, or require, outside intervention. This is an approach which, like its partner, economic globalization, breaks down the defenses and authority of weaker States. Rather than helping to enforce democratic institutions at the national level, it carries the notion of democracy to the largely abstract level of the "international community", whose sporadic and partial interest in the region is dictated by Great Power interests, lobbies, media attention and the institutional ambitions of "non-governmental organizations" — often linked to powerful governments — whose competition with each other for donations provides motivation for exaggeration of the abuses they specialize in denouncing. The readiness of distant observers to accept the most extreme allegations serves to discredit and ultimately disempower all State authority in former Yugoslavia. This "international community" may indeed be serious when it warns Ibrahim Rugova and his followers that it does not want an independent Kosovo, much less a "Greater Albania". The logic of its actions is to reduce the entire region to an ungovernable chaos, from which can emerge no independent States, but rather a new type of joint colonial rule by the international community. ________________________________________________ (1) "Ethnically defined" because, despite the argument accepted by the international community that it was the Republics that could invoke the right to secede, all the political argument surrounding recognition of independent Slovenia and Croatia dwelt on the right of Slovenes and Croats as such to selfdetermination. Claiming that it was impossible to stay in Yugoslavia because the Serbs were so oppressive was the popular pretext for the nationalist leaders in power in the Republics to set up their own statelets. Recognition of the administrative borders was a de facto support for the non-Serbian nationalisms — in the name of anti-nationalism. No other single act has been more decisive in determining the subsequent fate of the region. Countless books, articles and 36 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International declarations blaming the wars in Yugoslavia solely or primarily on one nationalism, Serbian nationalism, and on one man, Slobodan Milosevic, have deflected attention from the responsibilities of all the other internal and external actors, not to mention crucial economic and constitutional factors. An outstanding exception to this chorus is the careful account of these factors by Susan Woodward in Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Brookings, Washington, 1995. (2) The separatist positions of Adem Demaqi are proof that it takes more than years in prison to make a "Mandela". (3) The fact is "presumed" because ethnic Albanians boycotted the most recent census in 1991. (4) The generally well-documented 1998 Spring Report of the influential International Crisis Group (ICG) comments on its decision to refer throughout to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo as "Kosovars" as follows: "Serbs living in Kosovo are also sometimes called Kosovars. In this report, however, ‘Kosovar’ always means ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Serbs use for ethnic Albanians, either ‘Albanci’ or the derogatory term ‘Siptar’..." First, by giving the ethnic Albanians, and not the Serbs, a name attached to the region, the implication is established that the ethnic Albanians really belong in Kosovo, whereas the Serbs are outsiders. The same was done earlier by adopting the terms "Bosniak" and even "Bosnian" exclusively for Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Kosovo the appropriation of the place name is even more questionable, in view of the circumstance that a large but undetermined number of Albanian "Kosovars" have immigrated into Kosovo quite recently, whether during the wartime fascist occupation or afterwards, when the ethnic Albanian Party leaders tolerated illegal immigration from Albania itself. There is no mention in the long ICG Report of this clandestine immigration from Albania into Kosovo. The statement that "Serbs use... the derogatory term Siptar" is equally biased. The Albanian word for Albanian is precisely Shqiptar, written in Serbian as Siptar. That is how the Albanians have alway called themselves; it means "eagle men" and is scarcely derogatory. No mention is made of derogatory terms used by the Albanians to designate the Serbs... At the very start of the ICG report, mention is made of the importance of Kosovo for Serbs and for "Kosovars". Speaking of the importance for Serbs, the paragraph begins: "According to Serb mythology, Kosovo is the cradle of their nation..." Speaking of the importance for Kosovars (i.e., Albanians), it begins: "As descendants of the ancient Illyrians..." Thus the thoroughly documented history of the Serbian kingdom is described as "mythology" while the Albanian supposition is accepted as fact. With a board of directors including George Soros and prestigious political figures including Shimon Peres and the crown prince of Jordan, financed by both governments and private sources, the ICG is the perfect "think tank" for the "International community" at its highest levels. (5) Radovan Samardzic et al, Le Kosovo-Metohija dans l’Histoire Serbe, published by L’Age d’Homme in Lausanne in 1990; and Dimitrije Bogdanovic, Knjiga o DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 37 International Kosovu, Serbian Academy of Sciences and the Arts, Belgrade, 1985. Serbian historians point out that the two ethnic populations co-habited the region in the Middle Ages, but were differentiated in their economic activities. Place names, legal texts and tax documents indicate that in the thirteen century, the Serbs were tillers of the soil, centered in the plains, whereas Albanians (and Vlachs) were herdsmen who moved through the mountains according to grazing seasons. Another interesting instance of ethnic specialization is the immigration of Germans from Saxony to work the important gold and silver mines at Novo Brdo near Pristina during the height of the Serbian Kingdom. Such occupational distinctions have of course been lost in modern times. See Samardzic, 1990, p.30. See also Georges Castellan, Histoire des Balkans, Fayard, 1991, p.66. (6) Castellan, pp 211-214. (7) Branka Magas, in the introduction to The Destruction of Yugoslavia, London, Verso, 1993. (8) Susan Woodward points out that the same Serbian liberal leaders who attempted to denounce the intellectuals’ nationalism by leaking the incomplete "Memorandum" wanted to reduce Kosovo’s autonomy for purely economic reasons but saw no way to do it. The ex-banker Slobodan Milosevic found the political excuse to do so by defending the Kosovo Serbs: the political trick that built his power base. Ibid, p. 78. (9) "Bewaffneter Widerstand formiert sich", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 March 1998. It may be noted that the FAZ is the last newspaper in the world that could be accused of being pro-Serb. (10) "Minorités albanaises et géopolitique de l’héroïne", La Dépêche Internationale des Drogues, Paris, No 57, Juillet 1996. (11) "While he was president of Yugoslavia in 1992 and 1993, Dobrica Cosic made discreet contact with Kosovo Albanian leaders. He wanted to discuss the territorial division of the province, with the Albanian part, except for a number of Serbian enclaves, leaving Serbia. This was rejected by Albanian leaders." Tim Judah, The Serbs, Yale University Press, 1997, p.307. (12) Cosic’s analysis of the Kosovo situation, as expressed before and during his term as President of Yugoslavia (cut short in mid-1993 by Milosevic, who perhaps concluded that his domestic prestige was not exportable and thus of no use), is to be found in a 1994 collection of his writings published by L’Age d’Homme under the title L’Effondrement de la Yougoslavie. (13) Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) are described as follows by Tim Judah in The Serbs, Yale University Press, 1997: "The party is led by Ibrahim Rugova whose father was executed by the communists when they restored the region to Yugoslav control. His trademark is a scarf worn at all times. The LDK brooks little dissent and those that challenge it are howled down in LDK publications and can even be ostracised in the tight-knit Albanian community. Kosovo is odd because, despite constant police repression, Albanian politicians have held semi-underground polls, have declared Kosovo ‘independent’, have set up a parallel education system, and have hailed Rugova as president of the Republic of Kosova. Woe betide any Albanian family or shop or businessman who will not pay his dues to Kosova’s tax collectors. In his capacity as president, Rugova sweeps out of his headquarters, a ramshackle wooden building, hops into a 38 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International limousine surrounded by aides and bodyguards and drives about Pristina just like a real Balkan president. A government-in-exile complete with ministers commutes between Tirana, Germany and Skopje. Rugova travels abroad to lobby for international recognition for his phantom state, but despite the odd hassle over his passport he has not been arrested since challenging Serbian power in such a blatant fashion." (14) International Herald Tribune, 18 March 1998. Two months earlier, Mr. Rhodes hastened to address a letter to the same newspaper vehemently attacking Jonathan Clarke, who had had the temerity to write a balanced columned entitled "Don’t Encourage Separatist Aims of Kosovo Albanians". Mr. Rhodes accused Mr. Clarke of echoing Belgrade propaganda and of seeming to "favor appeasement in the face of murder, torture and the total denial of the human rights of Kosovo Albanians". DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 39 International 40 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Kosovo and Metohia: Origins of a Conflict and Possible Solutions Dusan T. Batakovic Historian, Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade The inter-ethnic tensions and political crisis in the southern province of Serbia - the autonomous province of Kosovo & Metohija - have a long and turbulent historical background. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century it was part of the Serbian medieval kingdom, the Serbian empire and the Serbian Despotate. From mid-fifteenth to early twentieth century, these regions were parts of the Ottoman Empire. From 1912, until today - with the exception of the Second World War occupation - Kosovo and Metohija were integral parts of the Kingdom of Serbia, later on the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and still today in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as in all the above mentioned states, was and is an integral part of Serbia. Neither Kosovo nor Metohija was a distinctive territorial unit until 1945. In Ottoman times as well as in the twentieth century, these regions were part of larger administrative units. The present internal border and political status of the province of Kosovo and Metohia were arbitrarily established by the communist dictator Josip Broz Tito in 1945.(1) The Communist Solution Within the communist Yugoslavia, the centuries-old SerboAlbanian conflict was only one aspect of the complex concept for resolving the national question which was carried out in DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 41 International phases and in the name of “brotherhood and unity” by J. B. Tito. The communist dictator of Yugoslavia was a Croat, brought up in the Habsburg environment of constant fear of “the Greater Serbian threat” as well as the ideological pattern of Lenin’s teaching that the nationalism of big nations is more dangerous than the nationalism of smaller ones. For these reasons, Tito was consistent in stifling any hint of “Serbian hegemony” which, according to the communists, was personified in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The first two decades of bureaucratic centralism (1945-1966) were a necessary phase for the communist authorities to consolidate power. During that period Tito relied on Serbian cadres with whom he emerged victorious from the civil war. The decentralization (from 1966 to 1974), based on the plans of his two closest associates - Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene, and Vladimir Bakaric, a Croat - which aimed at strengthening the competencies of the federal units, notably by the Constitution of 1974, finally led to the renewal of inter-ethnic tensions. With the introduction of national-communism, a model shaped by Edvard Kardelj, the power of federal jurisdiction came to reside in the ruling oligarchies of the republics. Thus the Party nomenklatura became sovereign each in its own republic, where each came to represent the majority nationality. As the only republic with provinces, Serbia was the exception, since, under the Constitution, the provinces could use their veto power against inner Serbia. National-communism, through the 1974 Constitution, introduced majority rule for the leading nation in each of six republic and two provinces of the federation, with the result that there continued to be - to a greater or lesser extent - discrimination against nations or national minorities residing in each republic or province. Josip Broz - Tito skillfully manipulated the growing nationalism in order to prevent an ideological thaw of the hard-line dictatorship and to preserve his undisputed authority. In the last phase of his rule, marked by the Constitution of 1974, he became, like Brezhnev in the USSR, the obstacle to any semi-liberal evolution of the system. As Tito’s only 42 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International legacy there remained the common ideologically oriented army, and the bulky party-bureaucratic apparatus, now divided along republican and provincial borders - borders which, although officially administrative, increasingly resembled the borders of self-sufficient, covertly rival national sates, linked together on the inside by the authority of the charismatic leader, and from the outside by the danger of a potential Soviet invasion. In such a context, Kosovo and Metohia had an important role: at first it was an autonomous region (1946), then an autonomous province within Serbia (1963) and finally an autonomous province (1974) only formally linked with Serbia, with competencies that were hardly different from those of the republics (the only thing it lacked was the Leninist principle concerning the right to self-determination). Kosovo and Metohia owes the change of its status within the federation not to the freely expressed will of the people of Serbia (of which it had been an integral part since 1912), but exclusively to the concepts designed by a narrow circle of communist leaders around Tito to resolve the national question within the whole federation. During the period of centralism when Albania was part of the Soviet bloc, openly hostile towards Yugoslavia (19451961), Tito relied on the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia who represented the guarantee of the preservation of Yugoslavia’s integrity in that region. After the reconciliation with Moscow (1955) and the gradual normalization of relations with Albania (1971), Tito favored the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in a way which, after the 1968 and 1971 Constitutional amendments, they understood not only as a possibility for national emancipation but also as a long-awaited opportunity to take historic revenge against the Serbs who had deprived Albanian feudal leaders of privileges enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to the modern democratic state of equal citizens, the ideological and national model for Kosovo and Metohia’s ethnic Albanians was the Stalinist-type ethnonationalism of Enver Hoxha, imbued with century-old intolerance towards the Serbs. The erasing of the name of Metohija, DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 43 International as an exclusively Serbian-Orthodox term, from the name of the autonomous province in 1968 symbolically indicated the direction to be taken by the ethnic Albanian communist nomenklatura in Kosovo in their national policy. A series of successive administrative, judicial, police and physical pressures against the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs resulted in their quiet but steady and forced migration to inner Serbia, a process which many knew about, but which very few dared publicly mention. Over the years, due to this silent ethnic cleansing tolerated or even encouraged by the federal communist leadership, the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohia was reduced by almost a half, from 23.6 percent in 1948 to 13.2 percent in 1981, the relatively high birth rate during Tito’s rule notwithstanding. The Montenegrin population in Kosovo and Metohia fell from 3.9 percent in 1948 to 1.7 percent in 1981.(2) As the process of moving out proceeded, the land of the expelled Serbs was given to emigrants from Albania. From the end of the Second World War until Tito’s death in 1980, the number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia tripled, resulting in a 164 percent population increase in the period of 1948 to 1981. Among them there were also a large number of immigrants, a number that has still not been definitely determined. The gradual settlement of Albanian refugees from Albania in Kosovo and Metohia, during the first years after the Second World War, aimed to ease the expected annexation of Albania to the Yugoslav federation. The second wave of settlement of refugees was organized from the late 1960s to late 1980s by the local nomenklatura of ethnic Albanians in order to improve Albanian ethnic domination of regions with a strong Serbian population. The uncontrolled growth of the ethnic Albanian population gave additional social stimuli to numerous young people, increasingly and openly educated on the basis of national mythology and brought up to hate Yugoslavia. The economic frustration of the young and predominantly agrarian population of ethnic Albanians was thereby largely diverted into the huge propaganda campaign of national dissatisfaction. Thus, the official 44 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International theory of Enver Hoxha that the Albanians were the direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians was used as a “proof” of the ethnic Albanians’ historical right to Kosovo and Metohija. The Serbs, who arrived there many centuries after the Illyrians (only in the 6th century), were stigmatized in popular opinion as the unlawful intruders into genuine “Albanian lands”.(3) The Kosovo Riot and the Serbia Reaction The unanimous demands by the Albanian minority to create a republic of Kosovo (with the right to self-determination, including secession), set out in 1981, only a year after Tito’s death, disrupted the sensitive balance of forces in the federal leadership of communist Yugoslavia. The attempt to hush up the Albanian question in Kosovo and Metohia by means of a party purge and with outside efforts (actions by the federal military and police forces) and to minimize the problem of the discrimination against the Serbs and their forced displacement, resulted in growing frustration among Serbs all over Yugoslavia in the years that followed. (4) Serbs gradually, but in an increasingly large numbers, started realizing that the Titoist communist order, contrary to the interwar period, was based on the national inequality of Serbs in Yugoslavia. The attempts by Serbian communists to resolve the question of Serbia’s competencies over the provinces in agreement with the other republican leaderships, for the purpose of protecting the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia more efficiently, were rejected by all the other republics with unhidden antagonism. All attempts from 1977 to 1987 to put an end to the discrimination against the non-Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohia failed. The intransigence of the national-communist nomenklatura in the federal leadership created dangerous tensions that were hard to control: the Kosovo Serbs started broadly self-organizing. (5) The Serbs’ growing national frustration was skillfully exploited, after a party coup in 1987, by Slobodan Milosevic, DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 45 International the new leader of the Serbian communists: instead of forums he used populist methods, taking over from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the non-communist intelligentsia the role of the protector of national interests. Thus, the protection of the endangered rights of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia became a mean of political manipulation. Milosevic’s intention to renew the weary communist party on the basis of newly discovered national ideals came at a moment when an irreversible process of communism’s demise by means of nationalism was launched in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. Milosevic’s communist approach to the national question began to compromise overall Serbian interests in Yugoslavia. At that moment, for most of the Serbs, preoccupied by the question of Kosovo, the interests of the nation were more important than the democratic changes taking place in the East, especially since Milosevic had created the semblance of a freedom of the media where former political and ideological taboos were now freely discussed. Democracy in Serbia was belated only because of the unresolved national question. The ethnic Albanians were already organized as a homogenous political movement. They held to their radical stands demanding neither political freedom nor human rights, but exclusively collective rights: “the Republic of Kosovo” within the Yugoslav federation. Ethnic Albanians responded to reassertion of Serbian authority with a relentless series of strikes and demonstrations: they were aware that the abolition of the autonomy based on the 1974 Constitution of communist Yugoslavia, meant, in fact, the abolition of certain elements of statehood, and put restrictions on uncontrolled Albanian political domination. But by organizing mass demonstrations, they only strengthened Milosevic’s positions. The polarization within the republican leaderships in regard to the Kosovo and Metohia issue became public. The support of the communist leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia to the ethnic Albanian demands definitely cemented Milosevic’s charisma. The final results of open rivalry between Serbia and other republics were the following: a majority vote by the National Assembly of Serbia to limit 46 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Kosovo and Metohia’s autonomy, huge unrest among the ethnic Albanians, and severe police repression in Kosovo and Metohia. On March 26, 1989, the semi-republican status of the two Serbian provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, was reduced to the more usual competencies of autonomous regions. The 1989 amendments to the 1974 Constitution annulled the provinces’ right to two separate legislatures, abolished the veto power held by the provincial legislature over the legislature of Serbia, placed the power over international relations in the hands of the republic, and limited the right to debate a measure to a period of six months, after which the matter was to be settled by a referendum. The referendum, boycotted by the ethnic Albanians was held on July 1, 1990. Kosovo remained as an autonomous province, but with territorial autonomy and a Statute which would be enacted with the Serbian parliament. The legislative authority was transferred to the parliament of Serbia and the executive authority to the Government of Serbia. The highest judicial authority resided in the Supreme Court of Serbia. The name Metohija (left out by the Albanian communist nomenklatura in 1968) reappeared in the official name of the autonomous province. The ethnic Albanians (through the members of the dismissed provincial communist Assembly) responded on July 2, 1990 by proclaiming Kosovo as republic within Yugoslavia and adopted their own Constitution on September 7, 1990 at an assembly held secretly in Kacanik. These acts, followed by the widespread Albanian boycott of all official institutions, were regarded by Serbian authorities as an attempt at secession. The result was firing of those who left their jobs, thereby challenging the state unity of Serbia. The second measure was harsh police retaliation against armed or anarmed street protesters. Since then, the ethnic Albanians, determined to obtain independence from Serbia, have consistently refused to have any contact with official Belgrade or with the local government in Kosovo. They have constantly boycotted Serbian parliamentary elections and accused the regime of “colonial” and “apartheid” policies. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 47 International The secessionist movement of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, derived from the logic of the Titoist order and based on ethnic discrimination and intolerance, led to the homogenization of the Serbs in Yugoslavia, directly producing Milosevic. This, following the domino effect, resulted in the homogenization of the other Yugoslav nations. In a state with such mixed populations, due to the inability of the communist and post-communist leaderships to place democratic principles of organizing a multi-ethnic community above narrow national interests, this homogenization directly led to the tragic civil war. The Balance of Intolerance After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, the SerboAlbanian conflict lost its important Titoist dimension and once again became Serbia’s internal issue, despite the demands to establish the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo through internationalization of the Kosovo issue as part of the search for a global solution of the civil war and the ethnic conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. If the ethnic Albanians were to give up their refusal to live in Serbia and cast their votes against Milosevic’s candidates, the democratic opposition in Serbia could easily take over power, which would open the way to a long-term solution. On the other hand, as long as Milosevic is in power in Serbia, Ibrahim Rugova, the “president” of self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, can still hope for the internationalization of the Kosovo issue. The two essentially authoritarian regimes, the Serbian one and the shadow regime of Kosovo Albanians, are only nourishing the extremism on both sides. The geopolitical realities point to the fact that every attempt at achieving the Kosovo Albanians’ goals would cause a war of broader Balkan proportions with unforeseeable consequences, because this would mean changing the 48 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International stable inter-state borders established way back in 1912 and 1913. The right to self-determination, which the ethnic Albanians refer to when rejecting even the very thought of remaining within Serbia, is not envisaged anywhere in Europe for national minorities, no matter how large their percentage may be compared to the country’s overall population. Today, the ethnic Albanians account for approximately 18 percent of the overall population of Serbia. That is approximately the same as the percentage of the Serbs and other nonAlbanians in Kosovo. The Possible Solution: The Regionalization of Serbia Mistakes have been made on both sides. The ethnic Albanians attempted to resolve the Kosovo question without the participation of the Kosovo and Metohia Serbs and against interests of Serbia, and the Serbian regime tried to resolve the problem without consulting the ethnic Albanians. The only viable solution appears to be the opening of dialogue and mutual concessions. The first concession of the ethnic Albanians should be the recognition of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo and Metohia. It is absolutely a conditio sine qua non for further negotiations. The next step would be negotiated concessions concerning the form of Kosovo and Metohia’s autonomy. A return to the old type of political organization set forth by the 1974 Constitution would mean a return to the completely outdated concept of administrative decision-making by simple majority vote - as was the practice under Titoist rule - and would inevitably result in a renewed flare-up of ethnic tensions, but this time on a larger scale. What is urgently needed is the abolition of collective rights - the communist legacy - and their replacement with human and civil rights for all citizen regardless of nationality and religion. Unlike the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who are ethnically, DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 49 International linguistically, and culturally close to the Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and therefore threatened by silent assimilation, the ethnic Albanians are in no danger of losing their ethnic identity through assimilation since their culture, language and religion differ substantially from those of the Serbs. Serbia should therefore offer the broadest possible status of autonomy to Kosovo-Metohia and the Europeantype of minority rights to ethnic Albanians. Minority rights, such as the right to use one’s own language in the local government, the courts, schools and universities, as well as the freedom of religion and full cultural autonomy, would have to conform to international law in every respect. The gradual introduction of a genuine democratic government, through which the majority ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, and the ethnic Albanian minority within the whole of Serbia, would became part of the Serbian state system, with full participation in parliamentary elections as well as public institutions such as schools and universities, would help reduce existing ethnic tensions since all economic and political matters would be resolved in the parliament of Serbia by the freely elected representatives of all citizens of Serbia. There are others forms of territorial arrangements that would work better as they are envisaged by the Serbian democratic parties in opposition to Milosevic’s regime. These parties consider that instead of ethnic and ideological criteria, it is more important to use economic and geographic criteria, with a heavy emphasis on a new communication system. In the 1970s and 1980s Kosovo and Metohia was unable to meet more than 10 percent of its domestic needs with its own production; whatever else was needed came from the federal or Serbian government. The financial investments in Kosovo by federal agencies in this period exceeded the total amount of funds used for the development of inner Serbia. On the other hand, inner Serbia was obliged by the federal government to invest in Kosovo and Metohia, regardless of its own economic stagnation. This had disastrous consequences for inner Serbia, which was deprived of a stable economic development, and for Kosovo and Metohia itself where the 50 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International investments were placed in a completely wrong way. Instead of encouraging small business or agriculture, funding was invested in big hotels, stadiums, bureaucratic buildings or large industrial complexes. For all these reasons, reforms are urgently needed to restructure Kosovo and Metohia’s basic economic production and whatever infrastructure already exists in the province so as to raise its productive capacities to the level existing in Serbia. A regionalization of Serbia - as envisaged by the experts from the opposition parties, that is based on economic priorities would reduce the risk of a centralized, authoritarian regime fueling particularistic and secessionist aims. Any linking of minority question with the territorial claims is only a basis for further confrontations. A region such as Kosovo and Metohia with from 1.6 to 1.9 million inhabitants would be able to thrive by means of its own productive capacities without threatening the integrity of the state. This would be desirable in all respects. Denationalization of state property, and the return of property confiscated during and after the Second World War to its rightful owners, is a basic prerequisite not only for all political solutions, but also for a favorable economic development in the future. Furthermore, regionalization would relieve the provincial administration of some of the enormous costs through the creation of smaller territorial units that would function as effective economic units. Already culturally and linguistically united, the ethnic Albanians would have better chances for economic prosperity within the smaller regional units. A Regional Assembly for Kosovo and Metohia, as a territory with an ethnically mixed population suffering from rising inter-ethnic tensions, would consist of two chambers. Members of the lower chamber would be elected by direct vote, while each ethnic group would be equally represented in the upper chamber.(6) The Assembly would vote its own Statute by a two third majority of both chambers. The acts adopted by the local parliament would not have the force of law but of decrees, necessarily in accordance with the existing laws of Serbia. An ombudsDIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 51 International man (an ethnic Albanian or a Serb) would be necessary to monitor implementation of these decrees. Within this system - which would be set out only for Kosovo and Metohia not for the rest of Serbia - would be prevent the use of any ethnically-based majority vote, a technique so destructively applied under the communists, while it guaranteeing the protection of all ethnic groups, not only the Serbs and ethnic Albanians, but the Turks, Muslims and Gypsies also. According to this project, the province of Kosovo and Metohia would enjoy rights similar to those envisaged for autonomous communities under the present constitution of Spain, or for regions according to the present constitution of Italy. All those competencies are far broader then those envisaged by the present Constitution of Serbia. The possible changes in legislative competencies of the province can be made only when the present Constitution is changed or amended by the National Assembly of Serbia. This is the most European, entirely democratic and multicultural solution, even though it is for the time being completely rejected by the political leadership of ethnic Albanians. But in time it could be accepted by the Kosovo and Metohia Serbs as well as by the opposition parties in Serbia, who are strongly in favor of regionalization. The present low level of political culture in Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohia, makes this global project viable only after the establishment of full parliamentary democracy within Serbia and Montenegro. Practical proposals The practical proposals within this framework are the following: to improve the present condition of school system, the ethnic Albanians should be given the right to attend the schools (which they more or less voluntarily left in 1990) in the existing school buildings which are now used only by the Serbs and Muslims and other minorities, like Turks and 52 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Gypsies. If they do not accept the curricula in use for the whole of Serbia, they can organize their own curricula, which will not be financed by the Serbia. If it is possible to find a common ground for curricula which will be accepted by Serbia, then it can be partially financed by the state. For the moment, the most important issue is to have all the students attending regular schools. Once a common program of schooling is agreed upon, ethnic Albanian teachers and professors will be paid by the state, like all the others in Serbia. The question of curricula is very sensitive, because Serbia cannot agree to pay for schooling which is, in many aspects, hostile to the state itself. There will be no ideological limitations in the search for a mutually acceptable school curricula. Second, the health care problem should be solved by the return of Albanian cadres to the existing system of hospitals and acceptance of rules which are generally observed elsewhere in Serbia. Ethnic Albanian patients, although officially rejecting all political connection with Serbia, are unofficially accepting the sovereignty of Serbia by frequently coming for medical care to Belgrade and other cities in inner Serbia, instead of going to Pristina, Pec or Mitrovica. Since they are not paying any taxes to the state funds, this humantarian acceptance of ethnic Albanian patients produces severe costs for Serbia. There is no real possibility of creating separate health-care system that will give to ethnic Albanians some kind of satisfaction concerning the governing of the hospitals or other medical institutions. The services offered by the Serbian hospitals are not presently covered by the social security of ethnic Albanian patients but by the state of Serbia itself. Some immediate improvements can be made on the level of public infrastructure. While formally rejecting any official ties with the state, ethnic Albanians all used the favorable economic situation and spiralling inflation in Serbia during the last several years to pay off their apartments and became owners of state-owned property at very low prices (as happened elsewhere in Serbia). On other levels as well, useful and commonly accepted state laws could provide DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 53 International the basis for improving inter-ethnic relations. The decrees firing ethnic Albanians could easily be annulled for the practical reasons of needed jobs and specialists for many factories, mines and companies. With their gradual return to their jobs, the question of the management of those companies or factories can be solved by mutual concessions, or, as a better solution, prescribed by the state laws of privatization which will give to employees the right to buy company shares and thus participate in owning and running the companies. The most problematic issue, but only for the moment, concerns the judiciary and executive bodies. If there is a massive return of ethnic Albanians in all structures of the Kosovo and Metohia economy, the next step will be their participation in the executive bodies of the political system. If the model of two-chamber system for the future Assembly of regionalized Kosovo and Metohia is accepted by both sides, the ethnic Albanians will be proportionally represented in all levels of the political system, including the judiciary and executive body. The Present Situation and the International Mediation Serbia is not as militarily and politically powerful as it was in early 1990’s, but it is still strong enough to defend Serbian territory itself if necessary. The Albanian side is overestimating international support, and underestimating the readiness of the Serbs to defend Kosovo and Metohia after the wars lost in Croatia and, partly, in Bosnia, even in moments of important internal turmoil such as the power struggle in late 1996 and early 1997. Due to a constant internal power struggle, in order to remain in power, Milosevic’s regime, which in September 1996 signed an educational agreement with Ibrahim Rugova, is not in a position to make more concessions to Kosovo and Metohia ethnic Albanians than could any other, democratically elected government of Serbia. Even a fully 54 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International democratic government would need stability in Kosovo and Metohia to consolidate the international position of Serbia. The role of international mediators, from the USA to the EU, needs to be extremely balanced, avoiding any one-sided approach, which has not been the case during the last several years. The ethnic Albanians understood the international mediation only as an opportunity to impose upon the Serbs and Serbia their own projects, ranging from the status of a republic within Yugoslavia, with no political ties with Serbia, to independence under international guarantees. But this would mean an imposed, not a negotiated settlement, which would not be viable in the long term. The role of the international mediators should be to pressure ethnic Albanians to find a common ground with Serbian authorities for a negotiated solution acceptable by both sides. Any solution which would not be found within the present Serbia is completely unacceptable for the Serbian side, not only for the current Milosevic regime but also for the democratic parties in the opposition. Any change in political status of any part of the Serbia can be effected only with the approval of the National Assembly of Serbia. Therefore, all negotiations must accept the fact that FR Yugoslavia is an internationally recognized state, and that Serbia, as a part of that federation, will not under any circumstances abandon its sovereignty on any part of its own territory. This is also the general standpoint of the international community concerning the states that emerged from the former SFR Yugoslavia. Therefore, democracy as the general framework seems as the only way out of the present crisis in the province of Kosovo and Metohia. A step by step approach is, in this respect, more viable then any imposed solution. _________________________________________________ (1) R. Samardzic (ed.), Kosovo-Metochien in der serbischen Geschichte, Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme 1990. (2) R.Petrovic, M. Blagojevic, The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija. Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985-1986, Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 1992. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 55 International (3) Cf. D.T. Batakovic, The Kosovo Chronicles, Belgrade: Plato 1992, pp. 23-38. The Albanian view on Illyrian theory in : Albanians and Their Territories, Tirana: Academy of Science 1985. (4) “Declaration of the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church against the Genocide by the Albanians on the indigenous Serbian Population, together with the Sacrilege of their Cultural Monuments in their own Country”, South Slav Journal, vol 11, No 2-3 (40-41), London 1988, pp. 61-64; 87-89. (5) Kjell Magnusson, “The Serbian reaction: Kosovo and the Ethnic Mobilization Among the Serbs”, Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, vol 4:3 (1987), pp. 3-30. (6) Cf. M. Jovicic, Regionalna drzava, Beograd: Vajat 1996. 56 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International The Kosovo and Metohia Problem and Regional Security in the Balkans Predrag Simic (1) Institute of International Politics and Economics Belgrade, Yugoslavia. 1. Introduction Serbian-Albanian relations and, in particular, the problem of the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohia (2) where the national aspirations of the two nations are in conflict, are among the most complex contemporary ethnic, territorial and security problems in the Balkans and in Europe. For the Serbs, Kosovo and Metohia is part of their national territory, a region of great strategic and economic importance besides being the cradle of the medieval state of Serbia - a place with a concentration of Serbian historical, religious and cultural monuments and where the legendary battle against the Ottoman conquerors had been fought in 1389. In other words, it is an area that sublimes the collective identity of the Serbian people just as Jerusalem does, for instance, for the Jewish nation. For the Albanians, Kosovo and Metohia is a territory where they comprise an ethnic majority, where Albanian national movement was born in 1878 and where is still the focus of Albanian irredentism. In brief, Kosovo and Metohia has an important place in the national consciousness of both Serbs and Albanians - for the Serbs, it stands for Ancient Serbia, whereas, for the Albanians, it is their Piedmont - and this made ethnic conflict over Kosovo and Metohia intractable from the very beginning. The problem of Kosovo and Metohia is consequently a dispute DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 57 International over the historical rights of the Serbs and the ethnic rights of the Albanians, two conflicting principles of international law, that made any attempt of international mediation in this dispute extremely complicated. The Kosovo and Metohia problem is, however, much more than an ethnic and territorial dispute between the Serbs and Albanians. This is, above all, a region with the highest population growth in Europe: in the period 1948-1981, its population had doubled, completely upsetting the ethnic balance that had existed among the Albanians and Serbs. (3) In a matter of twenty years (1961-1981), the local Albanian population increased by 90 per cent bringing its percentage in the overall population up from 66.2 to 77.4 and the Serbian down from 23.6 to 7.3, with Montenegrins accounting for 1.7 compared with 3.9 per cent previously (see Tab. I). Furthermore, half the ethnic Albanian population is under the age of 20, so it is expected that there will be another doubling of its numbers in the next decade. Second, despite large investments on the part of the federal government, Kosovo and Metohia has remained the most underdeveloped region of FR Yugoslavia precisely because of its high demographic growth, its traditional social structure, misguided investments and for various other reasons. Third, this is the religious and cultural problem, as the ethnic Albanians are largely Moslems whereas the Serbs are Christians. In addition, it is a political and geostrategic problem since this is an area crucial to Serbia’s and FR Yugoslavia’s stability and security and the boycott ethnic Albanians are conducting by abstaining from the political life of the country (they make up 16.5 percent of the population of FR Yugoslavia), has created a major gap on its political scene. Fifth, it is also an economic problem as some of the main natural resources and industrial facilities of Serbia are located in this province. Last, but not least, it is also a regional and European problem, because any kind of emergency situation in the area would destabilize all neighboring states (above all the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), causing broader conflicts in the southern Balkans. 58 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Tab. I: Population Trends in Kosovo and Metohia 1931-1991 (4) ________________________________________________________ Year Total Serbs/Montenegrins % Albanians % 1880 240,300 1890 301,200 1900 378,300 1910 475,200 1921 439,010 1931 552,064 150,745 27.3 331,549 60.1 1948 727,820 199,961 27.5 463,742 63.7 1953 808,141 221,212 27.4 524,559 64.9 1961 963,988 264,604 27.4 646,605 67.1 1971 1,243,693 259,819 20.9 916,168 73.7 1981 1,584,441 236,525 14.9 1,226,736 77.4 1991 1,956,196 214,555 11.0 1,596,072 81.6 From a contemporary point of view, one could say that the crises and civil war that broke out in the former SFRY had been detonated by the Serb-Albanian dispute over Kosovo and Metohia. Violent demonstrations of ethnic Albanian that occurred in April 1981, hardly a year after the death of Marshal Tito, gave an initial blow to the ethnic balance of the “Second Yugoslavia”, inciting nationalism in all the Yugoslav republics which, ten years later, brought about the ultimate dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. The Albanian national movement of that time in Kosovo had come out demanding that this Serbian province be given the status of a seventh Yugoslav republic which, under the constitutional order of the SFRY meant a step towards secession from the Republic of Serbia and the SFR Yugoslavia as well, and creation of a “Greater Albania”. (5) The irredentist movement of the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo an Metohia roused strong national mobilization in Serbia - the largest of the Yugoslav republics which was already antagonized by the constitutional changes of 1971 and 1974 which had established an asymmetrical relationship between this republic and its two autonomous provinces (Voyvodina and Kosovo and Metohia). Serbia’s demands for reform of the Yugoslav Federation were at once countered by Slovenia and then by Croatia, which, in a covert way at first and then quite openly, took the side of the DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 59 International ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and Metohia seeing them as allies in their power struggle with Serbia; this ended in their actual secession and the dissolution of the SFRY, following which both of them lost interest in Kosovo and Metohija. On a broader scale, the problem of Kosovo an Metohia had, over the past fifteen years or so, transformed itself under the influence of the changes that were occurring in Europe. In the bipolar Europe SFRY was a respected member and one of the leading countries of the non-alignment movement whose stability was supported both by Washington and Moscow. Albania under Enver Hoxha, on the other hand, was a rigid communist dictatorship and all its attempts at internationalizing the issue of Kosovo did not meet with significant support from the international community. Most of the illegal political groups of Albanians from Kosovo shared, under the influence of the regime in Tirana, a radically leftist, Stalinist or Maoist (“Marxist-Leninist”) orientation that isolated them even more. The crisis that exploded in the Soviet bloc and the policy of the West during the eighties upset this balance and the Eastern European nationalist movements in time became allies in the struggle against the communist regimes indirectly also affecting the international position of SFRY which had lost its privileged status of a “strategic buffer” between East and West. Consequently, the nationalist movement of the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo gradually attracted the attention of influential Western circles, especially after the collapse of Enver Hoxha’s dictatorship in Albania. The well-organized Albanian emigration in the USA and Western Europe (especially in Germany, the Benelux and Scandinavia), had much to do with this. An analysis of the CIA, published in the New York Times in November 1990, predicted that civil war would break out in SFRY within next eighteen months and that it would actually flare up in Kosovo. Although war did actually start six months later, the prediction prove to be wrong, since the war did not started in the ethnically mixed and poverty stricken province of Kosovo and Metohia, but in Slovenia that was the richest and only ethnically homogenous republic 60 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International of the former Yugoslavia. While the war went on in the western republics, Kosovo and Metohia maintained its relative peace, primarily because of a balance of fear in which the leaders of both ethnic communities estimated that a conflict between them would surpass even the violence that had come to expression in Bosnia and Herzegovina and be fatal to the interests of both nations. Despite their mutual distrust and their profoundly disrupted relations, the Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo took care not to exceed a point that would inevitably provoke a breakout of conflict. Thus, quite unexpectedly, the gravest ethnic problem in Yugoslavia escaped from being drawn into the Yugoslav civil war, but relations between the two ethnic communities remained frozen, in a way unprecedented in Europe. With its constitutional amendments of 1989 and 1990, Serbia did away with the disputed provisions of the 1974 Constitution. This, however, was met with resistance from the Albanian political parties of Kosovo that resorted then to creating their own para-state with the result that two parallel systems of government - one legal and the other illegal - came into being. Although the participation of Albanian political parties in the Republic and Federal elections would probably have made them runner ups to the leading group in the country opening opportunities for the institutional solution of these open problems, they have remained adamant in their boycott, regardless even of the fact that such a policy has become counterproductive to the best interests of the Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohia. After the initial support given by some international circles to the Albanian national movement of Kosovo and Metohia, the international community has changed its attitude taking the standpoint that any attempt at the forced secession of this province from Serbia and FR Yugoslavia would undoubtedly first draw neighboring FRY Macedonia into the conflict (as a strengthening of Albanian parties in the borderline area had come about in the early nineties), and then all the other neighboring countries as well. When the civil war in the former Yugoslavia began to be unraveled as a result of the Dayton peace agreement, the international DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 61 International community’s stand that the problem of Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo be settled within the framework of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, certain changes began taking place within the Albanian and Serbian political parties creating possibilities for a new approach to Serbian-Albanian relations in the Balkans. The two ethnic communities will, however, need to face the difficult heritage of their past and find new constitutional models of autonomy for ethnic Albanians living in Serbia, different from those the Yugoslav communist federalist model had developed. The new model of autonomy must, therefore, be sought within the standards established by the OSCE (CSCE), and the Council of Europe, but above all in existing European models of autonomy for ethnic communities. The motive for doing this should not merely be on account of the pressure of the international community: The development of democratic institutions in Serbia will hardly be possible if the Kosovo and Metohia issue is not solved, and vice versa, the problem of Kosovo and Metohia cannot be resolved without strengthening democratic institutions in Serbia, that is, without the political participation of the Albanian segment of the population in the political life of Serbia and FR of Yugoslavia. 2. Kosovo and Metohia: the Burden of the Past In mediaeval Serbia, the present region of Kosovo and Metohia was not a separate administrative entity; reference to it as the Vilayet of Kosovo appears only towards the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th Century in the territorial organization of the Ottoman Empire where it covered broader area with administrative center in Skoplje. After the end of the First Balkan War in 1912, the Kosovo region became part of Serbia, whereas Metohia became part of Montenegro. This was internationally recognized by the London Peace Conference of 29 July 1913, when the present State of Albania was also recognized. Kosovo and Metohia appears as a distinctive 62 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International territory only in documents of the Yugoslav Communist Party in this century at the end of the twenties. Although during World War II it had come under “Greater Albania” which had been created as an Italian protectorate, Kosovo and Metohia was not given any special territorial status. It is only in 1946 that Kosovo and Metohia became a separate administrative “district” within Serbia, under the first constitution of “Second Yugoslavia. (6) Contrary to contemporary stereotypes, Serbian-Albanian relations had not been antagonistic during the middle ages, nor had the two nations been at odds before the period of Ottoman conquests in the Balkans. In the medieval State of Serbia, the Albanians were an active factor: Albanian feudal lords were recognized as was their property and titles, and they were treated without discrimination under the laws of the Serbian Nemanjic Dynasty. (7) The Serbs and Albanians resisted the Turkish invaders together and it is recorded that Albanians were part of the Serbian formations in the Battle of Kosovo. The core of the political, economic and cultural life of the medieval State of Serbia, between the 12th and the 15th Century, was in Kosovo, as numerous monasteries and the remnants of medieval cities and other cultural monuments testify. (8) Kosovo an Metohia retained this status throughout the first centuries of Ottoman occupation (15th and 16th Century), and it is only at the end of the 17th Century (1690) that the first great exodus of Serbs from this area took place. It was then that Albanians began to be converted to Islam and there are many who were given influential positions in the hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire (9) and became the stronghold of its rule in the Balkans. The Ottoman authorities fostered this process through tax and other concessions which induced most of central Albania to switch to Islam in the 16th Century (Albanian Catholic and Orthodox communities had persevered only in the north, in the area around Skadar). This conversion to Islam first embraced the feudal lords, then the townspeople and finally the villagers. The privileges of the Moslems and discrimination towards the Christians ignited the first controversies between the DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 63 International Albanians and Serbs in the area of present-day Kosovo and Metohia, where Albanians began settling in increasing numbers during the 18th and 19th Century, assimilating and pushing the Serbian population northwards. (10) Ottoman repression against the Christians grew in the 17th Century because the Empire’s expansion into Europe had been halted and the Habsburg armies during the 17th and 18th Century made deep thrusts into the Balkans. Two waves of exodus of Serbs took place under this pressure - in 1690 and 1737 - and the Habsburg princes settled these Serbian refugees along what they called their Military Boundaries (Militärgrenze) in Voyvodina, southern Hungary and the so-called Krayinas (11). Thus gradually weakened the resistance from the local Christian population in the area of present-day Kosovo and Metohia against the pressure of the Albanian colonizers who had settled in these parts for economic reasons (in search of cultivable land), and social reasons, too (to escape blood feuds), as well as by planned resettlement which the Ottoman regime had organized. Intensive settlement in the area took place in the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire’s existence, the idea probably being to prevent any homogenization of the Slav population which was revolting against the Ottoman authorities and also to prevent the formation of new national states in the Balkans. The First Serbian Uprising of 1804-1813, which marked the beginning of national revolutions in the Balkans, opened a new phase in Serbian-Albanian relations. In its first national program - the Nacertanije (the Plan) of Ilija Garasanin of 1844 - Serbia set itself the task of freeing the Southern Slavs from Ottoman occupation in cooperation with the other Balkan nations. Thus, ties were established with the Catholic Albanian tribe Miriditi which agreed to their common struggle against the Turks in 1849. The endeavor to incorporate Albanians in the liberation movement of the Balkan nations was significant, because as much as 70 percent of the Albanians were converted to Islam by the middle of the 19th Century and were interested in safeguarding the Ottoman Empire and its institutions. The resistance against the Otto64 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International man Empire’s reforms of 1839 (tanzimat) provoked unrest among the Islamicised Albanian feudal lords which had its repercussions on the Christian population which they considered responsible for the suspension of the privileges they used to enjoy. Further Albanian colonization of the Kosovo and Metohia region was intensified at that time, developing into mass terror and ethnic cleansing of the local Serbian population. The 1876-1878 wars against the Ottoman Empire brought the Serbs and Montenegrins into their first serious conflict with the Albanians. As the Serbian army’s advancement went through territory that was colonized by the Albanians, the Porte mobilized these Albanians to fight the Serbs. The operations of the Serbian army in southern Serbia, when Kosovo was briefly taken over in 1878, provoked a wave of refugees in the opposite direction as well high 30,000 Albanians deserted those parts of the country which the Serbian army had occupied. However, that same year, the Berlin Congress brought a stop to the liberation movements of the Balkan nations and began partitioning the Ottoman Empire. Thus, a “League for Defense of the Albanian Nation” was founded at Prizren in June 1878 (“The First Prizren League”), and the first Albanian national program was adopted then. Its objective was the creation of an Albanian state which would cover four regions: a) southern Albania and Epirus with Joannina as its capital; b) northern and central Albania (Skadar, Tirana and Elbasan); c) Macedonia (Skoplje, Debar, Gostivar, Prilep, Veles, Bitola, Ohrid); d) Kosovo with parts of southern Serbia and Macedonia (Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Novi Pazar, Mitrovica, Sjenica, Pristina, Gnjilane, Presevo and Kumanovo). In short, the First Prizren League laid down the terms for the creation of a “Greater Albania” which has even to this day remained the objective of Albanian Irredentism. Although the League enjoyed the support of the Turkish authorities at the start, after the Berlin Congress, the Albanian movement took a turn against the Porte which liquidated it in 1882 and the whole area was thrown into a state of anarchy and violence. Repression against the Serbian DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 65 International population inhabiting the area of present-day Kosovo and Metohia, led to the exodus of around 400,000 people into Serbia between the years 1878 and 1912. (12) The First Balkan War of 1912 had ended Ottoman rule in the Balkans but had also sparked off open conflicts among the national programs of the Balkan states. Serbia had entered the war intending to liberate the Serbian people living under Ottoman administration and to secure an outlet to the Adriatic Sea which inevitably brought it into conflict with the Albanians. Underestimating the power of the Albanian national movement, Serbian politicians of the time counted on the assimilation of the Albanians into Serbia, possibly extending them autonomy in those parts where they comprised a majority. This opinion has been strengthened by the relatively weak resistance of the Albanians against the advance of the Serbian army through Kosovo and Metohia and northern Albania. The situation then soon took a different turn when the Albanian national movement won the strong support of Austria-Hungary and Italy which were interested in creating an Albanian state that would be under their influence and in preventing other Balkan states from establishing any strongholds along the Adriatic coastline. A compromise was reached among the big powers at an ambassadorial conference in London in 1912-13 when a territorial demarcation was made between the new Albanian state and its neighbors. Despite the fact that neither the Balkan states nor the big powers (Italy in particular (13)) truly respected the decisions of the ambassadorial conference, these boundaries have by and large remained as delineated then to this day. Serbia, like the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians founded in 1918, had no set policy with respect to the Albanians who found themselves within her borders in 1912. Under the Peace Treaty concluded in Berlin in 1878, Serbia had committed herself to protect the religious minorities within its territories (14); this was amended only in 1919 under the terms of the Peace Treaty signed at Saint Germains constituting part of the Versailles Peace Treaties. The newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes committed 66 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International itself to protect the lives and freedom of its people, regardless of origin, nationality, language, race or creed; the equality of all citizens before the law; everyone’s right to speak his own language, and so on. In practice, however, the situation was quite different: Except for the Albanian feudal lords and the townspeople who found their place in the new state regime (especially through the Moslem Jemiet party (15)), ethnic Albanians were deprived of these rights. Albanian terrorist activities, known as kachak, which evoked retaliation from the authorities, encumbered the situation. (16) In the area of present-day Kosovo and Metohia, the new state had two main objectives: to conduct an agrarian reform (to liquidate the Ottoman feudal system), and colonization (to achieve an ethnic balance in its population). The chaotic way in which the policy was carried out and the abuses inflicted by the local authorities, only broadened the gap between the Serbs and Albanians. In the period between 1922 and 1941, 12,000 families (about 60,000 people) were settled in Kosovo and Metohia, which made up about 9.2 percent of the prewar population. Negotiations were conducted between Turkey and Yugoslavia in the thirties on the resettlement of a larger number of Albanians into Turkey “in the way in which Romania, Bulgaria and Greece had solved the problem of their Moslem population”, but nothing had come of it. The position of Serbian and Yugoslav left, in the first place of the Serbian Social Democratic Party (17), and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in the period between the two world wars, strongly opposed the policy of the Serbian ruling circles towards the Albanians. The Albanian population of Kosovo, thus, welcomed the break-up of Yugoslavia and Fascist occupation as its liberation, which the occupying forces instigated by annexing the territory of present-day Kosovo and Metohia to “Greater Albania” which has been established as an Italian protectorate. Between 1941 and 1945, the non-Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohia was exposed to terror and ethnic cleansing, particularly the Serbs and Montenegrins who were colonized and together with a large number of their indigenous DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 67 International compatriots were banished to Serbia. In his lecture on “Greater Albania” at the Royal Italian Academy on 30 May 1941, the president of the Albanian puppet government, Mustafa Kruya, had pointed out that “with the victory of the axis powers and establishment of the new world order, Mussolini and Hitler will ensure the Albanian people a national state that will cover its broadest ethnic borders and be indissolubly linked with fascist Italy”. The leaders of the pre-war Moslem Jemiet party of Kosovo had at that time founded a new Albanian political organization with a pronounced irredentist program - the Lidhja kombetare shquiptare. Upon Italy’s capitulation, the policy of this party continued to be supported by the Third Reich which contributed to the formation of the “Second Prizren League” at the end of 1943. At that time, the Yugoslav communists also appeared on the scene and through their representatives in Albania and in Kosovo and Metohia organized the Albanian communist and anti-fascist movement, opening a new phase in the history of Yugoslav-Albanian relations. In brief, centuries of Ottoman occupation and Islamization of the Balkans profoundly disrupted relations between the Albanians and other neighboring nations that often saw in them the instrument of Ottoman repression. The gap between the Slavs and the Albanians grew in the 19th and 20th Century when their national programs clashed, creating a vent for the interference of non-Balkan powers which had deftly taken advantage of these animosities for their own purposes. The legacy of such a history has been profound mistrust that at times transpired into national hatred between the two nations which is evident from the pejorative meaning of the word Shquiptar (Albanian) in Serbian, and Shkie (Slav) in the Albanian language. The religious factor should, however, not be underestimated (Islam is definitely accountable for the high demographic growth in Kosovo an Metohia), nor overestimated, for, even from the time of the First Prizren League, the credo of the Albanian national movement has been: “the religion of the Albanians is Albanianism” (feja e shqyptarit ashi shqyptaria). (18) 68 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International The Albanian Minority in the “Second Yugoslavia” At the end of the 19th and in the first half of the 20th Century, the Serbian and Yugoslav left had treated Serbian-Albanian relations within the scope of its aim at having the national question resolved through the creation of a Balkan confederation. The dilemma of the communists was cut short by the Comintern which had decided at its Fifth Congress in 1924 to break up the state of Yugoslavia considering it to be a “product of world imperialism”. From then onwards the national policy of the CPY was founded on the Leninist theory about “the reactionary nationalism of hegemonic nations and the progressive nationalism of oppressed people”, from which they drew the conclusion as to the need to counter “Greater Serbian nationalism” and for the cooperation of communists with all anti-Serbian nationalist movements. At its Fourth Congress in 1928, the CPY adopted the position of the Comintern that Yugoslavia should be dismembered as it was a country “created in the Balkans by world imperialism to counterrevolutionary purposes aimed against the Soviet Union”. This position was modified only in 1936 when the Comintern took a turn towards a “national front” policy and adopted a new policy for Yugoslavia’s preservation and defense. In doing so, however, the initial position that Yugoslav communists must support the Albanian national movement was not changed until the beginning of World War II. The CPY played a major role during the war in the formation of the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) and in organizing an anti-fascist movement as well as creating organs of government for the new Albanian state. (19) A conference that took place in the village of Buyan in Albania from 31 December 1943 to 2 January 1944 was later the cause of considerable controversy. A this conference delegates of the Albanian and Yugoslav communists invited the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo to join in the struggle against fascism with the hope that the victory of the communists would open the way to unification with Albania. Although the DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 69 International stands taken at the Buyan conference were criticized within the caucus of the CPY even before the end of 1944, they revealed two basic features of the CPY’s policy in respect of Kosovo and Metohia at that time: Its desire to have the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and Metohia join the anti-fascist movement and its orientation towards incorporating Albania into a Yugoslav or possibly a Balkan communist federation once the war came to an end. In a letter to the CPA at the end of 1943 concerning the future of Kosovo and Metohia, the Central Committee of the CPY had responded in the following manner: “Armed struggle against the occupying forces can only be clearly indicative of what who wants and forge real democracy and brotherhood of the people, so there is no need to emphasize the fact that such a question cannot constitute a problem where we and democratic anti-imperialistic Albania are concerned ... New Yugoslavia will be a country of free people and there will, therefore, be no place in it for national subjugation of the Albanian minority.” (20) It is the predominant opinion among Serbian historians that there were at least three motives for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohia on 7 August 1945: a) to resolve the status of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo; b) to make way for the incorporation of Albania into a Yugoslav communist federation (21), and c) to create a balance between the Serbs and the other nations of the country based on the Leninist doctrine for resolving nationality questions in multi-national states (so called “Weak Serbia - Strong Yugoslavia” policy). In support of the latter, the argument most often presented is that such autonomous regions were created only within the territory of Serbia and not within Macedonia or Montenegro, both of which also have areas in which Albanian minorities exist, nor for that matter within any of the other Yugoslav republics (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) which have ethnically mixed populations. (22) The Yugoslav constitution and a special bill passed January 1946, define Kosovo and Metohia as an autonomous region of Serbia and this was reaffirmed in the Serbian constitution of January 1947. The Yugoslav constitu70 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International tion of 1963, however, provided the possibility for the creation of autonomous provinces within the federal republics, leaving it to the republics to decide on this themselves. The victory of Slovenian and Croatian faction in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1964 made the status of the provinces a major stake in the struggle for power within the Yugoslav federation, which reflected on their status in the constitutional amendments of 1968. Under these amendments, legislative and judicial authority was passed on to the provinces and they were given direct representation in the federal parliament, their rights were determined under separate provincial constitutional laws and Metohia was abolished from the name of Serbia’s southern province, so for the first time it was to be known as the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. It is interesting to note, however, that the first Albanian nationalist demonstrations in “Second Yugoslavia”, took place in 1968, but were quickly suppressed by police and the federal army. The constitutional amendments of 1971 further extended the rights of the autonomous provinces of Serbia to the extent that they were given constitutional power and their representation in the Federal Parliament was also broadened; they were given seats in the State Presidency, the Federal Government, the Constitutional Court of Justice and they were to be given a “relative number of posts in the commanding staff of the army, in diplomacy” and so forth. In effect, these amendments in the Yugoslav constitutional system made the provinces almost equal with the republics, making it assume a confederational form. Although the territory they covered continued to be part of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, the provincial leadership dominated by the Albanians began referring to the province as a “constituent element of the Federation”. This development reached a climax with the federal constitution of 1974 which practically evened Serbia with its two provinces (the provinces were given the right of veto to any changes in the republic or federal constitution), creating a collision of competencies in the functions of the Republic (whilst they had no sovereign territory they did have soverDIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 71 International eign rights!). Under its own constitutional law, the competencies of the Province of Kosovo were extended even further, so far as to include the right to ratify international agreements. (23) Subsequent analyses of these constitutional reforms from 1974, indicated that they were the basis of “asymmetrical federalism” and even of the “protectorate of the Province over the Republic”, which is clearly a violation of the fundamental principles laid down at the Second Session of the Anti-fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ - Antifasisticko vece narodnog oslobo|enja Jugoslavije) in 1943, i.e. of the constitutive acts of the “Second Yugoslavia”. Thus, during the eighties, Kosovo became a key problem in the political life of Serbia and of Yugoslavia, provoking major changes not only in Serbia (Slobodan Milosevic’s advent to the position of President of the Republic), but in relations within the Federation were positions became sharply polarized. Whilst Serbia and the other eastern republics viewed Kosovo primarily as a political and ethnic problem incited by the actions of the Albanian irredenta, in the opinion of the western republics, Kosovo was an economic and social problem which had assumed the character of an ethnic controversy only after Serbia’s policy towards it had changed. One and the other, however, saw the problem of Kosovo in the eighties as a clear example of the failure of the Yugoslav communist policy. On the one hand, development of generous autonomy in the sixties and seventies did not satisfied the Albanian population of the province, nor did it ensure its loyalty towards the Yugoslav Federation. On the other hand, the exorbitant investments into capital intensive plants in an area abounding in labor and natural resources but lacking capital, over the sixties and seventies, produced frustrating results: whilst Slovenia’s and Croatia’s complained that much of their income was being poured into Kosovo as the province continued to lag behind in its economy on the Yugoslav scale, Kosovo was complaining about the unfavorable terms-oftrade that were being imposed in its dealings with these developed republics to which it was selling its raw materials 72 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International and energy cheaply whilst having to pay high prices for their manufactured goods. The main reason for this lagging was concealed behind the exceptionally high population growth, higher than in any of the neighboring countries even among the Albanians in Albania. Delayed demographic transition, the unsuccessful Yugoslav development policy for Kosovo, limited employment opportunities and the relative openness of “Second Yugoslavia”, which opened a window to the world for the young Albanians of Kosovo, gave vent to the emergence of a militant nationalism which exploded in the province in 1981. A revision of the controversial constitutional provisions of 1974 ensued 14 years later, in 1988, with amendments to the Federal Constitution. Changes in the constitution of Serbia, which were endorsed by the parliaments of its two provinces (26), were effected the following year. Although the controversial competencies were thereby transferred to the Republic Parliament, a three step procedure was ensured to afford the provinces the possibility to abort the passing of any controversial bill (the possibility of giving an opinion, deferment for a period of six months, or conducting a referendum). A year later, the new Serbian constitution was passed determining the status of the provinces as “a form of territorial autonomy”, whereby the provinces were given the right to bring their own statutes with the prior agreement of the National Assembly, and the southern province was again renamed Kosovo and Metohia. Serbia’s constitutional order was basically reverted to the principles of the 1963 Federal Constitution, which stipulated that the rights of the provinces were to be prescribed in the constitution of the Republic. Furthermore, the controversial constitutional provisions of 1968, 1971 and 1974 were made null and void. When it was confronted with the boycott of the Albanians, the Republic authorities tried to establish general administration over the entire territory of the republic “through centralization of government, political and propagandistic pressure, as well as police repression” (27), but this only widened the gap between the Serbian and Albanian ethnic communities in DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 73 International Kosovo. Serbs and Albanians: Civilizing the Conflict These changes and the manner in which they were executed in Kosovo caused a new round of homogenization of the Albanian national movement in Kosovo at the end of the eighties when a major political turnabout occurred. The old Marxist-Leninist parties and movements disappeared from the political scene and were replaced by new Albanian parties and leaders: “Carried by the flood of events in the area of former Yugoslavia, the political leaders of the Albanian national minority chose complete self-isolation from the political and public life of the new FR Yugoslavia and a strategy of passive resistance, and for the creation of a parallel system of government and further internationalization of the ‘Kosovo problem’, playing on the card of being ‘the victim of Serbian repression’”. (28) The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader, the writer Ibrahim Rugova, were given the main role in the national movement of the ethnic Albanians. The LDK was founded 23 December 1989 at Pristina, when it declared itself in its program document in favor of a democratic, federal and socialist Yugoslavia, for the government of law and political pluralism, freedom of speech, the press and political organization. The Democratic Forum of Kosovo was founded in Pristina on 1 July 1990 to muster all the newly formed ethnic Albanian parties for the purpose of establishing “the sovereignty of Kosovo as a constitutive entity of the Yugoslav community of equal standing with its other entities”, in other words, the status of a seventh Yugoslav republic. A demand was made for annulment of the Serbian constitutional amendments of March 1989, as well as of all the bills brought on the basis of them. The Albanian political parties of Kosovo and Metohia reacted to the constitutional reforms by radicalizing their demands. In September 1990, two thirds of the Albanian 74 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Table II: Projection of Population Growth of Kosovo and Metohia (24) _______________________________________________________________________________________ Total Serbs, Montenegrins % Albanians % Others % 1961 963,988 2 64,604 27.4 646,605 67.1 52,779 5.5 1981 1,584,441 236,525 14.9 1,226,736 77.4 121,179 7.6 1991 1,956,196 214,555 11.0 1,596,072 81.6 145,569 7.4 2001 2,400,000 194,000 8.1 2,041,000 85.0 165,000 6.9 2011 2,900,000 170,000 5.9 2,340,000 86.6 190,000 6.9 2021 3,360,000 155,000 4.6 2,995,000 89.1 210,000 6.3 2031 3,800,000 145,000 3.8 3,425,000 90.1 230,000 6.1 2041 4,180,000 135,000 3.2 3,795,000 90.8 250,000 6.0 2051 4,500,000 130,000 2.9 4,105,000 91.2 265,000 5.9 75 International Year _______________________________________________________________________________________ DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Year Total Serbs, Montenegrins % Albanians % Others % 1931 5,795,724 4,195,670 72.4 355,517 6.1 1,244,537 21.5 1961 7,642,227 5,809,439 75.0 669,772 8.8 1,163,016 15.2 1981 9,313,677 6,669,621 71.6 1,303,032 14.0 1,341,024 13.6 1991 9,791,475 6,785,894 69.3 1,674,353 17.1 1,331,228 13.6 2001 10,220,000 8,080,000 79.1 2,140,000 20.9 - - 2011 10,498,000 7,838,000 74.7 2,660,000 25.3 - - 2021 10,817,000 7,687,000 71.7 3,130,000 28.9 - - 2031 10,718,000 7,148,000 66.7 3,570,000 33.3 - - 2041 10,698,000 6,748,000 63.1 3,950,000 36.9 - - 2051 10,535,000 6,265,000 59.5 4,270,000 40.5 - - International 76 Table III: Projection of Population Growth in Serbia (25) International members of the provincial parliament organized a secret meeting at Kacanik and adopted a “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo” which laid down the demand for the foundation of an “independent Republic of Kosovo”. (29) Quite in conformity with their policy of “severance” from Serbia, the Albanians boycotted the first multi-party elections in Serbia of 1990. The aggravation of the country’s political crisis at the beginning of 1991, emanating from Slovenia’s and Croatia’s secession, suited the radical Albanians of Kosovo: in January 1991, Albanian nationalists attacked the police stations at Pec and Kosovska Mitrovica and the following month more than 7,000 Albanians and Croats held joint demonstrations in Frankfurt calling for “the right to selfdetermination of the peoples of Yugoslavia”. On the basis of the “Kacanik Constitution”, ethnic Albanians of Kosovo held an illegal referendum in September 1991, and in May 1992 elected their own parliament with Ibrahim Rugova as president of the “Republic of Kosovo”. Analyzers consider that “the leaders of the ethnic Albanian political parties had thereby made it known to the Serbian authorities that they were not interested in any kind of autonomy, not even in the constitution of a new provincial parliament, but in constituting their own government authorities leading the way to their withdrawal from Yugoslavia.” (30) “The Coordinating Committee of Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia” with Ibrahim Rugova as chairman, passed a political declaration in October 1991 putting forth three options for the solution of “the Albanian question in Yugoslavia”: * If the external and internal borders of the SFRY remain unaltered, the status of a sovereign and independent state with the right of association in a new community of sovereign Yugoslav states, is demanded. Ethnic Albanians within Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro should enjoy the status of a nation and not be a national minority within it; * Should only the internal borders of the SFRY be changed and not the external ones, the founding of an Albanian Republic is called for, incorporating, apart from Kosovo, DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 77 International those territories in central Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia which are inhabited by Albanians; * In the event that the external borders are changed, the Albanians would by referendum and the proclamation of a general declaration, declare territorial unification with Albania and the creation of “an undivided Albanian state in the Balkans within Albanian ethnic boundaries” (31), namely, within the boundaries that had been proclaimed by the First Prizren League in 1878 (Fig. 2). Although there had been certain Serbian-Albanian contacts (32) in previous years, their results were meager and the ethnic Albanian political party rank and file considered these contacts with Serbian and Yugoslav officials to be acts of national betrayal. (33) While counting on a weakening of Serbia and the FR Yugoslavia as a result of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and the possibility of its opening the way for their secession, many Albanians joined the ranks of the Croatian and Moslem army. (34) Their exclusiveness and unwillingness to abstain from their radical objectives brought into being a dual system of government, finances, education, health care and the like. Thus an unexpected modus vivendi was temporarily found by the two ethnic groups, as the Serbian authorities have by and large been tolerating the “parallel authorities” of the Albanians (except the formation of para-military forces). (35) On the other hand, the Albanians under the leadership of the LDK have been withholding from violence having pursuing the of internationalization of their demands and isolating themselves within the “virtual reality” of their para-state. Disregarding the interests of the non-Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohia, the ethnic Albanians seek a dialogue with Belgrade from a power position, accusing the Serbian side for “occupation” and “apartheid”. They are refusing direct negotiations with the Serbian or Yugoslav authorities, insisting to be recognized as the representatives of the “sovereign Republic of Kosovo”, while the legal Serbian authorities reject this in particular, pointing out that Kosovo and Metohia is the internal affair of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. The situation has affected rela78 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International tions between Belgrade and Tirana, which Albanian policy considers completely dependent on the Kosovo issue. It is rather paradoxical that the Albanian boycott of the multi-party elections in Serbia in 1990, 1992 and 1993 had actually strengthened the power of the leading Serbian parties. In the 1992 elections, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) won 13 mandates in the electoral district of Pristina with 42,396 votes; the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) got 5 mandates with 18,735 votes, and so forth. The situation was repeated in the December elections the following year when the leading SPS in Kosovo and Metohia won a total of 21 mandates (the SRS got 2 and the coalition of the opposition parties DEPOS got 1 seat). Although some prominent Albanian intellectuals of Kosovo and Metohia (Shkelzen Maliqi), called upon the Albanians to individually take part in the elections in Serbia, only two Albanian parties outside Kosovo (the Party of Democratic Activity and the Democratic Party of Albanians) came out and got 2 mandates in the Serbian Assembly. Had the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohia performed their electoral rights in the Republic and Federal elections, they could have counted on taking power in 24 of the 29 municipalities of the province, and have at least 24 seats in the Republic and 12 seats in the Federal parliament. As the dominant Serbian parties would then have lost equivalent number of seats, the participation of the ethnic Albanians in the ballot would have considerably changed the existing political balance in the country. The ensuing settlement of the Yugoslav drama has been creating visible nervousness among the Albanian political parties in Kosovo and Metohia and polarization as to how the struggle for secession from Serbia and FR Yugoslavia is to be further conducted. In simpler terms, the leaders of the radical wing, Rexhep Qoxia, a writer (president of the Forum of Independent Intellectuals), and Adem Demaqi (president of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights), are against the policy of the LDK and Ibrahim Rugova and are pleading for maximalist objectives (the “third option” mentioned earlier). Rugova, himself, is in favor of an “independDIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 79 International ent and neutral Kosovo”, whereas Buyar Bukoshi, the “prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo in exile”, under the influence of circles in the West, is inclined to the idea of a return to the autonomy of 1974. The ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and Metohia had followed the course of the war in Croatia and in Bosnia Herzegovina with mixed feelings: they saw in the establishment of a Serbian state in the Krayina (Croatia), a precedent which could be applied in the case of Kosovo and Metohia (the “K+K” program), but Croatia’s assault in the summer of 1995 and the exodus of around 200,000 Serbs in an “ethnic cleansing” that had followed, incited fear among the Albanians that Serbia might attempt to take similar action in Kosovo and Metohia. Naturally, nothing of the kind happened and the Albanian parties are seeking new options in solutions which various international mediators have proposed for Bosnia. Preoccupied with the drama of the civil war in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbian political parties have not shown much understanding nor readiness to deal with Serbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo and Metohia. Both the government and opposition share the opinion that problem of Serbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo and Metohia are the internal affair of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, and that things will return to normal once the ethnic Albanians turn their backs on their militant leaders and join in the political life of the country as loyal citizens. The leading SPS has been trying to rally a certain number of ethnic Albanians of Kosovo into its lines (36), whereas the Associated Yugoslav Left (JUL Jugoslovenska udruzena levica) is expounding its anti-nationalist policy opening itself with more or less success towards all the national minorities in the country. The center and right parties have, in the main, still not declared themselves on the problem nor what model of coexistence between the Albanians and Serbs in the southern Serbian province they are in favor of, probably because they find that the subject would not ensure them any popularity nor the votes of the Serbian voters. The years of conflict and distrust have simply created a deep gap between the political elite of the 80 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International two nations which is presently the greatest obstacle on the way to resolving this problem. Despite this, there is little likelihood that SerbianAlbanian relations could now escalate into open conflict; the tragedy of the civil war in Croatia and in Bosnia Herzegovina is sufficient warning that any conflict in Kosovo and Metohia would be fateful to the interests of both nations and would end without any real victor. Thus the end of the war in the region of the former Yugoslavia inevitably places this problem on the agenda since its solution will directly affect not only the internal stability of FR Yugoslavia, but also the stability of the entire Balkans. Hence, it needs to be emphasized that FR Yugoslavia is the largest multi-national and multi-confessional community in the Balkans - with diverse national, cultural, religious and linguistic features: “It is a state with uncompleted administrative organization, a state that is in the process of political constitution, and the features of which are remnants of the normative and institutional order of the former Yugoslavia”. (37) According to the 1991 census, there are 10,394,026 inhabitants living on its territory, the majority of whom are Serbs (62.2% or 6,504,048 persons), whereas Montenegrins make up 5 percent (519,757) of the population of FR Yugoslavia. The “Others” comprise thirty odd ethnic groups among whom the Albanians form the largest with 16.5 percent (1,714,768 (38)), Hungarians follow with 3.3 percent (344,147), Moslems with 3.2 percent (336,025), Romanies (Gypsies) - 1.4 percent (143,519), Croats - 1.1 percent (111,650), and so on. The majority of Albanians in the FR Yugoslavia lives in the region of the Kosovo and Metohia province where they are an absolute majority in 25 of the 31 municipalities, whilst the Serbs are the absolute majority in 5 municipalities, that is in 16.1 percent of the territory of this province. According to their respective constitutions, FR Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro are defined as being the states of their citizens, not as national states. Accordingly, members of both majority and minority nations all enjoy equal human rights and freedoms (39), and the provocation of national, DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 81 International racist, religious and other inequalities, and equally so the provocation of national, racial or other hatreds and intolerance are regarded as constitutional offenses and are punishable. (40) Under the Federal Constitution, members of the national minorities are guaranteed freedom of expression of their national identity and culture, the use of their native language and alphabet, the right to education in their mother tongue, the right to public information in their own language, the right to educational and cultural organizations and associations financed on a voluntary basis which the government may support, the right to establish and maintain mutual relations with their compatriots within the FRY and abroad without interference (however, not to the detriment of FRY and its republics), and also the right to participate in international non-governmental organizations on condition that this is not to the detriment of the interests of FRY and its republics. In short, the constitutional order of FR Yugoslavia and her republics does not represent an obstacle for the ethnic Albanians to partake in the political life of the country, the problems arise in practice which is still very different from the legal norms. Under the circumstances, it would not be realistic to expect any lasting solution to the disturbed Serbian-Albanian relations in the near future. What might be expected is the commencement of a dialogue that would create conditions for the return of ethnic Albanians to the political institutions of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia and for the institutional solution of the open issues. The main obstacle to the commencement of such a dialogue, despite certain encouraging signs, is the overwhelming radicalism of the ethnic Albanians whose political parties are still not ready to give up the idea of an “independent state of Kosovo” and a “Greater Albania” which would have the same consequences for the security of the Balkans and of Europe as would the creation of a “Greater Croatia”, a “Greater Serbia” or a “Greater Bulgaria”. On the other hand, Belgrade’s hesitation at present to offer a political dialogue may be comprehended as delaying in the hope that extremists on both sides will weaken and create conditions 82 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International for negotiations over the autonomy of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia which will be able to reach a sustainable compromise between the legitimate demands of the Serbs and the Albanians. It is hard not to discern that the only real basis for the commencement of such a dialogue and for defining the autonomy of the ethnic Albanians in Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, both in the territorial as well as in a normative sense, is the so-called “minority standards of the OSCE (CSCE)” formulated in Paris in 1989, in Copenhagen (l990) and in Moscow (1991), as well as the European models of autonomy for ethnic communities which have had their confirmation in practice (Southern Tyrol and the like). However the framework for such a solution could only be presented with the expansion of European integrations into the Balkans, for it is only in this case that the solution of the Serbian-Albanian controversy in Kosovo and Metohia would not mean a zero sum game, but a way for the two nations to satisfy their legitimate interests. Unfortunately, considering the discouraging results of past mediations in the Yugoslav crisis, it is difficult to expect that European integrations will be prepared to make sustained efforts in this direction in the near future. ________________________________________________ 1) Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Yugoslavia. 2) The area of the present-day Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia consists of two separate geographic entities. The first is Kosovo, a valley between Pristina and Drenica, 84 km long and about 14 km wide, densely populated, with significant agricultural and mineral resources and a network of important transport connections in this section of the Balkans. The other constitutes the territory known as Metohia (in medieval times metoh was the term for the holdings of the monasteries), which the Albanians include in a broader area called Dukagyin. It is about 80 km in length and over 40 km in width, and, compared with Kosovo, is primarily agricultural. The area of the Autonomous Province is 10,887 sq. km, which is 12.3 percent of the area of Serbia and 10.6 percent of the total area of FR Yugoslavia. Its population is 1.954.747 or 20.5 percent of the total population of Serbia, that is 19 percent of that of FR Yugoslavia. See: Branislav Krstic, Kosovo Between Historical and Ethnic Rights, Kuca Vid, Belgrade 1994, pp. 11-20. 3) On this point, see: Milos Macura, The Development, Social and Demographic Problems of Kosovo, in: Kosovo Today and Tomorrow, Jugoslovenski pogledi, No. 2/88, pp. 389-390. 4) B. Krstic, op. cit., p. 90. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 83 International 5) Apart from Kosovo and Metohia, the eastern parts of Montenegro, parts of central Serbia, half of the FYR Macedonia and southern Epirus in Greece (Chameria in Albanian), would form part of it according to the maximalist Albanian national program. 6) The first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was a constitutional monarchy under the rule of the Serbian dynasty Karadjordjevic; the second Yugoslavia (1945-1991) was a communist type federation consisting of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia). 7) Dimitrije Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu (Book About Kosovo), Serbian Academy of Sciences and the Arts, Belgrade 1985, pp. 23-35. 8) D. Bogdanovic, Kosovo in the Culture of Mediaeval Serbia, in: Knjiga o Kosovu, op. cit., pp. 40-47. 9) For instance, the Albanian family of Küprulü gave a whole dynasty of grand viziers at the height of the Ottoman Empire. See: Georges Castellan, Histoire des Balkans, XIV-XX Siècle, Fayard, Paris 1991. 10) See: D. Bogdanovic, The Dispersion of Albanians Throughout the Yugoslav Countries in the 17th and 18th Century, in: Knjiga o Kosovu, op. cit., pp. 85-125. 11) Krayina means frontier in the Serbian language. On this point, see: Predrag Simic, Le conflit Serbo-Croate et l’eclatement de la Yougoslavie, Politique étrangère, No. 1/94, pp. 129-144. 12) J. Jovanovic, Southern Serbia from the End of the 18th Century up to Liberation, Belgrade 1941, pp. 39-41. 13) At the Versailles Peace Conference at the end of World War I Italy asked for protectorate over Albania. The representatives of the newly founded Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes particularly defied these Italian aspirations, being in favor of having an independent Albanian state in its neighborhood. 14) Article 35 of this Treaty reads: “Differences of religion and religious denomination cannot be held as an obstacle for anyone to be excluded or to be prevented from enjoying his citizen’s or political rights, from not being accepted in public service and positions, and not to be accorded honors or not to be able to perform various trades or professions in whatever location this may be in Serbia. Freedom to conduct public church ceremonies in all religious faiths will be guaranteed to all citizens of Serbia and to foreigners and no obstacle shall be made in their relations with their spiritual fathers.” Quoted after: D. Bogdanovic, op. cit., p. 184. Citizen equality regardless of religion was provided for in all the fundamental laws that Serbia promulgated in the period from 1888 to 1919. 15) Nevertheless, members of the Jemiet and other Albanian political organizations nurtured their irredentist objectives and in 1941 were recruited to work in offices of the puppet state of “Greater Albania” which was created under Italian protectorate. 16) The activity of Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohia had the support of the Albanian and Italian authorities. The Italian minister of foreign affairs, Count Cianno, had written at that time: “We must lull the Yugoslavs. But later, our politics must energetically deal with Kosovo. This will keep the irredentist problem alive in the Balkans, engage the attention of the Albanians and be a knife aimed at the back of Yugoslavia.” Quoted after: D. Bogdanovic, op.cit., p. 191. 84 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International 17) The positions of Serbian Social Democrats on relations between the two nations may be found in the book of their leader Dimitrije Tucovic, Serbia and Albania - A Contribution to Critics of the Aggressive Policy of the Serbian Bourgeoisie, published in 1914, in which he criticizes the policy of the Serbian government towards the Albanians during the Balkan wars. Contemporary Serbian historians are of the opinion that Tucovic’s views about Serbian-Albanian relations were under the influence of Austrian social democrats. 18) See: Rexhep Ismaili, Albanians and South-Eastern Europe (Aspects of Identity), in: D. Janjic and S. Maliqi (eds.), Conflict or Dialogue - SerbianAlbanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans, Open University, Subotica 1994. 19) See: Milan Komatina, Enver Hodja i jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi (Enver Hoxha and Yugoslav-Albanian Relations), Sluzbeni list SRJ, Beograd 1995. 20) Vladimir Dedijer, Yugoslav-Albanian Relations, pp. 126-127. 21) On this point , see: M. Komatina, ibid. 22) D. Bogdanovic, op. cit., p. 239. 23) After the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution, a “positive discrimination” of the Albanians in Kosovo took place: bilingualism became a condition for employment in public services; 80 percent of the available posts were reserved for Albanians on a parity basis; national quotas were strictly applied when nominations were made for public functions; the University of Pristina became the largest Albanian higher school; the Academy of Science and the Arts of Kosovo was actually an Albanian academy; in the mid-eighties an Albanian (Sinan Hasani) became president of the Presidency of the SFRY, and so on. Total Albanization of public life, that is the establishment of ethnic Albanian domination in the province, resulted in discrimination of the non-Albanian population in everyday life and their “ethnic cleansing” out of Kosovo and Metohia. 24) Source: B. Krstic, op. cit., p. 193. 25) Source: B. Krstic, op. cit., p. 243. 26) Voyvodina’s Assembly in February, and the Assembly of Kosovo in March 1989; out of a total of 180 members of parliament in Kosovo, only 10 had voted against and 2 abstained. 27) Dusan Janjic, Socialism, Federalism and Nationalism, Sociology, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3/1992, p. 319. 28) Zoran M. Lutovac, Minorities, the CSCE and the Yugoslav Crisis, IDN & IMPP, Belgrade 1995, p. 113. 29) It deserves to be noted that already by 22 October Albania had recognized the “independence of Kosovo” and opened a “diplomatic mission of the Republic of Kosovo” in Tirana in an obvious attempt at internationalizing the “Kosovo issue”. Endeavors of the Albanians of Kosovo to get the support of the European Community and the United Nations for a “Republic of Kosovo” (a request was even made for the deployment of the “Blue Helmets”), did not bring any results, however. See Dusan Janjic, National Identity, Movement and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians, in: D. Janjic and S. Maliqi (eds.), Conflict or Dialogue..., op.cit., p. 161. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 85 International 30) Ibid, p. 115. 31) Kosovo as a State, special edition of the magazine Republika, No. 3. 32) The convention of Serbian and Albanian intellectuals in Budapest and the visit of a delegation of the Democratic Alliance in Belgrade 1993; meeting held at the Swiss Embassy in the summer of 1994; contacts between the SPS and the Socialist Party of Albania in 1995, etc. 33) On their return from a visit to the Institute of International Politics and Economics of Belgrade in October 1993, which had a strictly academic character, three representatives of the Democratic Alliance of Tirana were accused in Albania and among the Albanians of Kosovo for national treason and collaboration with Belgrade! 34) “Albanians joined the Croatian army voluntarily and with their weapons ... It is a known fact that there were many esteemed Albanian officers of high rank who joined the Croatian army and not just ordinary soldiers; they contributed to Croatia’s victories so far against the Serbian army.” Behar Zogiani, Granic’s ProSerbian Position on Kosovo, Buyku, quoted after: TANJUG BBS, 27 February 1996. 35) Apart from the Albanian language media controlled by the official authorities of Kosovo, there are a number of independent newspapers and magazines in Albanian language expressing very critical attitudes towards the authorities of Serbia. 36) So far, only one Albanian, Hayrie Rugova from Pristina, has been elected at the last party congress (March 1996) to the leading bodies of the SPS. 37) Zoran M. Lutovac, op. cit., p. 97. On this matter see: Vladimir Goati, Dilemmas Concerning the Institutional Development of Third Yugoslavia, Arhiv za pravne i drustvene nauke, No. 2/1994, pp. 247-270; Vladan Kutlesic: State of the Constitutions of Serbia and Montenegro, Their Constitutionality, Legality and Conformity with the Yugoslav Constitution, Arhiv za pravne i drustvene nauke, No. 3/1994, pp. 382-392. 38) As the Albanians had boycotted the 1991 population census, an estimate was made on the basis of the previous 1981 census (the number of Albanians in the whole of the former Yugoslavia was then 1,340,796) and data relating to the natural demographic growth. Albanian political parties deny this figure and claim that there are more than 2,000,000 Albanians living in FR Yugoslavia. The census boycott in Yugoslavia in 1991 and in FYR Macedonia in 1994, the latter conducted under international supervision, make the data produced in Albanian sources open to founded suspicion. 39) Article 20 of the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia reads: “All citizens are equal without distinction as to national origin, race, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, education, social status, property and other individual features. All are equal before the law. Everyone is obliged to respect the freedom and rights of others and is responsible for same.” 40) Article 50 of the Constitution. 86 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Der Kosovokonflikt: Bemerkungen und Fragen George Pumphrey Bonn Auf dem Balkan folgt eine Krisenmeldung auf die andere. Dieses Mal brennt die Lunte im Kosovo. Es war vorauszusehen. Wie Bosnien zuvor, wird der Kosovo zum Dauerbrenner erklärt. Staatsangehörigkeit soll keine Rolle spielen, sondern die Probleme werden wieder auf Volksgruppenzugehörigkeit reduziert. Es gibt wieder nur die Bösen und die Guten, die Täter und die Opfer, die Serben und diesmal die Albaner. Nicht das Tun sondern das Sein ist bestimmend. Darüber sind hierzulande Regierende und Opposition wesentlich einer Meinung. Die quasi-totalitär gleichgeschalteten Medien hierzulande, mit ihrer Flut von nichtssagenden Bildern und vielsagenden Interpretationen, Nachrichten, die nicht auf Fakten sondern auf Gerüchten basieren, zielen auf die Einteilung in Weiß und Schwarz, lassen keine Grautöne mehr zu, schließen Zweifel und Fragen aus. Das Erschreckende dabei ist doch, daß für den übergroßen Teil der bundesdeutschen Opposition der Balkan nur noch in "Ethnien" existiert und grundlegende Widersprüche, die für jede Gesellschaft gelten, keinerlei Bedeutung auf dem Balkan mehr haben sollen: z. B. Widersprüche innerhalb der "Volksgruppen" selbst zwischen Friedensbewegten und Kriegstreibern, zwischen den Kompromiß Suchenden und jenen, die jeden Kompromiß von vorneherein ausschließen, zwischen Arm und Reich, Links und Rechts.... Nach dem Motto "Macht besteht darin, Realität zu definieren und sie durch Handeln in die gewünschte DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 87 International Richtung zu bewegen" haben die Meister der veröffentlichten Meinung es verstanden, unser ehemals progressives Vokabular für ihre Zwecke zu vereinnahmen. Progressive Begriffe von gestern wie "Selbstbestimmungsrecht" - als es um Antikolonialismus ging - werden heute in ihrer Auswirkung ins Gegenteil gewandelt, um neue Apartheid-Situationen ungeniert zu rechtfertigen. Ähnlich mit dem Begriff "Menschenrecht": früher geltend als Kampfbegriff gegen Kolonialismus, Apartheid, Sklaverei und Ausbeutung, für die Anerkennung als Mensch (im Gegensatz zum "Untermenschen") als gleichwertiges Subjekt in der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung der Welt, wird er heute selektiv für eine Bevölkerungsgruppe reklamiert und einer anderen faktisch abgesprochen, indem sie als sprach- und rechtloses Objekt des Weltgeschehens vom elitären "Klub der Menschheit" ausgegrenzt bzw. ferngehalten wird. Besonders wichtig für Friedensbewegte und Linke ist, nicht an umdefinierten Begriffen festzuhalten, sondern die Prinzipien auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen, die diesen Begriffen in der Vergangenheit zugrunde lagen. Nicht ethnisch und national, sondern Völkerverständigung und Internationalismus! Als Anstoß für Überlegungen, die zu einer Rückeroberung unserer Begrifflichkeit führen, im Folgenden einige Bermerkungen und Fragen zum Kosovokonflikt. 1. Albanischer Nationalismus Daß die serbische Regierung ihren Teil Schuld trägt, daß der Konflikt eskalierte, ist - denke ich - unumstritten. Aber die Regierung hat nicht in einem luftleeren Raum gehandelt. Was wäre denn die Antwort jeder anderen Regierung gegenüber jeder anderen sezessionistichen Bewegung die Gewalt anwendet? Dies entschuldigt in keiner Weise Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die auf beiden Seiten verübt werden. Der albanische Nationalismus betrifft nicht nur Kosovo, sondern als Staatsbürger andere Nationen leben Albaner zerstreut über die ganze Region. Es wird berichtet, 88 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International daß ein Großteil der materiellen Unterstützung für die Aufständischen in Kosovo aus Albanien kommt. Soll ein Groß-Albanien besser sein als ein Groß-Serbien? 2. Die "Internationalisierung" des Kosovokonflikts Das Anwenden zweierlei Maßstäbe für sich selbst und für schwächere Nationen wird heute in den stärkeren und starken Nationen auch von der Opposition weitgehend kritiklos hingenommen. Während sich Frankreich, Italien, Großbritannien, Deutschland, die USA und Rußland in London treffen um serbische Polizeiaktionen gegen Terroranschläge albanischer Sezessionisten zu verurteilen, kommt keiner auf die Idee Großbritannien nach seinen Armeeaktionen gegen die Nordiren oder französische Polizeiaktionen gegen terroristische korsische Seperatisten, oder den "Vermittler" Gonzales nach Spaniens Antwort auf terroristische Anschläge im Baskenland zu fragen, um nur diese zu erwähnen. Welcher dieser Staaten der Kontaktgruppe duldet denn eine Gewaltanwendung gegen ihren jeweiligen Staatsapparat ohne massiv dagegen vorzugehen - und daß die BRD diesbezüglich nicht gerade zimperlich ist, braucht nicht ausgeführt zu werden. Unter Berufung auf nebulöse "Menschenrechte," die weder für alle noch überall reklamiert werden, werden vorhandene völkerrechtliche Verträge und internationale Normen außer Kraft gesetzt und ein Gesetzdes-Dschungels gegen schwächere Länder eingeführt. Nur Rußland scheint zu erkennen, welche Gefahr eine solche Initiative in sich bergen kann. Die internationale Kontaktgruppe ist zum einen gegen die Sezession des Kosovo und zum anderen gegen Gewaltanwendung durch die serbische Polizei bei der Entwaffnung zunehmend gewalttätiger albanischer Sezessionisten. Dies konnte zum einen Belgrad’s Auffassung bestätigen, der Kosovo sei ein interner Konflikt zum anderen mußte es die Sezessionisten ermutigen bewaffnete Auseindersetzungen zu provozieren, wohlwissend, daß die Serben dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden. Diese DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 89 International widersprüchlichen Signale können den Konflikt nur anheizen und verlängern. Im Kosovo haben wir eine Situation wie in Bosnien: die Sezessionisten sind nicht stark genug um sich militärisch durchzusetzen, deshalb brauchen sie "internationale Intervention". "Die politische Führung der Kosovo-Albaner begrüßte dagegen in einer ersten Stellungnahme die Londoner Beschlüsse vom Vortag als "ersten und wichtigen Schritt" zur Internationalisierung des Konflikts, bedauerte aber zugleich, daß nicht deutlicher Druck auf Belgrad ausgeübt worden sei. Auch die albanische Regierung in Tirana begrüßte den Plan der Kontaktgruppe" heißt es in der Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 11.3.98. "Im Gespräch mit der türkischen Zeitung Milliyet forderte eine Vertreterin der Demokratischen Liga des Kosovo (LDK), der wichtigsten albanischen Partei, die Entsendung von NatoTruppen, um noch mehr Blutvergießen zu verhüten. "Die internationale Gemeinschaft und die Nato sollten handeln, um eine weitere Tragödie wie in Bosnien zu verhindern", sagte Edita Tahiri, die in der LDK für Außenbeziehungen zuständig ist." (AFP 04.03.1998) 3. Die besondere Rolle Deutschlands Wenn Klaus Kinkel laut AFP (02.03.1998) "Terrorismus und Gewalt, egal von welcher Seite sie ausgingen" verurteilt, ob er da auch die UCK und ihren politischen Flügel LPK meint?. Die LPK hat sich in Deutschland zusammengefunden und ist heute noch unter dem Namen "Demokratische Vereinigung der Albaner in Deutschland" mit Sitz in Siegburg vertreten. Albanische nationalistische Gruppen, darunter diverse sich "marxistisch-leninistische" nennende, genießen seit Jahren Bewegungs- und Organisationsfreiheit in der BRD - schon erstaunlich wenn man sie mit der Behandlung der PKK in der BRD vergleicht. Agenturmeldungen berichten, daß es Kinkel war, der die Kontaktgruppe in London zusammentrommelte um Kosovo zu diskutieren. Aus der anfänglichen Kritik am deutschen Alleingang in bezug auf die Abspaltung Kroatiens und Sloweniens lernend, achtet 90 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Kinkel nun darauf, in "Koordinierung" mit den anderen Mächten zu handeln. Vorpreschen will die BRD diesmal also nicht. Wie heute im Fall Kosovo, lehnten 1991 die USA und die europäischen Mächte das Auseinanderbrechen Jugoslawiens ab. Die Ablehnung damals hielt bekannterweise nicht lange vor, nachdem die BRD Ende 1991 Kroatien und Slowenien anerkannte. Die doppeldeutigen Signale der Kontaktgruppe heute, die ständige Betonung Kinkels, der jetzige status quo müsse einer umfassenden Autonomie weichen, und die weitere Zuspitzung des Konflikts - eben auch durch ein nicht zu erwartendes Ablassen von großalbanischen Bestrebungen - lassen die Frage aufkommen, wie lange die Ablehnung diesmal währen wird. In diesem Zusammenhang sei daran erinnert, was Rupert Scholz 1991 zu Beginn des Bürgerkrieges in Jugoslawien, anläßlich einer gemeinsamen Tagung der Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände mit Bundewehrgeneräle zum Thema "Fragen an das Selbstverständnis der Deutschen" von sich gab. Laut Protokoll äußerte Scholz, "daß dieser Jugoslawienkonflikt unbestreitbar fundamental gesamteuropäische Bedeutung hat"; während die Folgen des Zweiten Weltkrieges überwunden seien, ging es nun darum, "noch die Folgen des Ersten Weltkrieges zu bewältigen", Jugoslawien sei "eine sehr künstliche, mit dem Selbstbestimmungsrecht nie vereinbar gewesene Konstruktion". Für Scholz hieß das, "daß (...) Kroatien und Slowenien völkerrechtlich unmittelbar anerkannt werden müssen. Wenn eine solche Anerkennung erfolgt ist, dann handelt es sich im Jugoslawienkonflikt nicht mehr um ein innenpolitisches Problem Jugoslawiens", eine international Intervention sei dann möglich." (IG-Medien Zeitschrift M) BRD 4. Die ethnische Komponente der Außenpolitik der Zu bedenken ist, daß ein wesentlicher Aspekt der Außenpolitik der BRD für diese Region Europas ethnisch begründet ist. Diese "völkische" Herangehensweise setzt DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 91 International voraus, daß Völker ver schiedener Ethnien nicht in Frieden (weiter) leben können. Das Motto "1 Volk, 1 Führung, 1 Boden" scheint sich wieder durchzusetzen. Aber völkisch will man es heute natürlich nicht mehr nennen, man nennt es "ethnisch" damit es besser zur Waffe "Menschenrechtspolitik" paßt. Diese völkische Politik führt nicht nur auf dem Balkan zu einer Katastrophe. Was wäre wenn sie sich in den anderen Vielvölkerstaaten durchsetzen würde wie Frankreich, Großbritannien, Spanien und Italien? Dies ist Apartheidpolitik auf Europäisch. Washington DC, die Hauptstadt der USA ist 80% schwarz und 20% nichtschwarz. Wenn die 80% nun beschließen, sie wollen nicht mehr den "weißen" USA angehören, sondern sich mit Afrika verbünden? Oder große Teile des Südwestens der USA, die mehrheitlich Chicano sind, möchten sich Mexiko zuschlagen, oder Miami Cuba? Oder gar: Was wäre, wenn die Deutschen in den Grenzregionen Polens ihre Sezession und Anschluß an Deutschland proklamieren? "Ethnisch" alles nachvollziehbar oder zu rechtfertigen? Oder anders gefragt: wann und wo sollen wir völkische Politik gutheißen oder "ethnische" Lösungen unterstützen, wo und wann nicht? Oder muß linke Politik nicht eine ganz andere Ebene beschreiten? Die Ost-WestKonfrontation wurde durch "ethnischen Konflikt" ersetzt und im internationalen Denken als maßgebliche politische Kategorie inzwischen etabliert. Wie oft werden derartige Konflikte jedoch vorgeschoben und bewußt geschürt um ganz andere Machtinteressen zu kaschieren und zu verfolgen? Das völkische Denkmuster führt unweigerlich in die Aufteilung in "gutes" und "böses" Volk, in ein Volk mit "Menschen"rechten und eines ohne, wie die "internationale Gemeinschaft" bereits mit Jugoslawien vorgeführt hat und heute immer noch vorführt. Nur zwei Beispiele: ein Sezessionsrecht für Kroatien bzw. Bosnien-Herzegowina, aber Weigerung des gleichen für kroatische Serben bzw. bosnische Serben um in Jugoslawien zu bleiben, "Rückkehrrecht" für Flüchtlinge aus Gebieten, die in der heutigen Republika Srpska liegen, aber keins für Flüchtlinge aus der Föderation. Die Designierung eines bösen Volkes und 92 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International die einseitige Parteinahme von außen mußte den Krieg anheizen und ging soweit, daß allein die Reklamierung der Rechtengleichheit für alle Beteiligte als "pro-serbisch" diffamiert wird. Gerade Linke in Deutschland hätten jeden Grund skeptisch gegenüber völkischen, "ethnischen" Erklärungen, Denkmustern und "Lösungen" zu sein... Nach all den leidvollen Erfahrungen dieses Jahrunderts muß die Linke offensiv Internationalismus und Völkerverständigung am Ende des Jahrhunderts fordern und auf die Tagesordnung des kommenden Jahrhunderts setzen. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 93 International 94 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Les sanctions, à quoi servent-elles ? Dragas Keseljevic, Marko Krstic, Djordje Radovanovitch * L’évolution récente de la situation au Kosovo a suscité une campagne réclamant de nouvelles sanctions contre la Yougoslavie, alors que toutes les précédentes, appliquées depuis 1992, ne sont pas encore levées ! Les médias, surtout d’outre-Atlantique, demandent un nouvel embargo et des actions punitives à condition qu’il n’y ait pas de victimes dans les rangs des forces militaires américaines faisant partie des troupes de l’ONU ou de l’OTAN ! Récemment, à propos de l’Irak, les plus hautes autorités françaises ont exprimé leur préférence pour la voie diplomatique et émis des doutes sur l’efficacité de l’embargo qui touche les populations et non les régimes en place. Effectivement, les expériences d’embargo aussi bien en Yougoslavie que contre Cuba et l’Irak, confirment le bienfondé de ce point de vue. A la différence de ces deux derniers, en Yougoslavie, le peuple avait réagi avec éclat contre le régime antidémocratique. Au cours de l’hiver 1996/97, le peuple serbe, privé de tout, avec une économie en ruines, un chômage qui atteignait 50%, supportant, sans aide internationale appropriée, la charge de presque 700 000 réfugiés, avait trouvé la force, dans un sursaut inattendu, de manifester sans relâche contre le pouvoir pendant trois mois et par un temps exécrable. Certes, les leaders de l’opposition démocratique, hissés au premier plan par la révolte populaire, avaient été reçu ensuite dans les capitales occidentales dont les médias s’étaient montrés, pour une fois, bienveillants, en saluant le réveil de "l’autre DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 95 International Serbie". Hélas ! Provisoirement ébranlé, le régime antidémocratique profitant des dissensions au sein de l’opposition, mais surtout de l’appui et de la reconnaissance des Etats-Unis, des gouvernements de l’Union européenne et de la faveur des diplomates et des multiples négociateurs et médiateurs internationaux, a réussi, non seulement à se maintenir, mais à renfoncer sa mainmise sur le pays épuisé, à bout de souffle. Pendant ce temps de la révolte démocratique en Serbie et au Monténégro, l’opposition albanaise au Kosovo n’a pas bougé, elle n’a, malheureusement, pas essayé de prendre contact avec l’opposition serbe, ni donné suite aux avances de celle-ci. On oublie généralement, en particulier les Albanais du Kosovo, qu’à la veille de la tragédie yougoslave, en mars 1991, le régime et ses dirigeants, tous - comme c’est le cas encore aujourd’hui, anciens titistes et communistes - avaient sorti l’armée et les chars dans les rues de Belgrade contre les manifestants et qu’il y a eu, à cette occasion, des morts et des blessés. Contrairement à l’assertion d’un sociologue connu sur le "total-nationalisme" serbe, à Belgrade et en Yougoslavie les événements au Kosovo n’ont provoqué aucune manifestation contre les Albanais, ni incidents avec les nombreux Albanais qui travaillent en Serbie, en dehors du Kosovo. D’ailleurs, pendant la tragédie yougoslave, les Serbes de Serbie n’ont pas montré un empressement particulier envers leurs frères de Croatie et de Bosnie. Plus de 100 000 jeunes appelés ont esquivé de servir dans l’armée populaire yougoslave, ce qui est un fait unique dans la longue histoire du peuple serbe ! Les observateurs étrangers n’ont pu constater aucune attitude hostile du peuple serbe à l’égard des 109 000 Croates vivant en Serbie, des 240 000 musulmans, d’une dizaine de milliers de réfugiés Musulmans de Bosnie, des Slovènes et autres. Alors que les nationalistes croates ont forcé l’exode d’environ 500 000 Serbes, dont 250 000 de Krajina sous les yeux du monde entier qui n’a pas réagi ! Actuellement, le nettoyage ethnique achevé, il ne reste plus que 2% de Serbes en Croatie ! Un phénomène similaire s’est 96 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International produit en Slovénie à l’encontre des non-Slovènes qui y habitaient ! Le problème du Kosovo relève de “la quadrature du cercle” comme s’en aperçoivent les nombreux diplomates et services américains, dont l’arrogance dans les affaires yougoslaves est aussi inefficace que partiale. Pour les Serbes, paradoxalement, le fait d’avoir été, pendant les deux dernières grandes guerres, du côté des démocraties occidentales, représente, aujourd’hui, un handicap. Il ne faut pas oublier, qu’au cours de la dernière guerre, 60 000 Serbes ont été expulsés du Kosovo par le pouvoir nazi albanais que les Allemands et les Italiens avaient mis en place, puis interdits de retour, après 1945, par le régime titiste. L’événement majeur de l’histoire des peuples balkaniques a été l’invasion turque, d’un côté et la vassalisation et conquête du Nord des Balkans par l’empire habsbourgeois, de l’autre. Au Kosovo, lors de la bataille décisive contre les Turcs, en 1389, à la tête de la résistance balkanique se trouvait le prince serbe Lazare, mais aussi les représentants d’autres peuples parmi lesquels les Albanais. En combattant pour leur liberté, les Serbes ont pris une part active dans la lutte pour la liberté et l’indépendance de tous les peuples balkaniques. Un bon connaisseur polonais de l’histoire et des problèmes yougoslaves, C. Bobrowski, écrivait que "dans sa lutte, la Serbie n’a joui de l’appui des grandes puissances que par intermittence. Elle ne s’intégrait dans aucun des desseins durables formés par l’une quelconque de ces puissances, tandis que son histoire et sa géographie avaient de bonne heure donné à entendre qu’elle ferait un mauvais vassal . . . Il n’est pas étonnant dans ces conditions que le mythe - en bonne partie fondé - de la liberté conquise de haute lutte . . ., liberté qui n’est ni un don de ciel ni des puissances alliées, soit devenu l’une des composantes essentielles de la psychologie serbe" (1). Toutes les sanctions économiques contre les Serbes touchent non seulement la Yougoslavie (la Serbie et le Monténégro) qui, par sa position centrale dans les Balkans, contrôle toutes les voies principales, terrestres et fluviales, de DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 97 International la région, mais aussi la Hongrie, la Roumanie, la Macédoine, l’Albanie, la Bulgarie, la Grèce et la Turquie. Sur la complexité tragique de la question du Kosovo s’est exprimé, il y a plus de deux décennies, en 1975, avec une rare clairvoyance, André Malraux lors d’un entretien avec l’écrivain serbe Zivorad Stojkovic, récemment disparu : "J’ai beaucoup de sympathie pour votre pays : j’ai admiré la Serbie durant la Grande Guerre; j’ai été impressionné par l’organisation et la force de votre Résistance pendant la dernière guerre ; j’ai gardé le souvenir de la Yougoslavie d’avant-guerre, bien qu’elle fut une monarchie, pour son opposition au fascisme, pour avoir refusé de s’allier à l’Axe. Au prix d’une guerre ! . . Mais, ajoutait-il comme un reproche: ". . . Vous êtes dans une situation néfaste. Vous avez raison, votre Algérie est dans votre Orléanais. Si le Kosovo n’était que le pays de votre histoire, ce ne serait pas l’essentiel, mais il est au coeur de votre culture, et la culture, puisque c’est le bien le plus précieux que l’on possède, n’appartient jamais au passé. Je pressens plus que je ne comprends l’ensemble de la question. En plus de la détermination, il faut avoir le courage d’aborder toutes les possibilités de solution raisonnable, ce qui ne veut pas dire des solutions molles. C’est absurde, j’ai l’air de vous donner des conseils, alors que je ne fais que parler sincèrement, en ami . . ." (2). Ce conseil est toujours valable. Il faut rechercher "toutes les possibilités de solution raisonnable". Le récent développement, en particulier le voyage à Belgrade des ministres des affaires étrangères de la France et de l’Allemagne, a enfin ébauché une perspective constructive et des méthodes appropriées pour se diriger vers une solution pacifique tenant compte, d’une façon impartiale, des intérêts légitimes des deux parties en conflit. Il est évident - et les deux ministres l’ont formellement reconnu - qu’outre le facteur démographique, la prépondérance numérique de la population albanaise, il y en a d’autres, non moins importants, en premier lieu l’intégrité territoriale de la Fédération yougoslave, les droits historiques du peuple serbe, la sauvegarde et la protection de ses sanctuaires, le respect des droits des minorités 98 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International nationales et religieuses, qui doivent être pris en considération et garantis par l’ONU, et en particulier par les Etats-Unis, la Russie et les pays de l’Union européenne. ____________________________________________________________________ * Fondateurs du Groupe de Paris, qui, depuis 1971, rassemble les intellectuels originaires de l’Europe du Centre et de l’Est, y compris la Russie ____________________________________________________________________ (1) C. Bobrowski : La Yougoslavie socialiste, p. 15, 16 et 17, Armand Colin, Paris 1956. (2) Zivorad Stojkovic : “Une utopie obligatoire ?”, p. 464/5/6, Revue des Etudes slaves, tome 56, Fascicule 3, Paris 1984. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 99 International 100 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International documents LA LOI DE NON-RETOUR DE 1945-1946 Commentaire de 1989 et textes de 1945 et 1946 I - COMMENTAIRE (Politika, vendredi 10 March 1989) Prof.Dr. Gavrilo Perazic: “A DECISION DE 1945 CONCERNANT L’INTERDICTION DU RETOUR DES COLONS DANS LEUR FOYERS EST JURIDIQUEMENT INVALIDE” Le Comité de coordination de la conférence féderative SSRNJ (Fédération Socialiste de la République des Peuples Yougoslaves) vient d’approuver l’initiative du Forum yougoslave pour les droits de l’homme concernant l’annulation de la décision du Comité National de Libération de la Yougoslavie (NKOJ) du 6 mars 1945. Dans l’argumentation de l’initiative, le Pr.Dr.Gavrilo Perazic a exposé en sept points les arguments avec lesquels il prouve que la décision mentionnée est juridiquement invalide. 1) Jusqu’à récemment inaccessible au public, la Décision NKOJ (no 153) du 6 mars 1945, intitulée “Interdiction provisoire de retour aux colons sur les lieux de leurs habitations d’autrefois” a provoqué l’indignation justifiée de toute l’opinion yougoslave. Particulièrement aujourd’hui quand, sous la pression des séparatistes albanais, le Kosovo se nettoie éthniquement, la conscience juridique doit se demander quelle erreur juridique fatale ont pu commettre les dirigeants de l’Etat (le gouvernement encore provisoire de la guerre) pour qu’elle frappe encore aujourd’hui par ses conséquences. En tant que juriste, je considère que cette décision est DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 101 International juridiquement défectueuse pour les motifs suivants: a) Déjà dans le terme “interdiction” est comprise, bien sür, la sanction si l’interdiction est violée. Avec le terme “colons” le NKOJ, c’est-à-dire son Commissaire aux Affaires intérieures, fait une discrimination parmi les habitants du Kosovo et de la Métohie, mettant ceux que frappe l’interdiction dans la situation de citoyens nonprotégés, au sens de leur libre choix de résidence en Yougoslavie et de leur liberté de disposer de leurs biens. Est-ce que cette décision ne leur a pas ôté le droit de citoyen dans ces régions, en considérant ces territoires — ceux sur lesquels il leur est interdit de retourner — comme des lieux d’habitation provisoire, et leur déniant le droit d’y fonder leur vie? Les droits supprimés illégalement b) En qualifiant cette interdiction de “provisoire” et en l’accompagnant d’une argumentation consciencieuse pour que ces gens ne s’exposent pas aux dépenses et aux inconvénients, avec la promesse que tout rentrera dans l’ordre moyennant une décision particulière concernant “qui pourra déménager, quand et dans quelle partie du pays”, le Commission aux Affaires intérieures prive visiblement ces citoyens de leur droit de récupérer les biens qui leur ont été enlevés par la force et de réintégrer leurs foyers confisqués illégalement par l’occupant. 2) L’infraction la plus drastique qui caractérise cette décision est le manque de respect des règles standard existant depuis toujours en matière de droits internationaux, qui condamnent les déportations et les expulsions forcées des territoires occupés, et qui incluent ces actes dans les crimes internationaux pour lesquels beaucoup de chefs allemands entre autres ont été condamnés à Nuremberg et par d’autres tribunaux après la Seconde guerre mondiale. En fait, on sait que l’Albanie avait le statut de protectorat d’Italie, et que par le decret du roi d’Italie et du Régent albanais du 12 juillet 1941, la plus grande partie du Kosovo et de la Métohija a été annexée à la grande Albanie, où ont été modifiés l’ordre constitutionnel, l’organisation administrative, etc., ce qui est contraire au droit international. 3) A cette époque, des dizaines de milliers de réfugiés de la Macédoine, du Kosovo et de la Metohie ont fui leur foyer et, pour sauver leur vie, ont émigré en Serbie et dans le Monténegro. Sous la protection de l’occupant italien, le pouvoir du Quisling grandalbanais a entrepris la dénationalisation et la persécution des citoyens d’origine non albanaise, au premier chef des Serbes et des Montenegrins. A partir de ce fondement anti-juridique, qui est en soi un crime 102 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International de guerre, se sont perpétrés d’autres crimes selon le droit international, comme la déportation forcée sur une base religieuse et nationale, et d’autres. Dans l’article no 6 du Statut du Tribunal International Militaire de Nuremberg, sous la clause no 6, il est dit que parmi les crimes contre l’humanité figurent “l’assassinat, l’extermination..., la déportation et d’autres actes inhumains... exécutés contre n’importe quelle population civile, avant ou après la durée de la guerre, ou la persécution sur une base politique et religieuse”, ou n’importe quel autre crime ressortant de la compétence du Tribunal, sans tenir compte du fait que les actes violent ou ne violent pas les lois du pays où les crimes ont eu lieu. Il est évident qu’ici le principal coupable, d’après le Droit international, est l’occupant. Mais également le pouvoir Quisling local. C’est-à-dire que le pouvoir fantoche albanais n’est pas déchargé de sa responsabilité concernant ces actes, parce que, selon l’article no 8 du Statut du Tribunal, “le fait que l’accusé ait agi sur l’ordre de son gouvernement ou de son supérieur ne le déchargera pas de ses responsabilités”... Mais on peut considérer le cas comme une raison d’adoucir la peine si le Tribunal trouve que la justice l’exige. En même temps, les “chefs, les organisateurs, les provocateurs ou les collaborateurs qui ont pris part à la conception ou l’exécution d’un plan commun pour la réalisation de ces crimes, sont considérés comme responsables.” Les doutes concernant la légalité de la Décision 4) Il est d’une importance capitale de souligner que ces actes ne se périment pas (Conventions concernant la non-péremption des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l’humanité, Journal officiel de la Fédération Socialiste de la République de Yougoslavie, 50/1970). Indépendamment de la date à laquelle ils ont été commis, il n’existe pas de péremption pour les crimes suivants: a) d’après la définition du Statut international..., les crimes de guerre; b) les crimes contre l’humanité...” Les Etats s’obligent à entreprendre dans leurs législations les mesures relatives à la poursuite et à la condamnation des crimes indiqués, et à la suppression des décisions de péremption de tels crimes si celles-ci existent. 5) Nous désirons souligner un fait qui jette le doute sur la légalité de cette décision (relative à l’interdiction de retour): le président du NKOJ a, le 5 mars 1945, présenté à l’AVNOJ (Comité Anti-fasciste de Libération Yougoslave) la démission de cet organisme, selon ce qui avait été prévu dans l’accord avec le gouvernement royal, le 2 novembre 1944. Dans cet acte ne figure pas la date de son entrée en vigueur, bien que la loi elle-même concernant la dissolution du NKOJ (Comité National de Libération de la Yougoslavie) ait été DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 103 International promulguée le 7 mars de cette année et soit entrée en vigueur le jour de sa proclamation. Cet intervalle du 5 au 7 mars n’aurait pas dû être utilisé aux fins de prendre cette décision par un organe qui avait cessé d’exister, puisque c’est seulement par la suite qu’a été créé le gouvernement unique de la DFJ (Fédération Démocratique de Yougoslavie). 6) Le NKOJ a donc promulgué une décision pendant que la guerre durait encore. De cette manière, cet organisme a objectivement amnistié le crime de persécution des Serbes et des Monténégrins du Kosovo au lieu de condamner les procédés qui les ont amenés à abandonner leurs foyers, c’est-à-dire la dénationalisation, la déportation et la fuite forcée. Sans entrer dans les motivations politiques, objectivement, juridiquement, même s’il s’agit de nos propres concitoyens auxquels on a promis des compensations, cet organisme n’avait pas ce droit. Etant donné que les actes ci-dessus sont considérés comme des crimes internationaux, il n’appartient pas à un gouvernement national de prendre une décision arbitraire concernant le traitement de ces crimes, ce dernier doit se plier au Droit international. 7) Il est urgent aujourd’hui, justement parce que ces crimes ne se périment pas, que l’instance la plus haute de la SFRJ, l’Assemblée de la SFRJ, confirme publiquement l’invalidité juridique de cet acte ab initio, car il a indubitablement fourni aux séparatistes le fondement de leurs actions, dès les premiers jours de l’après-guerre, en vue de la réalisation d’un Kosovo et d’une Métohie ethniquement purs. C’est de cette façon qu’on réfutera le dernier argument des séparatistes albanais (à coté de l’annulation de la résolution de Bujan), et qu’on empêchera leurs inspirateurs de se servir de n’importe quel motif juridique pour leurs troubles entreprises. II - TEXTES DES LOIS Journal Officiel, dimanche 5 août 1945, no 56, pages 510 et 511. 527. Dans le but de réparer les dommages causés aux droits des propriétaires et aux intérêts des agriculteurs indigènes sur les territoires de la Macédoine et de la région du Kosovo-Métohie, par la colonisation et la réforme agraire basée sur la loi et les décisions prises avant le 6 avril 1941, la Présidence du Comité Antifasciste de Libération Nationale de la Yougoslavie, conformément à l’article no 4 de la Decision du corps populaire suprême législatif et exécutif représentatif de la Yougoslavie, décide ce qui suit: LA LOI 104 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International Concernant la révision de la distribution des terre aux colons et aux intéressés agraires en Macédoine et en Kosovo-Métohie. (Les articles 1 et 2 ne concernent que la Macédoine.) Article 3 1 - Sont annulés tous les baux féodaux ou semi-féodaux (tels ceux de serfs) au Kosovo et dans la Métohie et sont proclamés tous les fermiers-locataires comme propriétaires des terres sur lesquelles ils ont travaillé. 2 - Les personnes qui, dans cette région, pratiquaient exclusivement l’agriculture et qui entretenaient la terre comme serfs, métayers, et fermiers-locataires au moins depuis l’année 1935, ne possédant pas d’autres terres ou n’en possédant pas suffisamment, sont déclarés propriétaires des terres qu’ils cultivent. Article 4 Les colons à qui ont été distribuées des terres dans les régions du Kosovo et de la Métohie jusqu’au 6 avril 1941, perdent leurs droits dans les conditions suivantes: a) si la terre d’un propriétaire privé leur a été distribuée, étant donné que chaque agriculteur ayant cultivé sa terre est considéré comme propriétaire, nonobstant le fait qu’il ait ou n’ait pas un titre de propriété foncière concernant cette terre ou qu’il ait travaillé sur cette terre comme serf ou locataire permanent; b) si, après 1918, ils étaient installé sur les terres des Shqiptar - les émigrants politiques; c) s’ils n’étaient pas des agriculteurs, et qu’ils ont reçu la terre en tant que gendarmes, employés des finances ou semblables, pour services rendus aux régimes anti-nationaux; d) s’ils vivaient de la terre distribuées comme des rentiers. Article 5 Pour tous les cas de l’article 4 figurant dans la loi, une décision sera prise au plus tard le 1er septembre 1945, par une commission mixte des délégués du ministère de l’Agriculture de la Serbie, et de délégués régionaux du Comité national de la région de Kosovo-Métohie. Article 6 1 - Les colons-agriculteurs sur le territoire du Kosovo et de la Métohie qui, d’après cette loi, perdent les terres préalablement distribuées, obtiendront, sous la condition de ne pas appartenir aux groupes c) et d) de l’article 4, une compensation en terre dans un autre endroit dans la même région, si pour cela ils disposent des moyens nécessaires, et cela en premier lieu sur les terre des colons appartenant aux groupes c) et d) de l’article 4. Si cela n’est pas possible, ils emménageront hors de cette région. (La clause 2 de l’article 6 ne concerne que la Macédoine.) Article 7 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 105 International Tous ces actes et ces opérations, afférents à l’exécution de la présente loi, sont exemptés de taxes. Article 8 Le ministre de la Colonisation exécutera cette loi et fournira toutes informations utiles à son application en accord avec les gouvernments de Macédoine et de Serbie. Article 9 La présente loi entre en vigueur dès sa publication dans le Journal Officiel de la Yougoslavie Démocratique et Fédérale. Le 3 août 1945 Belgrade La Présidence du Comité Antifasciste de la Libération Nationale Le Secrétaire: Le Président M. Perunicic, (signed) Dr. I.Ribar, (signed) .**** Journal Official, no 89, daté du 5 novembre 1946, page de couverture et page 1114 634. DECRET Conformément à l’article 73, 6, et de l’article 136 de la Constitution, le Présidium de l’Assemblée Nationale de la FNRJ (République Fédérative Populaire de Yougoslavie) promulgue une loi confirmant, modifiant et complétant la loi relative à la révision de la distribution des terres aux colons et aux intéressés agricoles dans les régions de la Macédoine et du Kosovo et Métohie, datée du 3 août 1945, qui conformément à l’article 136 de la Constitution, a été décidée par le Comité législatif et par le Conseil fédéral des peuples de l’Assemblée Nationale de la FNRJ. LOI relative à la confirmation, aux modifications et aux compléments de la loi concernant a révision de la distribution des terres aux colons et aux intéressés agricoles en Macédoine et dans les régions du Kosovo et de la Métohie. La loi relative à la révision de la distribution des terres aux colons et aux intéressés agricoles dans les régions de la Macédoine et duu Kosovo et Métohie du 3 août est confirmée avec les changements et les compléments énoncés dans la présente loi, de manière à ce que son texte modifié déclare: LOI relative à la révision de la distribution des terres aux colons et aux intéressés agricoles dans la République Populaire de Macédoine et 106 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International dans la Région autonome du Kosovo et de la Métohie. (Les articles 1 et 2 ne concernent que la Macédoine.) Article 3 1 - Sont annulés tous les baux féodaux ou semi-féodaux (tels ceux de serfs) dans les régions autonomes du Kosovo et de la Métohie et sont proclamés tous les fermiers-locataires comme propriétaires des terres sur lesquelles ils ont travaillé. 2 - Les personnes qui, dans cette région, pratiquaient exclusivement l’agriculture et qui entretenaient la terre comme serfs, métayers, et fermiers-locataires au moins depuis l’année 1935, ne possédant pas d’autres terres ou n’en possédant pas suffisamment, sont déclarés propriétaires des terres qu’ils cultivent. Article 4 Les colons à qui ont été distribuées des terres dans les régions autonomes du Kosovo et de la Métohie jusqu’au 6 avril 1941, perdent leurs droits dans les conditions suivantes: a) si la terre d’un possédant privé leur a été distribuée, étant donné que chaque agriculteur ayant cultivé sa terre est considéré comme possédant, nonobstant le fait qu’il ait ou n’ait pas un titre de propriété foncière concernant cette terre ou qu’il ait travaillé sur cette terre comme serf ou locataire permanent; b) si, après 1918, ils étaient installé sur les terres des Shqiptar - les émigrants politiques; c) s’ils n’étaient pas des agriculteurs, et qu’ils ont reçu la terre en tant que gendarmes, employés des finances ou semblables, pour services rendus aux régimes anti-nationaux; d) s’ils vivaient de la terre distribuées comme des rentiers. Article 5 Pour tous les cas de l’article 4 figurant dans la loi, une décision sera prise au plus tard le 1er décembre 1946, par une commission mixte composée de délégués de la Commission de la réforme agraire et de la colonisation auprès du gouvernement de la FNRJ, de délégués du ministère de l’Agriculture de la République Populaire de Serbie, et de délégués régionaux du Comité national de la Région autonome de Kosovo-Métohie. Article 6 1 - Les colons-agriculteurs de la Région autonome du KosovoMétohie qui, d’après cette loi, perdent les terres préalablement distribuées, obtiendront, sous la condition de ne pas appartenir aux groupes c) et d) de l’article 4, une compensation en terre dans un autre endroit dans la même région, si pour cela ils disposent des moyens nécessaires, et cela en premier lieu sur les terre des colons appartenant aux groupes c) et d) de l’article 4. Si cela n’est pas possible, ils emménageront hors de cette région. DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 107 International (La clause 2 de l’article 6 ne concerne que la Macédoine.) Article 7 Tous ces actes et ces opérations, afférents à l’exécution de la présente loi, sont exemptés de taxes. Article 8 1 - La Commission de la réforme agraire et de la colonisation auprès du Gouvernement de la FNRJ exécutera cette loi et fournira toutes informations utiles à son application en accord avec les gouvernments de la République Populaire de Macédoine et de la République Populaire de Serbie. 2 - Les affaires de l’article 3 de cette loi ressortent de la compétence du ministère de l’Agriculture de la République Populaire de Serbie. Le ministre de l’Agriculture de la République Populaire de Serbie peut présenter un règlement pour la liquidation de ces rapports. Article 9 La présente loi entre en vigueur dès sa publication dans le Journal Officiel de la Yougoslavie Démocratique et Fédérale. Le 2 novembre 1946 Belgrade La Présidence de l’Assemblée Nationale de la République Fédérale de Yougoslavie Le Secrétaire:. Le Président M. Perunicic, (signed). Dr. I.Ribar, (signed) (Les termes de la loi de 1946 qui diffèrent de ceux utilisés dans la loi précédente sont en italiques.) 108 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International SPEECH BY SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AT THE COMMEMORATION OF THE 600TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF KOSOVO 28 June 1989 at Gazimestan, Kosovo Friends, comrades, in this place, on this spot in the heart of Serbia, on the field of Kosovo six centuries ago, fully six hundred years ago, there took place one of the most important battles of its time. Like all great events, it left behind it many questions and secrets, it has been the object of unceasing scientific research and the usual popular curiosity. As social circumstances would have it, this great six hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kosovo is taking place in the year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has recovered its Statehood and its national and spiritual identity. For us therefore it is not hard to answer that old question, “what shall we have to present to the king?” In the play of history and life, it would seem that Serbia has recovered its statehood and its dignity in this very year 1989 so as to celebrate this historic event from the distant past which has great historic and symbolic significance for its future. Today, in speaking of the battle of Kosovo, it is hard to tell what is historic truth and what is legend. Today that no longer matters. The people have repeatedly remembered and forgetten under the pressure of suffering, and still were filled with hope, just like any other people in the world. The people were ashamed of treason and glorified heroism. Therefore it is hard to say today whether the battle of Kosovo was a defeat or a victory of the Serbian people, whether on account of it we fell into slavery, or whether thanks to it we survived that slavery. Answers to those questions will be ceaselessly sought by science and by the people. One thing that remains certain after all the centuries we have been through since is that in Kosovo, six hundred years ago, discord reigned. If we lost the battle, then that was not only the result of the social superiority and military advantage of the Ottoman Empire, but also of the tragic discord in the highest ranks of DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 109 International the Serbian State. Then, in that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than the Serbian. It was also luckier than the Serbian Empire. Discord and betrayal in Kosovo were to pursue the Serbian nation like an evil fate for the whole of its history. And in the last war, that dissension and that betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into an agony whose historic and moral consequences exceeded those of the fascist aggression. And later, when socialist Yugoslavia was formed, the Serbian leadership in this new country remained divided, inclined to make compromises at the expense of its own people. No people in the world would have accepted the concessions which many Serbian leaders made on their account. All the more in that throughout their whole history, the Serbs had never conquered or exploited others. Their national and historic essence through all their history and through two World Wars, as today, was liberating. They constantly liberated themselves and when they had the opportunity, they helped others to liberate themselves. And the fact that in these regions they are a great nation is in no way a sin for Serbs to be ashamed of. It is an advantage that they did not use against others. But I must say here on this great legendary field of Kosovo that the Serbs never even used that advantage of being a great nation for themselves. Thanks to their leadership and politicians and their vassal mentality, they even felt guilty toward others, and to themselves. The discord among Serbian politicians held Serbia back. And their inferiority humiliated Serbia. So it went on for decades, for years. Here we are today, on the field of Kosovo, to say that it is not like that any more. There is no more suitable place that the field of Kosovo to say this. And therefore, in Serbia, there is no more suitable place than the field of Kosovo to say that harmony in Serbia will make possible prosperity for the Serbian people, for Serbia, and for its citizens without regard to national or religious affiliation. Serbia today is united, equal to other republics and ready to do everything to improve the material and social position of all its citizens. If there is harmony, cooperation and seriousness, she will succeed. Therefore the optimism which is today present in Serbia regarding the future is realistic, all the more in that it is based on freedom which enables all people to express their positive, creative human abilities for the advancement of social and personal life. Never 110 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International in history did Serbs alone live in Serbia. Today more than ever before, citizens of other nationalities and ethnic groups are living here. That is not a handicap for Serbia. I am sincerely convinced it is an advantage. National structure is changing in this direction in all countries in the contemporary world, especially in developed countries. More and more, and more and more successfully, citizens of different nationalilties, different faiths and races are living together. Socialism especially, as a progressive and just democratic society, would not dare to allow people to be divided by nationality and religion. The only distinction that can and mut be allowed in socialism is that between those who work hard and those who do nothing, between respectable and dishonorable people. Therefore all those who live honestly in Serbia from their labor deserve respect from other people and other nationalities in their republic. Moreover, our whole country must be organized on this basis. Yugoslavia is a multinational community, and it can survive only on condition of full equality of all the nations that live in it. The crisis that has affected Yugoslaiva has led to national, but also to social, cultural, religious and many other less important divisions. Among all those divisions, the national divisions appear to be the most dramatic. Eliminating them will facilitate eliminating other divisions and alleviate the effects caused by them. Ever since multinational communities have existed, their weak point has been the relations established between the various nations. Like a sword over their heads, the constant threat is present that one day will arise the question of one nation being threatened by others, thereby setting off a wave of suspicion, accusations and intolerance which as a rule grows and is hard to stop. Internal and outside enemies of such communities know this and therefore generally organize their action against multinational societies by stimulating national conflicts. At this moment we in Yugoslavia are behaving as though this experience were absolutely unknown to us. And as if in both our own nearest and most distant past we had not experienced all the tragedy of national conflicts which a society can live through and yet survive. Equal and harmonious relations between the peoples of Yugoslavia are the indispensible condition for Yugoslavia’s survival, for her emergence from crisis and above all the indispensible condition for her economic and social prosperity. In this, Yugoslavia is not DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 111 International different from the contemporary societies around her, especially in the developed world. This world is more and more marked by tolerance, cooperation and equal rights between peoples. Contemporary economic and technological, but also political and cultural developments are bringing various peoples together, making them mutually dependent, and more and more equal to each other. Equal and united peoples are the first who can step into the civilization toward which humanity is moving. If we cannot lead the way toward such a civilization, we surely don’t need to bring up the rear. At the time when the famous historic battle in Kosovo took place, people were looking to the stars for help. Today, six centuries later, they are again looking to the stars for conquest. It used to be that they could allow themselves disunity, hatred, betrayal because they lived in smaller worlds weakly linked to each other. Today, as inhabitants of the planet, if we are disunited we cannot master even our own planet, much less the other planets, unless we live in mutual harmony and solidarity. Therefore, perhaps nowhere on earth more than our homeland have words devoted to harmony, solidarity and cooperation between people so much meaning as here on Kosovo field, which is the symbol of discord and betrayal. In the memory of the Serb people, that discord was decisive for the loss of the battle, and for the evil fate that Serbia endured for fully five centuries. But even if it weren’t so from the historical point of view, it remains certain that the people experienced discord as their greatest misfortune. And the obligation of the nation is therefore to prevent it in order in the future to protect itself from defeat, failure and stagnation. The Serbian people have this year become aware of the necessity of mutual harmony as the indispensible condition for life today and for further development. I am certain that this consciousness of the need for harmony and unity will enable Serbia not only to function as a State, but also to function as a successful State. Therefore I think it makes sense to say so right here in Kosovo, where discord once tragically and for centuries held back and imperiled Serbia, and where restored harmony can enable her to advance and restore her dignity. And such consciousness about mutual relations represents an elementary necessity for Yugoslavia too, as her fate lies in the associated friendly 112 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International hands of all her peoples. The Kosovo battle contains still another great symbol. That is the symbol of heroism. To this symbol have been dedicated poems, dances, literature, histories. For six centuries, Kosovo heroism inspired our creativity, nourished our pride, kept us from forgetting that we once were a great and brave army, and proud, one of the great which even in defeat remained unvanquished. Six centuries later, today, we are again in battles and facing new battles. These are not armed battles, although even those cannot yet be ruled out. But regardless of what kind they are, battles cannot be won without decisiveness, courage and self-sacrifice, without those qualities which were present in the Kosovo field so long ago. Our main battle today relates to achieving economic, political, cultural and in general social prosperity. For the rapid and successful approach of the civilization in which people will live in the 21st century, for that battle, we especially need heroism. It goes without saying, a different sort, but that courage without which nothing serious and great in the world can be achieved remains unchanged, remains eternally necessary. Six centuries ago, Serbia here on the field of Kosovo was defending herself. But she also was defending Europe. She then found herself on the rampart which protected European culture, religion, European society as a whole. Thus today it seems not only unjust, but also unhistorical and altogether absurd to discuss whether Serbia belongs to Europe. She has been there all the time, today as before. It goes without saying, in her own way. In a way that in an historic sense never deprived her of dignity. In this spirit, we today are striving to build a rich and democratic society. And thereby, we are contribuitng to the prosperity of our beautiful and yet at this moment unjustly tormented country. And thereby we contribute to the efforts of all progressive people of our age who are working for a new and better world. May the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever! Long live Serbia! Long live Yugoslavia! Long live PEACE AND BROTHERHOOD among nations! DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 113 International MEMORANDUM of Kosovo - Albanians to the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group Meeting in London Monday, 9 March 1998 The Government of the Republic of Kosova, as the highest legitimate executive body of the Albanian institutional life in the Republic of Kosova, in its capacity to perform all the rights deriving therefrom and under political guidance by the Coordinating Council of the Political Parties of Kosova in today’s emergency situation, is honoured and privileged to address itself to the distinguished Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group Countries meeting in London, on Monday 9 March 1998, to discuss in an emergency meeting the explosive and ever deteriorating situation in Kosova. The Government of the Republic of Kosova wishes to reiterate, distinguished Foreign Ministers, its most profound and grave concern over the recent barbarous, massive combined and indiscriminate Serb police, paramilitary and military attack, from land and air, against the defenceless and peaceful Albanian civilian population in various villages of Skenderaj and Drenica zones. According to independent reports, in their large-scale, police-military operation which is still going on, the combined Serb forces have killed over 60 Albanian civilians, including women and children, destroyed numerous houses and property, forcing the Albanians to leave their ancestral homes and villages, in another sweeping ethnic cleansing, which takes exact heritage from what the Belgrade regime organised and carried out in Bosnia and Hercegovina during 1991-1994. The Serbian Belgrade regime is using all kinds of manipulations, fabrications and concoctions to try to justify their longstanding, overall anti-Albanian state terrorism and genocide, as well as their present, totally unacceptable and fully condemnable military and police aggression against the Albanian people of Kosova, with alleged anti-terrorist operations. The whole world understands, as 114 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International could be visibly confirmed by all those few who have been able to penetrate into the sealed off region and some very reliable TV channels, that this is not the case. All condemn terrorism, in whatever form it appears. There is nothing new to this position. But what is happening in Kosova is something quite different and far from Serb allegations, which can be hardly believed any longer. In the face of an ever increasing terror, violence, military aggression, ethnic cleansing, flagrant violation of all international norms, standards, principles and commitments, as well as all human, political and national rights of the two million-strong, unprotected Albanian population of Kosova by the Belgrade regime, the Government of the Republic of Kosova is appealing to the Contact Group to take immediate action to stop this new wave of aggression and massacres against the Albanians of Kosova. The Government of the Republic of Kosova, in its all-out efforts to work cooperatively and constructively with the major factor of international politics, it its efforts to do whatever it possibly can to stop the Serbian massacres and aggression, and to represent faithfully the wishes, desires and aspiration of an entire people of two million in their bid for the right to decide on their own political future, kindly takes this opportunity to request to the Contact Group to show the necessary cohesion, cooperation and determination to act, without losing time, to stop Belgrade’s policy and dictator from further pursuing its political objectives through terror, oppression, violence and use of force in Kosova. Distinguished Foreign Ministers, Rump Yugoslavia is another unsuccessful effort to keep unity by force. We all know that forced unity is no unity and the coercive unity that Milosevic is advocating is again serving only as a cover for Serbian hegemony, which we all know by now what it means. Milosevic is unwilling to give to the Albanians in Kosova the same right to self-determination that he demanded, inspired, encouraged and supported politically and militarily, for the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia, which subsequently led to terrible blood-shed and loss of lives. Old, sentimental alliances with and support for aggressive, warmongering regimes and their policies for unjust causes in the DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 115 International modern, ever integrating world of democratic countries that share the same values radiating over the entire world, seem to be groundless and little justified, it at all, today, at the close of the Millennium. With four of the former six republics and two autonomous regions of the SFRY gone independent, and rightly supported in their bid to do so, Kosova, it is clear, cannot survive in any sort of Yugoslavia controlled and dominated by Serbia. The Albanian people of Kosova are not secure, in any way, and they cannot endure any more the kind of genocide, oppression and aggression they are experiencing, nor can they be forced to live in a building which has already collapsed, simply because one wishes to keep that building’s facade and the few remaining ones inside by force, when all its other inhabitants have left. After 80 years under Serbian rule, the Albanians have opted, through a broad popular referendum, that they want to be free of Serbian state terror, humiliation, domination, oppression, violation of all their political future, just as any other people has the right to do and/or have done, including some of those of the former Yugoslavia. They have been pushed by the Serb actions onto a path of no return towards absolute self-determination and freedom. And they have chosen to do so through a resistance that is non-violent, as they have demonstrated all along these decades and have been credited for it. In view of the current tragedy of the Albanian people of Kosova, the Government of Kosova wishes to put before you, through this Memorandum, certain concrete measures and actions, which it proposes as part of a strong, forward looking package, which the Contact Group hopefully would be in a position to agree upon, and bring to bear on Belgrade all kinds of pressure, ruling out no option, if necessary, and save the entire region from further, unpredictable destabilisation. With all the above clearly in mind, in order to stop what is happening and find just, fair and lasting solutions, projecting longterm stability, the Government of the Republic of Kosova kindly requests the distinguished Contact Group Foreign Ministers to seriously consider taking concrete steps as follows: * Present dynamics point to further violence by those who have the weapons, the political orientation and goals to do so. The status quo cannot - nor should it - endure any more. Avoiding such a violence 116 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International requires an urgent, comprehensive international peace process, in which all involved would participate as equals, with clear, indiscriminate and/or superior-versus-inferior positions. * Kosova, as a major international issue of key significance for the future of the region’s stability, should be channelled toward peacefully negotiated political solutions, with strong international mediation, a step that we have always asked for and which should ultimately be imposed on Milosevic. * Certain non-military confidence building measures should immediately take place, in the first instance, such as, the unconditional and immediate return of the OSCE long-duration mission; an immediate end to all kinds of repression and human, political and other rights and fundamental freedoms; immediate opening of school buildings and permission of Albanian students to continue all studies in their mother tongue in their normal school buildings; establish democratic institutions, including the independent judiciary and the parliament; allow complete and unimpeded freedom of expression and association, as well as freedom of the media; All this is part of the entire bulk of international documents, decisions, resolutions and statements of the UNGA, UNSC, CoE Parliamentary Assembly, EU, NATO, OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly, national parliaments, numerous NGO’s etc.; * Reinstatement of all sanctions, previously lifted, on Serbia’s Belgrade regime and careful, very cautious use of carrots in the foreseeable future. We hail the new decision of the US Administration to that effect, and urge all the other states to do so. The new developments and situations are already teaching again the lesson that the international community is dealing and will have to deal with a dictator, with a very unreliable, a second Saddam in Europe, who is a manipulator and uses and misuses everything for his own power and for his regimes political objectives, built on myths and far from any pragmatic realism; * Immediate and entire lifting of the martial law imposed since 1989, and urgent commencement of the gradual withdrawal of the police and the military from Kosova, unilaterally, before the start of any negotiations; * Subsequent military confidence building, including full compliance DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 117 International with the Articles II, III and IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Accords, as well as commencement of inspection and verification of compliance with full regard to Kosova; * Urgent dispatch of an advanced NATO observation team, possibly from NATO’s SFOR contingents in Bosnia and Hercegovina, as well as urgent decision on a no-fly zone over Kosova, due to frequent Serbian air raids, attacks and helicopter gunships. * Imposition on and recognition by Serbia’s Belgrade regime of the indispensable need for political talks and negotiations to solve the question of the political status of Kosova, under the auspices and mediation of the international community, in order to bring about a lasting solution to the pending and unresolved Kosova and the Albanian question in the Balkans; * Take concrete steps to immediately start consultations and talks, both with Belgrade authorities and with the legitimate Albanian authorities and institutions, elected and recognised a such, on all the modalities for these negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina; make all the necessary preparations for the appropriate setting in which these negotiations should take place; There is enough legal mandate and justification for the Contact Group, under the existing relevant UNSC resolutions on the former Yugoslavia, to proceed swiftly and unimpeded, with concrete messages and action. Distinguished Foreign Ministers, The situation today is no longer that during the years 19911992. We confidently hope that the appropriate lessons have been learned from certain, long-dragged consultations, discussions and negotiations, diverging views and interests, that dominated the international scene in 1991-93 when the break-up of the former Yugoslavia started. Belgrade’s policy, objectives, manipulations and intensions vis-à-vis Kosova are the same as those vis- à -vis other regions in the former Yugoslavia which experienced a terrible war, and today are but too clear to repeat the same mistakes of the past. If the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs in the southern part of rump Yugoslavia would be transformed from a warnot-fought into a large-scale open conflict, it would surely assume dimensions which, in all probability, would engulf the whole central- 118 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International southern Balkans. It is only through serious political dialogue and negotiations, at all levels, that this impasse situation can be overcome. We express our profound hope in the democratic values which western democracies have developed, stand for and are prepared to defend. We pin great hopes in their might. What the situation urgently warrants and calls for is determination and political will. By defending these values, the international community is and will be defending themselves and their interests and regional long-term security and stability. There are many examples when such will and determination has been exemplarly displayed, as was the Iraq-UN crisis. We do hope the same would be the case with the situation in Kosova and its just and fair solution. The Contact Group, its member states, are the only ones invested with the necessary power and trust to do so. The Government of the Republic of Kosova, the people of Kosova and the entire Albanian people are looking forward to immediate and appropriate responses to this new tragedy, at the roots of which lies the Serbian policy, the only one which is catapulting the Balkans from one bloody war into another. The Government of the Republic of Kosova wishes to reiterate its full readiness, commitment and availability to work closely and cooperatively with the international community, to achieve the common goal. It is fully available, at all levels and any time, to start consultations with the Contact Group or the relevant personality or body charged by it to act on its behalf, on the points which the Government has been pleased to list above. We would highly appreciate it and be grateful if the Contact Group would take our request seriously into account during its very important upcoming deliberations on Monday an subsequently. Rexhep Bajrami DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 119 International A proposal of the Expert group which consists of the representatives of several Serbian parties of democratic orientation which took part in the work of the inter -Serbian dialog. _______________________________________________________ The members of the Expert Group are: Mr Dusan Batakovic, PhD; Prof. Miodrag Jovicic, PhD, the member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences; Mr. Zoran Lutovac, MA; Mr. Caslav Ocic, PhD; Prof. Kosta Cavoski, PhD and Prof. Dragoljub Popovic, PhD. ____________________________________________________________________ Taking into consideration the worrisome situation in KOSOVO and Metohija, an inalienable part of the Serbian state, without which the future security of Serbia and the equality of all its citizens without regard to their religious or ethnic affiliation cannot be imagined, and certain of the unacceptability of the continuation of the status quo we present the following: THE PROPOSAL FOR THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO AND METOHIJA QUESTION The Kosovo and Metohija region has been a historic, cultural and political part of Serbia for nearly a millennium. During the Middle ages Kosovo and Metohija represented the “Serbian Jerusalem”, the center of the Serbian state and culture, with some 1,300 churches and monasteries. This territory as well as the whole of Serbia found itself under Ottoman rule from the mid XV century until 1912. During the First Balkan War, these territories were liberated and returned to the two Serbian states: Kosovo to Serbia, and Metohija to Montenegro, in accordance with international treaties concluded between 1912 1913. During Ottoman administration, Kosovo and Metohija, just as the rest of Serbia, was divided into larger or smaller administrative units, “sandzaks” or “vilayets”. Due to wars, conflicts and forced migrations during the Ottoman rule, the ethnic structure of Kosovo 120 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International and Metohija was forcibly changed. By the end of the XVII century these mostly Serbian provinces were forcibly taken over and inhabited by ethnic Albanians who, as opposed to the Serbs, were Muslims and had a privileged position in the theocratically-constituted Ottoman empire. The number of Serbs slowly decreased, while the number of ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo vilayet (Old Serbia) reached almost half of the total population. In the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, until 1929, the areas of Kosovo and Metohija were divided into smaller administrative units (oblasti). In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, after 1929, this area was administratively divided between three larger units (banovinas-counties): the Vardarska, Moravska and Zetska county. During the Second World War, after the Nazi attack on Yugoslavia and the subsequent occupation of the country, the largest part of Kosovo and Metohija was annexed to “Greater Albania,’’ which was placed under the Italian protectorate. The northern part of Kosovo was left within German-occupied Serbia, while a smaller eastern section was attached to the Bulgarian occupation zone. Kosovo and Metohija was established as a separate territorial unit within Serbia in 1945 by a decision of the communist authorities. Its borders were arbitrarily drawn without a democratic consensus of the population of Serbia and Montenegro. Those Serbs who had fled the area during World War II were not allowed by the communist authorities to return to Kosovo and Metohija. At the same time, ethnic Albanians who had been deliberately brought to the area from Albania during the occupation were allowed to settle permanently on the usurped land. During communist rule, Kosovo and Metohija first had the status of an autonomous area (1946) and was later granted the status of autonomous province (1963). Constitutional amendments increasing the authority of the autonomous province (1968 - 1971 ) allowed the Albanian minority, as in the Ottoman period, to establish a regime based on political and ethnic domination. These policies were first introduced by the anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav demonstrations in 1968: protesters called for the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo as the first part in the process of secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia. The name Metohija was erased from the name of the province as a concession of the Yugoslav communist establishment DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 121 International to Albanian demands (the term “metoh” signifies the property of the Orthodox Church). The Kosovo Albanian leadership attempted to promote further emigration of the Serbian population of the area by using discriminatory policies. The ideological framework for this process, influenced by Enver Hoxha’s ethno-communism, was based on the theory that Albanians were the descendants of the Illyrians; all Serbs that had moved to the area after the VI century were therefore seen, according to the official theory, as “aliens on Albanian soil”. Besides “the inventing tradition” and the systematic violation of the civil and human rights of Kosovo and Metohija’s Serbian people, ethnic Albanians also used communist ideology as an excuse to continue the ethnic cleansing of the Serb population in the province. The 1974 constitution fragmented the Yugoslav state, turning it into a union of communist party establishments based on ethnic principles. This constitution also broke up the Serbian state with two provinces. In this ideological process the ethnic Albanian communist establishment received Kosovo and Metohija as its fief. The attempt to turn Kosovo and Metohija into a seventh republic as a step towards secession from Serbia and then Yugoslavia was halted in 1981, although the emigration of Serbs was not abated. The autonomous status of Kosovo and Metohija was returned to the standard European framework of autonomous units in 1989. Ethnic Albanians using demonstrations and a boycott of the Serbian state are attempting to keep the crisis alive. The size of their population, aggressiveness, high level of national homogeneity, as well as the continuation of inter-ethnic tensions, are the elements of a strategy whose goal is secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia and not respect for human rights. The series of repressive policy measures carried out by the Serbian Government, in answer to the position taken by ethnic Albanians, has caused only further deterioration of the situation. Convinced that the present situation in Kosovo and Metohija does not benefit anyone, neither the local Serbs, the ethnic Albanians, the other ethnic communities, the Serbian state nor the international community, we critically reexamine in this proposal some ideas for the resolution of this question, in order to show that they are unfounded and impossible to implement, before finally presenting our 122 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International own ideas in the form of this proposal. I 1. It is not acceptable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e. to its members: Serbia and Montenegro, that Kosovo and Metohija become a third federal unit of the federation since this change would usher in the danger of Kosovo and Metohija’s secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia. This danger is made plainly evident both by the programs of ethnic Albanian political forces and by the international precedent committed by the international community when it recognized the former Yugoslav republics of the SFRY as sovereign states after they had unilaterally seceded from the former federation. Just as the provision (article 5, paragraph 3) of the Constitution of the former SFRY which banned the unilateral secession of Yugoslav republics was ignored, future constitutional safeguards would not be able to stop any future secession of a third federal unit. Two events that shook the former SFRY prove that the strong secessionist tendencies of the leadership and a large part of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija are not the result of the present policies of repression and violations of basic human rights by the present regime. On two separate occasions, strong ethnic Albanian aspirations toward secession were manifested, both in the form of demonstrations, in November 1968 and in March and April 1981. In both cases the proclaimed goal of these protests was formation of the Republic of Kosovo. The 1968 demonstrations led to changing Kosovo and Metohija’s name to Kosovo only, and to the Albanization of the province: the Albanization of the topography, the educational system, the media, commerce and culture, in short, the Albanization of life in the province, which only intensified the process of ethnic cleansing and assimilation. In 1981, secessionist demonstrations again rocked the province even though the 1974 Constitution gave the province the status of a state within a state (Kosovo was, along with Serbia’s other province, given the right to decide on vital questions that concerned the rest of Serbia; the reverse was not granted). However, this entity was not a kind of democratic unit based on the rule of law, but was in fact a fief of the Albanian communist establishment, which was DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 123 International systematically furthering a process of, on one side, ethnic cleansing primarily aimed at the Serbs, and on the other, assimilation of the Turks, Goranis and Romani, and other non-Albanian inhabitants of the Muslim faith. The subsequent disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia retrospectively clarifies the background of the 1968 and 1981 demonstrations and the aims of its strategists: the creation of a republic that would represent a first step towards secession. Just as it is unacceptable for Kosovo and Metohija to become a third federal unit in the Yugoslav federation it is, for the same reasons, even more inappropriate to support the federalization of Serbia itself, in which Kosovo and Metohija would be granted the status of a federal unit within Serbia. This process of federalization of Serbia would be an anti-historical act: instead of strengthening a unified Serbian state, based on democracy and equal rights for all the citizens, this would lead to its disintegration. Worldwide common experience that says that federal arrangements should be avoided whenever possible has just been confirmed by the insurmountable organizational and functional problems encountered during the last fifty years of the Yugoslav federation. Having taken this into consideration, we emphasize that we do not envisage the resolution of the Kosovo-Metohija question by the transformation of Kosovo and Metohija into a federal unit of any kind. 2. A second unacceptable idea is that Kosovo and Metohija retain the status of autonomous province, especially if it is given back the rights of the 1974 Constitution. The establishment of the autonomous province in 1946 (then called an autonomous area or “oblast”) represented, along with the aim of weakening Serbia as a federal unit, a concession of the Yugoslav communist regime to its “fraternal” communist regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania. Turning a minority question into a territorial question proved to be a fatal mistake. The consequences of this error are still being felt today. The 1974 constitution gave the autonomous province of Kosovo the status of a “constituent element of the federation”, and stripped Serbia of many attributes it possessed as a federal unit equal to other Yugoslav republics. The 1989/90 constitutional reforms left intact Kosovo’s status as autonomous province, but reduced its rights and authority. 124 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International We advocate that, since the idea that Serbia should be asymmetrically organized has proved a complete failure, the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija should be abolished. The numeric superiority of the ethnic Albanian population cannot be an excuse for the further existence of the province. Taking into consideration the old Latin saying, which is the foundation of the whole legal system ex iniuria ius non oritur (from the unlawful cannot proceed the lawful), it is clear that the majority ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija cannot claim the right to ethnic autonomy, and especially not the right to any kind of statehood, since their majority, throughout earlier and modern history, has been, for the most part, gained by force, i.e. by using unlawful methods. The position of the ethnic Albanian minority will be regulated by laws and the constitution that will guarantee, without any form of autonomy, their complete equality with all the other citizens of Serbia. 3. Finally, we reject the idea that Serbia should be organized as a centralized state, which is essentially the way the Republic of Serbia is ordered now. The concept of decentralization of constitutional arrangement has been steadily gaining ground worldwide; this idea addresses both the demands of democratic governance and the needs of a rational territorial organization of the state. Serbia cannot go against such broad trends, especially after the negative experiences of the communist totalitarianism, and the present rigid centralism. II We will start presenting the proposal for the democratic resolution of the Kosovo and Metohija problem by emphasizing the importance of guaranteeing human rights, which will be followed by a description of our vision of the territorial division of the country, with Kosovo and Metohija reorganized as two separate regions. Finally, we will conclude with a summary of other suggestions for the resolution of the Kosovo and Metohija problem. 1 . Guaranteeing human rights DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 125 International The respect for human rights in Serbia, and especially in Kosovo and Metohija, is highly unsatisfactory, since the present regime is violating the rights of both Serbs and ethnic Albanians, as well as the rights of other inhabitants of the province. To rectify this situation, Serbia must be reordered as a democratic, social and rule-of-law state that respects and protects human rights. A modern and democratically ordered Serbia belongs to Europe, and shares its ideals that call for respect for the territorial integrity of all states which are free, share modern values and allow the free flow of people and ideas. Serbia wishes to belong to a Europe in which states and peoples will never again fight over borders, because these frontiers should become channels of communication and exchange, and not the markers of division. Serbia wishes to belong to a Europe in which nations develop freely in democratically ordered and pluralistic states and therefore do not have to seek refuge in their mother countries, precisely because all states equally value and respect universal human rights. Human rights in Serbia organized on modern principles will be recognized and protected as envisaged in the founding declarations of the United Nations, the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe and all other international and European documents and instruments for the protection of human and minority rights. 2. The regionalization of Serbia It has become evident that Serbia, within the framework of a complete reconstruction of the legal and state system, should be transformed into a modern regional state, in which Kosovo and Metohija would be two distinct regions. The regional state, which represents a form of state organization that lies between the unitary and federal system, adopts the positive aspects of both frameworks while it mitigates the negative sides. It provides the necessary level of state unity, while it gives regions, territorial units of relatively equal size, the authority to be governed within a legal framework specified in the constitution and set by the regional jurisdiction. Regions in Serbia must be organized along geographic, commercial, and transportation lines, as well as according to historic and 126 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International traditional criteria. The regions would have between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants and would therefore represent the optimal form of territorial organization for complete economic and social development as well as a good foundation for harmonious life and development of all the ethnic groups that inhabit the region. Kosovo and Metohija had never been a single territorial unit until the establishment of a communist dictatorship in Serbia. In addition, the population size of both areas fits into the suggested framework. All the regions in Serbia must have equal status and authority. They would be authorized to set policy in the areas of regional commerce, transportation, territorial planning, tourism, health, social services and other issues, by the constitution. In effect, the authority of the regions would be greater than that of the present autonomous provinces. The regions would have their own institutions, including a regional assembly that would be authorized to pass regulations within the framework of the constitution and the law. There would be two types of official bodies in the regions: the regional branches of the central government, and regional bodies. Their work would be monitored by the central authorities. The court system within the regions would be integrated within a unified court system of the country. The regions would be stripped of any aspects of statehood, which is a characteristic of federal units, but would be represented in one of the two houses of Serbian Parliament, the House of Regions. The regional organization of the Serbian state would allow all minorities or ethnic communities that live in Serbia and fully enjoy all personal and collective rights, in accordance with international standards, such as the right to use their own language in local administration and the courts, the right to profess their religious faith in their mother tongue, as well as to partake in cultural and other activities. These rights are conditional upon the fact that the minority communities maintain loyal behavior towards the state to which they belong. It is clear that in Kosovo and Metohija, which developed under specific historical consequences and suffered the adverse effects of the rule of both the communist and the present regime, the Serbs have become the minority group, and should therefore be afforded special protection within the organization of the two regions. This would be DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 127 International accomplished by creating a dual house regional assembly in the two regions. The members of one house of the assembly would be elected from electoral units of the same size (which would therefore give the ethnic Albanian community a majority position). The second body of the regional assembly would be composed on a parity basis, with one half of its members from the ethnic Albanian community, and the other half representing the Serbian and other ethnic groups that live in Kosovo and Metohija (Muslims, Turks, Romani and others). Both houses of the regional assembly would have equal say in decisionmaking, so that the regional assembly could not pass regulations that were harmful to any ethnic group or the country as a whole. The above described distinct organization of the regional assemblies of Kosovo and Metohija is necessary because ethnic Albanians do not presently offer any assurance that they are loyal citizens of Serbia, nor that they are ready to abandon their secessionist intentions. Once a change in their attitudes becomes evident, it is quite natural that the organization of these two regions would be brought into accordance with the organization of the other regions. The establishment of a regional state must be followed by reorganization of the system of local self-government. This system should be modified in a manner that would break up all the large communes (opstinas) into smaller ones. This would increase the number of opstinas, in accordance with the needs of economic development and the rational functioning of the system of local selfgovernment. III a) Population census: It would be necessary to conduct a census of the population of the Kosovo and Metohija region. Citizens must be allowed to declare their national and ethnic background freely and without pressure. The results of the census would give the real demographic picture of the area. b) The return of exiled Serbs To alleviate the serious consequences of the prolonged ethnic cleans- 128 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International ing, which began as far back as 1941 and was continued under the communist dictatorship, all those who were expelled under pressure or whose return to the area was banned should be offered guarantees for a safe return. In addition, conditions should be made to allow the return of private property which these persons had been forced to leave behind due to ethnic discriminations. c) Stopping the assimilation of non-Albanian inhabitants Since Kosovo and Metohija has witnessed a long-time systematic forced assimilation of Muslims, Turks, Romani and others into Albanians, although in truth the only issue they share is their Islamic faith, such trends must be halted. All those who have declared themselves under duress as Albanians should be allowed to freely declare their membership in their true ethnic community. d) Economic and social development Rapid economic development must be stimulated in the regions of Kosovo and Metohija, with the goal of increased employment, higher living standards and establishing conditions necessary for successful work and living in the regions. This includes, besides the return of expelled Serbs, the full economic and social integration of ethnic Albanians. A special economic program must be instituted for these regions, which would include measures to stimulate investment and employment, as well as customs and tax incentives. Denationalization is another necessary measure for the democratization and free market-oriented reform of Serbia. The process of denationalization in Kosovo and Metohija would include the return of property not only to individuals, but also to the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities. e) Stability of the region The settlement of the Kosovo and Metohija problem is a crucial goal for the Serbian state since the stability of the wider Balkan area depends on its resolution. The attempts of part of the ethnic Albanian leadership to instigate Kosovo and Metohija’s secession against the will of Serbia endangers the security and stability not only of Serbia and Yugosla- DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 129 International via, but that of neighboring states as well. Such goals are in direct conflict with the Helsinki agreements and obligations, as well as the foundations of the OSCE’s vision of security in the XXI century. The projected cooperative (common and all-encompassing) security is based on democracy, the respect for human rights, the rule of law, a free market economy and on social justice. A solution for the Kosovo and Metohija problem should be based on these concepts. *** Two conditions must be met for the successful implementation of our proposal: 1. The true and democratically legitimate representatives of both the Serbs and ethnic Albanians must reach a basic consensus on achieving a peaceful, negotiated resolution for the Kosovo and Metohija problem. 2. A Constitutional Assembly, freely elected by all the citizens of the country should ratify a new constitution that would, along with all other deep structural changes of the constitutional system, establish a new form of state organization - the regional state, in which the regions of Kosovo and Metohija would find their rightful place. 130 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International SENATOR ALFONSE D’AMATO (Republican, New York) Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe OPENINGSTATEMENT Hearing On Kosovo Repression and Violence U.S. Congress, Washington, March 18, 1998 Today’s hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation is called to examine the current, critical situation in Kosovo. In recent days, continuing Serbian repression of the Kosovar Albanian majority population has triggered an escalating spiral of violence that demands U.S. leadership now to stop another outbreak of ethnic cleansing and achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis. This is one of those times when all people of conscience must speak out; and we must take action to stop the slaughter of innocent men, women and children. Our distinguished panel of witnesses includes Mr. Isa Zymberi, who is the Director of the London Office of the Kosova Information Center. Mr. Zymberi is a principal international spokesman for the leadership of the non-recognized “Republic of Kosova”. The Honorable Joe DioGuardi, a former Congressman from New York who is a prominent activist on Albanian issues, is a witness. We also have with us Mr. Fred Abrahams, of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, who is a leading expert on human rights violations in Kosovo. Joining him at the witness table are Dr. Janusz Bugajski, the Director of East European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a leading expert on Balkan affairs, and Ms. Nancy Lindburg, who is the Director of the Washington Office of Mercy Corps International, a leading provider of humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. Finally, we have the Serbian Orthodox Bishop in Kosovo, His Grace Artmije (1). I welcome these witnesses and look forward to learning their views on the situation in Kosovo and what we should do to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis there. Before turning to our witnesses, I want to take a few minutes to discuss the situation in Kosovo. Two steps are needed to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis. The first is U.S. leadership to make President Milosevic believe that DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 131 International the world will not stand by while his goons conduct another genocidal episode of ethnic cleansing. He must know beyond a shadow of a doubt that we won’t stand for it. He second step is talks between Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanian leadership, without preconditions. Milosevic’s recent offer to talk with “responsible” Albanian leaders was a sham, and was rejected by President Rugova. The crisis must be settled fairly, democratically, and without coercion between the parties. Any settlement reached must respect and protect the human rights of all persons residing in Kosovo. The recent violence has claimed the lives of more than seventy Kosovar Albanians at the hands of Serbian police and paramilitary forces. In addition to young men of fighting age, the dead included the elderly, women, and children. Published reports state that the body of Adem Jashari, the alleged Kosova Liberation Army leader who was the alleged target of the massive Serbian assault, looked like he was killed with a knife. We witnessed the Bosnian genocide. We resolved that the world would never again stand by while innocent people were slaughtered. While the recent outbreak of violent oppression has now come to a halt, Serbian police and paramilitary units still occupy the center of Kosovo. There is no sign that these horrible violations of human rights have actually ended. The United States, and this Commission, have key roles to play in the effort to restore peace to Kosovo. Clearly, the situation is not now stable, and after these Serbian assaults, a return to the situation as it was before is not possible. The U.S. must press the Contact Group, which will meet here in Washington on March 25th, to agree on a joint, strong stand against Serbian ethnic cleansing. Anything less won’t deter Milosevic. So far, the international response to the crisis has been swift but far from united and decisive. The Contact Group, comprised of the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, met in London on March 9th. The U.S. called for six strong measures against Serbia and Montenegro, but only two were adopted. These sanctions are: 1) a refusal to supply equipment to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which might be used for internal repression, or for terrorism; and, 2) on the part of the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany and Italy, a halt to all government credit to Serbia and Montenegro, and a denial of visas for senior Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive action by FRY security forces in Kosovo. Stronger measures were not agreed to. Among the proposed sanctions were an international freeze on all Serbian and Montenegrin 132 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 International financial assets. The International Criminal Tribunal was invited to begin gathering information on what had happened in Kosovo, and former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez was asked to go to the region to mediate the crisis. The Contact Group also supported the return of the OSCE long-term missions to Kosovo and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, something this Commission strongly supports. Lastly, the Contact Group said, “We demand that President Milosevic commence a political dialogue with moderate, peaceful [Kosovar Albanian] leadership to find a solution.” The international community can and must do better. Here, today, we will listen to our witnesses tell us what is going on in Kosovo. Mr. Zymberi will tell us what it feels like to Kosovar Albanians to live under Serbian rule. Mr. Abrahams will tell us about the human rights violations. Ms. Lindburg will tell us about the problems of getting humanitarian assistance to the people of Kosovo. And Dr. Bugajski will advise us about the prospects for achieving a peaceful resolution to the problem. The Bishop will provide a Serbian perspective on the situation. At this point, I will turn to my distinguished colleague and CoChairman, Congressman Chris Smith from New Jersey for any comments he may want to make. _____________________________________________________________ FOOTNOTE (1) Sic. Artemije Radosavljevic, bishop of Raska and Prizren, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, was allowed a few minutes to present “a Serbian perspective” in which he pointed out that Serbia is a multi-ethnic country. No debate was permitted at the Hearing. (Editors’ note.) DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 133 Arts Bojana Maksimovic B elgrade 134 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Arts DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 135 Arts 136 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Arts LAVISION POE TIQUE DE DANTE D’APRE S PE JOVIC T homas T odorovic Professeur d’université, Japon Après l’Italie, la France est depuis longtemps le premier centre de la dantologie, juste avant l’Allemagne. Au cours de ces dernières années sont apparues de nouvelles traductions des oeuvres de Dante en français. Signalons la plus importante : Dante Oeuvres complètes, La Pochothèque, 1996, traduction nouvelle sous la direction de Christian Bec. (Traductions et notes de Christian Bec, Roberto Barbone, François Livi, Marc Scialom et Antonio Stäuble). Quant à la critique littéraire, c’est l’ouvrage de Milivoje Pejovic Dante Alighieri, La conscience poétique et l’oeuvre, (Editions du Titre, Paris, 1996), qui a attiré notre attention. Dans la dantologie, il y a plusieurs explications pour un seul sujet, mais on a l’impression qu’elles ne s’opposent pas avec une extrême acuité les unes aux autres. Ces divergences donnent l’impression que chaque critique littéraire s’adresse à tout le monde, qu’il travaille pour tout le monde, mais qu’il “travaille” pour lui aussi. Telle est notre impression de l’ouvrage de Pejovic. Nous parlons de cet ouvrage pour deux raisons principales : primo, il est le dernier, à notre connaissance, dans la critique dantesque en français, et secondo, l’auteur s’emploie à y formuler la structure de l’oeuvre poétique de Dante selon une manière nouvelle et à donner une interprétation thématique nouvelle. C’est une entreprise autant méritoire que difficile, s’exposant aux risques de secouer certains tabous. Dans cet article, nous allons essayer de suivre le critique littéraire dans son entreprise, en y faisant nos observations. En parlant de la DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 137 Arts première oeuvre de Dante, Pejovic précise : “Dans la Vita Nuova, Dante ne décrit pas la vie, la réalité, les personnages, mais il analyse leurs effets, leurs reflets dans sa conscience et dans ce sens-là, il décrit toujours son sentiment et sa pensée personnels, c’est-à-dire suo stato”. Il est clair que le critique explique la Vie nouvelle par l’idéalisme objectif de Schelling en voulant faire savoir que ce courant philosophique existait chez certains créateurs du Moyen Age. D’une certaine manière, par cet aspect de la création de Dante, Pejovic veut dire, bien qu’il ne le fasse que supposer, que l’oeuvre de Dante s’apparente, par sa nature même, à l’âme romantique. Que Dante soit précurseur de beaucoup de choses en littérature mondiale, c’est incontestable ; comment pourrait-on expliquer autrement son aspect de modernité permanente ? Mais nous pensons que Pejovic fait un chemin nouveau dans la dantologie et qu’il reste à faire, à la critique littéraire, d’autres explorations dans ce sens-là. Un autre problème est soulevé dans l’ouvrage de Pejovic se rapportant à la pensée poétique de Dante. C’est son caractère dialectique, où Hegel doit être évoqué. Mais l’auteur observe la dialectique dantesque dans ses aspects d’originalité et d’unicité même. Dans le préambule de son ouvrage, Pejovic précise le champ de sa recherche : “Considérant la Vie nouvelle (la Vita Nuova), le Banquet (il Convivio) et la Divine comédie (la Divina Commedia) comme une oeuvre poétique en trois parties, rédigée à la première personne du singulier, nous avons étudié sa genèse par rapport au Je narrateur, c’est-à-dire à Dante-personnage qui est réellement le personnage littéraire principal. Notre travail a été effectué à partir d’une lecture nouvelle de cette oeuvre.” Ajoutons tout de suite que le statut du Narrateur dans la Divine comédie est le problème principal de la dantologie moderne. A propos du Narrateur, qui s’affirme sous forme du Je, Pejovic se distingue en partie de la critique dantesque contemporaine. D’abord, dans la critique, le Je est observé uniquement dans la Divine comédie , et non dans la Vie nouvelle et dans le Banquet, et ensuite, Pejovic exclut le Je de l’auteur dans l’oeuvre poétique de Dante. Il défend son point de vue, en précisant que dans l’oeuvre se trouve uniquement le 138 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Arts Je du personnage littéraire, mais le Je de l’auteur est en dehors de celle-ci. Comme s’il avait le souci de nous faire savoir que Dante ne pouvait réaliser autrement son oeuvre que par son alter ego et qui prend toute la place de l’auteur. De ce point de vue, Dante se transcende en son alter ego imaginaire qui est dans l’oeuvre mais qui, dans aucun cas, ne peut être confondu avec lui. Le Je, d’après Pejovic, est une fiction que nous concevons comme un être réel, mais qui vit au travers de telles situations qui n’ont aucun rapport avec ce qu’il appelle “la réalité telle quelle”. Dans ce cas, le Je chez Dante n’est rien d’autre qu’un intermédiaire entre l’auteur et la nouvelle réalité poétique, il n’est ni l’un ni l’autre, mais permet à l’un et à l’autre d’exister. Si le Je n’était pas compris comme personnage littéraire, l’oeuvre poétique de Dante perdrait tout caractère de réalisme et de plausibilité. L’univers poétique de Dante est autonome. Il a sa vie, ses structures psychologiques, mentales et esthétiques. C’est un univers créé, une “réalité” fictive, mais ses qualités nous la rende plausible comme si cette “réalité” existait de fait. “Le thème fondamental chez Dante, écrit Pejovic, est l’état du Je narrateur, qui se divise et génère l’état de tous les autres personnages”. Le critique voit dans ce fait le fondement de la structure de l’oeuvre poétique et son organisation linguistique. Le centre de l’univers dantesque est toujours l’endroit où se trouve le Je. Dans l’Avant-propos de la nouvelle traduction des Oeuvres complètes de Dante, le professeur Christian Bec, éminent spécialiste du Moyen Age italien, dit à propos de la Divine comédie : “Ecrite à la première personne (fait nouveau dans les littératures romanes) -à travers le “je” du personnage et celui de l’auteur- la Comédie vise à la réalisation d’une mission exemplaire”. Il est bien évident que dans son ouvrage, Pejovic s’éloigne de la position de la critique académique concernant les deux faits majeurs suivants : Primo, il exclut, précisons-le bien encore une fois, l’existence du Je de l’auteur dans l’oeuvre, et secondo, il attribue cette particularité à la Vie nouvelle et au Banquet et pas seulement à la Divine comédie . Quant à nous, nous pensons que l’auteur de La conscience poétique et l’oeuvre chez Dante nous doit un peu plus DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 139 Arts d’argumentation. C’est un problème de dantologie qui ne peut être tranché par des affirmations allant dans un sens ou dans l’autre. Des recherches plus poussées sont encore nécessaires. Tout au long de son ouvrage, Pejovic a tenté de distinguer l’auteur et le personnage. Il exprime ce fait même à propos de la conscience poétique. Il écrit : “La conscience poétique de Dante auteur ne peut pas coïncider avec la conscience poétique du poète-héros. La première est la conscience de l’homme qui est engagé dans la compréhension de la réalité, la conscience qui est variable à tout instant, la seconde est la conscience du personnage littéraire qui est contenue dans une matérialité linguistique invariable mais qui par son contenu même est en grande partie indéterminée et polyvalente dans sa potentialité sémantique inépuisable”. Cette position nous semble être plausible mais à notre tour nous voudrions savoir où se trouve, où commence cette bifurcation de la conscience de l’auteur ? Quand Pejovic écrit : “..., la création de Dante, ..., se trouve dans l’espace et le temps qui se situent entre l’acte préalable de la conscience du poète et la conscience de l’oeuvre achevée,”, il nous donne en partie la réponse. Cela veut dire que dans l’acte préalable de la conscience de l’auteur, l’oeuvre n’est qu’une présupposition. Mais quand l’oeuvre est définitivement achevée, l’univers poétique est autonome et la conscience de l’oeuvre est l’émanation de cette autonomie, d’où le triptyque “conscience-oeuvre-conscience de l’oeuvre.” La notion conscience est consubstantielle à l’auteur, la notion oeuvre suppose aussi tout le procédé de création et la notion conscience de l’oeuvre est la conscience du personnage littéraire principal, du Je narrateur. La bifurcation s’effectue donc au cours de la genèse de l’oeuvre de sorte que l’auteur, pendant ce temps, se transforme en son univers imaginé à qui il donne une forme littéraire inédite. En partant de ce point de vue, Pejovic ne pourrait pas formuler sa théorie sur Dante si le sommo poeta n’était pas allé jusqu’au bout de la réalisation de son oeuvre. Pour donner un fondement à sa thèse, Pejovic ne se limite pas à un réexamen de la thématique et de la structure de l’oeuvre dantesque. Il propose une redéfinition de toute son oeuvre poétique, en 140 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Arts reconsidérant même le prénom de l’auteur. Il propose de réhabiliter le prénom de Durante mais de ne pas porter pour autant préjudice au prénom Dante ; aussi écrit-il D(ur)ante. Comme le Je narrateur, ou Dante personnage, est le personnage central, il propose d’appeler la Vie nouvelle, le Banquet et la Divine comédie, la Dantéide et de présenter cette nouvelle formulation ainsi : D(ur)ante Alighieri La Dantéide, I la Vie nouvelle, II le Banquet, III la Divine comédie. En partant de la Dantéide, aboutissement de son étude, Pejovic peut définir le caractère de l’oeuvre poétique de Dante. Considérant le Paradis comme la conclusion de cette oeuvre, Pejovic écrit : “Cette partie de la Dantéide est la preuve la plus évidente que toute l’oeuvre ainsi que l’univers poétique en tant que sa forme spatiale qui se meut dans le temps, présente une “réalité” fictive, imaginée. C’est un exemple le plus clair de l’idéalisme objectif, où la conscience poétique est le seul contenant de la réalité poétique. La poète va de la fiction à sa réalité et de là à une nouvelle “réalité” fictive qui est en forme d’oeuvre d’art. Il est bien évident que si l’on ne prend pas en compte toutes les lois inhérentes à la création poétique, on pourrait prendre la réalité de la poésie de Dante comme une forme de discours éloigné du vrai et du réel, mais en partant avant tout de la logique de la création poétique, nous arrivons à la conclusion que toute son oeuvre et son univers poétique sont une allégorie majeure de la réalité de l’histoire de son époque.” Là se trouve, nous semble-t-il, la force principale, esthétique et philosophique, de la poétique de Dante. C’est en réalité une oeuvre littéraire géniale et colossale qui se trouve dans la forme la plus parfaite et qui, à travers celle-ci, donne aussi une image historique de son époque. Pour arriver à une conclusion pareille, Pejovic fait une distinction nette entre la vérité historique de l’oeuvre et sa vérité esthétique. Son ouvrage est au fond l’étude de la vérité esthétique de Dante. L’auteur de cette étude se trouve, comme tous les autres critiques d’ailleurs, devant une difficulté pour définir le Narrateur chez Dante. Il écrit : “De l’extérieur, nous ne pouvons pas trouver de limites précises entre Dante le poète et Dante le personnage littéraire, car la fiction se rapporte, d’une DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 141 Arts manière égale, à l’un et à l’autre. Mais si nous mettions une relation effective entre la fiction et Dante le poète, nous ne pourrions pas concevoir la plausibilité de l’action du poème ni constater aucun aspect de réalisme. Mais pour cette raison le Narrateur, accepté uniquement comme personnage littéraire, nous donne la possibilité de concevoir cette plausibilité et ce “réalisme” et d’accepter le poème tout entier comme une oeuvre réaliste.” Ici le mot extérieur veut signifier l’apparence, c’est-à-dire l’oeuvre telle quelle nous paraît, sans considérer d’abord son essence et son authenticité que Pejovic met au premier plan dans ses analyses. En deuxième partie de son ouvrage, Pejovic essaie de définir l’origine psychologique des fameux effets chez Dante. A leur source se trouve l’imagination poétique. A ce propos il précise : “Les effets que le sujet provoque par imagination sont de fait les sensations internes. Il les extériorise et les objectivise, dans les structures psychologiques, en les présentant comme s’il s’agissait des phénomènes qui provenaient d’une réalité ne dépendant pas de lui, d’une réalité effectivement objective. Dans cette perspective, le procédé du poète est perçu par le lecteur comme Dante le sent et le conçoit et la réalité littéraire inventée est acceptée comme une réalité indépendante du sujet, en l’occurrence du poète.” Cette constatation définit en partie l’imagination du poète, c’est-à-dire le caractère de sa particularité. Pour Dante, imaginer quelque chose ne peut s’effectuer que comme un vécu permanent. Ici les sensations internes sont réellement la seule explication plausible de pareils phénomènes psychologiques. Pejovic, par ses analyses, ne ramène pourtant pas tout à l’auteur, mais lui attribue, en tant que héros principal de sa création, le rôle de conscience poétique centrale, dans laquelle se reflète la réalité évoquée dans l’univers poétique entier. Chez Dante, il y a deux caractéristiques dans l’oeuvre poétique qui provoquent des interprétations diverses. C’est l’oublié et l’ineffable. Pejovic les classe dans la catégorie des qualités et écarte la moindre idée contraire qui diminuerait l’importance du grand poète. A ce sujet il écrit : “ L’oublié n’est pas ce que Dante a imaginé d’abord et ensuite a oublié, ou plus 142 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Arts précisément, l’oublié n’est pas ce que Dante imagine et oublie tout de suite. L’ineffable n’est pas ce que Dante voit et qui est une merveille pour laquelle il ne trouve pas, ou ne possède pas de mots, pour la décrire. L’oublié et l’ineffable chez Dante sont des notions bien précises désignant les quantités et les qualités, les objets et les effets, la matière et l’essence, où dans ces diptyques de mots seulement le second élément est supposé être pris en compte, et comme tel il est évoqué sans plus, sans aucune description réelle.” Ce point de vue de Pejovic est associé à sa définition de la particularité de la pensée poétique chez Dante. Il essaie constamment d’écarter tout caractère de contradiction en elle. Dans ce sens l’oublié ne peut dans aucun cas avoir un rapport avec la mémoire défaillante du poète, qui ne l’est pas, mais uniquement avec son procédé de compréhension de la réalité et de sa présentation dans l’oeuvre d’art. Dans son étude sur Dante, Pejovic s’est toujours servi du texte du poète pour justifier ses points de vue. Il a utilisé les vers des Opere minori, repris dans la Divine comédie, comme arguments forts pour définir la structure de la Dantéide. De même, il les a utilisés, avec d’autres textes, pour donner son explication des deux grandes énigmes, le veltro et le dux. A la différence de la critique courante, Pejovic exprime ainsi son idée : “... il faut considérer le veltro et le dux comme des personnages de l’oeuvre, issus des divisions psychologiques du Narrateur et non pas comme des personnages extérieurs à elle, soit de cette époque ou d’une époque à venir”. Le Narrateur est constamment considéré dans une double perspective, il est d’abord la source qui alimente la genèse de l’oeuvre et qui crée l’univers poétique, ensuite il est la conscience où se focalise cet univers entier. Dans cet aspect est redéfinie l’oeuvre poétique de Dante et en même temps elle est revalorisée dans ses qualités morales et esthétiques. Ces qualités définissent aussi, d’après Pejovic, la vision poétique de Dante. L’ouvrage de Milivoje Pejovic est une contribution marquante à la dantologie, ouvrant des voies aux interprétations nouvelles de recherche sur “la Dantéide”. Il fourmille d’idées qui pourraient servir facilement de titres pour beaucoup DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 143 Arts d’ouvrages. Vu sous cet angle-là, cette étude donne une nouvelle interprétation, et définition de l’oeuvre poétique de Dante, de sa thématique et de sa structure, mais elle est aussi un outil qui nous rend le grand poète plus clair et plus proche. 144 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Arts E squisse pour MA VIE SANS MENSONGE Milivoje PE JOVIC P aris Je passe mes journées entières dans l’attente d’une réponse finale à la question. Et cette question !... Quelle question ? Mon problème ne réside pas dans la recherche de la réponse ellemême, mais il est dans la difficulté à connaître la question, à l’entendre de la bouche d’une personne amie. Pourtant je suis seul, absolument seul. Non, je me corrige. Je suis avec mon idée oppressante à connaître la question, la trouver ou, sinon, à l’inventer même. Je suis tourmenté par elle, je n’arrive plus à mettre de l’ordre dans mes idées qui déchirent mon âme. Que faire ? Supporter la solitude en attendant, ou disparaître. Mais j’aime la vie, ou plus exactement j’aime vivre, exister sans savoir même pourquoi. A propos des tourments de ma pensée, le docteur m’a dit l’autre jour que je ne l’inquiète pas. Il a précisé : “Si vous ne possédiez rien d’autre que votre instinct de conservation, ce serait suffisant pour que vous les sublimiez.”Depuis je me demande, sais-je réellement pourquoi je suis au monde ? Si, j’y suis finalement, c’est, en grande partie, pour définir la question et en trouver la réponse. Je pense que le docteur s’est bien trompé et qu’il a confondu chez moi l’instinct et l’obsession. Je sais que ce n’est pas bien de se servir d’un tel moyen, d’une obsession, pour exister, durer. Dans ce sens-là je ne peux pas être un homme noble, mais cependant mon but est noble : résoudre mon problème, l’écarter de mes idées et être comme les autres, heureux et réconcilié avec le monde. Ce serait le vrai bonheur de ma vie. Mais il est bien loin, ce bonheur, je dois patienter encore longtemps. Je dois me demander constamment DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 145 Arts comment est-il possible, et surtout comment est-il normal, de vaincre par une mauvaise chose une autre chose encore plus mauvaise, et tout cela, le remplacer par le bien où apparaîtrait une nouvelle aurore dans ma vie. Je crois que je me suis trompé sur le jugement du docteur. Dans l’instinct dont il parlait se trouve peut-être ma pensée qui abrite l’étincelle de l’aurore où je trouverai la clé magique de mon bonheur... J’étais soumis à un agréable sentiment de cette probabilité, quand soudainement un étrange frisson m’envahit ; je me rappelais quelque chose, quelqu’un, mais un voile couvrait encore son visage dans mon esprit. D’abord je me rappelle des mots, des bribes de phrases, et petit à petit, elles devenaient plus claires, avec toute leur gravité...”Vais-je mourir aujourd’hui ?” “Oui, mais pas aujourd’hui”. C’étaient bien les mots de Sonia qu’elle prononçait en racontant un épisode de sa vie pendant que je la regardais avec compassion, amitié et amour. Avec une extrême perspicacité, elle savait deviner et même lire, dans mon regard, mes pensées. Je lui ai dit : “Le tragique rapproche les gens”. Elle a compris, me tendit la main et sortit. Depuis, aucune nouvelle d’elle, je ne sais même pas si elle est vivante ou morte. Cette idée inattendue m’effraya et secoua durement mon corps entier. Et puis, une lumière indéfinissable éblouit mes yeux, comme un puissant éclair, une cité assombrie, en me rappelant qu’il faut commencer à accomplir la tâche désirée. Pendant que je faisais un tel rêve, éveillé, Barine entra dans le bureau... 146 DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Arts DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 147 Arts BULLETIN D'ABONNEMENT ORDER FORM 1 an/volume, quatre numéros: 190 FF; 56 DM; £23; US$ 39 (Institutions: 300 FF). 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Aires Canada: Dusan Pavlovic, 4564 Avenue Coolbrook, Montreal, Qué, H3X 2K6. France: Nikolas Suica, Dialogue, 20, rue Jean Colly, 75013 Paris United Kingdom: Miss Deborah Danica 148 Mager, 88 Henniker Road, London E15 1JP U. S. A.: Desa Tomasevic - Wakeman, 2471 Cedar Street, Berkeley, CA 95708 Yugoslavia: Djordje Maksimovic, Cvijiceva 24, 11000 Beograd DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 PISMA A LETTRES DE LETTERS Privatizacija u Srbiji i “medjunarodna zajednica” Slobodan Vukovi} Institut za kriminolo{ka i sociolo{ka istra‘ivanja, Beograd Medjunarodna izolacija jugoslovenske, odnosno srpske privrede od strane mo}nih sila Zapada, ili kako one to retori~ki za sebe ka‘u, “medjunarodne zajednice”, vi{estruko se negativno odrazila na dalji tok proizvodnje, pa samim tim i na tok privrednog razvoja zemlje. Naravno o problemu pada proizvodnje i zaustavljanja privrednog razvoja kao i ukupnih gubitaka, koji se kre}u do fantasti~nih veli~ina (1), ovde ne}emo raspravljati. Ovde nas, pre svega, zanima koliko je medjunarodna izolacija Jugoslavije u osnovnim crtama uticala na usporavanje privatizacije, odnosno koliko je usporeno transformisanje DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 149 jugoslovenske samoupravne u trzi{nu privredu. Samim tim koliko se ovo stavljanje zemlje u svojevrstan karantin odrazilo na usporavanje i razvoj demokratskih dru{tvenih odnosa. Prvo, pad jugoslovenskog nacionalnog dohotka na ispod polovine svoje vrednosti u odnosu na period pre sankcija, neminovno dovodi do enormnog optere}enja privrede. Veliko poresko optere}enje privrede tera sposobne u bekstvo van granica zemlje, a {to ujedno zna~i i selidbu kapitala. Na drugoj strani, u tako osiroma{enoj i izolovanoj privredi nema zna~ajnijeg tr‘i{nog dobitka, ni kod privatnog, ni kod” dru{tvenog” sektora koji bi se, i pod ovakvim prete‘no nepovoljnim zakonskim re{enjima, mogao reinvestirati u kupovinu i prestrukturiranje neuspe{nih “dru{tvenih” preduze}a. Drugo, u uslovima zatvorenog tr‘i{ta, nesta{ice mnogih roba i zadr‘avanje nefleksibilnog dr‘avnog i “dru{tvenog” vlasni{tva kao dominantnih oblika svojine, dr‘ava je bila prinudjena, ne samo da toleri{e nelegalnu trgovinu tim robama, posebno naftom i njenim derivatima, nego ~ak i da je podsti~e. Tako se stvaraju pravi organizovani oblici privrednog kriminala, ne samo u toj sferi, nego i u mnogim drugim. Jedna od klju~nih karakteristika organizovanog kriminala jeste stvaranje dobiti nelegalnom trgovinom, ili kontrolom proizvodnje ili trgovine robe koja nedostaje na tr‘i{tu, uz saradnju sa dr‘avom, odnosno njenim institucijama. Sve je to pospe{ilo naglo nelegalno boga}enje i uvelo kao model po‘eljnog pona{anja - kriminalno pona{anje. Nelegalno oboga}eni, od straha pred poreskim organima, ili pak promene politike socijalisti~ke vlasti, {to se kao alternativa ne sme zanemariti, be‘e u inostranstvo nose}i sa sobom brzo ste~eni (oplja~kani) kapital(2). Odliv tako ste~enog kapitala je ve}i {to su njegovi akteri bili bli‘i postoje}oj socijalisti~koj vlasti i njenoj nomenklaturi. Tre}e, fakti~ki nije data jednaka {ansa svim gradjanima da se oku{aju u privrednoj utakmici. U~e{}e u privrednoj utakmici na legalan na~in, za sve one koji su 150 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 do ju~e bili van privatnog sektora, bilo je naj~e{}e skop~ano sa znatnim ulaganjima, ili se pak zasnivalo na vezama u nomenklaturi, {to zna~i, bilo je prete‘no rezervisano samo za pojedince bliske vlasti. Naravno, ovo u~e{}e se moglo ostvariti i na nelegalan na~in : preko sive ekonomije. Nepostojanje jednakih {ansi za sve, povla~i za sobom posledicu da ne dolaze najsposobniji u privatni posao, pa samim tim i na ~elo privrede, {to dalje prouzrokuje negativan odnos celih dru{tvenih grupa prema privatnom poslu i privatnoj inicijativi. Da bi jedan program privatizacije uspeo, on mora biti prihva}en od glavnih politi~kih aktera i naj{irih slojeva stanovni{tva. Ali, ne samo da bude prihva}en, ve} i da oni u~estvuju u njemu. U~e{}e klju~nih politi~kih snaga i stanovni{tva bi}e obezbedjeno onda, kada oni u tom programu budu videli svoje interese (Boycko, Shleifer,Vishny, 1995:3839). To zna~i, da bi u praksi program privatizacije uspeo, on treba da bude prihva}en od strane klju~nih politi~kih aktera (pozicije i opozicije) i prilagodjen interesima ve}ine stanovni{tva. Zato, negativan “ imid‘ “ koji je godinama sistematski stvaran protiv privatnog vlasni{tva, a koji se delimi~no i sada ose}a, ve{to koriste demagozi iz socijalisti~ke i njoj bliskih stranaka, za otvoreni ideolo{ki rat protiv privatne inicijative, koji se uglavnom mo‘e sa‘eti u jednoj re~enici : po{to se ogromna ve}ina privatnika obogatila plja~kom, to zna~i, po socijalistima, da je privatna svojina plja~ka (!), i zato je najbolje da i dalje ostane “dru{tvena” svojina, a ona }e opstati pod uslovom da glasate za njihovu stranku. To }e obezbediti njihov model regulisane tr‘i{ne privrede, zasnovene na ravnopravnosti svih oblika svojine (a to zna~i dominantan polo‘aj dr‘avnog i”dru{tvenog”sektora), jer je “sa stanovi{ta efikasnosti vlasnik irelevantan” {to su u svom programu i zapisali (Mini},1993:76,78). Produ‘enje u nedogled postojanja “dru{tvene” svojine na jednoj strani, i njenu svakodnevnu eroziju na drugoj strani, svesno poma‘e “medjunarodna zajednica”, stavljaju}i zemlju u medjunarodnu izolaciju. Kakvog li DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 151 apsurda! Ta izolacija u potpunosti poma‘e srpskoj socijalisti~koj vlasti da opstane. To ona sama priznaje, jer je u svom programu zapisala da “strani ~inioci uzrokuju negativnu stopu privrednog rasta” (Mini},1993:75). Za njen opstanak je va‘na jo{ jedna ~injenica : borba opzicionih stranaka protiv nje (srpske vlasti), u medijima koje ta vlast kontroli{e, ve{to se predstavlja kao borba protiv naroda kojeg su, zapravo, srpski mo}nici stavili u karantin (D‘uverovi}, Mihailovi}, Vukovi} 1994). Pitanje je da li je tu potrebna neka velika propaganda. Odnosno, da li bi i jedan ozbiljan narod u svetu u situaciji kada mu je prvo, razbijena dr`ava, drugo, jednom njegovom delu objavljen rat do istrebljenja (na njemu je isprobano super moderno oru‘je najmo}nije svetske alijanse) i tre}e, kada je glavnini tog naroda objavljen ekonomski rat (za vreme Drugog svetskog rata SAD su trgovale sa Nema~kom), dakle, da li bi i jedan narod menjao, usred tog rata, svoju vlast pod diktatom, pa makar ona bila i najgora. Jedan od klju~eva podr{ke naroda (na izborima) aktuelnom re‘imu u Srbiji, bez obzira na njegove katastrofalne rezultate u politici i ekonomiji, mo‘emo tra‘iti u politici “medjunarodne zajednice” prema srpskom narodu, posebno {to je u ovoj situaciji u zapadnim medijima naj~e{}e optu`ivan ceo jedan narod (Brdar,1995). Odnosno, nevidjen spoljni pritisak na tre}u Jugoslaviju rezultirao je najvi{e u u~vr{}ivanju postoje}eg re‘ima na vlasti. Ovu konstataciju potvrdjuju rezultati izbora koji se mogu razumeti samo ako se imaju u vidu rezultati istra‘ivanja (Brankovi},1994a), koji pokazuju da je, bez obzira na pona{anje re‘ima javno mnjenje, uslovno re~eno, podeljeno: tj. gradjani za situaciju u kojoj se Srbija nalazi najvi{e okrivljuju strane sile (35,7%), zatim rukovodstvo Srbije (30,1%), unutra{nje neprijatelje (11,8%) ili pak isti~e kolektivnu krivicu (17,9%). Zna~i, gradjani na prvom mestu okrivljuju strane sile, odnosno gotovo polovina (47,5%) razne neprijatelje (spolja{nje i unutra{nje), a samo nepuna tre}ina (Kosovo i Metohija nisu obuhva}eni 152 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 istra‘ivanjem) percipira rukovodstvo Srbije kao krivca za situaciju u Srbiji. Na drugoj strani, uvode}i blokadu, “medjunarodna zajednica” dala je srpskoj socijalisti~koj vlasti izobilje materijala za pravdanje svoje neuspe{nosti. Za udaljavanje Srbije od demokratskih i kulturnih vrednosti Evrope, kriva je ona - “medjunarodna zajednica”. Za sve privredne neda}e, bez obzira da li su one izazvane blokadom ili ne, u propagandnim porukama kriva je ona - “medjunarodna zajednica”. Za odlaganje privatizacije, odnosno izgradnje moderne tr`i{ne privrede kriva je ona - “medjunarodna zajednica”. Pored odr`avanja na vlasti, ona joj je omogu}ila da na nelegalan na~in dodje do poseda znatnog dela srpskog nacionalnog bogatstva. Ta plja~ka sprovodi se putem organizovanog {verca pod izgovorom zadovoljenja ve}ine stanovni{tva osnovnim, a deficitarnim, proizvodima. Postupci “medjunarodne zajednice” ne samo da odr`avaju postoje}u socijalisti~ku vlast, nego joj omogu}avaju produ`etak u ovom ili ne{to izmenjenom obliku, poma`u}i joj, pre svega, da se postepeno pretvori u vlasni~ku klasu. Za{to ba{ tako postupa tzv.”medjunarodna zajednica”? Ne}e ona ba{ ni{ta da rizikuje. Ona ne mo‘e znati kako }e se sutra pona{ati novoizabrana vlast u Srbiji. Tu eventualnu novu vlast ona tek treba da upozna, pa ~ak i da pregovara sa njome, dok je ovu, aktuelnu, upoznala sa vi{e strana. Posebno sa one za nju najzna~ajnije - njene pregovara~ke “~vrstine”. Aktuelna vlast u Srbiji kad god je bila pritisnuta od “medjunarodne zajednice” , popustila je, a ko danas popusti, popusti}e i sutra. O svim tim popu{tanjima ne obave{tavaju}i nikoga : ni narod ni Skup{tinu. Zbog svojih uskostrana~kih interesa, ta vlast propustila je da sebi obezbedi {irok front podr{ke ; jer tada bi morala da deli vlast. [iroki front podr{ke, posebno klju~nih politi~kih faktora, sa (makar i delimi~no) izvr{enom svojinskom reformom i deljivom vla{}u, prinudio bi “medjunarodnu zajednicu” na ne{to druga~ije pona{anje, ne samo prema toj vlasti, DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 153 nego i prema celom srpskom narodu. Medjunarodni mo}nici, shavataju}i da je ta vlast dosta krhka, sve je vi{e pritiskaju - a ova sve vi{e popu{ta. Zato je bilo i vrlo lako da “medjunarodna zajednica” natera srpsku aktuelnu vlast da ostavi na cedilu preko dva miliona prekodrinskih Srba. Tako }e je naterati, ako to njeni interesi budu zahtevali, da se odrekne i drugih vitalnih srpskih nacionalnih interesa. Imaju}i re~eno u vidu, na prvi pogled izgleda potpuno nelogi~no da “medjunarodna zajednica”, zapravo mo}ne sile Zapada, podr‘avaju socijalisti~ku vlast u Srbiji. Ali ova “nelogi~nost” je samo “vidljiva” na prvi pogled. Medjunarodna zajednica je ne samo podr‘ava, iz gore navedenih razloga, nego je i dugoro~no u~vr{}uje poma‘u}i joj da, daljim opstankom na vlasti, njeni predstavnici, putem nelegalne privatizacije, postanu punopravni ~lanovi novoformiraju}e vlasni~ke klase. Mo}ne zapadne dr‘ave vi{estruko uni{tavaju srpsku privredu, stavljaju}i zemlju u svojevrstan karantin zajedno sa srpskom vla{}u, koju, kao {to vidimo, podr‘avaju. Ono {to je najgore, pored ogromne direktne i indirektne {tete, one uti~u na sve ve}e tehnolo{ko zaostajanje njene privrede. Pored tehnolo{kog zaostajanja, sankcije “medjunarodne zajednice”, uni{tile su radne navike kod znatnog dela stanovni{tva (na stotine hiljada zaposlenih fakti~ki je ostalo bez posla - odnosno, bilo je poslato na prinudne odmore) i gurnule ga u {verc i druge oblike sive ekonomije. Tako vi{estruko uni{tena privreda ne}e biti u stanju da izadje na medjunarodno tr‘i{te, pa }e biti lak plen, zasada politi~ara sa Zapada, a sutra poslovnih ljudi, i to za bagatelne pare. Ko }e im u tom poslu biti najbolji partner nije te{ko pogoditi. To }e, pre svega, biti ona ista vlast koju su do ju~e, na vrlo perfidan na~in prvo podr‘ali, i s kojom su do ju~e pregovarali, pa je zatim prisilili na popu{tanje (3). To mo‘e imati vi{estruko negativne posledice. (i) Stavljanje privrede jedne zemlje pod inostranu kontrolu, a posebno ako je re~ o zemljama koje su prema Srbiji neprijateljski nastrojene, o~ito je da je 154 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 jedan vid gubljenja nezavisnosti. Tako }e ta ista “medjunarodna zajednica” poku{ati na indirektan na~in da naplati ne male tro{kove koje je sama sebi nametnula razbijaju}i drugu Jugoslaviju. (ii) Druga zna~ajna posledica ove izolacije podstakla je proces, koji je ve} dugo vreme bio u toku, a to je odliv stru~njaka, kojim se, takodje, na indirektan na~in napla}uju tro{kovi za rasturanje druge Jugoslavije. Na drugoj strani, odliv stru~njaka pove}ava nau~no-tehnolo{ku zavisnost zemlje od onih istih dr‘ava u koje na{i stru~njaci i najvi{e odlaze, {to je gotovo nenadoknadiv gubitak. (iii) Tre}e, uvodjenjem ekonomske blokade “medjunarodna zajednica”, kao {to smo videli, pomogla je, pored usporavanja transformacije jugoslovenske samoupravne privrede u tr`i{nu, da se gotovo razbije, ili preciznije re~eno, rasto~i srednja klasa. Tr`i{na privreda i stabilna srednja klasa su u razvijenim gradjanskim dru{tvima osnovni stubovi na kojima se zasnivaju individualne slobode gradjana. Rastakaju}i srednju klasu, ona je uspela, ili na du`i rok spre~ila, razvoj i izgradnju demokratskih institucija dru{tva, pa samim tim spre~ila i razvoj demokratije. To jest, zapretala je sve one vrednosti na kojima ona sama insistira. (iv) ^etvrto, izolacija pospe{uje odliv kapitala, ne samo onog {pekulantskog, nego i onog, da tako ka‘emo, stvorenog pove}anim preduzetni~kim ume}em i radom. Bekstvo kapitala uslovljeno je ve}im povoljnostima koje mogu dati zemlje u samom na{em okru‘enju, a jo{ vi{e one druge koje nisu iskusile blokadu privrede. S druge strane, ta ista “medjunarodna zajednica” svojim merama nesebi~no poma‘e uru{avanje pravnog sistema, odnosno uti~e na kr{enje pravnih normi (u beznadju i borbi za golu egzistenciju kome je jo{ stalo do prava), ma kakve one bile, iako se stalno deklarativno zala‘e za po{tovanje zakonitosti, naravno, kad njoj to odgovara. Jednom na~et pravni poredak te{ko se ponovo uspostavlja i kod dru{tva sa zaokru‘enim pravnim sistemom, a kamoli kod dru{tva ~ija pravna zgrada mora do‘iveti zna~ajne promene. DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 155 Ovde je, takodje, neophodno postaviti pitanje - da li se uop{te mo‘e sprovesti iole valjana privatizacija u uslovima medjunarodne izolacije? Za odgovor na to pitanje ima vi{e valjanih argumenata i za i protiv(4). (i) Sankcije, kao {to smo videli, smanjuju dru{tveni proizvod, {to uti~e na prelivanje kapitala i dru{tvenog bogatstva u potro{nju, ~ime se smanjuje kapital neophodan za razvoj (Kova~,1994a:118), odnosno, smanjuje se mogu}nost za neophodna ulaganja u prestrukturisanim preduze}ima. (ii) U uslovima zatvorenog tr‘i{ta gotovo da je nemogu}e utvrditi tr‘i{nu cenu preduze}a kao jedino relevantnu. (iii) Unutra{nje cene su ne samo nerealne, ve~ i "naduvane", jer nisu izlo`ene medjunarodnoj konkurenciji. Pored toga, na delu je ogroman nesklad izmedju cena razli~itih proizvoda {to remeti normalne privredne tokove. To stvara privid uspe{nosti, odnosno neuspe{nosti, kod mnogih preduze}a. Privid uspe{nosti kod onih koji u`ivaju dru{tvenu rentu, a neuspe{nosti kod onih ~ije su cene du`i period depresirane, pa im to pove}ava, odnosno smanjuje tr`i{nu cenu. (iv) Privatizovana preduze}a od samog po~etka nisu izlo‘ena medjunarodnoj konkurenciji, pa samim tim nisu primorana na smanjenje tro{kova proizvodnje, ve} se maksimizacija profita vr{i na osnovu pove}anja cena, {to je mogu}e jednostavno ostvariti, jer nema inostrane konkurencije. (v) Peto, zatvorena privreda je pravi "raj" za razvoj sive ekonomije, koja dvostruko negativno uti~e na privrednu aktivnost, zapravo stimuli{e se uvoz nekvalitetne robe po dampinskim cenama, na jednoj, a dr`ava ostaje bez zna~ajnih fiskalnih prihoda, na drugoj strani. Zato je dr`ava prinudjena na ve}a fiskalna optere}enja ~ime se smanjuje konkurentnost legalne privrede. (vi) Tako se podsti~e, ve} pomenuto, seljenje kapitala. (vii) Novostvoreni privatnici, preko naduvanih cena a ~esto u saradnji sa dr‘avom, dolaze do enormnih zarada za kratko vreme, {to negativno uti~e na radinost, stvara 156 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 privid lake i brze zarade i ru{i poslovni moral pre njegovog uspostavljanja. “Medjunarodna zajednica” blokadom zemlje spre~ava, ili bolje re~eno, usporava razvoj finansijskog tr`i{ta ("svetinje" u smislu zapadnih ekonomskih institucija), pa samim tim i tr`i{ta uop{te, ili kako se to u poslednje vreme ka`e - integralnog tr`i{ta. Blokada finansijskih sredstava jugoslovenskih banaka u inostranstvu i zabrana inostranom kapitalu da u~estvuje, makar i simboli~no, na pove}anje tra`nje hartija od vrednosti na doma}oj berzi - prvo spre~ava, a zatim i usporava neophodan razvoj tr`i{ta. U~e{}e stranog kapitala poja~ava finansijsko tr`i{te ne samo u psiholo{kom, ve} i u tehni~kom smislu - pove}ava neophodnu finansijsku disciplinu. Prethodno opisani uslovi vi{e su nego nepovoljni za privatizaciju putem prodaje ili dokapitalizacijom. Oni se, pre svega, ogledaju u nepostojanju tr‘i{ta, odatle i nepostojanje tr‘i{ta kapitala (5), pa samim tim i nemogu}nosti utvrdjivanja realne tr‘i{ne cene preduze}a. Ali, argumenti nedvosmisleno govore da je privatizacija nasu{na potreba srpske privrede, pa samim tim i dru{tva. U takvim uslovima name}e se kao jedino racionalno re{enje besplatna privatizacija putem privatizacionih bonova - vau~era. Prihvatanjem ovog modela, ve}ina prethodno nabrojanih ograni~enja, ostala bi bezpredmetna, a danom ukidanja ili suspenzijom sankcija, pretvorila bi se u prednost. Besplatnom privatizacijom bila bi, za po~etak, obuhva}ena ne cela privreda, nego samo jedan njen deo, kako bi se dao zamajac razvoju tr‘i{nih odnosa i spre~ila masovna plja~ka “dru{tvene” imovine. Ona bi zadovoljila bar dva uslova : brzinu i koliko toliko pravednost. Prvi uslov bio bi u potpunosti zadovoljen. Brzom privatizacijom bila bi u{tedjena znatna sredstva samoniklog privatnog kapitala za ulaganja u infrastrukturu - pre svega u prodajni prostor u trgovini i hale u industriji. Posebno u situaciji kada u postoje}em dru{tvenom sektoru postoje ogromni DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 157 neiskori{}eni kapaciteti. Taj novac, koji se koristi za izgradnju, uslovno re~eno, duplih kapaciteta, treba usmeriti putem raznih stimulacija u organizaciona i tehnolo{ka pobolj{anja, pro{irivanja asortimana roba i naravno, u oskudan obrtan kapital. Ovde se mo‘e prigovoriti da su ta ulaganja strogo namenska i racionalna, pa samim tim i zdravija. Ali to je u ovim uslovima oskudnih finansijskih sredstava,nepotrebno tro{enje resursa. Drugi uslov, pravednost, bio bi samo delimi~no zadovoljen, jer se postavlja pitanje da li uop{te mo‘e biti pravedne privatizacije. U takvoj privatizaciji u~estvovali bi svi punoletni gradjani Srbije. Besplatnom privatizacijom, preko centralnih privatizacionih fondova, mogu}e je obuhvatiti, ako ne celu, ono u prvoj fazi jedan deo (primera radi, do jedne tre}ine) srpske privrede. To bi tada vi{estruko stabiliziraju}e uticalo na ukupno stanje u privredi i dru{tvu. Prethodno nabrojana ograni~enja na polju privatizacije proistekla iz medjunarodne izolacije, srpska vlast, zbog svojih ideolo{kih ograni~enja ili pojedina~nih interesa njenih aktera, nije htela, ili pak, nije umela da iskoristi i da ih preokrene u prednost, i to ne samo za zemlju, nego i za sebe. Besplatnom privatizacijom, makar i dela srpske privrede, u onom obimu da sa postoje}im privatnim sektorom ~ini dominantni vlasni~ki odnos, nastupile bi promene koje bi se ogledale u slede}em: 1. To bi bio prvi korak ka istinskom uvodjenju prave tr‘i{ne privrede i miran prelazak u postkomunisti~ko dru{tvo sa dominantnom privatnom privredom. Sprovedenom besplatnom privatizacijom, po{to nema finansijskih sredstava u narodu za sprovodjenje nekih drugih modela, izbili bi se iz ruku argumenti nedobronamernih zapadnih sila da je Srbija poslednji neokomunisti~ki bastion u Evropi. 2. Po~elo bi se vra}ati potpuno poljuljano poverenje u dr‘avu i njene institucije. Modelom besplatne privatizacije bi se, takodje, koliko-toliko zadovoljila pravi~nost, {to za dru{tva kao {to je na{e, koja su pre‘ivela 158 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 ovakve katastrofe mo‘e biti jedan od retkih podsticaja za njegovo ozdravljenje. Tako bi dobila i socijalisti~ka partija dokazuju}i da je raskinula sa svojom, ne ba{ davnom, komunisti~kom pro{lo{}u. Time bi ona mogla pokazati da se svesrdno zala‘e za modernizaciju, kako privrede, tako i dru{tva i da nastavlja tradiciju ne bolj{evi~ke, ve}, pre svega, socijalisti~ke orijentacije, a to su na Zapadu stranke socijaldemokratske provenijencije. 3. Ja~anjem privatnog sektora pove}ava se konkurentnost medju privrednim subjektima, {to direktno uti~e na pove}anje profitabilnosti cele privrede i naravno uti~e na dinami~niji privredni rast. 4. Reduciraju se izdaci iz bud‘eta (po socijalisti~kom principu) za odr‘avanje nelikvidnih “dru{tvenih” i dr‘avnih preduze}a. Takodje, smanjuje se pritisak na bankarski sistem (koji je, uzgred re~eno, u potpunom kolapsu, po izjavama gotovo svih njegovih aktera), da daju kredite preduze}ima za koje se zna da ih ne}e (ili nemogu) nikada vratiti - time bi se, koliko-toliko, smanjio inflatorni pritisak. 5. Velika je verovatno}a, ili sasvim izvesno, da bi u tim privatizovanim preduze}ima vrlo brzo do{lo, pod privatnom dirigentskom palicom, do o‘ivljavanja i pove}anja proizvodnje. Sve bi to omogu}ilo brz porast bruto nacionalnog dohotka i legalnije i jednostavnije popunjavanje dr‘avne kase i raznih fondova zdravim novcem. 6. U dominantnoj privatnoj privredi dr‘ava lak{e sprovodi tvrdo bud‘etsko ograni~enje (jer se mo‘e neutralnije postaviti prema privatnim nego prema svojim preduze}ima), neophodno za stabilnost i sigurnost privredjivanja. 7. Brza besplatna privatizacija smanjila bi mogu}nost dosada{nje bezobzirne plja~ke “dru{tvenih” preduze}a od strane komunisti~ke nomenklature i njenih saputnika. 8. Znatno bi se smanjio prostor za aktivnost sive DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 159 ekonomije, a to automatski zna~i pove}anje dr‘avnih prihoda i mogu}nost smanjenja fiskalnog optere}enja legalne privrede. 9. Verovatan dinami~niji rast pozitivno bi uticao na pove}anje zaposlenosti, pa samim tim i na smanjenje socijalnih tenzija. 10. Pove}anje u~e{}a privatnog sektora u strukturi privrede, uticalo bi na ukupan oporavak privrede, {to bi kasnije uticalo na pove}anje cene neprivatizovanih preduze}a. To zna~i da bi se besplatna podela deonica vrlo brzo vratila kroz pove}anu cenu deonica preduze}a pripremljenih za prodaju u nekoj od slede}ih faza privatizacije i kroz pove}anje poreskih prihoda na ra~un pove}ane proizvodnje. Brzom privatizacijom dela srpske privrede, pa makar to bilo i u nenormalnim uslovima, smanjile bi se posledice izazvane medjunarodnom blokadom tre}e Jugoslavije. Zemlja sa fleksibilnom i dominantnom privatnom privredom lak{e }e se suprotstavljati pritiscima i apetitima “medjunarodne zajednice”. Lak{e }e se prestrukturisati proizvodnja neophodna doma}em tr`i{tu i lak{e }e se zameniti uvozne komponente doma}im, zbog poznate ve}e fleksibilnosti, odnosno br`eg reagovanja privatnog sektora od dr`avnog ili “dru{tvenog”. Ona }e sa takvom privredom lak{e na}i ili organizovati lobi grupe, koje ne}e biti optu`ivane da podr`avaju komuniste. Fleksibilnost i izdr`ljivost privatnog sektora dokazana je i u poljoprivredi. I pored medjunarodne izolacije i totalne ekonomske blokade zemlja nije bila gladna, i ako su to svetski mo}nici hteli zahvaljuju}i ne samo prirodnim pogodnostima nego i ~injenici da je poljoprivredna proizvodnja, pre svega, privatna. Bez zna~ajne pomo}i dr`ave, a ~esto sa otkupnim cenama i tri puta ni`im od svetskih , ona je uspela da prehrani stanovni{tvo. Pri tom se ne sme zaboraviti da je sve vreme blokade hranila i preko pola miliona izbeglica, a delimi~no i stanovni{tvo Republike Srpske i stanovni{tvo tada{nje Republike Srpske Krajine. Privatna poljoprivredna proizvodnja 160 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 stvorila je solidne materijalne rezerve, posebno u ovako te{kim vremenima, za psiholo{ku sigurnost naroda. Naravno, ako to ne bude pro}erdano od strane aktuelne srpske vlasti. Ne tereba zaboraviti da je privatna poljoprivreda podnela glavni teret dru{tveno ekonomske krize i pove}anim anga`manom, na ra~un sopstvene akumulacije, spasla zemlju od propasti. ____________________________________________________________________ l. Direktni gubici procenjuju se na oko 45 milijardi dolara, a indirektni (gubici zbog usporenog razvoja) na jo{ celih 8o milijardi dolara. 2. Gotovo da je op{te mesto da je ogroman broj pojedinaca opljackani kapital iz Rusije izneo u inostranstvo (Djokanovic,1995.). Rusija je, po nekim procenama, u 1992. zabelezila bekstvo kapitala od preko dvadeset milijardi dolara (Boysko,Shlifer,Vishny,1955:39). 3. To oni sami priznaju kada ka‘u da }e se prema srpskoj vlasti koristiti principom “{tapa i {argarepe”, odnosno eufemizmom “kooperativnost” zvani~ni mo~nici Zapada ‘ele prikriti slepu poslu{nost (Simi},1995:76). 4. Jedno od tih stanovista zalaze se za krajnji oprez jer “vlasnicka transformacija mora da bude samostalna i dobrovoljna”, da ona ne mora voditi ubrzanju privrednog razvoja, vec naprotiv( primer zemalja Istocne Evrope), kao i to da u ubrzanje privrednog rasta u Kini nije imao udela proces privatizacije. Ovde se ipak priznaje da “ekonomske konsekvence sankcija nisu bile neprelazna prepreka na putu transformacije privrede SRJ” (Kovac,1994:123-138). Isti autor u jednom drugom radu, pored analize otezavajucih okolnosti za prestruktuiranje privrede pod sankcijama, ipak naglasava da one “znacajno otezavaju tranziciju, ali se ne mogu smatrati neprelaznom preprekom na njenom putu (Kovac,1994a:118). 5. Kada je tr‘iste kapitala savr{eno (kod nas ga uop{te nema) tada je efikasnost odlu~uju}i razlog za prodaje putem aukcija (Boycko, Shiefer, Vishny,1995:39) _____________________________________________________________ LITERATURA Boycko,M.,Shleifer,A.,Vishay, W.R. 1995, “Vau~erska privatizacija”, Ekonomika, God. 31 (9-10), str. 38-43. Brankovi}, S.1994a, “O fenomenu podr{ke neuspe{noj vlasti” Srpska politi~ka misao, Vol.I 1-4, str. 197-215. Brdar, M. 1995, “Srbi i/ili nova Evropa,1991-1995: Preispitivanje odnosa”, Srpska politi~ka misao, Vol.2 (2-3), str.15-56. D‘uverovi}, B.,Mihailovi}, S., Vukovi}, S., 1994, Izborna upotreba medija, IDN i IKSI, Beograd. Djokanovi}, T. 1995, “Privatizacija na Istoku i Zapadu”, Ekonomika, God. 31 (9-10), str.44-46 Glinti}, T. 1994, “Razmatranje buducnosti Evrope kroz njenu sada{nju politiku prema srpskom narodu”, Sociolo{ki pregled, Vol.28(4), str. 463-470. Kornai, J. 1992 , Put u slobodnu privredu, Ekonomski institut, Beograd DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 161 Kokolj, M. 1995. Medjunarodni krivi~ni sud za prethodnu Jugoslaviju (kome se sudi u Hagu?), Centar marketing, Beograd. Kova~, O. 1994, “Dosada{nji uticaj sankcija na tranziciju privrede SR Jugoslavije i kako dalje”, U: Institucionalna infrastruktura u tranziciji u tr‘i{noj ekonomiji, IDN, Beograd. Kova~, O. 1994a, “Uticaj sankcija na funkcionisanje i reformu privrede u SR Jugoslaviji”, Ekonomska misao, Vol.28(3-4), str. 117-135. Lazi}, M. 1994a, “Dru{tveni ~inioci raspada Jugoslavije”, Socioloski pregled, Vol. XXVIII (2), str. 155-166 . Mad‘ar, Lj. 1992.,”Putevi privatizacije u Jugoslaviji zakonski modalitet”, u: Maksimovi}, I.(red), Transformacija svojinskih odnosa-teorijski i empirijski aspekti,Ekon. zbor. Knj. X, SANU i IDN, Beograd, str. 45-65. Mijatovi}, B. 1993.,Privatizacija, Ekonomski institut, Beograd. Mini}, J. 1993.,”Komparativna analiza ekonomskih programa politi~kih stranaka u SR Jugoslaviji”, Sociologija, Vol. XXXV (1), str. 69-86. Pejovi}, S. 1991.,” Dru{tvene i ekonomske posledice razli~itih svojinskih odnosa u Jugoslaviji”, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu,God.XXXIX (5-6), str.619-630. Rankovi}, M. 1995. Sociologija i futurologija, ISIFF, Beograd. Roman, V. 1994. “Imperija i limes”, Ekonomika, God.30(10-12), str.70-75. Simi}, R.D. 1995, “Ravnote`a snaga ili svetska dr`ava”, Ekonomika, God. 31(910),str. 76-78. Tomas.Dz.K.R. 1994, “Balkanski sukob i medjunarodna reakcija: ameri~ke i srpske opcije”, Srpska politi~ka misao, Vol.1 (1-4), str. 147-166. Vukovi}, S. 1994.,”Javno mnjenje i privatizacija”, Socioloski pregled, Vol.XXVIII (1), str. 37-44. Vukovi}, S. 1995. “Ciljevi i dometi privatizacije u Srbiji”, Lu~a, Vol. 12 (1-2), str. 309-316. Vukovi}, S. 1995a, “ Some aspect of the privatization in Serbia”, Socioloski pregled, Vol 29(2) str.184-204. 162 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Nikola Milenkovi} DOMORODKA OPSENA Domorodko, vi{njo, s domom sred oblaka - na travnjaku brvnara u }ilibaru rezbarena barka, veslima od zlata jezgru plaveti se pru‘a - ru‘a bela, nevenu}a, vre‘ama lijana se‘e dalji, - brodi opsen, opseni nedostupna - krajolika jarka!.. Stanarko, oblaka laka, milostiva divo, dugo, - si|i, svrati, svemo}na opseno, ro|ako bliska plamte}ih rana dana i sumraka zrâka!.. - Ja sam tvoj sused belosudnji: - konj tvoj lete}i, s kopitama slivenim - iz mulja munja, - od ‘ada ‘arna kaljenim, u bunarima, svetom rasvetom - radosnica-suzica!.. Na krilima papratnim iz ‘íve obzorja i paperja daha u lahor-val spregnuta... DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 163 - nosi}u te, ródo, zvezdani zavi~aju, preko belog sveta!.. Vrelo usjalo, ~áro, vilo, medom razmilela boljko, seti me se, - razvigorena jasiko, bela {umo di~na, rane, jutra presvisla, - ~amom neumornom raspela si verna konja tvoga!.. Snom probudnim u predzoru, dahom, bosiljka rosna, prosvetli guju: - utuli uzdah modri!.. Da sladno, - uz grcaj zagu{ni, obdanim dan bakljama, grudi prese~e njisak, - propne konja zenitu - kr{tenje vernik da spozna: u radostima ljubavnika svo osvetlo sveta!.. Tebi, bela rado, radosti, - mladosti u slavu neprestanu, konj tvoj na ispa{i sred milja poja poljuba ljubavna svilovezom, mazno, venac spli}e, za vekove upam}uje te!.. Konj tvoj osedlan, s krilima, smi{ljanim, pletenim 164 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 oputom i pritkom snovi|ena srmlja, - nestrpljiv, trepti, treperi... Ve} sto godina na te ~eka - da se vine, - Veneri let usmeri!... ^eka tvoju blagovesnu ruku, pospanih prstiju, s vinogorna puta da naluta, - odazove se sanjivim dodirom lekovita bilja: - pevu{e}a, laka kap da se iz lista istrgne, konju oma|ijanom niz vlasi grive u sr‘ ‘i}a si|e: - ~arobom sunaca ‘e|eno podoji srce!.. Ali konj je konj, - bio i s krilima, sve {to zna je: - pase travu i tovar tegli, svejedno, da neumorno bdi u njemu, u zlatnoj krletci - ludom ‘udnjom ogranulo samoniklo vrelo ru‘i~njaka!.. O, seti se, selo belo, sun~an-grade, dobri~ino vilo, da negde, uzastopno, samoosedlani konj, - nestrpljive uzengije zveka zove bez prestanka, - da uzleti, stremi krilom: - tebe ~eka!.. DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 165 Nai|i, iznenada, prazni~na: - vila ~ila, stado rado, mila sliko, - zrelo podne oplodne lepote, - krepka kapi, ‘uborom tekla vodo: Domorodka opsena, - izvoru, ‘ivote!.. Tico-pesmarico, p{enico, s klasa ‘ita, iz osja, ispilela svitko, - namu~enoga, od srca hrani konja svoga, daj sudnju pregr{t zobi: - nedra jedra, - vedra bedra... Ot{krini na}ve bo‘anske!.. Konj tvoj, buja, kipti: - uroka reka!.. u teskobi srca zemna boravak tvori, u ‘ilici-damarici, ~ifta se, lomi, - gori, tebe ~eka, da na mig tvoj odgovori: s tobom, u sedlu mu, uzleti, - vatrom zlatnom, posred neba zlatu vrata otvori!.. Sred nemirne, burne nedostupne zari okeana, u zagrljaj bi lagune - da se baci, silinom orkana neumoljive sladostrasti, - s tobom da roni zna}e 166 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 u kolutu: - suna{ca - lune, niz koral da se nagoni, kroz biser-sa}e!... [ta je pelen a {ta je melem? Zarodava}e se konj tvoj do mere: - da se mre, od u‘itka krhka!.. Slavi}e tren kad te u zene svoje uze: ljube}i neven - uzde zvezde predade!.. A Mrak je vasceli sad bez tebe, Domorodko opsena, - groma pesni sna|en: osaka}en san - opusto{en sâd: sred same smrti izro|en - presvisnuo le‘i opru‘en u bespu}a, - na ledini konj!.. Jo{ jedino zagrobnim, meriv ar{inima!.. Lokva - jaruga: - du{a ugu{ena; bez premca rana: - danu belom sela crna smola oko vrata!.. Ma bio i ~arobni, - konj je samo konj, DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 167 nji{ti - penu{a, batrga se, u gubici gvo‘|e glo|e - zaludo ~elik i zube mrvi, s munjama krvi, - gnev svoj, uludo silu strvi!.. Samo sevne, zaslepljuju}i - blesne kopitom po kamenu, da opet, u teskobi pe}ine, poklekuju}i, - muklim jekom kotrlja se, niz strmu stenu kobi - te{ka gar mu~nine!.. Sa slepilom se zdru‘uju}i potonulosti se daje - u ponor udavni le}i }e, gde od trena opaka do na veke okapa niko i ni{ta ~ekati ga ne}e!.. Ku‘na jama bezdana ponapukla prenapregom ropca, cvili, podlo, ‘elezo u crnoj d‘igerici sja}eno!.. - Java - izdajica, bubama modra usijanja - gmi‘e-stri‘e u koru mo‘danu uranja!.. - Java - besna utvara maljem ga po slepoo~nici, - krvavo u sisu no‘ no‘ presti‘e!.. 168 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Ba{ ti je prilika: - crkni crni crve, konju, jadom zgnje~en, - pomrkom munjom uhva}en, kamd‘ijama izmolovan!.. Hajd’ sad i sâm uzmi, - zlobi op{toj ispomogni: - strgni, srubi srpom, sa srca sure stovari srsi, - prepusti se pomornici, dok jo{ poslednjim, u lo‘nici, - snom za njom, posve ne pomeri{ pame}u!.. K nebu sapi izokreni, u srcu lampione ispogasi, - u nemilosti ogreznuo, nemanje proglasi: - {to rosna perivoja ljupka, - {to vrta ljubavni~ka!... Isti onaj, vazda ponositi, preprekama prkose}i: - vrletima vranac vi~ni, nezadr‘iv div, - predvodnik ve~ni!.. Sad, isto {to i smrvljen: sapet u olovo!.., - evo, - u zanosu zaustavljen stoji, - pregoreo!.. Stoji, konj tvoj krilati, zale|en, otpisan, - u sunovrat posr}e umom: DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 169 - izgubljen za smisao!.. Broji, sri~e, stalno uzaludno isto, - jednonoga pomisao, u neverici, u mestu skaku}e, presli{ava se ~isto: - nije mogu}e?!. Odgurnuto u vrtlog, obru{eno u brlog: - stalo groblje; narastao preko neba crni glog, - orah-o~aj!.. Celo-celcato sazve‘|e - nakrenulo se, zaglibilo krilima u crnicu-kukavicu!.. Vino rujno pri~esno izgubilo svetost - sjaj; u gor~icu prelomljeno - zatrovanjem raskr{teno, niz sinju slepu bogazu - obezro|enom du{om suzi nevina{ce-krvce gro‘|a!.. Podno leglo, razboljeno podne smrklo, i krunu i oreol izgubilo: - Veli~anstvo Obsjaj!.. Kao golo ni{ta, nemi vrisak voska sve}a - trune se, 170 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 - trunu s peteljkom do u kraj odne}a vodolija i mesec maj!... Raspinje ga mukla kletva: stigla mu je crna ‘etva, - pod plo~u - kopitu konj trene izjede u rite spominjanje do bestraga trga!.. Sve {to tlo bilo spla~inom splasnulo!.. Zbraja u gromuljice srce, najzad je gotovo, tu: - pred njim, u njemu, sve se svelo na rasulo!.. Samosvislo ‘ar-pti~e, - opovrgnulo se: jedno prole}e!.. Ono {to ~inja{e let i svet u biti je nepostoje}e: golubice lice - golotinja je avet!.. A da te i bivalo u jasenima, me|u borovima: - krhka jela, - Domorodka opsena, koji tren sla|ani: - konju u sedlu da si i bogovala!.. Sad, za svekad, poderanoj ko{uljici zmijskoj jedva da {to nali~i, DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 171 dok u nemo}i, da magom, - snagom kristala uverljiva sna zra~i!.. Ako ve} na javi nigde te nije i nema, - svom ludom |ila{u-konju ubistvenu si darovala oglav-gubu: samotinju, - u neprosvetlu gor~inu, bedu, doslovno sro~enu... - u memlu, pepeo krvni~ki zapretala!.. Kad u mahu, - pod svodom bespovrati, prkosno razmahuju}i sumanuto daljno - du{mansko-tu|insko, zlobom osoljeno, osiljeno okre}e{ lice... Dozlogrdilo ti, nevero, s ove strane sudbe, jarima novim stala su~elice: - zaslepljena, hrli{ umi{ljenim vidicima!.. Jogunasta vrsta lasta, silaze}u rovove, lomoglave bira{ - sle}e{, odziva{ se vratolomnim klancima!.. Zaklju~ano, na vekove okamenjeno nebo za nas: 172 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 - Zapro{ena za sla|e svadbe, drugom nekom, ti od danas |ila{u-bratu o vratu, - podneblju nadmenom, - snom {irom otvara{ vratnice, - na varljive dine, na vejavicom narasle smetove!.. Sejo, rode, izdajo obdanice, - {ta nam se ovo desi? koje li pomamljenosti guje! - guvno ovo odmazde?!.. Ni na tren slu}ene surovosti: - Iz koreni se istrebljuje sve {to sveto steklo se - sav mogu}i sadr‘aj radosti!.. Bez pogovora i leka dok na hrbi veka - iskustvom smrti pretovarena konja tvoga bura tetura... Vra‘je ~ila: - zolja ushitela, ljuto otrovima nadahnuta, u opijuma korovu s konjem-mazgom novajlijom - nova doma ustrojena!... Niti za mig oklevanja, - bez vlati milosr|a, nehajna, ledena, zakleto nepokajna, - tu, smesta, ne bi li da odanog konja, ragu lete}u DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 173 - nogom grobu preporu~i... Stekne raskomot vidiku - u slavu zaboravu, la‘nim, bla‘enim osmejkom sraste sa spokojem!.. Vilo, divo neponovljiva, a da bi se okrenula i tek ispod oka za sobom virnula?.. Videla bi: - tvog zaljubljenog konja u ~ami polja sagorela, uklje{tena d‘ombama puta - oduzeta, okamenjena krila - nepomi}nost ga sna{la!.. Stoji, zane{en, gleda: - duboka jedna urvina konju u grudima: - u bogovetnu nedogled stisnuo se led!.. Stoji, zane{en, gleda - duboka jedna urvina konju u grudima: - u bogovetnu nedogled stisnuo se led!.. Stoji: - kamen, kremen: - zazid!.. 174 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 Da nikad ne poveruje vi{e zadu{nom miri{ljaju otkosa mladih livada, - opet opijen da bi bio, uzne{en svetlostima pio - dah tople letnje ki{e!.. Ravno pred hrid bleska da sine sen: - novosvane, uranila, uvek ista ona - Domorodka opsena!.. - Da ga zove, ispo~etka ~eka!. Raspasana haljina: pevaju}a jedna njiva, - ‘e{ka sjaja {uma zlata, bujaju}e vru}e, plavno rasplamsuju}e, gordo ispr{eno - rasno pleme suncokreta!.. Pariz, septebra 1997. DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 175 MAR[ PO LED ! Bo‘idar Violi}, Zagreb Bo‘idar Violi} re‘irao je i zapisima propitavao dramu Mate Mati{i}a Andjeli Babilona (praizvedenu 14. prosinca 1996. u Dramskom kazali{tu Gavella) Slike apstraktnog slikarstva, koje je mar{al FNRJ bio ‘estoko napao, u SFRJ su visjele na zidovima apartmana i vila partijskih funkcionera uz slike naivnih slikara. Jugoslavija je postala zemlja ~upavih hipika i rokera, avangardnih festivala, ultralijevih marksista koji su pu{tali bradu, pijuckali whiskey i pozivali sa na mladoga Marksa. “Demokratski centralizam”, apsurdni spoj liberalnog pridjeva i totalitarne imenice, bio bi nepotpun bez dekorativne intelektualne opozicije. Biv{i bravar Jo‘a Broz prona{ao je klju~ za pobo~na vrata{ca u ‘eljeznoj zavjesi, koja su bila dovoljno velika da propuste dotok gastarbajterskih i turisti~kih deviza u saveznu blagajnu. Sve drugo ostalo je ~vrsto zaklju~ano pod kontrolom Partije, armije i policije. Socijalisti~ka Jugoslavija nastavila je putovati u komunizam premazana {arenim kapitalisti~kim bojicama na skerletnom licu. Kostimirana u politiku nesvrstanosti simulirala je koegzistenciju dvaju nepomirljivih sustava. Tako dotjerana i uljep{ana dobivala je obilne dolarske zajmove na ra~un putnih tro{kova. Najvi{e je putovao Veliki vodja: u odori Admirala na svom je Galebu oplovio sva mora i oceane Tre}ega svijeta, presvla~io se u afri~ke, indijanske i mongolske poglavice, hinduske maharad‘e i burmanske mudrace, navla~io na glavu svakojaka pokrivala, kitio se oko vrata ogrlicama od cvije}a i metala. S tih je putovanja pored skupocenih drangulija dovozio i egzoti~ne ‘ivotinje kojima je napu~io {umovite, zelene Brijune, najblagotvornije i najljep{e svoje leno. Goli, 176 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 kameniti otok rezervirao je za neposlu{ne protivnike, da zaslu‘enu kaznu ispa{taju na ‘arkom suncu, uz more, a ne kao drugovi {to u Sibiru skapavaju u snijegu i ledu. Iako sitna, ta pa‘nja pru‘a uvid u “ljudsko nali~je” jugoslavenskoga samoupravnog socijalizma. Andjeli Babilona komad su o travestiranom komunizmu koji je u Jugoslaviji simulirao reformaciju prije svoje op}e, kona~ne propasti. ^esi, Madjari, Poljaci i ostalo komunisti~ko roblje {to su kao bijedni paradajzturisti silazili na na{e more i zavidjeli nam na demokraciji i standardu, nisu u strukturama tada{njega jugoslavenskog socijalizma mogli naslutiti sli~nost s budu}im strukturama vlastitih zemalja u tranziciji. Ona, medjutim, postoji iako je “tranzicija” u ono vrijeme u Jugoslaviji bila simulirana. U prijetvorbi komunizma u kapitalizam u osnovi se radi o strukturno identi~nom sklopu, i materijalnom i mentalnom, kod travestita i reformista. Eventualna razlika samo je u tome {to su na{i travestirani reformisti u prijetvorbu u{li pripremljeni, s predratnim iskustvom. Rat koji je u nas bio usmjeren na obranu i uspostavu nacionalnog integriteta i suvereniteta tek je periferno utjecao na proces tranzicije. Crvene knji`ice dinarske {tednje zamijenjene su plavima, kunskima, dok su plave devizne udvojene na staru i novu {tednju. Sve su knji`ice otada iste boje, ali razlike medju njima time nisu poni{tene. U jeku Domovinskog rata nacionalni je kostim mogao poslu`iti kao idealno maskirno ruho za unosnu reformisti~ku travestiju po posljednjoj modi. Godinu dana poslije Daytonskih sporazuma Andjeli Babilona su, dakle, s razlogom mogli biti pro~itani kao aktualan tekst. Politi~ka stvarnost kao da je slijedila Mati{i}ev komad. Kona~no, nisu li reformirani komunisti~ki rukovodioci i prije rata igrali tenis? (P.S. - Nedavno sam ~uo ovaj vic: Za vrijeme Drugoga svijetskoga rata Saveznici su na{im partizanima bacali padobranima iz aviona pakete s municijom, odje}om i hranom. Grupa je partizana DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 177 otvorila jedan takav paket. Jedna je boca ~udno izgledala, otvorili su je, naizmjence pomirisali, nisu znali {to je to u njoj: nije {ljivovica, a nije ni votka. Nisu se usudili ku{ati to nepoznato, zagonetno pi}e. Vojnici su odnijeli bocu komandiru ~ete, drugu kapetanu. I on je od{arafio ~ep i pomirisao: nije {ljivovica, nije votka. Bocu su proslijedili komandiru bataljona, drugu majoru, pa drugu pukovniku, komesaru. Obojica su je od{arafila, pomirisala: nije {ljivovica, nije votka. Po kuriru je boca dostavljena komandantu divizije. Kad je drug generalmajor dubokim uzdasima pomirisao to problemati~no pi}e ni on nije znao {to je: nit je votka nit je {ljivovica?! Telefonirao je u vrhovni {tab i uz propratnu depe{u uputio drugu Mar{alu sumnjivu Savezni~ku bocu. Drug Tito hrabro je od{arafio bocu, pomirisao pi}e i ozarena lica rekao: “To je whiskey, drugovi!” I smjesta je izdao komandu: “[esta li~ka mar{ na Igman po led!” Postavlja se pitanje: {to je autor vica njime htio re}i po~etkom 1997?) ________________________________________________ *Ovaj ~lanak pozajmljen je iz ~asopisa “VIJENAC”, broj 93-94, 1997, novine Matice hrvatske za knji`evnost, umjetnost i znanost. “ Vijenac ” izlazi dvotjedno, cijena 6.00 kn. Uredni{tvo: Ulica Matice hrvatske 2, 10000 Zagreb, tel. 385 (0)1 275 117. U broju 93-94 (31 srpnja 1997) pi{u i govore: Juri~i}, Gall, Radja, O`egovi}, Matu{i}, ^egec, Kalini}, [tajduhar, Beck, [vab, Bratuli}, Jareb, [porer, Donat, [pani~ek, Lasi}, Mandi}, Bo{njak, Juri}, Moja{, Vukov-Coli}, Govedi}, Kurelac, Luki}, Peri~i}, Katalini}, Davidovi}, Posari}, Movre, Hundi}, Attenborough, Gili}, Berkovi}, Lovrenovi}, [tiks, [impraga, Ramadan, Veli~kovi}, Kebo, Zaimovi}, Pecoti}, Vojkovi}, Plei}, Djordjevi}, Mudrov~i}, Pinterovi}, Crnkovi}, Mer{injak, Violi}. Na prvoj strani, sjajni uvodnik (Borisa Marune) u dana{nju Hrvatsku - “Raj na zemlji”. Na zadnjoj, kratki “ izvodnik” Bo`idara Violi}a, direktno iz “Raja”. _______________________________________________________________________________ UPUTSTVA AUTORIMA (stampana u svakom broju "Dijaloga") "DIJALOG" je tromese~ni ~asopis o idejama, time podrazumevaju}i sve ideje. Po{to je sadr`aj veoma raznovrstan i zahvata sve {to u naj{irem smislu spada u dru{tvene i prirodne nauke, kulturu i umetnost, autori bi trebalo da su svesni da je malo ~itaoca koji su eksperti za sve oblasti. Treba izbegavati nepotrebne stru~ne izraze, a tamo gde su takvi izrazi nu`ni detaljno ih objasniti prilikom prve upotrebe. Prilozi bi trebalo da budu uredno kucani pisa}om ma{inim ili laserskim {tampa~em, sa duplim proredom samo sa jedne strane papira. Tekstovi pra}eni kompjuter disketom i pisani u ASCII, Word ili nekom uobi~ajenom 178 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 formatu i bez posebnog oblikovanja teksta (bez komplikovanih tabela i grafi~kih prikaza u samom tekstu) olak{avaju posao redakciji i imaju vi{e {ansi da budu {tampani. Urednici smatraju da jezik slu`i komunikaciji i zato vas molimo da upotrebljavate dijalekt koji ve}ina ~itaoca razume. Ukoliko sama forma jezika ~ini ono {to se `eli saop{titi, takav tekst spada u literarni odeljak na{eg lista. Autori bi trebalo da imaju na umu da }e "analize i du`i komentari" kao i "originalni ~lanci" biti pregledani od vi{e (naj~es}e 2 - 3) ~lanova uredni{tva i stru~nih savetnika od kojih neki `ive u udaljenim krajevima sveta. Putovanje po{tanske po{iljke mo`e da traje od tri nedelje do nepuna dva meseca. S toga bi sadr`aj tekstova trebalo da bude takav da ostane aktuelan i posle 6 meseci od njihovog podno{enja redakciji. Svi tekstovi moraju biti potpisani, navedena profesija i afiliacija (institucija) autora - ukoliko je nau~ni rad iz oblasti profesije autora a ne sasvim nezavisan autorski tekst, data puna adresa, broj telefona i eventualno faksa i e-mail adresa. AUTORSKE IZJAVE. i) Autor bi morao da u propratnom pismu ili u posebnom paragrafu odvojenom od teksta ~lanka dâ kratku pismenu izjavu da dati tekst podnosi za {tampu "Dijalogu" i da ~lanak nije u istoj formi i na istom jeziku podnesen drugom ~asopisu za ~tampu. ii) Ukoliko to nije druk~ije ugovoreno, AUTORSKA PRAVA (copyright) zadr`ava "Dijalog", Ukoliko autor `eli da zadr`i autorska prava morao bi to posebno da naglasi. KATEGORIJE ^LANAKA I RUBRIKE 1. PISMA ^ITALACA. 1/2 strane po pismu. 2. ORIGINALNI ^LANCI.. To su argumentovana izlaganja novih vidjenja pojedinih problema sa eventualnim originalnim re{enjima. Du`ina i struktura kao "analize i duzi komentari". Autori bi trebalo da vode ra~una da naslov opisno odgovara sadr`aju ~lanka. ^lanak bi trebalo da po~ne kratkim rezimeom (80 do 100 re~i). Naslov i rezime bi trebalo prevesti na francuski i engleski. Jedan ili vi{e po~etnih paragrafa bi trebalo da poslu`e ~itaocu, koji nije stru~njak za predmet o kome se pi{e, kao uvod, kako bi razumeo kasniji tekst, a stru~njaku da poslu`i kao vodi~ kroz relevantnu nau~nu literaturu iz oblasti koja se obra|uje. Tekst treba da se zavr{i kratkim zaklju~kom. Ako je vi{e elemenata zaklju~ka, treba spomenuti samo one najva`nije. Ograni~ena relevantna literatura je data na kraju, citirana po redosledu po kome je spomenuta u tekstu. Fusnote, koje ne spadaju striktno u literaturu, su takodje dozvoljene. Autorima se preporu~uje da, u idealnom slucaju, u ~lanku dokazuju samo jednu ~injenicu, pri tom koriste}i argumente koji su u nauci opste prihva}eni i koje ne treba naknadno dokazivati. Tekst mora da ima oblik ZAKLJU^IVANJA. Posebno je va`no da se uzme u obzir da "Dijalog" objavljuje kao centralne ~lanke argumentovane studije koje nekad mogu i da budu ne dva suprotna MI[LJENJA (koja objavljujemo u posebnoj rubrici "kratki komentari") ve} dva suprotna argumentovana ZAKLJU^IVANJA. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaklju~uje moraju zadovoljiti kriterijume relevantnosti, prihvatljivosti, biti dovoljno osnovane za zaklju~ivanje, a zaklju~ivanje mora da poseduje elemente za uspe{nu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji. 3. KOMENTARI. i) KRATKI KOMENTARI. To su kra}i komentari, napisani od strane urednika, ure|iva~kog saveta, ili izuzetno, ~italaca. Odnose se na va`nije ~lanke u datom "Dijalogu" ili na momentalno aktuelne probleme. Po{to autor izra`ava svoje MI[LJENJE, struktura je slobodna, novinarska, mada je po`eljno da tekst ima izvesne elemente ZAKLJU^IVANJA (videti opis originalnih ~lanaka, kao i ni`e "Posebne napomene"). Literatura, ako je citirana, data je u tekstu. Du`ina teksta je prose~no 1 strana "Dijaloga". ii) KOMENTARI ^ITALACA. To su komentari (1 do 2 strane "Dijaloga" po komentaru), koji imaju strukturu ~lanaka, ali ne produbljuju}i suvise predmet o kojem se radi. Rezime nije potreban, mada je citiranje literature po`eljno. DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 179 iii) ANALIZE I DUZI KOMENTARI. Komentari{u najnovija dostignu}a u izvesnoj oblasti. Po`eljno je da ne budu du`i od pet stranica "Dijaloga". Struktura kao struktura ^LANAKA. 4. AKTUELNOSTI.. Prikazi, bez dublje analize, povodom kulturnih i nau~nih dogadjaja (1 strana po prikazu). Prikazi novih knjiga koje ne spadaju striktno u literaturu (1 strana po knjizi). 5. LITERATURA I UMETNOST. Proza i Poezija. Originalna neobjavljena knjizevna ostvarenja. Maksimalno ukupno 10 strana "Dijaloga". Izuzetno bi}e omogu}eno objavljivanje du`ih priloga ili ODLOMAKA knjiga u nastavcima. Knji`evna i umetni~ka kritika. Obuhva}ene su sve umetnosti. ^lanci 3 do 5 strana "Dijaloga" Likovna kritika. 3-5 strana. Likovni prilozi. Kratki prikazi Prikazi novih knjiga koje spadaju u literaturu u {irem smislu (1/2 do 1 strane "Dijaloga" po prikazanoj knjizi). 6. DOGA\AJI.. Kalendar kulturnih i nau~nih dogadjaja. 7. OGLASI. Spiskovi i cenovnici novih knjiga. Reklame i oglasi. Posebne napomene Mada se bavi svim temama od op{teg zna~aja, ~asopis }e pokazivati malo ve}i interes za teme koje se ti~u Evrope i Balkana. ^lanci bi trbalo da imaju prete`no formu argumentovanih zaklju~ivanja. Mi{ljenja, li~na uverenja, neargumentovai stavovi nisu tipi~ni za "Dijalog" i autorima savetujemo da izbegavaju takve forme. Mi{ljenja, stavovi, deklaracije, izlivi psiholo{kih stanja, i sve neargumentovane tvrdnje, ili suvi{e op{te - te nepogodne za dokazivanje, ili konkretne ali nepoduprte dokazima, ostavljaju malo ili ne ostavljaju uop{te prostora za dijalog. Op{te prihva}ene ~injenice nije potrebno posebno dokazivati sem kad se radi o specijalnim znanjima. Nasuprot, sve nove tvrdnje moraju biti poduprte argumentima. Kori{}eni argumenti mogu biti druge op{te prihva}ene ~injenice, ali i nove ~injenice koje, ako ne predstavljaju direktna iskustva, moraju biti poduprte argumentima. [ta su "op{te" prihva}ene ~injenice nije uvek jednostavno odrediti. Snaga rezonovanja na kojima te ~injenice po~ivaju ~ini ih "op{te" prihva}enim. Broj ljudi koji ih prihvata nije sam po sebi kriterijum. ^esto samo ponavljanje nekih "~injenica" (u {iroko uticajnim medijima) ostavlja la`an utisak da su one "op{te" prihva}ene. U tom smislu o snazi rezonovanja mo`e se suditi samo ako se prika`e ceo tok rezonovanja tj. ako tvrdnja bude pra}ena kompletnim dokazivanjem - ako ima dijalo{ku formu. Dijalo{ka forma je tipi~na forma u kojoj dolazi do merenja argumenata, upore|ivanja, proveravanja i najzad zaklju~ivanja o tome koje je rezonovanje bolje. Pisani tekst, u odsustvu direktnog sagovornika, rekonstrui{e tu "dinamiku" dijaloga unapred eksponiraju}i celo rezonovanje i time eksponira najja~e ali i najslabije delove rezonovanja, omogu}avaju}i merenje argumenata od strane ~itaoca. Kompletano argumentovano zaklju~ivanje omogu}uje ~itaocu potpunu rekonstrukciju saznajnog procesa autora. Snaga dokaza ne le`i u koli~ini dokaza (recimo citiranju dugih listi kori{}ene literature), ve} u njihovoj snazi kao primenjenog rezonovanja tako|e sa~injenog od sna`ne argumentacije. Ima tekstova koji sadr`e kompletne argumentacije te tu nije potrebna dodatna lista dokaza, izvora tj. literature. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaklju~uje moraju zadovoljiti kriterijume relevantnosti , prihvatljivosti , biti 180 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 dovoljno osnovane za zaklju~ivanje, a zaklju~ivanje mora da poseduje elemente za uspe{nu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji. Sama ~injenica da je jedna tvrdnja snabdevena eksplicitno svim elementima koji su doveli do njenog nastajanja otkriva potencijalne slabe ta~ke argumenata te ~italac mo`e da proveri sam argument ne bi li verifikovao njegovu validnost i uporedio sa eventualnim li~no razvijenim argumentom. Sadr`aj i formma teksta su jedini faktori koji se procenjuju prilikom odlu~ivanju o objavljivanju. Li~nost autora, autoritet i reputacija, u pozitivnom ili negativnom smislu, nisu uzeti u obzir prilikom dono{enja odluke o prihvatanju ili odbijanju teksta za {tampu. Svi tekstovi podle`u najmanje dvema recenzijama. Preporu~ujemo autorima, bez obzira na njihov eventualni autoritet za oblast kojom se bavi njihov tekst, da u idealnom slu~aju prihvate, ili odgovore argumentovano na SVE primedbe recenzenata. Ignorisanje primedbi recenzenta mo`e da dovede do definitivnog odbijanja teksta, ili, ako se radi o solitarnim primedbama, tekst bude objavljen ali pra}en komentarom urednika koji bi ukratko izra`avao mi{ljenja stru~nih recenzenata. Takodje, ~ak i u retkim slu~ajevima kad autor striktno po{tuje "uputstva autorima", trebalo bi o~ekivati ponovljene kontakte sa urednikom i, gotovo redovno, zna~ajne izmene i dopune tekstova. Objavljivanje autorskih tekstova u "Dijalogu" primarno ostvaruje veoma va`nu informativnu funkciju ~asopisa i nema, samo po sebi, karakter odavanja priznanja autoru za njegov, veoma ~esto, zna~ajan istra`iva~ki i nau~ni rad. Prilozi se redovno ne honori{u sem posebno naru~enih tekstova, ~ije je honorisanje predmet posebnog dogovora.Tro{kovi {tampe, ukoliko zahtevi ne prevazilaze redovnu formu lista, se ne napla}uju. Ako prilozi zahtevaju posebne {tamparske usluge (preduga~ak tekst koji zahteva pove}anje broja strana broja, posebne sveske, prilozi u boji, posebni grafi~ki prikazi), ukoliko odobreni od uredni{tva, napla}uju se po specijalnoj ekonomskoj tarifi. DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 181 ~asopisi, knjige, nova izdanja SVEDO^ANSTVA O PRO[LOSTI Dimitrije \or|evi}, Portreti iz novije srpske istorije, Bigz, Beograd 1997. Dimitrije Djordjevi} je, besumnje, jedan od najve~ih srpskih istori~ara u XX veku, pisac ~uvenih istorijskih studija o poku{aju Srbije da 1912 dobije izlaz na more, o carinskom ratu s Austro-Ugarskom, o balkanskim revolucijama i pisac mnogih priloga koji su, sabrani u razne knjige, dobar pokazatelj njegovih {irokih i pouzdanih znanja. Malo je poznato, takodje, da je Dimitrije Djordjevi} i pisac jedne istorije moderne Srbije, koja je objavljena samo na gr~kom jeziku. Dugogodi{nji profesor istorije na Kalifornijskom univerzitetu u Santa Barbari, Dimitrije Djordjevi} je, na vrhuncu karijere, izabran za ~lana Srpske akademije nauke i umetnosti. Posebno vredne u njegovom bogatom i razgranatom opusu su dve knjige se}anja “O`iljci i opomene” u kojima je, perom rasnog memoariste, opisao najva`nije dogadjaje iz svoje mladosti, obele`ene borbom u redovima Jugoslovenske vojske u otad`bini. Pisani bez mr`nje i pristrasnmosti, memoari Dimitrija Djordjevi}a su, s mnogo razloga, odmah uvr{teni ne samo u red naj~itanijih knjiga u Srbiji, nego i u najbolja dela na{e posleratne memoarske proze. U skra}enom obliku, memoari su, nedavno, objavljeni i na engleskom jeziku u SAD, pod naslovom “Scars and Memoirs”. Biografija je ‘anr koji u na{oj istoriografiji ima sjajnu tradiciju. Portreti Slobodana Jovanovi}a u posthumno objavljenoj knjizi “Moji savremenici”, kao i njegovi monumentalni spisi o vladavini poslednjih Obrenovi}a, uzorni su primeri kako biografski metod mo‘e biti zahvalan u portretisanju ~itave jedne epohe. S 182 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 naro~itim uspehom biografije istorijskih li~nosti novijeg doba pisali su, jo{ i Dragoslav Stranjakovi}, Jovan Mili}evi}, Dragoljub @ivojinovi} kao i mnogi drugi pisci na{e istorije, uklju~iv i strane autore, poput Dejvida Mekenzija i Gejla Stouksa. Portreti koje u svojoj najnovijoj knjizi donosi Dimitrije \or|evi}, ulaze u red onih knjiga koje sladokusci neprestano i{~itavaju, a radoznali ~itaoci posredstvom njih otkrivaju danas jednu zaboravljenu etapu u burnom razvoju moderne Srbije. Sredi{nje mesto u knjizi zauzima biografija Milovana Milovanovi}a, pariskog doktora prava, pisca liberalnog Ustava od 1888, teoreti~ara parlamentarizma, radikalskog prvaka i ministra, arhitekte Balkanskog saveza iz 1912. Napisana jo{ davne 1958, biografija Milovanovi}eva bila je, u to ideolo{kim ograni~enjima obele‘eno vreme, ona dragocena spona sa istorijskim metodom i literarnim stilom koji je u srpskoj istoriografiji uspostavio Slobodan Jovanovi}. Malo je primera u na{oj istoriografiji druge polovine XIXI veka, da je portret jednog politi~ara dat u izvanrednom spoju nau~ne akribije i knji‘evne sposobnosti da se re~ljefno ocrta njegov karakter. \or|evi} je pi{u}i Milovanovi}ev ‘ivotopis, sav sazdan od preokreta i isku{enja, gde su se privatni ‘ivot i dr‘avni poslovi pro‘imali bez ostatka, reljefno prikazao njegove afinitete prema Zapadu, izrazitu sklonost ka ugodnom ‘ivotu i bogatu ma{tu koja plete politi~ke kombinacije uvek kada one daju izvesnog izgleda za uspeh. Nimalo doktrinaran u sklapanju politi~kih kompromisa, Milovanovi} je bio podjednako uspe{an kao ustavopisac, teoreti~ar nacionalne politike ili pragmati~an ministar spoljnih poslova, Milovanovi} je, zaista, bio najizrazitiji izdanak onih nara{taja koji su, {kolovani prete‘no u Francuskoj, u Srbiju preneli ideologiju liberalnog nacionalizma, na~ela francuskog radikalizma, britanske obrasce parlamentarizma i, uop{te, kulturne standarde civilizovane Evrope. \or|evi} je sjajno zapazio da se Milovanovi} bio najslabiji kao politi~ar: kao “gospodsko dete”on se, ipak, “nije moga potpuno sna}i u lavirintu doma}e politike...kao ve}ina intelektualaca, te{ko je razbijao prepreku koja ga DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 183 je delila od }udi njegovog reda i nikad nije imao prisnog kontakta s na{om selja~ko-trgova~kom skup{tinom...” Najuspe{niji, Milovanovi} je bio kao diplomata: “Klemanso je rekao 1909 da ne poznaje evropskog dr`avnika njegova kalibra. Ambasadori sila otimali su se o njegovo prijateljstvo i pa`ljivo slu{ali njegova izlaganja. Njegov makijavelizam, koji je podbacio u doma}oj praksi, dobio je u diplomatiji svoju punu vrednost; on se kretao u svetu evropske diplomatije slobodno i neusiljeno, kao da je za njega ro|en.” Uz obimnu Milovanovi}evu biografiju, koja zauzima polovinu knjige portreta, Dimitrije \or|evi} je prilo‘io kra}e biografije niza istaknutih li~nosti koje su, svaka u svom vremenu, obele‘ile istoriju Srbije: Radi se o portretima pisanim za stranu publiku, preciznim i li{enim suvi{nih detalja, sa dubinskom analizom njihovog ukupnog istorijskog doma{aja. Me|u njima, posebnu pa‘nju zaslu‘uju biografije vojvode Putnika, Vuka Karad‘i}a, Slobodana Jovanovi}a i Stojana Novakovi}a, ali i prve biografske skice va‘nih delatnika istorije kakvi su bili radikalski prvak Andra Nikoli}, diplomata i politi~ir Jovan M. Jovanovi}, poznatiji pod nadimkom “Pi‘on” ili Ljuba Davidovi}, prvi predsednik Demokratske stranke. Posebnu vrednost knjige ~ini uporedni portret dva Jovanovi}a, oca i sina, Vladimira i Slobodana, koji u preseku daje ne samo profile ~elnih ljudi srpske kulturne i politi~ke elite, nego u sebi sa‘ima i glavne etape razvoja politi~ke misli u Srbiji. Sudbina najistaknutijeg liberalskog ideologa, Vladimira Jovanovi}a, i njegovog sina Slobodana, prvog Srbina koji je poneo to ime - u ime na~ela o slobodi koja je ispovedao njegov otac - obuhvata razdoblje od sredine XIX do sredine XX veka, u kojem su i otac i sin svetionici slobode i mudrosti u jednoj maloj balkanskoj zemlji koja se tek oslobadja orijentalnog nasledja i ulazi u porodicu razvijenih, kako se onda govorilo, civilizovanih evropskih dr‘ava. Posebnu vrednost knjizi daje portret jednog u nizu mnogih stradalnika iz redova srpskog sve{tenstva, prote Bo‘idara Luki}a, ~iju li~nu dramu u ‘rvnju nemilosrdne komunisti~ke “revolucije” \or|evi} 184 DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 rasklapa ne samo kao istori~ar nego i kao najbli‘i svedok. Knjiga portreta Dimitrija Djordjevi}a, odi{e jednostavno{}u izraza i lako}om ioslikavanja dogadjajha i likova koju mogu da dostignu samo retki znalci i provereni majstori istorijske analize. Dobar psiholog i suveren u tuma~enju istorijskih meandara, Dimitrije Djordjevi} je ovom zbirkom istorijskih portreta, jo{ jednom potvrdio da je ne samo vrhunski istori~ar nego i talentovan pisac. Du{an T. Batakovi} POVELJA VIJENAC ^asopis za knji‘evnost, umetnost i kulturu. Izlazi 2 puta godi{nje, cena 10 din. Izdava~: Narodna biblioteka, Cara Lazara 36, 36000 Kraljevo. Tel. 036 21 442 Novine Matice hrvatske za knji‘evnost, umjetnost i znanost. Izlaze dvotjedno, cijena 6.00 kn. Uredni{tvo: Ulica Matice hrvatske 2, 10000 Zagreb, Tel 385 (0)1 275 117. U broju 93-94 (31 srpnja 1997) pi{u i govore: Juri~i}, Gall, Radja, O‘egovi}, Matu{i}, ^egec, Kalini}, [tajduhar, Beck, [vab, Bratuli}, Jareb, [porer, Donat, [pani~ek, Lasi}, Mandi}, Bo{njak, Juri}, Moja{, Vukov-Coli}, Govedi}, Kurelac, Luki}, Peri~i}, Katalini}, Davidovi}, Posari}, Movre, Hundi}, Attenborough, Gili}, Berkovi}, Lovrenovi}, [tiks, [impraga, Ramadan, Veli~kovi}, Kebo, Zaimovi}, Pecoti}, Vojkovi}, Plei}, Djordjevi}, Mudrov~i}, Pinterovi}, Crnkovi}, Mer{injak, Violi}. Na prvoj strani, sjajni uvodnik Borisa Marune u dana{nju Hrvatsku - Raj na zemlji. Na zadnjoj, kratki izvodnik Bo‘idara Violi}a, direktno iz Raja. U dvobroju 2/3 1996 pi{u: Milovan Danojli}, Draginja Uro{evi}, Vasa Pavkovi}, Mihajlo Panti}, Milan Djordjevi}, Milenko Paji}, @ivorad Nedeljkovi}, Vladimir Jagli~i}, Sne‘ana Jakovljevi}, Sa{a Radoj~i}, Borislav Radovi}, Teofil Gotje, Mario Luci, Ronald Harvud, Mi{el Turnije, Piter Akrojd, Tamiki Hara, Miroslav Egeri} . . . Iz ovoga broja za slede}e izdanje "Dijaloga" izabrali smo: Mihajlo Panti} : Kako na{ pisac zami{lja . . . DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 185 BULLETIN D'ABONNEMENT ORDER FORM 1 an/volume, quatre numéros: 190 FF; 56 DM; £23; US$ 39 (Institutions: 300 FF). 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