1985 - 1990
Many U.S. communities were gripped by violence stemming from the drug trade.
The Hot Box was the first means of “field testing” heroin
and cocaine. By placing a small amount of the drug onto the metal element,
the drug could be identified by its melting temperature.
DEA
John C. Lawn
July 26, 1985-
March 23, 1990
On
March 1, 1985, Francis M. Mullen retired and John C. "Jack" Lawn,
Deputy Administrator since 1982, became Acting Administrator. On
April 4, 1985, he was nominated as DEA Administrator. Mr. Lawn
was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on July 16, 1985, and sworn in
on July 26, 1985, as the DEA's fourth Administrator. Before coming
to the DEA, Mr. Lawn had been an FBI Agent for 15 years. As FBI
Special Agent in Charge in San Antonio from 1980 to 1982, he had
directed the successful investigation into the assassination of
Federal Judge John H. Wood, Jr. Before this historic case, Mr.
Lawn had supervised all FBI civil rights cases, including allegations
of police brutality and color of law complaints. In addition, he
was responsible for background investigations of White House officials,
federal judges, and US attorney nominees. He also served in the
Criminal Division of FBI headquarters where he supervised Congressional
review of the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and
President John F. Kennedy. From 1990-1994, Mr. Lawn served as vice-president
and chief of operations of the New York Yankees. In 1998, he was
serving as the chairman and CEO of The Century Council, a national
organization dedicated to fighting alcohol abuse.
|
During
the late 1980s, the international drug trafficking organizations grew
more powerful as the cocaine trade dominated the Western Hemisphere. Mafias
headquartered in the Colombian cities of Medellin and Cali wielded enormous
influence and employed bribery, intimidation, and murder to further their
criminal goals. Many U.S. communities were gripped by violence stemming
from the drug trade. At first, the most dramatic examples of drug-related
violence were experienced in Miami, where cocaine traffickers fought open
battles on the city streets. Later, in 1985, the crack epidemic hit the
United States full force, resulting in escalating violence among rival
groups and crack users in many other U.S. cities. By 1989, the crack epidemic
was still raging and drug abuse was considered the most important issue
facing the nation. DAWN data showed a 28-fold increase in cocaine-related
hospital emergency room admissions over a four-year period.
Special
Agents
1985.....2,234
1990.....3,191
DEA Budget
1985.....$362.4 million
1990.....$769.2 million
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The
Crack Epidemic
In the early 1980s, the majority of cocaine being shipped to the United States was coming
through the Bahamas. Soon there was a huge glut of cocaine powder in these islands which
caused the price to drop by as much as 80 percent. Faced with dropping prices for their illegal
product, drug dealers made a shrewd marketing decision to convert the powder to "crack," a
smokeable form of cocaine. It was cheap, simple to produce, ready to use, and highly profitable
for dealers to develop. As early as 1981, reports of crack appeared in Los Angeles, San Diego,
Houston, and in the Caribbean.
At this time, powder cocaine was available on the street at an average of 55 percent purity for
$100 per gram, and crack was sold at average purity levels of 80-plus percent for the same price.
In some major cities, such as New York, Detroit, and Philadelphia, one dosage unit of crack
could be obtained for as little as $2.50. Never before had any form of cocaine been available at
such low prices and at such high purity. More important from a marketing standpoint, it
produced an instant high and its users became addicted in a very short time. Eventually,
Caribbean immigrants taught young people in Miami how to produce crack, and they in turn
went into business in the United States.
With the influx of traffickers and cocaine, South Florida had become a principal
area for the
"conversion laboratories" that were used to convert cocaine base into cocaine
HCl, the form in which cocaine is sold. The majority of these labs were found
in South Florida, but they also
appeared in other parts of the country, indicating the expansion of Colombian
trafficking. For example, in 1985, four conversion laboratories were seized in
New York State [see "Minden
Lab" on page 65], four in California, two in Virginia, and one each in North
Carolina and Arizona. One year later, 23 more conversion labs were seized in
the United States.
The first crack house had been discovered in Miami in 1982. However, this form of cocaine was
not fully appreciated as a major threat because it was primarily being consumed by middle class
users who were not associated with cocaine addicts. In fact, crack was initially considered a
purely Miami phenomenon until it became a serious problem in New York City, where it first
appeared in December 1983. In the New York City area, it was estimated that more than three-fourths of the early crack consumers were white professionals or middle-class youngsters from
Long Island, suburban New Jersey, or upper-class Westchester County. However, partly because
crack sold for as little as $5 a rock, it ultimately spread to less affluent neighborhoods.
The crack epidemic dramatically increased the numbers of Americans addicted to cocaine. In
1985, the number of people who admitted using cocaine on a routine basis increased from 4.2
million to 5.8 million, according to the Department of Health and Human Service's National
Household Survey. Likewise, cocaine-related hospital emergencies continued to increase
nationwide during 1985 and 1986. According to DAWN statistics, in 1985, cocaine-related
hospital emergencies rose by 12 percent, from 23,500 to 26,300; and in 1986, they increased 110
percent, from 26,300 to 55,200. Between 1984 and 1987, cocaine incidents increased fourfold.
By this time, the Medellin cartel was at the height of its power and controlled cocaine trafficking
from the conversion and packaging process in Colombia, to the transportation of cocaine to the
United States, as well as the first level of wholesale distribution in U.S. communities. While the
Medellin cartel had established a foothold in U.S. communities, its rival, the Cali mafia, began to
dominate markets in the Northeastern United States. The Cali mafia was less visible, less violent,
and more businesslike than the Medellin cartel. Operating through a system of cells, where
members were insulated from one another, the Cali mafia steadily began establishing far-reaching networks that eventually ensured that they would dominate the cocaine trade well into
the 1990s.
By early 1986, crack had a stranglehold on the ghettos of New York City and was dominated by
traffickers and dealers from the Dominican Republic. Crack distribution and abuse exploded in
1986, and by year-end was available in 28 states and the District of Columbia. According to the
1985-1986 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, crack was available in
Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, Kansas City, Miami, New York City, Newark, San Francisco, Seattle,
St. Louis, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, and Phoenix.
By 1987, crack was reported to be available in the District
of Columbia and all but four states in the Union. Crack was abundantly
available in at least 19 cities in 13 states: Texas (Dallas), Oklahoma
(Tulsa, Oklahoma City), Michigan (Detroit), California (Los Angeles, Riverside,
Santa Barbara), Florida (Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, Tampa), New York (New
York City), Oregon (Portland), Washington (Seattle), Missouri (Kansas
City), Minnesota (Minneapolis), Colorado (Denver), Nevada (Las Vegas),
and Maryland (Hagerstown, Salisbury). By 1988, crack had replaced heroin
as the greatest problem in Detroit, and it was available in Los Angeles
in multi-kilo quantities.
Meanwhile, wholesale and retail prices for cocaine had declined, while purity levels for kilogram
amounts of the drug had remained at 90 percent or higher. Street-level gram purity rose from 25
percent in 1981, to 55 percent in 1987, to 70 percent in 1988. By the late 1980s, over 10,000
gang members were dealing drugs in some 50 cities from Baltimore to Seattle. The crack trade
had created a violent sub-world, and crack-related murders in many large cities were
skyrocketing. For example, a 1988 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in New
York City, crack use was tied to 32% of all homicides and 60% of drug-related homicides. On a
daily basis, the evening news reported the violence of drive-by shootings and crack users trying
to obtain money for their next hit. Smokeable crack appealed to a new group of users, especially
women, because it did not have the stigma associated with needles or heroin, and because it was
smoked, many mistakenly equated crack with marijuana. As a result, a generation of addicted
children were born to--and frequently abandoned by--crack-using mothers. By the late 1980s,
about one out of every 10 newborns in the United States (375,000 per year) had been exposed in
the womb to one or more illicit drug.
In October 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese explained the U.S. anti-crack strategy: "The
most effective long-term way to reduce crack trafficking is to reduce the amount of cocaine
entering this country. The federal government's main priorities against cocaine are reducing
production in source countries, interdicting shipments entering the United States, and disrupting
major trafficking rings." Thus, the DEA attacked the major trafficking organizations, primarily
the Medellin and Cali cartels, which were producing cocaine and smuggling it into the United
States. To help accomplish this, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 allocated $8 million for
domestic cocaine enforcement. A portion of this budget was used to establish DEA Crack
Teams. Each of these teams consisted of two DEA special agents who assisted state and local
law enforcement agencies in the investigation of large-scale violators and interstate trafficking
networks.
The agents either worked with existing DEA-funded state
and local task forces or with local law enforcement agencies that had
established their own special crack groups. In addition, DEA Crack Teams
were also deployed to states experiencing extensive crack problems. Examples
included Arizona, which was vulnerable to a rapid influx of crack dealers
from Los Angeles street groups, and Louisiana, where traffickers from
Haiti were dealing to migrant workers in rural areas. Another significant
source of support for the Crack Teams was the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 that provided for asset forfeiture sharing with state and
local law enforcement agencies.
Paz where they developed daily situation reports and drafted a strategic
intelligence report. In addition, their analysis of ledgers found at
three laboratory sites helped identify several major Bolivian violators.
On the day of the law enforcement action, six U.S. military Black Hawk
helicopters, operated by U.S. Army pilots and support personnel, transported
the strike teams to the suspected laboratory sites. Eight cocaine laboratories
and one shipment location were located and destroyed. Some of the labs
destroyed had been capable of producing 1,000 kilograms of cocaine per
week. At least one lab had been in operation since 1982. Operation Blast
Furnace brought cocaine production to a virtual standstill in Bolivia.
Traffickers fled the country and coca paste buyers from Colombia stayed
away. The coca leaf market collapsed and quantities that had previously
sold for $1.50 dropped to 10 cents. Following the success of Operation
Blast Furnace, many coca farmers approached the U.S. Agency for International
Development asking for assistance in planting legal substitute crops.
Trafficking Via Mexico
During the latter half of the 1980s, the role of traffickers based in Mexico and the use of
Mexican territory increased dramatically. Mexico's strategic location, midway between source
and consumer nations, and an increasingly powerful international drug mafia headquartered in
Mexico made it an ideal transit point for South American-produced cocaine. Mexico's
topography offered several seaports along its Pacific and Gulf coasts and countless airstrips
scattered across its interior allowed vessel and aircraft refueling to be quickly and easily
accomplished. Equally significant was Mexico's 2,000-mile land border with the United States,
over 95 percent of which had no fences or barricades. Moreover, the remoteness of many border
areas made patrolling and surveillance exceedingly difficult. Cocaine traffickers from Colombia
expanded their trafficking routes to include Mexico, and increasingly used Mexico as a shipping
point.
Meanwhile, the Guadalajara mafia was formed in Mexico with close ties to Colombian mafia, to
ship heroin, marijuana, and cocaine to the United States. Included in these shipments would be
smaller quantities of Mexican black tar or brown powder heroin, piggybacked on the larger
Colombian drug loads. Drug-laden private aircraft from Colombia began using thousands of
registered and unregistered airstrips located throughout Mexico to deliver their product.
However, the preferred method of smuggling drugs remained the overland routes, and 90 percent
of cocaine seizures made by U.S. law enforcement on the southwest border in 1989 were land
seizures. Cocaine seizures made by U.S. law enforcement increased from under 2,000 kilograms
in 1985 to over 40,000 kilograms in 1989.
Employee Assistance Program Expanded (1985)
Recognizing the importance of meeting the unique needs of DEA agents, support
personnel, and families, the DEA had created an Employee Assistance Program (EAP)
in 1978, which was expanded in 1985. By April 1986, the EAP provided each of
the DEA's field divisions with access to an area clinician and at least one backup
clinician, enabling all DEA employees and their families to become eligible to
receive professional, confidential assistance in marital/family/parenting and
relationship concerns, alcohol and drug abuse, job stress and other emotional/psychological
problems, as well as guidance regarding financial and legal concerns. The DEA
also implemented a program whereby each division had a team of personnel trained
to assist employees and their families following traumatic incidents related
to the dangerous nature of working in drug law enforcement. This Trauma Team
program was originally established in 1978, when Yvonne Conner, the head of the
EAP, conducted extensive research to determine the special needs of DEA personnel.
This enabled her to design a professional and confidential program that is uniquely
responsive to DEA employees and their
families.
Drug-Free Workplace (1986)
On September 15, 1986, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12564, The Drug-Free
Federal Workplace Program. He called on all federal employees to refuse drugs
and instructed each federal agency to set up programs to test for the use of
illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions.
By March 1988, the DEA established its own Drug-Free Workplace Program. The
Drug Deterrence Staff, along with a state-of-the-art contract laboratory, conducted
almost 2,000 drug tests at 51 DEA sites. Over 1,600 of those tests were conducted
by the unannounced, random test method using a computer-generated program to
select employees for testing.
Year |
Foreign Office Opened |
1986 |
Cochabamba, Bolivia |
1987 |
Canberra, Australia |
1987 |
Lagos, Nigeria |
1987 |
Port-au-Prince, Haiti |
1988 |
Bridgetown, Barbados |
National Security Decision Directive 221
On April 8, 1986, President Reagan proclaimed that drug production and trafficking
constituted a threat to the security of the United States, and extended executive
sanction to an active war on drugs with National Security Decision Directive
221.
The Murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique CamarenaPerhaps no single event had a more significant impact on the DEA than the abduction and
murder of Special Agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico in 1985. His murder led to the most
comprehensive homicide investigation ever undertaken by the DEA, which ultimately uncovered
corruption and complicity by numerous Mexican officials.
Known as "Kiki" to his friends, Special Agent Camarena had a reputation for believing that the
actions of each and every individual made a difference in the drug war. He was assigned to the
DEA's Guadalajara Resident Office in Mexico, and was working to identify drug trafficking
kingpins when he left his office to meet his wife for lunch on February 7, 1985. A late-model
car pulled up beside Camarena and four men grabbed him, threw him into the back of the car,
and sped off. Hours later, Alfredo Zavala Avelar, a Mexican Agriculture Department pilot
working with anti-drug authorities, was also abducted.
Immediately after Mrs. Camarena reported her husband missing, the DEA Guadalajara
Resident Office made every effort to locate him. After determining that Special
Agent Camarena's
disappearance had no innocent explanation, Resident Agent in Charge James Kuykendall
promptly notified his superiors and began attempting to enlist the support of
the Mexican police. Meanwhile, special agents assigned to the Guadalajara Resident
Office began to query confidential informants and police contacts for information
about the whereabouts of Special
Agent Camarena. Mexico Country Attache Edward Heath then requested assistance
from U.S. Ambassador Gavin, who called the Mexican Attorney General and requested
his assistance in
resolving the disappearance of the special agent. Next, all DEA domestic SACs
and country attaches in Latin America were notified of the agent's disappearance
and were requested to query
all sources knowledgeable about Mexican trafficking organizations for any intelligence
that might lead to his rescue. DEA headquarters then quickly established a
special group to
coordinate the investigation and 25 special agents were sent to Guadalajara to
assist in the search
for Special Agent Camarena.
Throughout February 1985, the DEA continued its efforts
to locate Special Agent Camarena. Witnesses were interviewed and numerous
leads were followed. Searches of several residences and ranches in Mexico.
Based on the information that was developed, the DEA requested the Mexican
Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) to consider Rafael Caro-Quintero, Miguel
Felix-Gallardo, and Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo as suspects in the kidnapping.
All three were notorious narcotics traffickers based in Guadalajara, and
were believed to have the resources and motive to commit such an act.
“Kiki” Camarena with Nicole Telles,(
daughter of RAC Tom Telles, in Hermosillo, Mexico). SA Camarena
stayed in the Telles home for security reasons while he helped
launch an operation against a Mexican marijuana trafficking
organization.
|
On February 9, 1985, Rafael Caro-Quintero was confronted by MFJP officers at the Guadalajara
Airport as he was preparing to leave on a private jet with several of his associates. After an
armed stand-off, the Mexican officer in charge, an MFJP Comandante, spoke privately with
Caro-Quintero and then allowed him and his associates to depart.
Subsequently, a local farm worker discovered two bodies
in a field adjacent to a busy road about one kilometer from a ranch in
Michoacan, Mexico. The bodies, which apparently had been dumped there,
were identified as those of Special Agent Camarena and Captain Zavala.
Soil samples taken from the two bodies by FBI special agents in Mexico
proved the bodies had previously been buried elsewhere and then moved.
On March 7 and 8, 1985, a U.S. pathologist and forensic team analyzed
the discovery site and performed an autopsy. The pathologist's findings
made positive identifications and indicated that death in both cases was
due to blunt force injuries to the head.
On March 8, 1985, Agent Camarena's body was returned to the United States for burial. For the
DEA and the American public, the 1985 torture and murder of Agent Camarena marked a
turning point in the war on drugs. His violent death brought the American public face-to-face
with the vicious brutality of drug trafficking.
Camarena Investigation Leads to Operation Leyenda
On March 14, 1985, the DEA was notified by MFJP officials that they had taken into custody
five Jalisco State Police officers who were believed to have participated in the abduction of
Special Agent Camarena. However, the DEA was neither advised in advance of this operation,
nor invited to participate in the subsequent interviews of the suspected Jalisco State Police
officers.
Under Mexican police questioning, the Jalisco officers gave statements implicating themselves
and others in the abduction of Special Agent Camarena. One suspect died during the
interrogation. The statements of the Jalisco officers implicated Caro-Quintero and
Fonseca-Carrillo, among others, in planning and ordering the abduction of Special Agent
Camarena.
On March 17, 1985, Mexican newspapers reported that 11 individuals had been arrested by the
MFJP for the kidnapping of Special Agent Camarena. Arrest orders were also issued for seven
international drug traffickers, including Caro-Quintero, on kidnapping and murder charges.
The DEA subsequently discovered that Caro-Quintero was in Costa Rica. On April 4, 1985, the
DEA Office in San Jose, in conjunction with the local authorities in Costa Rica, located and
apprehended Caro-Quintero and seven of his associates. The Mexican Government then sent
MFJP officials to Costa Rica after persuading the Costa Rican Government to expel
Caro-Quintero to Mexico on immigration violations. On April 5, 1985, Caro-Quintero and the
others arrested with him left Costa Rica for Mexico aboard two jets belonging to the Mexican
Government. In Mexico City, Caro-Quintero was interrogated for several days by police
officials. Ultimately he gave a statement implicating himself and others in the abduction of
Special Agent Camarena.
But Caro-Quintero denied any knowledge of who actually killed Special Agent Camarena or how
he died. He also denied any knowledge of the abduction and death of Captain Zavala.
On April 7, 1985, drug trafficker Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo and several of his bodyguards were
arrested by Mexican police officials and military forces in Puerto Vallarta and taken to Mexico
City for questioning. Fonseca and his right-hand man, Samuel Ramirez-Razo, gave statements to
the MFJP implicating themselves in the abduction of Special Agent Camarena. However, neither
individual admitted having any knowledge of Camarena's death or Captain Zavala's abduction.
Although there were some discrepancies in the testimony of Caro-Quintero,
Fonseca-Carrillo, and Ramirez-Razo, all claimed that they had nothing
to do with the death of the DEA agent and further stated that these crimes
were probably the work of another narcotics trafficker, Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo.
Meanwhile, in April 1985, the DEA learned that certain members of the Mexican Government
had in their possession a series of audio tapes of Camarena's torture and interrogation. These
tapes allegedly had been seized by Mexican military authorities from Fonseca during his arrest in
Puerto Vallarta. When the DEA confirmed that the voice on the tape was Camarena, the Mexican
Government, after great pressure from the U.S. Government, turned over copies of all five tapes.
On April 12, 1985, a team of one DEA and four FBI agents arrived in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
Mexico, via DEA aircraft. These agents were advised that the house where Special Agent
Camarena was alleged to have been taken after his abduction had been located by the MFJP in
Guadalajara.
On May 3, 1985, a new DEA investigative team was established to coordinate and investigate the
abduction of Camarena and Captain Zavala. This investigation was given the name Operation
Leyenda (the Spanish word meaning lawman ). Through evidence gained from cooperating
individuals and relentless investigative pursuit, this team was able to ascertain that five
individuals abducted Special Agent Camarena and took him to a house at 881 Lope de Vega in
Guadalajara on February 7, 1985. Ultimately, the agents were successful in securing the
indictments of several individuals connected to the abduction and murder. The hard work, long
hours, and total agency commitment had yielded positsive results.
In retrospect, Operation Leyenda was a long and complex investigation, made more difficult by
the fact that the crime was committed on foreign soil and involved major drug traffickers and
government officials from Mexico. It took several years to develop the facts, to apprehend the
perpetrators, and to finally bring them to justice.
Red Ribbon Campaign
The National Red Ribbon Campaign was sparked by the
murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena by drug traffickers. Within
weeks
of his death in March of 1985, Camarena's Congressman, Duncan Hunter,
and high school friend Henry Lozano launched Camarena Clubs in the Imperial
Valley, California, Camarena's home. Hundreds of club members pledged
to lead drug-free lives to honor the sacrifices made by Camarena and
others
on behalf of all Americans. That spring, two club members presented the
"Camarena Club Proclamation" to then-First Lady Nancy Reagan, bringing
the
program national attention. That summer, parent groups in California,
Illinois, and Virginia began to expand the Camarena Club program and
promoted
the wearing of red ribbons nationwide during one week in late October.
In 1988 the National Federation of Parents organized the first National
Red Ribbon Week, an eight-day event proclaimed by the U.S. Congress and
chaired by President and Mrs. Reagan. The Red Ribbon Campaign also became
a symbol of support for the DEA's efforts to reduce demand for drugs
through prevention and education programs.
Demand Reduction Section (1987)
In 1987, the DEA took another step forward in the demand
reduction arena by establishing the Demand Reduction Section. "If we
are truly the leaders in drug efforts," said DEA Administrator Jack Lawn, "we
must also establish a leadership role in drug education efforts . . .
I believe . . . that our personnel can do more to direct the attitudes
of young people than can many other professions because our personnel
know the reality of drugs."
Following its establishment, the DEA's Demand Reduction Program provided
leadership, coordination, and resources for drug prevention and education.
Each of the DEA's domestic field divisions was assigned a demand reduction
coordinator whose role was to provide leadership and support to local
agencies and organizations as they developed drug education and prevention
programs. The program soon evolved from a few drug awareness presentations,
to a nationwide effort that worked to change attitudes about drugs in
sports, schools, and communities all across the nation.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
In 1986, Congress approved a significant bill authorizing $6 billion over three years for
interdiction and enforcement measures, as well as demand reduction education and treatment
programs. On the enforcement side, increases in criminal penalties were passed as part of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Mandatory prison sentences for large scale marijuana distribution were
reinstated and Federal Drug Control scheduling was expanded to include analogues (designer
drugs). A federal grant program for state drug enforcement was also created to assist local efforts
at thwarting traffickers. On the demand side, federal funds were allocated for prevention and
treatment programs, giving these programs a larger share of federal drug control funds than did
previous laws. Prevention efforts were expanded under this law with the creation of the White
House Conference for a Drug-Free America and the establishment of the Office for Substance
Abuse Prevention (OSAP), aimed at community prevention strategies. In the international arena,
the 1986 law established a requirement that foreign assistance be withheld from countries if the
President could not certify that they had cooperated fully with the United States or taken
adequate steps on their own to prevent drug production, drug trafficking, and drug-related money
laundering.
The Certification Process (1986)
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse
Acts of 1986 and 1988, required the President to make yearly determinations
and file a report to Congress regarding the progress of drug producing
and/or drug transit countries’ efforts to eliminate the drug threat.
After the President’s certification of a country for fully cooperating
in counter-drug efforts, decertification for noncooperation, or decertification
with a waiver for vital U.S. national interests, the Congress had 30
days in which to disapprove of the President’s certification decisions
by a simple majority vote before the decisions took effect. If the President
vetoed a disapproval action, Congress could override the veto with a
two-thirds vote. Decertification resulted in reduction of foreign aid
by 50 percent and U.S. opposition to loans from any international agency,
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
For those countries not certified, the Act required that most forms
of U.S. foreign assistance, with the exception of counter-narcotics assistance
and humanitarian aid, be withheld, and further required the United States
to vote against bank lending to non-certified countries.
As part of the certification process, the U.S. Department of State,
through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
presented findings on the drug strategies and policies, as well as current
drug trafficking and abuse situations in every country listed as a major
drug producing and/or drug-transit country, precursor chemical source
country, or money laundering country. This Department of State report,
known as the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, provided
an objective basis for the certification determinations and was issued
at the same time as the list of certification.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also required that every certified country
have a treaty in effect with the United States addressing drug eradication,
interdiction, demand reduction, chemical control, and cooperation with
U.S. drug law enforcement agencies. The DEA’s role in the certification
process is limited to providing the Attorney General and other U.S. policy
makers with an assessment of the level of cooperation between the DEA
and foreign law enforcement counterparts.
The success of Operation Blast Furnace set the stage for one of the
DEA’s most extensive and unprecedented enforcement efforts— Operation
Snowcap. This initiative was developed by the DEA and the Department
of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) in 1987,
and was designed to disrupt the growing, processing, and transportation
systems supporting the cocaine industry.
The DEA and INM coordinated Operation Snowcap operations in 12 countries
including Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela,
Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. The Department of Defense
and the U.S. Border Patrol also participated in the operation. The majority
of Snowcap activity was concentrated in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador because
of the prevalence of coca processing in these nations.
Planning for Operation Snowcap began in September 1986, two months before
Operation Blast Furnace was concluded. When the 1987 operation was launched,
there was a smooth transition of responsibility for air operations from
the U.S. Army to the Government of Bolivia. Six Bell UH-1 Huey helicopters,
loaned by the U.S. Army to the INM, and a U.S. Army training team arrived
on the same C5-A transport that withdrew the Blast Furnace equipment
from Bolivia.
Besides coca suppression operations, the Snowcap strategy included chemical
control, vehicular interdiction, and marine law enforcement interdiction
operations. The marine law enforcement and vehicular interdiction concepts
mirrored successful programs in the United States. The marine law enforcement
operations grew from the DEA’s close coordination with the U.S.
Coast Guard, while vehicular interdiction originated from the DEA’s
Operation Pipeline, EPIC’s national highway interdiction program.
Carlos Lehder Extradition (1987)
In 1981, Carlos Lehder was indicted on U.S. federal charges
in Jacksonville, Florida, and a request for his extradition from Colombia
was formally presented to that government in 1983. Up until that time,
no extradition requests had been honored by the Colombian Government.
Lehder, a major cocaine trafficker, had formed his own political party
and adopted a platform which was vehemently opposed to extradition. He
viewed cocaine as a very powerful weapon that could be used against the
United States and referred to the substance as an atomic bomb. Lehder
also claimed that he was allied with the Colombian guerilla movement,
M-19, in an effort to protect Colombian sovereignty.
Fanatical in his efforts to prevent extradition, Lehder was instrumental in forcing a political
debate on the merits of extradition and publicly faced off against Colombia's Justice Minister,
Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla. When Lara-Bonilla was suddenly murdered in 1984, Lehder and the
Medellin cartel, who had hidden behind the pseudonym "The Extraditables," were suspected.
Embarrassed and outraged by the terrorist tactics employed by the Medellin organization, the
Colombian Government turned Lehder over to the DEA and extradited him to the United States
in February 1987. Lehder was convicted and sentenced to 135 years in federal prison. He
subsequently cooperated in the U.S. investigation of Panama dictator Manuel Noriega and
received a reduced sentence in return for his testimony. However, the Medellin reign of terror
did not end. The Medellin cartel was responsible for the murders of many government officials,
including Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos-Jiminez in 1988, and presidential candidate
Luis Carlos Galan in 1989.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act (PL 100-690) increased criminal penalties for offenses related to
drug trafficking and created new federal offenses and regulatory drug control requirements.
Federal funding for state and local drug enforcement grant programs were also bolstered under
this law. As a result, significant new programs were established, such as the Edward Byrne
Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program that provided badly needed
funds to local police departments.
The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act also expanded a change to
the certification process established by the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.
The 1986 legislation required all certified countries to sign a treaty
with the United States that addressed drug eradication, interdiction,
demand reduction, chemical control, and cooperation with U.S. drug enforcement
agencies. The 1988 act went a step further and made it unlawful to certify
a country's compliance unless it had signed such a treaty.
Another requirement called for the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate negotiations with
governments whose banks were known to engage in significant U.S. dollar transactions. This
requirement helped to identify money laundering and illicit drug transaction funds.
Perhaps the most significant provision of this legislation was the creation of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and it's director, the "Drug Czar."
The Creation of a Drug Czar (1988)
The Anti-Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1988 established the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) and its director became the nation's "Drug Czar." ONDCP was charged with
setting national priorities and implementing a national drug control strategy. The ONDCP
director was required to ensure that the national drug control strategy was research-based,
contained long-range goals and measurable objectives, and sought to reduce drug abuse, drug
trafficking, and their consequences. In 1993, Executive Orders No. 12880, 12992, and eventually
13023 (1996), extended ONDCP as the leading entity for drug control policy. The Executive
Orders also created the President's Drug Policy Council. In 1994, the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act extended ONDCP's mission to assessing budgets and resources related to
the National Drug Control Strategy. It also established specific reporting requirements in the
areas of drug use, availability, consequences, and treatment.
Colombian Government Helps Seize Gacha Funds (1989)
In 1989, a successful international cooperative effort
helped to bring down one of the highest ranking members of the Medellin
drug cartel, Jose Rodriguez-Gacha, the right-hand man of cocaine kingpin
Pablo Escobar. First, the Government of Colombia provided the investigation
and enforcement actions that revealed the extent and location of Gacha's
drug assets. These efforts also uncovered documents disclosing that some
of Gacha's assets were hidden in accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere.
Next, the DEA and other law enforcement agencies in Europe and Latin America,
working closely with the Colombian National Police, froze over $80 million
of Gacha's assets in bank accounts throughout the world. Large amounts
of Gacha's financial empire were forfeited and disbursed to the governments
of countries aiding in the cooperative effort to bring down Gacha. Over
$1.5 million was allotted to the Government of Colombia. This investigation
and seizure represented one of the largest financial efforts in the history
of the DEA and underscored the importance of attacking a cartel's financial
holdings as well as its physical assets.
Rescheduling of Marijuana Denied (1989)
During the late 1980s, as a proposed solution to the enormous drug problem in the United States,
a small, but vocal minority began supporting the wholesale legalization of drugs, particularly
marijuana. However, in December 1989, DEA Administrator Jack Lawn overruled the decision
of one administrative law judge who had agreed with marijuana advocates that marijuana should
be moved from Schedule I to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. This proposed
rescheduling of marijuana would have allowed physicians to prescribe the smoking of marijuana
as a legal treatment for some forms of illness.
Administrator Lawn maintained that there was no medicinal benefit to smoking marijuana.
While some believed that smoking marijuana alleviated vomiting and nausea experienced by
cancer patients undergoing radiation, scientific studies indicated otherwise. These also showed
that smoking marijuana did not benefit patients suffering from glaucoma or multiple sclerosis. In
addition, it was found that smoking marijuana might further weaken the immune systems of
patients undergoing radiation and might speed up, rather than slow down, the loss of eyesight in
glaucoma patients.
It was found that pure Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), one of 400 chemicals commonly
found in marijuana, had some effect on controlling nausea and vomiting. However, pure THC
was already available for use by the medical community in a capsule form called Marinol. For
these reasons, and the fact that no valid scientific studies offered proof of any medicinal value of
marijuana, Administrator Lawn maintained that marijuana should remain a Schedule I
controlled substance.
Joint Investigation
Agents of the DEA’s Phoenix Field Division and the
Arizona
Department of Public Safety (DPS) posed with 700 pounds of
cocaine
seized in
1987. The
seizure, which took place 50 miles
south of Phoenix, was the result of a joint
DEA, U.S. Customs
Service, and Arizona DPS investigation.
Operation Snowcap (1987)
The success of Operation Blast Furnace set the stage for one of the DEA’s
most extensive and unprecedented enforcement efforts—Operation Snowcap.
This initiative was developed by the DEA and the Department of State’s
Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) in 1987, and was designed to
disrupt the growing, processing, and transportation systems supporting the
cocaine industry.
The DEA and INM coordinated Operation Snowcap operations in 12 countries including
Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. The Department of Defense and the U.S.
Border Patrol also participated in the operation. The majority of Snowcap activity
was concentrated in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador because of the prevalence of
coca processing in these nations.
Planning for Operation Snowcap began in September 1986, two months before
Operation Blast Furnace was concluded. When the 1987 operation was launched,
there was a smooth transition of responsibility for air operations from the
U.S. Army to the Government of Bolivia. Six Bell UH-1 Huey helicopters, loaned
by the U.S. Army to the INM, and a U.S. Army training team arrived on the same
C5-A transport that withdrew the Blast Furnace equipment from Bolivia.
Besides coca suppression operations, the Snowcap strategy included chemical
control, vehicular interdiction, and marine law enforcement interdiction
operations. The marine law enforcement and vehicular interdiction concepts
mirrored successful programs in the United States. The marine law enforcement
operations grew from the DEA’s close coordination with the U.S. Coast
Guard, while vehicular interdiction originated from the DEA’s Operation
Pipeline, EPIC’s national highway interdiction program.
Operation Snowcap depended on agents who volunteered for temporary assignments
in foreign countries. These special agents left domestic field divisions for
temporary tour of duty assignments to work closely with host country law enforcement
counterparts. As envisioned, Operation Snowcap was designed to be a temporary
program to assist law enforcement entities in Latin America with training and
investigative work.
Organized Crime Targeted
January 8, 1986: Enforcement Group 31 in New York specialized in traditional
Italian organized crime targets. This case targeted the Philipp Vasta trafficking
organization and resulted in 18 arrests and seizures totaling $6 million including
drugs, real estate, cars and currency.
Operation Polar Cap (1989)
In 1989, Operation Polar Cap was concluded. It was the largest money-laundering
investigation in the United States at the time. The operation was conducted
cooperatively by the DEA, FBI, IRS, U.S. Customs Service, and state and local
law enforcement agencies and led to the dismantling of a money-laundering enterprise
called La Mina that handled illegal drug profits belonging to the
Medellin cartel. Operation Polar Cap involved two international organizations
that were laundering the proceeds of cocaine sales by using false gold sales
and wholesale jewelry businesses as cover. Between 1988 and 1990, these two
organizations laundered almost $1.2 billion in drug proceeds. Operation Polar
Cap led to the first conviction of a foreign financial institution, Banco de
Occidente/Panama, for violating U.S. money laundering laws. As a result of
this operation, over 100 people were arrested, and more than $105 million in
assets, including currency, bank accounts, real estate, jewelry, gold, and
vehicles were seized. The money forfeited by the Banco de Occidente/Panama
was shared with other governments, including Canada and Switzerland, which
each received $1 million.
Sylmar Seizure (1989)
On September 29, 1989, the American public was presented with irrefutable evidence
of the enormous volume of cocaine coming into the country when the DEA raided
a warehouse in Sylmar, California, and seized 21.5 tons of cocaine. Such a huge
amount of cocaine was amassed at the Sylmar warehouse because of a conflict between
Colombia-based distributors and the Mexico-based group they had hired to transport
the drug. The group from Mexico had continued to transport cocaine to the warehouse
but refused to release it to the Colombian distributors until they were paid
for their transportation services. This was the largest cocaine seizure in U.S.
history. Colombian drug traffickers responded to the staggering Sylmar seizure
by changing the way they compensated transportation groups from Mexico; they
began to pay Mexico-based smuggling organizations up to 50 percent of each cocaine
shipment in product rather than in cash. This shift to using cocaine as compensation
for transportation services radically changed the role and sphere of influence
of Mexico-based trafficking organizations in the U.S. cocaine trade. Criminal
groups from Mexico
became not only transporters, but also distributors of cocaine.
DEA Headquarters Relocated (1989)
By the late 1980s, the DEA headquarters building at
1405 "Eye" St. in Washington, D.C., was no longer large enough to house the
increasing headquarters staff. In fact, many of the 1,500 headquarters employees
had already been dispersed to 13 nearby buildings in an effort to accommodate
the agency's continued growth.
The search for a new headquarters location included an evaluation of land
in Arkansas and Mississippi, as well as abandoned military bases around the
country. However, Attorney General Edwin Meese determined that the DEA headquarters
had to be located in close proximity to the Attorney General's offices. Thus,
the location selected for the new headquarters building was on Army-Navy Drive
in Arlington, Virginia. The new facility consisted of two buildings that provided
292,000 square feet of available space.
The relocation of headquarters was the largest non-enforcement related project
ever undertaken by the DEA or its predecessor agencies. The physical relocation
began in May 1988.
Aviation
During this period, the DEA's Air Wing program was expanding rapidly. From
1975 to 1985, the number of Air Wing planes had doubled, rising from 30 to
61. After a budget increase from $1,310,00 in 1980 to $3,760,000 in 1985, the
Aviation Division anticipated purchasing more aircraft and increasing the Air
Wing's staff.
With the rapid growth of the Air Wing, the facility at Addison quickly became
inadequate. Operations had been separated among several buildings and security
had become a problem because the airport was located right on the street with
public access to several ramps. In addition, airplanes were parked in the open
and were subject to vandalism. From 1986 to 1988, the DEA's Air Wing looked
for a secure location in Texas in order to be equally accessible for DEA officials
located on the East and West Coasts. In addition, Texas was an ideal location
based on its proximity to Central and South America, where many Air Wing support
operations were performed. The location chosen for the new facility was a 12.3
acre site adjacent to Alliance Airport, north of Forth Worth, Texas. The site
selected was spacious and accommodated future expansion. The new facility also
offered greater security and included a guarded fence.
Training
Although DEA training had been conducted
at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia since
1981, Administrator Lawn wanted the DEA to establish a unique training facility
that focused specifically on drug law enforcement. Because FBI and DEA agents
cooperated on many cases and would benefit from a degree of shared training,
Administrator Lawn decided that the new training center should be located near
the FBI Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Ultimately, he acquired 155
acres of land adjacent to the FBI Academy from U.S. Marine Corps Commandante
Alfred M. Gray for the construction of the new training center.
Originally the move was expected to take several months,
with new classes not beginning until January 1986, but a special appropriation
from Congress was earmarked for agent classes starting in 1985. Consequently,
the pace of the move was accelerated and the DEA Office of Training officially
moved to Quantico on October 1, 1985.
Arrest of Noriega (1989)
On February 4th, 1989, Manuel A. Noriega and 15 defendants
were indicted by the grand jury in Miami, Florida. The structure of the
RICO indictment alleged that Noriega was a drug facilitator for the Medellin
cartel. Noriega had utilized his position as the Commander of the Panamanian
Defense Forces and as the ruler of Panama to assist the Medellin cartel
in shipping cocaine; procuring precursor chemicals for the manufacture
of cocaine; providing a safe haven for cartel members following the assassination
of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla on April 30, 1984;
and sponsoring the laundering of narco-proceeds in Panamanian banks.
When the United States invaded the country of Panama on
December 20, 1989, Noriega eluded capture by the U.S. military for the
next several weeks. Finally, Noriega surrendered to the DEA in Panama
and was immediately taken to Miami to answer the indictment. Over the
next 21 months, enforcement Group 9 in Miami interviewed hundreds of individuals
and reviewed reams of seized papers in the United States and Panama. In
September 1991, the drug "Trial of the Century" began.
During the next eight months, over 100 prosecution witnesses, including Carlos Lehder, ex-DEA
Administrators Bensinger, Mullen, and Lawn, an ex-Panamanian Attorney General, cartel leader
Pepe Cabrera, and others testified at the trial. In supporting the prosecution, the DEA had special
agents deployed in 15 countries around the world, including Panama, Colombia, Spain,
Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Cuba.
Finally, on April 9,1992, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on eight of the ten counts in the
indictment. Noriega, who had become Panama's political leader in 1988 after President Eric
Arturo Delvalle was ousted, was convicted on racketeering and cocaine-trafficking charges for
protecting Colombian smugglers who had routed drugs through Panama. On July 9,1992, Manuel
Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in federal prison.
On April 6, 1998, he failed to overturn his drug trafficking conviction and the 40-year prison
sentence it drew. Noriega's appeal contended that the drug cartel had paid $1.25 million to a
witness to testify falsely against him, and that the government must be held responsible for the
alleged bribe. The U.S. Supreme Court, acting without comment, let stand a ruling that said
Noriega received a fair trial. The Noriega case was the most notorious drug trial in U.S. history
and demonstrated to the American public the global scope of corruption that accompanied
international drug smuggling.
Laboratories
In 1989, the Western Field Laboratory, under the leadership of Robert Sager, moved to a new
location in San Francisco, California. The new laboratory featured 17,000 square feet of floor
space and had benches for 16 chemists, special purpose instrument rooms, and natural light from
several windows.
Technology
The first office automation (OA) system for the DEA was
procured in 1986 for a contract cost of $36 million. The operating system
of this computer network provided DEA employees with E-mail, word processing,
spreadsheets and other standard desktop tools. Based on its experience
with the OA system, the DEA's introduction to and reliance on automation
tools to assist in all facets of the agency's day-to-day operations were
established. This computerization of the agency produced increased demands
for more capabilities through the office automation infrastructure.
In
January 1989, members of the DEA Phoenix Task Force seized 4.5 kilograms
of black tar heroin, the largest seizure of its kind in Arizona at that
time. The task force members from left are: Sgt. Doug Stine, Task Force
Agent Charlie Adams, SA Steff Stewart, Group Supervisor Bill Ruzzamenti,
SA Michelle Ashley, Task Force Agents Ben Quezada, Tom Reynolds, Phil
Smyth, and Bob Hajek, SA Gerry Courtney, and Task Force Agents Garry
Applegate, Adam Kurgan, and Dan Kelly.
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Dedication
(1989)
To celebrate the opening of a new facility,
the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) held a dedication ceremony
on February 22, 1989, in Ft. Bliss, Texas. The new installation
was dedicated in the name of slain DEA SA Enrique Camarena. Heartfelt
remarks made by Dora Camarena, his mother, were the highlight of
the ceremony.
Killed in the Line of Duty
|
|
Enrique S. Camarena
Died on February 9,
1985
DEA Special Agent
Camarena of the
Guadalajara, Mexico
Resident Office was
kidnapped, tortured,
and killed by drug
traffickers from
Mexico. |
|
Arthur L. Cash
Died on August 25,
1987
DEA Special Agent
Cash, who was in
charge of the Sierra
Vista Post of Duty in
Arizona, was killed
in a traffic accident
while transporting
three prisoners to
Tucson.
|
|
James A. Avant
Died on July 24,
1986
Deputy Sheriff Avant
of the Pulaski
County, Arkansas,
Sheriff's Office, was
killed in a helicopter
crash in Mount Ida,
Arkansas. He was
assigned to the
DEA's Task Force in
Little Rock,
Arkansas.
|
|
Terry W. McNett
Died on February 2,
1988
Detective McNett of
the Sedwick County,
Kansas Sheriff's
Office was shot and
killed in the
execution of a search
warrant in Wichita,
Kansas, while
assigned to a DEA
task force. |
|
Charles M. Bassing
Died on July 24,
1986
Criminal Investigator
Bassing of the
Arkansas State Police
was killed in a
helicopter crash in
Mount Ida, Arkansas.
He was assigned to
the DEA's Task
Force in Little Rock,
Arkansas.
|
|
George M. Montoya
Died on February 5,
1988
DEA Special Agent
Montoya of the Los
Angeles Field
Division was shot
and killed during an
undercover operation
in Los Angeles,
California. |
|
Kevin L. Brosch
Died on July 24,
1986
Criminal Investigator
Brosch of the
Jefferson County,
Arkansas, Sheriff's
Office, was killed in
a helicopter crash in
Mt. Ida, Arkansas.
He was participating
in a DEA Marijuana
Eradication Spotter
School.
|
|
Paul S. Seema
Died on February 6,
1988
DEA Special Agent
Seema of the Los
Angeles Field
Division died of
gunshot wounds
received during an
undercover operation
in Los Angeles,
California. |
|
Susan M. Hoefler
Died on August 16,
1986
Ms. Hoefler, an
office assistant at the
DEA Office in
Guadalajara, Mexico,
died from injuries
suffered in an
automobile accident
in Guadalajara. |
|
Everett E. Hatcher
Died on February
28, 1989
DEA Special Agent
Hatcher of the New
York Field Division
was shot and killed
during an undercover
investigation in New
York City.
|
|
William Ramos
Died on December
31, 1986
DEA Special Agent
Ramos of the
McAllen District
Office was shot and
killed by a drug-trafficking suspect
during an undercover
investigation at Las
Milpas, Texas, near
the Mexican
border.
|
|
Rickie C. Finley
Died on May 20,
1989
DEA Special Agent
Finley was killed in a
plane crash as he was
returning from a
jungle operation to a
base camp in Lima,
Peru. |
|
Raymond J. Stastny
Died on January 26,
1987
DEA Special Agent
Stastny of the Atlanta
Field Division died
from gunshot wounds
he received six days
earlier while working
in an undercover
operation in Atlanta. |
|
|
|