Abstract
Bertrand Russell’s celebrated essay “On the Notion of Cause” was first delivered to the Aristotelian Society on 4 November 1912, as Russell’s Presidential Address. The piece is best known for a passage in which its author deftly positions himself between the traditional metaphysics of causation and the British crown, firing broadsides in both directions: “The law of causality”, Russell declares, “Like much that passes muster in philosophy, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” To mark the lecture’s centenary, I offer a contemporary view of the issues Russell here puts on the table, and of the health or otherwise, at the end of the essay’s first century, of his notorious conclusion.
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Notes
- 1.
This piece was written for delivery on 1 November 2012, as my inaugural lecture as the Bertrand Russell Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge. I am very grateful to Maria Carla Galavotti and the organisers of “New Directions in Philosophy of Science” for the invitation that enabled me to give the lecture as a dress rehearsal in Bertinoro on 20 October 2012, and to the audience on that occasion for many helpful comments and questions.
- 2.
This problem has also been much discussed in recent literature, especially by way of criticism of David Lewis’s attempt, mentioned above, to explain a corresponding asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, to which that of causation might then be reduced. See, e.g., Price and Weslake (2009) and references therein.
- 3.
This deletion is present in the manuscript of Ramsey’s paper.
- 4.
See Price (1996) for an introduction to the issue.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
The heirs to the monarchies of Europe don’t have that opportunity, of course. It is true that in principle they could abdicate, but at considerable cost – like it or not, they are public figures, after all – and only by passing the unasked-for obligation to a sibling or cousin.
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Price, H. (2014). Where Would We Be Without Counterfactuals?. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_42
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