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2020 – today
- 2024
[j24]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
Combinatorial Reallocation Mechanisms. Algorithmica 86(4): 1246-1262 (2024)- [c50]Shahar Dobzinski
, Ariel Shaulker:
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values. STOC 2024: 237-246 - [c49]Shahar Dobzinski, Wenzheng Li, Aviad Rubinstein, Jan Vondrák:
A Constant-Factor Approximation for Nash Social Welfare with Subadditive Valuations. STOC 2024: 467-478 - [i40]Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrák:
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees. CoRR abs/2402.14173 (2024) - 2023
- [c48]Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker:
Rigidity in Mechanism Design and Its Applications. ITCS 2023: 44:1-44:21 - [c47]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer:
Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity. EC 2023: 153-182 - [c46]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron:
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings. EC 2023: 183 - [c45]Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrák:
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees. EC 2023: 517-535 - [i39]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron:
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings. CoRR abs/2305.13247 (2023) - [i38]Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker:
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values. CoRR abs/2308.09964 (2023) - [i37]Shahar Dobzinski, Wenzheng Li, Aviad Rubinstein, Jan Vondrák:
A constant factor approximation for Nash social welfare with subadditive valuations. CoRR abs/2309.04656 (2023) - 2022
- [j23]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect. Games Econ. Behav. 136: 255-273 (2022) - [c44]Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders. ITCS 2022: 55:1-55:17 - [c43]Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron, Jan Vondrák:
On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design. STOC 2022: 690-703 - [i36]Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron, Jan Vondrák:
On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/2206.00334 (2022) - [i35]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer:
Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity. CoRR abs/2207.09853 (2022) - [i34]Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker:
Rigidity in Mechanism Design and its Applications. CoRR abs/2212.09847 (2022) - 2021
- [j22]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Games Econ. Behav. 130: 369-383 (2021) - [j21]Shahar Dobzinski:
Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders. SIAM J. Comput. 50(3) (2021) - [c42]Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi:
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal. EC 2021: 134-135 - [c41]Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? EC 2021: 390-408 - [c40]Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron:
The communication complexity of payment computation. STOC 2021: 933-946 - [i33]Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? CoRR abs/2102.13343 (2021) - [i32]Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi:
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal. CoRR abs/2106.01019 (2021) - [i31]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer:
A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism. CoRR abs/2111.07790 (2021) - [i30]Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders. CoRR abs/2111.10674 (2021) - 2020
- [i29]Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker:
Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling. CoRR abs/2007.04362 (2020) - [i28]Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron:
The Communication Complexity of Payment Computation. CoRR abs/2012.14623 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j20]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Optimization with Demand Oracles. Algorithmica 81(6): 2244-2269 (2019) - [j19]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren:
Economic efficiency requires interaction. Games Econ. Behav. 118: 589-608 (2019) - [c39]Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
The communication complexity of local search. STOC 2019: 650-661 - 2018
- [j18]Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? Games Econ. Behav. 108: 130-138 (2018) - [j17]Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia:
Combinatorial cost sharing. SIGecom Exch. 16(2): 38-44 (2018) - [c38]Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia:
Combinatorial Cost Sharing. IJCAI 2018: 5234-5238 - [c37]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect. EC 2018: 73-90 - [c36]Shahar Dobzinski, Nitzan Uziely:
Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets. EC 2018: 431-442 - [i27]Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
The Communication Complexity of Local Search. CoRR abs/1804.02676 (2018) - [i26]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect. CoRR abs/1805.10913 (2018) - 2017
- [j16]Keren Cohavi, Shahar Dobzinski:
Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions. ACM Trans. Algorithms 13(3): 30:1-30:9 (2017) - [c35]Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia:
Combinatorial Cost Sharing. EC 2017: 387-404 - [i25]Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia:
Combinatorial Cost Sharing. CoRR abs/1704.08480 (2017) - [i24]Shahar Dobzinski, Nitzan Uziely:
Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets. CoRR abs/1706.08148 (2017) - 2016
- [j15]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. J. ACM 63(1): 5:1-5:19 (2016) - [c34]Shahar Dobzinski:
Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation. FOCS 2016: 209-218 - [c33]Shahar Dobzinski:
Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. STOC 2016: 940-948 - [i23]Shahar Dobzinski:
Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders. CoRR abs/1602.05914 (2016) - [i22]Shahar Dobzinski:
Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation. CoRR abs/1604.01971 (2016) - [i21]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. CoRR abs/1604.04876 (2016) - 2015
- [j14]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders. Games Econ. Behav. 92: 349-369 (2015) - [j13]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts. J. Econ. Theory 156: 14-44 (2015) - [c32]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg:
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. SODA 2015: 110-122 - [c31]Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. WINE 2015: 300-313 - [i20]Shahar Dobzinski, Ami Mor:
On the Greedy Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions with a Random Order. CoRR abs/1502.02178 (2015) - [i19]Shahar Dobzinski, Ami Mor:
A Deterministic Algorithm for Maximizing Submodular Functions. CoRR abs/1507.07237 (2015) - 2014
- [c30]Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme:
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets. ICALP (1) 2014: 392-404 - [c29]Shahar Dobzinski, Amir Ronen:
Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes. SAGT 2014: 98-109 - [c28]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
Reallocation mechanisms. EC 2014: 617 - [c27]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren:
Economic efficiency requires interaction. STOC 2014: 233-242 - [i18]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions. CoRR abs/1401.3834 (2014) - [i17]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1404.2041 (2014) - [i16]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
Reallocation Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1404.6786 (2014) - [i15]Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1406.0576 (2014) - [i14]Keren Cohavi, Shahar Dobzinski:
Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions. CoRR abs/1407.7269 (2014) - 2013
- [j12]Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. SIAM J. Comput. 42(6): 2287-2304 (2013) - [c26]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. SODA 2013: 1205-1215 - [i13]Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme:
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets. CoRR abs/1304.7048 (2013) - [i12]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren:
Economic Efficiency Requires Interaction. CoRR abs/1311.4721 (2013) - 2012
- [j11]Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games Econ. Behav. 74(2): 486-503 (2012) - [j10]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 15-25 (2012) - [j9]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 37(2): 244-258 (2012) - [c25]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar:
On bitcoin and red balloons. EC 2012: 56-73 - [c24]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Optimization with demand oracles. EC 2012: 110-127 - [c23]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions. EC 2012: 405-422 - [c22]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden:
Sketching valuation functions. SODA 2012: 1025-1035 - [c21]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
From query complexity to computational complexity. STOC 2012: 1107-1116 - [i11]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1202.2789 (2012) - [i10]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
On the Hardness of Welfare Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. CoRR abs/1202.2792 (2012) - 2011
- [j8]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. Comb. 31(4): 379-396 (2011) - [j7]Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden:
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. SIAM J. Comput. 40(3): 915-933 (2011) - [j6]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar:
On Bitcoin and red balloons. SIGecom Exch. 10(3): 5-9 (2011) - [c20]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts. EC 2011: 233-242 - [c19]Shahar Dobzinski, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer:
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement. EC 2011: 273-282 - [c18]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy. STOC 2011: 129-138 - [c17]Shahar Dobzinski:
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. STOC 2011: 139-148 - [i9]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Optimization with Demand Oracles. CoRR abs/1107.2869 (2011) - [i8]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar:
On Bitcoin and Red Balloons. CoRR abs/1111.2626 (2011) - 2010
- [j5]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 37: 85-98 (2010) - [j4]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders. Math. Oper. Res. 35(1): 1-13 (2010) - [i7]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts. CoRR abs/1004.1449 (2010) - [i6]Shahar Dobzinski:
An Impossibility Result for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. CoRR abs/1011.1830 (2010) - [i5]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy. CoRR abs/1011.2413 (2010) - [i4]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Truthfulness via Proxies. CoRR abs/1011.3232 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [b1]Shahar Dobzinski:
The power of approximations in mechanism design (על כוחם של קירובים בתכנון מנגנונים.). Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, 2009 - [j3]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism. SIGecom Exch. 8(1) (2009) - [c16]Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. FOCS 2009: 505-514 - [c15]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem. SAGT 2009: 14-23 - [c14]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. EC 2009: 169-176 - [i3]Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/0904.4193 (2009) - [i2]Shahar Dobzinski:
A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms. CoRR abs/0907.5219 (2009) - 2008
- [c13]Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden:
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. FOCS 2008: 15-24 - [c12]Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. FOCS 2008: 260-269 - [c11]Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, Lisa Fleischer:
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. SAGT 2008: 170-181 - [c10]Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? SAGT 2008: 327-336 - [c9]Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan:
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. EC 2008: 38-47 - [c8]Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters. WINE 2008: 653-664 - 2007
- [j2]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 25(6): 1224-1236 (2007) - [j1]Shahar Dobzinski:
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms? SIGecom Exch. 7(1): 30-33 (2007) - [c7]Shahar Dobzinski:
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. APPROX-RANDOM 2007: 89-103 - [c6]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. EC 2007: 346-351 - [c5]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. STOC 2007: 338-344 - 2006
- [c4]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
Welfare maximization in congestion games. EC 2006: 52-61 - [c3]Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira:
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. SODA 2006: 1064-1073 - [c2]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. STOC 2006: 644-652 - [i1]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR06 (2006) - 2005
- [c1]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. STOC 2005: 610-618
Coauthor Index
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