Analysts believe that Israel initiated a chemical warfare (CW) program at some point in its history probably in the mid-1950s. [1] Intelligence sources have also suggested that Israel has previously developed, tested, produced, and possibly even deployed CW munitions. [2] 

Israel has traditionally taken a regional approach to WMD nonproliferation, based on bilateral inspection agreements, making Israel's signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 13 January 1993 its first significant experience with the international nonproliferation regime. [3] However, Israel's decision not to ratify the CWC unless and until the treaty gains broader regional participation remains consistent with the country's regional outlook. [4] Responding to growing chemical terrorism concerns, Israel strengthened its export control regulations on dual-use chemical technologies in 2004, bringing them in line with Australia Group standards. [5]

Israel's unique and nuanced security situation, sophisticated science and technology infrastructure, and longstanding philosophy of using science and technology as instruments of national security could provide both motive and means for an offensive CW. [6] While Israel likely recalibrates its CW attitude against the changing Middle East WMD landscape, it rarely issues CW-related official statements, and does not publicly discuss its activities, capabilities, or intentions. [7] However, Israeli defensive CW research regularly appears in open publications. [8] Official assessments have reported that Israel possesses advanced know-how and a "breakout capacity" in the CW field. [9] Ultimately, however, insufficient firm information exists to reconstruct Israel's CW program comprehensively.

Capabilities

Israel is believed to maintain advanced national scientific-technical CW research and development (R&D) infrastructure, in addition to well-respected academic and industrial chemistry communities. Israel openly publishes defensive CW research, but does not officially comment on its CW capabilities or policies. [10] According to the Swedish Defence Research Agency, there are several indicators to suggest that at some point,, Israel had an advanced CW program potentially capable of producing nerve agents, mustard gas, riot-control, and even "binary" nerve agents (agents comprised of two relatively harmless substances that become toxic when mixed in the field). [11]

Dual Capable Infrastructure

Israel's chemical industry is advanced and diverse and accounts for roughly 25% of Israel's revenues (excluding diamonds). [12] In the 1950's, well-educated migrant chemists from Europe built Israel's chemical industry, which today is one of the fastest growing chemical sectors in the world. [13] Prominent companies include Israel Chemicals Ltd., a major producer of such products as potash, phosphate fertilizers, phosphoric acid, and bromine, and Teva, the world's largest generic pharmaceutical maker. [14] Israel's research chemists also produce highly regarded scientific work. Over the past decade, Israeli chemists published research in quantities comparable to Turkey, Portugal, and Greece, and of quality, measured by average citation rate, comparable to Switzerland, Japan, and Ireland. [15] Regionally speaking, Turkey and Iran produce similar quantities of research, but Israeli research is cited twice as frequently. [16] Further indicating the sophistication of Israel's chemistry knowledge base, Aaron Ciechanover and Avram Hershko of Technion received the 2004 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, and Ada Yonath of the Weizmann Institute of Science received the 2009 Nobel Prize in Chemistry.

In terms of research on CWC-regulated toxic chemicals, over the past 20 years Israel produced the 17th highest quantity of research publications with the 11th highest average citation rate worldwide. Both rankings are higher than Israel's rankings for general chemistry, with Israel's toxic chemical research portfolio comparable in quantity with Brazil, Sweden, and Switzerland, and comparable in impact factor with Spain, Belgium, and Japan. Within the region, only Iran produces comparable quantities of research on CWC-regulated toxic chemicals, and Iranian research was cited roughly 60% as frequently as Israeli research over the past 20 years. [17]

Speculation about the dual-capable nature of Israeli chemistry and toxic chemicals research focuses on the Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR), a highly classified research center operated and funded by the Israel Ministry of Defense (MOD). [18] Karel Knip's 1999 survey of IIBR's publications reveals an overall "extensive effort to identify practical methods of synthesis for nerve gases (such as tabun, sarin, and VX) and other organophosphorous and fluorine compounds." [19] IIBR continues to publish defensive CW research openly, as do several other Israeli institutions, including Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, and the Weizmann Institute of Science. [20] Several prominent foreign institutions have collaborated on and co-authored defensive CW agent research with Israelis. [21]

A review of patent records illustrates ongoing Israeli commitment to biodefense research. Israeli scientists at the IIBR have conducted research into skin applications such as a decontaminating "gel" to neutralize chemical and biological agents. [22] Other Israeli research has led to European patents for similar technologies designed to prevent the absorption of substances ranging from the oil found in poison ivy to VX. [23] A series of recent Israeli patents concerns research into pesticide/nerve agent antidotes and treatments post-exposure. [24]

Strategic and Operational Aspects of Israel's CW Capabilities

Bibliographical surveys can indicate the general sophistication level of physical infrastructure and expertise. However, assessing strategy or operational status requires additional information. The Israeli government does not comment on speculation about its domestic CW program; declassified U.S. intelligence assessments that mention Israel also sanitized their actual Israeli CW assessments. [25] A 1983 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, however, revealed that Israel maintained a CW testing facility in the Negev desert. [26] Additionally, the Sunday Times in 1998 cited an Israeli military source in reporting that Israeli F-16 crews received training in loading active chemical and biological warheads onto airplanes; this suggests Israel's intent to maintain both chemical agents and a delivery system. [27] For decades Israel has closely monitored and prepared for potential CW threats from hostile neighbors. During the 1991 Iraq War, Israel took the unprecedented step of equipping its entire population with gas masks and recommending quarantine rooms in all Israeli homes. [28]

History

1948 to 1952: Science and Security — Independence and the IIBR

The ethos and individuals dominating Israeli security establishment attitudes during its founding motivated Israel's early pursuit of non-conventional arms. [29] David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founding father, firmly believed that small minorities in a hostile environment must protect themselves or face genocide. [30] Despite Israel's impressive victory in 1949, security fears and the assumption that deep and enduring Arab hostility would inevitably bring renewed war consumed Ben-Gurion. [31] Professor Ernst David Bergmann, an organic chemist, the Katzir brothers, Ephraim, a chemist and microbiologist, and Aharon, a biochemist, served for years as Ben-Gurion's informal scientific advisors on defense matters. According to Avner Cohen, the three scientists not only founded the Science Corps of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), or HEMED, but also reinforced Ben-Gurion's conviction that technology could provide Israel with a military advantage. [32]

Founded only three years after the end of World War II, the historical context surrounding Israel's establishment may have also contributed to Israel's CW outlook at the time, although the specific manner in which it did so remains open to interpretation. [33] Cohen contends that Ben-Gurion's belief that Israel must strengthen itself and its defensive capabilities using science and technology to survive may have encouraged CW development. [34] Eitan Barak, however, notes that the role of CW in the Holocaust could also have produced a visceral rejection of, or at least a hesitation towards, chemical weapons. [35]

Following independence, Israel reorganized its defense bureaucracy, and HEMED became one of several MOD-sponsored civilian research centers. [36] In 1952 the civilian Department for Research and Planning at the Ministry of Defense replaced HEMED, and in the same year a biology center and a chemistry center merged to form the Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR). [37] Bergmann insisted that Israel build a central laboratory for all biological and chemical R&D in the national interest. [38] By Cohen's account, although Ben-Gurion and his associates viewed the atomic bomb as the ultimate guarantor of Israel's security, CBW could bridge the gap until Israel realized a nuclear capability. [39] As the Arab states lacked CBW in the early 1950s, Israel had no motive to pursue defensive CBW research. Thus, Bergmann and his colleagues likely focused on "offensive" CW capabilities, much like American, British, and French CW programs of the time. [40]

1955 to 1989: Deterrence on Display

According to the Israeli journalist Aluf Benn, and Munya Mardor, the founder of Israel's Weapons Development Authority, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion launched a crash project to develop "a cheap non-conventional capability" upon returning to power in 1955, although Mardor did not define it explicitly as a CW program. [41] Cohen, however, argues that Ben-Gurion, convinced of imminent war with Egypt, pushed an Israeli CW agenda to counter Egypt's chemical arsenal. Ben-Gurion ordered the rapid weaponization and stockpiling of CW agents under a crushing timetable. [42] Ben-Gurion monitored progress closely, asked detailed questions, and was "evidently concerned that [project staff] would not meet the deadline he had set, worrying that the enemy would have such capability and [Israel] would have nothing to deter or retaliate." [43] Israel allegedly collaborated with France on CW around 1960, with rumors of Israeli scientists visiting the French CW testing range at Beni Ounif in Algeria. [44] However, these claims remain unconfirmed and are highly speculative.

Egypt's use of CW against Yemen during the 1963 to 1967 war influenced Israeli preparations for the 1967 Six-Day War. Israeli military leaders purchased tens of thousands of gas masks and, by Cohen's account, likely deployed chemical weapons. [45] According to Cohen, Israeli military officers viewed CW as "nasty" but legitimate in retaliation. Egypt did not use CW during the Six-Day War; and according to one Israeli analyst, fear of retaliation encouraged Egypt's restraint. [46] In February 1959, Israel signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons. However, Israel reserved the right to retaliate in kind, as many other signatories have. [47] The subsequent 1973 Yom Kippur War, fought against Egypt and Syria over lands lost during the Six-Day War, did not feature CW. [48]

Following the 1973 war, Israel further expanded its conventional and nuclear superiority after realizing, Cohen argues, that nuclear ambiguity provided deterrence at low political cost. [49] During this same period, Egypt continued to expand its CW program, and Syria began developing a CW capability as a "poor man's atom bomb" to offset Israel's nuclear arsenal. [50] While Israeli military planners considered CW a declining asset, they maintained a CW R&D capacity for defense and retaliation. Iraq's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq War notwithstanding, Israel still did not consider CW an existential threat. [51] Nevertheless, Israel's high-profile participation in the 1989 Paris conference on CW confirmed Israeli interest in "strengthening the international norm against chemical warfare." [52]

1990 to 1997: The Iraq Threat and the CWC

Israeli complacency toward the CW threat evaporated on 1 April 1990. Four months before invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein threatened "to make fire burn half of Israel," threatening to use what he called "the binary chemical weapon" should Israel attack Iraq's nuclear installations, as it had during the 1981 attack on the Osiraq reactor. [53] According to Cohen, Iraq's use of CW to project parity, deterrence, and a "balance of terror" against Israel both elevated CW's strategic role and worried Israeli military planners. Some feared Iraq would call Israel's nuclear bluff, while other Israeli strategists worried Saddam might bait Israel into some kind of nuclear demonstration. [54] Israeli Minister of Science Yuval Ne'eman publicly suggested in July 1990 that Israel should retaliate against an Iraqi CW strike "with the same merchandise" rather than cross the nuclear threshold in response to CW. [55] While Israel's CW status in 1990 remained ambiguous, such a policy would have required Israel to either build, re-build, or maintain a CW capability. [56] The Israeli Cabinet did not endorse Ne'eman's proposal officially, declining to state what timeline, target, or weaponry Israel would choose in a retaliatory attack. [57]

In 1992, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) introduced new questions for Israeli policy. The CWC allowance of short-notice challenge inspections of any member-state facility could threaten the "off-limits" status of Israel's Dimona nuclear facility. [58] Nevertheless, several factors likely encouraged Israeli leaders to sign the treaty. First, the 1991 Madrid Conference and the initiation of the Middle East peace process reconfigured Israel's security outlook. As a consequence "Israel began to reconsider its policy on arms control," and began better understanding and developing its outlook towards multilateral arms control and multilateral negotiations. [59] Second, the recent war with Iraq heightened Israeli sensitivity to chemical weapons proliferation as a security threat. [60] According to Gerald Steinberg, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin considered the CWC a "net benefit," despite the Arab League's plan to boycott the treaty to protest Israel's nuclear policies. [61] Cohen also notes that the Rabin government recognized that signing the treaty, while symbolically important, did not finalize Israel's commitment until and unless Israel also ratified the treaty. [62] Israel signed the CWC on 13 January 1993, the first day it was opened for signature, alongside 65 other countries, including Iran and 5 Arab League countries that abandoned the boycott. [63] By the end of the year, a total of 13 Arab League countries had signed the CWC. At the Signing Ceremony of the CWC, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres issued a rare official Israeli statement on CW, and emphasized that while Israel fully accepted the spirit of the CWC, it would continue to seek greater regional acceptance of the treaty. [64] During the CWC Preparatory Commission, Israeli diplomats participated in talks to clarify and refine how the CWC's verification procedures would operate on site, in addition to the procedures surrounding challenge inspections and the issue of "managed access" to prevent potential abuse of these tools by requesting unsuitable challenge inspections. [65]

Israel has not ratified the CWC despite its entry into force in 1997. When the ratification issue surfaced in April 1997, a high-level ad hoc ministerial committee headed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and including Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Commerce Minister Natan Sharansky, and National Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon re-examined Israel's CWC position. [66] The committee quietly decided not to submit the CWC to the Israeli parliament for ratification while keeping the issue open pending a future review. In the words of Mordechai: "I think that we have to wait and see how things develop. The problem is that some of the states in the region are not signing, and there is no way of inspecting those who are [not signing]. We had discussion in the cabinet, and we decided to postpone a decision for a certain period. We will discuss it again."[67] 

1997 to the Present: Ongoing Secrecy and Suspicion

In 1993, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment identified Israel as a probable host to an offensive CW capability. [68] Israel's established scientific community and chemical industry, alongside continued secrecy about the IIBR facility, continue to fuel speculation. A number of well-publicized events in the 1990s brought further attention to this issue. In 1997, Israeli security agents reportedly attempted to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Meshal using levofentanyl, possibly a modified form of the opioid, fentanyl. [69] In 1998, Dutch authorities publically confirmed that the 1992 El Al cargo plane that crashed in Amsterdam en route to Israel carried 190 liters of dimethyl methylphosphonate. [70] Media reports alleged that the Israelis intended to use it for the manufacture of sarin, and that the amount carried on board could have yielded up to 594 pounds of the nerve agent. [71] However, Israeli officials argued that the IIBR ordered the chemicals for defensive research, and that the U.S. government had approved the shipment. [72] In addition to its industrial applications and utility as a precursor in sarin production, dimethyl methylphosphonate can be used as a simulant for testing the effectiveness of filters in chemical protective equipment. [73]

In the same year, The Sunday Times reported that Israeli F-16 crews received training in loading active chemical and biological warheads onto airplanes, suggesting active stockpiles at military installations, viable CW delivery capabilities, and a continued active role for CW in Israel's military planning. [74]

A 2005 report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency assessed that, although Israel does not currently actively produce "traditional" CW agents, "many indications exist that Israel has had an advanced CW program in the past" and potentially possesses functional and stockpiled CW agents today. [75] A team of Swedish defense analysts have claimed that Israel produced advanced binary nerve agents. [76]

U.S. government WMD reports that mention Israeli CW redact the text assessing Israeli CW capabilities prior to declassification. [77] Thus, no publically available sources can conclusively confirm a sustained Israeli offensive CW capability. This lack of confirmation, combined with Israel's refusal to sign the CWC, only strengthens what is often referred to as "deterrence through ambiguity." [78]

Recent Developments and Current Status

The CWC has entered into force in every Arab League country except Egypt, which has neither signed nor ratified the CWC. Within the region, only Israel has signed but not ratified the treaty. [79] Concerns over potential biological and chemical terrorism, however, have motivated Israel to adopt dual-use chemical technology export controls in line with the Australia Group standards. [80]

While analysts believe that Israel produced and deployed CW munitions and that Israel may still maintain some retaliatory capability, the current status of this stockpile is unknown. Israel's commitment to the spirit of the CWC, particularly given its continued non-ratification, remains vague. Israel likely maintains advanced know-how in the CW field, including weaponization, physiological effects, and environmental effects. Israel could also easily divert its sophisticated chemical infrastructure to rapid CW production. The general Israeli philosophy that the nation must possess a technological edge in all defense R&D areas continues to fuel Israel's maintenance of a strong and cutting-edge infrastructure. The view that Israel should "hedge" against the unknown future will likely continue to motivate Israel's CW research and planning.

Israeli officials have emphasized the threat of a chemical weapon attack from Iran, especially if Israel were to take military action against the Iranian nuclear program. The chief of the Home Front Command for the Tel Aviv region, Colonel Adam Zusman, expressed concern that Iran had the potential to target the metropolitan area at the heart of Israel with "unconventional warheads," and argued that Israeli citizens lack adequate shelter and protective equipment. [81] The former head of the parliamentary commission for home front preparedness, Zeev Bielski, made similar comments in April 2012, warning that 1.7 million Israelis did not have access to bomb shelters, and 3.5 million had not yet received protective masks. [82] Israel distributed protective masks to its entire population prior to the first Gulf War in 1991. In 2010, authorities again perceived the threat of a radiological, biological or chemical attack to be high, and subsequently embarked on a three-year program to supply masks to all Israeli citizens. [83]

Additionally, the worsening civil war in Syria, including the use of chemical weapons in the war, has fueled fears within Israeli policy circles over the possibility that al-Qaeda or Hezbollah could acquire CW from Syrian stockpiles. [84] After Free Syrian forces captured a Syrian airbase near Homs and took control of a missile battery (albeit a surface-to-air battery), Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Yair Naveh, claimed in June 2012 that "Syria's chemical arsenal is the world's largest, and it possesses missiles that can target the entirety of Israel's territory." [85] Israel previously accused Iran and Syria of providing CW to Hezbollah in 2009 after 3 of 8 militants killed in an explosion in Khirbet Silim allegedly bore signs of chemical exposure. [86] Notably however, in September 2014 the destruction of the Syrian Chemical arsenal was declared complete by the OPCW. [87] 

In response to regional crises, Israel has increased the number and frequency of its CW-related military response and civil defense exercises. One scenario in the five-day Turning Point 4 exercise in May 2010 featured an attack on a chemical facility in Holon near Tel Aviv. [88] This was a test of both military and civilian preparedness and response to a chemical incident attack. [89] In November 2011, Home Front Command soldiers staged an exercise that simulated a CW-equipped missile strike in Holon. [90] In February 2012 defense units staged a mass chemical drill in Hadera, and Jane's Defense reported a March 2012 military exercise "simulating an attack by missiles carrying chemical or biological payloads". [91, 92] In May 2013, Israel conducted a weeklong nationwide exercise, code-named "Home Front Eitan 1" which focused on "coping with chemical weapons [missile] attacks" from Syria and Lebanon. [93] Israel has also responded to the threat of projectile-delivered chemical weapons by investing heavily in a multi-tiered, anti-missile and anti-rocket defense system. Currently based around the MIM-104 Patriot and Arrow 2 systems, the program is expanding rapidly and will incorporate the Iron Dome, David's Sling, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) and Arrow 3 anti-rocket/anti-missile systems in order to counter any projectiles between the 4 km and 2,500 km range. [94] Recent Israeli defensive measures with regards to procurement, development and military exercises indicate that the state considers the threat of CW to be significant. However, these measures are also meant to project resilience, by communicating to potential aggressors that an attack utilizing CW would be impractical. Furthermore, the lack of definitive data on Israel's offensive capabilities enables a secondary "deterrence through ambiguity," whereby those contemplating an attack on Israel utilizing CW cannot be certain that Israel will not respond in kind.

The spotlight on Syria's chemical weapons has brought unwanted attention to Israel's own chemical weapons program. The Syrian regime's 2013 accession to the CWC and agreement to the destruction of its CW capabilities, has led many, both in Israel and abroad, to ask why Israel has not yet ratified the CWC. Most importantly, some senior Israeli defense officials have argued that Israel should ratify the CWC, given Syria's ratification. [95]

Sources:
[1] Eitan Barak, "Where Do We Go from Here?, Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 121; Avner Cohen and Shane Mason, "Coming Clean on Chemical Weapons," Foreign Affairs, Online, 19 September 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com.
[2] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 39.
[3] Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," OPCW Synthesis, November 2000, pp. 29-31.
[4] H.E. Mr. Eytan Bentsur, "Israel's Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament," Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 4 September 1997.
[5] Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor, Import and Export Order (Control of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Exports), 5764-2004, 4 April 2004, unofficial English: www.tamas.gov.il, 18 April 2011.
[6] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3(Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 27-53.
[7] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3(Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 45-48.
[8] A Scopus® search current through 2011 yielded recent publication activity on sarin, VX, and tabun, with a particularly high volume of sarin research.
[9] A 2005 Swedish Defence Research Agency report characterizes Israel as having a "breakout" capability at a minimum: Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities, (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 38. In 2008, the U.S. Congressional Research Service also characterized the state of CW proliferation in Israel as "likely" — a stronger rating that "suspected" or "ended" See: Paul Kerr, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, CRS Report for Congress RL30699, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Update 20 February 2008). However, the 2009 unclassified intelligence report on WMD acquisitions does not mention any Israeli CW developments: Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2009," 2009.
[10] A Scopus® search yielded recent publication activity on all Sarin, Tabun, and VX from IIRB and other Israeli research institutes, with a disproportionately high volume of Sarin research.
[11] Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), pp. 36-40.
[12] Clay Boswell, "Chemicals in the holy land: Israel's chemical industry founded on immigration," ICIS Chemical Business, 14 November 2008.
[13] Dexter Johnson, "Israel moving on the fast track," Chemical Market Reporter, Volume 251, Issue 8, 24 February 1996, p. SR12; and Clay Boswell, "Chemicals in the holy land: Israel's chemical industry founded on immigration," ICIS Chemical Business, 14 November 2008.
[14] "Corporate Profile," ICL, www.icl-group.com, 26 March 2011; and Scientific American, "A Global Biotechnology Perspective," Scientific American Worldview, 2009, p. 43.
[15] Quantity and quality measures derived using data from the ISI Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Database. Records and citations for articles, proceedings papers, and reviews were used to estimate the knowledge production and acknowledged expertise of the top 30 chemistry research producing countries and to identify Israel's peers. Quantity was measured based on number of publications and quality was measured by average citations per publication. Citation rate is a commonly used proxy indicator for impact factor and overall quality of a scientific paper (see: Thompson Reuters, "Essential Science Indicators," www.thomsonreuters.com, 6 April 2011). A 7 March 2011 query for publications between 2002 and 2011 finds 1264 chemistry publications credited to Israel with an average citation rate of 14.89 times. Countries with comparable quantities of research are: Iran (1383 publications), Portugal (1294 publications), Turkey (1223 publications), Greece (1117 publications), Norway (1028 publications) and Mexico (998 publications). Countries with comparable citations rates are: Switzerland (15.85 citations/publication), Denmark (15.83 citations/publication), Ireland (15.79 citations/publication), Sweden (14.07 citations/publication), Italy (13.45 citations/publication), Belgium (13.42 citations/publication), Singapore (13.38 citations/publication), France (13.12 citations/publication), and Japan (12.11 citations/publication). For context, the most productive countries are: the United States (46,339 publications), China (15,705 publications), Germany (14,740 publications), and the United Kingdom (12,972 publications) and the highest citation rates are: the Netherlands (19.97 citations/publication), Germany (17.13 citations/publication), the United States (16.9 citations/publication), and the United Kingdom (16.15 citations/publication).
[16] A 07 March 2011 query of the ISI Web of Knowledge Science Citation Index Expanded Database found 1223 Turkish papers cited 9094 times (7.44 citations/publication) and 1383 Iranian papers cited 9573 times (6.93 citations/publication). Other significant regional programs include Egypt (644 publications, 3533 citations, 5.49 citations/publication) and Saudi Arabia (216 publications, 830 citations, 3.84 citations/publication).
[17] A 22 March 2011 query for publications over the past 20 years found 223 total publications on CWC-regulated toxins with an average citation rate of 14.2 citations/publication. Countries with comparable publication rates are: the Czech Republic (249 publications), Brazil (235 publications), the Sweden (229 publications), Switzerland (197 publications), South Korea (194 publications), and Iran (188 publications). Countries with comparable average citation rate are: Brazil (11.78 citations/publication), Taiwan (12.48 citations/publication), Spain (12.67 citations/publication), Belgium (15.38 citations/publication), Japan (16.9 citations/publication), and Australia (16.92 citations/publication). For context, the top producing countries are: the United States (5175 publications), Japan (1231 publications), the United Kingdom (1105 publications), Germany (947 publications), and China PR (732 publications); the top impact factor countries are: Denmark (36.5 citations/publication), Norway (33.89 citations/publication), Switzerland (31.76 citations/publication), the United Kingdom (24.21 citations/publication), and the United States (22.89 citations/publication).
[18] The Israel Institute for Biological Research, "IIBR-Home," accessed 7 March 2011, www.iibr.gov.il. The IIBR employs analytic, organic, and physical chemists and experienced a roughly 15% increase in total staffing since 2004, with the number of technicians rising 70%.
[19] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3(Fall-Winter 2001), p. 38; and Karel Knip, "Biologie in Ness Ziona," NRC Handelsband (Rotterdam), 27 February 1999, http://retro.nrc.nl, 9 March 2011.
[20] A 1999 survey of openly published research by Karel Knip revealed extensive nerve gas and other organophosphorous and fluorine research. A Scopus® search current through 2011 yielded recent publication activity on all three agents, with a disproportionately high volume of sarin research.
[21] A Scopus® affiliation search for the three agents VX, tabun, and sarin found Israeli collaborations with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut für Pharmakologie und Toxikologie der Bundeswehr, and Moscow State University, to name just a few.
[22] "Compositions for Decontamination," United States Patent Application, US2012/0021068, 26 January 2012, www.appft1.uspto.gov.
[23] "Skin-Protective Compositions Effective Against Vesicants and Percutaneous Chemical Agents," European Patent Office, European Patent Specification, Patent No. EP1381348, www.data.epo.org.
[24] "Uses of Chemically-Modified Cholinesterases for Detoxification of Organophosphorus Compounds," World Intellectual Proprty Organization: Patenscope, WO/2002/87624, www.patentscope.wipo.int.
[25] See, for example: The Director of Central Intelligence, "Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons for U.S. Security Interests," U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, published 15 September 1983, released 4 April 1994.
[26] Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 35.
[27] Uvi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets equipped for Chemical Warfare," Sunday Times, 4 October 1998.
[28] Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israeli Responses to the Threat of Chemical Warfare," Armed Forces & Society, Volume 20, No. 1, Fall 1993, pp. 85-101.
[29] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 27-53.
[30] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 29.
[31] David Ben Gurion, War Diaries, 1948-1949, Vol. 3 (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Misrad Habitachon, 1982), pp. 852-853; and DBGD, 26 April 1949; DBGD, 23 October 1950; Zaki Shalom, David Ben-Gurion: The State of Israel and the Arab World 1949-1956 (in Hebrew) (Sdeh Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 1995).
[32] Ephraim Katzir, "The Beginning of Defense Research: Ben Gurion and the HEMED" (in Hebrew), in David Ben-Gurion and the Development of Science in Israel (Jerusalem: Israel National Academy of Science, 1989), p. 37.
[33] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 28-31.
[34] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 28-31.
[35] Eitan Barak, "Where Do We Go from Here? Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the Middle East in the Post-Saddam Era," Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2003), p. 130.
[36] Munya Mardor, RAFAEL (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publication, 1981), pp. 53-66, 78-79, 104-106.
[37] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 33.
[38] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 33-34.
[39] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 40.
[40] At that time, a national CBW program did not contravene international laws, treaties, or norms. All three major Western (and NATO) powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—had significant CBW programs. Bergmann was well aware of the activities of those programs. The Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibited the use, but not the production, of CBW agents. Furthermore, many countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, China, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Syria, reserved the right to retaliate in kind.
[41] Aluf Benn, "The Project that Preceded the Nuclear Project," Haaretz, 2 March 1995; and Munya Mardor, RAFAEL (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publication, 1981), p. 128.
[42] Aluf Benn, "The Project that Preceded the Nuclear Project," Haaretz, 2 March 1995.
[43] Munya Mardor, RAFAEL (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publication, 1981), p. 39.
[44] Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House), pp. 63-64.
[45] Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) To Secretary of Defense McNamara, "Gas Masks for Israel," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 37, 22 May 1967; and Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 41.
[46] Danny Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring Summer 1998), p. 49.
[47] For background on the Geneva Protocols and a list of countries that reserve the right to retaliate in kind, see: "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)," Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Treaties and Regimes, www.nti.org.
[48] Danny Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring Summer 1998), p. 49.
[49] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 42.
[50] Danny Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring Summer 1998), p. 50; and Alfred B. Prados, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB92075 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 13 March 2006), p. 9.
[51] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 42.
[52] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 42.
[53] Alan Cowell, "Iraqi Chief, Boasting of Poison Gas, Warns of Destruction if Israel Strikes," The New York Times, 3 April 1990.
[54] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 44.
[55] Eitan Barak, "Where Do We Go From Here?" Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 123.
[56] "Israeli See Chemical Option Against Iraq," The New York Times, 28 July 1990.
[57] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 44.
[58] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 46.
[59] Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," OPCW Synthesis, November 2000, pp. 29-31.
[60] Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," OPCW Synthesis, November 2000, pp. 29-31.
[61] Alan Riding, "Signing of Chemical-Arms Pact Begins," The New York Times, 14 January 1993; and Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," OPCW Synthesis, November 2000, pp. 29-31.
[62] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 46.
[63] OPCW Technical Secretariat, "Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 21 May 2009," Office of the Legal Advisor, 27 May 2009. Despite calls to boycott the CWC by the Arab League, the following five members signed the CWC on 13 January 1993: Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Additionally, the following eight Arab League countries signed the CWC by the end of 1993: Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Also see: Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," OPCW Synthesis, November 2000, pp. 9-13; and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "OPCW Member States," About OPCW, www.opcw.org, April 2011; and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Non-Member States," About OPCW, www.opcw.org, 4 April 2011.
[64] Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres "A Farewell to Chemical Arms," Address at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, January 13, 1993.
[65] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 46.
[66] Steve Rodan, "Bitter Choices: Israel's Chemical Dilemma," Jerusalem Post, August 15, 1997, p. 10; David Makovsky, "Israel Must Ratify Chemical Treaty," Haaretz, January 8, 1998; Aluf Benn, "Chemical Weapons Convention: Israel's Decision Time," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57 (March-April 2001), pp. 22-24.
[67] Ze'ev Schiff, "An interview with Yitzhak Mordechai," Haaretz, April 16 1998, p. 10. See also Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC."
[68] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risk, Report No. OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 65.
[69] Alan Cowell, "The Daring Attack That Blew Up in Israel's Face," The New York Times, 15 October 1997, p. A1.
[70] Joel Greenberg, "Nerve-Gas Element Was in El Al Plane Lost in 1992 Crash," The New York Times, October 2, 1998, p. A1. The Dutch confirmed the presence of 50 gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate in El Al's cargo as early as 1996, according to a report to the Dutch Parliament reported by Agence France-Presse.
[71] Joel Greenberg, "Nerve-Gas Element Was in El Al Plane Lost in 1992 Crash," The New York Times, October 2, 1998, p. A1
[72] Joel Greenberg, "Nerve-Gas Element Was in El Al Plane Lost in 1992 Crash," The New York Times, October 2, 1998, p. A1
[73] "Dimethyl methylphosphonate," Sigma-Aldrich, www.sigmaaldrich.com.
[74] Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare," Sunday Times, October 4, 1998.
[75] Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 40.
[76] Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 40.
[77] See, for example: U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," July 2010; and Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering January 1 to December 31, 2009," 2009.
[78] Joel Greenberg, "Nerve-Gas Element Was in El Al Plane Lost in 1992 Crash," The New York Times, October 2, 1998.
[79] OPCW Technical Secretariat, "Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 21 May 2009," Office of the Legal Advisor, May 27,  2009.
[80] Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor, Import and Export Order (Control of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Exports), 5764-2004, April 4 2004, unofficial English translation: www.tamas.gov.il, April 18, 2011.
[81] "Tel Aviv 'Exodus' Planned in Event of Missile Strike," RT, June 12, 2012, www.rt.com.
[82] "War Drums Beat, but Israel 'Ill Equipped' for Threats," RT, April 24, 2012, www.rt.com.
[83] Amos Harel,"IDF to blanket Israel with Gas Masks: Home Front Command to Distribute Protection Kits to All Civilians, Rather than Planned 60%, Starting February," Haaretz, January 5, 2010, www.haaretz.com.
[84] Gili Cohen and Jonathan Lis, "IDF: Israel in Range of Nearly 65,000 Hezbollah, Iran, Syria Rockets," Haaretz, May 23, 2012, www.haaretz.com
[85] Ilan Ben Zion, "IDF Brass Warns of Syria's Chemical Weapon Threat," The Times of Israel, June 11, 2012, www.timesofisrael.com.
[86] "Photos of Exercise Turning Point 4 – Simulated Attack on Chemical Factory, Israel Defense Forces, May 25, 2010," Israel Defense Forces, May 26, 2010, www.idfblog.com.
[87] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), "OPCW-UN Joint Mission Draws to a Close," October 1, 2014. www.opcw.org.
[88] "Report: Chemical Weapons in Hezbollah Arms Cache Blast," Haaretz, September 3, 2009, www.haaretz.com.
[89] Isabel Kershner and Fares Akram, "No Worries, Israel Insists, Defense Drill Is Just a Drill," The New York Times, May 24, 2010, p. A10.
[90] "Tel Aviv 'Exodus' Planned in Event of Missile Strike," RT, June 12, 2012, www.rt.com.,
[91] "Israel Holds Chemical Warfare Drill," Press TV, February 16, 2012, www.presstv.ir.
[92] Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, June 18, 2012, http://sentinel.janes.com.
[93] Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, June 18, 2012, http://sentinel.janes.com.
[94] Times of Israel Staff, "Israelis take cover as chemical warfare drill continues," Times of Israel, May 27, 2013.
[95] Avner Cohen and Shane Mason, "No More Exceptions: Why Israel Can No Longer Afford to Rebuff Global Norms Pertaining to Weapons of Mass Destruction," Foreign Policy (online), September 22, 2013, www.foreignpolicy.org.