In October 2024, the PSCRP program’s publications covered most sub-regions of the post-Soviet area.
Velvl Chernin presents his analysis of a shootout that occurred in September in the Russian capital, near the office of the Wildberries marketplace. He views this outbreak of violence as a struggle for resources between ethnopolitical groups, namely, Chechens (supported by Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen region’s head) on the one side, and Dagestanis and Ingushs (supported by a Dagestani senator Suleiman Kerimov, of Lezghin ethnicity), on the other side. Two Ingush guards were killed, leading to public outrage and a growth in anti-Chechen sentiment in the Ingush region. The subsequent meeting in Moscow between Chechen and Ingush delegations, aimed to resolve the conflict between two ethnically and linguistically close groups, brought no significant results. Chernin traces the complex history of Chechen-Ingush relations, stressing the importance of the unequal territorial swap between the regions in 2018 viewed by many Ingushs as a national humiliation. He cautiously concludes that, considering this and other micro-conflicts, a “qualitative deterioration of relations between the federal center and Chechnya is quite likely in the foreseeable future.”
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman’s material further explores the complex ethnopolitical and inter-elite nature of the conflict around the Wildberries marketplace’s merger with Russ Group. (Earlier, Kazantsev-Vaisman analyzed the affair’s initial phase.) In October 2024, Kadyrov, who supports the Wildberries owner’s ex-husband and tries to impede the deal, accused Senator Kerimov and two members of the parliament’s lower chamber of plotting his assassination, and threatened them with blood vengeance. The Dagestani public and regional head have expressed their support for Kerimov, who is believed to be connected to Anton Vaino, the head of the Presidential Administration; the companies’ merger was earlier approved by President Putin. Kazantsev-Vaisman asserts that the rivalry might either weaken Russia’s stability (by undermining some key points of the Russian state’s propaganda) or strengthen it (by convincing Caucasian elites of the necessity of Moscow’s “strong hand” in the region).
Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin presents a sociological account of two other aspects of Russia’s social development, especially salient for the State of Israel: Russian society’s perceptions of Israel and the Jewish state’s ongoing war against Hamas. The “direct solidarity from Moscow with Tehran’s Arab satellites, including Hamas and Hezbollah” marks a turn in the official discourse of Russia, which tried earlier to position itself as an “impartial moderator.” This was followed by public opinion in Russia, quite favorable toward Israel in the last 30 years. Popular attitudes have shifted instantly, being susceptible to the influence of official television and “patriotic” Telegram channels. Khanin notes that the shooting of a Russian IL-20 over Syria in September 2018, for which the Russian authorities have blamed the Israeli Air Forces, has demonstrated that the “reintroduction of Soviet-era anti-Israel and antisemitic clichés into Russia’s legitimate public discourse was a real possibility, should such narratives be required by the government.” Jerusalem’s official condemnation of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 “caused notable irritation within the Russian leadership,” and public support for Israel among Russians dropped to a historic low. “By September 2024, 51% of Russians expressed a negative attitude toward Israel, marking a 34 percentage point increase from 2018. Meanwhile, positive sentiment toward Israel fell by 32 percentage points, reaching just 27%.”
Concerning the current war against Hamas, Khanin notes that, though only “3% of Russians closely follow Middle Eastern political news,” anti-Zionism “remains an ‘acceptable’ expression of latent anti-Semitism among certain groups.” According to the surveys conducted by Levada Center, the leading independent sociological think tank in Russia, “Russians largely consider the United States and NATO countries to be primarily responsible for ongoing bloodshed and instability in the Middle East,” with a twofold increase (in 2024, compared to 2023) of those who blame Israel entirely. Only 10 % of respondents attribute responsibility to Hamas and Palestinian extremists. Compared to 2007-2010, “the share of supporters of Palestinian Arabs in the conflict with Israel has doubled (…), while support for the Jewish state has similarly halved”; at the same time, the overall attention to the conflict is waning. The author concludes that, in case of a direct confrontation between Russia and Israel, “Russian society is likely to accept it with the same ‘understanding’ that many Russians displayed toward the military aggression against Ukraine.”
Continuing their sociological research, Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin and Velvl Chernin scrutinize Jewish political participation in Ukraine. After 1991, Jewish organizations refrained from directly partaking in the political process, and Jewish politicians “generally did not position themselves as representatives of the Jewish community.” However, individual politicians of Jewish origin play a large role in the country’s political life – for example, the now iconic figure of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, as well as the Prime Minister, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, the mayor of the capital, Deputy Prime Minister (2020–2021), and Minister of Defense (2021–2023). The authors point to a certain “in-built dissonance” in Ukrainian society, where “latent anti-Semitic stereotypes coexist with condemnation of public manifestations of anti-Semitism.” In recent years, most Jewish leaders and public figures of Ukraine have unequivocally supported pro-Western orientation (a few exceptions might include Vadim Rabinovich, ex-MP, and Hennadiy Kernes, ex-mayor of Kharkiv). Amid the Russian invasion, Israel is likely to become for Ukraine a role model “of a state that faces permanent military aggression and manages to support a developed and generally prosperous society.” Unlike in many other countries, after the tragedy of October 7th, 2023, “Ukrainian society was literally overwhelmed by a wave of solidarity and sympathy for Israel,” with 69 % of Ukrainians supporting Israel in the Middle East conflict in November-December 2023.
Moving southward, Vakhtang Maisaia provides an overview of the complex situation that has formed in Georgia before the national elections (October 26th). The incumbent government, led by the “Georgian Dream” party, has since May 2024 stiffened the country’s relations with the West, which is harshly opposed by the Georgian pro-Western community led by President Salome Zourabichvili and four main opposition parties. The latter demands the government to “abolish the so-called ‘Russian Law’ and return to the pro-Western foreign policy” (stipulated in the Constitution), cancel strategic relations with China, and reverse the “appeasement policy” towards Russia and Belarus. The “Georgian Dream”’s controversial policy of “strategic patience” towards the occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) includes preventing escalation, stressing non-confrontation, and facilitating “people diplomacy” – with the Kremlin having suspended financial aid to Abkhazia since September 2024. These steps appear to signal the collaboration between the Russian and Georgian governments in dealing with the conflict zones. Maisaia offers three post-election scenarios, namely, “Belarusization” (ruling party rigs the election, secures a constitutional majority in the parliament, Georgia joins pro-Russian projects, opposition leaders are persecuted), “political anarchy” (no side secures enough seats to form a government, additional elections are needed), “the Polish option” (opposition wins, a coalition government is formed, and the “Georgian Dream” attempts a Russia-backed coup). The paper was written, logically, before the elections; now, in early November, we already see their outcome (stay tuned for our further analytics on this subject).
Viktor Denisenko provides an important insight into the Lithuanian defense discourse and practices amid the Russian war against Ukraine. In “January 2024, three Baltic States agreed to establish a common defence zone on their borders with Russia and Belarus.” After 2022, Vilnius sees that Russia’s actions may transcend the confines of hybrid aggression, and a classic conventional war is not taboo, with the Baltic countries being at the potential frontline. In 2004, Lithuania became a NATO and EU member state, and NATO is seen nowadays as a main guarantee for the country’s security, together with closer ties with some particular Alliance members (e.g., Germany). Apart from cooperating with allies, Lithuania prepares for possible Russian aggression by building its own capabilities – developing its military industry and increasing military expenditures. The ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrated to the Lithuanian authorities the importance of air defense and artillery, drone technologies, and total defense involving civilian capabilities. Though “consensus about the importance of defence is found on different levels,” preparing for Moscow’s direct military aggression should not overshadow the risk of indirect threats, including various hybrid tactics realized by Russia and Belarus.
From a cross-national perspective, Ariel Kogan compared the relative successes of Iran to fortify its relationships with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Kazakhstan, incredibly rich in natural resources, had to look for additional trade roots after the Russian-Ukrainian war started. However, in terms of economic cooperation with Iran, mostly in energy and agriculture, little progress was achieved. In 2025, Iran hopes to get an observer state status in the Eurasian Economic Union, with Kazakhstan’s help. However, Kazakhstan still maintains favorable economic and political relations with Israel, and Iranian diplomacy has failed to influence Kazakhstan’s neutral stance on the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. Uzbekistan is also unwilling to side with Iran against Israel, from which Toshkent gets important agricultural technologies. This country has a huge market for Iranian export and import, with strategic priority put on transit initiatives, like the port of Chabahar. However, 2024 saw a decline in mutual trade turnover, following the stalling of the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-India transport corridor. The attempted rapprochement between Israel and Azerbaijan was nullified by the recent threats from Tehran to strike Azerbaijani energy facilities as an act of revenge against Israel and the US. The main problem between Baku and Tehran is the former’s strategic relations with Israel both in energy supplies and in defense and intelligence. Other problems between the countries include the issues of the Zangezur Corridor Project, beneficial for Azerbaijan but potentially detrimental for Iran, and of the repressed Azerbaijani minority in southern Iran. Finally, Armenia is an important transit point for Tehran to circumvent sanctions and its closest ally in the region. In 2024, a huge arms deal between the two countries was signed, including supplies of drones and air missile defense systems to Yerevan; some experts assert that another secret agreement might have stipulated the establishment of Iranian military bases in Armenia.
As the recent electoral and non-electoral processes in the post-Soviet region demonstrate, the situation is changing rapidly, and one may hardly predict what exactly we might expect in the following months. However, it is certain that we will update our readership as to what is going on in this turbulent area. Stay tuned!