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Link to original content: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04482-6
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Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing

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Abstract

Market makers choose and design market rules to serve certain objectives, such as to maximize revenue from the sales in the case of a single seller and multiple buyers. Given such rules, market participants play against each other to maximize their utility function values on goods acquired, possibly by hiding or misrepresenting their information needed in the implementation of market rules. Today’s Internet economy has changed the information collection process and may make some of the assumptions of market rule implementation obsolete. Here we make a fresh review of works on this challenge on the Internet where new economic systems operate.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, China

    Yukun Cheng

  2. Center on Frontiers of Computing Studies, Computer Science Department, Peking University, Beijing, China

    Xiaotie Deng

  3. Department of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China

    Dominik Scheder

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  1. Yukun Cheng
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  2. Xiaotie Deng
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  3. Dominik Scheder
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Correspondence to Yukun Cheng.

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This research was partially supported by the National Major Science and Technology Projects of China—“New Generation Artificial Intelligence” (No. 2018AAA0100901), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 11871366, 61502300), Qing Lan Project for Young Academic Leaders, and Qing Lan Project for Key Teachers. Corresponding authors: Yukun Cheng and Xiaotie Deng.

This paper is an updated version of the paper that appeared in 4OR (2018) 16:231–260.

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Cheng, Y., Deng, X. & Scheder, D. Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing. Ann Oper Res 314, 49–76 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04482-6

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