5PM: Secure pattern matching

Issue title: Advances in Security for Communication Networks

Guest editors: Ivan ViscontiGuest-Editor

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Baron, Joshua^{a; *} | El Defrawy, Karim^a | Minkovich, Kirill^a | Ostrovsky, Rafail^b | Tressler, Eric^a

Affiliations: [a] Information and System Sciences Laboratory, HRL Laboratories, LLC, Malibu, CA, USA. E-mails: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] | [b] Departments of Mathematics and Computer Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author: Joshua Baron, Information and System Sciences Laboratory, HRL Laboratories, LLC, 3011 Malibu Canyon Road, Malibu, CA 90265, USA. Tel.: +1 310 317 5768; Fax: +1 310 317 5219

Abstract: In this paper we consider the problem of secure pattern matching that allows single-character wildcards and substring matching in the malicious (stand-alone) setting. Our protocol, called 5PM, is executed between two parties: Server, holding a text of length n, and Client, holding a pattern of length m to be matched against the text, where our notion of matching is more general than traditionally considered and includes non-binary alphabets, non-binary Hamming distance and non-binary substring matching. 5PM is the first secure expressive pattern matching protocol designed to optimize round complexity by carefully specifying the entire protocol round by round. 5PM requires only eight rounds in the malicious (static corruptions) model. In the malicious model, 5PM requires O((m+n)k2) communication complexity and O(m+n) encryptions, where m is the pattern length and n is the text length. Further, 5PM can hide pattern size with no asymptotic additional costs in either computation or bandwidth.

Keywords: Secure pattern matching, secure two-party computation, malicious adversary, full simulation, homomorphic encryption

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-130481

Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 601-625, 2013