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ORCID17th WINE 2021: Potsdam, Germany
- Michal Feldman
, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13112, Springer 2022, ISBN 978-3-030-94675-3
Mechanism Design and Pricing
- Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality. 3-21 - Shih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck:
Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials. 22-40 - Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt, Alex Smolin:
The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing. 41-58 - Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design. 59-75 - Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka:
Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. 76-94 - Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos:
Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances. 95-112 - Wanyi Dai Li, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Contract Design for Afforestation Programs. 113-130 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu, Zihe Wang:
Relaxing the Independence Assumption in Sequential Posted Pricing, Prophet Inequality, and Random Bipartite Matching. 131-148 - Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness. 149-166 - Shih-Tang Su, David Kempe, Vijay G. Subramanian:
On the Benefits of Being Constrained When Receiving Signals. 167-185 - Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Artem Tsikiridis:
Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction. 186-204
Matching, Markets and Equilibria
- Billy Jin, David P. Williamson:
Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model. 207-225 - Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan:
Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis. 226-243 - Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner:
The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent's Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up Your Home? 244-261 - Sigal Oren, Oren Roth:
Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods. 262-279 - Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem. 280-298 - Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe, Robert Kleinberg:
Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy. 299-316 - Christos Harilaos Papadimitriou, Kiran Vodrahalli, Mihalis Yannakakis:
The Platform Design Problem. 317-333 - Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald:
A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria. 334-351
Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models
- Uriel Feige, Ariel Sapir, Laliv Tauber:
A Tight Negative Example for MMS Fair Allocations. 355-372 - Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma:
Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations. 373-390 - Pál András Papp, Roger Wattenhofer:
Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem. 391-409 - Sigal Oren, Nadav Sklar:
Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias. 410-427 - Mark York, Munther A. Dahleh, David C. Parkes:
Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment. 428-445
Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies
- Zhaohua Chen, Guang Yang:
Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security Against Rational Adversary. 449-466 - Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris:
The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice. 467-485 - Jing Chen, Bo Li:
Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries. 486-503 - Ayumi Igarashi, Frédéric Meunier:
Envy-free Division of Multi-layered Cakes. 504-521 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Stavros Ioannidis:
Computing Envy-Freeable Allocations with Limited Subsidies. 522-539
Abstracts
- Vineet Goyal, Garud Iyengar, Rajan Udwani:
Asymptotically Optimal Competitive Ratio for Online Allocation of Reusable Resources. 543 - Naonori Kakimura, Donghao Zhu:
Dynamic Bipartite Matching Market with Arrivals and Departures. 544 - Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Thodoris Lykouris:
Static Pricing for Multi-unit Prophet Inequalities (Extended Abstract). 545-546 - Will Ma, Pan Xu, Yifan Xu:
Fairness Maximization Among Offline Agents in Online-Matching Markets. 547 - Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker, Warut Suksompong:
Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule. 548 - Zhi Chen, Zhenyu Hu, Ruiqin Wang:
Screening with Limited Information: The Minimax Theorem and a Geometric Approach. 549 - Ido Feldman, Ron Lavi:
Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post Vs. Ex-Interim IR. 550 - Xi Chen, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar:
Throttling Equilibria in Auction Markets. 551 - Tobias Harks, Julian Schwarz:
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems with Mixed-Integer Variables. 552 - Nicole Immorlica, Yash Kanoria, Jiaqi Lu:
In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock? 553 - Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg:
Contest Design with Threshold Objectives. 554 - Yonatan Gur, Gregory Macnamara, Ilan Morgenstern, Daniela Sabán:
Confounding Equilibria for Platforms with Private Information on Promotion Value. 555
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