Abstract
Side Channel Attacks are a powerful instrument to break cryptographic algorithms by measuring physical quantities during the execution of these algorithms on electronic devices. In this paper, the electromagnetic emanations of smartphones and embedded devices will be used to extract secret keys of public key cryptosystems. This will be done using standard radio equipment in combination with far-field antennas. While such attacks have been shown previously, the details of how to find relevant emanations and the limits of the attack remain largely unknown. Therefore, this paper will present all the required steps to find emanations of devices, implement a side channel attack exploiting ultra high frequency emanations and discuss different test setups. The result is a test setup which enables an attacker to mount a side channel attack for less than 30 Euros.
Gabriel Goller—This work has been partly supported by the German Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung as part of the project SIBASE with Förderkennzeichen 01IS13020E. Responsibility for the content of this publication lies with the authors.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 104–113. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Kocher, P.C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Genkin, D., Shamir, A., Tromer, E.: RSA key extraction via low-bandwidth acoustic cryptanalysis. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Archive 2013, 857 (2013)
National Security Agency: NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals. Partially released in December 2000–February 1982
Agrawal, D., Archambeault, B., Rao, J., Rohatgi, P.: The EM side-channel(s). In: Kaliski, B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002, pp. 29–45. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Aboulkassimi, D., Agoyan, M., Freund, L., Fournier, J., Robisson, B., Tria, A.: Electromagnetic analysis (EMA) of software AES on java mobile phones. In: 2011 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), pp. 1–6. IEEE (2011)
Aboulkassimi, D., Fournier, J., Freund, L., Robisson, B., Tria, A.: EMA as a physical method for extracting secret data from mobile phones. Int. J. Comput. Sci. Appl. (IJCSA) 2(1), 16–25 (2013)
Montminy, D., Baldwin, R., Temple, M., Oxley, M.: Differential electromagnetic attacks on a 32-bit microprocessor using software defined radios. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 8(12), 2101–2114 (2013)
Kenworthy, G., Rohatgi, P.: Mobile device security: the case for side channel resistance. In: Proceedings of the 2012 Mobile Security Technologies Conference, California, USA (2012)
Jun, B., Kenworthy, G.: Is your mobile device radiating keys? Presentation, held at RSA Conference (2012)
Kenworthy, G., Rohatgi, P.: Mobile device security: the case for side channel resistance. Presentation, held at Mobile Security Technologies Workshop (2012)
Eaton, J., Bateman, D., Hauberg, S., Wehbring, R.: GNU Octave Free Your Numbers edition 3 for octave version 3.8.0 edition (2011)
Swanson, D.C.: Signal Processing for Intelligent Sensor Systems with MATLAB, 2nd edn. Taylor & Francis, Boca Raton (2012)
The OpenSSL Project: OpenSSL: The Open Source Toolkit for SSL/TLS. http://www.openssl.org. Accessed December 2014
Wiki, http://rtlsdr.org. Accessed December 2014
Johnson, D.H.: Signal-to-noise ratio. Scholarpedia 1(12), 2088 (2006)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Goller, G., Sigl, G. (2015). Side Channel Attacks on Smartphones and Embedded Devices Using Standard Radio Equipment. In: Mangard, S., Poschmann, A. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9064. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_17
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-21475-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-21476-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)