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Definition
Attack based on the leakage of information of secret parameters through variations in the running times of a cryptographic device.
Background
When the running time of a cryptographic device is not constant, it may leak information about the secret parameters involved, so that careful timing measurement and analysis may allow to recover the system’s secret key. This idea first appeared in the scientific literature in 1996 [7].
Targeting implementation specificities, timing attacks belong to the side-channel attacks family, of which they were one of the first representatives.
Time Measurement
To conduct the attack, the adversary needs to collect a set (sample) of messages together with their processing time by the cryptographic device. Running time might, for example, be obtained by measuring the question–answer delay or by monitoring the processor activity. One privileged target for timing attacks – as well as other side-channel attacks...
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Recommended Reading
Bernstein D (2005) Cache timing attacks on AES. Available at http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#cachetiming
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Koeune, F. (2011). Timing Attack. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_138
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