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Interleaving Cryptography and Mechanism Design

The Case of Online Auctions

  • Conference paper
Financial Cryptography (FC 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3110))

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Abstract

We propose a new cryptographically protected multi-round auction mechanism for online auctions. This auction mechanism is designed to provide (in this order) security, cognitive convenience, and round-effectiveness. One can vary internal parameters of the mechanism to trade off bid privacy and cognitive costs, or cognitive costs and the number of rounds. We are aware of no previous work that interleaves cryptography explicitly with the mechanism design.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, 35 Olden St, Princeton, NJ, 08544, USA

    Edith Elkind

  2. Laboratory for Theoretical Computer Science Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Helsinki University of Technology, P.O.Box 5400, FI-02015, Espoo, Finland

    Helger Lipmaa

Authors
  1. Edith Elkind
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  2. Helger Lipmaa
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RSA Laboratories, Bedford, MA, USA

    Ari Juels

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Elkind, E., Lipmaa, H. (2004). Interleaving Cryptography and Mechanism Design. In: Juels, A. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3110. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22420-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-27809-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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