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Link to original content: https://link.springer.com/doi/10.1007/s10916-012-9843-1
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Security Analysis of Standards-Driven Communication Protocols for Healthcare Scenarios

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Abstract

The importance of the Electronic Health Record (EHR), that stores all healthcare-related data belonging to a patient, has been recognised in recent years by governments, institutions and industry. Initiatives like the Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) have been developed for the definition of standard methodologies for secure and interoperable EHR exchanges among clinics and hospitals. Using the requisites specified by these initiatives, many large scale projects have been set up for enabling healthcare professionals to handle patients’ EHRs. The success of applications developed in these contexts crucially depends on ensuring such security properties as confidentiality, authentication, and authorization. In this paper, we first propose a communication protocol, based on the IHE specifications, for authenticating healthcare professionals and assuring patients’ safety. By means of a formal analysis carried out by using the specification language COWS and the model checker CMC, we reveal a security flaw in the protocol thus demonstrating that to simply adopt the international standards does not guarantee the absence of such type of flaws. We then propose how to emend the IHE specifications and modify the protocol accordingly. Finally, we show how to tailor our protocol for application to more critical scenarios with no assumptions on the communication channels. To demonstrate feasibility and effectiveness of our protocols we have fully implemented them.

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Notes

  1. IHE is an initiative by healthcare professionals and industry that strictly follows such international guidelines as HIPAA and EU commission reports.

  2. For simplicity sake, we assume an STS that is directly able to authenticate users, i.e., it plays also the role of the identity provider.

  3. The SAML profile [32] supports a third subject confirmation method, i.e. sender vouches. This method however is intended to be used when an intermediary is vouching for another requester, which is out of scope in our scenarios.

  4. The string – indicates that the rest of the line is a comment.

  5. Notice that if both receives along \(\mathtt{c.rstr}\) match an incoming message, hence the first argument is \(\mathtt{sts}\), due to the prioritized semantics of COWS only the second receive (which generates a smaller substitution) can progress.

  6. This is the modal logic operator box: \(\mathtt{[a] f}\) states that, no matter how a process performs action \(\mathtt{a}\), the state it reaches in doing so will necessarily satisfy the property expressed by \(\mathtt{f}\).

  7. Notably, the major healthcare initiatives are in the way to identify some specific threat models (see e.g., [40]). We define our threat model using their experience as a basis.

  8. Available at http://ws.apache.org/axis2.

  9. Available at http://www.jboss.org.

  10. Web site: http://www.tiani-spirit.com

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Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

List of acronyms

AES:

Advanced Encryption Standard

ARR:

Audit Record Repository

ATNA:

Audit Trail and Node Authentication

AVISPA:

Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications

CDA:

Clinical Document Architecture

CMC:

COWS model checker

COWS:

Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services

EHR:

Electronic Health Record

epSOS:

European Patients Smart Open Services

HIPAA:

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

Hl7:

Health Level Seven International

IHE:

Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise

IP:

Internet Protocol

LIFO:

Last In First Out

OASIS:

Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards

RST:

WS-Trust Request Security Token

RSTR:

WS-Trust Request Security Token Response

SAML:

Security Assertion Markup Language

SHA:

Secure Hash Algorithm

SOAP:

Simple Object Access Protocol

SOC:

Service-Oriented Computing

SocL:

Service-Oriented Computing Logic

STS:

Security Token Service

TCP:

Transmission Control Protocol

TLA+:

Temporal Logic of Actions specification language

TLC:

TLA+ model Checker

TLS:

Transport Layer Security

UT:

WS-Security Username Token

W3C:

World Wide Web Consortium

WS-BPEL:

Web Services Business Process Execution Language

XACML:

eXtensible Access Control Markup Language

XCN:

eXtended Composite ID Number and name for persons

XDM:

Cross Enterprise Document Sharing using Portable Media

XDS:

Cross Enterprise Document Sharing

XML:

eXtensible Markup Language

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tiani “Spirit” GmbH, Guglgasse, 6-1110, Vienna, Austria

    Massimiliano Masi

  2. Università degli Studi di Firenze, Viale Morgagni, 65-50134, Firenze, Italy

    Massimiliano Masi & Rosario Pugliese

  3. IMT Advanced Studies Lucca, Piazza S. Ponziano, 65-55100, Lucca, Italy

    Francesco Tiezzi

Authors
  1. Massimiliano Masi
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  2. Rosario Pugliese
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  3. Francesco Tiezzi
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Massimiliano Masi.

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Masi, M., Pugliese, R. & Tiezzi, F. Security Analysis of Standards-Driven Communication Protocols for Healthcare Scenarios. J Med Syst 36, 3695–3711 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10916-012-9843-1

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