Saad Salloum
ÊZIDÎS IN IRAQ
Memory, Beliefs,
and Current Genocide
2016
We also extend our gratitude to
Flora Family Foundation
for the support granted to Un ponte per...
In the protection of Ezidi Minority Component
اإيزيدون في العراق
الذاكرة ،الهوية ،اإبادة الجماعية
ÊZIDÎS IN IRAQ
Memory, Beliefs, and Current Genocide
By: Sa'ad Salloum
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Photographs by Salam Saloo, Photographer
صورة الغاف :أيزيدي يتوجه خارجا من البوابة الرئيسية لمعبد الش بعد اداءه الطقوس
Archieve of Prince Bayazid Ismail's Family
First Edition, 2016
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جميع حقوق النشر محفوظة ،وا يحق أي شخص أو مؤسسة أو جهة ،إعادة إصدار هذا
الكتاب ،أو جزء منه ،أونقله ،بأي شكل أو واسطة من وسائط نقل المعلومات ،سواء
أكانت إلكترونية أو ميكانيكية ،بما في ذلك النسخ أو التسجيل أو التخزين وااسترجاع،
دون إذن خطي من أصحاب الحقوق
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including
photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods,
without the prior written permission of the rights holders.
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CEI
بغداد2016 ،
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تعبر بالضرورة عن رأي الناشر.
تعبر عن رأي كاتبها ،وا ّ
هام :إن جميع اآراء الواردة في هذا الكتاب ّ
ISBN: 978-1-988150-07-9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Inscription..............................................................................................7
Foreword: Standing by the Êzidî community ....................................9
Introduction: Êzidî Miracle .............................................................. 11
Chapter I: Êzidîs: Beliefs, Castes and Mythology ...........................19
I. Etymology ...................................................................................21
II. Demographics ...........................................................................23
III. Castes ......................................................................................24
IV. Holy Books ...............................................................................27
V. «Chest Science» and Oral Heritage .............................................29
VI. Mythology and Beliefs .............................................................30
Chapter II: Myths and Witchcraft ....................................................35
I. Orientalist School: Inventing a Community outside History ......36
II. Arab School: Islamic Stereotype of a Heretical Group .............39
III. Êzidî School: Breaking Silence ................................................46
Chapter III: Modern Êzidî Identity Currents ..................................57
I. Kurdish Identity Current .............................................................57
II. Arab Identity Current ................................................................60
III. Êzidî Nationality Current .........................................................65
IV. Êzidî Particularity Current: .......................................................66
V. Civil Identity Current .................................................................67
Chapter IV: Êzidîs and State Policies in Modern Iraq ....................71
5
I. Takir Policy ................................................................................71
II. Annexation Policy......................................................................79
III. Assimilation Policy ..................................................................86
IV. Merging Policy ........................................................................89
V. Recruitment Policy ....................................................................97
Chapter V: Êzidîs: From Nation State to State of Components ...101
I. Recognizing the Êzidîs .............................................................101
II. Relation between Religion and State .......................................102
III. Violence and Struggle over Disputed Areas ...........................103
IV. Rise of Militant Islam .............................................................104
V. Religious Hatred Discourse .....................................................105
Chapter VI: Current Êzidî Genocide ..............................................109
I. Figures.......................................................................................109
II. Welcoming female survivors .................................................. 113
III. Conlict over Sinjar ................................................................ 115
Chapter VII: Scenarios of Êzidîs’ Future in Iraq .......................... 119
I. Mass migration scenario .......................................................... 119
II. Internal reform scenario...........................................................121
1.Reforming the religious institutions ....................................122
2.Reforming the caste system .................................................122
3.Pros and cons .......................................................................123
III. Special zone under international protection scenario .............124
IV. Special situation of Êzidî areas scenario ................................125
Conclusion .........................................................................................129
References ..........................................................................................131
Glossary of Êzidîs terms ...................................................................145
6
INSCRIPTION
To the female slaves of the 21st century
The capture and rape of Êzidî women by ISIS extremists is
a special kind of attack that may concern the world since it is a
gender-based attack. However, it is much more than that since
it has been used as a means for ethnic cleansing to achieve goals
beyond the raping and using of women in the slave trade of the 21st
century.
Êzidî women have been exploited in the war with a view to
collectively intimidating, humiliating and degrading a religious
minority and also to impact its ethnic structure. This act is part of
the series of genocides – locally known as firmans(1( – that have
been afflicted on the Êzidîs. In essence, they are a continuation
of the policies that have sought to root them out, change their
creed and affect their unique ethnic and religious structure. The
acts that constitute the pillars of this crime are similar to what the
Turks did to the Armenians when they forced Armenian women to
convert to Islam. Similarly, what the Serbs did to Bosnian women
and what the Hutu did to Tutsi women are the same as these
criminal acts.
Saad Salloum, Êzidî Women as a Weapon in the War
of Ethnic Cleansing, appeared on «Mada newspaper»,
Baghdad, May 2nd 2015.
(1( genocide's legislation
7
FOREWORD
STANDING BY THE ÊZIDÎ COMMUNITY
We, in the Italian NGO Un ponte per… (A bridge to…), always
thought of Êzidî activists as good friends and brave human rights
defenders, struggling to protect their people from persecution.
When we brought Italian delegations to the North of Iraq, and
wanted them to understand how rich and complex is the Iraqi
cultural heritage, we guided them to the Êzidî sanctuary of Lalish.
But many aspects of their life and culture remained unclear to us.
As an example, for years we kept calling them Yazidis, not realizing
that such a name entailed the attempt by some to wrongly present
them as followers of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid I, hence as Arabs,
or even to hold them accountable for the murder of Imam Hussein
by the Caliph.
Then, in 2014, everything changed. The dimension of preexisting persecutions became genocidal after Daesh (Arab acronym
for ISIS) conquered a large portion of Ninawa Governorate.
Daesh occupied the office of our partner in many projects, the
“Azidi Solidarity and Fraternity League”, and our friends became
displaced people, joining us in Erbil and Dohuk. Since then we
started cooperating with Êzidî activists who wanted to document
human rights violations and prove that the massacres, the sexual
slavery of women and children, the forced conversions and forced
exile could be qualified as “genocide”. This is finally the opinion of
9
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, as stated in a March 2015 report.
But denouncing and persecuting crimes, and helping the
victims to overcome trauma, is not enough. In order to accompany
the brave Êzidî people in their struggle to live through this 73rd
genocide, it is even more important to spread detailed information
about their culture and history. We are therefore enormously
grateful to our colleague "Saad Salloum" for completing this
detailed and fascinating study about the Êzidîs, who will help
many, in the West and in the East, to understand who they are,
and what are future perspectives for their survival as a people. This
study is published in the frame of the project “Out of the Siege”,
designed to foster interfaith dialogue and conflict transformation
in Iraq and Lebanon, funded by the Italian Episcopal Conference
and implemented by the Italian NGO Un ponte per…
The program “Out of the siege” has the objective to defend
cultural identity, promote dialogue and build relationships
among minorities of different cultures and religions in Iraq and
Lebanon. The action brings together different groups giving them
the opportunity to work jointly for the protection of their cultural
heritage, to promote youth activities and disseminate a culture of
dialogue and nonviolence. The action thus supports social centres
for youth of minorities and host communities to foster coexistence
and peace. The project has a special component dedicated to build
interfaith cultural cooperation and exchange among different
communities in Iraq through books’ and archives’ restoration.
Finally, the program has developed a research component to
collect stories about persecuted minorities and in particularly the
Êzidîs.
Martina Pignatti Morano,
President,
Un ponte per…
10
INTRODUCTION
ÊZIDÎ MIRACLE
MEMORY OF GENOCIDES AND IDENTITY OF THE
SACRED MOUNTAIN
The Sinjar Mountains represent the history and identity of
Êzidîs. Located in the middle of Upper Mesopotamia, these
mountains are a 77 kilometers-long, east-west trending and 13
kilometers-width, north-south trending mountain range that rises
to an elevation of 1470 meters – Gul Mira Peak – above sea level.
The western and lower segment of these mountains lies in Syria.
Gul Mira in Kurdish means forty men, which is a name of a sacred
shrine Êzidîs had been deprived of visiting due to the stationing of
a unit of the Iraqi army at the mountain peak where the shrine is.
However, this changed when the Americans invaded the country
in 2003.
During the Gulf War in 1991, the rockets of Saddam Hussein’s
regime that bombed Israel were launched from the Gul Mira Peak.
Hence, the strategic location of the mountain was like a pawn in
Middle Eastern chess. However, the mountain has another story.
Armenian families fleeing the 1915 Armenian Genocide by Turkey
resorted to the mountain and its Êzidî inhabitants protected them.
For centuries, the mountain has been indifferently watching the
11
battles and massacres committed under its slopes and providing
impervious ecology for those whom Roger Lescot describes as
“the most sorely persecuted and misrepresented people in the
Middle East.”(1( Nonetheless, the apathetic mountain that for
centuries protected Êzidîs from persecution and genocides became
a giant grave for fugitives who vainly waited for an international
intervention to save them from the ISIS nightmare, before they died
of thirst in the hot summer of 2014. The mountain appeared in the
news like a salvation shrine for those running towards the sky.
At the mountain’s foothill, the train of history has been passing
with an inexhaustible stock of accusations, stereotypes and myths
about the Êzidîs since Muslim conquests of present Iraq and the
consecutive Islamic empires. The impacts of these accusations are
still alive in the writings of modern authors as well as in people’s
views on the Êzidîs. It is a heavy burden of a legacy that has
depicted them as highwaymen, rebels, ungovernable, Satanists,
indecent and godless.
The Êzidîs lived in the shadows for centuries before ISIS drew
the worlds’ attention in an unprecedented manner to this forgotten
group and its bloody history. ISIS occupation of Êzidî areas in
Sinjar revealed their histories hidden under layers of oblivion.
As such, they experienced a new and bitterly ridiculous paradox
when they were spotlighted for the first time in their history –
their genocide did what scholars failed to do, i.e. introducing them
and talking about their beliefs.
Êzidîs chronicle 72 firmans – which they call firmans – in
their wounded memory. The last genocide by ISIS is number
73. Cold numbers may only begin to describe their tragedy. One
year after ISIS occupation of Êzidî areas in Sinjar, 400,000 of the
550,000 Êzidîs in Iraq or 75% are still displaced. There are also
some 65,000 refugees, 5,838 abductees, 841 missing persons, and
890 wounded. In addition, the documented number of those who
(1( Roger Lescot, Enquête sur les Yézidis de Syrie et du Djebel Sindjâr , Beirut, 1938, P.253.
12
have been killed is 1,280, 280 of whom were murdered during the
invasion of Sinjar. ISIS has blown-up 18 Êzidî shrines in Sinjar,
Bashiqa and Bahzani and 12 mass graves have been discovered in
the northern liberated parts of Sinjar. However, more mass graves
are expected to be found in the southern part which is still under
ISIS.(1(
The Êzidîs believe that their mass murdering, the kidnapping of
their women, the destroying of their religious shrines and forcing
them to convert to Islam is a new ring in the series of genocides that
have affected them and a continuation of the policies that have for
centuries, been trying to uproot them, change their religion and
impact their distinguished ethnic and religious structure.
Most of the news and analyses about the Êzidîs have failed to
understand the nature of the beliefs and identity of this group,
reflecting prevailing ignorance of religious pluralism in Iraq and
limited understanding that views Iraq as only shared among three
major groups: the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds.
Who are the Êzidîs? Who is Melek Taus? What is their religious
and ethnical identity? These questions were raised to explain
why ISIS targeted them. Hence, it was the genocide inflicted on
them rather than the desire to explore others that was behind the
curiosity to learn about them. Once again, their beliefs were in
question and layers of stereotypes and prejudices about this group
and its wounded memory resurfaced.
The collective memory of the Êzidîs is wounded with images
and stories of military campaigns and takfiri fatwa-supported
genocides which constitute the way different authorities have
dealt with them since the Muslim conquests of Iraq. The Ottoman
Empire was strict with them. The military operations waged
against the Êzidîs during the Safavid-Ottoman conflict in the early
16th century took place again after the mid-16th century by both
(1( According to the igures announced by the Êzidî Endowment in the Kurdistan
Regional Government.
13
Ottoman and Safavid leaders and governors, supported by official
Ottoman fatwas that considered their areas to be a war zone from
a Sharia perspective. Thus, they became a target of permitted
killing and looting.
Moreover, throughout the 19th century, the Êzidîs faced
campaigns of local leaders, governors and princes in various
Ottoman regions and states. In the mid-19th century, the Ottoman
authorities tried to force them to perform military service in the
Ottoman army and they were redefined as a group that had broken
away from Islam and that violently collided with the authorities.
During the first two decades of the 20th century, the Ottoman
violence policy towards the Êzidîs continued and was even
exacerbated after the outbreak of World War I, when the Ottomans
adopted the final solution policy – used later by the Nazis – of
eliminating religious minority groups in the Ottoman state, which
culminated in the Armenian Genocide. The Ottomans used with
the Êzidîs, the same a hard-line policy as they used with the
Armenians.(1( Later, the British occupied Iraq, the French occupied
Syria and they both, together with the old Turkish occupation
jostled for influence in Êzidî areas.
Between Islamization and Arabization, Êzidîs’ identity was
misunderstood by their neighbours and defamed by the authorities
as well as by scholars and writers whose writings were based
on hostile national ideologies or inimical religious provisions.
Governors through their campaigns and firmans, clergymen
through their takfiri fatwas(2(, and writers and scholars through
their writing of studies that confirm distortions and adopt readymade stereotypes, constituted the three sides of the triangle of an
integrated system of a relation among power, faith and knowledge
that enhanced the majority’s right to oppress the minority and
merge it into an identity, guaranteeing the interest and privilege
of a certain group and culture.
(1( For more, see Adnan Zayyan Farhan and Qader Saleem, Êzidîs’ Tragedy: Firmans
and Genocide Campaigns against Êzidî Kurds throughout History, Dahuk, 2009.
(2) original Arabic phrase of muslim clerics' legislation about permissible and
impermissible acts
14
In a country where religion and the state are one, the Êzidîs were
religiously isolated outside two circles of ideologies: the first was
the smaller circle – Islam – which they were kept outside because
they were viewed as a weird religious group that did not belong
to the prevailing cultural structure represented in the religion of
the majority. Although the Êzidîs are monotheistic, they were not
included in the larger circle of the Abrahamic religions – which
also included Judaism and Christianity – whose followers had
some freedom of religion and belief.
The authors and scholars who constituted one side about triangle
of power, faith and knowledge – rulers, clergymen and scholars –
were no exception, since they were part of the prevailing cultural
structure and they adopted without scrutiny the stereotypes of the
Êzidîs in line with the fatwas and the practical policies adopted
by rulers.(1(
When the national government was established in Iraq in 1921,
which adopted maximum national ideological policies under the
Baath Party (1963-2003), some scholars were employed by the
authorities. Their task was to issue studies under security policies
to deal with a group that might pose a threat to national unity, or
be part of the plans of the external enemies of the political regime
or of its internal opponents of independence-seeking movements
that encouraged a pluralistic identity which was unacceptable
within the ideology of a regime that was based on a single identity
rejecting differences. These scholars and writers modeled ideas
about the Êzidîs in conformity with the prevailing view i.e. Êzidîs
as a group whose options should only be identified through the
religion of the majority or whose identity should be identified with
the ethnical identity of the majority or be merged within an allinclusive identity as the political regime sought to.
After 2003, the Êzidîs were under a new conflict. In light of
(1( Saad Salloum, Êzidîs: The Memory of Firmans and the Siege of Prevailing Cultural
Structure, Baghdad-based Mada newspaper, issue 2982, 16.01.2014. appeared on
«Mada newspaper»,issue 2982, Baghdad, 16.01.2014.
15
new negotiating circumstances of major groups – the Kurds, the
Shiites and the Sunnis – on sharing power and wealth under
the American occupation, the Êzidîs were targeted for religious
reasons by extremist groups that issued takfiri fatwas repeating
an old history of persecution and targeting.
The new targeting has become a background informing the
worrisome reality of the Êzidîs. The present from Êzidîs’ perspective
has become another ring added to a long and persevering history
in which they were not accepted as a different group. It is a history
that casts additional figures to the list of the 72 firmans. Though
officially recognized as a religious minority in Article 2(2) of the
2005 Constitution of Iraq, represented in the “Christian and Other
Religion Endowment” and covered by the quota system in the
parliament, the Êzidîs are still socially isolated by the prevailing
view which classifies them as a different entity even within their
Kurdish context which they are religiously different from.
The harsh way successive governments dealt with this religious
minority and its feeling of being isolated from its social atmosphere
were an additional reason for its secrecy, sick fears and ideological
and geographical isolation at the foothill of the Sinjar Mountains
or in the Lalish valleys, where they could live comfortably.
Therefore, any attempt to attract them outside this world through
conscription, taxes, recognizing the authorities, preaching in their
areas, etc., would pose a threat to their modus vivendi and beliefs.
This is why they tried to protect themselves with a wall of cultural
and geographical isolation. Consequently, slandering myths on
every mysterious issue were hatched on them. After all, a man
antagonizes what he is not familiar with.
However, Êzidîs’ existence and survival are a kind of miracle
because they were re-born after each genocide. In parallel with
the 72 genocides, there have been 72 re-births in which those who
are outside history have proved that they are going to re-enter
it using a top-bottom road in accordance with their traditional
way of returning to the womb of existence. In other words, the
16
Êzidîs will descend from the sky of Sinjar to the earth to the rest of
mankind, having escaped to the top – where the gods live – fleeing
the deadly cruelty of human beings.
This book seeks to celebrate the Êzidî miracle and present it
through its modern history in a very simplified way. Although
it targets unspecialized readers, we have tried to introduce the
identity of the group in its transformations that have come to be
centered on the memory and the mountain: the memory is labeled
with the history of genocides, while the mountain is gradually
shaped in the form of a heart that symbolizes the steadfastness
and survival of the afflicted ethnic group in a manner equivalent
to the symbolism of Mount Ararat for the Armenians.
For the Êzidîs, Sinjar will always be the big brother during
ordeals and the father caring for the generations that survive after
a series of continued genocides.
Finally, we believe that it is time for the history of murderers
and invaders who have for centuries, inflicted tragedy on the
Êzidîs to cease. True, the Êzidîs, as a result, confined themselves,
resorting to their first home – the mountain, as a buffer for killers
and the best resort to face invaders – but in the summer of 2014
the mountain which was still alive as in the previous centuries was
revived as a symbol of a live identity and it announced the re-birth
of the Êzidîs from the ashes of a new firman.
Saad Salloum
Baghdad, Iraq, 2016
17
CHAPTER I
ÊZIDÎS: BELIEFS, CASTES AND
MYTHOLOGY
A Êzidî (as an individual within a community) and Êzidîsm (as
a religion)(1( are viewed in a troubled manner that burdens them
on different levels and raises an inconvenient uncertainty for a
group that lives outside history or within a world of myth. Like the
Mandaeans who resorted to the valleys in southern Iraq to preserve
their faith, the Êzidîs were housed in northern Iraq by the slopes
of mountains, including the Sinjar Mountains,(2( and by valleys,
such as the Lalish Valley(3( in Ain Sfni in the Shekhan District.
This valley is 60 kilometers north of Mosul, which geographically
(1( The Êzidîs’ own name for themselves is Êzidî or Êzîdî or, in some areas, Dasinî (the
latter, strictly speaking, is a tribal name). Some scholars have derived the name Êzidî
from Old Farsi yazata (divine being), and Êzidîs themselves believe that their name is
derived from the word Yezdan or Êzid ‘God’, denying the widespread idea that it is a
derivation from Umayyad Caliph Yazid I (Yazid bin Muawiyah), revered as Sultan Ez.
(2( The Sinjar Mountains are on the Iraqi (Nineveh Governorate)-Syrian (Hassakeh
Governorate) border. Most of its residents and the residents of surrounding areas
are Êzidîs with a minority of Muslim Arabs and Kurds.
(3( This valley is located within three mountains. The conical roofs characteristic of
Êzidî sites mark it. Êzidîs call this place ‘Mah Ra Kah’ or the home of the sun. It
houses the tomb of Sheikh Adi ibn Musair, the main igure of the Êzidî faith. It is
also the permanent residence of Êzidî clergymen and Spiritual Council.
19
isolated this distinguished ethnic group and protected it from
extinction. However, high mountains cannot protect human beings
from unfair accusations, stereotypes or rigorous prejudices. Êzidîs
have suffered a series of accusations and defamations: some deem
them to be ancestors of the extinct Parsees, while others say they
are Muslims but then apostates. Some ascribe the name Êzidî
to the followers of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid I who is credited
with the murder of Imam Hussein – viewed by the Shia as the
defender of Islam – and baselessly hold them accountable for His
act. Êzidîs are also considered to be devil worshipers with all the
accompanying beliefs of incarnation, reincarnation, adultery and
disbelief. They are truly what Lady Drower said about them: “...
one of the most sorely persecuted and misrepresented people in
the world.”(1(
Mah Ra Kah (the Home of the Sun): Conical domes in Lalish valley
(1( Lady Ethel S. Drower, Peacock Angel: Being some Account of Votaries of a
Secret Cult and their Sanctuaries, London, 1941, p.119
20
Entrance to the Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir Shrine in Lalish
I. Etymology
Êzidîsm is old religion, it has been affected by surrounding
religions. While some scholars associate it with ancient peoples in
the region, there has been a lot of controversy about the designation
of Êzidîsm. There are many and conflicting views that this book
cannot numerate or easily tackle. However, they reflect the fact
that historically speaking Êzidîsm has gone through several stages
and taken many names.(1(
Some believe that Êzidîsm comes from the Persian city of
Yezd, since it first appeared there and soon spread to other areas
in northern Iraq.(2( Nonetheless, the most probable view is that
Êzidîsm is derived from the word Êzid (God King), Yazata in
(1( We will ignore the Islamic Arab school’s approach
toÊzidîsm, which
considers Êzidîs’ name to be derived from Umayyad Caliph Yazid I and that
they are consequently Umayyad, according to Iraqi and Arab scholars. We
will also ignore the view of Aš-Šahrastani who found in His book Sects and
Creeds the religious origin of Êzidîs in the person of Yezîd bn Unaisa, who
was originally, and thus considering Êzidîs to be, a Kharijite sub-sect. We
will analyze this school in Chapter III
(2( Khalaf Jarad, Êzidîsm and Êzidîs, Latakia, 1995, p.15
21
Avestan which means worthy of worship, Yazd in Pahlavi and
Yajata in Sanskrit. As such, Êzidî, Yezidi or Êzidî means God’s
worshiper. We can also find the name Yazid in the legend of King
Ezda and Yazdan, a grandfather of Êzidîsm. Moreover, early
Êzidîs were called Yazdanis.(1(
Scholar Hooshang Broca believes that Êzidîs in their prayers
and hymns ascribe their name to their god Ezi which is a name of
God. He is God himself Khudi the absolute who has one thousand
and one names:
My God is God
[He is] a decorator of all engravings
Sultan/Angel Ezi is aware of what has passed and what is yet to
come
My God is the one and only
My friends know Him
[He is] exalted in His free giving
........................
My God is the secret of the heavens
[He has been] eternal since there were no board or pencil
My Angel Ezi/god! With You, time disperses
Other religious texts mention that Ezi is a God incarnate and that
he is God’s greatest name:
Ezi is the Sultan himself
His greatest name is God
Sultan Ezi knows how much water the sea contains
The world is only one step for Him
He crosses it in one hour
It is He who organized the wedding of Adam and Eve.(2(
(1( Abdunnasser Hesso, Êzidîsm and the Philosophy of the Circle, Damascus, 2008,
p.63-66.
(2( Hooshang Broca: Mythology of Êzidîsm, Damascus, 2009.p.29-31
22
Yezi means God, Ye zdai means the Creator in Kurdish, and
Ezwan - Ezdan means God in Farsi. So, a Êzidî means ‘slave of the
Creator.’ Êzidîs themselves say: “We Êzidîs are in white, immortal
in the heavens and content with a loaf of barley bread.”(1(
Êzidîs would call a member of their community a Êzidî, which
means ‘he created me’, hence it is not derived from Yazid I, a
deceptive name given to them in order to falsify their identity
and beliefs. This difference in the name explains why this closed
community is deeply misunderstood by the public.
II. Demographics
Êzidî population estimations are unclear due to the lack of
official ethnic demographics in Iraq. International and local
estimations of this community vary significantly, but the Êzidî
Affair Department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Kurdistan
Regional Government puts the number at 550,000 which appears
To be the closest to reality.
Êzidîs mainly live in north and north-western- Iraq, namely in
the area surrounding the Sinjar Mountains towards the west of
Mosul (120 km), in the north-eastern area of the Shekhan District,
in some villages and towns of Talkeef District, in Bashiqa, and in
Zakho and Semel districts in Dohuk Governorate.(2(
The terrains of the Sinjar Mountains naturally protect Êzidîs.
The Emir of Êzidîs lives in Ba’adra in the Shekhan District. The
choice of this area limited by the Sinjar Mountains and the valley
(1( “Masarat magazine: a special issue on Êzidîsm”, Issue n. 2, 2005. Also Saad Salloum,
Minorities in Iraq, Masarat for Cultural and Media Development, Baghdad, p. 86.
Bibar Kheder Suleiman and Khalil Jundi are the irst to adopt that in their book
Êzidîati which was issued in Kurdish by the Kurdish Scientiic Academy, Baghdad,
1979.p.17. Through the assumptions they incorporated into their book, they
challenged all the stereotypes and ideological determinants of the Baath regime in
Iraq, which considered Êzidîsm to be a mere Umayyad sect integrated in a broader
Arab identity.
(2(
Munther Abdulmajeed Badri, Geography of Religious Minorities in Iraq,
unpublished master’s thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1975,p. 366.
23
in Shekhan, was due to continuous persecutions and genocides,
while their spread to central and southern Iraq was due to purely
economic purposes where many Êzidîs worked there in liquor
stores and restaurants. Apart from Iraq, Êzidîs exist in countries
such as Georgia, Armenia and Iraq’s neighbouring countries with
a Kurdish population, like Syria and Turkey.
Baba Sheikh, the Êzidî religious Leader (Sage)
III. Castes
The caste system in Êzidîsm is unique and was developed by
Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir al-Hakkari (named after the Hakkari
Mountains) (1071-1161).(1( It is based on a hierarchical structure
that is closed from inside and outside.
This closed hierarchical structure gives to Sheikh Adi’s
followers hereditary spiritual ranks, in order to avoid conflicts and
competition among them and among castes. Each sheikh has a pir
and a sheikh and each pir has a pir and a sheikh too. Each one
gives the other a bounty (tax) for the religious services they do for
(1( He was buried in the Lalish Valley and His tomb is a focal point of Êzidî pilgrimage.
He is considered the renewer of Êzidîsm. Êzidîs call him different names, such as Adi
Shikhadi, Adi ibn Musair al-Umawī al-Shami and al-Hakkari.
24
each other rather than per the religious hierarchy. Furthermore,
each Êzidî has a sheikh and a pir to whom he gives equal bounties
for their services in various occasions, such as visits during feasts,
marriages, births and deaths.(1( Each Êzidî should have a sheikh,
a pir, a mureed, afterlife friends and brother. This has become a
basic pillar of Êzidîsm.(2(
The Êzidî community consists of social classes and religious ranks:
-
Al-mir [the prince]: their religious and worldly leader in
Iraq; he lives in Ain Sfni city in the Shekhan District. The
current mir is Mir Tahsin Saied, the prince of Êzidîs in the
world.
-
Baba Sheikh: the spiritual leader of all Êzidîs around
the world. He is like the Pope for Christians. Currently this
position is occupied by Khatto Baba Sheikh Hajji Baba
Sheikh Rasho, who also lives in Ain Sfni.
-
The Sheikhs: there are forty Sheikhs divided into three
factions: Adani, Achammsana and Qatani.
-
Al pir: a Farsi word meaning "the method Sheikh"; there are
forty who regulate the religious affairs of the followers.
-
Al Fakir: a Sui wearing sacred "rags". They are worshipping
hermits.
-
Al Qawwal: religious groups specialized in playing
tambourine and piccolo at religious occasions. Every year
they travel from one Êzidî village, town or city to another
holding the peacock symbol.
-
Al Mureed [the follower]: ordinary people of the Êzidî
community; they form the lowest religious rank. Each
mureed should have a Sheikh, a pir, a mureed and an
(1( Emir Bayazid al-Umawi,The Hereditary System of Êzidî Umayyads, «Folklore
magazine», Iraqi Ministry of Information, Baghdad, 1975, p.49, 57.
(2( Khalil Jundi: Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, Sweden, 1998,p.64.
25
afterlife brother. They give alms to Sheikhs, pirs and afterlife
brothers. They do not get married to members of the Sheikh
and pir classes, who do not get married between each other
either.
-
Al Kojak: specialized in parapsychology and metaphysics,
they forecast and communicate with spirits, and treat
patients spiritually.(1(
This closed hierarchy prohibits two types of exogamy: among
Êzidî castes and with non-Êzidîs. While this complex system
preserves the purity and coherence of this community, it ushers
in its extinction. True, exogamy preserves the religious and ethnic
identity of this group, but how to perpetuate this system, especially
with the calls to reform it in order to preserve the community under
the current complex challenges and the complexities of migrating
to the West and of communicating with more open cultures, makes
adaptation to the complexity of this system almost impossible.
Êzidîs have a religious authority called the Supreme Spiritual
Êzidî Council, consisting of:
-
The prince: who is currently Mir Tahsin Saied, the prince
of Êzidîs in Iraq and the world, chairman of the Supreme
Spiritual Êzidî Council.
-
Baba Sheikh: the spiritual leader of the Êzidîs; he is in
charge of all religious affairs and relevant legislation, which
are made in agreement among the Council members and
upon the Prince approval.
-
Head of Al Qawwals: he is in charge of religious texts
memorizers and chanters of invocations during the parade
of the lag (sanjaq).
-
The Sheikh el Wazir, whose role is to organize the parade
of the lag throughout the Êzidî regions, accompanying Al
(1( “Masarat Magazine: a special issue on Êzidîsm”, Issue 2, 2005. Also Saad Salloum,
Minorities in Iraq, p. 67.
26
Qawwals and explain and deine their works.
-
The Peshimam who is in charge of the community affairs
such as marriage arrangements in the Êzidî villages.
IV. Holy Books
Êzidîs have a rich spiritual heritage of legends, folklore, musical
epics and stories. Part of this heritage has survived thanks to the
Kurds in Armenia and Georgia, while the greatest part of the
literature of myths and stories have been effaced.(1(
The holiness of a number of holy books of Êzidîsm, such
as the Sun Mishefa (Roj) and the Black Mishefa (Reş), is still
controversial. Êzidîs believe some of their holy books were lost
during genocide campaigns waged against them and that they
were re-written based on memory. Therefore, they might have
been amended, altered or deformed.(2( Êzidîsm depends on verbal
heritage and the conveying of mythology through hymns, stories
and poetry (qawls and sabqat). Mishefas [holy books] were
written down in limited amount of copies in order for them not be
circulated within the public, so that the secrets of the religion will
not be revealed. Êzidîsm is not a preaching religion.
Thus, we deduce that these books were written late after the
appearance of Êzidîsm and that they may only represent an
endeavor to adapt to the broader Islamic surrounding, which
doubts any religion unless it is provided with a holy script and
only recognizes Christianity and Judaism.
A lack of written scripts or the holy book that keeps the spiritual
content of the religion is a challenge facing those investigating the
origins of Êzidîsm. Such books do not exist, are unwritten and orally
memorized by clergymen, or have been lost due to unwillingness
to write them down for fear of being acquired by others and used
(1( Khalil Jundi, : Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, p.122.
(2( Azad Sa’eed Samo, Êzidîsm through its Holy Scripts, Islamic Bureau, Beirut, 2001,
p. 241.
27
against the cult or its followers.(1( Therefore, Êzidîs throughout the
ages have preferred to maintain the confidentiality of their beliefs
and holy scripts, which has adversely impacted the introduction of
the religion to others and even to its followers.
In addition, the lack of a holy book within an atmosphere that
hallows religious books was embarrassing for Êzidîs and caused
them to be rejected by a culture that respects scriptural religions.
There is a difference between the Abrahamic religions – Judaism,
Christianity and Islam – which consider Abraham to be the father
of all prophets and the other monotheistic religions which has
no mythological relation to Abraham, such as Mandaeanism,
Êzidîsm, Zoroastrianism, Sikhism, etc. The lack of a holy book that
may be resorted to figure out whether the religion is monotheistic
or polytheistic makes the religion questionable.
Therefore, Êzidî authors and scholars have called for a holy
book of Êzidîs so that they and others can peruse the holy scripts
of the religion and combat all the wrong stereotypes about the
community and its beliefs. Êzidî writer Kheri Ibrahim Kourou
believes that rescuing Êzidîsm and its heritage requires a holy
book. He urges to quickly write a book that contains the holy
scripts of Êzidîsm, in order to eternalize the religion and preserve
it from extinction.(2(
In His book Êzidîsm between Questioners and Respondents,
Amin Farhan Jijo says Êzidîsm has holy scripts and books called
qawls which he defines as: “orally transmitted Êzidî texts and
part of them has been written down and collected in books called
Mishefas.” He lists the names of 83 qawls, mishefas and books.(3(
However, these scattered scripts, unlike the holy sourcebooks
(1( Kadhim Habib,: Êzidîsm: A Religion Fighting Calamities of Time, London,
2003,p.28.
(2( Kheri Ibrahim Kourou, East and West: Writings on Êzidî Affairs, publications of
the Supreme Authority of Lalish Center, Dahuk, 2012,p.8.
(3( Amin Farhan Jijo, Êzidîsm between Questioners and Respondents, publications of
the Endowment of Christians and other Religions, Baghdad, 2012,pp.166-170.
28
such the Quran, the New Testament and the Torah as well as
the Ginza Rba for Mandaeans, may confuse readers rather than
provide them with guidelines.
Nonetheless, Êzidîs mention some holy books or scripts,
mainly:(1(
- Achammsani Mishefa of secrets: the Êzidîs attribute it
to the epoch of Prophet Noah; it was written in Aramaic.
-
The Sun Mishefa (Roj): a part of the Achammsani
Mishefa of secrets (philosophical - historical).
-
The Black Mishefa (Reş): it contains the story of the
creation of the universe, as well as the story of Adam and
Eve, and tells about the Êzidî kings and the Flood.
-
Jalouh: Êzidîs believe that it is sent from Heaven as a
revelation to the faithful through Melek Taus [peacock
angel] in Kurdish. It talks about God's mightiness, and the
authority given by God to Melek Taus, who is considered a
luminary phenomenon and the second name of God. The
ive letters of the word Tawos [Taus in Êzidî] stands for ive
names of God: T for Taa [Loyalty], A for Aulfa [Affection],
W for Wadoud [Friendly], O for Oue’am [Concord] and S for
Salam [Peace].
V. “Chest Science” and Oral Heritage
Instead of a holy and comprehensive text of Êzidîsm, there is
consensus about a lot of religious principles kept in the chests of
Êzidî clergymen, which they call “chest science”. Clergymen have
transmitted this science, which is based on an oral culture that
relies on memorizing prayers, hymns, historical events and stories,
from one generation to the other. This however has exposed it
to risks of forgetfulness, transformation, change, omission and
addition, let alone the pressures of religious persecution and
(1( “Masarat Magazine: a special issue on Êzidîsm”, Issue n. 2, 2005. Also Saad Salloum,
Minorities in Iraq, p.91-92.
29
campaigns to forcedly change beliefs, especially since this heritage
is unrecorded, which has exposed it to loss and dissipation over
years. Moreover, oral cultural leads to an unfamiliarity of the
origins, culture and history of the religion.
VI. Mythology and Beliefs
“Êzidîsm is like an archaeological hill covered with
the sands of thousands of years and has been poorly
prospected.”
Khalil Jundi, Towards Knowing the Truth about
Êzidîsm.
1. Origin of Êzidîs Beliefs
Êzidîsm originates from the first fertility religions in the Middle
East and it bears the traditions and heritage of old Mesopotamian
civilizations. According to Êzidî scholars, it derives from the IndoIranian, Indo-European and Mesopotamian beliefs along with the
beliefs of Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian civilizations.(1(
Ancient religions of the East have common roots and links; the
Êzidî community bears the heritage of those ancient religions of
the East. Nature's main symbols and elements have a significant
position in Êzidîsm: Water, air, earth and fire. The representation
of those elements can be largely seen in both the verbal Êzidî and
mythology, which canonizes those elements as represented in
religious practices in various temples and shrines. For example,
when Êzidîs welcome a new year in the Lalish Temple at the end of
the final day of the year according to their eastern calendar, which
precedes the Gregorian one by fourteen days, on an Eid called Seh
Rsal (New Year's Day), they chant religious hymns, lighting lamps
in the temple courtyard to show that they welcome the new year
by light and shine. In the Temple itself, a visitor can realize how
sacred the Earth is, and how sacred the Water is in Kanya Spî
[white spring], in which a Êzidî gets purified and is baptized to be
(1( Khalil Jundi, Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, p.55.
30
born as a Êzidî; a ritual that takes place in the oldest part of Lalish
Temple.(1(
Some say the history and civilization of Êzidîsm dates back to the
third millennium B.C. as the remains of the oldest Kurdish religion
from the area of great civilizations in the East, i.e. the ancient
Sumerian Babylonian beliefs. This view depends on a discovery
made by an archaeologist and ancient language expert who found
the word Ezdi, meaning “the good soul, the non-polluted and those
who follows the right path”, among archaeological discoveries in
Mesopotamia.
Moreover, the three major gods in Êzidîsm (the basic pillars of
Êzidîsm) are mentioned in old civilizations:(2(
- The shamash [Sun-god] which is Sheikh Shams in
Êzidîsm and Shamas in Babylonian. The scholar believes
that Sheikh Shams is but Melek Taus, God’s representative
on Earth. The shape of the Sun appears when a peacock
spread its feathers.
-
The Sin (Moon-god) which is Sheikh Sinn in Êzidîsm,
Nanna in Sumerian and Sin in Babylonian; he was the god
of women’s fertility.
-
Sheikh Adi (the god of rain, goodness and blessing).
It has several names: Adad, Adi, Hadad, Denoch, etc. He is
represented in Êzidîsm in its renewer Sheikh Adi ibn Musair.
(1( Saad Salloum: Minorities in Iraq, p.90.
(2( Khalil Jundi, Towards knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, and Saad Salloum,
Minorities in Iraq, pp.90-91.
31
Melek Taus Stone curving relief in Bahzani
2. Universe in Êzidî Mythology
Êzidî mythology depicts the beginning of the universe as dark
seas with no living creatures. They contained a pearl which God
created out of His most precious essence. the pearl then became
alive with a body and a soul. Soon, it exploded forming seven
heavens; for each space a great angel was created and each space
was comprised of seven spaces.
The explosion (which is parallel to the Big Bang) led to the
formation of galaxies, the Sun, the Moon and all the planets,
including the Earth, in six days. Then started the creation of man.
God brought the four elements of earth, fire, water and air and made
the form of Adam, but He left it without a soul for 700 years. Then,
He brought a glass of the water of life for Adam, and the angels
gathered around him. When Adam drank the water, he became
a human being. Angel Michael was His guide in Paradise for 700
years, and then God ordered him to be driven out from Paradise.(1(
(1( Hassoun Abboud Jizani, Êzidîsm in Iraq, master’s thesis, College of Basic Education,
Al-Mustansiriyah University, Baghdad, 2014, p.93. For comparison, please see the
creation myth according to Mishefa Reş in Sami Sa’eed Ahmad, Êzidîs’ Situations
32
3. Melek Taus
Khalil Jundi believes that in order to know the beliefs of
Êzidîsm, we must examine the phenomenon of Melek Taus, Êzidîs’
sacred symbol who had different names in the cultures of ancient
peoples, such as: Tammuz, Adonis, Azoris, Baal, etc. He believes
that Melek Taus is but “the God son of the greatest mother, the
goddess of nature and universe. This God is dead alive and alive
dead. He is eternally evolving with the rotation of the natural life
and crops every year. When men controlled means of production
and replaced women and also gods replaced goddesses, Melek
Taus replaced His mother Ishtar and became head of the pantheon
and god of the Heavens.”(1(
This issue is the source of all delusions and misconceptions
about Êzidîs’ beliefs as worshipers of the devil/god of evil. To
raise awareness on the fact that they worship God (Azda-Khuda)
as the source of both good and evil, one should disregard the
beliefs of Semitic monotheistic religions which consider God to
be a source of absolute goodness (positive God) while evil comes
from outside (the enemy), because the Êzidî mythology does not
consider divinity represented in Melek Taus as Satan but as the
perfect god in His goodness and evil. Pure evil does not exist in
Êzidî philosophy; good and evil has one source; God is the source
of everything in Êzidîsm.
Accordingly, Melek Taus “is not the dark face of God or a god of
pure evil or accursed Satan as opposed to God the Most Gracious.
Rather, according to the Êzidî books of faith, He is the perfect god
or the other face of the greatest god (God, Khuh Da, Azda) who
is almighty in His goodness as well as in His evil, almighty in His
peace as well as in His war. Over and above, he is one of God’s
names, which is ‘Plentiful’.”(2(
and Beliefs, Part II, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, 1971, p.5-24. And also
Birgul Acikyildiz, The Yezidis: The History of a Community, Culture and Religion,
London. New York. 2014, pp. 86-87.
(1( Khalil Jundi, Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, p.13.
(2( Hooshang Broca, The Mystery of Melek Taus or the Origin of Good and Evil in
Êzidîsm, Damascus, 2014, p. 285-286.
33
Consequently, the monotheism of Êzidîsm differs from that
of the Abrahamic religions. God in the Êzidî creation mythology
has created both Himself and the world and He is worshipped in
His oneness and multiplicity. In addition to worshiping God the
origin/center (Khuh Da) as all the good and bad; all angels and
elves; and all the world and what before it and beyond it; there is
also the worship of God in His unlimited manifestations (Azda),
which flows from him into the world amongst man. This is why,
according to Êzidî beliefs, God has made two creations: He created
Himself (Khudah Da) and the world (Izda).(1(
Thus, we may conclude that Êzidîsm combines between
monotheism and polytheism. God in Êzidîsm is one and the only
(Khuh Da) and many and multiple (Azda). This combination is
the basis of the philosophy of Êzidîsm.(2(
Êzidîs have seven brass flags (sanjaq) in the form of seven
peacocks, representing the heavenly flag. Each flag symbolizes an
angel and is specific for one of their areas. Qawwals visit Êzidî
villages three times a year (April, September and November)
bringing these flags to spread the teachings of their religion and
collect alms. Each sanjaq is a statue comprised of several rings on
the top of which stands a bird that looks like a she peacock.(3(
(1( Khalil Jundi, Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm ,p.19.
(2( Hooshang Broca, The Mystery of Melek Taus or the Origin of Good and Evil in
Êzidîsm, pp.285-286; and Sadiq Damlouji,Êzidîsm, Baghdad, 2010, p. 54.
(3( Khalil Jundi, Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, p.122.
34
CHAPTER II
MYTHS AND WITCHCRAFT
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT OF ÊZIDÎSM
The disagreement on the etymology of Êzidîs as a community
and of Êzidîsm as a cult highlights the disagreement between
Muslim Arab scholars and Western scholars regarding the origin
of this community and the nature of its beliefs. Muslim authors
ascribed the name Êzidî to the followers of the Umayyad Caliph
Yazid I, while Western orientalists had a different approach. This
was before Êzidî scholars finally started stressing the genuineness
of their religion and that it was different than the religion of
Muslim majority. This happened only a few decades ago, when
Êzidîs began to emphasize their identity through searching and
exploring their history and the origin of their beliefs. In light of
this and in order to simplify things, we can say there are three
schools of thought that sought to determine the origin of Êzidîsm
and the nature of its beliefs:
- Orientalist Western school: mainly represented by Western
travelers who either visited the regions of Êzidîs and
communicated with them supericially or wrote ictional
accounts about an ethnic community whose individuals they
had never met while they were undergoing their studies.
35
-
Islamic Arab school: represented by muslim Arab authors
who through the determinants of their Islamic Arab culture
stereotyped Êzidîsm as a community that had broken away
from the religion of the majority, i.e. Islam.
-
Êzidî school: represented by Êzidî scholars who strove
to clarify their beliefs after the level of distortion of their
identity could no longer be tolerated or ignored.
I. Orientalist School: Inventing a Community outside History
Western authors’ views on Êzidîs were compatible with their
bizarre orientalist view they had about the Orient. They viewed
Êzidîs as an odd community that worshiped Satan, violated taboos
through their profligacy and even practiced cannibalism. It was a
way to excite readers and depict the author as an adventurer who
got through the Orient’s magic, myths and ancient religions with
its funny beliefs and suspicious followers. The Cradle of Mankind:
Life in Eastern Kurdistan,(1( has the same view about Êzidîs as
devil worshipers. It even describes the temple of Sheikh Adi as the
temple of the devil.
Books by British travelers say Êzidîs practice preposterous
rituals during their religious feasts, such as the killing of people
and eating their flesh, in addition to other things that are difficult
to mention. British traveler Sir Wallis Budge’s story depended on
a Chaldean deacon called Jeremiah Shamir from Ankawa (Erbil),
who Shamir was trading in books and ancient manuscripts and
sold a number of them to British travelers.(2( The story of Shamir
who provided Budge with a lot of information is similar to that of
Êzidî Habib who converted to Christianity and was used by Father
Anastas Karmali as a source. It also seems that the trade, or perhaps
(1( W. A. Wigram and E. T. A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern
Kurdistan, London, 1922, translated into Arabic, Arbil, 2010.
(2( Sir Wallis Budge, Trips to Iraq, Volume II, Baghdad, 1968, p.256. see Also, Arshad
Hammo Maho, Êzidîs in the Books of British Travelers, Dahuk, 2012, p.142. See also
Saad Salloum, Policies and Ethnicities of Iraq, Masarat, Baghdad, 2014, p.112-174.
36
creation, of ancient manuscripts became an important source of
income since they attracted Western travelers and journalists who
loved exotic tales and sought to explore pre-modern communities.
British travelers also mentioned other incorrect narrations
about practicing pornography during Êzidî feasts. Traveler John
Usher pointed out that Êzidîs practiced orgies on one night every
year after turning the lights off. This is why Turks called them Jrag
Sondran which means switchers-off of lights.(1( Traveler William
Heud mentioned a similarly funny story on how Êzidîs went to
a mountain close to the tomb of Sheikh Adi and vowed part of
their money to the devil while carrying out mad movements with
barbaric dancing at suspicious parties.(2(
Eighteen years after Lady Drower wrote about Êzidîs, she
re-visited them and wrote about them again. She admitted that
when she first wrote about them, she mentioned many of the
stories which were common among their neighbours and took
other stories from similar sources (I have personally great doubts
about such stories and reports). After examining the Mandaeans,
Drower(3( learned how inaccurate rumors could be. She was
convinced that all things written about Êzidîs were inaccurate and
full of superficial information that largely depended on gossip,
rather than on thorough, direct research.(4(
French orientalist Thomas Bois (1900-1975) mentioned some
amusing books written by foreign authors, scholars and journalists
who wrote fantasy stories to stir readers’ imagination.
(1( Arshad Hammo, Êzidîs in the Books of British Travelers, p. 142.
(2( Ibid, p.143.
(3( Lady Drower wrote a famous book on Mandaeans in two volumes: Mandaean
Sabians and Sabian Myths and Folk Tales. E. S. Drower, The Mandaeans of Iraq
and Iran: Their Cults, Customs, Magic, Legends, and Folklore, Leiden, 1962,
(reprint of 1937 edition)
(4( E. S. DROWER, Peacock Angel: Being some Account of Votaries of a Secret Cult and
their Sanctuaries, p. 7.
37
According to Bois, these travelers and journalists did not
look for the truth but aimed at writing exciting reports, and the
information they provided was usually fabricated and inaccurate.
They “often write what they have heard from villagers, whether
Christians or Muslims, whom they have met and who do not know
well these good people. They rather commit a lot of mistakes
while writing about them.”(1( Bois presented a list of such writers
and their unbelievable stories about “bisexual Êzidîs, or fictitious
women covered with hair”. There are also stories about how they
“built a temple for the devil in Mosul, protected by a sacred serpent,
or that one of their temples on the edge of the Sinjar Mountains
has creatures with a dog-like head, which jump over the tombs of
sacred cats, etc.”(2(
Bois’ works included self-appraisal that liberated him from the
attractiveness of writing adventure stories. He followed the same
road of these writers before him, eventually not believing the
rumors and myths. During His youth in 1928, he met two 12-yearold Êzidîs from the family of mirs (princes) in the Dominican
Monastery Mar (Saint) of Mary Jacob, west of Dahuk. He asked
them several questions about how to translate animals and other
stuff to Kurdish and then dared to ask about religion:
- “Do you Êzidîs pray?
- Of course.
- Have you memorized your prayers, Shukri?
- Of course.
- Can you say a prayer?
- Our Father...
My surprise and dissatisfaction were great; I
expected to hear a prayer to the devil or the sun.”(3)
(1( Thomas Bois, Êzidîs, their Religious Origins and Temples, and Christian Monasteries
in Iraq’s Kurdistan, Academic Center for Research, Baghdad, 2013, p.11-12.
(2( Ibid, p.14.
(3( Ibid,p.15.
38
Since conducting research is not so easy and the truth cannot
be reached without dificulties, meticulous investigations,
comparison of literature and stories, and reviewing the
subject of the research to test it, what could we say about
the stories of orientalists who never got to intimately know
Êzidîs and who only wanted to provide their readers with
information and convey to them what they had read? They
are no more than “information collectors and translators or
commentators,” as Bois put it.(1(
II. Arab School: Islamic Stereotype of a Heretical
Group
The difference between the Western orientalist approach and
the Islamic Arab approach appears in renowned Iraqi historian
Abdurrazzaq Hassani’s book on Êzidîsm, in which he ideologically
differentiated between what he recalled from senior Muslim
scholars who ascribed Êzidîsm to Yazid I and senior orientalists
who said it was an Aryan religion and considered the word Êzidîsm
to be derived from Ezdan in Farsi or Kurdish, which means God.(2(
In the early 1930s, Hassani issued the 83-page book Satanists
in which he ascribed the Êzidîsm belief in the devil to Manichaean
impacts and suggested their relation to Parsiism.(3(
In the margins of the introduction of His book Êzidîs in their
Present and Past, Hassani admitted that His first book titled
Êzidîs or Satanists, which he first printed in 1929, adopted
Western scholars’ approach. However, when he re-printed the
book in 1939, he changed His opinion about Êzidîs’ origin because
His historical investigations proved to him that they were Muslims
who believed that Yazid I was their righteous Imam, and that they
(1( Thomas Bois, Êzidîs, their Religious Origins and Temples, and Christian
Monasteries in Iraq’s Kurdistan, Academic Center for Research, Baghdad, p.15.
(2( Abdurrazzaq Hassani, Êzidîs in their Present and Past, Sidon, 1967, p.8.
(3( Id., Satanists, Sidon, 1931, p.42-43.
39
They inherited national Sufi religious traditions, together with
and political considerations mixed with zealotry to the Umayyads,
which moved them away from the other Muslims and caused
them to adopt traditions that spoiled the essence of their Islam.
Hassani said he followed the steps of previous Muslim scholars,
such as Mahmud Falah, Ahmad Taymour Pasha, Abbas Ezzawi
and Seddiq Damlouji.(1(
The writings that adopt the Islamic Arab view of the origins
of Êzidîsm were influenced by the Egyptian, Ahmad Taymour
Pasha’s book Êzidîs and the Origin of their Creed, which was one
of the first studies about Êzidîs and the most influential in the
subsequent studies and books. Although Egypt had no Êzidîs,
Taymour Pasha was interested in Êzidîsm because he was of
Kurdish origin.
Taymour Pasha considered Êzidîs to be a Muslim Sufi cult who
overemphasized their beliefs until they broke away from Islam.(2( It
seems that all Iraqi authors who wrote about Êzidîsm followed the
steps of Taymour Pasha in identifying the origin of Êzidîs’ beliefs.
Moreover, most of those who write encyclopedias on religion in
the Arab world have repeated the same fallacies based on the same
source or based on those who quoted him and adopted His view.
In 1934, Mir Ismael Gul wrote Êzidîsm in the Past and Present,
a group of articles collected and verified by historian Qastantine
Zreiq. Gul originally meant to publish them in the American
University of Beirut's magazine, but His death turned these texts
into a book that became one of the first on Êzidîsm from an internal
perspective.(3(
Damlouji angrily criticized this book and considered it to have
been manipulated and reflecting a subjective view by Qastantine
(1( Abderazzaq Hassani, Êzidîs in Their Present and Past, p.9-16...
(2( Ahmad Taymour Pasha, Êzidîs and the Origin of their Creed, Cairo, p.45.
(3( Mir Ismael Gul, Êzidîsm in the Past and Present, published and veriied by
Qastantine Zreiq, Beirut, 1934.
40
Zreiq and that the book became merely a missionary tool in the
hands of Zreig to criticize Islam. Damlouji claimed to know very
well that Gul could not have written the ideas mentioned in the
book.(1( He also criticized Satanists by Hassani without referring
to His name, calling him a writer of Baghdad and objecting to His
adoption from orientalists’ views regarding the origin of Êzidîsm.(2(
This criticism affected the way Hassani tackled Êzidîsm, so he
changed His view in His book Êzidîs in their Present and Past,
adopting the ideological view of the Islamic Arab school about
Êzidîsm as he admitted in the preface.
Iraqi scholars then followed this track and linked Êzidîsm to
Yazid I and Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir al-Umawi. They even claimed
that the latter’s followers knew about Adawiyya. Their religious
background and the national orientations of some of them
undeniably affected their opinion about Êzidîsm as a group that
had broken away from Islam, especially when Sheik Adi died,
which paved the way for the return of ancient myths that were
mixed with their Islam, which distorted their Islam and eventually
led them to abandon Islam.
In 1949, Damlouji published His study on Êzidîsm in an over500-hundred-page book with the help of the Iraqi Academy of
Science. His book attacked the authority of Êzidî religious leaders
and included a desire to reform Êzidîsm so as to re-join Islam.
The introduction was largely provocative to Êzidîs, to the point
that Damlouji expresses his hopes that the day would come when
Êzidîsm would be terminated by a state official saviour. This
refers to the modernization process in which the public sphere is
imposed upon to build a modern state, with an inevitable impact
on changing the ancient beliefs of religious groups in the country.
In the context of this salvation vision, Damlouji hoped that the
seven peacocks – the symbols of Êzidîsm – would go to the Iraqi
(1( Seddiq Damlouji, Êzidîsm, second edition, Baghdad, 2010.
(2( Ibid.
41
Museum as a type of folklore, the conical roofs be torn, clergymen
of different castes become common people, and that Êzidîs make
the pilgrimage to Mecca rather than to Lalish.(1(
A summarization of this view of Êzidîsm and its beliefs can
be found in a book by Sa’eed Diyouhji, which was the last in a
series of books on Êzidîsm by Muslim Arab authors, including
Ahmad Taymour, Abbass Ezzawi(2(, Abdurrazzaq Hassani, Seddiq
Damlouji, Sami Sa’eed Ahmad(3(, and Muhammad Tounji.(4(
Sa’eed Diyouhji wrote His book based on the views of His
predecessors. He says Êzidîs respect the devil Melek Taus and
deify Yazid I. He also argues that Êzidîsm is a purely political
movement with an implicit religious nature to restore power to
the Umayyads.(5(
Although some of these writers neither perused the scripts of
Êzidîsm, nor knew Kurdish, nor genuinely investigated the subject
of their research, nor validated their opinions on the ground, their
views became a prevailing opinion which was enhanced by Êzidîs’
silence and failure to correct these fallacies. The majority of Êzidîs
(1( Seddiq Damlouji, Êzidîsm, p.11.
(2( Abbass Ezzawi, The History of Êzidîs and the Origin of their Creed, Baghdad, 1935 .
The author who was a historian of Iraq said Êzidîs were godless with no sacred book.
This is why it is righteous to kill them and take their money until they go back to the
right path: see ibid. p.81. He followed the steps of historian Abdurrazzaq Hassani
who wrote important historical books, but was not that successful in tackling the
creeds of religious minorities in his country. Ezzawi also wrote The History of Iraq
between Two Occupations and another book on Iraqi clans..
(3( Sami Sa’eed Ahmad, Êzidîs: Conditions and Beliefs, 2 vol., Baghdad, 1971. Although
the book contains important approaches to the origin of Êzidîsm, it is not completely
free from the footprint and inluence of the Islamic Arab school’s view on the origin
of Êzidî beliefs. Prior to this book, the scholar wrote a book in which he examined
the origin of the idea of evil, thus paving the way for his book on Êzidîsm: see Sami
Sa’eed Ahmad, The First Origins of the Ideas of Evil and Devil, Baghdad, 1970.
(4( Muhammad Tounji, Êzidîs: Reality, History and Beliefs, Beirut, 1999.
(5( Sa’eed Diyouhji, Êzidîsm, Beirut, 2003, p.13.
42
then had no access to education and did not know the affairs of
their religion and the philosophy of their beliefs. Moreover, these
beliefs belonged to confidential and religious sphere and secular
leaders did not want to clash with the others.
.Prince Ismail bek with the privileged men of Sinjarin 1920s
There are also practical reasons related to the national regimes
that were in power in Iraq and that adopted the project of a national
identity with secular content believing in Arabism. Therefore,
Êzidîs preferred to adapt to the identity policies of the consecutive
governments and were willing to adapt to the social atmosphere of
a different religion although these fallacies in the books of scholars
represented distortions without any attempt to understand what
was Êzidîsm and Êzidîs as a distinguished ethnic group.
In the 1970s, some writers broke away from this ideological line
of the Arab school: first was a scholar who became well-known
through writing in the famous «Folklore» magazine. He did not
agree with Arab scholars about Êzidîsm because he was himself
a member of a minority group, in addition to other reasons we
will see below. In 1978, George Habib issued a book that adopted
43
a different approach to the origin of Êzidîs’ religious beliefs.(1( A
second edition of the book was issued in 1996 but only outside
Iraq.(2(
Êzidîs highly value Habib’s book because, unlike the Islamic
Arab perspective that considers them a mere Islamic group that
broke away from Islam, views Êzidîsm as a non-Abrahamic
religion. The book underlines that many of the ancient beliefs and
traditions that date back to the fourth Millennium B.C. could be
found in Êzidîsm.(3(
Before he issued His book, Habib published in «Folklore»
magazine a group of articles on Êzidîsm in which he addressed the
fallacies mentioned in the books of Arab scholars about Êzidîsm.
He criticized every new publication on Êzidîsm, including a book
by Dr. Sami Sa’eed Ahmad in 1971.(4( In 1973, he wrote a critique
of an article on Êzidîsm translated by Saadi Youssef in «Folklore»
magazine. He considered the article to be an exaggerative piece that
showed Êzidîsm as if it was a closed puzzle and was only written
“for journalistic excitement rather than to conduct scientific
research. I believe the article was indeed written for purposes
other than scientific research, especially since it was written in a
foreign language to be read by foreigners.”(5(
IIn 1974, Habib objected to Diyouhji’s belief on Êzidîsm, being
an in which he objected to Diyouhji’s belief that Êzidîsm was an
Umayyad political movement that turned overtime into a religious
creed. “When I finished the book, I was more convinced that
Êzidîsm was far from the Umayyads and that Yazid of Êzidîsm
(1( George Habib, Êzidîsm: Remains of an Ancient religion, irst edition, Baghdad, 1978.
(2( Idem, Êzidîsm: Remains of an Ancient religion: Historical Research, second
edition, Baghdad, 1996
(3( Idem, Êzidîsm, irst edition (1978), p.5.
(4( «Folklore magazine», issue n. 4, 1971.
(5( George Habib, Satanists Too, in «Folklore magazine», issue n. 2, 1973, p.71
44
was not Yazid I,” concluded Habib.(1( Was it for a purely cognitive
reason that Habib was interested in Êzidîsm, since he was
interested in the heritage of religious and national minorities in
Iraq? Did His non-Muslim background help him in adopting an
approach different than the Islamic Arab consensus on the origins
of Êzidîsm? Or were there other reasons that made him interested
in the religion of this outcast minority?
Êzidî writer Khedr Suleiman narrated a story explaining why
Habib was interested in Êzidîsm and why he wrote about them in a
fair way. Suleiman met with Habib in 1973 through Chief Editor of
«Folklore» magazine, Lutfi Khouri. When Suleiman asked Habib
why he was interested in Êzidîs, he replied: “I am a mechanical
engineer and my brother is the chief editor of «Folklore» magazine.
Our father was the mayor of Alqosh Sub-district in the Shekhan
District near Nineveh. When I was a little boy, they brought an
old and bearded sheikh in 1922. He was handcuffed and seemed
peaceful. My father said: ‘Is this Kojak Salman?’ They replied: ‘Yes.’
My father said: ‘They want him in Mosul.’ Since then, I have been
sympathetic with Êzidîsm. I am 100 percent sure that Êzidîsm is
a long-established religion, but authors were not just with you.
Therefore, I am in the process of writing a book about Êzidîsm.
Its title is going to be Êzidîsm: Remains of a Long-Established
Religion.”
Such different approaches adopted by serious scholars would
not be encouraged by the authorities since they might eventually
come to conclusions that would challenge the national ideological
determinants of the authority and its project of eliminating
differences and melting diversity in the crucible of an ethnically
pure identity. When Habib issued His book under the title Êzidîsm:
Remains of an Ancient Religion in the late 1970s, Suleiman asked
him why he changed the title from long-established to ancient.
(1( George Habib, Êzidîsm, in «Folklore» magazine, issue 1, 1974, p. 150.
45
“The censorship did not approve the first title,” replied Habib. The
book was later banned in Iraq.(1(
III. Êzidî School: Breaking Silence
Silence and passive attitude started to change during the 1970s
with the emergence of a group of Êzidî writers who found it
necessary to prevent outsiders from writing about their religion
and beliefs. They took upon themselves to write about their own
religion, like the Mandaeans did before about theirs. Among these
Êzidî writers were Khalil Jundi and Khedr Suleiman who in 1979
published a book in Kurdish entitled Yazdiati (In Light of the
Scripts of Êzidîsm,) which was printed by the Kurdish Scientific
Academy.(2( The reason why these two writers worked together
to clarify the beliefs of their own religion and correct fallacies, is
actually a story which is worth telling since it highlights the nature
of the mono-educational system and the way religion was taught,
which was incommensurate with a pluralistic society like the Iraqi
one. During the academic year 1964-1965, Suleiman and Jundi
were attending to the 8th grade at Ain Sfni High School. Their
class was included of a religiously mixed group of Muslims and
Christians, with a Êzidî majority. On a cold day in the winter of that
year, at the beginning of the Islamic Education class, the teacher
entered the class and ordered all students who had no religion to
go out. Suleiman and Jundi went out with their Christian fellows
hurt by this deep humiliation. “Does the teacher mean that nonMuslims have no religion?” they wondered.
Rain was pouring and there was no place where they could
take shelter. Suleiman and His colleague went back to the class
to object to the provocative “have no religion” statement. When
they confronted the teacher in the class, an unequal dialogue on
Êzidîsm occurred. The teacher asked them a flood of irritating
questions to which they had no answer. Since then, says Suleiman,
“exploring what Êzidîsm is about has become our main concern.
(1( Khedr Suleiman, The Book of Êzidîsm, publications of Lalish Cultural and Social
Center, series 9, Dahuk, 2009, p.86.
(2( Khedr Suleiman and Khalil Jundi, Yazdiati, Baghdad, 1979.(in Kurdish).
46
We have taken advantage of every possible opportunity to find the
key to the secret hidden in the chests of the clergymen, Qawwals
and Majiors who have always shut doors in our faces.”(1(
In the introduction of the second edition of His book Towards
Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, Khalil Jundi referred to this
meaning, saying: “Our small city in Ain Sfni in the Shekhan
District was a miniature of the meeting and coexistence of several
religions: Êzidîsm, Christianity, Islam and previously Judaism.
During middle and high school, we faced as many questions and
inquiries as those we faced in that day. We grew older and these
questions grew but bigger: What is Êzidîsm? Who is Melek Taus?
Is Êzidîsm, a monotheistic religion? What is the secret behind the
religious castes and strict endogamy? Why is there a hierarchical
system of religious castes?”(2(
The two authors faced not only an atmosphere that
misunderstood Êzidîsm, but also internal pressures from Êzidî
clergymen who closed doors in their faces. In an article published
in «Folklore» magazine in 1974, Suleiman mentioned the
importance and role of the new generation of young scholars in
discovering their literary heritage, especially since Êzidî literature
is not recorded. To this end, Suleiman visited Baba Sheikh and
other clergymen several times until His endeavors were successful
in allowing him to write the legacy scripts and exploring Êzidîsm.
These leaders expressed their willingness to answer any question
based on the heritage they memorized, provided that the aim was
only to look for the truth.(3(
«Folklore» magazine was a chance for publishing different
writings on the heritage and folklore of various religious and
national minority groups. It adopted a different approach to tackle
(1( Khedr Suleiman, The Book of Êzidîsm, p.116.
(2( Khalil Jundi, Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, p.11.
(3( Khedr Suleiman, Literature of Kurds and Êzidîs, in «Folklore» magazine, issue n.
10, 1974, p.50.
47
Êzidîsm as a creed and heritage. The works of George Habib and
Khedr Suleiman on Êzidîsm attracted attention.
The magazine published some articles that sought to address
attempts to distort Êzidîsm. One such article was about divinity in
Êzidîsm by Abu Barakat. Although the author who is apparently
Êzidî used a pseudonym for unknown reasons, the article defends
Êzidîsm and refutes fabricated lies which, according to the author,
were made not only by the ancients, but also by modern writers
and scholars. He quotes George Habib when he responded to Sami
Sa’eed Ahmad’s book on Êzidîsm, saying that such writings were
“prattle at the expense of readers’ time and money.”(1( The article
discloses repeated mistakes in the works about several scholars
about Êzidîsm. It questions their sources, such as the available
copies of the holy books of Êzidîs – Book of Revelation (Kitêba
Cilwe) and Mishefa Reş – which were randomly collected. The
author believes that these books could not be ascribed to Êzidîs
since they are different than those ascribed to them. He mentions
the fatwas adopted by scholars as a source, which harmed the
interests of both Êzidîs and Muslims. Furthermore, the article
clarifies the idea of divinity through replying to some questions
drawn from incorrect conclusions by scholars “driven by personal,
psychological motives or to serve the authority or a prim opinion.”(2(
These questions are: Is Êzidîsm a polytheistic religion? Does it
believe in dualism? Does it have a solar deity and a lunar deity?
Does it hallow trees, springs and rocks? What is a sanjaq (peacock)?
Does Êzidîsm hallow it? Through answering these questions,
the article refutes many incorrect views and concepts about
Êzidîsm and gives a great impression that Êzidîsm is genuinely
monotheistic and that monotheism is but one of its basic pillars.
Mir Bayazid al-Umawi wrote a group of articles in line with
His Umayyad call. In one of them, he criticized an article about
(1( Abu Barakat, Divinity in Êzidîsm, in «Folklore» magazine, issue n. 10, 1973, p.33.
(2( Ibid, p.36.
48
Êzidî feasts by Abdurrazzaq Hassani who expressed His desire to
establish these feasts to protect them from loss and extinction.
With His article, Hassani published a photo of him and two Êzidîs
from Sinjar who had braids and were holding their arms. He did
that to give the impression that he really explored the subject of
His research. The feasts he mentioned were: New Year, Summer
Solstice, Winter Solstice, Yazid Day, Balanda Day, Ajwa Day, St.
Elijah Day, Mahya and Tawwafat Day, Sanjaq Presence Day,
Oblation Day and Mass Feast. The article also mentioned the
rituals taking place in the last feast.(1(
Khedr Suleiman-(second from right) and Khalil Jundi(first from left)
However, Mir Bayazid al-Umawi said there were only seven
feasts: Yazid Day, April Wednesday, Sheikh Adi Day, Mass Day,
Winter Solstice, Sheikh Al Shamsan Day, and Pilgrimage Day.(2(
Al-Umawi wrote an article about the Êzidî hereditary system in
another issue of the same magazine, but he titled it by referring
(1( Abdurrazzaq Hassani, Religious Feasts of Êzidîsm, in «Folklore» magazine, issue n.
7, 1973, p.9-22.
(2( Mir Bayazid al-Umawi, Feasts of Êzidîsm, in «Folklore» magazine, issue n. 9, 1973,
p.79-89.
49
explicitly to what he called Umayyad Êzidîs, opposite to of the
title of a previous article he published two years earlier in which
he made no mention of about the Umayyads.(1(
It seems that al-Umawi’s article did not annoy Hassani that
much since the one who was writing in response to His article was
a mir. Nonetheless, what really irritated him were comments by
an ambitious young Êzidî called Khedr Suleiman. Suleiman read
Hassani’s book on Êzidîsm in 1968, found intolerable fallacies
and, in 1973, he wrote a series of articles to correct them and
published three of them in «Folklore» magazine. When he tried
to publish the fourth article, he had this conversation with the
editor-in-chief:
“The late Chief Editor Lutfi Khouri read the article, smiled and
gently gave it back to me. ‘What is the matter, Mr. Khouri?’ I asked.
He showed me a letter addressed to him by the Iraqi Ministry of
Information, which prohibited publications on Êzidîsm. ‘Hassani
visited us and was furious,’ said Khouri. ‘He said how dared a young
man – referring to Suleiman – criticize my writings although I am
the greatest Historian of Iraq?’” (2(
Suleiman’s comments did not personally attack Hassani; rather,
they reflected a desire by a Êzidî who knew the beliefs of Êzidîsm
to defend it, prove it was monotheistic and refute Hassani’s view
that it was polytheistic, the greatest misconception about Êzidîsm.
The prohibition was shocking for Suleiman; it was like a sentence
to keep His mouth shut and prevent him from publishing about
His religion and beliefs in Arabic. «Folklore» magazine was the
most famous magazine publishing on the heritage of national and
religious minority groups in Iraq. Depriving Suleiman of trying to
change wrong misconceptions held by Muslim Arabs pushed him
to write and publish in Kurdish from 1973 to 1991.
(1( Idem, The Hereditary System of Êzidî Umayyads, in « Folklore» magazine, issues
n. 2-3, 1975, p.84-85.
(2( Khedr Suleiman, The Book of Êzidîsm, 2009.
50
Prince Bayazid al-Umawi with Êzidî members of parliament of the Soviet Union
Although Suleiman started writing in Arabic again after 1991
and was active through «Lalish» magazine and the “Lalish
Cultural Center”, he went back to His silence when ISIS occupied
Sinjar and committed genocides against Êzidîs. Forty days after
ISIS occupation, he set fire to His works in Arabic to protest the
Arabs’ silence and failure to condemn the criminal acts against
His people and to express His disappointment because decades of
writing in Arabic could not change stereotypes about the beliefs
and origin of Êzidîsm.(1(
When Kurds gained relative autonomy after the Gulf War in
1991, Êzidîs had an unprecedented freedom to express themselves.
Êzidî scholars became active and Êzidî research centers were
established.
Khedr Suleiman and Khalil Jundi had a role in raising Êzidî
awareness through establishing research centers specialized
in Êzidî affairs. The “Lalish Center” headed by Suleiman was
(1( For more information about the background of Suleiman’s attitude, see Saad
Salloum, I am Êzidî, in «Mada newspaper», Baghdad (issue n. 3191), 14.10.2014.
51
established in Iraq, and the “Êzidîsm Center” led by Jundi was
founded abroad.
Founded in 1993, the “Lalish Center” was the first research
center that cared for Êzidî culture and heritage and sought to
clarify the truth about Êzidîsm and its philosophy, identity,
customs and rituals. Its establishment has been a turning point
with its publications of studies and research on Êzidî heritage
and folklore. It has also published and documented traditions
and beliefs and collected religious scripts, rituals and feasts
in its «Lalish» magazine in Kurdish, Arabic and English. The
Center has also held cultural seminars and festivals, provided a
well-established floor for scholars of Êzidîsm, and published and
printed the Êzidîsm Education textbooks which are taught in the
elementary schools in Êzidî areas in Kurdistan of Iraq.(1(
The “Êzidîsm Center” was established in Germany on 24
December 1995 through the election of a commission of 21 Êzidî
members from Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Armenia and Georgia.
Like its twin center, the “Lalish Center”, the Êzidîsm Center has
issued a cultural magazine called «Roz» concerning Êzidî affairs.
According to its bylaw, the Center has become a confluence point
for Êzidîs abroad and a mediator to develop their relations, not to
mention its activities for preserving Êzidî identity and heritage,
collecting, archiving and conducting research on heritage texts,
facilitating the tasks of writers and authors of Êzidî affairs, and
issuing books and magazines in several languages, in addition
to many other goals similar and complementary to those of the
“Lalish Center”.(2(
Despite all of that, Islamic websites and Arab authors writing
about Êzidîsm still adopt the regular stereotypes about Êzidîsm,
and Êzidî writers are still reluctant to tackle their religion as Jundi
(1( Kamel Khadida Yazdin, About Êzidî Discourse: Writings on Êzidî Affairs, Iraq’s
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 2009,p.13.
(2( Khalil Jundi, Êzidîsm and the Tough Exam, Cultural Series, Erbil, 2008, p.279.
52
says: “I have written my study Towards Knowing the Truth about
Êzidîsm, especially its first chapter, carefully because a scholar of
the origins and beliefs of religions in the prim religious communities
of the Orient faces challenging challenges in reconciling people’s
religious feelings with saying historical facts.”(1(
Exceptions and the New Generation of Êzidî
Scholars
There are exceptions, which are represented within a generation
of Muslim Iraqi scholars and writers who have adopted views
supportive of Êzidîsm or have an opinion different than that of the
national school of Arabism regarding the religious beliefs of Iraqi
minorities, such as Mandaeanism and Êzidîsm. Such scholars
have been led by scholar Rashid Khayoun whose book on religions
and sects in Iraq is a turning point in addressing the history of
religious beliefs of national, religious and sectarian groups in Iraq.(2(
There are also the writings of Judge Zuhair Kadhim Abboud(3( and
scholar Kadhim Habib.(4(
In addition, some scholars tackled Êzidîs beliefs objectively
with no prejudices. They refused to call Êzidîs as devil worshipers
and refuted fabricated lies leveled against Êzidîsm. These
scholars include Tawfiq Wahbi in His study Êzidîsm: Remains of
Mithraism,(5( and Shaker Fattah in His book Êzidîs and Êzidîsm.(6(
After 2003, when Êzidîsm was recognized in the Iraqi
Constitution (Article 2/2) along the lines of other religions in Iraq,
(1( Idem, Towards Knowing the Truth about Êzidîsm, p.12..
(2( Rashid Khayoun, Religions and Sects in Iraq, Cologne, Germany, 2003
(3( Zuhair Kadhim Abboud, Êzidîsm, Beirut, 2005. This is a huge book consisting of
744 large pages and it includes all the studies the author wrote on Êzidîsm
(4( Kadhim Habib, Êzidîsm: A Religion Fighting Calamities of Time, London, 2003.
(5( Tawiq Wahbi, Êzidîsm: Remains of Mithraism, in «Lalish» magazine, issues n. 2-3,
the Lalish Center, Dahuk, 1994.
(6( Shaker Fattah, Êzidîs and Êzidîsm, Beirut, 1997.
53
Êzidîs were granted a quota in the Iraqi Parliament; a Christian,
Êzidî and Mandaean Sabian Endowment was established.(1(
Êzidîsm was officially recognized, which urged Êzidîs to devote
their efforts to introduce their beliefs, overcome their fear of the
social atmosphere surrounding them, and demolish the wall of
ignorance in others.
Thus emerged a new generation of young scholars who sought
to introduce the history and beliefs of Êzidîsm, including academic
researchers Adnan Zayyan Farhan and Qadir Salim Shammou
who published two joint books in 2009: Studies on the History
of Êzidî Kurds,(2( and Êzidîs’ Tragedy: Firmans and Genocide
Campaigns against Êzidî Kurds throughout History.(3( They had
other works too and they published articles in several periodicals
in Arabic. There are also other scholars of the same generation,
such as Majed Hassan, Arshad Hammo Maho and Khedr Domali.
Throwing a piece of cloth, closed eyes, on the “Wishes Wall” inside the
Lalish Temple
(1( The Christian, Êzidî and Mandaean Sabian Endowment Law n. 58, of 2012. “Oficial
Iraqi Gazette”, issue 4254, 2012.
(2(
Issued by Kurdish Study and Archiving Center, University of Dahuk, Ministry of
Higher Education in Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government, 2009.
(3( Issued by Khani Press in Dahuk. 2009.
54
An Êzidî woman serves in the Lalish Temple wearing a traditional
costume of Bashiqa and Bahzani area.
A poor Êzidî woman wears a white woollen costume inside the Lalish
Temple
55
CHAPTER III
MODERN ÊZIDÎ IDENTITY CURRENTS
I. Kurdish Identity Current: Êzidîs are Original Kurds
The official Kurdish discourse says Êzidîs are original Kurds. In
a meeting with Êzidî, Christian and Muslim notables and figures of
the Shekhan District, President of Iraq Kurdistan Region Masoud
Barzani said no one would impose any identity on Êzidîs, stating
that they were original Kurds.(1(
In Kurdish scholars’ works, there are references to
Zoroastrianism and Êzidîsm as Kurdish religions. One of these
works is Nizar Baban’s book on Kurdistan. In the section about
Êzidîsm among Kurdish religions, Baban says Êzidîs in Farsi and
Kurdish means “God’s worshipers”, and that Ezdan means “God”.
This is why he says most followers of this religion are Kurds: “It is
a distinctively Kurdish religion. Reviewing the names of the tribes
embracing Êzidîsm, we can make sure that they belong to the
Kurdish people; thus, they are nationally Kurds.”(2(
This view accords with those of many orientalists who deem
Êzidîsm to be a national religion of Kurds, although they disagree
on the origin of Êzidî beliefs, their changes, and whether Êzidîsm
is an old religion or a mixture of other beliefs that has gone through
(1( The oficial website of the Kurdistan Regional Government: http://www.krg.
org/a/print.aspx?l=14&smap=010000&a=27533.
(last browsed on December 2015).
(2( Nizar Baban, Kurdistan: God’s Paradise and a Nation’s Hell, Amman, 2010,p.231.
57
many changes.(1( According to the facts of language, history and
traditions, the Êzidî Supreme Spiritual Council highlights the
Kurdish determinant of the Êzidî identity.(2(
The authority’s attitude under the Baathist regime is revealed by
a document containing a question on the Êzidî ethnicity, addressed
to the Mosul Governorate in 1966, which simply means that the
authority was not sure of the Êzidî identity, or, at least, it could
not decide without first consulting the community leaders. The
document shows that Êzidîs’ multi-strata identity gives room to
multi ethnic determinants: ethnically speaking, Êzidîs are Kurds,
although some Êzidîs are of Arab origin since their forefathers
were born in Syria during the Umayyad epoch, while religiously
speaking, Êzidîs have their own religious traditions, which are
different from their Islamic milieu.(3(
Most arguments of the supporters of this current focus on the
Kurdish determinant of the Êzidî identity. They mention evidence
proving that Êzidîsm has spread in Kurdish areas. They also
refer to the language, which is the most important and essential
determinant of identity, because the language of Êzidî religious
texts and prayers is in Kurdish. Therefore, Êzidîsm is the Kurds’
original religion before the majority of them then converted to
Islam.
(1( See, for example, Roger Lescot, Êzidîsm, p. 33-43.
(2( A statement by the Êzidî Supreme Spiritual Council, in «Lalish» magazin”, issue n.
31, 2010, p. 106.
(3( The document was published in Delshad Noman Farhan’s Sufferings of Êzidî Kurds
under Iraqi Governments 1921-2003, The Kurdish Studies and Archives Center,
University of Dahuk, 2008.
58
Secret letter from the Iraqi Authorities under the Baathist
regime, concerning the Êzidî's ethnicity in 1966
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الجمهورية العراقية
سري
قائممقامية قضاء شيخان
التحرير
العدد /س6/
التأريخ1966/1/4 :
إلى متصرفية لواء الموصل – التحرير
الموضوع /قومية اليزيدية
كتابكم المرقم س 4326/في 1965/12/4المعطوف على كتاب مديرية تسجيل اأحوال
المدنية العامة الرقم س 719/في .6511/29
نعرض لمقامكم أنه لدى قيامنا بالتحقيقات وااتصاات الشخصية مع بعض من رؤساء الطائفة
اليزيدية التي تسكن منطقة قضائنا ،وخاصة (تحسين سعيد) رئيس الطائفة عامة وأميرها و(بابا شيخ)
المسؤول الديني للطائفة اليزيدية وااسترسال معهما في الموضوع تبين من أقوالهما أن منشأ هذه
الطائفة هو في شمال العراق في المناطق الكردية ،وبذلك تعتبر قومية أفرادها ((القومية الكردية))
سواء المقيمين حاليا في شمال العراق أو من هاجر من العراق إلى الباد اأخرى ،وأن شيوخ هذه
الطائفة التي تنتشر مراقدهم في قرى متعددة من قضاء الشيخان وغيره كالشيخ شمس وعبدي رش
وبير خوشابا وغيرهم يعتبرون من مشايخ الطائفة في العهود الماضية ،وأن هجرة «الشيخ عادي» الذي
هو :عدي بن مسافر اأموي من الشام إلى العراق قبل مئات السنين ،وإقامته في شمال العراق حيث
المغار الحالي في (وادي الش) ضمن منطقة هذا القضاء لم يغير من حقيقة كون الطائفة اليزيدية
ينتمي أفرادها أصا إلى القومية الكردية .وأن ورع وتقوى وشخصية (الشيخ عادي) مكنته من الهيمنة
على اتباع الطائفة وشيوخها المنوه عنهم آنفا فاصبحوا يقتدون به ويقدسونه وانهم يعتبرون (عدي بن
مسافر) من صحابة يزيد بن معاوية واتباعه حيث يعتبر ااخير وليا من اولياء الله تعالى وهذا ما تبين لنا
من اتصالنا مع (بابا شيخ) بالذات أيضا كما أن المسؤول الديني هذا أعلمنا بأن اليزيديين الذين نشأوا
في الخارج ،واسيما في الشام في العهد اأموي هم من أصل عربي.
هذا فيما يخص (قومية الطائفة) ،أما ما يخص الناحية الدينية؛ فإن للطائفة المذكورة طقوسها
وتقاليدها الدينية الخاصة بها ،كما أنهم ينقسمون إلى فرق عدة ،كل منها لها عاداتها في السلوك
ااجتماعي ،كعادتهم عدم جواز زواج الشخص إا من الفرقة التي ينتمي إليها.
هذا ما نعرضه للتفضيل بالعلم رجا ًء.
عبد العزيز بدر العبد الجليل
قائمقام قضاء الشيخان
59
However, the Kurdish determinant of identity remains an open
choice for Êzidîs. The majority of Kurds are religiously different
from Êzidîs and the fears of the growing political Islamism in
Kurdistan and Kurds’ discriminatory view towards Êzidîs, which
is not different than that of Muslim Arabs towards them, concern
Êzidîs. “The grievances, marginalization and discrimination
which Êzidîs have long been suffering from, as well as the
oppression practiced against them by Muslims, especially by their
fellow-citizens Muslim Kurds for centuries, cannot be expressed
in few compositional statements; rather, they need a thorough
historical and social study.”(1( This current of thought leads to
political consequences, including the fact that Êzidî MPs act
under the umbrella of Kurdish parties, Êzidîs are not distinctively
represented in parliament or the government, and there are
claims to annex the areas with Êzidî majority, which now belong
administratively to the federal government, to the Kurds as parts
of the Kurdish areas (disputed areas).
II. Arab Identity Current: Êzidîs are Umayyad Arabs
Today, Êzidîs view the identity policy followed by the Baathist
state, which called them “Umayyad Followers of Yazid” I rather
than Êzidîs, as part of the Arabization policy that affected their
areas through destroying hundreds of Êzidî villages, settling Arabs
in them, waging military campaigns against Êzidîs, and displacing
them in forced settlements. With the issuance of the Governorate
Law on July 1st, 1963, the governorates were demarcated so that
Kurdish areas inhabited by Êzidîs were annexed to areas under
Arab administration.
Thus, Êzidîs were considered Umayyad Arabs. In addition, the
“Umayyad Office” was opened in Baghdad in 1969 with official
government support, and ethnically, Êzidîs were registered as
Arabs as of the 1977 census.(2(
(1( Abdunnasser Hesso, Êzidîsm and the Philosophy of the Circle, Damascus, 2008, p.36.
(2( Delshad Noman Farhan, Sufferings of Êzidî Kurds under Iraqi Governments 19212003, The Kurdish Studies and Archives Center, University of Dahuk, 2008, p.116.
60
Established by Mir Bayazid al-Umawi, founder of the Arab
Movement of the Umayyads, in 1969, the “Umayyad Office” aimed
to revive the Arab identity of the Umayyad Cult of the “Followers of
Yazid” I through spreading a nationalist call based on spiritual and
worldly facts under the slogan of Arabs with Umayyad Nationality
and Êzidî Belief. In 1964, Mir al-Umawi sent a letter to Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Iraqi President Abdul Salam
Arif requesting them to support the Arabism of their Umayyad
identity. “The Followers of Yazid I are Umayyad Arabs living in
isolation amid a non-Arab atmosphere,” said Mir al-Umawi in
the preface. “They have become so ignorant that they are about to
lose their Arab properties.”(1( Months after the first letter, he sent
another letter to Iraqi President Abdul Salam Arif asking him to
support the Arab call among the Umayyad “Followers of Yazid”
I. The Mir said he had started the Arab call among those whom
he described as “isolated tribes who lost their Arab identity” and
revived the names of their Umayyad forbearers, indicating that he
had managed to bring three tribes back to their Arab origin.(2(
In 1980, a presidential decree appointed Mir Bayazid alUmawi as the official and legitimate president of Êzidîs after
issuing a death sentence against the former Êzidî Mir who fled
abroad because he supported the opponent Kurdish movement.
Mir Bayazid’s daughter believes that the Baathist government
exploited her father’s Arab call regarding the belonging of Êzidî
Sheikhs to Arab nationality since Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir was an
Arab, hence considering all Êzidîs to be Arabs.(3(
(1( Bayazid al-Umawi, Letter to President Gamal Abdel Nasser and President Abdul
Salam Arif to support the Arabism of the Umayyads, Baghdad, 07.06 1964, published
in Delshad Noman Farhan Sufferings of Êzidî Kurds under Iraqi Governments
1921- 2003, p.164-165.
(2( Idem, Letter to the President via the Minister of Interior to support the Arab call
among the Umayyad Followers of Yazid I, Baghdad, 18.10.1964, published ibid.
p.160-162.
(3( Interview with Alya Bayazid Ismael by Hesso Hourmi, published on www.bahzani.
net on 12.12.2009.
61
Bayazid al-Umawi, Letter to President Gamal Abdel Nasser
and President Abdul Salam Arif to support the Arabism of
the Umayyads, Baghdad, 07.06 1964
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
بايزيد اأموي /من أمراء بني أمية اليزيدية
بغداد في 1964/10/18
السيد رئيس الجمهورية المحترم
بواسطة السيد وزير الداخلية المحترم
الموضوع – دعم الدعوة العربية في بني أمية اليزيدية
كانت قبائل بني أمية اليزيدية معروفة بالطائفة اليزيدية وبلغ الجهل في هذا القوم حتى تفقد
صفتها العربية .وقمت بالدعوة العربية في هذه القبائل المنعزلة (الضالة عروبتها) وعدت لها اسم
أجدادها اأمويين الذين أضافوا اأندلس إقليما لوطننا العربي الكبير.
وقمت بجمع المتطوعين اأمويين سنة 1956لمؤازرة إخواننا المصريين يوم ااعتداء
الثاثي اأثيم على قناة السويس ولم تسمح لنا السلطات آنذاك.
وفتحت مكتبة للحركة العربية في بغداد وحققنا اإنجازات اآتية:
إعادة ثاث قبائل يزيدية إلى أصلها العربي العريق وهم:أ -قبيلة الهسكان -ورئيسها الشيخ خلف الناصر.
ب -قبيلة القيران -ورئيسها الشيخ اسماعيل الخضر.
جـ -قبيلة بني خالد -ورئيسها سمير آغا رشو وقولو وأخوتي وبعض المثقفين.
إبراز كيان عروبة بني أمية .وتعريف أصلهم العربي العريق .والوعي القومي في قبائلناالممتدة من شمال الموصل إلى مدينة حلب في اإقليم الشمالي.
إحباط محاولة ضم عشائر بني أمية إلى جهة معينة (غير عربية) ،وغلق مكاتب الدعاية التيكانت تعمل ضد القومية العربية في قضاءي شيخان والسنجار.
قدمنا المقاتلين اأمويين لمؤازرة جيشنا الباسل في تطهير الشمال ،وأعطينا الضحاياوكبدناهم أضعافها .وقضينا على كل نشاط معادي للقومية العربية عبر مناطق بني أمية
التي تدمج شمال العراق باإقليم الشمالي ودعوتنا العربية تعمل على عقيدة ومبدأ لتكون
مجتمعا عربيا مؤمنا بالحرية وااشتراكية والوحدة ,وتهيئة عشائر بني أمية للواجبات
القومية وتصفية ااستعمار ودعم الجيوش العربية لمحو إسرائيل من الخارطة العربية يوم
الحساب ،وجعل قبائل بني أمية قوة عربية في شمال الوطن رمز ًا للوحدة اأولى وفرسانا
62
للوحدة الكبرى .وخال الثورات التحررية الثاث أحرزنا نجاحا وتقدما مما يبشران ببلوغ
اأهداف القومية في تلك المناطق وفي ذلك الوسط ااجتماعي المتخلف.
وغدت مسؤولياتنا القومية ملزمة في بني أمية بعد تحقيق عروبة ثاث قبائل منها .ولما كانت
مهمة التوعية والتوجيه ترتبط ارتباطا وثيقا بمستقبل الوطن وأجيالنا العربية الصاعدة .اأمر
الذي يستوجب اهتمام المسؤولين إليها ومعاونة القائمين بتوعية مائتي ألف مواطن أموي (ضالة
عروبتها) والعودة بهم إلى قوميتهم وأصلهم العربي العريق.
وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الشكر وااحترام
بايزيد اأموي
مؤسسة الحركة العربية في بني أمية
Prince Bayazid with Jamal Abdul Nasser
Recently, Mir Anwar Muawiyah has been advocating the Arab
identity of Êzidîsm and countering Kurdish parties’ effort to
“Kurdize the Cult of the Followers of Yazid I,” as he puts it. For
the same reasons, he refuses the change made to the “Followers of
Yazid I” as written in the 1921 Iraqi Constitution to “Êzidîs” in the
new Constitution. For him, this means that the Followers of Yazid
I would be tied to Kurds as a nationality, and are also related to the
63
Aryan race and Parsee Zoroastrianism.(1( Furthermore, he stands
against the Kurdish political elites’ efforts to impose the Kurdish
identity on Êzidîs, which he believes an endeavor to detach them
from the Iraqi identity. From His viewpoint, the fact that some
Êzidîs speak Kurdish does not necessarily mean that they are Kurds.
“It is known that our Cult consists of believers from the different
ethnicities that have lived in northern Mesopotamia whether in
Iraq, especially Mosul Governorate, Syria or Turkey. Our Cult also
includes members of Kurdish, Arab, Syriac and even Armenian
and Turkmen origins. We believe that it is wrong to determine
our Cult’s identity based on the language alone. Other conditions
must be taken into account; namely, history, geography, heritage
and traditions. If some Followers of Yazid I, for example, speak
Kurdish, it does not mean that they are. Moreover, not all people
speaking Arabic are ethnically Arabs.(2(
Mir Anwar repeated His view in similar statements he made after
the occupation of Sinjar by ISIS. He held the Kurdistan Democratic
Party in Iraq and its leader Masoud Barzani accountable for the
Peshmerga’s relinquishing of the protection of the “Followers of
Yazid I” during an ISIS attack on their regions in June 2014.(3(
During a meeting with some Êzidî Sheikhs and notables in
October 2014 in Dahuk, Barzani replied to Mir Tahsin Saied’s
statement on the Alarabiya Channel, in which he proclaimed
(1( Mir of the Followers of Yazid I Decides their National Belonging, an interview with
Mir Anwar Muawiyah by Intisar Alousi: http://www.al-yezidi.net/Arabic.htm (last
browsed on December 2015)
(2( Muawiyah al-Umawi, The Identity of the Followers of Yazid I between History and
Politics: Ancient Iraqi Roots with an Umayyad Name and no Relation to Kurds, an
article published on: http://www.furkono.com/modules.php?name=News&ile=art
icle&sid=12280 (last browsed on December 2015)
(3( Mir of the Followers of Yazid I: “The Followers of Yazid I are not Kurds and we will
demand an international investigation into an ethnic cleansing crime against them
by ISIS and into the Peshmerga’s betrayal”: http://www.al-moharer.net/mohhtm/
anwar_mouawiyah12-11-14-307. http://www.al-moharer.net/mohhtm/ anwar_
mouawiyah12-11-14-307.html (last browsed on December 2015)
64
that Êzidîs were not Kurds, saying, “Neither I nor Mir Saied
can determine the national belonging of Êzidîs; it is up to them
todetermine it through a referendum.”
“There is not even one example in the history about a minority
that conducted a referendum to determine its national belonging,”
replied Mir Anwar. “Referendums are usually organized regarding
economic projects, state projects, self-government or secession
from a country.” He underscored His old accusations leveled
against the Kurdish authority of trying to Kurdize the “Followers
of Yazid I”.(1(
Finally, we will point to the results relevant to this current:
the Baathist authority strongly supported this tendency since
the 1970s in order to hinder Kurdish autonomy, with the March
1970 Declaration and then the 1974 Autonomy Agreement. Syrian
Kurdish writer and politician Issmat Sharif Wanly says the way
the Baathist government implemented the Agreement practically
rendered it meaningless. The Iraqi government asked him to
be its guest to examine Kurds’ conditions and how to improve
the Agreement, which enabled him to observe how it was being
implemented. He says when he and members of His delegation
travelled from Erbil to Mosul, the Governor of Mosul introduced
the Êzidî inhabitants of the tiny city of Bashiqa as “Umayyad
Arabs”. The Shekhan District and Ain Sfni were subject to
Arabization as well; Muslim Kurds were expelled, while Christians
and Êzidîs were allowed to stay, under the condition of confessing
that they were of Arab origins. The residents of the Aqrah Plain
were also subjected to Arabization.(2(
III. Êzidî Nationality Current: Separate Identity
Advocates
Against the current that focuses on the national determinant of
(1( Ibid.
(2( Gérard Chaliand, A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, (Ed),
Arbil, 2012, p.282-283.
65
Êzidîs as Kurds all, or the majority of them, embracing an original
Kurdish religion before converting to Islam, there is another
current calling for a separate identity of Êzidîs, focusing on the
religious determinant, in which Êzidîs are different than the rest
of Muslim Kurds. This current has risen the religious determinant
amount to the level of a separate identity; in other words, it has
translated religion into a national identity.
The most prominent representative of this orientation is perhaps
MP Amin Farhan Jajo, head of the “Êzidî Movement for Reform
and Progress”, who issued in 2010 a book titled Êzidî Nationalism
in which he tried to discover the missing link in the Êzidî people’s
history from the fall of the Babylonian Empire (539 BC) to the
appearance of Sheikh Adi ibn Musafir (1078-1161). In His book,
Jajo underlines that Êzidîs belong to Sumerian and Babylonian
civilizations and that Êzidîsm is purely Babylonian.(1( In 2013,
he published an Arabic-Êzidî dictionary, and in the introduction
he proclaimed that Êzidî language appeared simultaneously
with Mandaic and that the existence of ancient Mesopotamian
vocabularies in Êzidî is an evidence of Êzidîs’ ties with their
Sumerian and Babylonian forbearers.(2( Jajo demanded that the
Ministries of Education and Higher Education pay attention to
Êzidî and their language is taught in Iraqi schools and universities.
The results built on this current are a call for separate political
representation of Êzidîs, recognizing them as a fourth nationality
in Iraq alongside Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens.
IV. Êzidî Particularity Current: Religious Identity
before National Identity
Among the currents over the struggle of Êzidî identity, a calm
or centrist liberal current tries to stand half-way between those
(1( Amin Farhan Jijo, Êzidî Nationalism: Roots, Constituents and Suffering, Baghdad,
2010.
(2( Idem, Arabic-Êzidî Dictionary, Baghdad, 2013, p.7.
66
calling for a separate Êzidî nationality and those focusing on the
Kurdish determinant of the Êzidî identity without the religious
determinant. This current can be called the “Êzidî Particularity
current”.
Through referring to a Êzidî Particularity, this current stresses
the minimum level of a separate identity. Thus, it is a compromise
between the current that consider Êzidîs to be Kurds and the
current that advocates for a separate Êzidî national identity.
Hence, the current has innovated the Êzidî Particularity term,
which does not irritate any party and gives Êzidîsm the minimum
level of identity separation, without exasperating the Kurdish
nationalist current, whether Êzidî or not.(1(
Representatives of this current demonstrate themselves
through brief statements. For example, during official meetings,
Mir Tahsin Saied has stated that Êzidîs are indisputably Kurds,
but they have a peculiarity and rights that must be respected and
guaranteed lest Êzidîs should reject their Kurdish identity.(2( During
an interview by the Alarabiya Channel after the ISIS invasion of
Sinjar, Mir Saied went further to refer to Êzidîsm as a religion
and a nationality, describing Kurds as friends.(3( This statement
reflects how unconfident Êzidîs have become in Muslims, whether
Arabs or Kurds.
V. Civil Identity Current: Citizenship Advocates
Given the aforementioned conflicts and the new generation’s
desire to keep away from identity politicization and to reside
within a public sphere that recognizes differences regardless of the
national, religious or sectarian background, a current has adopted
civil activity to modernize the Êzidî community and disseminate
reform ideas. The greater identity, be it nationalist or religious,
(1( Wissam Johar, Êzidî Nationality is a Legitimate Right, in www.ahewar.org, Issue n. 1798,
17.01.2007.
(2( Saad Salloum, Minorities in Iraq, p.94.
(3( www.youtube.com/watch?v=oc6Hpjv8t30 (last browsed on December 2015)
67
is not the important thing in a world where individuals are the
bearers of basic rights. The decisive factor that proves and confirms
an identity, whether a Êzidî is Kurdish or not, and whether there is
a Êzidî nationality or not, is the availability of freedom of religion
and belief, which makes individuals assured that they can practice
their religious rituals without fear from others.(1(
There is a civil current whose members come from different
religious, national and linguistic backgrounds and it is not
limited to Êzidîs. Since 2003, the current tries to challenge the
politicization of collective identities, which has raised the issue
of the entitlements of imagined communities, while ignoring the
individual/citizen who is re-defined according to the identity of
the constituent/sect. This current believes that raising the issue of
the rights of constituents would inevitably lead to clash of interests
among political elites representing the traditional guardians of
imaginary collective identities which would adopt the policies
of ethnicities at a time when we are in extreme need to build a
state of institutions that represents all individuals regardless of
the constituents they belong to. A state of institutions must adopt
the principle of state neutrality, a fundamental demand under
the ethnic division and the struggle for power and wealth among
Iraq’s biggest communities: Kurds, Shias and Sunnis.
Without that, the rights granted to small constituents
(minorities) would become abstract and eventually valueless in
the social and political reality. The civil current believes that even
if the Constitution recognized Êzidîsm and minorities’ rights, a
real human identity allowing individuals to be themselves would
only be realized with a neutral and civil state of institutions that
recognizes differences and wisely manages the cultural diversity.
This would force Êzidîs to adopt a fake identity to please the outer
(1( The conception presented about this current is the result of discussions between the
Author and a group of Êzidî civil activists about the issues of identity and national
and religious belonging as conceived by the new Êzidî generation, during the period
2011-2013
68
milieu, making them part of a bigger identity that provides them
with protection, but this, in no way, can substitute living under a
state of citizenship.
When ISIS invaded Sinjar and the atrocities associatd with that
took place, the fact that this current of thought seeks to liberate
Êzidîs from the struggle of majority identities and modernize
Êzidîsm made it demand the integration of Êzidîm into the West
as the only solution after failed establishment of a pluralistic
model encompassing diversity in Iraq after 2003. There were also
demands to abolish the caste system within the Êzidî community;
reduce the power of traditional leaders, i.e. the mir, the Spiritual
Council and clan leaders in Shekhan and Sinjar; and allow educated
elites and the youth to play their role, which may contribute to a
reform movement that preserves the Êzidî existence from risks of
extinction or dissolution into the majority’s cultures.(1(
Two Êzidî women: the poor one wears a white costume and the
other one is from public in the baptism area of Lalish Temple
(White Spring)
(1( After Iinterviews made by the Author with a number of Êzidîs in Germany and
Holland and correspondence with Êzidî activists inside and outside Iraq in July and
December 2014, and July 2015.
69
A family from Sinjar is resting in one of Lalish Temple’s corridors ater
performing religious rituals
70
CHAPTER IV
ÊZIDÎS AND STATE POLICIES IN
MODERN IRAQ
I. Takfir(1( Policy: Êzidîs under Ottomans
There was nothing in common between the Ottomans and the
Êzidîs, whether religiously or ethnically. That perhaps mitigated
the severity of differences with the Ottoman State and provided a
religiously legitimate justification of its rule. The weak influence
and power of the Ottoman State over Êzidîs agitated the former
so it launched campaigns to tame the latter. The relationship
between successive rulers and Êzidîs was characterized by
distrust, a trait that would overwhelm relations with the central
government even after the establishment of modern Iraq. With
the Iraqi governments’ repression of Êzidîs who showed separatist
tendencies in the 1930s, Êzidîs’ defiance, separatism and discontent
made them be stereotyped as disobedient by Iraqi governments
which therefore believed that Êzidîs should be mastered by all
means – faking their ethnic and religious identity, using force and
the stick and carrot approach, etc. Later on, this would become
clearer through the attention paid by intelligence services to this
community, the study of its beliefs in order to control and exploit
(1( Takir is the accusation of others of being godless.
71
it in the government’s war against other communities – the Kurds
– and the efforts made to ensure Êzidîs would pose no threat to
the national unity.
The relation between the Ottoman authority and the Êzidîs was
based on using force to oblige Êzidîs to submit. A series of reasons
and motivations fueled the Ottoman-Êzidî struggle. For example,
there were endeavors to subdue Êzidîs, their villages and towns
were looted on the pretext of their failure to pay government taxes,
campaigns were launched to force them to convert to Islam, and
there was a desire to subjugate them to Ottoman organizations
and conscription, which was rejected by Êzidîs throughout
their relations with successive governments, whether under the
Ottomans or during the era following the establishment of modern
Iraq.(1(
The Ottomans followed radical policies against Êzidîs,
encouraged by their policy of introducing themselves to the
Islamic world on the basis that Islam was the common religion
between them and the peoples they ruled in the Middle East. They
“depended on religious movement and war effort and gave the
impression that they were the belief-defenders and that they had to
establish that belief according to their intellectual and ideological
orientations to build their state and strengthen its foundations.”(2(
With their well-known bravery, defiance and desire for
autonomy, Êzidîs faced up to Ottoman campaigns. The campaign
policy to subdue Êzidîs continued and their revolt against such
campaigns continued as well. This conflict characterized their
relations with Ottomans with short relatively peaceful intervals.
(1(
For Ottoman documents about these different reasons, see Dawoud Murad
Khatari, Eighty-Five Ottoman Documents on Êzidî Tragedy, issued by the Higher
Commission of Lalish Centre (26), Dahuk, 2013.
(2( Jawad Kadhim Bedany, History and Kurdish Historians, Iraqi Scientiic Centre,
Baghdad, 2012,p.49.
72
Religious Fatwas: Weapon of Soft Power
The weapon of religious fatwas(1( against religious minorities
was perhaps the most effective tool used to justify oppression or
revenge policies against a religious community by deeming it to
be heretic or dissident from Islam. The anti-Êzidî fatwa made
by Sheikh Ebussuud Efendi, the Grand Mufti of the Ottoman
State under Sultan Suleiman I (1520-1566), would become the
religiously legitimate text governing the view towards Êzidîs in
the following centuries whenever a clash took place between them
and the authority or a campaign was launched against them. It
would be resorted to in order to justify the atrocities perpetrated
against them.
The Fatwa stipulated a series of dangerous notions attributed
to Êzidîs in a way depicting them as defiant to Islam, attacking
Muslims’ beliefs and offending their holy texts, such as denying
the Quran, throwing Islamic books into dirt and assaulting
Muslim scholars. Such pretensions stirred people’s rage and
justified the killing and arresting of Êzidîs. The Fatwa mentioned
other similarly bad beliefs from an Islamic perspective, such as
deeming their holy figures, like Sheikh Adi, better than Prophet
Muhammad, stating that they gave up prayer, and preferred
visiting their Lalish Temple to visiting the Kaaba – Muslim’s
holy site. Moreover, the Fatwa introduced Êzidîs as a licentious
community lacking the moral conduct of those deemed acceptable
by the Abrahamic religions, such as adultery, incest, and allowing
sheikhs to have sex with other people’s wives. These kind of
ideas, as expressed by the Fatwa, would become the stereotype of
Êzidîs, in addition to the accusations leveled against them of being
unchaste, polytheistic and denying rites.
The Fatwa legalized the Ottoman’s behaviours that could be
(1( A fatwa in the Islamic faith is the term for the legal opinion or learned interpretation
that the Sheikhul Islam, a qualiied jurist or mufti, can give on issues pertaining to
the Islamic law.
73
justified against unbelievers, such as giving permission to loot
Êzidîs’ property, rape their women and even kill them. Later on,
this Fatwa was reused or reproduced in many fatwas by the clans
in conflict with Êzidîs over land or trade roads. In different times,
similar fatwas were made to legalize the killing and looting of
Êzidîs and consider their fight a religious duty or Jihad – a holy
war against the unbelievers. Occupying Nineveh Governorate in
the summer of 2014 and invading Êzidîs’ territories in Sinjar,
terrorist ISIS re-legalized the killing of Êzidîs and the raping of
their women. However, this became known to the world for the
first time thanks to the world media power, which now cover
conflicts all over the world.
Among the efforts made to accuse Êzidîs of being godless, there
were also Fatwas by Kurdish Muslim clergymen who considered
anyone who disobeyed the authorities to be dissolute in order
for them to claim the rights of Kurds. They also accused their
fellow-citizen Êzidîs of being godless and supported the Ottoman
or Safavid occupation authorities. Those fatwas left incurable
wounds and a memory of deep differences, fueling the identity
divisions in the present.
Efendi’s fatwa and the following fatwas, such as Mullah
Muhammad Khati’s fatwa (1832), became religious references to
judge Êzidîs in the writings of many Muslim scholars who adopted
their content as faits accomplis, such as mentioned Egyptian
Ahmad Taymour Pasha’s book on Êzidîs, which became a basis for
the books of following authors, including a book by Iraqi historian
Abdurrazzaq Hassani, of which twelve editions were published. In
addition to accumulated layers of misconceptions, another layer
of judgment was built which difficult to remove without removing
the impact of the former.
The tragic result of the association between military campaigns
(hard power policy) and fatwas accusing Êzidîs of being godless
(soft power policy) was the destruction of their lands, looting
of their properties, defaming of their reputation, and distortion
74
of their beliefs by classifying them among the heretic beliefs
challenging, in essence, the prevailing cultural structure of the
Abrahamic religions in the Middle East.
Ottoman document about trying to force the Êzidî to convert to Islam 20
Septmber 1892
75
Fatwas and Firmans: Targeting the Ethnically
Different and Outlawing the Religiously Different
The wounded memory of Êzidîs under the Ottomans was
a result of the military campaigns launched against them in
the context of targeting and taming the other. Êzidîs record 72
campaigns accompanying official fatwas of the Ottoman state
that considered their territories to be war zones from a religious
point of view (outlawing the other.) Thus, they became subject to
different forms of blind cruelty.
This explains their isolation. Had their milieu given them
a degree of freedom of religion and belief, they would not have
confined themselves and refrained from contact with others.
In such cases, a community’s closed nature, non-missionary
doctrine and secret beliefs become stricter than ever owing to the
atmosphere of oppression and pressure, rather than being reasons
for such oppressions. Moreover, their inclination not to mix with
the outer world and to maintain their doctrinal/geographical selfconcentration pushed them to become a source of myths. They
exaggerated the attributes distinguishing them from others to
justify their non-intermixing and isolated world, as was the case
when they tried, by all means, to ward off conscription which
caused them panic to the point that they petitioned the Ottoman
authority with exaggerations about their religious restraints,
giving an odd image of a community that could only live within a
closed circle.(1(
(1( For the petition raised by Êzidîs to the Ottoman state in 1872 to exempt them from
military service, see Dr. Ahmad Sino, Êzidî Kurds under Ottomans, Damascus, 2012,
p.425-429.
76
The anti-Êzidî fatwa made by Sheikh Ebussuud
Efendi, the Grand Mufti of the Ottoman State under
)Sultan Suleiman I (1520-1566
فتوى ابو السعود العمادي (مفتي الدولة العثمانية الرسمي) عن اأيزيدية
نص الفتوى
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
اللهم الهمنا الصواب ،وفصل الخطاب وجنبنا العي والغي واارتياب وهب لنا من لدنك رحمة
إنك أنت الوهاب .أما بعد فهذه كلمات في بيان مذهب الطائفة اليزيدية ،وحكمهم وحكم اأموال
الكائنة بأيديهم .إعلم أنهم متفقون فيما بينهم على أباطيل من عقائد وتأويل كلها مما يوجب الكفر
العتيد والضال البعيد.
فمنها :أنهم ينكرون القرآن الشرع ويزعمون أنه كذب وأن مثل هذيانات الشيخ فخر هي المعول
عليها والتي يجب التمسك بها .ولذا يعادون علماء اإسام ويبغضونهم بل إن ظفروا بهم يقتلونهم
بأشنع قتل كما وقع غير مرة ،وإن وقعت كتب اإسام بأيديهم يلقونها في القاذورات ،بل يمزقونها…
ومنها :إنهم يحلون الزنا إذا جرى بالتراضي .أخبرني من أثق به أنه رأى ذلك مسطور ًا في كتاب
لهم يسمونه (جلوة) ينسبونه للشيخ عدي.
ومنها :أنهم يفضلون عديا على النبـي (ص) بمراتب ،بل يقولون إنه ا مناسبة بينهما.
ومنها :إنهم يصفون الله بصفات اأجسام كاأكل والشرب والقيام والقعود وغيرها.
ومنها :إنهم يحكون حكايات في شأن الله تعالى ورسوله وعدي تشتمل على ذكر تذلل الله
ورسوله بين يدي عدي وعلى تحقير شأنهما وااستهزاء بهما وتضجره من ترددهما إليه واستغنائه
عن صحبتهما وماقاتهما وغير ذلك مما يوجب تنزيه شأن الله والرسول عنه.
ومنها :أنهم يمكنون شيوخهم من زوجاتهم ومحارمهم ويستحلون ذلك بل يعتقدون به خيرا.
ومنها :إنهم يصرحون بأن ا فائدة في الصاة وا بأس في تركها وهي ليست واجبة بل الواجب
طهارة القلب وصفاؤه.
ومنها :إنهم يعتقدون أن (الشا) أفضل من الكعبة وأنه ا فائدة في زيارتها لمن يقدر على زيارة
الش.
ومنها :إنهم يسجدون لالش ،ولكل مكان شريف بزعمهم واسيما لعلم (سنجق) عدي؛ فإنهم
يدعون أن من لم يسجد له فهو كافر .ومعلوم أن هذا السجود كالسجود للصنم والشمس ا كالسجود
لأمراء والعلماء والمشائخ فإنه يحتمل وجهين دون هذا .وإن كان هذا مكابرة ظاهرة.
ومنها :إنهم يعتقدون أن عديا يجعل أمته في طبق يوم القيامة ويحمله على رأسه ويذهب به إلى
الجنة رغم الله والمائكة.
77
فهذه هي بعض أقوالهم الفضيحة وأعمالهم القبيحة وقد تواترت عندي ممن خالطهم واستخبر
أحوالهم .ثم إني سمعت غير واحد ممن استكشف مضمرات صدورهم الخبيثة يقولون إنهم ثاث فرق:
إحداها :غاتهم الذين قالوا إن عديا هو الله نفسه.
وثانيها :الذين يقولون إنه ساهم الله في األوهية ،فحكم السماء بيد الله وحكم اأرض بيده.
وثالثها :هم الذين يقولون ليس هو الله ،وليس هو شريكا له ،ولكنه عند الله بمنزلة الوزير الكبير،
ا يصدر من الله أمر من اأمور إا برأيه فكلهم متفقون على الكفر الشديد والضال البعيد.
والظاهر أن مذهبهم على ما استقرأت وفحصت يؤول إلى الحلول ،ولذلك يوالون النصارى
ويستصوبون بعض اعتقاداتهم ،وا خفاء في أن هذه المذكورات جميع ًا ،مما تستوجب أشنع الكفر
وأقبحه .فهم إذن كفرة أصلية كما نقل عن بعض كتب المذهب ونسبة إلى أصل المذهب فإنه نقل
عن كتاب (المتفق والمختلف) أن الظاهر من مذهب مالك أنه إذا ظهر أحكام الكفر في بلد تصير دار
حرب هو مذهب الشافعي وأحمد (ر.ع) واتفقوا على أنه تغنم أموالهم.
وفي الصغير عن أبي حنيفة أن البطن اأول مرتدون ،والبطن الثاني إما كفار أصليون ،أو مرتدون
بارتداد آبائهم اأولين وبقوا على ذلك قرنا بعد قرن .ومن لم يكفرهم إا لجهله بحالهم فمعذور:
وشفاء العي السؤال ،وأما لعدم التميز بين أسباب الكفر واإيمان أو لخوفه منهم ،أو لطمع بما في
أيديهم ،أو لرضاه بمذهبه ،أو لمراء جبل عليه ،فأمره أن يخفي حالهم في قانون الشرع.
ثم إنهم قد يظهرون اإسام ويتلفظون بالشهادتين ويصلون تقية وسترا لمذهبهم عند أهل الحق،
فهم يصيرون بمجرد ذلك مسلمين ويعصمون دماءهم ،أم ابد من الرجوع عما اعتقدوه من اأباطيل
كلها والندامة عليها واإقرار ببطانها؟
والجواب :إن الظاهر من عبارة الفقهاء في باب توبة المرتد وإسام الكافر اعتبارها وعدم القبول
دونها.
قال في اأنوار" :توبة المرتد وإسام الكافر أن يشهد أن ا اله إا الله ومحمدا رسول الله ،ويتبرأ
من كل دين يخالف اإسام ويرجع من كل اعتقاد هو كفر" هذا ومعلوم أنهم لو أجبروا وأكرهوا
وأوعدوا بكل مكروه يتبرؤون عن معتقدهم في عدي ويزيد والش وغير ذلك من شيوخهم .ومنه
رأيهم على أنهم زنادقة وتوبة الزنديق اتقبل في وجهه "وإذا لقوا الذين آمنوا قالوا آمنا وإذا خلوا إلى
شياطينهم قالوا إنا معكم" .اآية.
وفي الصغير :وعليه مالك وأحمد وأبو حنيفة في أحد روايتيه .قال في الروضة قال الروياني في
الحلية :والعمل على هذا.
وفي التقديرين ا نزاع في حرمة مناكحتهم وأكل ذبيحتهم وتقريرهم في الباد اإسامية بالجزية
وغيرها ،ومباشرة أنكحتهم وفي وجوب قتلهم وقتالهم حيث لهم شوكة وفي إهدار دمائهم وغير
ذلك.
وأما حكم اأموال الكائنة في أيديهم ،فإن قلنا إنهم كفرة أصليون فعلى ما نقل من المتفق
والمختلف (إنها غنيمة) ،وإن قلنا بارتدادهم فما تلقاه صغيرهم عن كبيرهم بالموت فهو فيء ،إذ
اتوارث بينهم كما ايخفي ،وما اكتسبوه بالمعامات من البيع والشراء واإجازة وغيرها والغصب
78
والنهب والسرقة ونحوها ،فإن كانت هذه التصرفات صادرة منهم مع بعضهم فهو تصرف إما
بالفيء ،أو إما في المال الضائع ،إذ ما في أيديهم ايخلو من هذين القسمين ،كما سينكشف وليس
لهم التصرف فيهما ،وإن كانت صادرة منهم مع المسلمين والذميين فما عرف المأخوذ منه وجب رده
إليه عند القدرة لفساد معاماتهم كما تقرر في باب الردة ،وان لم يعرف المأخوذ منه فهو من اأموال
الضائعة.
فعلم إنه ا يتصور لهم مال في الغالب ،ويحتمل أن يجعل موقوفا على رجوعهم أو قتلهم .وأما
ما اشتهر في الكتب من أن مال المرتد يكون موقوفا فذلك يتصور في مرتد كان مسلما زمنا وحصل
بـيده حال إسامه مال هو له بحكم اليد والمقابل ثم شقي أو قطع اإسام فإن تاب استمر ملكه ،وأن
مات أو قتل على كفره صار فيئا أو ضائعا.
وأما الذين نحن بصددهم فليسوا كذلك ،فانه لو فرض إسامهم وحسن حالهم كان حكم اأموال
الكائنة بأيديهم على ما ذكر ،فكيف حكم حال إصرارهم على كفرهم ،وهذا ما ا ينبغي أن يناقش فيه
عند اأنصاف وترك المراء.
وإن قيل صبيانهم محكوم عليهم باإسام فما حصل لهم حال صبائهم يجب أن يكون موقوفا
فلم قلت ا يتصور أن يكون لهم موقوفا؟ قلنا القول بإسام صبيانهم مرجوح زيفه صاحب الروضة،
وجزم بأنهم مرتدون كآبائهم .وبتقدير التسليم تكون تصرفاتهم أيضا باطلة لكونهم غير مكلفين وا
ولي لهم يمكنهم من التصرفات ويتصرف لهم أو يقبل لهم شيئا باإيهاب والوصية غير ذلك ،وحال
إرثهم كما ذكر فا يتصور لهم أيضا ما لم يجعل موقوفا كالبالغين.
وأما القول بأنه يحتمل أن يكون فيهم من ليس منهم من المسلمين و الذميين ،أو يكون مال مسلم
بغضب أو لسبب غير ذلك ،ومال الفيء والغنيمة يجب قسمته والمال الضائع يجب أن ينظر فيه اإمام
فمسلم اينكره أحد لكنه غير مختص بما في أيدي هؤاء وا ما يؤخذ منهم ،إذ يتصور ذلك في سائر
الكفار الحربيين ،مثا يمكن أن يكون في الكرج مسلم أو يكون بأيديهم مال مسلم ،بل هو واقع،
فإن أوجب ذلك الكف عنهم وعما بأيديهم ،أوجب ،الكف عن الحربيين عما بأيديهم ،وا قائل به
على أن الكام فيمن علم أنه منهم .ووجوب قسمة الغنيمة ووجوب نظر اإمام في المال الضائع أن
أوجب اأعراض عما بأيديهم ،أوجب اإعراض عن اأموال المأخوذة من أهل الذمة في زماننا هذا،
فإنها إما مال ضائع أو مال فيء ،مع أنه ايقع فيه قسمة أصا وا ينظر اأئمة فيها كما هو حق النظر.
ثم أنها تؤخذ بالباطل ،بل مع أنواع الظلم .وأكثر فقهاء النواحي ايتحاشون عن تعاطيها وا
يبحثون عنها كيف أخذت وممن أخذت وعلى أي وجه أخذت ،بل ا يتطرق ببالهم شبهة في ذلك
فضا عن الحرمة .وإذا سئلوا عن حكم هذه اأموال وأموال أمثالهم من المشركين ،فتارة يقولون
أنهم مسلمون ويتكلمون بالشهادتين وتارة يقولون أموالهم موقوفة على قتلهم إلى غير ذلك من
ااعتذارات الباردة من غير تأمل وأعمال روية .والحال إنا مأمورون بأن نقول الحق أنى كنا وا
نخاف في الله لومة ائم ،وفقنا الله لما يحب ويرضى( .انتهت).
79
II. Annexation Policy: Êzidîs and Establishment of
Modern Iraq
Examining the monarchical period, especially the beginning
of Êzidîs’ accession to the emerging state in Iraq, is necessary to
understand the dilemma they face today. During the British mandate
of Iraq, three powers struggled over their territories: Turkey, France
and Britain. With the movable political borders of mandate zones,
it was not easy for Êzidîs to decide which side or power to ally with.
Today, just as in the past, they are going through a critical moment;
they have challenging options that are as difficult as the ones they
had at the establishment of modern Iraq.
Some believe that it is better for them to remain within one
Iraq, some support acceding to the Kurdistan Region, some call
for international protection of Êzidî territories, while others have
lost hope and believe that migration is the final solution in light
of absolute mistrust of others. These views are similar, with some
different details, to the ones they had when they acceded to Iraq;
a decision that surely was not easy, was taken under a policy of
carrot and stick and under specific changes and political balances
of interests.
With their high separatism, Êzidîs were confused whether or
not they should recognize and accede to the new state. Would it
be possible for such accession to terminate the firmans they had
always faced throughout their modern history to enjoy, eventually,
the rights of citizenship like other Muslim citizens? Britain
managed to convince them or, at least, convince some of their
leaders of the need of such accession and the British mandate was
a guarantee in this context.
Êzidîs’ areas, especially in the Sinjar Mountains with their
strategic location, were important for the British influence in northwestern Iraq, while Shekhan, which was relatively quiet, did not
have similar importance. Thus, it became affiliated with the Mosul
Governorate with an apparently laissez-faire policy by the British.(1(
(1( Adnan Zayyan Farhan, British Policy towards Religious Minorities in Iraq 1914-1941,
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Arts, University of Dahuk. 2009, p.115.
80
Today, when we watch the air strikes of the International
Coalition against ISIS which has occupied Sinjar and displaced its
people, we can but think of the importance of the air force to impose
control over this region since the establishment of modern Iraq.
Without the shells of the air force, it would have been impossible
for Baghdad to impose its control over all parts of the country and
for Iraq to emerge as an independent state.
Similarly, the Royal Air Force was the main force to impose
British control over those remote territories, and the famous
Êzidî Mountains had strategic importance for the Royal Air Force
Leadership in Baghdad because it was adjacent to the temporary
north-western borders with Turkey, in addition to its adjacency to
the French Controlled areas in Syria westward.
This explains the great attention paid by the British Intelligence,
as well as the big number of local informers working for the Royal
Air Force among Êzidî tribes which, at the time, became easy
targets for the Turkish propaganda against Britain, on one hand,
and for French conspiracies, on the other.(1(
Hence, the Êzidîs’ accession to Iraq became a British political
priority, but that was not easy for Êzidîs who, like other Iraqi
cults and minorities, were asked to recognize King Faisal I of Iraq.
“They refused to do that and to be under an Arab government,
preferring to be subjects of the British State.(2( A Êzidî declaration
signed by 50 figures, including Êzidî leaders representing Êzidîs
in Diyarbakir and Mosul governorates, expressed their desire
to be British subjects and rejection of being under an Arab
government(3(. The British tried to convince them to recognize
King Faisal I of Iraq, promising them that the British mandate
(1( Adnan Zayyan Farhan, British Policy towards Religious Minorities in Iraq 1914-1941,
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Arts, University of Dahuk. 2009, p.115.
(2( Qader Salim Shammo, Êzidîs and Modern Iraqi State, «Lalish» magazine, Lalish
Cultural and Social Center, Duhok, issue 29, July 2009,p.26.
(3( John S. Keast, History of Êzidîs, Arab House of Encyclopedias, 2006, p. 394.
81
would persist forever. Political governor of Mosul Colonel Nolder
issued an official letter confirming the recognition and the British
mandate existence forever. This convinced Êzidîs and they thus
recognized King Faisal I and supported British efforts to annex
Mosul Governorate to the State of Iraq.”(1(
Hence, they were misled to conform to the mandate authority’s
politics and interests. Shedding light on that crucial period which
made them citizens in a new state, built on a national basis and
believing both in Arabism and secularism, would, in fact, explain
how the disagreements among Êzidî leaders were exploited to
impose the viewpoint of the authority in Baghdad and to achieve
the British interests, and how both Britain and France exploited
the support to each leader individually to impose their policies and
support their interests, not to mention the Turkish influences. This
would reoccur in their contemporary history as we witness it today
in the attempts made by many parties to exploit Êzidîs and their
many political and religious leaders to realize interests that do not
necessarily conform to the interests of this marginalized minority.
The British supported Êzidî leader Hamo Sharo who was
appointed Governor of Sinjar and granted broad powers. He
played a big role in solving local conflicts. His strong alliance
with Britain increased His political and economic influence in the
Sinjar Mountains and Upper Mesopotamia where he was granted
continuous subsidies. Supported by the British, Sharo seized the
rich village of Jedaleh after a long struggle with the Arab tribe
of Khatouniyeh. The other step was the appointment of Youssef
Rassam as the commissioner of Sinjar by the British authority.
This appointment of a Christian official from a family with old
relations with Great Britain reflected the need to establish a new
administration as acceptable as possible to Sharo.(2(
(1( Adnan Zayyan Farhan, British Policy towards Religious Minorities in Iraq 19141941, p.114.
(2( Adnan Zayyan Farhan, British Policy towards Religious Minorities in Iraq 19141941, p.114.
82
On the other hand, Atatürk’s Turkey was trying to infiltrate the
Sinjar Êzidîs and exploit relations with some of their leaders in
order to undermine the British policy in the area. Through the
pro-Britain Êzidî leader, the British tried to confront the Turkish
influence and even proposed to conscript Êzidî tribesmen under
the leadership of British officers to defend the Sinjar Mountains
in case of a Turkish aggression, a step that could have developed
their ties with the British, similarly to the step achieved with the
Assyrians when Britain conscripted them as part of its troops in
Iraq. Luckily for Êzidîs, the British efforts failed; otherwise, they
would have been suffering from an additional reason of hate by
their neighbours similarly to what happened to the Assyrians who
paid dearly for that in 1933, when the Iraqi army committed a
massacre against them on the pretext that they were a threat to
the new State’s unity.(1(
In addition to the Turks in the North and the British inside Iraq,
the French in the West constituted the third power struggling for
influence over the Sinjar Êzidîs. The French in Syria had ambitions
in Êzidîs’ areas in Sinjar. Their agents distributed money to some
Êzidî clan heads in Sinjar, with a view to convincing them to accept
the French supremacy and control over the region.(2( It was easy
to gain Êzidîs’ content by merely showing readiness to arm them
and respond to their demands which Britain might have hesitated
to fulfil.
(1( See Saad Salloum, Christians in Iraq: Comprehensive History and Current
Challenges, Masarat, Baghdad, 2014, p.250-287.
(2( Shukr Khedr Murad Bazo, Shingal under Monarchy 1921-1958, Kurdish Scientiic
Research and Study Center, University of Dahuk, 2012, p69.
83
Prince Ismail bek with the British Governor of Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, in the 1920s
The French viewed Êzidî leader Daoud Daoud in Sinjar, who
opposed the British politics and the accession to the newborn Iraqi
state, as the best chance to penetrate Êzidîs’ areas. While Daoud
became an extreme opponent of the recruitment of Êzidîs by the
Iraqi government, establishing a conscripted army was a priority
for King Faisal I – the founder of the Iraqi state and the first king
thereof –He deemed recruitment to be a major mechanism to build
a national identity to integrate, by force, different religious and
ethnic constituents. King Faisal’s successors followed His steps.
However, when the conscription law (National Defence Code) was
passed in 1934, it was severely opposed both by Shiite clans in
southern Iraq and by Êzidîs in the Sinjar Mountains.(1(
Êzidî leader Daoud was the major opponent of the new policy.
He stated that he would not comply with the conscription law and
ordered His followers not to join the military service. Also, he
refused to submit to the government’s warning, led His followers
(1( Saad Salloum, Identity Policies in Modern Iraq, in “Ittijahat magazine”, Baghdad,
issue n. 1, 2008, p.34.
84
through the impregnable paths and caves of the Sinjar Mountains
and contacted the French in Hassakeh in Syria for assistance.(1(
Stationed at Iraq’s north-western borders in the Sinjar of
Êzidîs, the French Intelligence Service induced Êzidîs to oppose
the law. The failure of the Iraqi experience would indirectly serve
the French interests because this would make an impression for
the League of Nations that it would be illogical to grant Syria
independence after the failure of Iraq’s experience. Some reports
mentioned that the French intelligence officer in Qamishli had
facilitated the smuggling of French weapons to Sinjar Êzidîs, that
he had appointed a special force for that purpose, and that soon
after that he visited the region where he met Êzidî leader Daoud,
inducing him to move to Syria with His fighters.(2(
As a consequence, the clash between the Êzidîs, led by Daoud
in association with another leader – Rasho Qolo – and the Iraqi
government troops was inevitable. Êzidî troops were defeated with
big losses. The clash claimed the lives of 200 Êzidîs, wounded 120
others, and destroyed 11 villages. The martial law was declared in
Sinjar and localities thereof on October 14, 1935, under which 364
Êzidîs were arrested and 9 of them were sentenced to death, 69 to
life imprisonment, 70 to 20 years detention and 162 to 15 years in
prison, while 54 were banished to southern Iraq. Daoud resorted
to the French and settled in Qamishli in Syria with His family.(3(
Thus, Êzidî disobedience against the new State of Iraq was
suppressed. Besides the massacre against the Assyrian minority
in 1933, suppressing Êzidî disobedience in 1935 was yet another
example that building the new nation-state model was decisive
in adopting machtpolitik to integrate the religious minorities’
(1( Hassoun Abboud Jizani, Êzidîsm in Iraq 1921-1958, p.162.
(2( Adnan Zayyan Farhan, British Policy towards Religious Minorities in Iraq 19141941, p.166, and Hassoun Abboud Jizani, Êzidîsm in Iraq 1921-1958, p.162.
(3( Adnan Zayyan Farhan, British Policy towards Religious Minorities in Iraq 19141941,p.167.
85
members and an example of dealing decisively and harshly with
any attempt to threaten the existing model and its official policies.
However, the establishment of modern Iraq in 1921 relieved
Êzidî of the Ottoman genocidal campaigns aiming to Islamize
them. Even after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in
1923, Turkey followed policies of developing a homogenous society
by containing non-Christian minorities. Êzidîs were viewed as a
minority within the Kurdish minority, with which the authority
dealt with the basis of converting to Islam or not.(1(
This was perhaps another reason that pushed them to accede
to the new State of Iraq as a more convenient choice in terms of
freedom of religion and belief, which was, later on, exemplified
in the establishment of the Êzidî Spiritual Council in the late
1930s, which implied an official recognition of them as a separate
religious cult like other non-Muslim ones.
(1( Birgul Acikyildiz, The Êzidîs: The History of a Community, Culture and Religion,
London-New York, 2014, p. 59.
86
Daoud al-Daoud with one of his sons
III. Assimilation Policy: Management of Êzidî Affairs
and Establishment of Spiritual Council
The 1925 Iraqi Constitution recognized Arabic as the official
language, except as it may be prescribed by a special law.(1( It
except as also provided for citizens’ right to equality and nondiscrimination: “There shall be no differentiation in the rights of
Iraqis before the law, whatever differences may exist in language,
race or creed.”(2( Although the Constitution stated that “Islam
shall be the official religion of the State,” it guaranteed freedom of
religion and belief to all citizens.(3(
(1( 1925 Iraqi Constitution, art. 17.
(2( Ibid., art. 6.
(3( (1)
1925 Iraqi Constitution, art. 13.
87
Several articles of the Constitution provided for the affairs of
organization of religious cults in Iraq. Then, detailed legislation was
issued to implement these articles so as to guarantee the religious
cults’ freedom to manage their religious affairs in a way similar
to the Muslims with their various doctrines. The Constitution
listed the spiritual councils of the cults recognized in Iraq, which
“include the Jewish spiritual councils and the Christian spiritual
councils. Such councils shall be established and vested with powers
of jurisdiction by a special law.”(1( The Constitution also provided
for these councils’ jurisdictions in personal status cases.(2(
Êzidîs requested the establishment of a Êzidî Supreme Spiritual
Council in 1928 and the Iraqi government responded positively,
in order to show flexibility in order in the formation of spiritual
councils with a view to creating a representative body for each cult
to manage its own affairs, with which the government would deal
to solve problems, if any.
However, the most important untold motive was its fears of
Sinjar Êzidîs who might be influenced and attracted by the French
government – mandated over Syria – by encouraging them to
found their own entity. Therefore, the Council of Ministers called,
in a secret document, to thwart foreign powers’ endeavors to
exploit Êzidîs, which would happen through improving attention
paid to them. A petition raised by Sa’eed Bey – supported by the
government – and 13 other Êzidî leaders to the government to
form a Êzidî spiritual council, read as follows: “We, the spiritual
leaders of the Êzidîs of the world in the Shekhan District, based on
the trust of our Cult which has appointed us in our current posts
that we have inherited from our father and grandfathers, raise,
on behalf of our Cult and in our own capacity, our petition calling
upon the respected government to pay us some of the attention
paid to many Iraqi cults and allow us to form a spiritual council
(1( Ibid., art. 78.
(2( Ibid., art. 79.
88
of five spiritual leaders consensually elected by all our spiritual
leaders…”(1(
However, this formation did not give Êzidîs autonomy in the
management of their religious affairs. The Iraqi government
issued a package of legislation concerning religious minorities.
In addition to the commitment made to the League of Nations to
maintain the rights of minorities in Iraq,(2( legislation regarding
language plurality and the management of religious minorities of
their own affairs was enacted, like the Local Language Law issued
in 1931 acknowledging language plurality in some mixed regions
that was comprised of Kurdish and Turkmen minorities.(3(
Other legislation issued in 1931 sought to organize religious
sects’ affairs with the aim of granting minorities a bigger role
and control over their own internal affairs, such as the Orthodox
Armenian Cult Code No. 70 and the Jewish Cult Code No. 77.
However, no legislation for Êzidîs was issued; thus, Êzidîs’
personal status cases were not under the jurisdiction of the Êzidî
Spiritual Council and Êzidîs lost the opportunity of enjoying
almost complete autonomy to manage their own religious affairs
due to internal disagreements among their religious leaders.
On another hand, Êzidî feasts were added to the country’s
official system of feasts in 1937. The Official Vacation Law no. 72
of 1931 was amended to include the following Êzidî feasts:(4( “The
(1( The document is published in Khalil Jundi, Êzidîs and the Tough Exam, Erbil, Iraq,
2008, p.167.
(2( See the International Statement and Commitment made by Iraq to the Council of
the League of Nations, as formulated by the House of Representatives Reviewing
Committee on January 28, 1932, on the protection of the rights of religious and
racial minorities and communities in Iraq.
(3( Local Language Law No. 74 of 1931, published in the «Iraqi Oficial Gazette», issue
989, June 1931.
(4( Public Holiday Law No. 72 of 1931, as amended by Law No. 29 of 1937, in «Iraqi
Oficial Gazette», issue n. 1579, July 3, 1937.
89
following days shall be official vacations with regard to Êzidîs:
Mass Day on November 15, Winter Solstice, Summer Solstice, and
Determination Day on December 3.”
Êzidî soldiers belonging to Alkiran tribe (on
the right) and to Alhbabat tribe (on the left)
IV. Merging Policy: Êzidîs under the Republican Rule
of Iraq
The identity policies in modern Iraq, which were formed
within a nation-state model believing in Arabism, excluded ethnic
and religious minorities from participation in their formation.
The government designed a project to Arabize Êzidîs, which for
decades caused them to experience under the Republican rule,
specifically under the Baath party, a project of forced merging into
a greater Arab identity, having faced for centuries the Ottoman
Islamization project.
Between the Ottoman Islamization project (the Islamization
90
Firman) and the national Arabization project (Arabization Decree),
Êzidîs were referred to in Muslim Arabs’ writings as a devious
Islamic faction or as a community whose collective memory lost
the identity of Arabism amid history confusions and fragments
of the peoples remaining from the clashes of major empires and
religions of Mesopotamia.
With the establishment of modern Iraq, the project of melting
the smaller religious identities into a greater identity became an
official policy. With the coming to power of the Baathists in 1963,
the project became part of the ruling authority’s ideology and
peaked during the 1970s and 1980s.
Prior to 1963, the Official Vacation Law was amended so as to
include the following Êzidî feasts:(1( the first Friday of December
and first Wednesday of April according to the Julian calendar, as
well as July 18-21, and September 23-30..
These vacations were approved again in the Official Vacation
Law No. 110 of 1972. Although Mir: Mir Bayazid al-Umawi
submitted an application to the Iraqi government to recognize
seven Êzidî feasts,(2( the government only recognized the four
as approved under the Republican era. In 1981, a law listed the
officially recognized religious cults in Iraq, and the Êzidî cult’s
name was officially changed to the “Êzidî Umayyad Cult”(3( after a
republican decree appointed al-Umawi as the Cult’s head.
When the Baathists came to power, all anthropological
information of Êzidîs was in service of the authority. During that
period, against the backdrop of the struggle with the Kurdish
liberation movement and the consequences of the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988), Êzidîs and other religious and ethnic minorities
(1( Public Holiday Law No. 21 of 1958 as amended, in the Iraqi «Oficial Gazette»,
issue n. 320, March 15th, 1960.
(2( Bayazid al-Umawi, Feasts of Êzidîsm, in «Folklore magazine», issue n.9, 1973, p. 79.
(3( Annex to the Religious Cult Patronage Law (the religious cults oficially recognized
in Iraq) n. 32 of 1981.
91
in Kurdistan and adjacent areas attracted the attention of the
authorities. Several secret or limitedly circulated intelligence
studies were conducted to serve the authority. In 1982, the
Security Development Center issued a study on religious and
ethnic minorities in Nineveh Governorate, a limitedly circulated
book with a specific chapter for Êzidîsm.(1(
The book repeated all the ideas mentioned in the writings of
Muslim Arab writers on Êzidîsm, such as Ahmed Taymour, Abbas
Ezzawi, Abdurrazzaq Hassani, Damlouji and Diyouhji, with regard
to their beliefs and source of their religious and ethnic identity.
It also confirmed the stereotypes of Êzidîs, which pictured
them as primitives.(2( The study mentioned some prohibited
actions for Êzidîs, such as shaving moustaches, and literacy; this
latter prohibition contradicted the Baathist ideological project
of eradicating illiteracy because it would only deny a large
number of people the right to learn the principles of the Baath
and the Revolution. The study justified that by a desire of the
Cult’s spiritual leaders to keep Êzidîs in a state of intellectual
darkness and absolute ignorance because through education and
knowledge they might convert. Therefore, the study warned of the
Êzidî clergymen’s attitude of resisting the spread of schools and
encouraging Êzidîs not to attend illiteracy eradication schools.(3(
The study tried to distinguish between two categories of Êzidîs,
both suffering from a complex of oppression by the authority.
Throughout their history and because of their beliefs, they became
bandits, looting travellers and attacking remote villages whenever
they had a chance. Those of them who settled in stable places
(1( Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities and their Effect on the
Political and Social Reality in Nineveh Governorate, Security Development Center,
issued under the supervision of the Media Science Ofice, Cultural Qualiication and
Development Center, Baghdad, 1982.
(2( Ibid, p.79.
(3( Ibid, p.80.
92
refused to obey the authorities by refraining from paying taxes,
defaulting on government duties and tithes, abstaining from
doing military service, which irritated rulers, especially under the
Ottomans.
The study also sought to explain, if not justify, the oppressions
and military campaigns and the resulting genocides experienced
by Êzidîs. Having closed beliefs and being aggressive towards
Islam and disobedient to the authority made them a concern
for all governments and rulers of Iraq. Their relation with the
authority was always built on an element of fear, regardless of its
intentions towards them. Their continued look of suspicion and
doubt towards their Muslim neighbours pushed them to exert
extraordinary efforts to keep themselves isolated from others and
to maintain their religious and social cohesion. This prompted
them to conceal each other’s deeds against the government and
protect disobedient and criminals, which was, from the study’s
viewpoint, a gap utilized by rebelling political movements and
groups to gain their support against the existing regime.
The study focused on the danger of the Kurdish movement
which it described as an agent pocket since it could move to
promote Êzidîs’ complex of oppression by the authority and
attract the majority of them to its side. The study also flagged the
Syrian Intelligence service’s movement among the Êzidîs living on
border areas adjacent to Syria and recruitment of them to gather
information and carry out acts of sabotage.(1( Thus, the study
revived the old fears at the establishment of modern Iraq when the
French exploited them on the western front in Syria near Sinjar.
On the other side, the study praised the development of the
Êzidî reality by the revolution government which exerted efforts to
modernize their areas at a time when ignorance was very common
in their villages. Some of them were even living in caves in the Sinjar
(1( Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities and their Effect on the
Political and Social Reality in Nineveh Governorate, p.173-174
93
Mountains and had never seen cars or any movable machines.
The discourse of this limitedly circulated study suggested that
the revolution government would become a rescuer or saviour of
this outcast community which lived outside of history, with the
aim of transiting it “from its decayed reality to a new phase.”(1( It
also suggested that urging Êzidîs to join the Baath Party, popular
organizations and the Popular Army, easing their severe rejection
of military service, housing them in modern villages and paying
them tempting wages to work for government establishments
would be a motive for them to reside in mixed areas, end their
isolation and mitigate what the study described as “their wrong
and odd beliefs.”(2(
In another secret book of the General Military Intelligence
Service about Kurdish clans in Iraq, a chapter was specified for
Êzidîs.(3( The mere mentioning of Êzidîs in this book was an implicit
recognition of their Kurdish identity. However, it demoted them
from an Umayyad Êzidî religious cult to a Kurdish clan.
The book aimed at drawing a map of the Kurdish clans in terms
of their demographics, fighting readiness and methods, loyalty to
the authority and possibility of being exploited by neighbouring
states. It also sought to provide the Army and Intelligence services
with sufficient information to deal with the clans spreading in
rough areas, which were difficult to control, in addition to the
clans on border areas with neighbours classified as enemies, like
Iran and Syria.
Although the book classified Êzidîs as a clan, It referred to
them sometimes as a category and othertimes as a cult. It also
underscored that living in mountains and remote areas or in the
northern plains of the Tigris profoundly impacted their struggle
(1( Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities and their Effect on the
Political and Social Reality in Nineveh Governorate, p.90
(2( Ibid. p.91.
(3( General Military Intelligence Service, Kurdish Clans in Iraq, (classiied), Military
Printing Directorate, undated.
94
to preserve their religious entity and defend themselves. Thus,
they were a startled clan whose members had fighting potentials,
especially guerrilla wars.(1(
The Prince (Mir) Bayazid al-Umawi with Sheikh Zayed, UAE President,
in 1974
The book mentioned Mir Tahsin Saied as head of the Êzidî
Clan, highlighting His collaboration with the Kurdish movement
which it described as the agent pocket. It also mentioned that
Bayazid al-Umawi was appointed head of the Êzidî Clan by virtue
of a presidential decree in April, 1980. The book estimated their
population at 140,000, and assessed their capabilities and loyalty
to the authority as follows: “Their fighting capability: good. Their
fighting style: in clans. Loyalty to the authority: they were with the
destroyers except for the moieties of Huwaydiyeh and Reshkan,
both presided by Murad Barakat. Degree of being utilized by
neighbouring countries: they are not utilized for military purposes,
but they spy, smuggle and have links with the Syrian regime. Some
of them do exist in Syria, mainly Elias Khalaf, Khedr Basso, Hajjo
(1( Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities and their Effect on the
Political and Social Reality in Nineveh Governorate, p.116.
95
Dahham, Qasim Malkih, Sheikh Khalaf and Elias Qasso.”(1(
As Êzidîs were well known for being ungovernable under the
Ottomans and the Iraqi monarchy, the Baathist authorities tried
to take a step forwards based on understanding and studying
the Êzidî personality in order to control and exploit them in the
struggle with the larger disobedient communities – the Kurds – or,
at least, to keep it away from the effect of the Kurdish movement.
The General Military Intelligence Service Psychological
Intelligence Section was tasked with studying the psychology of
Iraqi communities and it conducted a study on the Êzidî personality.
The study sought to discover the general laws governing Êzidîs’
behaviour as drawn from the culture of the specified minority in
order to learn whether or not it was possible to use it maximally by
the authority and eliminate the possible influence or control of the
Kurdish movement – officially described as disobedient – and of
internal and external enemies. The Baathist authority was skilful
in the making, and even fabrication, of enemies.
The study overtly declared that a serious study of the personality
of Êzidîs and other minorities was a persisting requirement by
politicians and the army because it would help them understand
the implying motives of their behaviour.
The study refused to consider Êzidîs to be isolated because no
matter how isolated a minority was and how immune to affect
and be affected was, there was still a possibility to be infiltrated
and used by others/enemies “because the atmosphere affect any
community regardless of the tightening degree of its connections,
and of the secrecy of its rituals.”(2(
From the very beginning, the study declared its ideological
stance; it did not view the Êzidî minority as a separate identity or
with a religiously or ethnically peculiarity, but as part of a bigger
(1) Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities and their Effect on the
Political and Social Reality in Nineveh Governorate, p.118.
(2( The Presidency, General Military Intelligence Service, Psychological Intelligence
Section, Êzidî Personality, (limitedly circulated), Military Print Directorate, undated.
96
Arab identity.(1( In order to make an accurate ethnical distinction
of Êzidîs, the study gave accurate figures depending on an analysis
of their physical features. It also contained tables listing the
overall features of the Êzidîs of Shekhan and Sinjar, based on their
percentage of the Êzidî population and by hair colour and shape
and eye colour,(2( in a way recalling Nazi studies of other peoples.
Examining the ecological order of Êzidîs and their social
and religious system, the study, in its final chapter, identified
the characters of the Êzidî personality and mentioned many
conclusions about this community, such as deeming it a closed
community with a specific behavioural character, leading to a
very homogeneous behaviour of the cult’s members and cohesion
stemming, specifically, from the religion factor. Thus, the Êzidî
personality was deemed belief-centred in a way thwarting any
attempt for change, which might be a challenge to the Baath
Government which wanted to deeply influence all Iraqis, with any
religious belief preventing it for its effect on individuals.
The study also concluded that the Êzidî personality was
subdued and isolated, a dangerous conclusion for the government
since it made the Êzidî personality aggressive against other
communities. It was in the best interest of the government to
use this aggressiveness against disobedient movements and the
government had fears of seeing that aggressiveness directed
against its policies and authorities where Êzidî existed or in other
adjacent areas. That personality was also doubtful and this doubt
was dangerous because it might be difficult for the government
to gain its confidence and consequently dictate the authority’s
ideology and goals. Moreover, it might view any stranger as a spy
of the authority or an enemy lying in wait to undermine its religion
or cult. It was also described as a suppressed, humiliated and
(1( Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities and their Effect on the
Political and Social Reality in Nineveh Governorate, p.5.
(2( Ibid., p.46-52.
97
submissive personality. The suppressive role played by the mir
and clergymen made Êzidîs lost and defeated people who feared
the mir and received religious teachings with weakness and fears
of failure to perform them properly. They were always required
to show obedience and loyalty to the clergies and the state. A
submissive and obedient personality is a chance for the authorities
to affect who is affecting it and to whom it is submissive. It might
also be affected by the enemy, and then become a helping factor in
any anti-authority project.
It was a material and unstable personality before the factors
of civilization and was dazzled by the means of material welfare
that entered the society, especially after the oil abundances which
enabled the Baath government to become the biggest employer
and adopt bold social policies. There was a risk that Êzidîs could
have a double-faced personality – the personality of ascetic poor
who became rich through greed – and their desire to acquire things
through the binding gift exchange system. Perhaps they deemed
the acquisition of the belongings of other minorities’ members or
of the authority a kind of triumph. Here, there was a chance to
exploit this attribute similarly to what happened previously.
Importantly, the Êzidî personality was accordingly classified as
politically anxious. This lack of stability in Êzidîs’ stances made
them rush to fight the authority at a moment, and to support and
be loyal to it at another. They acted this way or the other according
to their leaders’ desires and the interests of their doctrine.(1(
V. Recruitment Policy: Êzidîs in the Horizontal
Violence Game of the Baath Regime
The Baath regime of Iraq mastered manipulation of ethnic
communities through putting them against each other. It pursued
the same policy followed by the British before, when they tried to
(1( Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities and their Effect on the
Political and Social Reality in Nineveh Governorate, p.137-142
98
exploit their relations with religious minorities, such as the Jews,
Assyrians and Êzidîs, but it went a step further with a view to
rooting its rule. Depicting the Shias as a threat to the Iraqi Sunnis
(the 1991 uprising), using the Jews as a scapegoat in 1969(1( then
the Baha’is in the 1970s,(2( listing the Kurdish movement on top
of the collaborators and as a major threat to national security
as of the 1960s and classifying the Feyli Kurds(3( in the 1970s as
subordinators to Iran, which was also viewed as a Farsi enemy (a
national re-definition reviving an old memory of enmity and strata
of historical fears) are only examples of a regime that produced
fears and manipulated them, introducing its absolute strength as
a final solution to provide a fake sense of security.
In this context, the Êzidîs were used in the struggle between
the central government and the Kurdish movement through
recruiting them in the pro-authority militia against the revolting
Kurds. Some sources also mention that they were used to suppress
the Shia uprising in Southern Iraq in 1991. In His book Cruelty
and Silence, Kanan Makiyeh claims that the soldiers who attacked
Najaf and southern Iraq in general were selected from Sunni
towns; namely, Hīt, Mosul, Shirqat and Baiji and from the Êzidîs
whom Makiyeh describes as “a small cult in northern Iraq that
has a history of struggle with Shia Muslims.”(4( Leftist writer
(1( On the execution of Jews in the Tahrir Square in Baghdad in 1969 on charges of
spying, see a series of articles by Saad Salloum, Re-reading the History of Jews in
Iraq, in «Mada newspaper», (8 episodes), issues n. 3298-3308, February-March,
2015
(2( In 1970, Law No. 105 banning Baha’i activity in Iraq was enacted. See a series of
articles by Saad Salloum, Re-reading the History of Baha’is in Iraq, in «Mada
newspaper», (9 episodes), issues n. 3324-3342, March-April, 2015
(3( A minority which has ethnic elements in common with the Kurds, but they are Shias
and their Lurish, Feyli and Bakhtiari dialects are distinguished from other Kurdish
dialects (Sorani, Badînî and Zaza).
(4( Kanan Makiyeh, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny and Uprising in the Arab
World, Cologne, 2005, p.87.
99
Abdurrazzaq Safi rejects this narration, arguing that it was an
attempt by the Saddam regime to stir Shias against Êzidîs, while,
in essence, it was a trick in which troops of the Republican Guards
put on Êzidî clothes when attacking the holy Shia towns during
the Shia uprising of March, 1991.(1(
Safi confirmed this by reporting what a Êzidî sheikh said to
an Iraqi scholar of history of religions, Rashid Khayoun: “We are
Kurds forced to wear agal and red keffiyeh in order to not look
strangers in Upper Mesopotamia and Sinjar, same way as Yazid I
and the Satan have been attributed to us. We do not hate Husayn
ibn Ali(2( and we neither took part in hitting His tomb nor shown
joy on the Day of Ashura.”(3(
If this was only an attempt by the Baath regime to divert
attention from the real perpetrator of the crime, it was under the
authority’s general policy of falsifying events and manipulating
ethnic, religious and doctrinal communities in Iraq with a view
to controlling everyone and diverting the rejection powers
horizontally among the communities rather than vertically against
those at the helm.
(1( Abdurrazzaq Sai, Êzidîs: Are They Satanists? published in «Al Hayat», London,
26.08.2005.
(2( Husayn ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (also spelled as Husain, Hussain or Hussein, was the
son of Ali ibn Abi Talib (fourth Rashidun caliph of Sunni Islam, and irst Imam of
Shia Islam) and Fatimah Zahra (daughter of Muhammad) and the younger brother
of Hasan ibn Ali. Husayn is an important igure in Islam, as he is a member of the
Ahl al-Bayt (the household of Muhammad) and Ahl al-Kisa, as well as being the third
Shia Imam.
(W. (n.d.). Husayn ibn Ali. Retrieved March 20, 2016, from. https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Husayn_ibn_Ali)
(3( Ibid.
100
A cleric from the Baishemam at the entrance of Lalish Temple
101
102
CHAPTER V
ÊZIDÎS: FROM NATION STATE
TO STATE OF COMPONENTS
In the wake of the US invasion of Iraq, the philosophy of the
Iraqi political regime changed from the nation state model based
on an all-inclusive merging identity, the Arab identity, to a state
of components.
I. Recognizing the Êzidîs
Article 3 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution states that: “Iraq is a
country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects.” Êzidîs
are mentioned among the recognized religious minorities where
Article 2(2) states: “This Constitution guarantees the Islamic
identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full
religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all
individuals such as Christians, Êzidîs and Mandean Sabians.”
Êzidîs consider the mentioning of their religion in the
Constitution an unprecedented official recognition. Also, a
Baghdad-based Êzidî Endowment has been formed within the
Non-Muslim Religion Endowment. Moreover, Êzidîs have been
granted parliamentary representation and for the first time a
Êzidî, Mamo Farhan Othman, was appointed minister – Minister
of Civil Society – in Ayad Allawi’s government.(1(
(1( Saad Salloum, Different and Equal: International and National Frameworks of
Minorities’ Rights in Iraq, UNDP, Baghdad, 2013, p. 49.
103
II. Relation between Religion and State
However, the constitutionalized rights and the official
recognition of Êzidîs cannot alone guarantee equality and nondiscrimination among citizens unless formal structures and
institutions respond to these rights. In addition, the relation
between religion and the state, of which Islam is the official
religion, subjects the pluralistic identity of the country to the risk
of hegemony and guardianship by the Muslim majority. Article 2
of the Constitution states: “Islam is the official religion of the State
and is a foundation source of legislation.” Also, Article 2 /First(A)
states: “No law may be enacted that contradicts the established
provisions of Islam.”
The hegemony of political Islam parties in power poses risks
for implementing the project of a civil state based on a pluralistic
floor that balances individuals’ rights (citizenship) with the rights
of different groups. Finally, the ability of this experience to address
the grim reality of the state losing its pluralism due to violence,
ethnic cleansing and continued migration is questionable.
Although the state and the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) have made some progress in protecting minorities and
other groups, they have not adopted legal or practical mechanisms
to implement an effective protection framework. The state has not
made any significant progress in reforming the discriminating
or possibly discriminating provisions of Iraqi law, neither has it
provided for sufficiently using the judiciary, or for indemnity or
any alternative measures to address persecution and past and
continuous discrimination against vulnerable groups.(1(
(1( Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation
and Human Rights, Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Washington
D.C., 2013, p. 12.
104
III. Violence and Struggle over Disputed Areas
The Êzidîs were subjected to attacks by terrorist groups during
2005-2007, which led to their total migration from Mosul that
had housed hundreds of Êzidî families prior to 2003, in addition
to thousands of Êzidîs working in enterprises, factories and
restaurants.
Other Êzidî areas also faced fierce attacks, mainly the bombings
against Êzidî communities’ which occurred on August 14, 2007,
when four co-ordinated suicide bomb attacks detonated in
the Êzidî towns of Siba Shikh Khidir and Giruzer in the Sinjar
District and led to the killing and wounding of 800 victims, the
destruction of over 300 houses and the damaging of another 300
houses, making this the Iraq War’s deadliest car bomb attack.
Furthermore, an armed terrorist group heinously killed 23 Êzidî
workers in downtown Mosul in April, 2007, not to mention other
operations on the road between Mosul and Sinjar and also within
Mosul, Baghdad and other areas.(1(
Êzidîs working in liquor stores in Baghdad have been killed
and persecuted over the past years amid real negligence by the
government, which has failed to initiate serious investigations
because these operations are connected with influential Islamic
bodies inside and outside the government.(2( Besides, Êzidî areas
have become part of the disputed areas between the central
government and KRG: Sinjar, Shekhan, Telkaif or Tel Keppe, and
Bashiqa in Nineveh. However, since ISIS occupation, Kurdish
political forces have been vying for influence in these areas,
especially in Sinjar, which has delayed liberating them from ISIS.(3(
(1( Chris Chapman, Improving Security for Minorities in Iraq, London: Minority
Rights Group International, 2011, p. 2-3.
(2( Saad Salloum et al., In the Wind: Iraq’s Minorities Following ISIS Tsunami,
Violation of Minorities’ Rights report, Masarat, Baghdad, 2015.
(3) Saad Salloum, Êzidî Inighting, Disputes over Sinjar Stall Battle against Islamic
State, in «Al-Monitor», August 18, 2015.
105
IV. Rise of Militant Islam
The future seems worrisome for the Êzidîs. In Mosul, in
northern Iraq, ISIS has permitted their killing, the raping of their
women and the destroying of their sacred places, while militias in
central and southern Iraq have been targeting them. Their fears of
the rise of political Islam forces in the region are further promoted
by the identity currents of thought that call for focusing on the
peculiarity of Êzidîs, or demand an independent identity for them.
In the countries where Êzidîs live or in their neighbouring areas,
political Islam parties have come to power, such as in Iran with
its Shiite political Islam, in Iraq where various Shiite and Sunni
political Islam parties fight, and in Turkey which is dominated
by a party, the Justice and Development Party, with an Islamic
ideology, though less ideologically militant than its Middle Eastern
peers of political Islam parties.
The distressing situation in Syria is even worse since it has
witnessed the rise of militant Islamic forces that have overtly
attacked holy Êzidî symbols. ISIS has chopped off an over-160year-old sacred oak tree, which is an Êzidî shrine in Atme, an Êzidî
region in Syria, which also includes the shrines of Sheikh Ment and
Sheikh Bakr. Oak trees are a religious symbol of Êzidîsm; Êzidîs
call them Nishan.(1(
Just as the elevation of Shiite political Islam forces pushed
Êzidîs to flee central and southern Iraq, the increasing influence
of political Islam parties in Kurdistan may jeopardize religious
diversity there. Disseminating religious intolerance makes nonMuslims fear both the Kurds and the future.
Indeed, the rise of militant Islamic forces in Kurdistan causes
Êzidîs to panic and concentrate on their religious peculiarity. After
all, they are religiously different than the Kurds, though of the
same ethnicity and language. Every now and then, the severity of
(1( Saad Salloum, Êzidîs in Iraq: Wounded Memory and Current Genocide, Al-Arabiya
Institute for Studies, August 6, 2014.
106
religious difference is highlighted, especially since the Êzidîs may
pose a threat to a Kurdish Islamic identity from the perspective of
militant religious forces.
The elevation of influence of Islamism in state departments
and society encourages violations of the rights of Êzidîs who are
religiously different than the Muslim (Kurdish/Arab) majority.
These frequent violations make Êzidîs feel unsafe in Iraq because
they have to live a defensive lifestyle as if prisoners of stereotypes
and prejudices that describe them as infidels. The Êzidîs still
wonder why religious institutions in Kurdistan have not yet issued
any clear fatwa forbidding the killing of Êzidîs or condemning the
atrocities they have been subjected to.
In Kurdistan, Êzidîs were victims of more than one attack
by Islamic militants, whether in the Shekhan District or what
happened in Zakho on December 2, 2012, when demonstrators,
following the Friday’s prayer, attacked liquor stores owned by
Êzidîs and Christians and set fire to them. They also stormed into
hotels that offered liquors and burned massage centers, barber
shops and motels owned by members of minority groups in the
region.
V. Religious Hatred Discourse
Moreover, there is a hatred discourse by Muslim clergymen. In
spite of the tragedies the Êzidîs have experienced by ISIS, Muslim
clergymen from time to time ascend mosque pulpits and start
insulting Êzidîs, whether implicitly or explicitly. These discourses
fuel sectarian hatred. Although such religious preachers are few
in number, their appearance on popular TV channels, the spread
of their footages on social media, the abominable comments these
footages induce and their violence-encouraging content impacts a
wide segment of society.
For example, a videotaped speech by Islamic activist Abdulwahed
Bangkhwazi has enraged the Êzidîs because Bangkhwazi questions
their religion and Kurdish ethnicity and severely criticizes some of
their behaviours and rituals, levelling harsh accusations against
107
them.
Êzidî scholar Majed Hassan who specializes in religious
minorities says this example is not an exception. “Êzidîs are often
and publically from mosque platforms described as godless by
some Muslim clerics and preachers, such as Dr. Abdullatif, Mullah
Farzandeh who overtly criticize Êzidîs, Jews and Christians in
most of His speeches, and Professor Dr. Abdulwahed Abdussamad
– all of them being major preachers,” says Hassan.(1(
In addition, there is the attitude adopted by leaders of political
parties in Kurdistan where the head of the Islamic Union Ali Bapir,
for example, has stated that Êzidî and other non-Muslim fighters
against ISIS will not be considered martyrs if they die because
they are non-Muslims and consequently ungodly.(2( This tragic
background explains why the Êzidî community has re-isolated
itself after a relatively short openness.
Therefore, it is important to face the discourse of hate and
incitement against the Êzidîs through encouraging religious
dialogue, holding more training and educating courses and
workshops targeting Muslim and Êzidî clergymen to deepen their
knowledge of each other, and enhancing the civil frameworks of
dialogue between these clerics, because creating communicative
dialogue using mutual visits and participating in different Islamic
and Êzidî religious feasts pave the way for eliminating the
stereotypes of each other through joint dialogue and activities.
(1( From the Author’s correspondence with Êzidî scholar Majed Hassan, who is
specialized in Religious Minorities in Bamberg University, Germany.
(2( From a statement by the Supreme Authority of the Lalish Cultural and Social Center
in response to Ali Bapir’s statements, published on www.Bahzani.net. (last browsed:
December 2015).
108
Êzidî of Sinjar sits beside awall of Lalish Temple
Êzidî woman of Sinjar inLalish valley is looking to the sky
109
110
CHAPTER VI
CURRENT ÊZIDÎ GENOCIDE
The humanitarian impact of the ISIS invasion of Sinjar on
August 3, 2014, has destructive and hard to determine traces on
the Êzidî identity and future existence for an indefinite period:
massive massacres; abducting children to recruit and train them
on arms; enslaving and raping women; forcing Êzidîs to convert
to Islam; destroying their property and shrines; enslaving people
into agricultural and commercial projects and serving at ISIS
fighters’ houses; in addition to the humanitarian disaster of the
displacement of 400,000 Êzidîs out of 500,000 living in Kurdistan.
I. Figures
The total number of the kidnapped Êzidîs by ISIS is estimated
at 5,838 people (3,192 females and 2,646 males). ISIS’ deeds
not only show intent to commit genocide, but also constitute the
pillars of an actual genocide. KRG‘s figures as of August 2015 draw
a cruel picture of the destroyed structure of that isolated ethnic
community:(1(
− Killing some 4,000 people;
− Capturing and selling women and girls or offering them as
gifts to ISIS fighters;
(1( Hesso Hormi, The Last Firman, Masarat, Baghdad-Beirut, 2015, p.34.
111
− Abducting children to be trained for fighting;
− Forcing many captive Êzidîs to convert to Islam;
− Forcing all Êzidîs living in Sinjar District and its subdistricts and villages, in addition to the villages of Bashiqa
and Bahzani (400,000 people), to flee to the Kurdistan
Region;
− Death of more than 1,300 Êzidîs, mostly elders and babies,
due to hunger, thirst or diseases as a result of severe
circumstances during the siege of the Sinjar Mountains or in
some of the Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps which,
especially at the beginning of the crisis, lacked many basic
needs of life;
− Blasting 21 Êzidî shrines.
An old woman from Sinjar who lost her entire family via ISIS invasion
Some Êzidî villages, including the village of Kujo, the story of
which will be legendary in the genocide history, were kept under
112
siege and at risk of genocide for 12 days into after the invasion of
Sinjar with no international intervention. Located 23 kilometers
south of Sinjar District, Kujo was invaded on August 15, 2014 by
ISIS who committed a terrible was committed. The village was
inhabited by 300 families with 1,738 individuals, 1,200 of which
were present in the village on the day of the massacre. The final
toll of the Kujo massacre is as follows: (1(
− 459 persons were killed: 388 males on August 15 and 71
females on August 16.
− 727 were kidnapped on August 15. One year later, 304 are
still held captive by ISIS.
− 42 orphans in camps.
− 63 annihilated families.
− 47 families having only one survivor.
− 17 families having only two survivors.
− The number of families having all members safe is 25 out of
300.
Two survived sisters who were kidnapped by ISIS for 9 months
(1( Daoud Murad Khatari, Statistics on the Kujo massacre on August 15, 2014.in The
Last Farman, Baghdad, 2015.
113
Stories of survivors of this genocide have not yet been
documented. Some have survived the genocide, especially
kidnapped children recruited for fight, but are still under the
mercy and command of ISIS. Following are the figures of the
survivors of the Kujo massacre:(1(
− 544 survivors on the day of invasion on August 15, 2014.
− 19 people survived the massacre through hiding under
corpses.
− 31 kidnapped children trained by ISIS for fighting.
− 423 survivors in Iraq and Syria: 92 girls, 198 children, 116
women and 17 men.
Êzidî women were not only exploited in sexual slavery, but
also enslaved with Êzidî men and children under exhausting
circumstances in ranches, poultry farms and houses controlled by
ISIS, say eyewitnesses who escaped from ISIS.(2(
The capture and rape of Êzidî women by ISIS extremists is a
special kind of attack that has to concern the world since it is a
gender-based attack. However, it is much more than that, since
it has been used as a means for ethnic cleansing to achieve goals
beyond the raping and using of women in the slave trade of the 21st
century.
Êzidî women have been exploited in the war with a view to
collectively intimidate, humiliate and degrade a religious minority
and also to impact its ethnic structure. This act is part of a series
of genocides – locally known as firmans(3( – that have been
afflicted upon the Êzidîs. In essence, they are a continuation of
the policies that have sought to root them out, change their creed
(1( Daoud Murad Khatari, Statistics on the Kujo massacre on August 15, 2014.
(2( Kheder Domali, Black Death, Tragedies of Êzidî Women in ISIS’s Grip, Khani
Publisher, Dahuk, 2015, p. 44-47.
(3( According to Êzidî scholar Murad Suleiman Alo, the word irman comes from the
Persian farmân, meaning ‘decree’ or ‘order.’ In Turkish, it is called ferman, which is
an irreversible order by the Porte, i.e. the Sultan himself.
114
and affect their unique ethnic and religious structure. The acts
that constitute the pillars of this crime are similar to what the
Turks did to the Armenians when they forced Armenian women
to convert to Islam. Similarly, these criminal acts are the same as
what the Serbs did to Bosnian women and what the Hutu did to
Tutsi women.(1(
II. Welcoming female survivors
The invasion of ISIS of the Êzidî areas and villages south of
the Sinjar Mountains, a red rocky mass with a bloody history,
constituted the 73rd firman in the Êzidîs’ memory, thus establishing
the infrastructure of the slavery of men and women in the 21st
century.
That infrastructure was already established with a web of
warehouses to captivate victims; show rooms to photograph,
examine and sell Êzidî women and girls; and many vehicles for
transportation. (2(
The Êzidî genocide and the enslaving of Êzidî women have
crowned a history of misunderstanding for this non-missionary
ethnic minority considered by neighbours to be polytheistic. All
literature issued about this minority since the early 20th century by
authors and scholars whose works we have analyzed in Chapter II
have been an introduction, even if unintentional, to the atrocities
inflicted on it.
Baba Sheikh, the Êzidîs’ highest religious leader, issued a
statement to face the coercive conversion of Êzidî dogma, appease
Êzidîs’ concerns that such attempts would not affect the purity
of belonging to Êzidîsm, and call for welcoming the kidnapped
and reintegrating them into society. This statement, along with
(1( Saad Salloum, The Female Captives of the 21st Century: Êzidî Women as a Weapon
in the Ethnic Cleansing War, in «Mada Newspaper», issue n. 3352, May 2, 2015.
(2( Horriied by ISIS’ Use of Sex Slaves, Letter to the Editor, in «The New York Times»,
August 18, 2015, and Erika Allen, Kidnapping and Sex Slavery: Covering ISIS’
Religious Justiication for Rape, in «The New York Times», August 14, 2015.
115
other endeavours tries to contain the threat jeopardizing the Êzidî
identity and existence. (1(
Marrying raped or survived women was both an example
establishing an Êzidî identity overcoming the genocide, and
liberation from the traditions that used to persecute and look
down on women or refuse to accept raped women. With such
behaviours and stories, the Êzidîs have managed to show to the
world another image transcending the stereotypes and prejudices
of a closed traditional community like the Êzidî community.
Marking the first anniversary of the Kujo massacre, a greeting
ceremony of female Êzidî survivors at the sacred temple of Lalish
on August 15, 2015, drew a new stage, symbolically celebrating
the victims in a solemn way, emphasizing a unique example in the
history of social transformation of religious groups in the Middle
East.
With religious hymns, tambourines and flutes, the survivors
were received by Qawwals and then by clergymen and Lalish
Temple priests, and then they were baptized in the water of Kaniya
Sipi (the White Spring) according to Êzidî rituals. Êzidî young men
were awaiting them with red roses in hand for marriage proposals.
One of these young men, called Jamal Bir Haydar, a previous
volunteer in the fighting Êzidî units against ISIS, declared His
marriage to His beloved, once kidnapped then managed to escape,
Asmahan Bir Ibrahim Bir Meshkou in the Lalish Temple with the
blessing of Baba Sheikh. Another story worth mentioning is that
of Êzidî Ali, who volunteered in the armed Êzidî forces and set His
girl free, an ISIS slave, Vian Mirza and proposed to her her after
she was enrolled in a German special rehabilitation program for
physical and psychological treatment for Êzidî female survivors.
Widely celebrated, these stories, along with the greeting of the
female survivors in the Lalish Temple, constitute the community’s
(1( Statement n. 28 by Baba Sheikh, the religious leader of Êzidîs around the world,
dated February 6, 2015.
116
rites of passage under the supervision and blessing of its leaders.
Êzidîs’ Emir Tahseen Said Bek congratulated those young men for
their marriage and courage in taking such a step, and encouraged
others to follow suit. “We prove to the world that we are a religion
and creed of forgiveness, peace, brotherly relations and love,” says
the Emir.(1(
Only survivors’ stories will divulge the true effect of such steps.
“I had two opportunities to escape, but I was scared of being
unaccepted by the community,” says a survivor. “A friend however
told me that Baba Sheikh, the religious council, and all Êzidîs
support our return. I told the rest of the kidnapped girls and that
motivated us to persist and resist.”(2(
III. Conflict over Sinjar
The other transformation undergone by the community is the
formation of a volunteer military force, known as the Sinjar Defense
Units (HPŞ) led by Haydar Shesho who came from Germany
to lead the liberation efforts. These Êzidî resistance forces even
raised their own flag. However, liberating the city from ISIS grew
more complicated when several political parties vied for influence
in Sinjar.
While the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) made organizational
changes in the city — upgrading its affiliate branches from the
administrative to the leadership level — the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) entrusted Qasim Shesho with the command of a
military brigade, presiding over another Êzidî force operating
under the peshmerga forces. The other main party in Sinjar — and
the most organized one — is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Thus, three Êzidî militias emerged struggling not only against ISIS
but also against each other over control of this vital area(3(.
(1( A statement by Emir Tahseen Said Bek, emir of Êzidîs in Iraq and the world,
congratulating Êzidî female survivors, published on www.bahzani.net (last browsed
in December 2015).
(2( Kheder Domali, Black Death, ibid, p. 148.
(3( Saad Salloum, Yazidi inighting, disputes over Sinjar stall battle against Islamic
117
1. Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ): The YBŞ are part of The PKK
and consist of Êzidîs from Turkey and Syria. The group
has an all-women offshoot, the “Êzidxan Women’s Units”
(YJÊ). A number of European Êzidîs, mostly from Germany
— the European country with the largest Êzidî community
outside Iraq — have joined the YBŞ. This group of 1,200
ighters was trained by the People’s Protection Units (YPG)
in Syria. Many Êzidî volunteers also undergo training in the
Syrian governorate of Al-Hassakah. In late 2014, the PKK
also established the Sinjar self-Administration Unit and the
Council of Sinjar Êzidîs which is comprised of 27 members
representing the displaced Êzidîs in the Nowruz refugee
camp in Al-Malikiyah, in the Al-Hassakah Governorate,
and in refugee camps in Turkey and Mount Sinjar. The
council is tasked with setting the foundations for the selfadministration of Al-Hassakah. In January 2015, President
Massoud Barzani said the move was “a step by the PKK to
form a Sinjar canton.”
2. Sinjar Defense Units (HPŞ): The HPŞ, The second largest
Êzidî armed force, is made up of 5,000 ighters, including
400 women. The leadership of this force maintains ties with
the PUK, as HPŞ leader Haydar Shesho is a member of the
party. As a result of the political conlict over the control of
Sinjar, Shesho was arrested in early April 2015 by security
services in the Kurdistan Region. The move infuriated
Êzidîs and set off a wave of denunciations and protests on
April 7 in Êzidî cities such as Zakho and in refugee camps in
the Kurdistan Region. The Kurdish Ministry of Peshmerga
(KDP) prohibits the formation of any independent military
force as its policy requires that all religious and nationalist
armed forces operate under it and follow its orders. The KDR
is angry with Shesho for more than forming a force outside
its framework and receiving money from the PUK without
the knowledge of the Kurdistan Region. “Shesho’s deiance
of the Kurdistan Region’s authority went further, setting up
an independent administration and lag for Sinjar,” said the
State, in “AL-monitor”, August 18, 2015.
118
KRG President Barzani on April 8, 2015. This crisis revealed
a political struggle between Kurds and Shiites for inluence
over Êzidî forces in areas that the Kurds believe are an integral
part of their regions, while they are administratively subject
to the Iraqi federal government. This crisis also reveals the
conlict over Sinjar between the two major Kurdish parties,
the PUK and the KDP. Since Shesho was released on April 13
as a result of pressures by the PUK, the HPŞ, with a tendency
for independence, has been discussing the usefulness of
its accession to the KDp. The primary objection is HPŞ’
unwillingness to change its name, insisting that dozens of its
members were killed while ighting under this name and it
must be kept to honor them.
3. The third armed force is led by Qasim Shesho and it operates
under the supervision of the peshmerga forces in the lands
surrounding Sharaf al-Deen temple shrine, one of the holiest
sites for Êzidîs that ISIS tried to burn after invading Sinjar.
Shesho and hundreds of Êzidîs strongly defended the shrine,
refusing to leave the area even after ISIS took over Sinjar in
August 2014.
On August 3, 2015, marking the one-year anniversary of the
invasion of Sinjar, President Barzani announced that Sinjar was
to become a governorate linked to the Kurdistan Region and shall
be handed over to no other authority. Majed Hassan, a researcher
specializing in Êzidî affairs at the University of Bamberg,
Germany, believes that Barzani’s statement shows the importance
of Sinjar in the future of the political conflict over the leadership
of the Kurdistan Region, since there are up to half a million Êzidîs
in the Kurdistan Region. This is a pull factor for the KDP which
started losing its popular bases in the Kurdistan Region due to
competition with other opposition parties, such as the PUK and
the Gorran movement, as well as the rise of the influence of Islamic
movements in Kurdistan.(1(
An Êzidî activist interviewed during last August 2015, expressed
(1( From Author’s correspondence with the scholar.
119
concerns that Sinjar will remain the focus of lasting political
conflicts. “Êzidîs lost trust in all parties,” he said. “The Federal
Government failed to provide us with protection when ISIS
invaded Nineveh Governorate, and the government of Nineveh
Governorate, too, was unable for years to efficiently and equitably
manage the governorate. The Kurdistan Regional Government
was unable to protect Sinjar. This enabled ISIS to advance and
occupy the city and commit unspeakable atrocities.”(1(
There is no way to predict the future of Sinjar until it is
liberated from ISIS, the enemy of all these forces. But even after
the liberation of the city from ISIS, the struggle over this Êzidî city
and its sacred mountain will continue to haunt the Êzidîs over the
next years and place them in front of options tackled by the last
chapter of this book.
(1( From an Author’s interview with the activist.
120
CHAPTER VII
SCENARIOS OF ÊZIDÎS’ FUTURE IN IRAQ
During the British Mandate for Iraq, the Êzidî areas were
disputed by three powers: Turkey, France and Britain. In light of
the moving political border of mandated areas, it was not easy for
the Êzidîs to choose which body they should be affiliated with and
which power they should ally with. Currently, the Êzidîs are at a
crossroad and they have to make calls as tough as the ones they
made when establishing modern Iraq.
Some believe that it is better for them to remain within one
Iraq, some support acceding to the Kurdistan Region, some call
for international protection of Êzidî territories, while others have
lost hope and believe that migration is the final solution in light of
absolute mistrust of others.
I. Mass migration scenario
Mass migration is no ideal solution or easy option. Most Êzidîs
today are thinking of migrating abroad because they have no
alternative options that ensure stability. It is important to realize
that direct violence and targeting the Êzidîs are not the major
reason for the migration call; rather, there are other reasons, such
as social discrimination, the rise of militant Islam, the struggle
over Êzidî disputed areas, the loss of confidence in others and in
the future, poor parliamentary representation of Êzidîs at the level
121
of both Iraq and Kurdistan Region, and the spread of religious
discourses of hate.
What we are witnessing today is not optional migration, but
forced mass migration unprecedented in the country, which
forebodes the loss of diversity for good.(1( This migration is not
voluntary for the displaced who have lost their cities and villages
due to ISIS occupation of Nineveh Governorate. Even the Êzidîs
living outside ISIS-controlled areas and who have not been directly
threatened by ISIS are selling their property and migrating forever.
Êzidî scholar Hesso Hourami argues that many Êzidî families in
Shekhan, Dahuk, Sharya, Khank and Zakho have offered their
houses and property for sale in preparation for migration for fear
of the atmosphere of religious extremism phasing in all around,
which, in essence, is no different than the atmosphere of ISIS.(2(
According to sources from within Êzidîs communities in the
Kurdistan Region, specifically in Dahuk Governorate and Nineveh
Plain, the migration of Êzidîs to other countries – to Europe
in particular – is the largest in the country. And according to
unofficial estimates, 10-15 Êzidîs migrate every day.(3(
Êzidî activist Muyassar Adani lists a number of reasons for youth
migration, including a lack of freedom of opinion where many
Êzidîs have been arrested once expressing their view in defense of
the Êzidîs. Young Êzidîs are disappointed and are looking for an
alternative option through migration having lost their confidence
in the future.(4(
Êzidî activist Jalal Lazkini mentions other reasons, such as
poor representation of Êzidî youth in different governmental
(1( Saad Salloum, End of Diversity in Iraq, History under the Sword: Tracking Cultural
Heritage Destruction, Human Migration, and the Dynamic Nature of Conlict in
Iraq, Exploratory Seminar at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard
University,July 9-10, 2015.
(2( From the author’s correspondence with scholar Hesso Hourami.
(3( Saad Salloum, et al., In the Wind: Iraq’s Minorities Following ISIS Tsunami, Report
1, Masarat, Baghdad, 2015.
(4( From an interview with Muyassar Adani, 26 years old, who comes from the Sinjar
District.
122
institutions, which has adversely affected their self-confidence
and prevented them from developing their capacities, let alone
the harassments they have suffered and their marginalization in
the running of their affairs in IDP camps and host communities.(1(
Another Êzidî activist points to Êzidîs’ frustration because they
do not feel they are taken seriously to minimize violations and
discrimination against them. “The Êzidîs and the liberation of
their areas from ISIS are dealt with in a vague way,” says Salem.
“Political conflicts over power among major forces in the country
frustrate the Êzidîs because they feel as if a minor matter.”(2(
Scholar Majed Hassan who is specialized in Êzidî affairs
mentions other discrimination aspects. All senior security,
intelligence and party officials in Êzidî areas, says Majed, are
Muslim Kurds, while Êzidîs are vested with minor responsibilities
although many of them are competent and academics who are
able to assume any position. “I believe that Kurdistan still looks
down on the Êzidîs as if only peasants and benighted tribes,” says
Hassan.(3(
Therefore, any solutions to reduce migration should examine
root and indirect causes, in order to provide an attractive
environment that encourages Êzidîs to stay, and also to provide
alternative options to mass migration which threatens the future
of the pluralistic identity of the country.
II. Internal reform scenario
Some are of the view that the future of Êzidî existence depends
on putting Êzidîs’ own house in order. Given the challenges
facing this non-missionary group that is experiencing fierce social
transformations, Êzidî elites have called for internal reforms,
mainly reforming the traditional religious structure of the group,
(1( From an Author’s interview with Jalal Lazkini, Sharya, Dahuk Governorate
(2( The Êzidî activistt was interviewed by the Author in August 2015.
(3( From the Author’s correspondence with Êzidî scholar Majed Hassan who is
specialized in Religious Minorities in Bamberg University, Germany.
123
in terms of reforming both the religious institution and the
traditional caste system.
1. Reforming the religious institution
There are Êzidî calls to reform the Êzidî religious institution;
its theocratic caste system has made it incompetent to face the
current challenges. Owing to the fact that there is no unified
authority for Êzidîs, a project has been proposed to form a Êzidî
Supreme Council in order to expand the representation of various
segments and classes of Êzidî society beyond the Êzidî Spiritual
Council and increase their participation in managing the affairs
of the group. The council aims to be a semi-parliament for Êzidîs,
but away from the political influences of Kurdish political parties
so as to maintain its independence, improve their participation
in the public life, and constitute a unified body that effectively
represents all classes and intellectual and cultural orientations of
the Êzidî community.
2. Reforming the caste system
Êzidî elites have called for other reforms, such as reforming the
Êzidî caste system. Scholar Badal Faqir Hajji has called for the
recognition of the seventh group as a way out of the problem of
forbidden exogamy among the three Êzidî castes – Sheikhs, Pirs
and Mureeds – so as to become the fourth caste. The seventh
group refers to the seventh Êzidî marriage group which has been
created by young Êzidîs born abroad. This group is governed by
no traditional or religious authority and it is a social power that
advocates natural, partial reforms for a number of the other six
vulnerable marriage groups which will not have the ability to
resist the forces of change, reform and renewal.(1( Hajji proposes
to name the seventh group Gaka which means “the good” in
Kurdish.(2( In an article he re-published in His book Êzidîsm and
(1( Badal Faqir Hajji, Êzidîs and Reform: Reforming the System and Laws of Êzidî
Castes and Marriage Groups, Arbil, 2012, p.5.
(2( Badal Faqir Hajji, Êzidîs and Reform: Reforming the System and Laws of Êzidî
Castes and Marriage Groups, Arbil, 2012, p.14.
124
the Tough Exam, which tackles aspects of this issue, Khalil Jundi
encouraged reforms and renewal.
Scholar Edo Baba Sheikh believes that such a reforming step is
very complex and challenging. He argues that the Mir and Êzidî
clergymen lack courage to permit exogamy among castes.(1( Dr.
Mamo Othman believes that the caste system, though peculiar,
is changeable in Êzidîsm and is a social norm rather than a pillar
of the religion. The system changes with new generations and it
is originally, says Othman, a Sufi system that was introduced to
Êzidîsm at some point during the period 1140-1265 because there
was a need for it at the time, while Êzidîsm is older. Othman
suggests initiating a group of reforms that precedes the reform of
the caste system, such as removing the impacts that was introduced
to Êzidî religious prayers from other religions, like Islam.(2(
3. Pros and cons
Such reforms have supporters and detractors. Detractors believe
that maintaining Êzidî traditions and heritage unchanged is part
of the preservation of Êzidîsm. They argue that it is complex and
even impossible to reform a non-missionary religion. Reforming
the religious institution and permitting exogamy among castes
may encourage exogamy with followers of other religions and
consequently eliminate the pure non-preaching nature of Êzidîsm
and cause the closed religious group to turn into merely a population
or a tribe that is merged in a Muslim Kurdish atmosphere and
cease to be a religion and a group with unique peculiarity.
These views are no more than the result of the isolation of the
group over centuries and of the fears of its extinction due to its
opening up to social changes and modernization, that may lead
to the vanishing of a cult that has kept its stability for centuries
(1( From the Author’s correspondence with scholar Edo Baba Sheikh.
(2( From the Author’s correspondence with Mamo Othman. For more information,
please see: Mamo Othman, Studies and Research on Êzidîsm’s Philosophy and
Identity, University of Dahuk, Dahuk, 2013, p.209-219.
125
despite dozens of genocides, through sticking to the traditional
structure of the religion and its castes.
On the other hand, reform supporters believe that migration to
Europe has changed the social nature of Êzidîs and opened their
minds to a culturally different environment. Consequently, there
have been cases of exogamy among castes, which is a religious
taboo, and even cases of Êzidî men marrying foreign women,
which violates the teachings of a closed religion that prohibits
exogamy with other religions. Therefore, responding to reform is
a current need before reforms are carried out naturally and due to
cultural and social development.
III. Special zone under international protection
scenario
Others see the best possible solutions to stop Êzidîs’ migration
and to put an end to the political conflict over their areas is to put
these areas under international protection.
Obviously, Êzidîs’ distrust of the solutions provided by the Iraqi
Federal Government or the KRG has made Êzidîs desire that the
international community supervise the management of their areas
to ensure their independence as well as the none-interference in
their affairs. However, the challenges facing this option are the
fact that the international community does not want to engage
itself in internal conflicts on the one hand, and a lack of agreement
on a unified option among Êzidîs’ representatives themselves, due
to their submitting to the hegemony of the political forces of major
groups and the internal conflicts among different Êzidî leaders
and elites on the other.(1( This causes Êzidîs to reach a dead end
and to consider migration, though challenging and complex, to be
a more secure option in the long run.
(1( For more information on the dificulties and complexities of this scenario, see: Saad
Salloum, Creative Diversity: A Roadmap to Enhance Pluralism in Iraq, Masarat,
Baghdad, 2013, p.41-44.
126
IV. Special situation of Êzidî areas scenario
Another option is establishing a special situation for Êzidî areas
whereby Êzidîs are granted more administrative autonomy in the
running of their affairs in an optimal way that helps promote the
existence of the group, minimizes the large levels of migration
of Êzidîs, distances them from the political conflicts of major
forces which have made Êzidî areas disputed areas, enhances
Êzidîs’ positive participation in the public life, and eliminates
the discrimination and marginalization they have suffered in the
running of their areas.
Administrative autonomy grants minorities their rights to
independently manage their political, economic and educational
affairs. This is the aim of the constitutional articles on minorities’
rights where Article 116 of the Iraqi Constitution states: “The
federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized
capital, regions, and governorates, as well as local administrations.”
Articles 117 through 124 include provisions on the regions, the
governorates and the capital. Article 125 – the first in Chapter
IV The Local Administration – states: “This Constitution shall
guarantee the administrative, political, cultural, and educational
rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans,
Assyrians, and all other constituents, and this shall be regulated
by law.”
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this option depends on
the availability of a favorable atmosphere and conditions. This
mainly requires independent representatives of the group who are
neither involved in narrow political conflicts nor affiliated with the
political forces of major groups. In addition, there is a need for the
UN to internationally supervise the application of this option to
ensure transparency and help restore the Êzidîs’ confidence. Then,
the Êzidîs themselves can gradually choose with no pressures or
coercion the optimal form to run and develop their areas while
preserving the country’s unity and pluralism.
Generally speaking, it is important to launch an internationally
127
supervised mandating operation for the disputed internal borders
which are the rich diversity areas in the country, including the
Êzidî areas which represent clearly disputed between the Arabs
and the Kurds in a conflict that may engage the country in an
imminent internal war. Enforcing Article 125 of the Constitution
and turning it into legislation that guarantees minorities’ selfadministration of their disputed areas may be an effective solution
that ends the conflicts of major forces over them, and ensures the
minorities the right to self-administration of their affairs without
necessarily supporting their wish of secession. Self-administration
is proposed here under the governorate and it includes the vesting
of minimum administrative powers to the minorities to run their
affairs independently. In this context, it is important to call upon
the international coalition against ISIS, as well as the UN and the
EU, to come up with a proper approach to initiate negotiations
that guarantee Êzidîs’ rights in their historical areas.
Êzidî woman from Sinjar led to Dohuk after the invasion of ISIS to her
128
Êzidî of Sinjar is smoking tobacco in one of Dohuk camps after the
invasion of ISIS to His city
129
130
CONCLUSION
THE GENOCIDE MESSAGE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The outrageous atrocities committed by ISIS against Êzidîs
have provoked many condemnations worldwide. For example, the
Special Advisors of the UN Secretary General on the Prevention
of Genocide, Adama Dieng, and on the Responsibility to Protect,
Jennifer Welsh, have condemned in the strongest terms the mass
execution of Êzidîs by ISIS in Sinjar. They have also expressed
alarm at reports of the abduction and enslaving of women.
“These reports are shocking in the extreme. They show, in very
clear terms, the complete absence of humanity of the perpetrators
of these crimes,” stated the Special Advisors. They added that such
acts “constitute grave violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law and may amount to war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The reports we have received of acts committed
by the “Islamic State” may also point to the risk of genocide.”(1(
Despite large-scale condemnations and sympathy for Êzidîs,
possible intervention to stop or limit the genocide remains limited.
“The federal government has not seriously paid attention to Êzidî
tragedy,” says Amina Said, a previous Êzidî parliament member.
“There have been no procedures or follow-up to know the fate
of 5,000 Êzidî women. Even the international community only
offers condemnation and sympathy. Despite dozens of interviews
(1( Statement by Adama Dieng, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention
of Genocide, and Jennifer Welsh, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary- General on the
Responsibility to Protect, on the situation in Iraq, 12 August 2014.
131
and meetings with the European Union, the United Nations and
American decision makers, no serious measures have been taken
to rescue these abducted women although it is a humanitarian
issue supposed to have priority among international issues.”(1(
The Êzidî genocide represents a new episode in the series of
international failures in stopping genocides since World War II.
The death toll of genocides in the 20th century was over 60 million
victims, including those in Bosnia and Rwanda and excluding
those of Darfur and Iraq. This should urge us to seek to prevent
that violence from being repeated through the confrontation of
classification and discrimination policies, a favorable environment
for genocides.
The genocides of Êzidîs and other minorities in Iraq and the
previous genocides in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Eastern Timor and
Darfur prove that the genocidal threat is still a major issue in
international politics. However, developing an effective mechanism
to ward off future genocides has proven an utter failure.
The international community’s promises have failed to stop
genocides and this failure reeks of opportunism. Superpowers
are involved and conniving.
A quick and appropriate human treatment of the Êzidî genocide
necessitates restructuring international organizations to have
the perpetrators convicted and future genocides prohibited.
Genocides should encourage us, as advocates of diversity, to
launch a transnational and transcultural informal coalition to face
international tycoons and business ethno-sectarian elites. This
coalition could be called ‘International Victim Coalition’ and can
include many peacemakers of intellects, civil activists, academics
and clergymen. It should develop concrete measures to be adopted
by peacemakers and the international community in order to
better respond to forthcoming genocides.
(1( Saad Salloum, In the Wind, Iraq’s Minorities Following IS’ Tsunami, Violations of Minorities’
Rights in Iraq, Report n. 1, Masarat, 2015, p.43.
132
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Centre for Research, Baghdad, 2013.
W. A. Wigram and E. T. A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind:
Life in Eastern Kurdistan, London, 1922, translated into
Arabic, Arbil, 2010 Abdurrazzaq Hassani, Êzidîs in their
Present and Past, Sidon, 1967.
Idem, Satanists, Sidon, 1931
Zuhair Kadhim Abboud, Êzidîsm, Beirut, 2005.
Idem, Êzidîsm and Abraham’s First Papers, Berlin, 2010
Decrees and Legislation
-
1925 Iraq’s Constitution (Basic Law).
Annex to the Religious Cult Patronage Law (the religious
cults oficially recognized in Iraq) No. 32 of 1981.
Iraqi Constitution, 2005.
Local Language Law No. 74 of 1931, published in «the Iraqi
Oficial Gazette», issue 989, June 1931.
Public Holiday Law No. 21 of 1958 as amended, published
in «the Iraqi Oficial Gazette», issue 320, March 15,1960.
136
-
-
Public Holiday Law No. 72 of 1931 as amended by Law No.
29 of 1937, published in «the Iraqi Oficial Gazette», issue
1579, July 03, 1937.
The Christian, Êzidî and Mandaean Sabian Endowment Law
No. 58 of 2012. published in «the Iraqi Oficial Gazette»,,
issue 4254/2012
Classified or limitedly circulated books
-
-
-
General Military Intelligence Service, Kurdish Clans in
Iraq, (classiied), Military Printing Directorate, Baghdad,
undated.
Saad Ibrahim A’adhami, Religious and Ethnic Minorities
and their Effect on the Political and Social Reality in
Nineveh Governorate, Security Development Center,
issued under the supervision of the Media Science Ofice,
Cultural Qualiication and Development Centre, Baghdad,
1982.
The Presidency, General Military Intelligence Service,
Psychological Intelligence Section, Êzidî Personality,
(limitedly circulated), Military Print Directorate, Baghdad,
undated.
Reports
-
Saad Salloum et al., In the Wind: Iraq’s Minorities
Following ISIS Tsunami, Violation of Minorities’ Rights
report, Masarat, Baghdad, 2015.
Dissertations
-
Adnan Zayyan Farhan, British Policy towards Religious
Minorities in Iraq 1914-1941, unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Faculty of Arts, University of Dahuk, 2009.
137
-
-
Hassoun Abboud Jizani, Êzidîsm in Iraq, master’s thesis,
College of Basic Education, Al-Mustansiriyah University,
Baghdad, 2014.
Munther Abdulmajeed Badri, Geography of Religious
Minorities in Iraq, unpublished master’s thesis, College of
Arts, University of Baghdad, 1975.
Studies and research
-
-
Badal Faqir Hajji, Êzidîs and Reform: Reforming the
System and Laws of Êzidî Castes and Marriage Groups,
Arbil, 2012.
Saad Salloum, Êzidîs in Iraq: Wounded Memory and
Current Genocide, Al-Arabiya Institute for Studies, August
6, 2014.
List of Author’s Interviews and correspondence
-
-
An interview with anonymous Êzidî activist, August 2015.
An interview with Muyassar Adani who comes from the
Sinjar
District.
An interview with Jalal Lazkini, Sharya, Dahuk Governorate
Interviews with a number of Êzidî youth on the issues of
identity and national and religious belonging (2011-2013).
Interviews with a number of Êzidîs in Germany and Holland
(2014-2015).
Mutual correspondence with Êzidî activists inside and
outside Iraq, July and December, 2014, and July, 2015.
The author’s correspondence with scholar Majed Hassan,
who is specialized in Religious Minorities in Bamberg
University, Germany.
The author’s correspondence with Dr. Mamo Othman.
The author’s correspondence with Edo Baba Sheikh.
138
-
The author’s correspondence with scholar Hesso Hourami.
Articles on Magazines and newspapers
-
-
-
A statement by the Êzidî Supreme Spiritual Council, Lalish
magazine, issue 31, 2010.
Abdurrazzaq Hassani, Religious Feasts of Êzidîsm, in
«Folklore magazine», issue 7, 1973.
Idem, Êzidîs: Are They Satanists? in «Al Hayat» London,
August 26, 2005.
Abu Barakat, Divinity in Êzidîsm, in «Folklore magazine»,
issue n. 10, Iraqi Ministry of Information, 1973.
George Habib, Êzidîsm, in «Folklore magazine», issue n.
1, 1974.
George Habib, Satanists Too, Ibid., issue n. 2, 1973.
George Habib, Yazid, Ibid., issue n. 4, 1974.
Khedr Suleiman, Literature of Kurds and Êzidîs, Ibid.,
issue n.10, 1974.
«Masarat magazine»: a special issue on Êzidîsm, Issue n.
2, 2005.
Mir Bayazid al-Umawi, Feasts of Êzidîsm, ibid., issue n.9,
1973.
Mir Bayazidal-Umawi, The Hereditary System of Êzidî
Umayyads, ibid. issues n. 2-3, 1975
Idem, The Hereditary System of Êzidî Umayyads, ibid.
issues n. 2-3, 1975.
Idem, Feasts of Êzidîsm, ibid., issue n. 9, 1973.
Qader Salim Shammo, Êzidîs and Modern Iraqi State,
Lalish magazine, Lalish Cultural and Social Centre, Dahuk,
issue n. 29, July 2009.
Saad Salloum, Re-reading the History of Baha’is in Iraq,
in «Mada newspaper», (9 episodes), issues n. 3324-3342,
Baghdad, March-April, 2015.
Idem, Re-reading the History of Jews in Iraq, Ibid., (8
139
-
episodes), issues n. 3298-3308, February-March, 2015
Idem, I am Êzidî, Ibid., issue n. 3191, October 14, 2014.
Idem, Identity Policies in Modern Iraq, in «Ittijahat
magazine», Baghdad, issue n. 1, 2008.
Tawiq Wahbi, Êzidîsm: Remains of Mithraism, Lalish
magazine, issues 2-3, the Lalish Center, Dahuk, 1994.
Foreign Sources in English
-
-
-
-
-
-
Birgul Acikyildiz, The Yezidis: The History of a Community,
Culture and Religion, London-New York, 2014.
Chris Chapman, Improving security for minorities in Iraq,
London, Minority Rights Group International, 2011.
E. S. Drower, Peacock Angel: Being some Account of
Votaries of a Secret Cult and their Sanctuaries, London,
First Edition, 1941.
Erika Allen, Kidnapping and Sex Slavery: Covering ISIS’
Religious Justiication for Rape, in «The New York Times»,
August 14, 2015.
Garnik Asatrian and Victoria Arakelova, Malak-Tāwūs:
The Peacock Angel of the Yezidis, in Iran & the Caucasus,
Vol. 7, n. 1-2, Leiden, 2003.
Horriied by ISIS’ Use of Sex Slaves, Letter to the Editor, in
«The New York Times», August 18, 2015.
Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal
Framework, Documentation and Human Rights, Institute
for International Law and Human Rights, Washington,
D.C., 2013.
Saad Salloum, Yazidi inighting, disputes over Sinjar stall
battle against Islamic State, in «Al-Monitor», August 18,
2015
Idem, End of Diversity in Iraq, History under the
Sword: Tracking Cultural Heritage Destruction, Human
Migration, and the Dynamic Nature of Conlict in Iraq,
140
-
Exploratory Seminar at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced
Study, Harvard University, July 9-10, 2015
Statement by Adama Dieng, Special Advisor to the UN
Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, and
Jennifer Welsh, Special Advisor to the UN SecretaryGeneral on the Responsibility to Protect, on the situation
in Iraq, August 12, 2014
References in Kurdish
-
Khedr Suleiman and Khalil Jundi, Yazdiati, Baghdad, 1979
141
142
Saad Salloum was born in Baghdad in 1975. He is the general
coordinator of the Masarat Foundation for Cultural and Media
Development (MCMD), and editor-in-chief of its magazine,
"Masarat." Salloum is one of the founders of the Iraqi Council for
Interfaith Dialogue (ICID), and the Head of Studies and Research
Department at the Political Sciences College, Al- Mustansiriya
University in Baghdad. He is also a Member of the Scientific
Committee at the Baghdad Academy for Human Sciences,
managed by the Dominican Fathers in Iraq.
Salloum’s publications include Minorities in Iraq: Memory, Identity,
and Challenges, 2013; Different and Equal, 2013; Creative
Diversity, 2013, Christians in Iraq, 2014; Policies Ethnicities in
Iraq: From the Ottomans to the Present, 2014; and 100 Illusions
about Minorities in Iraq, 2015. and Unity in Diversity : Promoting
Pluralism and Intercultural Citizenship in Iraq, 2015.
Salloum’s documentaries include Conditional Freedom, 2010;
Minority at Risk, 2011; Silent Scheherazade, 2011; Voices, 2012;
Minorities in the Wind, 2012; Nation at Risk, 2012; Our Creative
Diversity, 2013; and The Last Decree (2014).
saadsalloum@yahoo.com
saadsalloum1975@gmail.com
MCMD: http://masaratiraq.org
https://independent.academia.edu/SaadSalloum
143
144
GLOSSARY OF ÊZIDÎS TERMS
Phrases
Definition
Page no.
Adonis
Adonis (Greek: Aδωνις), in Greek
mythology, is a central figure in
various mystery religions.(1(
33
Ajwa
Ajwa is a type of dessert which is a
thick sweet bread. Êzidîs handout this
dessert to their families and relatives
in Ajwa holiday.
49
Ashura
Ashura is an Islamic holiday
observed on the 10th of Muharram,
the first month of the Islamic year. The
word Ashura means “10,” denoting the
date of the holiday.(2(
100
Baal
The name of the supreme god
worshiped in ancient Canaan and
Phoenicia.(3(
33
Balanda day
Balanda holiday is the “Revival” or
“Resurrection.”
Êzidîs celebrate Balanda holiday
in the first week of January, they visit
tombs and handout food.
49
fatwas are religious advisory
opinions which are legislated by
scholars of Islamic law (Sharia). These
fatwas are related to the commands
and prohibitions, permissions (Halal)
and prohibitions (Haram) etc. The
fatwas are issued to cover many
political, social, economic, or religious
aspects.
14-
Firman is a Persian term of a
document about «an order, judgment,
or constitution» which has to be signed
by the Ottoman ruler as an irreversible
decision. The Êzidîs genocides orders
were issued in firmans, since then
these genocides become firmans.
14-
fatwas
Firmans
145
The holy book of Mandaeans “The
Great Book.”
29
Kitêba Cilwe
One of Êzidîs holy book which
shows the power of God as well as the
granted power from God to Melek
Taus.
48
Lalish (Valley &
Temple)
“The entire Lalish valley is a
reflection of the mystic, social and
political life of Yezidism.”(4(
“The sanctuary of Shaykh Adī, the
monumental complex of the Yezidis,
lies at Lalish, 35 kilometers north of
Mosul, in Iraqi Kurdistan.”
Mahya
Mahya is an Êzidîs overnight
holiday, people and Clerics pray
together hopping their wishes are
achieved.
49
Mir, mir
Al- Amir (prince) is a religious and
worldly leader of Êzidîs in Iraq; he
lives in Ain Sfni city in the Shekhan
District. The current mir is Mir Tahsin
Saied, the prince of Êzidîs in the world.
48
Mishefa Reş
One of the Êzidîs holy books which
tells their historical story.
48
multi-strata
The multiclass nature of Êzidî
community, these classes belong to
different sources and their traditions
prevent intermarriage among classes
members.
58
Mureeds
Mureeds are most of the Êzidî
popular community who represents
the lowest religious class.
124
Pirs
A Persian word means (Al Tarica
pir), there are four pirs who are
responsible for organizing religious
issue of mureeds.
124
Ginza Rba
146
sanjaq
A bird’s sculpture (refers to MalakTāwūs position). This sculpture is
annually round among Êzidîs to
remind them about their religion and
rituals and keep them apart from other
religions impacts.
Seh Rsal
Sheikh
New Year’s Day
One class of Êzidî’s community
which has 40 Sheikh of 3 types: Adani,
Shamsani, and Qatani.
strata
Tammuz
Accumulation of historical fears.
Tammuz: was the name of a
Sumerian god of food and vegetation,
also worshiped in the later
Mesopotamian states(5(.
Takfir, Takfiri
Is the accusation of others of being
godless.
Tawwafat day
Êzidî’s new year festivals, which
are performed on the first Wednesday
of the eastern April. All Ezidi villages
celebrate this events by move around
the holy shrine in these villages.
26-
30
24-
99
33
6, 13 -
49
(1( W. (n.d.(. Adonis. Retrieved March 24, 2016, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adonis
(2(
“Ashura.” ReligionFacts.com. 10 Nov. 2015. Web. Accessed 23 Mar. 2016. <www.
religionfacts.com/ashura>
(3( Who was Baal? (n.d.(. Retrieved March 23, 2016, from http://www.gotquestions.org/whoBaal.html
(4) Birgül Açıkyıldız (2009). “The sanctuary of Shaykh Adī at Lalish: Centre of pilgrimage of
the Yezidis.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 72, p 301
(5) W. (n.d.). Tammuz. Retrieved March 25, 2016, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tammuz_
(deity(
147
148
Saad Salloum