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Bylandt's Dutch/Belgian infantry brigade. Tripp's Dutch/Belgian heavy cavalry brigade. Comparison of cavalry casualties (by nationality) at Waterloo. Terms used by the "balanced" and "unbiased" British writers to report on the war
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"Wellington and English writers usually played down the role of any troops except their own.
The Dutch, Prussians and Germans and their commanders are conveniently forgotten except,
of course, where blame is imparted." The modern English accounts tend to be shallow and
superficial works that repeat selected myths without bothering to refer to other accounts.
"But for the heroic determination of the Prince of Orange, who, with a handful of men
dared to stand firm at Quatre Bras, I would have taken the English army in flagrante
delicto and would have conquered as (the Russians) at Friedland."
- Napoleon to de Montholon on St. Helen.
Massive column of French infantry.
The Dutch colonies were annexed by England.
During the "100 Days Campaign", Belgium again became battlefield; the decision fell in the Battale of Waterloo. Upon Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the allies amalgamated Belgium and Holland into the United Kingdom of the Netherlands under Prince William of Orange.
Religious, financial and political differences between the Dutch and the Belgians caused 15 years of controversy.
The army commanded by Wellington at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo included 2 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry brigades of the newly-unified Netherlands (or 'Dutch-Belgian') army.
Many authors writing about the campaign of 1815 and the Battle of Waterloo overly rellies on British memoirs and dispatches. It is probably due to either nonunderstending any other language but English, or intellectual lazyness as they never took the trouble of reading Belgian or Dutch memoirs. They took 80% off the performance score of anyone not having had the good sense to have been born English.
I maye be wrong but I doubt it. How is it that we get the image of the thin red line alone resisting the French hordes. At one point the only thing standing between Brussles and the entire Napoleon's army appears to have been a few decimated British battalions. Why were these the only units on the battlefield fighting against the French ? It seems like the Dutch, the Belgians, the Nasaauers, the KGL and the entire Prussian army disappeared from English books and maps. Surely Wellington's behavior towards his Spanish allies in the Peninsula was no less egregious that that towards the Dutch/Belgians and Prussians in 1815 ! Had the Allies lost at Waterloo, no doubt Wellington would have had to reluctantly and bluffly point out that the failure was all the fault of the Dutch, Belgians and Prussians.
Today the slanted misinformation is and will be published because there is a specific audience for it. As England declined economically, completely shed its empire and faced up to the new world order, not only the English press became increasingly xenophobic in their coverage of foreign cultures. Tabloid newspeak for the Germans (Krauts), French (Frogs), Spaniards (Dagos) drew from, and reflected back to, the language and the values of the backstreet. [The little Englanders who write this sort of trash should remember that their British monarchy are krauts.] Such nationalistic sentiments also seem to reverberate in wider public discourses in Britain about 'Johnny Foreigner', especially, for example, in recent political speeches by anti-European Union politicians.
This is not surprising that in such situation many of the "historians" sex up the facts and then the "English version" is repeatly trumpeted. To me any work on the Waterloo Campaign which does not refer in detail to Dutch, German ro French sources is essentially one-seded and unreliable.
The Dutch/Belgian role in the battle of Waterloo is often overlooked or minimized by many of the prolific (Chandler) and passionate anglocentric (Jac Weller) authors. This is what happened to the Dutch and Belgian troops in 1815, especially with Bylandt's and Tripp's brigades. Britain needed them, and they served but then they were not appreciated." (In 1811 Britain had a total of 191.179 infantrymen at home and abroad, and the foreign infantrymen (mostly Germans) consisted 20 % of the total ! In cavalry the foreigners consisted 15 % of the total cavalry force.)
1st Brigade: Major-Generaal W. F. Count de Bylandt (Van Bijlandt) 7th (Belgian) Line Btn. - Lt.-Kolonel F. C. Vandensande* with 701 men 27th (Dutch) Jäger Btn. - Lt.-Colonel J. W. Gunebosch with 809 men 5th (Dutch) Militia Btn. - Lt.-Kolonel J. J. Westenberg with 482 men 7th (Dutch) Militia Btn. - Lt.-Kolonel H. Singendonck with 675 mrn 8th (Dutch) Militia Btn. - Lt.-Kolonel W. A. de Jongh with 566 men
* - F. C. Vandensande served in the French 112e Ligne and was awarded with Légion d’Honneur. |
Generals de Perponcher-Slednitsky, van Saksen-Weimar and Bylandt fought bravely at Quatre-Brass disobeying Wellington's orders as they recognized the importance of the crossroads and ordered to defend it. It was one of the most effective and most important operations of this war.
The 5th commanded by Lt.-Kolonel J. J. Westenbergand and the 8th Militia commanded by Lt.-Kolonel W. A. de Jongh fought in and near Gemioncourt, losing and retaking it twice.
Their casualties were approx. 40 % !
The 800-men strong 27th Jäger Btn. commanded by Lt.-Kolonel J. W. Gunebosch fought the entire day and lost appprox. 32 %. But British officer, Captain Mercer, saw them later on the road, and "thought that they are all deserters" !
At Quatre Bras the Dutch/Belgians halted the French for quite a long time and saved Wellington's reputation.
At Waterloo the 3rd Dutch Division under general Chassé was positioned several kilometres west of the main body of Allied troops, in and around Braine-l'Alleud. It was to cover the right flank against a possible French flanking manoeuvre, which didn't materialise.
But for some strange reason Perponcher, Saksen-Weimar and Bylandt's troops, all those who saved Wellington's butt at Quatre Bras, were left by him on forward slope, a suicidal position. These lads and not the British were exposed to the fury of French Grand Battery. They also were destined to serve as the "wave-breakers" for the attacking French massive columns.
In contrast all the British brigades were deployed on reverse slope, at least 100 yards behind the crest, and invisible to the French gunners. They were kept in the safety and unscratched for quite long.
Bylandt's brigade's flanks were not protected and de Perponcher-Slednitsky ordered on his own authority to move them back, behind the hedge line on the ridge. This movement was implemented around noon, approx. one hour before the French artillery opened fire.
According to Lt. Scheltens and de Jongh (7th Line and 8th Militia), here they laid down in order to lessen the effects of the expected cannonade from the French Grand Battery.
But according to English authors the Dutch/Belgians were standing straight, and in full view of the French gunners. [Of course, nobody was so smart as the English were.] Chandler even mention that the standing Dutch/Belgians "suffered grievously" from artillery fire. Very soon, according to Siborne, they showed "a considerable degree of unsteadiness" and "fled in disarray at the first shots".
This contradicts witnesses and accounts that claim that Bylandt's brigade withstood the cannonade and even resisted the French column for several minutes, and only then they fell back.
For example Belgian and British contemporary accounts (Leutenant Hope/92nd Regiment of "Gordon Highlanders" and Luitenant Henri Chrétien Scheltens from the Dutch 7th Militia Btn.) stated that the men of Bylandt brigade engaged in close range volley fire with D'Erlons men at the hedgeline. According to these accounts the firefight was "protracted and effective".
Hope (92nd "Gordon Highlanders"), wrote "the Belgians....returned the fire of the enemy for some time with great spirit," and how they then "retired from the hedge".
Scheltens of the 7th Line (formed in 1814 in Gent) the author of "Souveniers d’un Grognard Belge" stated: "...our battalion opened fire as soon as our skirmishers had come in. The French column imprudently halted and began to deploy. We were at such close quarters ..." It was only after a series of firefights that Bylandt's forces eventually gave way and retreated through British line. But for some lazy authors the Dutch/Belgians ran away "at the first shots". Sorry, no comment about this kind of crap.
Instead of launching a cavalry counter-attack to support the fighting Dutch/Belgians, they were left by themselves and then called cowards by the fresh and unsratched British units.
When soon the British infantry was bending under similar pressure as the Dutch/Belgians were, they received full and quick support from a massive cavalry forces, and their "steady red line" was restored.
According to two British officers, Seymour and Uxbridge, Tripp's brigade had no stomach to fight. That it refused to charge, and even had fled. I'm still laughing into my cornflakes as such behaviour was seen in the British cavalry too. At Genappe Uxbridge unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the British 11th Light Dragoon Regiment to charge in support of the 7th who were being driven back by French lancers. ("My address to these Light Dragoons not having been received with all the enthusiasm that I expected, I ordered them to clear the chausee and said, 'The Life Guard shall have this honour', and instantly sending for them.")
This is necessary to compare Uxbridge's statement about the Dutch/Belgians with accounts from other nations. GM Jonkheer after action report:
"After resting in this position, I noticed enemy's cuirassiers which were advancing to charge the English squares. I saw a perfect moment to charge the enemy and ordered the 1st Regiment attack the enemy as they were disordered around the squares.
After the charge there were numerous enemies dead and wounded left on the ground. At the moment when the 1st Karabiniers Regiment rallied, the enemy sent in a second charge, in this action there were more than one French cuirassier regiment. These were equally repulsed by the 2nd and 3rd Regiment, many French cuirassiers were left in our hands."
(Dutch-Belgian) Cavalry Division - GL Baron Jean A. de Collaert
1st [Heavy] Cavalry Brigade - GM Jonkheer A.D. Tripp*
2nd [Light] Cavalry Brigade - GM Baron Charles Etienne de Ghigny
* - In previous campaign Jonkheer Tripp served in the French 14th Cuirassier Reg. |
After the British horse guard suffered heavy casualties in the hands of French cavalry, Tripp's carabiniers were the biggest formation of heavy cavalry on the British side. They counterattacked several times preventing the cuirassiers to penetrate behind the squares of British and German infantry. The heavy brigade had 2 out of its 3 regimental commanders hors de combat !
In contrast to Uxbridge's smearing the carabiniers, Wellington praised Tripp and his heavy brigade.
Tripp's carabiniers also participated in the pursuit after battle.
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1. 1st Netherlands (Dutch-Belgian) Light Cavalry Brigade - Mjr Ghigny - 49 %
This brigade suffered the heaviest casualties of all Wellington's cavalry brigades.
These lads charged to help cover the frantic retreat of two British heavy brigades
when they were chased away by the French cavalry. Later in battle they conducted numerous
counter-attacks against French cuirassiers when they penetrated between the
English-German-Dutch-Belgian squares. Now my question is: show me the books where
English authors describe the heroics of Ghigny's lads.
There are none.
2. 1st (British) 'Household' Cavalry Brigade - MG Somerset - 48 %
3. 2nd (British) 'Union' Cavalry Brigade - MG Ponssonby - 46 %
4. 2nd Netherlands (Dutch-Belgian) Light Cavalry Brigade - MG Merlen - 34 %
5. 5th (British) Cavalry Brigade - MG Grant - 31 %
6. 4th (British) Cavalry Brigade - GM Vandeleur - 23 %
7. 3rd (British-German) Cavalry Brigade - GM Dornberg - 22 %
8. Netherlands (Dutch-Belgian) Heavy Cavalry Brigade - GM Tripp - 19 %
9. 7th (British-German) Cavalry Brigade - Col Arentschild - 19 %
10. 6th (British-German) Cavalry Brigade - GM Vivian - 14 %
11. (Hannoverian) Cavalry Brigade - Col Estorff - 12 %
Here served the Duke of Cumberland's Hussars.
1. (Belgian) 8th Hussar - 65 % (!)
The Bellgian hussars fought with "insane gallantry"
throughout the afternoon.
2. (British) 7th Hussars - 55 %
3. (British) Life Guards - 49 %
4. (British) 1st King's Dragoons - 48
5. (British) 6th Dragoons - 48 %
6. (British) Royal Horse Guards - 46 %
7. (Dutch) 6th Hussars - 45 %
8. (British) 1st Royal Dragoons - 45 %
9. (British) 2nd Royal Dragoons - 45 % ('The Scots Greys')
10. (Belgian) 2nd Carabinier - 40 %
11. (Dutch) 4th Light Dragoons - 38 %
12. (Belgian) 5th Light Dragoons - 36 %
13. (German) 1st KGL Light Dragoons - 28 %
14. (British) 12th Light Dragoons - 26 %
15. (British) 13th Light Dragoons - 24 %
16. (Dutch) 1st Carabiniers - 23 %
17. (British) 23rd Light Dragoons - 23 %
18. (British) 18th Hussar - 23 %
19. (British) 10th Hussar - 21 %
20. (German) 3rd KGL Hussar - 19 %
21. (British) 15th Hussar - 18 %
22. (British) 11th Light Dragoons - 17 %
23. (Dutch) 3rd Carabinier - 16 %
24. (German) 2nd KGL Light Dragoons - 16 %
25. (Brunswick) Uhlan Squadron - 13 %
26. (Hannoverian) Cumberland's Hussar - 12 %
27. (Brunswick) 2nd Hussar - 11 %
28. (British) 16th Light Dragoons - 7 %
29. (German) 1st KGL Hussar - 2 %
The Dutch and German soldiers are:
Brainwashed
Paper tigers
Cowardly
Desperate
Cornered
Cannon fodder
Bastards
Mad dogs
"The idea that the British see themselves as different (and often superior) to the Europeans
is not confined to the tabloids or a few Jingoistic historians.
It is a commonly held notion, as can be seen from, everyday articles in the British press.
For some lads , of course, the press coverage is "all bollocks" but, contradictorily, they read and enjoy it.
In February 1994, public life in Great Britain was disrupted by cold and snow.
The Independent was able to explain this. British snow is different.
On 15 February the newspaper reported that British snow is commonly wetter and superior
to that of the European continent." :-)
PS.
Below is a short description of how the British "Knights of the battlefield" fled from the battlefield without firing one shot at the Germans.
On May 10th 1940, the British Guards land at Hook of Holland, to clear the road to The
Hague of german airborne and paratroops. By the time they are ready to
attack, the Dutch have cleared the road themselves.
The Guards are then requested to help clear other areas in the vicinity of Hook, but they
refuse, it not being their exact orders. A refinement of the request to
have the Guards defend the fortress of Hook, so the garisson could help
clear the area is also refused, the Guards just stay in the docks.
When on the 12th a rumour arrives that German tanks have crossed the the
bridges at Rotterdam (which did not happen until after the armistice on
the 14th), they flee in total disarray by sea, leaving all their
equipment behind !
(Source: Lt Col Brongers "De slag om de Afsluitdijk" and "De slag om
de Residentie")