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Link to original content: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2018.11
Ergodic Mean-Payoff Games for the Analysis of Attacks in Crypto-Currencies
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Ergodic Mean-Payoff Games for the Analysis of Attacks in Crypto-Currencies

Authors Krishnendu Chatterjee, Amir Kafshdar Goharshady, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen, Yaron Velner

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Krishnendu Chatterjee
  • IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria), Klosterneuburg, Austria
Amir Kafshdar Goharshady
  • IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria), Klosterneuburg, Austria
Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen
  • IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria), Klosterneuburg, Austria
Yaron Velner
  • Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

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Krishnendu Chatterjee, Amir Kafshdar Goharshady, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen, and Yaron Velner. Ergodic Mean-Payoff Games for the Analysis of Attacks in Crypto-Currencies. In 29th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 118, pp. 11:1-11:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2018.11

Abstract

Crypto-currencies are digital assets designed to work as a medium of exchange, e.g., Bitcoin, but they are susceptible to attacks (dishonest behavior of participants). A framework for the analysis of attacks in crypto-currencies requires (a) modeling of game-theoretic aspects to analyze incentives for deviation from honest behavior; (b) concurrent interactions between participants; and (c) analysis of long-term monetary gains. Traditional game-theoretic approaches for the analysis of security protocols consider either qualitative temporal properties such as safety and termination, or the very special class of one-shot (stateless) games. However, to analyze general attacks on protocols for crypto-currencies, both stateful analysis and quantitative objectives are necessary. In this work our main contributions are as follows: (a) we show how a class of concurrent mean-payoff games, namely ergodic games, can model various attacks that arise naturally in crypto-currencies; (b) we present the first practical implementation of algorithms for ergodic games that scales to model realistic problems for crypto-currencies; and (c) we present experimental results showing that our framework can handle games with thousands of states and millions of transitions.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Software and its engineering → Formal software verification
Keywords
  • Crypto-currency
  • Quantitative Verification
  • Mean-payoff Games

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