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Executive Power in Venezuela

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Leo B. Lott
Affiliation:
Ohio State University

Extract

Throughout most of its national history, Venezuela has been the victim of long and tyrannical dictatorships, broken only by brief spells of semi-democratic government. Constitution after constitution has fallen before the whims of self made generals. Numerous major revolts and countless minor civil uprisings have scarred the country, all having the twofold objective of acquiring for their leaders national power for power's sake and the privilege of organizing Venezuela as a private economic and political domain.

In almost all instances the politicians have travelled a bloody road to national power. Having once established themselves in the presidency, they demonstrated considerable reluctance to observe the functional separation of powers decreed by the constitution. As a result of this attitude the legislature and judiciary were weakened to the point of impotency. The raison d'être of these branches thus came to be the legalization of the programs and activities of the executive, even if this meant, as it often did, violating the constitution. The purpose of this article is to examine the evolution and application of executive power.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1956

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References

1 This tendency is by no means peculiar to Venezuela. See Schurz, William L., Latin America (New York, 1949)Google Scholar and Jane, Cecil, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America (Oxford, 1929)Google Scholar for a discussion of the trait as it appears generally in Latin America. The Venezuelan sociologist, Siso, Carlos, in his La Formación del Pueblo Venezolano, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1951), Vol. 2 Google Scholar, argues that even in the bloody struggle that marked the federal war in the middle of the 19th century thousands of men, identifying themselves only with leaders, died without being aware of the cause for which they were fighting.

2 See Stokes, William S., “Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, pp. 445–68 (Sept., 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 León, Ramón David, Hombres y Sucesos de Venezuela (Caracas, 1952), p. 15 Google Scholar.

4 Derived from the Spanish word caudillo, the term encompasses all the phenomena associated with the caudillo. Roughly equivalent to our political boss, the caudillo is a person who possesses the real authority in a given area. He may be a government official, but as often as not he has no official connection with the government. See Stokes, op. cit.

5 Gaceta Oficial, Jan. 3, 1949.

6 The Venezuelan constitutionalist Wolf, Ernesto, in his Tratado de Derecho Constitutional Venezolano, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1945), Vol. 1, p. 401 Google Scholar, asserted that the title of general had come to be a necessity for the discharge of the duties not only of the presidency but also of most other high offices. From 1945 until June of this year, however, the highest active military rank was that of colonel. Military rank is no longer essential for “other high offices” and in Congress, at least, a change of emphasis from military to academic rank has occurred. In the Congress of 1873, for example, 19 of the 30 senators and 50 of the 70 deputies were generals. In the present Congress (1953 figures) there are no generals. Fifty-five per cent of the Senators and 32 per cent of the members of the Chamber of Deputies carry the academic title of Doctor. See Gaceta Oficial, April 17, 1953.

7 Under Venezuelan law only the Senate may promote officers of the Armed Forces above the rank of Lt. Colonel.

8 See Griffin, Charles C., “Regionalism's Role in Venezuelan Politics,” The Inter-American Quarterly, Vol. 3, pp. 2135 (Oct., 1941)Google Scholar.

9 Documentos Oficiales Relativos al Movimiento Militar de 24 de Noviembre de 1948 (Caracas, 1949)Google Scholar.

10 In December, 1952 Pérez Jiménez dispensed with the committee form of government altogether and proclaimed himself Provisional President, even though his own newly elected Constitutional Assembly, scheduled to meet in January, 1953, was charged with the task of electing a Provisional President.

11 Hispanic World Report, Vol. 2, pp. 1719 (Dec., 1949)Google Scholar.

12 Ramón Davíd León discusses this subject in his De Agro-pecuario a Petrolero (Caracas, 1944)Google Scholar. See also the dedication in his Hombres y Sucessos de Venezuela (Caracas, 1952)Google Scholar.

13 Cesarismo Democrátic (Caracas, 1929), p. 283 Google Scholar.

14 Ibid., p. 307.

15 Ibid., p. 220.

16 Arcaya, Pedro Manuel, The Gómez Regime in Venezuela (Washington, D. C., 1936), p. 59 Google Scholar.

17 In a recent interview noted in Time (Feb. 28, 1955), p. 29 Google Scholar, President Marcos Pérez Jiménez said, “I make every effort to give Venezuelans the kind of government adapted to them …. We are still in our infant years and we still need halters …. There must be a leader who shows the way without being perturbed by the necessity of winning demogogic popularity.”

18 It is extremely difficult to learn from public utterances what the people really think about their President. While he is in office, the outward attitude toward him is one of abject servility. But experiences of the past have taught the Venezuelan leaders that fame is fleeting when they have been relieved of their command. The memory, statues, and properties of Gómez were reviled, destroyed, and confiscated in an outbreak of violence following his death in 1935. Yet earlier in the same year a member of Congress referred to him in the following terms: “There always surges from the bosom of the people a superior man, a light who illumines the way to the promised land, a Moses who, with his magical wand can cause not only the water to gush from the rock, but the spirit of love and fraternity to spring from the human heart. For us this man, with a soul as lofty as the clouds of his native Andes, is Juan Vicente Gómez.” Diário de Debates de la Cámara dc Diputados (Caracas, 1935)Google Scholar, No. 1.

19 Merlo, Luís Acosto, El Poder Ejecutivo (Caracas, 1917), pp. 2425 Google Scholar.

20 Constitution of 1881, Article 62: The Federal Council elects the President of the United States of Venezuela from its own membership …. The election of any person not a member of the Council is null and void.

21 Memória de la Carte, Federal y de Casación, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1941), Vol. 1, p. 195 Google Scholar.

22 Medina's party and Acción Democrática had both agreed on the same man, Señor Escalante. When illness forced Escalante to retire from the race, Medina nominated Angel Biaggini, former Minister of Agriculture. This man was totally unacceptable to AD.

23 The Constitutional Assembly also chose all the members of the National Congress, the state legislatures, and the municipal councils, a total of 1,602 men, plus an equal number of substitutes.

24 The office of the vice-presidency has had a chequered history in Venezuela. Abolished by the constitution of 1864, the institution was later reintroduced in 1904, when two vice-presidencies were created. Vice-President Juan Vicente Gómez soon demonstrated how the post could be used as a springboard to power, when he seized control of the government in 1908 during the absence abroad of the legal President. As Chief Executive, Gómez took immediate action to eliminate the office through which he himself had illegally come to power. Later, however, possessed by dynastic ambitions and feeling himself in absolute control of the government, he instructed his docile 1922 constitutional congress to restore the dual vice-presidency and to elect to the posts his brother and one of his many sons. Following the assassination of the brother and the disgrace of his son, he abolished the institution once more. It has never been restored.

25 Wolf, , Tratado de Derecho Constitucional Venezolano (cited in note 6), Vol. 1, p. 315 Google Scholar.

26 Fortoul, José Gil, Filosofía Constitucional (Caracas, 1940), p. 12 Google Scholar.

27 See Rivas, Ulíses Picón, Indice Constitutional de Venezuela (Caracas, 1944)Google Scholar for a discussion of the various constitutions and their backgrounds.

28 The Council of Government had been established in accordance with the constitution of 1893. It was composed of nine members, one from each state, elected by Congress for four-year terms. It had both deliberative and consultative functions.

29 Perero, Ambrosia, História Orgánica de Venezuela (Caracas, 1943), p. 147 Google Scholar. See also Robertson, W. S., History of the Latin American Nations (N. Y., 1922), p. 410 Google Scholar, and Rivas, Picón, Indice Constitutional de Venezuela (cited in note 26), pp. 4546 Google Scholar.

30 Schurz, , Latin America (cited in note 1), p. 122 Google Scholar.

31 Other matters which seem more properly within the scope of the legislature have also been subject to executive action. Specific examples include the organizational laws of the newly nationalized judicial system and the social security system. The vast Centro Bolívar project in the Center of Caracas and the fantastically expensive superhighway from Caracas to La Guaira both owe their existence to executive decrees.

32 Additional credits to the budget began in 1914, when Gómez included the power in the constitution of that year, presumably because of the disturbance and emergencies which he thought World War I would bring to Venezuela. The power was not discontinued when the war ended.

33 León, Ramón Davíd, De Agro Pecuario a Petrolero (cited in note 12), p. 142 Google Scholar.

34 Fox, A. M. et al. , Informe presentado al Sr. Ministro de Hacíenda de log E.E.U.U. de Venezuela por la Misión Técnica y Económica (Caracas, 1941), p. 42 Google Scholar.

35 See, for example, the Gaceta Oficial for April 4 and June 7, 1952 for transfers of 30 million and 70 million bolivars, respectively.

36 In practice the requirement of congressional approval for additional credits was of no importance. Congress, in recess the greater part of the year, was prevented from giving previous authorization. When it reconvened, it was presented with accomplished fact. The obligation of the President to prove the need for the additional sums was met by his sending the Congress the Gaceta Oficial in which the decree granting the credit appeared. See Wolf, , Tratado de Derecho Constitutional Venezolano, Vol. 2, p. 275 Google Scholar.

37 Fox, et. al., op. cit., p. 272.

38 Among those recently established are the Venezuelan Development Corporation, the National Institute of Sanitary Works, the Veneauelan Airmail Line, the National Agrarian Institute, the Institute of University City, and the Central Institute of Social Insurance.

39 Seijas, R., El Presidente (Caracas, 1891), p. 53 Google Scholar.

40 Wolf, , Tratado de Derecho Constitutional Venezolano (cited in note 6), Vol. 1, p. 316 Google Scholar.

41 An effective civil service system does not exist. In the absence of standards and criteria for the selection and employment of personnel, the possibility of an individual's obtaining a government job varies in direct proportion to the strength of his kinship or friendship with the employing official. Or, as the Venezuelans say, “Fulano es amigo.” The personalismo which pervades the government creates an atmosphere in which personal loyalty to the President or to his immediate subordinates constitutes the prime requirement for securing and holding a job. See Tejera, Enrique, Los Empleádos Públicos (Caracas, 1945)Google Scholar, passim.

42 Pierson, W. H., “Foreign Influence on Venezuelan Political Thought, 1830–1930,” Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 15, pp. 342, at p. 18 (Feb., 1935)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 One Gomecista member of Congress, after the death of the dictator, was stung by criticism on this point. “Everyone knows,” he said, “that orders accompanied every bill not to change so much as a comma.” Cited in Wolf, Vol. 1, pp. 315–18.

44 The 1953 Constitutional Assembly, in the midst of preparing a new constitution, approved the entire lot, some of which ran to five bulky volumes, in two weeks.

45 In 1954, for the avowed purpose of promoting greater administrative efficiency, the Congress authorized the President to divide the highest official agencies into three groups: National Policy, Production, and General Service. The National Policy Group includes the Office of the President, and the departments of Defense, Foreign Relations, Interior, and Treasury. Production comprehends the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock, Mines and Hydrocarbons, Public Works and Labor. General Services is in charge of Justice, Health and Social Welfare, Communications and Education. Under this division the National Policy Group is responsible for general administration; Production concerns itself with the national development of the country's physical conditions; and General Service has the responsibility of advancing the moral, intellectual, and material wellbeing of the people. See Venezuela U p-to-Date, Vol. 5, p. 3 (June, 1954)Google Scholar.

46 Time, Feb. 28, 1955, p. 28 Google ScholarPubMed alleges that Pérez Jiménez “demands plenty of action, but he rarely needs or wants suggestions from his cabinet. He treats the ministers as a team of technicians; their two-hour Saturday sessions are brisk and businesslike.”

47 Wolf, Vol. 1, p. 415.

48 Four have occurred since the revolution of 1945. The changes in administration from López Contreras to Medina Angarita brought about completely new cabinets, of course. López was responsible for 12 more shuffles, in which he shifted men from one post to another. In a four-month period one minister occupied three different ministries before being eliminated altogether. López moved at least ten men from one portfolio to another. Reshuffling the Cabinet was most common during the terms of López and Medina Angarita. It was used infrequently by the provisional governments of 1945–47 and 1948–52. The present regime has made several changes.

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