Conditional Tabular Generative Adversarial Based Intrusion Detection System for Detecting Ddos and Dos Attacks on the Internet of Things Networks
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- An approach that leverages CTGAN for accurate identification of DDoS and DoS attacks in IoT networks. The proposed approach utilizes the power of generative adversarial networks to synthesize realistic network traffic data, enabling more effective detection and classification of malicious activities.
- Conducting an extensive evaluation of the classification performance of various shallow machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) models. By leveraging the synthetic dataset generated by CTGAN, this research pioneers a comprehensive assessment of different ML and DL algorithms, providing insights into their strengths and weaknesses in detecting DDoS/DoS attacks in IoT networks. This evaluation contributes to the understanding of the most effective models for accurate attack classification.Furthermore, this evaluation serves as a valuable resource for future researchers in the same field, aiding them in identifying the optimal combination of machine ML or DL techniques in conjunction with CTGAN.
- Addressing the issue of extreme class imbalance in the Bot-IoT dataset through the utilization of synthetic data generation. The research proposes the use of CTGAN to generate synthetic data that represents the minority class of DDoS and DoS attacks. By augmenting the dataset with synthetic samples, this approach helps alleviate the challenges associated with imbalanced training data, enhancing the performance and robustness of detection models.
2. Background
2.1. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and Denial of Service (DoS)
2.2. Conditional Tabular GAN (CTGAN)
3. Literature Review
4. Proposed Approach
4.1. Data Pre-Processing
- Data cleansing: This procedure involves identifying data that is lacking, incorrect, erroneous, or irrelevant so it can be updated or removed. For example, if a feature has no available value in the dataset, it is assigned a value of 0.
- Categorical data transformation: This step entails converting data from one format to another. For example, the characteristics of the String/Object datatype are substituted by a unique number. The Categorical data in the dataset used are: proto, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, category, subcategory. Table 3 shows sample of categorical data while Table 4 shows sample of categorical data transformation
4.2. CTGAN-Based Synthetic Data Generation
4.3. DoS and DDoS Attack Detection
- The CTGAN-based IDS employs a generator network to produce synthetic traffic that closely mimics legitimate traffic patterns. This synthetic traffic generation step enables the IDS to effectively distinguish between legitimate and malicious traffic, facilitating accurate detection and mitigation of DoS and DDoS attacks.
- The discriminator network, a crucial component within the CTGAN framework, learns to differentiate between legitimate and malicious traffic. By analyzing the characteristics and patterns of the traffic, the discriminator enhances the IDS’s ability to detect and classify attacks. This helps in effectively identifying and mitigating both DoS and DDoS attacks on IoT networks.
- The syntactic tabular data generated by CTGAN is utilized to train multiple shallow machine-learning and deep-learning classifiers. The training process involves using the synthetic data to enhance the performance of the detection models. This results in improved accuracy and effectiveness in detecting and mitigating DoS and DDoS attacks.
5. Experimental Results
5.1. Dataset
5.2. Evaluation Metrics
5.3. Results and Discussion
5.4. Discussion
6. Conclusions and Future Works
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Attack Type | Explanation |
---|---|
Malware and Ransomware | Malicious programs that are downloaded and installed on IoT gadgets and then cause damage, steal information, or turn the gadgets into part of a botnet. Data on a device is encrypted and then locked until a ransom is paid |
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) | The connection between IoT devices and the network may be intercepted by hackers, allowing them to eavesdrop, alter data, or insert harmful instructions. This leads to compromised security, altered data, or outright device control. |
Physical Attacks | Physically accessing or tampering with an IoT device with the intent of stealing data, changing its behavior, or obtaining control over it. To identify and prevent such attacks, strong physical security measures are required. |
Privilege Escalation | Gaining administrative access by exploiting flaws in the software or configuration of an IoT device. Because of this, malicious actors may get access to private information, change the way a device normally operates, or even go beyond its limits. |
Information Leakage | The disclosure of private information, such as user passwords, configuration settings, or personal data, by IoT devices without permission. Those who would steal identities or get access illegally or maliciously take advantage of this vulnerability. |
Replay Attacks | A method of recording and then playing back authorized interaction between IoT gadgets. Because to this, malicious acts, entry into protected regions, and authentication bypass are all possible. |
DNS Attacks | DNS hijacking is the practice of diverting traffic from legitimate websites to malicious ones. Because of this, unauthorized parties may gain access to or modify information sent from an IoT device to its intended recipient. |
Firmware Attacks | Taking advantage of security holes in the firmware of embedded systems used in IoT devices. Software that has been compromised may be used to take over a device, modify its behavior, or install malicious software. The security and functioning of a device may be severely compromised by an attack on its firmware. |
Reference | Algorithm | Dataset | Accuracy |
---|---|---|---|
[15] | logistic model trees | IoT device classes | 99.92% to 99.99% |
[16] | Convolutional neural network (CNN) with LSTM | CISIDS-2017 | 99.03% |
[17] | Multi-layer perceptron (MLP) | Various types of DDoS and DoS attacks | High accuracy |
[18] | DT, k-NN, and NB | CICIDS-2019 | 100%, 98%, 29% |
[19] | RF, AB, GBM, ERT, CART, and MLP | CIDDS-001, UNSWNB15, NSL-KDD | 94% (RF) |
[20] | Naive Bayes, Bayes Net, ZeroR | UNSW-NB15 | Varying results |
[21] | Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) | BoT-IoT | 99% (binary class) and 97% (multiclass class) |
[24] | Refined long short-term memory (RLSTM) deep learning model | CICIDS-2017 and NSL-KDS | Outperforms other methods |
[25] | Machine Learning and Deep Learning models (Decision Tree and Multi-layer Perceptron) | Bot-IoT | Average accuracy over 99% |
[26] | CNN Multi-layer Perceptron RF | Bot-IoT | Average accuracy 92.85% |
[27] | Random Forest XGbooest | Bot-IoT | Average accuracy 99% |
Proto | Saddr | Sport | Daddr | Dport | Category | Subcategory |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
udp | 192.168.100.150 | 6551 | 192.168.100.3 | 80 | DDoS | UDP |
tcp | 192.168.100.150 | 5532 | 192.168.100.3 | 80 | DDoS | TCP |
tcp | 192.168.100.147 | 27,165 | 192.168.100.3 | 80 | DDoS | TCP |
udp | 192.168.100.150 | 48,719 | 192.168.100.3 | 80 | DoS | UDP |
udp | 192.168.100.147 | 22,461 | 192.168.100.3 | 80 | DDoS | UDP |
Proto | Saddr | Sport | Daddr | Dport | Category | Subcategory |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4 | 4 | 61,685 | 13 | 4191 | 0 | 7 |
3 | 4 | 50,363 | 13 | 4191 | 0 | 6 |
3 | 1 | 19,080 | 13 | 4191 | 0 | 6 |
4 | 4 | 43,028 | 13 | 4191 | 1 | 7 |
4 | 1 | 13,854 | 13 | 4191 | 0 | 7 |
pkSeqID | Proto | Saddr | Sport | Daddr | Dport | Seq |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0.856684 | 1.00 | 0.266667 | 0.941181 | 0.265306 | 0.887924 | 0.961012 |
0.663009 | 0.75 | 0.266667 | 0.768431 | 0.265306 | 0.887924 | 0.979089 |
0.538722 | 0.75 | 0.066667 | 0.291120 | 0.265306 | 0.887924 | 0.239964 |
0.338217 | 1.00 | 0.266667 | 0.656515 | 0.265306 | 0.887924 | 0.378203 |
0.888094 | 1.00 | 0.066667 | 0.211382 | 0.265306 | 0.887924 | 0.400685 |
Attack Type | Training Dataset | Testing Dataset |
---|---|---|
UDP | 566,132 | 396,580 |
TCP | 455,737 | 318,337 |
Service_Scan | 20,788 | 14,542 |
OS_Fingerprint | 5058 | 3621 |
HTTP | 721 | 504 |
Normal | 118 | 107 |
Keylogging | 20 | 14 |
Data_Exfiltration | 1 | 0 |
Total | 1,048,575 | 733,705 |
Category | Training Dataset | Testing Dataset |
---|---|---|
DDoS | 550,955 | 385,309 |
DoS | 471,635 | 330,112 |
Reconnaissance | 25,846 | 18,163 |
Normal | 118 | 107 |
Theft | 21 | 14 |
Total | 1,043,575 | 733,705 |
Column Name | Count | Mean | Std | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
pkSeqID | 1,048,575 | 1,833,736 | 1,058,796 | 5.0 | 3,668,519 |
seq | 1,048,575 | 121,283.3 | 75,795.08 | 1.0 | 262,207 |
stddev | 1,048,575 | 0.886813 | 0.803454 | 0.0 | 2.496763 |
N_IN_Conn _P_SrcIP | 1,048,575 | 82.58135 | 24.36642 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
min | 1,048,575 | 1.019018 | 1.484272 | 0.0 | 4.980471 |
state_number | 1,048,575 | 3.134601 | 1.186406 | 1.0 | 11.0 |
mean | 1,048,575 | 2.231664 | 1.517782 | 0.0 | 4.981882 |
N_IN_Conn _P_DstIP | 1,048,575 | 92.48208 | 18.13428 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
drate | 1,048,575 | 0.457156 | 67.19496 | 0.0 | 58,823.53 |
srate | 1,048,575 | 3.497612 | 1058.112 | 0.0 | 1,000,000.0 |
max | 1,048,575 | 3.020940 | 1.860618 | 0.0 | 4.999999 |
attack | 1048575.0 | 0.9998875 | 0.0106076 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
Column Name | Count | Mean | Std | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
pkSeqID | 733,705 | 1,834,472 | 1,058,826 | 2.0 | 3,668,507 |
seq | 733,705 | 121,412.819892 | 75,823.39884 | 1.0 | 262,212 |
stddev | 733,705 | 0.887894 | 0.804013 | 0.0 | 2.496758 |
N_IN_Conn _P_SrcIP | 733,705 | 82.492551 | 24.426145 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
min | 733,705 | 1.018868 | 1.484235 | 0.0 | 4.980470 |
state_number | 733,705 | 3.135073 | 1.186427 | 1.0 | 11.0 |
mean | 733,705 | 2.233429 | 1.517572 | 0.0 | 4.981785 |
N_IN_Conn _P_DstIP | 733,705 | 92.427763 | 18.216076 | 1.0 | 100.0 |
drate | 733,705 | 0.506298 | 74.330175 | 0.0 | 58,823.53 |
srate | 733,705 | 2.262398 | 403.408092 | 0.0 | 333,333.3125 |
max | 733,705 | 3.023000 | 1.860725 | 0.0 | 4.999999 |
attack | 733,705 | 0.999854 | 0.012075 | 0.0 | 1 |
Category | Protocol | Number of Records |
---|---|---|
DDoS | TCP | 279,601 |
UDP | 271,056 | |
Total of DDoS records | 550,657 | |
DoS | TCP | 295,063 |
UDP | 176,123 | |
Total of DoS records | 471,186 | |
Normal | TCP | 92 |
UDP | 13 | |
ARP | 10 | |
IPV6-ICMP | 3 | |
Total of Normal records | 118 | |
Total of records | 1,021,961 |
Category | Traffic Type | Number of Packets |
---|---|---|
0 (normal) | 4 (TCP) | 347,715 |
3 (UDP) | 94,386 | |
1 (attack) | 4 (TCP) | 313,836 |
3 (UDP) | 244,063 | |
Total number of records | 1,000,000 |
Evaluation Metric | Definition |
---|---|
True positive (TP) | Conditions under which the classifier makes the right decision an attack |
False negative (FN) | This is a condition in which the classifier incorrectly labels an attack as normal. |
False positive (FP) | Refers to situations in which the classifier incorrectly identifies a normal instance as an attack. |
True negative (TN) | This is the situations in which the classifier makes the right call common occurrences |
Precision | The ratio of accurately predicted attacks to all samples predicted as attacks. Precision = TP / (TP + FP) |
Recall / Detection Rate | The proportion of all attack samples correctly classified as attacks vs. all attack samples. Recall = TP / (TP + FN) |
False Alarm Rate / False Positive Rate | The ratio of incorrectly predicted attack samples vs. all normal samples. False Alarm Rate = FP / (TN + FP) |
True Negative Rate | The proportion of correctly classified normal samples vs. all normal samples. True Negative Rate = TN / (TN + FP) |
Accuracy | The proportion of instances correctly classified vs. the total number of instances. Accuracy = (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN) |
F1-measure | The harmonic means of precision and recall. F1 Measure = 2 × (Precision x Recall) / (Precision + Recall) |
Model | Detection Accuracy | Precision | Recall Score | F1 Measure |
---|---|---|---|---|
LR | 0.699 | 0.367 | 0.699 | 0.823 |
NB | 0.699 | 0.351 | 0.699 | 0.823 |
RF | 0.648 | 0.342 | 0.683 | 0.786 |
DT | 0.648 | 0.342 | 0.683 | 0.786 |
SVM | 0.699 | 0.849 | 0.699 | 0.823 |
LSTM | 0.978 | 0.966 | 1.000 | 0.984 |
RNN | 0.693 | 0.356 | 0.698 | 0.819 |
GRU | 0.695 | 0.359 | 0.698 | 0.820 |
Model | Detection Accuracy | Precision | Recall Score | F1 Measure |
---|---|---|---|---|
LR | 0.892 | 0.868 | 1.0 | 0.9170 |
NB | 0.966 | 0.949 | 1.0 | 0.9754 |
RF | 0.744 | 0.770 | 1.0 | 0.7765 |
DT | 0.831 | 0.820 | 1.0 | 0.8629 |
SVM | 0.775 | 0.786 | 1.0 | 0.8086 |
LSTM | 0.994 | 0.991 | 0.999 | 0.996 |
RNN | 0.986 | 0.978 | 1.0 | 0.990 |
GRU | 0.981 | 0.971 | 1.0 | 0.986 |
Model | Detection Accuracy | Precision | Recall Score | F1 Measure |
---|---|---|---|---|
LR | 0.193 | 0.501 | 0.301 | 0.094 |
NB | 0.267 | 0.598 | 0.301 | 0.1524 |
RF | 0.096 | 0.428 | 0.317 | −0.0095 |
DT | 0.183 | 0.478 | 0.317 | 0.0769 |
SVM | 0.076 | −0.063 | 0.301 | −0.0144 |
LSTM | 0.016 | 0.025 | −0.001 | 0.012 |
RNN | 0.293 | 0.622 | 0.302 | 0.171 |
GRU | 0.286 | 0.612 | 0.302 | 0.166 |
Epoch | Work in [26] | Mean Accuracy | Proposed Work | Mean Accuracy |
---|---|---|---|---|
10 | CNN | 90.85% | CNN | 97.48% |
10 | MLP | 53.07% | MLP | 97.63% |
30 | CNN | 89.82% | CNN | 83.65% |
30 | MLP | 62.95% | MLP | 97.37% |
50 | CNN | 88.30% | CNN | 79.09% |
50 | MLP | 62.00% | MLP | 97.23% |
Epoch | Work in [26] | Mean Accuracy | Proposed Work | Mean Accuracy |
---|---|---|---|---|
10 | CNN | 91.15% | CNN | 96.86% |
10 | MLP | 76.92% | MLP | 97.25% |
30 | CNN | 91.02% | CNN | 80.20% |
30 | MLP | 54.04% | MLP | 97.49% |
50 | CNN | 90.64% | CNN | 80.11% |
50 | MLP | 53.89% | MLP | 97.28% |
Epoch | Work in [26] | Mean Accuracy | Proposed Work | Mean Accuracy |
---|---|---|---|---|
10 | CNN | 90.87% | CNN | 95.17% |
10 | MLP | 54.10% | MLP | 97.20% |
30 | CNN | 90.76% | CNN | 79.97% |
30 | MLP | 54.43% | MLP | 97.16% |
50 | CNN | 91.27% | CNN | 80.96% |
50 | MLP | 79.01% | MLP | 97.18% |
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Alabsi, B.A.; Anbar, M.; Rihan, S.D.A. Conditional Tabular Generative Adversarial Based Intrusion Detection System for Detecting Ddos and Dos Attacks on the Internet of Things Networks. Sensors 2023, 23, 5644. https://doi.org/10.3390/s23125644
Alabsi BA, Anbar M, Rihan SDA. Conditional Tabular Generative Adversarial Based Intrusion Detection System for Detecting Ddos and Dos Attacks on the Internet of Things Networks. Sensors. 2023; 23(12):5644. https://doi.org/10.3390/s23125644
Chicago/Turabian StyleAlabsi, Basim Ahmad, Mohammed Anbar, and Shaza Dawood Ahmed Rihan. 2023. "Conditional Tabular Generative Adversarial Based Intrusion Detection System for Detecting Ddos and Dos Attacks on the Internet of Things Networks" Sensors 23, no. 12: 5644. https://doi.org/10.3390/s23125644
APA StyleAlabsi, B. A., Anbar, M., & Rihan, S. D. A. (2023). Conditional Tabular Generative Adversarial Based Intrusion Detection System for Detecting Ddos and Dos Attacks on the Internet of Things Networks. Sensors, 23(12), 5644. https://doi.org/10.3390/s23125644