Papers by Thomas Kjeller Johansen
S.Connell (ed.), Aristotle's Parts of Animals. A Critical Guide
We seem to find in the PA two opposed explanatory pressures: one ‘upwards’ towards explaining the... more We seem to find in the PA two opposed explanatory pressures: one ‘upwards’ towards explaining the parts of animals at the level of the most general kinds and and another ‘downwards’ towards explaining them at the level of the ultimate species. Aristotle's proposed solution is to account for the various bodily parts at a general level and to descend to the species only when the parts differ significantly. In this paper I address some of the difficulties that have to be resolved to make this solution work.
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2021
Plato in the Timaeus shows a strong interest in what we today would call ‘embodied cognition’, de... more Plato in the Timaeus shows a strong interest in what we today would call ‘embodied cognition’, developing a detailed account of the physiology of perception. One striking aspect of this account is that he presents the whole body as involved in perception. The cardiovascular system allows the blood to transmit sensory affections to all parts of the body, while the soul-filled marrow, which is particularly sensitive, extends via the bones throughout body. Timaeus reserves for the intellectual part (to phronimon) a distinctive role in perception providing rational content and reflexivity to our perceptual experiences. He seeks to integrate the intellect within the perceptual system, not just anatomically, but also by showing perception itself to be a form of intelligence (phronêsis). The whole ensouled body thus emerges as a single perceptual system, gathering, sharing and reflecting on perceptual information as one. The paper concludes by placing Timaeus´ theory in the context of Pre-Socratic views about the involvement of the whole body in perception.
The volume presents essays on the philosophical explanation of the relationship between body and ... more The volume presents essays on the philosophical explanation of the relationship between body and soul in antiquity from the Presocratics to Galen, including papers on Parmenides on thinking (E. Hussey, R. Dilcher), Empedocles' Love (D. O'Brien), tripartition in Plato (T. Buchheim), Aristotle (C. Rapp, T. Johansen, P.-M. Morel), Peripatetics after Aristotle (R. Sharples), Hellenistic Philosophy (C. Rapp, C. Gill), and Galen (R. J. Hankinson).
Aristotelian Metaphysics. Essays in Honour of David Charles, ed. by D.Bronstein, T.K.Johansen, and M.Peramatzis, OUP, 2024
David Charles has argued that, according to Aristotle, a psychological state such as anger is an ... more David Charles has argued that, according to Aristotle, a psychological state such as anger is an ‘inextricably psycho-physical phenomenon because it has a matter-involving (inextricably psycho-physical) form.’ Agreeing with this claim, this paper asks how one should further explicate the involvement of matter. For Charles the involvement demands an explicit mention of the specific matter of the psychological state in the definition of its form. So matter plays a role in defining the form itself, as nose, for example, occurs in the definition of snubness. The alternative explored in this paper is that the specific matter is not present in but follows from the definition of the form. In that case the definition of form is not like that of snubness in explicitly mentioning matter. Nor, however, is it like the mathematician’s account of concavity, which has no implications as to its material realisation. Rather, the formal definition of a psychological state may imply a certain material realisation by hypothetical necessity. I develop this suggestion and consider its strength against certain objections raised by David Charles.
G.Betegh, V.Tsouna (eds.), Conceptualising Concepts in Greek Philosophy, CUP, 2024
The paper explores the claim that the development of our cognitive powers follows the path of con... more The paper explores the claim that the development of our cognitive powers follows the path of conceptual differentiation in our souls. On the account offered Aristotle´s position is neither rationalist nor empiricist in any straightforward sense. It is not simply rationalist since the process of conceptual differentiation does not presuppose a full-fledged intellect or nous from the outset. The intellect has itself to develop gradually into nous through perception, memory and experience, just as also memory and experience have to develop as states and capacities from their starting point in perception. Nor is the position straightforwardly empiricist since it is the intellect itself that at each stage responds to percepts, memories or experiential judgments by recognising ever more general, unified concepts in the deliveries of lower cognition. Our intellect develops naturally through these stages by forming concepts that are ever closer to representing the basic features of reality.
P.Destrée and M.R.Johnson (eds.), Aristotle on Philosophical Exhortation, 2024
Metaphysics I.1-2 is, I argue in this paper, a protreptic to first philosophy. Aristotle shows ho... more Metaphysics I.1-2 is, I argue in this paper, a protreptic to first philosophy. Aristotle shows how we can only realize our human desire for knowledge through a cognitive development which leads to wisdom (sophia). We can only fulfil ourselves as human beings if we attend to philosophy. There could be no greater protreptic than that. Whether the Protrepticus underlies the composition of Metaph. I.1-2 is a matter of dispute. However, I want to show that on key points the Protrepticus serves to confirm, and give detail to, interpretations which can plausibly be established on the basis also of other texts in the corpus. Together the Metaph. I.1-2 and the Protrepticus present a consistent theory of the power of knowledge to satisfy our human nature and, as Aristotle would have it, "set us free".
K.Corcilius (ed.), Aims and Methods of Aristotle’s De anima, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen , 2024
The questions When Charles Darwin´s grandfather Erasmus Darwin in 1800 introduced the philosophy ... more The questions When Charles Darwin´s grandfather Erasmus Darwin in 1800 introduced the philosophy of agriculture and gardening, he pointed out that plants enjoy only a tenuous form of unity: 'If a bud be torn from the branch of a tree, or cut out and planted in the earth with a glass cup inverted over it, to prevent the exhalation from being at first greater than its power of absorption; or if it be inserted into the bark of another tree, it will grow, and become a plant in every respect like its parent. This evinces that every bud of a tree is an individual vegetable being; and that a tree therefore is a family or swarm of individual plants, like the polypus, with its young growing out of its sides, or like the branching cells of the coral-insect.' (Phytologia I.1.1, London 1800) Erasmus Darwin thought that propagating plants from cuttings showed that the new plants were somehow already present in the original plant. The original plant was therefore to be considered not an individual but rather 'a family' of plants. Even if one regards the elder Darwin´s conclusion as precipitous, his argument raises the questions about the identity of plants. How, if at all, is a plant one rather than a 'family' of plants, if its cuttings can also constitute individual plants, and on what basis should we think of these successor plants as the same as, or different from, the parent plant? These are questions that still occupy modern philosophers of biology. As Ellen Clarke puts it: 'The trouble with counting plant units is that a decision has to be made, before the counting begins, about what to count. In many animal lineages this seems like no problem at all because the relevant unit is just obvious. If we want to count pigs, for example, it is rather easy to tell which bits count as pig parts and which as new pigs. But plants, and other modular organisms, grow and develop in ways that cloud the issue, to say the least. In modular organisms, replication occurs at multiple hierarchical scales, and each scale constitutes a level at which the demographer might choose to count births and deaths.' 1 Given the reproductive patterns of plants are we ever entitled to speak of one plant? When do we register the birth and death of a plant, i.e. the coming into being or passage away of an individual plant, as opposed to a new growth or outshoot of the same plant? There is good reason to ask these questions also of Aristotle. In Metaph. VII.2 he mentions plants along with animals and their parts as prime candidates for being substances: T1 Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such
Rhizomata, 2020
This paper considers Theophrastus’ use in the De sensibus of the principles that like perceives l... more This paper considers Theophrastus’ use in the De sensibus of the principles that like perceives like and that unlike perceives unlike to criticise his predecessors. It is argued that the aporiai that arise from either position serve to motivate the view of perception articulated by Aristotle in the De anima.
Philosophical Inquiry, 2017
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2016
This paper reassesses the relationship between the way of Truth and the way of Opinion (doxa) in ... more This paper reassesses the relationship between the way of Truth and the way of Opinion (doxa) in Parmenides’ poem. Parmenides’ criteria or ‘signs’ of intelligible inquiry are paradigmatically met by being; however, by fulfilling those criteria, albeit partially and in a different manner from being, the cosmos comes to resemble being and achieve a degree of intelligibility and reality. Being and the cosmos appear in this way to be related as model to likeness. I argue on this basis that Parmenides’ cosmology anticipates the likely story of Plato’s Timaeus. Already Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus had made a similar suggestion, but this paper is the first to attempt to spell out and assess it.
Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science
Aristotle says in many places that the end or goal (telos) is a cause. In some of these places, h... more Aristotle says in many places that the end or goal (telos) is a cause. In some of these places, he also warns us that the notion of a telos is ambiguous. A telos may mean the end for the sake of which a change or activity takes place, but it may also mean the beneficiary of the change or activity. Linguistically, Aristotle marks the distinction by the genitive to hou heneka vs. the dative to tini. The genitive suggests an object of pursuit, often as an object of verb for desire (such as oregetai or ephietai), while the dative is naturally taken as a dative of interest. I shall refer to the one as 'the end-genitive' and the other as 'the end-dative'. Ancient commentators illustrated the distinction by the example of medicine, for the sake of the health and with the patient as beneficiary. 1 2. Teleology is of course a central tenet of Aristotle's philosophy. So one would think that a distinction two kinds of telos was of basic importance to our understanding of Aristotle's philosophy. Yet till recently the distinction has been met with general indifference. 2 So Hicks comments on its first occurrence in DA II.4 (415b2): 'This is of the nature of a footnote. It is repeated below 415 b 20. Probably either here or there it is out of place. We find it again, unnecessarily interrupting the argument, in Metaph.
The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
Plato's Natural Philosophy, 2004
The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
A study of the Timaeus-Critias
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Papers by Thomas Kjeller Johansen
Contents
Thomas Kjeller Johansen: Introduction
Edward Hussey: Protagoras on Political Technê
Tamer Nawar: Dynamic Modalities and Teleological Agency: Plato and
Aristotle on Skill and Ability
Rachel Barney: Technê As a Model for Virtue in Plato
Thomas Kjeller Johansen: Crafting the Cosmos: Plato on the Limitations of Divine
Craftsmanship
Ursula Coope: Aristotle on Productive Understanding and Completeness
Robert Bolton: Technê and Empeiria: Aristotle on Practical Knowledge
Voula Tsouna: The Stoics on Technê and the Technai
Voula Tsouna: The Epicureans on Technê and the Technai
Stefan Sienkiewicz: The Sceptic’s Art: Varieties of Expertise in Sextus Empiricus
Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson: Plotinus on the Arts
Jan Opsomer: Productive Knowledge in Proclus