LOGIC
THE THEORY OF INQUIRY
By
JOHN DEWEY
NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
COPYRIGHT, 1938, BY
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY, INC.
January, 1939
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PREFACE
^his book is a development of ideas regarding the nature of
logical theory that were first presented, some forty years ago,
in Studies in Logical Theory; that were somewhat expanded
in Essays in Experimental Logic and were briefly summarized with
special reference to education in Ho<w We Think. While basic
ideas remain the same, there has naturally been considerable modi-
fication during the intervening years. While connection with the
problematic is unchanged, express identification of reflective
thought with objective inquiry makes possible, I think, a mode of
statement less open to misapprehension than were the previous
ones. The present work is marked in particular by application of
the earlier ideas to interpretation of the forms and formal relations
that constitute the standard material of logical tradition. This in-
terpretation has at the same time involved a detailed development,
critical and constructive, of the general standpoint and its under-
lying ideas.
In this connection, attention is called particularly to the principle
of the continuum of inquiry, a principle whose importance, as far as
I am aware, only Peirce had previously noted. Application of this
principle enables an empirical account to be given of logical forms,
whose necessity traditional empiricism overlooked or denied while
at the same time it proves that the interpretation of them as a priori
is unnecessary. The connection of the principle with generalization
in its two forms — which are systematically distinguished through-
out the work — and with the probability coefficient of all existential
generalizations is, I suppose, sufficiently indicated in the chapters
devoted to these topics. The basic conception of inquiry as de-
termination of an indeterminate situation not only enables the vexed
topic of the relation of judgment and propositions to obtain an ob-
jective solution, but, in connection with the conjugate relation of
observed and conceptual material, enables a coherent account of the
different propositional forms to be given.
The word "Pragmatism" does not, I think, occur in the text.
lv PREFACE
Perhaps the word lends itself to misconception. At all events, so
much misunderstanding and relatively futile controversy have
gathered about the word that it seemed advisable to avoid its use.
But in the proper interpretation of "pragmatic," namely the func-
tion of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of proposi-
tions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and
are such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations,
the text that follows is thoroughly pragmatic.
In the present state of logic, the absence of any attempt at sym-
bolic formulation will doubtless cause serious objection in the minds
of many readers. This absence is not due to any aversion to such
formulation. On the contrary, I am convinced that acceptance of
the general principles set forth will enable a more complete and con-
sistent set of symbolizations than now exists to be made. The ab-
sence of symbolization is due, first, to a point mentioned in the text,
the need for development of a general theory of language in which
form and matter are not separated; and, secondly, to the fact that
an adequate set of symbols depends upon prior institution of valid
ideas of the conceptions and relations that are symbolized. With-
out fulfilment of this condition, formal symbolization will (as
so often happens at present) merely perpetuate existing mistakes
while strengthening them by seeming to give them scientific stand-
ing.
Readers not particularly conversant with contemporary logical
discussions may find portions of the text too technical, especially
perhaps in Part III. I suggest that such readers interpret what is
said by calling to mind what they themselves do, and the way they
proceed in doing it, when they are confronted with some question
or difficulty which they attempt to cope with in an intellectual
way. If they pursue this course, I think the general principles will
be sufficiently intelligible so that they will not be unduly troubled
by technical details. It is possible that the same advice is applicable
in the case of those whose very familiarity with current logical
literature constitutes an obstruction to understanding a positionthat
is at odds with most current theory.
As far as logical treatises and their authors are concerned, I hope
the work itself affords sufficient indication of my chief lines of in-
debtedness. I should however state explicitly that, with the out-
standing exception of Peirce, I have learned most from writers
with whose positions I have in the end been compelled to disagree.
Since it happens that there is no reference in the text to the writings
PREFACE v
of A. F. Bentley, I wish to record here how much I owe to them.
My indebtedness to George H. Mead is also much greater than
is indicated by the text.
With emphatic repetition of the disclaimer that is usual in the
case of personal acknowledgments of indebtedness, it is a pleasure
to mention some of them — my obligation to a succession of students
for a period of more than a generation in which I have lectured on
the themes of this volume can only be stated in this general way.
Dr. Sidney Hook has read the several versions of all the chapters of
this book and I have profited immensely by his suggestions and
criticisms, both as to manner and substance of what was contained
in these chapters. Dr. Joseph Ratner read many of the chapters and
I am also indebted to him for suggestions and corrections. In some
of the more technical chapters I have availed myself freely of the
superior knowledge and competency of Dr. Ernest Nagel. It is my
fault, not his, if avoidable errors still exist in the chapters referred to.
In conclusion, I want to say that the treatise that follows is intro-
ductory. It is a presentation of a point of view and method of ap-
proach. Although the statement of them has been maturing for
over forty years, I am well aware that the presentation does not
have and could not have the finish and completeness that are
theoretically possible. But I am also convinced that the standpoint
is so thoroughly sound that those who are willing to entertain it
will in the coming years develop a theory of logic that is in thorough
accord with all the best authenticated methods of attaining knowl-
edge. My best wishes as well as my hopes are with those who en-
gage in the profoundly important work of bringing logical theory
into accord with scientific practice, no matter how much their
conclusions may differ in detail from those presented in this book.
J.D.
Hubbards, Nova Scotia
August 24, 1938
CONTENTS
PART 1
INTRODUCTION
I THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-
MATTER 1
II THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY:
BIOLOGICAL 23
III THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY:
CULTURAL 42
IV COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 60
V THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC . . 81
PART II
THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENTS
VI THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY . . . . 101
VII THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT . . 120
VIII IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE: UNDERSTAND-
ING AND INFERENCE 139
IX JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 159
X AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION: JUDG-
MENT AS REQUALIFICATION . . . 181
XI THE FUNCTION OF PROPOSITIONS OF
QUANTITY IN JUDGMENT . . . . 199
vm CONTENTS
XII JUDGMENT AS SPATIAL-TEMPORAL DETER-
MINATION: NARRATION-DESCRIPTION . 220
XIII THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT:
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS .... 245
XIV GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS . 264
PART III
PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
XV GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS . . 283
XVI PROPOSITIONS ORDERED IN SETS AND
SERIES 311
XVII FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS . . 328
XVIII TERMS OR MEANINGS 349
PART IV
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
XIX LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE: FORM AND
MATTER 371
XX MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE .... 394
XXI SCIENTIFIC METHOD: INDUCTION AND
DEDUCTION 419
XXII SCIENTIFIC LAWS— CAUSATION AND
SEQUENCES 442
XXIII SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND SCIENTIFIC
SUBJECT-MATTER 463
XXIV SOCIAL INQUIRY 487
XXV THE LOGIC OF INQUIRY AND PHILOSOPHIES
OF KNOWLEDGE 513
Part One
INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
CHATTER I
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL
SUBJECT-MATTER
Contemporary logical theory is marked by an apparent
paradox. There is general agreement as to its proximate
subject-matter. With respect to this proximate subject-
matter no period shows a more confident advance. Its ultimate
subject-matter, on the other hand, is involved in controversies
which show little sign of abating. Proximate subject-matter is the
domain of the relations of propositions to one another, such as
affirmation-negation, inclusion-exclusion, particular-general, etc.
No one doubts that the relations expressed by such words as is, is-
not, if -then, only (none but), and, or, some-all, belong to the
subject-matter of logic in a way so distinctive as to mark off a
special field.
When, however, it is asked how and why the matters designated
by these terms form the subject-matter of logic, dissension takes
the place of consensus. Do they stand for pure forms, forms that
have independent subsistence, or are the forms in question forms
of subject-matter? If the latter, what is that of which they are
forms, and what happens when subject-matter takes on logical
form? How and why?
These are questions of what I called the ultimate subject-matter
of logic; and about this subject-matter controversy is rife. Un-
certainty about this question does not prevent valuable work in
the field of proximate subject-matter. But the more developed
this field becomes, the more pressing is the question as to what it is
all about. Moreover, it is not true that there is complete agreement
in the more limited field. On the contrary, in some important
matters, there is conflict even here; and there is a possibility (which
1
2 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
will be shown in the sequel to be actualized) that the uncertainty
and diversity that exists in the limited field is a reflection of the
unsettled state of opinion about ultimate subject-matter.
To illustrate the existing uncertainty as to ultimate subject-
matter, it is only necessary to enumerate some of the diverse con-
ceptions about the nature of logic that now stand over against
one another. It is said, for example, that logic is the science of
necessary laws of thought, and that it is the theory of ordered
relations— relations which are wholly independent of thought.
There are at least three views held as to the nature of these latter
relations: They are held (1) to constitute a realm of pure pos-
sibilities as such, where pure means independent of actuality; (2)
to be ultimate invariant relations forming the order of nature;
and (3) to constitute the rational structure of the universe. In
the latter status, while independent of human thought, they are
said to embody the rational structure of the universe which is re-
produced in part by human reason. There is also the view that
logic is concerned with processes of inference by which knowl-
edge, especially scientific knowledge, is attained.
Of late, another conception of its subject-matter has appeared
upon the scene. Logic is said to be concerned with the formal
structure of language as a system of symbols. And even here
there is division. Upon one view, logic is the theory of trans-
formation of linguistic expressions, the criterion of transformation
being identity of syntactical forms. According to another view,
the symbolic system, which is the subject-matter of logic, is a
universal algebra of existence.
In any case, as regards ultimate subject-matter, logic is a branch
of philosophic theory; so that different views of its subject-matter
are expressions of different ultimate philosophies, while logical con-
clusions are used in turn to support the underlying philosophies.
In view of the fact that philosophizing must satisfy logical re-
quirements there is something in this fact that should at least pro-
voke curiosity; conceivably it affects unfavorably the autonomy of
logical theory. On the face of the matter, it does not seem fitting
that logical theory should be determined by philosophical realism
or idealism, rationalism or empiricism, dualism or monism, atomistic
or organic metaphysics. Yet even when writers on logic do not
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 3
express their philosophic prepossessions, analysis discloses a connec-
tion. In some cases conceptions borrowed from one or another
philosophic system are openly laid down as -foundations of logic
and even of mathematics.
This list of diverse views given above is put down by way of
illustration. It is not exhaustive, but it suffices to justify one more
endeavor to deal with proximate subject-matter in terms of a
theory concerning the ultimate subject-matter of logic. In the
present state of affairs, it is foolish to say that logic must be about
this or that. Such assertions are verbal realisms, assuming that a
word has such magical power that it can point to and select the
subject to which it is applicable. Furthermore, any statement that
logic is so-and-so, can, in the existing state of logical theory, be
offered only as a hypothesis and an indication of a position to be
developed.
Whatever is offered as a hypothesis must, however, satisfy cer-
tain conditions. It must be of the nature of a vera causa. Being a
vera causa, does not mean, of course, that it is a true hypothesis,
for if it were that, it would be more than a hypothesis. It means
that whatever is offered as the ground of a theory must possess the
property of verifiable existence in some domain, no matter how
hypothetical it is in reference to the field in which it is proposed
to apply it. It has no standing if it is drawn from the void and
proffered simply ad hoc. The second condition that a hypothesis
about ultimate logical subject-matter must satisfy is that it be able
to order and account for what has been called the proximate
subject-matter. If it cannot meet the test thus imposed, no amount
of theoretical plausibility is of avail. In the third place, the
hypothesis must be such as to account for the arguments that are
advanced in support of other theories. This condition corresponds
to the capacity of a theory in any field to explain apparent negative
cases and exceptions. Unless this condition is fulfilled, conclusions
reached in satisfaction of the second condition are subject to the
fallacy of affirming an antecedent clause because the consequent is
affirmed.
From these preliminary remarks I turn to statement of the posi-
tion regarding logical subject-matter that is developed in this work.
The theory, in summary form, is that all logical forms (with their
4 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and
are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield
warranted assertions. This conception implies much more than
that logical forms are disclosed or come to light when we reflect
upon processes of inquiry that are in use. Of course it means that;
but it also means that the forms originate in operations of inquiry.
To employ a convenient expression, it means that while inquiry into
inquiry is the causa cognoscendi of logical forms, primary inquiry
is itself causa essendi of the forms which inquiry into inquiry dis-
closes.
It is not the task of this chapter to try to justify this hypothesis,
or to show that it satisfies the three conditions laid down. That
is the business of the work as a whole. But I wish to emphasize
two points preparatory to expounding the meaning (not the
justification) of the conception, an exposition that is the main task
of the present chapter. One of them is that any revulsion against
the position just indicated should be tempered by appreciation of
the fact that all other conceptions of logical subject-matter that
are now entertained are equally hypothetical. If they do not seem
to be so, it is because of their familiarity. If sheer dogmatism is
to be avoided, any hypothesis, no matter how unfamiliar, should
have a fair chance and be judged by its results. The other point
is that inquiries, numerous in variety and comprehensive in scope,
do exist and are open to public examination. Inquiry is the life-
blood of every science and is constantly engaged in every art,
craft and profession. In short, the hypothesis represents a vera
causa, no matter what doubt may attend its applicability in the
field of logic.
Further elucidation of the meaning of the position taken will
proceed largely in terms of objections that are most likely to arise.
The most basic of these objections is that the field indicated, that
of inquiries, is already pre-empted. There is, it will be said, a
recognized subject which deals with it. That subject is method-
ology; and there is a well recognized distinction between method-
ology and logic, the former being an application of the latter.
It certainly cannot be shown, short of the total development of
the position taken, that this objection is not just. But it may be
noted that assertion in advance of a fixed difference between logic
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 5
and the methodology of scientific and practical inquiry begs the
fundamental question at issue. The fact that most of the extant
treatises upon methodology have been written upon the assump-
tion of a fixed difference between the two does not prove that the
difference exists. Moreover, the relative failure of works on logic
that have identified logic and methodology (I may cite the logic
of Mill as an example) does not prove that the identification is
doomed to failure. For the failure may not be inherent. In any
case, a priori assumption of a dualism between logic and method-
ology can only be prejudicial to unbiased examination both of
methods of inquiry and logical subject-matter.
The plausibility of the view that sets up a dualism between
logic and the methodology of inquiry, between logic and scien-
tific method, is due to a fact that is not denied. Inquiry in order to
reach valid conclusions must itself satisfy logical requirements.
It is an easy inference from this fact to the idea that the logical re-
quirements are imposed upon methods of inquiry from without.
Since inquiries and methods are better and worse, logic involves a
standard for criticizing and evaluating them. How, it will be
asked, can inquiry which has to be evaluated by reference to a
standard be itself the source of the standard? How can inquiry
originate logical forms (as it has been stated that it does) and yet
be subject to the requirements of these forms? The question is
one that must be met. It can be adequately answered only in the
course of the entire discussion that follows. But the meaning of
the position taken may be clarified by indicating the direction in
which the answer will be sought.
The problem reduced to its lowest terms is whether inquiry can
develop in its own ongoing course the logical standards and forms
to which further inquiry shall submit. One might reply by say-
ing that it can because it has. One might even challenge the ob-
jector to produce a single instance of improvement in scientific
methods not produced in and by the self-corrective process of
inquiry; a single instance that is due to application of standards ab
extra. But such a retort needs to be justified. Some kind of inquiry
began presumably as soon as man appeared on earth. Of prehis-
toric methods of inquiry our knowledge is vague and speculative.
But we know a good deal about different methods that have been
6 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF 1XQUIRY
used in historic times. We know that the methods which now
control science are of comparatively recent origin in both physical
and mathematical science.
Moreover, different methods have been not only tried, but they
have been tried out; that is, tested. The developing course of
science thus presents us with an immanent criticism of methods
previously tried. Earlier methods failed in some important respect.
In consequence of this failure, they were modified so that more
dependable results were secured. Earlier methods yielded con-
clusions that could not stand the strain put upon them by further
investigation. It is not merely that conclusions were found to be
inadequate or false but that they were found to be so because of
methods employed. Other methods of inquiry were found to be
such that persistence in them not only produced conclusions that
stood the strain of further inquiry but that tended to be self-recti-
fying. They were methods that improved with and by use.
It may be instructive to compare the improvement of scientific
methods within inquiry with the improvement that has taken
place in the progress of the arts. Is there any reason to suppose
that advance in the art of metallurgy has been due to application
of an external standard? The "norms" used at present have de-
veloped out of the processes by which metallic ores were formerly
treated. There were needs to be satisfied; consequences to be
reached. As they were reached, new needs and new possibilities
opened to view and old processes were re-made to satisfy them. In
short, some procedures worked; some succeeded in reaching the
end intended; others failed. The latter were dropped; the former
were retained and extended. It is quite true that modern improve-
ments in technologies have been determined by advance in mathe-
matics and physical science. But these advances in scientific
knowledge are not external canons to which the arts have had
automatically to submit themselves. The}' provided new instru-
mentalities, but the instrumentalities were nor self-applying. They
were used; and it was the result of their use, their failure'and suc-
cess in accomplishing ends and effecting consequences, that pro-
vided the final criterion of the value of scientific principles for
carrying on determinate technological operations. What is said
is not intended as proof that the logical principles involved in
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 7
scientific method have themselves arisen in the progressive course
of inquiry. But it is meant to show that the hypothesis that they
have so arisen has a prima -facie claim to be entertained, final de-
cision being reserved.
I now return to exposition of the meaning of the position taken.
That inquiry is related to doubt will, I suppose, be admitted.
The admission carries with it an implication regarding the end of
inquiry: end in both senses of the word, as end-in-view and as close
or termination. If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the
institution of conditions which remove need for doubt. The latter
state of affairs may be designated by the words belief and knowl-
edge. For reasons that I shall state later I prefer the words "war-
ranted assertibility."
Belief may be so understood as to be a fitting designation for
the outcome of inquiry. Doubt is uneasy; it is tension that finds
expression and outlet in the processes of inquiry. Inquiry termi-
nates in reaching that which is settled. This settled condition
is a demarcating characteristic of genuine belief. In so far, be-
lief is an appropriate name for the end of inquiry. But belief is
a "double-barreled" word. It is used objectively to name what
is believed. In this sense, the outcome of inquiry is a settled ob-
jective state of affairs, so settled that we are ready to act upon it,
overtly or in imagination. Belief here names the settled condition
of objective subject-matter, together with readiness to act in a
given way when, if, and as, that subject-matter is present in
existence. But in popular usage, belief also means a personal mat-
ter; something that some human being entertains or holds; a
position, which under the influence of psychology, is converted
into the notion that belief is merely a mental or psychical state.
Associations from this signification of the word belief are likely
to creep in when it is said that the end of inquiry is settled belief.
The objective meaning of subject-matter as that is settled through
inquiry is then dimmed or even shut out. The ambiguity of the
word thus renders its use inadvisable for the purpose in hand.
The word knowledge is also a suitable term to designate the
objective and close of inquiry. But it, too, suffers from ambiguity.
When it is said that attainment of knowledge, or truth, is the end
of inquiry the statement, according to the position here taken, is
8 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
a truism. That which satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by
definition, knowledge; it is knowledge because it is the appropriate
close of inquiry. But the statement may be supposed, and has been
supposed, to enunciate something significant instead of a tautology.
As a truism, it defines knowledge as the outcome of competent and
controlled inquiry. When, however, the statement is thought to
enunciate something significant, the case is reversed. Knowledge
is then supposed to have a meaning of its own apart from connec-
tion with and reference to inquiry. The theory of inquiry is then
necessarily subordinated to this meaning as a fixed external end.
The opposition between the two views is basic. The idea that
any knowledge in particular can be instituted apart from its being
the consummation of inquiry, and that knowledge in general can
be defined apart from this connection is, moreover, one of the
sources of confusion in logical theory. For the different varieties
of realism, idealism and dualism have their diverse conceptions of
what "knowledge" really is. In consequence, logical theory is
rendered subservient to metaphysical and epistemological precon-
ceptions, so that interpretation of logical forms varies with under-
lying metaphysical assumptions.
The position here taken holds that since every special case of
knowledge is constituted as the outcome of some special inquiry,
the conception of knowledge as such can only be a generalization
of the properties discovered to belong to conclusions which are
outcomes of inquiry. Knowledge, as an abstract term, is a name
for the product of competent inquiries. Apart from this relation,
its meaning is so empty that any content or filling may be arbitra-
rily poured in. The general conception of knowledge, when for-
mulated in terms of the outcome of inquiry, has something im-
portant to say regarding the meaning of inquiry itself. For it
indicates that inquiry is a continuing process in even' field with
which it is engaged. The "settlement" of a particular situation by
a particular inquiry is no guarantee that that settled conclusion will
always remain settled. The attainment of settled beliefs is a
progressive matter; there is no belief so settled as not to be ex-
posed to further inquiry. It is the convergent and cumulative
effect of continued inquiry that defines knowledge in its general
meaning. In scientific inquiry, the criterion of what is taken to be
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 9
settled, or to be knowledge, is being so settled that it is available as
a resource in further inquiry; not being settled in such a way as
not to be subject to revision in further inquiry.
What has been said helps to explain why the term "warranted
assertion" is preferred to the terms belief and knowledge. It is free
from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference
to inquiry as that which warrants assertion. When knowledge is
taken as a general abstract term related to inquiry in the abstract,
it means "warranted assertibility." The use of a term that desig-
nates a potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition
that all special conclusions of special inquiries are parts of an
enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a going concern. 1
Up to this point, it may seem as if the criteria that emerge from
the processes of continuous inquiry were only descriptive, and in
that sense empirical. That they are empirical in one sense of that
ambiguous word is undeniable. They have grown out of the
experiences of actual inquiry. But they are not empirical in the
sense in which "empirical" means devoid of rational standing.
Through examination of the relations which exist between means
(methods) employed and conclusions attained as their consequence,
reasons are discovered why some methods succeed and other
methods fail. It is implied in what has been said (as a corollary of
the general hypothesis) that rationality is an affair of the relation
of means and consequences, not of fixed first principles as ultimate
premises or as contents of what the Neo-scholastics call crite-
riology.
Reasonableness or rationality is, according to the position here
taken, as well as in its ordinary usage, an affair of the relation of
means and consequences. In framing ends-in-view, it is un-
reasonable to set up those which have no connection with available
means and without reference to the obstacles standing in the way of
*C. S. Peirce, after noting that our scientific propositions are subject to being
brought in doubt by the results of further inquiries, adds, "We ought to construct
our theories so as to provide for such [later] discoveries ... by leaving room
for the modifications that cannot be foreseen but which are pretty sure to prove
needful." (Collected Papers, Vol. V., p. 376 n.) The readers who are acquainted
with the logical writings of Peirce will note my great indebtedness to him in the
general position taken. As far as I am aware, he was the first writer on logic to
make inquiry and its methods the primary and ultimate source of logical subject-
matter.
10
INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
attaining the end. It is reasonable to search for and select the
means that will, with the maximum probability, yield the con-
sequences which are intended. It is highly unreasonable to cm-
ploy as means, materials and processes which would be found, if
they were examined, to be such that they produce consequences
which are different from the intended end; so different that they
preclude its attainment. Rationality as an abstract conception is
precisely the generalized idea of the means-consequence relation
as such. Hence, from this point of view, the descriptive state-
ment of methods that achieve progressively stable beliefs, or war-
ranted assertibility, is also a rational statement in case the relation
between them as means and assertibility as consequence is ascer-
tained.
Reasonableness or rationality has, however, been hypostatized.
One of the oldest and most enduring traditions in logical theory
has converted rationality into a faculty which, when it is actualized
in perception of first truths, was called reason and later, Intcllectus
Purus. The idea of reason as the power which intuitively appre-
hends a priori ultimate first principles persists in logical philosophy.
Whether explicitly affirmed or not, it is the ground of even' view
which holds that scientific method is dependent upon logical forms
that are logically prior and external to inquiry. The original
ground for this conception of reason has now been destroyed.
This ground was the necessity for postulating a faculty that had
the power of direct apprehension of "truths" that were axiomatic
in the sense of being self-evident, or self-verifying, and self-
contained, as the necessary grounds of all demonstrative reasoning.
The notion was derived from the subject-matter that had attained
the highest scientific formulation at the time the classic logic was
formulated; namely, Euclidean geometry.
This conception of the nature of axioms is no longer held in
mathematics nor in the logic of mathematics. Axioms are now
held to be postulates, neither true nor false in themselves, and
to have their meaning determined by the consequences that follow
because of their implicatory relations to one another. The greatest
freedom is permitted, or rather encouraged, in laying" down
postulates— a freedom subject only to the condition that\hey be
rigorously fruitful of implied consequences.
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 11
The same principle holds in physics. Mathematical formulae
have now taken the place in physics once occupied by proposi-
tions about eternal essences and the fixed species defined by these
essences. The formulae are deductively developed by means of
rules of implication. But the value of the deduced result for
physical science is not determined by the correctness of the deduc-
tion.
The deductive conclusion is used to instigate and direct opera-
tions of experimental observation. The observable consequences
of these operations in their systematic correlation with one an-
other finally determine the scientific worth of the deduced
principle. The latter takes its place as a means necessary to obtain
the consequence of warranted assertibility. The position here
taken, the general hypothesis advanced, is a generalization of the
means-consequence relation characteristic of mathematical and
physical inquiry. According to it, all logical forms, such as are
represented by what has been called proximate logical subject-
matter, are instances of a relation between means and consequences
in properly controlled inquiry, the word "controlled" in this
statement standing for the methods of inquiry that are developed
and perfected in the processes of continuous inquiry. In this
continuity, the conclusions of any special inquiry are subordinate
to use in substantiation and maturation of methods of further in-
quiry. The general character of knowledge as an abstract term
is determined by the nature of the methods used, not vice-versa.
The character of the generalization of the relation of "first
principles" and conclusions (in mathematical and physical science)
may be illustrated by the meaning of first principles in logic; such
as traditionally represented by the principles, say, of identity,
contradiction and excluded middle. According to one view, such
principles represent ultimate invariant properties of the objects
with which methods of inquiry are concerned, and to which in-
quiry must conform. According to the view here expressed, they
represent conditions which have been ascertained during the con-
duct of continued inquiry to be involved in its own successful
pursuit. The two statements may seem to amount to the same
thing. Theoretically, there is a radical difference between them.
For the second position implies, as has already been stated, that the
1 2 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
principles are generated in the very process of control of continued
inquiry, while, according to the other view, they arc a priori
principles fixed antecedently to inquiry and conditioning it ah
extra. 2
Neither the existence nor the indispensability of primary logical
principles is, then, denied. The question concerns their origin and
use. In what is said upon this matter I follow in the main the
account given by Peirce of "guiding" or "leading 1 ' principles.
According to this view, every inferential conclusion that is drawn
involves a habit (either by way of expressing it or initiating it)
in the organic sense of habit, since life is impossible without ways
of action sufficiently general to be properly named kihits. At the
outset, the habit that operates in an inference is purely biological.
It operates without our being aware of it. We are aware at most
of particular acts and particular consequences. Later, we are
aware not only of 'what is done from time to time but of boz? it is
done. Attention to the way of doing is, moreover, indispensable
to control of what is done. The craftsman, for example, learns
that if he operates in a certain ii\iy the result will take care of it-
self, certain materials being given. In like fashion, we discover
that if we draw our inferences in a certain way, we shall, other
things being equal, get dependable conclusions. The iJca of a
method of inquiry arises as an articulate expression of the habit
that is involved in a class of inferences.
Since, moreover, the habits that operate are narrower and wider
in scope, the formulations of methods that result from observing
them have either restricted or extensive breadth. Peirce illustrates
the narrower type of habit by the following case: A person has
seen a rotating disk of copper come to rest when it is placed be-
tween magnets. He infers that another piece of copper will be-
have similarly under like conditions. At first such inferences
are made without formulation of a principle/' The disposition that
operates is limited in scope. It docs not extend beyond pieces of
copper. But when it is found that there are habits involved in
2 This point is discussed in Ch. XVII.
3 1 do not recall that Peirce alludes to Hume's doctrine of habit, or t<» Mill's
"propensity" to generalize. The fact involved seems to be die same. Bur Peirce
connects the fact, as Hume and Mill did nor, with basic uremic or biological
functions instead of leaving habit as an ultimate "mysterious" tie.
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 13
every inference, in spite of differences of subject-matter, and
when these habits are noted and formulated, then the formulations
are guiding or leading principles. The principles state habits
operative in every inference that tend to yield conclusions that are
stable and productive in further inquiries. Being free from con-
nection with any particular subject-matter, they are formal, not
material, though they are forms of material that is subjected to
authentic inquiry.
Validity of the principles is determined by the coherency of the
consequences produced by the habits they articulate. If the habit
in question is such as generally produces conclusions that are sus-
tained and developed in further inquiry, then it is valid even if in
an occasional case it yields a conclusion that turns out invalid. In
such cases, the trouble lies in the material dealt with rather than
with the habit and general principle. This distinction obviously
corresponds to the ordinary distinction between form and matter.
But it does not involve the complete separation between them that
is often set up in logical theories.
Any habit is a way or manner of action, not a particular act or
deed. When it is formulated it becomes, as far as it is accepted, a
rule, or more generally, a principle or "law" of action. It can
hardly be denied that there are habits of inference and that they
may be formulated as rules or principles. If there are such habits
as are necessary to conduct every successful inferential inquiry,
then the formulations that express them will be logical principles
of all inquiries. In this statement "successful" means operative in
a manner that tends in the long run, or in continuity of inquiry,
to yield results that are either confirmed in further inquiry or that
are corrected by use of the same procedures. These guiding
logical principles are not premises of inference or argument. They
are conditions to be satisfied such that knowledge of them pro-
vides a principle of direction and of testing. They are formulations
of ways of treating subject-matter that have been found to be so
determinative of sound conclusions in the past that they are taken
to regulate further inquiry until definite grounds are found for
questioning them. While they are derived from examination of
methods previously used in their connection with the kind of con-
14 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF IXQUIRY
elusion they have produced, they are operationally a priori with
respect to further inquiry. 4
In the previous discussion I have made statements whose full
force can become clear only in the more detailed development of
logical themes in subsequent chapters. The discussion, as was said
at the outset, is not intended to justify the position but to clarify
its general meaning. In the remaining pages of this Introduction
I shall set forth certain implications of the position for the
theory of logic.
1. Logic is a progressive discipline. The reason for this is that
logic rests upon analysis of the best methods of inquiry (being
judged "best" by their results with respect to continued inquiry)
that exist at a given time. As the methods of the sciences improve,
corresponding changes take place in logic. An enormous change
has taken place in logical theory since the classic logic formulated
the methods of the science that existed in its period. It has oc-
curred in consequence of the development of mathematical and
physical science. If, however, present theory provided a coherent
formulation of existing scientific methods, freed from a doctrine of
logical forms inherited from a science that is no longer held, this
treatise would have no reason for existence. When in the future
methods of inquiry are further changed, logical theory will also
change. There is no ground for supposing that logic has been or
ever will be so perfected that, save, perhaps, for minor details, it
will require no further modification. The idea that logic is capable
of final formulation is an eidolon of the theater.
2. The subject-matter of logic is determined operationally:'
This thesis is a verbal restatement of what was earlier said. The
methods of inquiry are operations performed or to be performed.
Logical forms are the conditions that inquiry, qua inquiry, has
4 As has been indicated, the above account is a free rendering of Peirce. See
particularly his Collected Papers, Vol. Ill, pp. 154-68, and Vol. V. pp. 36% 370.
5 The word "operational" is not a substitute for what is designated by the word
"instrumental." It expresses the way in and by which the subject-matter of inquiry
is rendered the means to the end of inquiry, the institution of determinate exist-
ential situations. As a general term, "instrumental" stands for the relation of
?neans-consequence i as the basic category for interpretation of logical forms,
while "operational" stands for the conditions by which subject-matter is (1)
rendered fit to serve as means and (2) actually functions as such means in effect-
ing the objective transformation which is the end of inquiry.
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 15
to meet. Operations, to anticipate, fall into two general types.
There are operations that are performed upon and with existential
material — as in experimental observation. There are operations
performed with and upon symbols. But even in the latter case,
"operation" is to be taken in as literal a sense as possible. There
are operations like hunting for a lost coin or measuring land, and
there are operations like drawing up a balance-sheet. The former
is performed upon existential conditions; the latter upon symbols.
But the symbols in the latter case stand for possible final existential
conditions while the conclusion, when it is stated in symbols, is a
pre-condition of further operations that deal with existences.
Moreover, the operations involved in making a balance-sheet for
a bank or any other business involve physical activities. The so-
called "mental" element in operations of both these kinds has to be
defined in terms of existential conditions and consequences, not
vice-versa.
Operations involve both material and instrumentalities, including
in the latter tools and techniques. The more material and in-
strumentalities are shaped in advance with a view to their operating
in conjunction with each other as means to consequences, the better
the operations performed are controlled. Refined steel, which is
the matter of the operations by which a watch-spring is formed, is
itself the product of a number of preparatory operations executed
with reference to getting the material into the state that fits it to be
the material of the final operation. The material is thus as instru-
mental, from an operational point of view, as are the tools and
techniques by which it is brought into a required condition. On
the other hand, old tools and techniques are modified in order
that they may apply more effectively to new materials. The intro-
duction, for example, of the lighter metals demanded different
methods of treatment from those to which the heavier metals
previously used were subjected. Or, stated from the other side,
the development of electrolytic operations made possible the use
of new materials as means to new consequences.
The illustration is drawn from the operations of industrial arts.
But the principle holds of operations of inquiry. The latter also
proceed by shaping on one hand subject-matter so that it lends
itself to the application of conceptions as modes of operation; and,
16 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
on the other hand, by development of such conceptual structures
as are applicable to existential conditions. Since, as in the arts,
both movements take place in strict correspondence with each
other, the conceptions employed are to be understood as directly
operational, while the existential material, in the degree in which
the conditions of inquiry are satisfied, is determined both by
operations and with an eye to operations still to be executed.
3. Logical forms are postulational. Inquiry in order to be
inquiry in the complete sense has to satisfy certain demands that
are capable of formal statement. According to the view that makes
a basic difference between logic and methodology, the require-
ments in question subsist prior to and independent (if inquiry.
Upon that view, they are final in themselves, not intrinsically
postulational. This conception of them is the ultimate ground of
the idea that they are completely and inherently a priori and are
disclosed to a faculty called pure reason. The position here taken
holds that they are intrinsically postulates of and for inquiry, be-
ing formulations of conditions, discovered in the course of inquiry
itself, which further inquiries must satisfy if the}' are to yield
warranted assertibility as a consequence.
Stated in terms of the means-consequence relation, they are a
generalization of the nature of the means that must be employed if
assertibility is to be attained as an end. Certain demands have to
be met by the operations that occur in the arts. A bridge is to be
built to span a river under given conditions, so that the\ridge, as
the consequence of the operations, will sustain certain loads.
There are local conditions set by the state of the banks, etc. But
there are general conditions of distance, weights, stresses and
strains, changes of temperature, etc. These are formal conditions.
As such they are demands, requirements, postulates, to be fulfilled.
^ A postulate is also a stipulation. To engage in an inquiry is
like entering into a contract. It commits the inquirer to observance
of certain conditions. A stipulation is a statement of conditions
that are agreed to in the conduct of some affair. The stipulations
involved are at first implicit in the undertaking of inquiry. As they
are formally acknowledged (formulated), they become logical
forms of various degrees of generality. They make definite what
is involved in a demand. Every demand is a request, but not every
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 17
request is a postulate. For a postulate involves the assumption of
responsibilities. The responsibilities that are assumed are stated in
stipulations. They involve readiness to act in certain specified
ways. On this account, postulates are not arbitrarily chosen.
They present claims to be met in the sense in which a claim
presents a title or has authority to receive due consideration.
In engaging in transactions, human beings are not at first aware
of the responsibilities that are implicit; for laws, in the legal
sense, are explicit statements of what was previously only implicit
in customs: namely, formal recognition of duties and rights that
were practically involved in acceptance of the customs. One of the
highly generalized demands to be met in inquiry is the following:
"If anything has a certain property, and whatever has this property
has a certain other property, then the thing in question has this
certain other property/' This logical "law" is a stipulation. If
you are going to inquire in a way which meets the requirements
of inquiry, you must proceed in a way which observes this rule,
just as when you make a business contract there are certain con-
ditions to be fulfilled.
A postulate is thus neither arbitrary nor externally a priori. It
is not the former because it issues from the relation of means to the
end to be reached. It is not the latter, because it is not imposed
upon inquiry from without, but is an acknowledgement of that to
which the undertaking of inquiry commits us. It is empirically
and temporally a priori in the same sense in which the law of
contracts is a rule regulating in advance the making of certain kinds
of business engagements. While it is derived from what is involved
in inquiries that have been successful in the past, it imposes a con-
dition to be satisfied in future inquiries, until the results of such in-
quiries show reason for modifying it.
Terming logical forms postulates is, thus, on the negative side,
a way of calling attention to the fact that they are not given and
imposed from without. Just as the postulates of, say, geometry are
not self-evident first truths that are externally imposed premises
but are formulations of the conditions that have to be satisfied in
procedures that deal with a certain subject-matter, so with logical
forms which hold for every inquiry. In a contract, the agreement
involved is that between the consequences of the activities of two
18
INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF IXQUIRV
or more parties with respect to some specified affair. In inquiry,
the agreement is between the consequences of a series of inquiries.
But inquiry as such is not carried on by one person rather than
another. When any one person engages in it, he is committed, in
as far as his inquiry is genuinely such and not an insincere bluff, to
stand by the results of similar inquiries by whomever conducted.
"Similar" in this phrase means inquiries that submit to the same
conditions or postulates.
The postulational character of logical theory requires, accord-
ingly, the most complete and explicit formulation that is attainable
of not only the subject-matter that is taken as evidential in a given
inference, but also of general conditions, stated in the rules and
principles of inference and discourse. A distinction of matter and
form is thus instituted. But it is one in which subject-matter and
form correspond strictly to each other. Hence, once more, postu-
lates are not arbitrary or mere linguistic conventions. They must
be such as control the determination and arrangement of subject-
matter with respect to achieving cnduringly stable beliefs. Only
after inquiry has proceeded for a considerable time and has hit
upon methods that work successfully, is it possible to extract the
postulates that are involved. They are not presuppositions at
large. They are abstract in the sense that the}' are derived from
analytic survey of the relations between methods as means and
conclusions as consequences — a principle that exemplifies the
meaning of rationality.
The postulational nature of logical theory thus agrees with what
has been said about logic as progressive and operational Postu-
lates alter as methods of inquiry are perfected; the logical forms
that express modern scientific inquiry are in many respects quite
unlike those that formulated the procedures of C J reek science. An
experimenter in the laboratory who publishes his results states the
materials used, the setup of apparatus and the procedures employed.
These specifications are limited postulates, demands and stipula-
tions, for any inquirer who wishes to test the conclusion reached.
Generalize this performance for procedures of inquiry as such,
that is, with respect to the form of every inquiry, and logical
forms as postulates are the outcome.
4. Logic is a naturalistic theory. The term "naturalistic" has
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 19
many meanings. As it is here employed it means, on one side, that
there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and
biological operations and physical operations. "Continuity," on
the other side, means that rational operations grow out of organic
activities, without being identical with that from which they
emerge. There is an adjustment of means to consequences in the
activities of living creatures, even though not directed by deliberate
purpose. Human beings in the ordinary or "natural" processes of
living come to make these adjustments purposely, the purpose
being limited at first to local situations as they arise. In the course
of time (to repeat a principle already set forth) the intent is so
generalized that inquiry is freed from limitation to special circum-
stances. The logic in question is also naturalistic in the sense of the
observability, in the ordinary sense of the word, of activities of
inquiry. Conceptions derived from a mystical faculty of intuition
or anything that is so occult as not to be open to public inspection
and verification (such as the purely psychical for example) are
excluded.
5. Logic is a social discipline. One ambiguity attending the
word "naturalistic" is that it may be understood to involve reduc-
tion of human behavior to the behavior of apes, amebae, or
electrons and protons. But man is naturally a being that lives in
association with others in communities possessing language, and
therefore enjoying a transmitted culture. Inquiry is a mode of
activity that is socially conditioned and that has cultural con-
sequences. This fact has a narrower and a wider import. Its
more limited import is expressed in the connection of logic with
symbols. Those who are concerned with "symbolic logic" do
not always recognize the need for giving an account of the
reference and function of symbols. While the relations of symbols
to one another is important, symbols as such must be finally under-
stood in terms of the function which symbolization serves. The
fact that all languages (which include much more than speech)
consist of symbols, does not of itself settle the nature of symbolism
as that is used in inquiry. But, upon any naturalistic basis, it
assuredly forms the point of departure for the logical theory of
symbols. Any theory of logic has to take some stand on the
question whether symbols are ready-made clothing for meanings
20 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF IXQUIRY^
that subsist independently, or whether the}- are necessary con-
ditions for the existence of meanings— in terms often used, whether
language is the dress of "thought" or is something without which
"thought" cannot be.
The wider import is found in the fact that ever}* inquiry grows
out of a background of culture and takes effect in greater or less
modification of the conditions out of which it arises. Merely
physical contacts with physical surroundings occur. But in every
interaction that involves intelligent direction, the physical en-
vironment is part of a more inclusive social or cultural environ-
ment. Just as logical texts usually remark incidental!}' that reflec-
tion grows out of the presence of a problem and then proceed as if
this fact had no further interest for the theory of reflection, so they
observe that science itself is culturally conditioned and then dis-
miss the fact from further consideration/"' This wider aspect of the
matter is connected with what was termed the narrower.
Language in its widest sense — that is, including all means of com-
munication such as, for example, monuments, rituals, and formal-
ized arts — is the medium in which culture exists and through which
it is transmitted. Phenomena that are not recorded cannot be even
discussed. Language is the record that perpetuates occurrences
and renders them amenable to public consideration. On the other
hand, ideas or meanings that exist ofily in symbols that are not
communicable are fantastic beyond imagination* The naturalistic
conception of logic, which underlies the position here taken, is thus
cultural naturalism. Neither inquiry nor the most abstractly
formal set of symbols can escape from the cultural matrix in which
they live, move and have their being.
6. Logic is autonomous. The position taken implies the
ultimacy of inquiry in determination of the formal conditions of
inquiry. Logic as inquiry into inquiry is, if you please, a circular
process; it does not depend upon anything extraneous to inquiry.
The force of this proposition may perhaps be most readily under-
stood by noting what it precludes. It precludes the determination
G "Not even the physicist is wholly independent of die context of experience
provided for him by the society within which he works." St ebbing A Modem
Introduction to Logic, p. 16. If one includes in "society" the community of
scientific workers, it would seem as if "even" should be changed to read/ "the
physicist almost more than anyone else."
THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL SUBJECT-MATTER 21
and selection of logical first principles by an a priori intuitional
act, even when the intuition in question is said to be that of
Intellects Purus. It precludes resting logic upon metaphysical
and epistemological assumptions and presuppositions. The latter
are to be determined, if at all, by means of what is disclosed as the
outcome of inquiry; they are not to be shoved under inquiry as its
"foundation." On the epistemological side, it precludes, as was
noted earlier in another connection, the assumption of a prior
ready-made definition of knowledge which determines the char-
acter of inquiry. Knowledge is to be defined in terms of inquiry,
not vice-versa, both in particular and universally.
The autonomy of logic also precludes the idea that its "founda-
tions" are psychological. It is not necessary to reach conclusions
about sensations, sense-data, ideas and thought, or mental faculties
generally, as material that preconditions logic. On the contrary,
just as the specific meaning of these matters is determined in
specific inquiries, so generally their relation to the logic of inquiry
is determined by discovering the relation that the subject-matters
to which these names are given bear to the effective conduct of
inquiry as such. The point may be illustrated by reference to
"thought." It would have been possible in the preceding pages
to use the term "reflective thought" where the word "inquiry" has
been used. But if that word had been used, it is certain that some
readers would have supposed that "reflective thought" designated
something already sufficiently known so that "inquiry" was
equated to a preexisting definition of thought. The opposite view
is implied in the position taken. We do not know what meaning
is to be assigned to "reflective thought" except in terms of what is
discovered by inquiry into inquiry; at least we do not know what
it means for the purposes of logic. Personally, I doubt whether
there exists anything that may be called thought as a strictly
psychical existence. But it is not necessary to go into that question
here. For even if there be such a thing, it does not determine the
meaning of "thought" for logic.
Either the word "thought" has no business at all in logic or else
it is a synonym of "inquiry" and its meaning is determined by what
we find out about inquiry. The latter would seem to be the
reasonable alternative. These statements do not mean that a
22 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF IXQUIRY _
sound psychology may not be of decided advantage to logical
theory. For history demonstrates that unsound psychology has
done great damage. But its general relation to logic is found in
the light that it, as a branch of inquiry, may throw upon what is
involved in inquiry. Its generic relation to logic is similar to that
of physics or biology. Specifically, for reasons that will appear
in subsequent chapters, its findings stand closer to logical theory
than do those of the other sciences. Occasional reference to
psychological subject-matter is inevitable in any case; lor, as will
be shown later, some logical positions that pride themselves upon
their complete indifference to psychological considerations in fact
rest upon psychological notions that have become so current, so em-
bedded in intellectual tradition, that they are accepted uncritically
as if they were self-evident.
The remaining chapters of Part One are preparatory to the
later and more detailed outline of what is implied in the proposi-
tions (1) that logical theory is the systematic formulation of eon-
trolled inquiry, and (2) that logical forms accrue in and because
of control that yields conclusions \\ Inch are w arrant ably assemble.
Were the general point of view even moderately represented in
current theory these chapters would not be needed. In the present
state of logical discussion they seem to me to he necessary. Chap-
ters II and III consider the naturalistic background of the theory,
one upon its biological side, the other upon the cultural. Chapters
IV and V endeavor to state the need and importance of a revision
of logical theory in the direction that has been set forth.
CHAPTER II
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY:
BIOLOGICAL
"nJhis chapter and the following one are occupied with de-
velopment of the statement that logic is naturalistic. The
present chapter is concerned with the biological natural
foundations of inquiry. It is obvious without argument that when
men inquire they employ their eyes and ears, their hands and their
brains. These organs, sensory, motor or central, are biological.
Hence, although biological operations and structures are not suf-
ficient conditions of inquiry, they are necessary conditions. The
fact that inquiry involves the use of biological factors is usually sup-
posed to pose a special metaphysical or epistomological problem,
that of the mind-body relation. When thus shunted off into a
special domain, its import for logical theory is ignored. When,
however, biological functions are recognized to be indispensable
constituents of inquiry, logic does not need to get enmeshed in the
intricacies of different theories regarding the relations of mind and
body. It suffices to accept the undeniable fact that they are neces-
sary factors in inquiry, and then consider how they operate in its
conduct. The purpose of the following discussion is to show that
biological functions and structures prepare the way for deliberate
inquiry and how they foreshadow its pattern.
The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is con-
tinuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex)
activities and forms. The idea of continuity is not self-explana-
tory. But its meaning excludes complete rupture on one side and
mere repetition of identities on the other; it precludes reduc-
tion of the "higher" to the "lower" just as it precludes complete
breaks and gaps. The growth and development of any living
organism from seed to maturity illustrates the meaning of con-
tinuity. The method by which development takes place is some-
23
24 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
thing to be determined by a study of what actually occurs. It
is not to be determined by prior conceptual constructions, even
though such constructions may be helpful as hypotheses when
they are used to direct observation and experimentation.
We cannot, for example, say in advance that development pro-
ceeds by minute increments or by abrupt mutations; that it pro-
ceeds from the part to the whole by means of compounding of
elements, or that it proceeds by differentiation of gross wholes into
definite related parts. None of these possibilities are excluded as
hypotheses to be tested by the results of investigation. What is
excluded by the postulate of continuity is the appearance upon
the scene of a totally new outside force as a cause of changes that
occur. Perhaps from mutations that are due to some form of
radio-activity a strikingly new form emerges. But radio-activity
is not invented ad hoc and introduced from withour in order to
account for such transformation. It is first known to exist in na-
ture, and then, if this particular theory of the origin of mutations
is confirmed, is found actually to occur in biological phenomena
and to be operative among them in observable and describablc
fashion. On the other hand, should the conclusion of scientific
investigation be that development proceeds by minute increments,
no amount of addition of such increments will constitute develop-
ment save when their cumulative effect generates something new
and different.
The application of the postulate of continuity to discussion of
logical subject-matter means, therefore, negatively, that in order to
account for the distinctive, and unique, characters of logical
subject-matter we shall not suddenly evoke a new power or faculty
like Reason or Pure Intuition. Positively and concretely, it means
that a reasonable account shall be given of the ways in which it is
possible for the traits that differentiate deliberate inquiry to de-
velop out of biological activities not marked by those traits. It is
possible, of course, to deal with what was called proximate logical
subject-matter without raising this question. But it is cause for
surprise that writers who energetically reject the intervention of
the supernatural or the non-natural in every other scientific field
feel no hesitancy in invoking Reason and a priori Intuition in the
domain of logical theory. It would seem to be more incumbent
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 25
upon logicians than upon others to make their position in logic
coherent with their beliefs about other matters.
If one denies the supernatural, then one has the intellectual re-
sponsibility of indicating how the logical may be connected with
the biological in a process of continuous development. This point
deserves emphasis, for if the following discussion fails to fulfil the
task of pointing out satisfactorily the continuous path, then that
failure becomes, for those who accept the naturalistic postulate,
but a challenge to perform the task better.
Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity
that involves an environment. It is a transaction extending be-
yond the spatial limits of the organism. An organism does not live
in an environment; it lives by means of an environment. Breath-
ing, the ingestion of food, the ejection of waste products, are cases
of direct integration; the circulation of the blood and the energiz-
ing of the nervous system are relatively indirect. But every or-
ganic function is an interaction of intra-organic and extra-organic
energies, either directly or indirectly. For life involves expendi-
ture of energy and the energy expended can be replenished only
as the activities performed succeed in making return drafts upon
the environment — the only source of restoration of energy. Not
even a hibernating animal can live indefinitely upon itself. The
energy that is drawn is not forced in from without; it is a conse-
quence of energy expended. If there is a surplus balance, growth
occurs. If there is a deficit balance, degeneration commences.
There are things in the world that are indifferent to the life-
activities of an organism. But they are not parts of its environ-
ment, save potentially. The processes of living are enacted by the
environment as truly as by the organism; for they are an integra-
tion.
It follows that with every differentiation of structure the en-
vironment expands. For a new organ provides a new way of in-
teracting in which things in the world that were previously
indifferent enter into life-functions. The environment of an ani-
mal that is locomotor differs from that of a sessile plant; that of a
jelly fish differs from that of a trout, and the environment of any
fish differs from that of a bird. So, to repeat what was just said,
the difference is not just that a fish lives in the water and a bird in
26 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF IXQUIRY
the air, but that the characteristic functions of these animals are
what they are because of the special way in which water and air
enter into their respective activities.
With differentiation of interactions comes the need of maintain-
ing a balance among them; or, in objective terms, a unified en-
vironment. The balance has to be maintained by a mechanism
that responds both to variations that occur within the organism and
in surroundings. For example, such an apparently self-contained
function as that of respiration is kept constant by means of active
exchanges between the alkaline and carbon dioxide contents of
changing pressures exerted by the blood and the carbon dioxide in
the lungs. The lungs in turn are dependent upon interactions
effected by kidneys and liver, which effect the interactions of the
circulating blood with materials of the digestive tract. This whole
system of accurately timed interchanges is regulated In* changes in
the nervous system.
The effect of this delicate and complex system of internal
changes is the maintenance of a fairly uniform integration with
the environment, or — what amounts to the same thing- -a fairly
unified environment. The interactions of inanimate things with
their surroundings are not such as to maintain a stable relation
between the things involved. The blow of a hammer, for example,
breaks a stone into bits. But as long as life normally continues,
the interactions to which organic and environmental energies enter
are such as to maintain the conditions in both of them needed for
later interactions. The processes, in other words, are self-main-
taining, in a sense in which they are not in the case of the interac-
tions of non-living things.
Capacity for maintenance of a constant form of interaction be-
tween organism and environment is not confined to the individual
organism. It is manifested also, in the reproduction of similar or-
ganisms. The stone is presumably indifferent as to how it reacts
mechanically and chemically (within the limits of its potentialities)
to other things. The stone may lose its individuality but basic
mechanical and chemical processes go on uninterruptedly. As long
as life continues, its processes are such as continuously "to maintain
and restore the enduring relationship which is characteristic of the
life-activities of a given organism.
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 27
Each particular activity prepares the way for the activity that
follows. These form not a mere succession but a series. This
seriated quality of life activities is effected through the delicate
balance of the complex factors in each particular activity. When
the balance within a given activity is disturbed — when there is a
proportionate excess or deficit in some factor — then there is ex-
hibited need, search and fulfilment (or satisfaction) in the ob-
jective meaning of those terms. The greater the differentiation of
structures and their corresponding activities becomes, the more
difficult it is to keep the balance. Indeed, living may be regarded
as a continual rhythm of dis equilibrations and recoveries of equi-
librium. The "higher" the organism, the more serious become
the disturbances and the more energetic (and often more pro-
longed) are the efforts necessary for its reestablishment. The state
of disturbed equilibration constitutes need. The movement to-
wards its restoration is search and exploration. The recovery is
fulfilment or satisfaction.
Hunger, for example, is a manifestation of a state of imbalance
between organic and environmental factors in that integration
which is life. This disturbance is a consequence of lack of full
responsive adaptation to one another of various organic functions.
The function of digestion fails to meet the demands made upon it
directly by the circulatory system which carries replenishing nutri-
tive material to all the organs concerned in the performance of
other functions, and the demands indirectly made by motor ac-
tivities. A state of tension is set up which is an actual state (not
mere feeling) of organic uneasiness and restlessness. This state of
tension (which defines need) passes into search for material that
will restore the condition of balance. In the lower organisms it
is expressed in the bulgings and retractions of parts of the organ-
ism's periphery so that nutritive material is ingested. The matter
ingested initiates activities throughout the rest of the animal that
lead to a restoration of balance, which, as the outcome of the state
of previous tension, is fulfilment.
Rignano, in an instructive discussion of the biological basis of
thinking, says that every organism strives to stay in a stationary
state. He gives evidence from the activity of lower organisms
which shows that activities occurring when their state is disturbed
28 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF 1NQUIRV
are such as tend to restore the former stationary condition. 1 He
also states that "a prior physiological state cannot be perfectly re-
established and made to persist in normal activity until an animal
by its movements has succeeded in getting again into an environ-
ment identical with its old one." His position may be interpreted
so that what is said in this text is in agreement with it. But as his
treatment stands, it emphasizes restoration of the previous state of
the organism rather than the institution of an integrated relation.
The establishment of the latter relation is compatible with definite
changes in both the organism and the environment; it does not re-
quire that old and new states of either the organism or the en-
vironments be identical with one another. Hence the difference in
the two views is of considerable theoretical importance.
If we take as an example the search for food found in connec-
tion with the higher organisms, it appears clear that the very search
often leads the organism into an environment that differs from the
old one, and that the appropriation of food under new conditions
involves a modified state of the organism. The for?// of the rela-
tionship, of the interaction, is reinstated, not the identical condi-
tions. Unless this fact is recognized, development becomes
abnormal or at least unusual matter rather than a normal feature of
life activities. Need remains a constant factor but it changes its
quality. With change in need comes a change in exploratory
and searching activities; and that change is followed by a changed
fulfilment or satisfaction. The conservative tendency is doubtless
strong; there is a tendency to get back. But in at least the more
complex organisms, the activity of search involves modification of
the old environment, if only by a change in the connection of the
organism with it. Ability to make and retain a changed mode of
adaptation in response to new conditions is the source of that more
extensive development called organic evolution. Of human or-
ganisms it is especially true that activities carried on for satisfying
needs so change the environment that new needs arise which de-
mand still further change in the activities of the organism by which
they are satisfied; and so on in a potentially endless chain.
In the lower organisms, interaction between organic and cn-
x The Psychology of Reasoning, English translation, p. 6, p. 11 and p. 31.
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 29
viron-energies takes place for the most part through direct contact.
The tension in the organism is that between its surface and its in-
terior. In the organisms that have distance receptors and special
organs of locomotion, the serial nature of life behavior demands
that earlier acts in the series be such as to prepare the way for the
later. The time between the occurrence of need and the occur-
rence of its satisfaction inevitably becomes longer when the inter-
action is not one of direct contact. For the attainment of an
integral relation is then dependent upon establishing connections
with the things at a distance which arouse exploratory activity
through stimulation of eye and ear. A definite order of initial, of
intermediate, and of final or closing activities, is thus instituted.
The terminus ab quo is fixed by such a condition of imbalance in
the organism that integration of organic factors cannot be attained
by any material with which the organism is in direct contact. Cer-
tain of its activities tend in one direction; others move in a differ-
ent direction. More particularly, its existing contact-activities and
those aroused by its distance-receptors, are at odds with each other,
and the outcome of this tension is that the latter activities domi-
nate. A satiated animal is not stirred by the sight or smell of the
prey that moves him when he is hungry. In the hungry creature
activities of search become a definite intervening or intermediate
series. At each intermediate stage there is still tension between
contact activities and those responsive to stimuli through distance-
receptors. Movement continues until integration is established be-
tween contact and visual and motor activities, as in the consum-
matory act of devouring food.
What has been said describes a difference between modes of
environing-organical interactions to which the names excitation-
reaction and stimulus-response may be applied. An animal at rest
is moved to sniff, say, by a sensory excitation. If this special rela-
tion is isolated and complete in itself, or is taken to be such, there
is simply excitation-reaction, as when a person jumps but does
nothing else when he hears a sudden noise. The excitation is
specific and so is the reaction. Now suppose an excitation comes
from a remote object through a distance-receptor, as, the eye.
There is also excitation-reaction. But if the animal is aroused to
an act of pursuit the situation is quite different. The particular
30 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
sensory excitation occurs, but it is coordinated with a larger num-
ber of other organic processes— those of its digestive and circula-
tory organs and its neuro-muscular system, autonomic, proprio-
ceptor and central. This coordination, which is a state of the total
organism, constitutes a stimulus. The difference between this con-
dition (whatever name it be called by) and a specific sensory
excitation, is enormous. The pursuit of prey is a response to the
total state of the organism, not to a particular sensory excitation.
Indeed, the distinction between what has been called stimulus and
response is made only by analytic reflection. The so-called stimu-
lus, being the total state of the organism, moves of itself, because
of the tensions contained, into those activities of pursuit which are
called the response. The stimulus is simply the earlier part of the
total coordinated serial behavior and the response the later part.
The principle involved in the distinction just drawn is more im-
portant than it may seem to be at first sight. If it is ignored, the
sequential character of behavior is lost from view. Behavior then
becomes simply a succession of isolated and independent units of
excitation-reaction, which would be comparable, say, to a succes-
sion of muscular twitches due to a disordered nervous mechanism.
When the stimulus is recognized to be the tension in the total
organic activity (ultimately reducible to that between contact
activities and those occasioned through distance-receptors), it is
seen that the stimulus in its relationship to special activities persists
throughout the entire pursuit, although it changes its actual content
at each stage of the chase. As the animal runs, specific sensory
excitations, those of contact and those that are olfactory and visual,
alter with every change of position; with every change in the char-
acter of the ground; with changing objects (like bushes and rocks)
that progressively intervene; and they also change in intensity with
every change in distance from the hunted object.
The changing excitations are, however, integrated into a single
stimulus by the total state of the organism. The theory that
identifies stimuli with a succession of specific sensory excitations,
cannot possibly account for such unified and continuous responses
as hunting and stalking prey. On that theory the animal would
have to make at each stage a new and isolated "response" (reac-
tion) to everything that came across his path. He would be re-
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 31
acting to stones, bushes and to changes in the levels and character
of the ground in so many independent acts that there would be
no continuity of behavior. He would forget, as we say, what he
was after in the multitude of separate reactions he would have to
make to independent excitations. Because behavior is in fact a
function of the total state of the organism in relation to environ-
ment, stimuli are functionally constant in spite of changes in
specific content. Because of this fact, behavior is sequential, one
act growing out of another and leading cumulatively to a further
act until the consummatory fully integrated activity occurs.
Because organic behavior is what it is, and not a succession and
compounding of independent discrete reflex-arc units, it has direc-
tion and cumulative force. There are special acts, like winking or
the knee-jerk, that exemplify the isolated reflex-arc that is some-
times supposed to be the unit which, through compounding, con-
stitutes behavior. But there is no evidence that such acts have
played any role in development. On the contrary, the available
evidence shows that they are end-points of highly specialized lines
of development, or else are coincident by-products of the behavior
of structures that have arisen developmentally.
What exists in normal behavior-development is thus a circuit of
which the earlier or "open" phase is the tension of various ele-
ments of organic energy, while the final and "closed" phase is the
institution of integrated interaction of organism and environment.
This integration is represented upon the organic side by equilibra-
tion of organic energies, and upon the environmental side by the
existence of satisfying conditions. In the behavior of higher or-
ganisms, the close of the circuit is not identical with the state out of
which disequilibration and tension emerged. A certain modifica-
tion of environment has also occurred, though it may be only a
change in the conditions which future behavior must meet. On
the other hand, there is change in the organic structures that con-
ditions further behavior. This modification constitutes what is
termed habit.
Habits are the basis of organic learning. According to the
theory of independent successive units of excitation-reaction, habit-
formation can mean only the increasing fixation of certain ways
32 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
of behavior through repetition, and an attendant weakening of
other behavioral activities. 2
Developmental behavior shows, on the other hand, that in the
higher organisms excitations are so diffusely linked with reactions
that the sequel is affected by the state of the organism in relation
to environment. In habit and learning the linkage is tightened up
not by sheer repetition but by the institution of effective integrated
interaction of organic-environing energies — the consummatory
close of activities of exploration and search. In organisms of the
higher order, the special and more definite pattern of recurrent
behavior thus formed does not become completely rigid. It enters
as a factorial agency, along with other patterns, in a total adaptive
response, and hence retains a certain amount of flexible capacity
to undergo further modifications as the organism meets new en-
vironing conditions.
There is, for example, reciprocal excitation between hand and
eye activity; a movement of the hand is aroused by visual activity,
then the movement of the hand is followed by a change in visual
activity, and so on. Here is a definite recurring pattern of action.
If the hand never did but one thing, say reach, then this habit-
pattern might become rigidly set. But the hand also grabs, pushes,
draws and manipulates. Visual behavior has to be responsive to
the performance of a great variety of manual activities. It thus
maintains flexibility and readaptability; the connection between
hand and eye does not become a rigid bond.
The view that habits are formed by sheer repetition puts the
cart before the horse. Ability to repeat is a result of a formation
of a habit through the organic redispositions effected by attainment
of a consummatory close. This modification is equivalent to giv-
ing some definite direction of future actions. As far as environing
conditions remain much the same, the resulting act will look like
a repetition of a previously performed act. But even then repeti-
tion will not be exact as far as conditions differ. Sheer repetition
2 The effect of terminal success or consummatory satisfaction in determining
habit has always been a stumbling-block to those who hold that there are ele-
mentary excitation-reaction "bonds." But this effect is just what should he
expected on the ground of the view expounded in the text, since it is an expres-
sion of the fact that the stimulus-response relation is a function of the state of the
organism as a whole.
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 33
is, in the case of the human organism, the product of conditions
that are uniform because they have been made so mechanically —
as in much school and factory "work." Such habits are limited
in their manifestation to the rather artificial conditions in which
they operate. They certainly do not provide the model upon
which a theory of habit formation and operation should be framed.
From the foregoing considerations certain general conclusions
follow as to the nature of the pattern of inquiry as a development
out of certain aspects of the pattern of life-activities. 3
1. Environmental conditions and energies are inherent in inquiry
as a special mode of organic behavior. Any account of inquiry
that supposes the factors involved in it, say, doubt, belief, observed
qualities and ideas, to be referable to an isolated organism (subject,
self, mind) is bound to destroy all ties between inquiry as reflective
thought and as scientific method. Such isolation logically entails
a view of inquiry which renders absurd the idea that there is a
necessary connection between inquiry and logical theory. But the
absurdity rests upon the acceptance of an unexamined premise
which is the product of a local "subjectivistic" phase of European
philosophy. If what is designated by such terms as doubt, belief,
idea, conception, is to have any objective meaning, to say nothing
of public verifiability, it must be located and described as behavior
in which organism and environment act together, or inter-act.
The earlier discussion set out with the familiar common sense
distinction of organism and environment, and went on to speak of
their interaction. Unfortunately, however, a special philosophical
interpretation may be unconsciously read into the common sense
distinction. It will then be supposed that organism and environ-
ment are "given" as independent things and interaction is a third
independent thing which finally intervenes. In fact, the distinc-
tion is a practical and temporal one, arising out of the state of
tension in which the organism at a given time, in a given phase of
life-activity, is set over against the environment as it then and there
exists. There is, of course, a natural world that exists independ-
ently of the organism, but this world is environment only as it
enters directly and indirectly into life-functions. The organism is
3 The more specific points of connection are taken up in Ch. VI.
34 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only
in active connections with its environment.
Integration is more fundamental than is the distinction designated
by interaction of organism and environment. The latter is indica-
tive of a partial disintegration of a prior integration, but one which
is of such a dynamic nature that it moves (as long as life continues)
toward redintegration.
2. The structure and course of life-behavior has a definite pat-
tern, spatial and temporal. This pattern definitely foreshadows
the general pattern of inquiry. For inquiry grows out of an earlier
state of settled adjustment, which, because of disturbance, is inde-
terminate or problematic (corresponding to the first phase of
tensional activity), and then passes into inquiry proper, (corre-
sponding to the searching and exploring activities of an organism) ;
when the search is successful, belief or assertion is the counterpart,
upon this level, of redintegration upon the organic level.
A detailed account of the pattern of inquiry is given in Chapter
VI. But the following considerations flow so directly from the
pattern of life-behavior that they should be noted here:
a. There is no inquiry that does not involve the making of some
change in environing conditions. This fact is exemplified in the
indispensable place of experiment in inquiry, since experimentation
is deliberate modification of prior conditions. Kvcn in the p re-
scientific stage, an individual moves head, eyes, often the entire
body, in order to determine the conditions to be taken account of
in forming a judgment; such movements effect a change in en-
vironmental relations. Active pressure by touch, the acts of push-
ing, pulling, pounding and manipulating to find out what things
"are like" is an even more overt approach to scientific experimenta-
tion.
b. The pattern is serial or sequential. It has already been noted
that this trait of life-behavior becomes more marked with the
emergence of distance-receptors and of the neural apparatus neces-
sary for coordinating their excitation with contact-receptors and
with the muscular, circulatory and respiratory mechanisms which
are involved in behavior. In the human organism, organic reten-
tion (or habit-patterns) give rise to recollection. Goals or conse-
quences that are even more remote in time and space are then set
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 35
up and the intervening process of search becomes more seriated
in temporal span and in connecting links than in the case of the
simple presence of distance-stimuli. Formation of an end-in-view,
or consequence to be brought about, is conditioned by recollec-
tion; it requires making plans in conjunction with selection and
ordering of the consecutive means by which the plan may become
an actuality.
c. The serially connected processes and operations by means of
which a consummatory close is brought into being are, by descrip-
tion, intermediate and instrumental. This distinctive characteristic
prefigures, on the biological level, the interpretation that must be
given, upon the level of inquiry, to operations of inference and
discourse in their relation to final judgment as the consummation
of inquiry.
d. The basic importance of the serial relation in logic is rooted
in the conditions of life itself. Modification of both organic and
environmental energies is involved in life-activity. This organic
fact foreshadows learning and discovery, with the consequent out-
growth of new needs and new problematic situations. Inquiry, in
settling the disturbed relation of organism-environment (which
defines doubt) does not merely remove doubt by recurrence to a
prior adaptive integration. It institutes new environing conditions
that occasion new problems. What the organism learns during
this process produces new powers that make new demands upon
the environment. In short, as special problems are resolved, new
ones tend to emerge. There is no such thing as a final settlement,
because every settlement introduces the conditions of some degree
of a new unsettling. In the stage of development marked by the
emergence of science, deliberate institution of problems becomes
an objective of inquiry. Philosophy, in case it has not lost touch
with science, may play an important role in determining formula-
tion of these problems and in suggesting hypothetical solutions.
But the moment philosophy supposes it can find a final and com-
prehensive solution, it ceases to be inquiry and becomes either
apologetics or propaganda.
e. From the postulate of naturalistic continuity, with its prime
corollary that inquiry is a development out of organic-environ-
mental integration and interaction, something follows regarding
36 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
the relation of psychology and logic. The negative side of this
conclusion has already been suggested. The assumptions of ik tnen-
talistic" psychology have no place in logical theory. The divorce
between logic and scientific methodology, discussed in the previous
chapter, has its basis largely in the belief that since inquiry involves
doubt, suggestion, observation, conjecture, sagacious discernment,
etc., and since it is assumed that all these things are "mentalistic,"
there is a gulf between inquiry (or reflective thinking) and lo^ic.
Given the assumption, the conclusion is just. But the recognition
of the natural continuity of inquiry with organic behavior — the fact
that it is a developed mode of such behavior — destroys the assump-
tion. The student of intellectual history is aware of how the new
scientific standpoint of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
succeeded in setting up a gulf between the mcnral and the physical.
The former was supposed to constitute a domain of existence of
psychical "stuff" marked by processes totally unlike those of the
external world which confronted "mind." The older Greek con-
ception that the difference was one in the type of organization of
common materials and processes, was lost from view. Psychology
and epistemology accepted complete dualism, the "bifurcation"
of nature, and the theory of thought and ideas was wrought into
conformity with the dualistic assumption.
On the positive side, psychology is itself a special branch of in-
quiry. In general, it bears the same relation to the theory of logical
inquiry that is sustained by physics or chemistry. Bur as It is
more directly concerned with the focal center of initiation and
execution of inquiry than are these other sciences, it may, if em-
ployed as servant and not as master of logic, make a contribution
to logical theory which they cannot make". Personally, as has just
been said, I doubt the existence of anything "mental" in the doc-
trinal sense alleged. But it is not necessary to go into that question,
for, as was stated, if there is anything of this kind it is irrelevant to
.the theory of inquiry. Moreover, any investigation into it must
itself be an inquiry that satisfies the logical conditions of all inquiry.
Nevertheless, whatever throws any light upon the organic condi-
tions and processes that are involved in the occurrence and conduct
of inquiry (as a sound biological psychology cannot fail to do) can
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 37
hardly fail to make valuable contributions to the results of inquiry
into inquiry.
The points that have been made may be gathered together by
consideration of the current meaning of "experience," especially
in connection with the intensified ambiguity, due to historical
changes, that is attached to "empirical." Experience has a favor-
able or honorific use, as when it is said that a certain conclusion or
theory is experientially verified, and is thereby marked off from a
wild fancy, a happy guess and from a merely theoretical construc-
tion. On the other hand, because of the influence of psychological
epistemology of a subjective, private type, "experience" has been
limited to conscious states and processes. The contrast of the two
meanings is radical. When it is said that certain conclusions are
experientially or empirically confirmed, a scientist means anything
but that they rest upon mental and personal states of mind. Again,
the word "empirical" is often set in opposition to the rational, and
this opposition adds to the confusion. The early meaning of "em-
pirical" limited the application of the word to conclusions that
rest upon an accumulation of past experiences to exclusion of in-
sight into principles.
Thus a medical practitioner may have skill in recognizing the
symptoms of disease and skill in their treatment because of re-
peated past observations and customary modes of treatment, with-
out understanding the etiology of disease and the reasons for the
kind of treatment employed. The same thing holds of the skills
of many mechanics and artisans. "Empirical" in this sense de-
scribes an actual fact and is justly distinguished from "rational"
activity, meaning, by that word, conduct grounded in understand-
ing of principles. But it is evident that when a scientific conclusion
is said to be empirically established, no such exclusion of rationality
or reasoning is intended or involved. On the contrary, every
conclusion scientifically reached as to matters of fact involves rea-
soning with and from principles, usually mathematically expressed.
To say, then, that it is empirically established is to say the op-
posite of what is said when "empirical" means only observations and
habitual response to what is observed. The conversion of a justi-
fiable distinction between empirical as defined in terms of the
knowledge and action of artisans and rational as defined in terms
38 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
of scientific understanding, into something absolute which sets
every mode of experience in opposition to reason and the rational,
depends accordingly, upon an arbitrary preconception as to what
experience and its limits must be. Unfortunately, this arbitrary
limitation still operates, as in many interpretations of the distinction
between, say, temporal and eternal objects, perception and concep-
tion, and, more generally, matter and form.
It may be added that the honorific use of "experience" when it
first appeared was undoubtedly overweighted upon the side of
observation, as in the case of Bacon and Locke. This overweight
is readily accounted for as a historic occurrence. For the classic
tradition had degenerated into a form in which it was supposed that
beliefs about matters of fact could and should be reached by rea-
soning alone; save as they were established by authority. Opposi-
tion to this extreme view evoked an equally one-sided notion that
mere sense-perception could satisfactorily determine beliefs about
matters of fact. It led in Bacon, as later in Mill, to a neglect of
the role of mathematics in scientific inquiry, and in Locke to a
pretty sharp division between knowledge of matters of fact and
of relations between ideas. The latter, moreover, rested finally
according to him upon sheer observation, "internal" or "external."
The final outcome was a doctrine that reduced "experience" to
"sensations" as the constituents of all observation, and "thought"
to external associations among these elements, both sensations and
associations being supposed to be merely mental or psychical.
The problem of the relation between material that is observed
and subject-matter that is conceived or thought of is a real one,
especially in respect to its logical equivalents. But the solution of
the problem should not be compromised at the outset by a state-
ment of it in terms of a fixed and absolute distinction between the
experiential and the rational. Such a statement implies that there
is no logical problem, but a separation absolutely and immediately
given. Justification cannot be given at this stage of the discussion
for the belief that, in a proper conception of experience, inference,
reasoning and conceptual structures are as experiential as is observa-
tion, and that the fixed separation between the former and the
latter has no warrant beyond an episode in the history of culture.
Upon the basis of the naturalistic position here taken, there is a
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 39
problem, which takes the following form: How does it come
about that the development of organic behavior into controlled
inquiry brings about the differentiation and cooperation of ob-
servational and conceptual operations?
The discussion of language and linguistic symbols in the follow-
ing chapter lays the basis for an answer. But it must be repeated
that adherence to a tradition that was formed before modern
scientific inquiry (including the biological) had arisen or been
subjected to independent analysis, should not be permitted to con-
vert a problem that holds for all schools alike, into an alleged
ready-made solution. For such a solution prevents the problem
from being seen as a problem. Finally, while the position here
taken implies that logic is empirical in that its subject-matter con-
sists of inquiries that are publicly accessible and open to observa-
tion, it is not empirical in the sense in which Mill, for example,
developed the ideas of Locke and Hume. It is experiential in the
same way in which the subject-matter and conclusions of any nat-
ural science are empirical: experiential in the way any natural
science is experiential, that is, as distinct from the merely specula-
tive and from the a priori and intuitional.
I close with a reference to a predicament in which both organic
behavior and deliberate inquiry are caught. There always exists a
discrepancy between means that are employed and consequences
that ensue; sometimes this discrepancy is so serious that its re-
sult is what we call mistake and error. The discrepancy exists
because the means used, the organs and habits of biological be-
havior and the organs and conceptions employed in deliberate
inquiry, must be present and actual, while consequences to be at-
tained are future. Present actual means are the result of past con-
ditions and past activities. They operate successfully, or "rightly,"
in ( 1 ) the degree in which existing environing conditions are very
similar to those which contributed in the past to formation of the
habits, and (2) in the degree in which habits retain enough flexibil-
ity to readapt themselves easily to new conditions. The latter
condition is not readily fulfilled by lower organisms; when it is
fulfilled a case of "evolution" occurs. The potential conditions
for its fulfilment are present in the activities of human beings in
much larger measure. But the inertial phase of habit is strong, and,
40 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
so far as it is yielded to, human beings continue to live upon a
relatively animal plane. Even the history of science has been
marked by epochs in which observation and reflection have oper-
ated only within a predetermined conceptual framework — an ex-
ample of the inertia-phase of habit. That the only way to avoid
and avert the mistakes of this fixation is by recognition of the
provisional and conditional nature (as respects any inquiry in
process) of the facts that enter into it, and the hypothetical nature
of the conceptions and theories employed, is a relatively late dis-
covery. The meaning of the discovery has hardly penetrated yet
into inquiry about the subjects of the greatest practical importance
to man, religion, politics and morals.
The recognition of what Peirce called "fallibilism" in distinction
from "infallibilism" is something more than a prudential maxim.
It results of necessity from the possibility and probability of a dis-
crepancy between means available for use and consequences that
follow; between past and future conditions, not from mere weak-
ness of mortal powers. Because we live in a world in process, the
future, although continuous with the past, is not its bare repetition.
The principle applies with peculiar force to inquiry about inquiry,
including, needless to say, the inquiry presented in this treatise.
The very words which must be used are words that have had their
meanings fixed in the past to express ideas that arc unlike those
which they must now convey if they are to express what is in-
tended. To those who are naturalistically inclined, the attendant
"fallibility" will be but a spur to do better the work which this
volume attempts to do. The present volume is an approach not
a closed treatise. The aim it hopes to fulfil is that of being a
sufficiently coherent and systematic approach to move others to
undertake the long cooperative work (never-ending in any case as
long as inquiry continues) needed to test and fill inthe framework
which is outlined in this book.
The important matter is that those who reject the doctrine of the
intervention of some supernatural agency should not be led, by the
fact that it is not customary to introduce biological considerations
into the discussion of logical theory, to dismiss the chapter as ir-
relevant. Those who believe in such intervention have ground
for belief in an a priori Reason upon which logical f onus and prin-
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 41
ciples depend; they are precommitted to belief in the irrelevancy of
all considerations of the order of those here presented. But any
thoroughgoing naturalist is equally committed by the logic of his
position to belief in continuity of development, with its corrollary
of community of factors in the respective patterns of logical and
biological forms and procedures.
CHAPTER III
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY
CULTURAL
^he environment in which human beings live, act and in-
quire, is not simply physical. It is cultural as well. Prob-
lems which induce inquiry grow out of the relations of
fellow beings to one another, and the organs for dealing with
these relations are not only the eye and ear, but the meanings
which have developed in the course of living, together with the
ways of forming and transmitting culture with all its constituents
of tools, arts, institutions, traditions and customary beliefs.
I. To a very large extent the ways in which human beings re-
spond even to physical conditions are influenced by their cultural
environment. Light and fire are physical facts. But the occasions
in which a human being responds to things as merely physical in
purely physical ways are comparatively rare. Such occasions arc
the act of jumping when a sudden noise is heard, withdrawing the
hand when something hot is touched, blinking in the presence of
a sudden increase of light, animal-like basking in sunshine, etc.
Such reactions are on the biological plane. But the typical cases
of human behavior are not represented by such examples. The
use of sound in speech and listening to speech, making and en-
joying music; the kindling and tending of fire to cook and to keep
warm; the production of light to carry on and regulate occupa-
tions and social enjoyments: — these things are representative of
distinctively human activity.
To indicate the full scope of cultural determination of the con-
duct of living one would have to follow the behavior of an in-
dividual throughout at least a day; whether that of a day laborer,
of a professional man, artist or scientist, and whether the individual
be a growing child or a parent. For the result would show how
thoroughly saturated behavior is with conditions and factors that
42
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 43
are of cultural origin and import. Of distinctively human be-
havior it may be said that the strictly physical environment is so
incorporated in a cultural environment that our interactions with
the former, the problems that arise with reference to it, and our
ways of dealing with these problems, are profoundly affected by
incorporation of the physical environment in the cultural.
Man, as Aristotle remarked, is a social animal. This fact intro-
duces him into situations and originates problems and ways of
solving them that have no precedent upon the organic biological
level. For man is social in another sense than the bee and ant,
since his activities are encompassed in an environment that is cul-
turally transmitted, so that what man does and how he acts, is de-
termined not by organic structure and physical heredity alone but
by the influence of cultural heredity, embedded in traditions, in-
stitutions, customs and the purposes and beliefs they both carry
and inspire. Even the neuro-muscular structures of individuals
are modified through the influence of the cultural environment
upon the activities performed. The acquisition and understanding
of language with proficiency in the arts (that are foreign to other
animals than men) represent an incorporation within the physical
structure of human beings of the effects of cultural conditions, an
interpenetration so profound that resulting activities are as direct
and seemingly "natural" as are the first reactions of an infant. To
speak, to read, to exercise any art, industrial, fine or political, are
instances of modifications wrought within the biological organism
by the cultural environment.
This modification of organic behavior in and by the cultural en-
vironment accounts for, or rather is, the transformation of purely
organic behavior into behavior marked by intellectual properties
with which the present discussion is concerned. Intellectual opera-
tions are foreshadowed in behavior of the biological kind, and the
latter prepares the way for the former. But to foreshadow is not
to exemplify and to prepare is not to fulfil. Any theory that
rests upon a naturalistic postulate must face the problem of the
extraordinary differences that mark off the activities and achieve-
ments of human beings from those of other biological forms. It
is these differences that have led to the idea that man is completely
separated from other animals by properties that come from a non-
44 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY __
natural source. The conception to be developed in the present
chapter is that the development of language (in its widest sense)
out of prior biological activities is, in its connection with wider cul-
tural forces, the key to this transformation. The problem, so
viewed, is not the problem of the transition of organic behavior
into something wholly discontinuous with it— as is the case when,
for example, Reason, Intuition and the A priori are appealed to for
explanation of the difference. It is a special form of the general
problem of continuity of change and the emergence of new modes
of activity — the problem of development at any level.
Viewing the problem from this angle, its constituents may be
reduced to certain heads, three of which will be noted. Organic
behavior is centered in particular organisms. This statement
applies to inferring and reasoning as existential activities. But if in-
ferences made and conclusions reached are to be valid, the subject-
matter dealt with and the operations employed must be such as to
yield identical results for all who infer and reason. If the same
evidence leads different persons to different conclusions, then either
the evidence is only speciously the same, or one conclusion (or
both) is wrong. The special constitution of an individual organ-
ism which plays such a role in biological behavior is so irrelevant
in controlled inquiry that it has to be discounted and mastered.
Another phase of the problem is brought out bv the part played
in human judgments by emotion and desire. These personal traits
cook the evidence and determine the result that is reached. That
is, upon the level of organic factors (which are the actively
determining forces in the type of cases just mentioned), the in-
dividual with his individual peculiarities, whether native or ac-
quired, is an active participant in producing ideas and beliefs, and
yet the latter are logically grounded only when such peculiarities
are deliberately precluded from taking effect. This point restates
what was said in connection with the first point, but it indicates
another phase of the matter. If, using accepted terminology, wc
say that the first difference is that between the singular and the
general, the present point may be formulated as the difference be-
tween the subjective and the objective. To be intellectually "ob-
jective" is to discount and eliminate merely personal factors in the
operations by which a conclusion is reached.
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 45
Organic behavior is a strictly temporal affair. But when be-
havior is intellectually formulated, in respect both to general ways
of behavior and the special environing conditions in which they
operate, propositions result and the terms of a proposition do not
sustain a temporal relation to one another. It was a temporal
event when someone landed on Robinson Crusoe's island. It was
a temporal event when Crusoe found the footprint on the sands.
It was a temporal event when Crusoe inferred the presence of a
possibly dangerous stranger. But while the proposition was about
something temporal, the relation of the observed fact as evidential
to the inference drawn from it is non-temporal. The same holds
of every logical relation in and of propositions.
In the following discussion it is maintained that the solution of
the problem just stated in some of its phases, is intimately and
directly connected with cultural subject-matter. Transformation
from organic behavior to intellectual behavior, marked by logical
properties, is a product of the fact that individuals live in a cultural
environment. Such living compels them to assume in their be-
havior the standpoint of customs, beliefs, institutions, meanings and
beliefs which are at least relatively general and objective. 1
II. Language occupies a peculiarly significant place and exercises
a peculiarly significant function in the complex that forms the cul-
tural environment. It is itself a cultural institution, and, from one
point of view, is but one among many such institutions. But it is
( 1 ) the agency by which other institutions and acquired habits are
transmitted, and (2) it permeates both the forms and the contents
of all other cultural activities. Moreover, (3) it has its own dis-
tinctive structure which is capable of abstraction as a form. This
structure, when abstracted as a form, had a decisive influence his-
torically upon the formulation of logical theory; the symbols which
are appropriate to the form of language as an agency of inquiry
(as distinct from its original function as a medium of communica-
tion) are still peculiarly relevant to logical theory. Consequently,
further discussion will take the wider cultural environment for
granted and confine itself to the especial function of language in
effecting the transformation of the biological into the intellectual
and the potentially logical.
1 The non-temporal phase of propositions receives attention later.
46 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY^
In this further discussion, language is taken in its widest sense, a
sense wider than oral and written speech. It includes the latter.
But it includes also not only gestures but rites, ceremonies, monu-
ments and the products of industrial and fine arts. A tool or ma-
chine, for example, is not simply a simple or complex physical
object having its own physical properties and effects, but is also a
mode of language. For it says something, to those who understand
it, about operations of use and their consequences. To the mem-
bers of a primitive community a loom operated by steam or elec-
tricity says nothing. It is composed in a foreign language, and so
with most of the mechanical devices of modern civilization. In the
present cultural setting, these objects are so intimately hound up
with interests, occupations and purposes that they have an eloquent
voice.
The importance of language as the necessary, and, in the end,
sufficient condition of the existence and transmission of non-purely
organic activities and their consequences lies in the fact that, on
one side, it is a strictly biological mode of behavior, emerging in
natural continuity from earlier organic activities, while, on the
other hand, it compels one individual to take the standpoint of
other individuals and to see and inquire from a standpoint that is
not strictly personal but is common to them as participants or
"parties" in a conjoint undertaking. It ma}' be directed bv and to-
wards some physical existence. But it first has reference to some
other person or persons with whom it institutes communication —
the making of something common. 1 Icnec, to that extent its refer-
ence becomes general and "objective."
Language is made up of physical existences; sounds, or marks
on paper, or a temple, statue, or loom. But these do not operate
or function as mere physical things when they are media of com-
munication. They operate in virtue of their representative ca-
pacity or meaning. The particular physical existence which has
meaning is, in the case of speech, a conventional matter. But the
convention or common consent which sets it apart as a means of
recording and communicating meaning is that of agreement in
action; of shared modes of responsive behavior and participation
in their consequences. The physical sound or mark gets its mean-
ing in and by conjoint community of functional use, not by any
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 47
explicit convening in a "convention" or by passing resolutions that
a certain sound or mark shall have a specified meaning. Even
when the meaning of certain legal words is determined by a court,
it is not the agreement of the judges which is finally decisive.
For such assent does not finish the matter. It occurs for the sake
of determining future agreements in associated behavior, and it is
this subsequent behavior which finally settles the actual meaning
of the words in question. Agreement in the proposition arrived
at is significant only through this function in promoting agreement
in action.
The reason for mentioning these considerations is that they
prove that the meaning which a conventional symbol has is not
itself conventional. For the meaning is established by agreements
of different persons in existential activities having reference to
existential consequences. The particular existential sound or mark
that stands for dog or justice in different cultures is arbitrary or
conventional in the sense that although it has causes there are no
reasons for it. But in so far as it is a medium of communication,
its meaning is common, because it is constituted by existential con-
ditions. If a word varies in meaning in intercommunication be-
tween different cultural groups, then to that degree communica-
tion is blocked and misunderstanding results. Indeed, there ceases
to be communication until variations of understanding can be
translated, through the meaning of words, into a meaning that is
the same to both parties. Whenever communication is blocked
and yet is supposed to exist misunderstanding, not merely absence
of understanding, is the result. It is an error to suppose that the
misunderstanding is about the meaning of the 'word in isolation,
just as it is fallacious to suppose that because two persons accept
the same dictionary meaning of a word they have therefore come
to agreement and understanding. For agreement and disagree-
ment are determined by the consequences of conjoint activities.
Harmony or the opposite exists in the effects produced by the
several activities that are occasioned by the words used.
III. Reference to concord of consequences as the determinant
of the meaning of any sound used as a medium of communication
shows that there is no such thing as a mere word or mere symbol.
The physical existence that is the vehicle of meaning may as a
48 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY ^
particular be called mere; the recitation of a number of such
sounds or the stringing together of such marks may be called mere
language. But in fact there is no word in the first case and no
language in the second. The activities that occur and the conse-
quences that result which are not determined by meaning, are,
by description, only physical. A sound or mark of any physical
existence is a part of language only in virtue of its operational
force; that is, as it functions as a means of evoking different activi-
ties performed by different persons so as to produce consequences
that are shared by all the participants in the conjoint undertaking.
This fact is evident and direct in oral communication. It is in-
direct and disguised in written communication. Where written
literature and literacy abound, the conception of language is likely
to be framed upon their model. The intrinsic connection of lan-
guage with community of action is then forgotten. Language is
then supposed to be simply a means of expressing or communicat-
ing "thoughts" — a means of conveying ideas or meanings that are
complete in themselves apart from communal operational force.
Much literature is read, moreover, simply for enjoyment, for
esthetic purposes. In this case, language is a means of action only
as it leads the reader to build up pictures and scenes to be enjoyed
by himself. There ceases to be immediate inherent reference to
conjoint activity and to consequences mutually participated in.
Such is not the case, however, in reading to get at the meaning of
the author; that is, in reading that is emphatically intellectual in dis-
tinction from esthetic. In the mere reading of a scientific treatise
there is, indeed, no direct overt participation in action with an-
other to produce consequences that are common in the sense of
being immediately and personally shared. But there must be
imaginative construction of the materials and operations which led
the author to certain conclusions, and there must be agreement or
disagreement with his conclusions as a consequence of following
through conditions and operations that are imaginatively rein-
stated.
Connection with overt activities is in such a case indirect or
mediated. But so far as definite grounded agreement or disagree-
ment is reached, an attitude is formed which is a preparatory read-
iness to act in a responsive way when the conditions in question
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 49
or others similar to them actually present themselves. The con-
nection with action in question is, in other words, with possible
ways of operation rather than with those found to be actually and
immediately required. 2 But preparation for possible action in sit-
uations not as yet existent in actuality is an essential condition of,
and factor in, all intelligent behavior. When persons meet to-
gether in conference to plan in advance of actual occasions and
emergencies what shall later be done, or when an individual delib-
erates in advance regarding his possible behavior in a possible fu-
ture contingency, something occurs, but more directly, the same
sort as happens in understanding intellectually the meaning of a
scientific treatise.
I turn now to the positive implication of the fact that no sound,
mark, product of art, is a word or part of language in isolation.
Any word or phrase has the meaning which it has only as a mem-
ber of a constellation of related meanings. Words as representa-
tives are part of an inclusive code. The code may be public or
private. A public code is illustrated in any language that is cur-
rent in a given cultural group. A private code is one agreed upon
by members of special groups so as to be unintelligible to those
who have not been initiated. Between these two come argots of
special groups in a community, and the technical codes invented
for a restricted special purpose, like the one used by ships at sea.
But in every case, a particular word has its meaning only in rela-
tion to the code of which it is one constituent. The distinction
just drawn between meanings that are determined respectively in
fairly direct connection with action in situations that are present
or near at hand, and meanings determined for possible use in re-
mote and contingent situations, provides the basis upon which
language codes as systems may be differentiated into two main
kinds.
While all language or symbol-meanings are what they are as
parts of a system, it does not follow that they have been deter-
mined on the basis of their fitness to be such members of a system;
much less on the basis of their membership in a comprehensive
2 Literature and literary habits are a strong force in building up that conception
of separation of ideas and theories from practical activity which is discussed in
ensuing chapters.
50 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
system. The system may be simply the language in common
use. Its meanings hang together not in virtue of their examined
relationship to one another, but because they are current in the
same set of group habits and expectations. They hang together
because of group activities, group interests, customs and institu-
tions. Scientific language, on the other hand, is subject to a test
over and above this criterion. Each meaning that enters into the
language is expressly determined in its relation to other members
of the language system. In all reasoning or ordered discourse this
criterion takes precedence over that instituted by connection
with cultural habits.
The resulting difference in the two types of language-meanings
fundamentally fixes the difference between what is called com-
mon sense and what is called science. In the former cases, the
customs, the ethos and spirit of a group is the decisive factor in
determining the system of meanings in use. The system is one in
a practical and institutional sense rather than in an intellectual
sense. Meanings that are formed on this basis are sure to contain
much that is irrelevant and to exclude much that is required for
intelligent control of activity. The meanings arc coarse, and
many of them are inconsistent with each other from a logical
point of view. One meaning is appropriate to action under cer-
tain institutional group conditions; another, in some other situa-
tion, and there is no attempt to relate the different situations to
one another in a coherent scheme. In an intellectual sense, there
are many languages, though in a social sense there is but one. This
multiplicity of language-meaning constellations is also a mark of
our existing culture. A word means one thing in relation to a
religious institution, still another thing in business, a third thing
in law, and so on. This fact is the real Babel of communication.
There is an attempt now making to propagate the idea that educa-
tion which indoctrinates individuals into some special tradition
provides the way out of this confusion. Aside from the fact that
there are in fact a considerable number of traditions and that se-
lection of some one of them, even though that one be internally
consistent and extensively accepted, is arbitrary, the attempt re-
verses the theoretical state of the case. Genuine community of
language or symbols can be achieved only through efforts that
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 51
bring about community of activities under existing conditions.
The ideal of scientific-language is construction of a system in
which meanings are related to one another in inference and dis-
course and where the symbols are such as to indicate the relation.
I shall now introduce the word "symbol" giving it its significa-
tion as a synonym for a word as a word, that is, as a meaning car-
ried by language in a system, whether the system be of the loose
or the intellectual rigorous kind. 3 The especial point in the intro-
duction of the word "symbol" is to institute the means by which
discrimination between what is designated by it and what is now
often designated by sign may be instituted. What I have called
symbols are often called "artificial signs" in distinction from what
are called natural signs.
IV. It is by agreement in conjoint action of the kind already
described, that the word "smoke" stands in the English language
for an object of certain qualities. In some other language the
same vocable and mark may stand for something different, and
an entirely different sound stand for "smoke." To such cases of
representation the word "artificial signs" applies. When it is
said that smoke as an actual existence points to, is evidence of,
an existential fire, smoke is said to be a natural sign of fire. Simi-
larly, heavy clouds of given qualities are a natural sign of prob-
able rain, and so on. The representative capacity in question is
attributed to things in their connection with one another, not to
marks whose meaning depends upon agreement in social use.
There is no doubt of the existence and the importance of the
distinction designated by the words "natural" and "artificial" signs.
But the fundamentally important difference is not brought out by
these words. For reasons now to be given, I prefer to mark the
difference by confining the application of sign to so-called "natural
signs" — employing symbol to designate "artificial signs."
The difference just stated is actual. But it fails to note the dis-
tinctive intellectual property of what I call symbols. It is, so to
3 This signification is narrower than the popular usage, according to which any-
thing is a symbol that has representative emotional force even if that force be
independent of its intellectual representational force. In this wider sense, a national
flag, a crucifix, a mourning garb, etc., are symbols. The definition of the text is
in so far arbitrary. But there is nothing arbitrary about the subject-matters to
which the limited signification applies.
52 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
speak, an incidental and external fact, logically speaking, that
certain things are given representative function by social agree-
ment. The fact becomes logically relevant only because of the
possibility of free and independent development of meanings in
discourse which arises when once symbols are instituted. A "nat-
ural sign," by description, is something that exists in an acutal
spatial-temporal context. Smoke, as a thing having certain ob-
served qualities, is a sign of fire only when the thing exists and
is observed. Its representative capacity, taken by itself, is highly
restricted, for it exists only under limited conditions. The situa-
tion is very different when the meaning "smoke" is embodied in
an existence, like a sound or a mark on paper. The actual quality
found in existence is then subordinate to a representative office.
Not only can the sound be produced practically at will, so that
we do not have to wait for the occurrence of the object; but,
what is more important, the meaning when embodied in an indif-
ferent or neutral existence is liberated with respect to its represent-
ative function. It is no longer tied down. It can be related to
other meanings in the language-system; not only to that of fire but
to such apparently unrelated meanings as friction, changes of tem-
perature, oxygen, molecular constitution, and, by intervening
meaning-symbols, to the laws of thermodynamics.
I shall, accordingly, in what follows, connect sign and signifi-
cance ; symbol and meaning, respectively, with each other, in order
to have terms to designate two different kinds of representative ca-
pacity. Linguistically, the choice of terms is more or less arbi-
trary, although sign and significance have a common verbal root.
This consideration is of no importance, however, compared with
the necessity of having some words by which to designate the two
kinds of representative function. For purposes of theory the im-
portant consideration is that existent things, as signs, are evidence
of the existence of something else, this something being at the
time inferred rather than observed.
But words, or symbols, provide no evidence of any existence.
Yet what they lack in this capacity they make up for in creation
of another dimension. They make possible ordered discourse or
reasoning. For this may be carried on without any of the exist-
ences to which symbols apply being actually present: without, in-
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 53
deed, assurance that objects to which they apply anywhere actu-
ally exist, and, as in the case of mathematical discourse, without
direct reference to existence at all.
Ideas as ideas, hypotheses as hypotheses, would not exist were
it not for symbols and meanings as distinct from signs and signifi-
cances. The greater capacity of symbols for manipulation is of
practical importance. But it pales in comparison with the fact
that symbols introduce into inquiry a dimension different from
that of existence. Clouds of certain shapes, size and color may
signify to us the probability of rain; they portend rain. But the
word cloud when it is brought into connection with other words
of a symbol-constellation enable us to relate the meaning of being
a cloud with such different matters as differences of temperature
and pressures, the rotation of the earth, the laws of motion, and
so on.
The difference between sign-significance and symbol-meaning
(in the sense defined) is brought out in the following incident. 4
A visitor in a savage tribe wanted on one occasion "the word for
Table. There were five or six boys standing around, and tapping
the table with my forefinger I asked 'What is this?' One boy
said it was dodela, another that it was an etanda, a third stated
that it was bokali, & fourth that it was elamba y and the fifth said it
was meza? After congratulating himself on the richness of the
vocabulary of the language the visitor found later "that one boy
had thought he wanted the word for tapping; another understood
we were seeking the word for the material of which the table was
made; another had the idea that we required the word for hard-
ness; another thought we wished the name for that which covered
the table; and the last . . . gave us the word meza> table."
This story might have been quoted earlier as an illustration of
the fact that there is not possible any such thing as a direct one-
to-one correspondence of names with existential objects; that
words mean what they mean in connection with conjoint activi-
ties that effect a common, or mutually participated in, conse-
quence. The word sought for was involved in conjoint activities
looking to a common end. The act of tapping in the illustration
was isolated from any such situation. It was, in consequence,
4 Quoted by and from Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, p. 174.
54 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
wholly indeterminate in reference; it was no part of communica-
tion, by which alone acts get significance and accompanying
words acquire meaning. 5 For the point in hand, the anecdote il-
lustrates the lack of any evidential status in relation to existence of
the symbols or representative values that have been given the
name "meanings." Without the intervention of a specific kind
of existential operation they cannot indicate or discriminate the
objects to which they refer. Reasoning or ordered discourse,
which is defined by development of symbol-meanings in relation
to one another, may (and should) provide a basis for performing
these operations, but of itself it determines no existence. This
statement holds no matter how comprehensive the meaning-system
and no matter how rigorous and cogent the relations of meanings
to one another. On the other hand, the story illustrates how, in
case the right word had been discovered, the meaning symbolized
would have been capable of entering into relations with any
number of other meanings independently of the actual presence
at any given time of the object table. Just as the sign-significance
relation defines inference, so the relation of meanings that consti-
tutes propositions defines implication in discourse, if it satisfies the
intellectual conditions for which it is instituted. Unless there are
words which mark off the two kinds of relations in their distinc-
tive capacities and offices, with reference to existence, there is
danger that two things as logically unlike as inference and impli-
cation will be confused. As a matter of fact, the confusion, when
inference is treated as identical with implication, has been a power-
ful agency in creating the doctrinal conception that logic is purely
formal — for, as has been said, the relation of meanings (carried
by symbols) to one another is, as such, independent of existential
reference.
V. So far the word "relation" has been rather indiscriminately
employed. The discussion has now reached a point where it is
necessary to deal with the ambiguity of the word as it is used not
5 Another aspect of the same general principle, not directly connected with
language, is brought out later in consideration of the meaning of any demon-
strated object in relation to "this"
b A farther important logical aspect of this matter is dealt with below in the
necessity of distinguishing judgment from propositions, and Involvement from
implication.
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 55
merely in ordinary speech but in logical texts. The word "rela-
tion" is used to cover three very different matters which in the
interest of a coherent logical doctrine must be discriminated. (1)
Symbols are "related" directly to one another; (2) they are "re-
lated" to existence by the mediating intervention of existential
operations; (3) existences are "related" to one another in the evi-
dential sign-signified function. That these three modes of "rela-
tion" are different from one another and that the use of one and
the same word tends to cover up the difference and thereby create
doctrinal confusion, is evident.
In order to avoid, negatively, the disastrous doctrinal confusion
that arises from the ambiguity of the word relation, and in order
to possess, positively, linguistic means of making clear the logical
nature of the different subject-matters under discussion, I shall
reserve the word relation to designate the kind of "relation" which
symbol-meanings bear to one another as symbol-meanings. I shall
use the term reference to designate the kind of relation they sus-
tain to existence; and the words connection (and involvement) to
designate that kind of relation sustained by things to one another
in virtue of which inference is possible.
The differences, when once pointed out, should be so obvious
as hardly to require illustration. Consider, however, propositions
of mathematical physics. ( 1 ) As propositions they form a system
of related symbol-meanings that may be considered and devel-
oped as such. (2) But as propositions of physics, not of mere
mathematics, they have reference to existence; a reference which
is realized in operations of application. (3) The final test of valid
reference or applicability resides in the connections that exist
among things. Existential involvement of things with one another
alone warrants inference so as to enable further connections among
things themselves to be discovered.
The question may be raised whether meaning-relations in dis-
course arise before or after significance-connections in existence.
Did we first infer and then use the results to engage in discourse?
Or did relations of meanings, instituted in discourse, enable us to
detect the connections in things in virtue of which some things
are evidential of other things? The question is rhetorical in that
the question of historical priority cannot be settled. The question
56 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY _
is asked, however, in order to indicate that in any case ability to
treat things as signs would not go far did not symbols enable us
to mark and retain just the qualities of things which are the
ground of inference. Without, for example, words or symbols
that discriminate and hold on to the experienced qualities of sight
and smell that constitute a thing "smoke," thereby enabling it to
serve as a sign of fire, we might react to the qualities in question
in animal-like fashion and perform activities appropriate to them.
But no inference could be made that was not blind and blunder-
ing. Moreover, since what is inferred, namely fire, is not present
in observation, any anticipation that could be formed of it would
be vague and indefinite, even supposing an anticipation could
occur at all. If we compare and contrast the range and the depth
of the signifying capacity of existential objects and events in a
savage and a civilized group and the corresponding power of
inference, we find a close correlation between it and the scope and
the intimacy of the relations that obtain between symbol-meanings
in discourse. Upon the whole, then, it is language, originating as
a medium of communication in order to bring about deliberate co-
operation and competition in conjoint activities, that has conferred
upon existential things their signifying or evidential power.
VI. We are thus brought back to the original problem: namely,
transformation of animal activities into intelligent behavior having
the properties which, when formulated, are logical in nature. As-
sociated behavior is characteristic not only of plants and animals,
but of electrons, atoms and molecules; as far as we know of every-
thing that exists in nature. Language did not originate association,
but when it supervened, as a natural emergence from previous
forms of animal activity, it reacted to transform prior forms and
modes of associated behavior in such a way as to give experience
a new dimension.
1. "Culture" and all that culture involves, as distinguished from
"nature," is both a condition and a product of language. Since
language is the only means of retaining and transmitting to subse-
quent generations acquired skills, acquired information and ac-
quired habits, it is the latter. Since, however, meanings and the
significance of events differ in different cultural groups, it is also
the former.
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 57
2. Animal activities, such as eating and drinking, searching for
food, copulation, etc., acquire new properties. Eating food be-
comes a group festival and celebration; procuring food, the art of
agriculture and exchange; copulation passes into the institution of
the family.
3. Apart from the existence of symbol-meanings the results of
prior experience are retained only through strictly organic modi-
fications. Moreover, these modifications once made, tend to be-
come so fixed as to retard, if not to prevent, the occurrence of
further modifications. The existence of symbols makes possible
deliberate recollection and expectation, and thereby the institu-
tion of new combinations of selected elements of experiences hav-
ing an intellectual dimension.
4. Organic biological activities end in overt actions, whose con-
sequences are irretrievable. When an activity and its consequences
can be rehearsed by representation in symbolic terms, there is no
such final commitment. If the representation of the final con-
sequence is of unwelcome quality, overt activity may be fore-
gone, or the way of acting be replanned in such a way as to avoid
the undesired outcome. 7
These transformations and others which they suggest, are not
of themselves equivalent to accrual of logical properties to behav-
ior. But they provide requisite conditions for it. The use of
meaning-symbols for institution of purposes or ends-in-view, for
deliberation, as a rehearsal through such symbols of the activities by
which the ends may be brought into being, is at least a rudimentary
form of reasoning in connection with solution of problems. The
habit of reasoning once instituted is capable of indefinite develop-
ment on its own account. The ordered development of mean-
ings in their relations to one another may become an engrossing
interest. When this happens, implicit logical conditions are made
explicit and then logical theory of some sort is born. It may be
imperfect; it will be imperfect from the standpoint of the in-
quiries and symbol-meanings that later develop. But the first step,
the one that costs and counts, was taken when some one began to
7 Generalizing beyond the strict requirements of the position outlined, I would
say that I am not aware of any so-called merely "mental" activity or result that
cannot be described in the objective terms of an organic activity modified and
directed by symbols-meaning, or language, in its broad sense.
58 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY^
reflect upon language, upon logos, in its syntactical structure and
its wealth of meaning contents. Hypostization of Logos was the
first result, and it held back for centuries the development of in-
quiries of a kind that are competent to deal with the problems of
the existent world. But the hypostization was, nevertheless, a
tribute to the power of language to generate reasoning and,
through application of the meanings contained in it, to confer
fuller and more ordered significance upon existence.
In later chapters we shall consider in some detail how- a logic
of ordered discourse, a logic that gathered in a system the rela-
tions which hold meanings consistently together in discourse, was
taken to be the final model of logic and thereby obstructed the
development of effective modes of inquiry into existence, pre-
venting the necessary reconstruction and expansion of the very
meanings that were used in discourse. For when these meanings
in their ordered relations to one another were taken to be final in
and of themselves, they were directly superimposed upon nature.
The necessity of existential operations for application of mean-
ings to natural existence was ignored. This failure reacted into the
system of meanings as meanings. The result was the belief that
the requirements of rational discourse constitute the measure of
natural existence, the criterion of complete Being. It is true that
logic emerged as the Greeks became aware of language as LogOvS
with the attendant implication that a system of ordered meanings
is involved.
This perception marked an enormous advance. But it suffered
from two serious defects. Because of the superior status as-
signed to forms of rational discourse, they were isolated from
the operations by means of which meanings originate, function
and are tested. This isolation was equivalent to the hypostiza-
tion of Reason. In the second place, the meanings that w r ere
recognized were ordered in a gradation derived from and controlled
by a class-structure of Greek society. The means, procedures
and kinds of organization that arose from active or "practical"
participation in natural processes were given a low rank in the
hierarchy of Being and Knowing. The scheme of knowledge
and of Nature became, without conscious intent, a mirror of a
social order in which craftsmen, mechanics, artisans generally,
THE EXISTENTIAL MATRIX OF INQUIRY 59
held a low position in comparison with a leisure class. Citizens
as citizens were also occupied with doing, a doing instigated by
need or lack. While possessed of a freedom denied to the artisan
class, they were also taken to fail in completely self-contained and
self-sufficient activity. The latter was exemplified only in the
exercise of Pure Reason untainted by need for anything outside it-
self and hence independent of all operations of doing and making.
The historic result was to give philosophic, even supposedly onto-
logical, sanction to the cultural conditions which prevented the
utilization of the immense potentialities for attainment of knowl-
edge that were resident in the activities of the arts— resident in
them because they involve operations of active modification of exist-
ing conditions which contain the procedures constituting the ex-
perimental method when once they are employed for the sake of
obtaining knowledge, instead of being subordinated to a scheme
of uses and enjoyments controlled by given socio-cultural con-
ditions.
CHAPTER IV
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
-rj- -7-PON the biological level, organisms have to respond to
' ' ' conditions about them in ways that modify those condi-
u
tions and the relations of organisms to them so as to re-
store the reciprocal adaptation that is required for the maintenance
of life-functions. Human organisms are involved in the same sort
of predicament. Because of the effect of cultural conditions, the
problems involved not only have different contents but arc capable
of statement as problems so that inquiry can enter as a factor
in their resolution. For in a cultural environment, physical condi-
tions are modified by the complex of customs, traditions; occupa-
tions, interests and purposes which envelops them. .Modes of re-
sponse are correspondingly transformed. They avail themselves of
the significance which things have acquired, and of the meanings
provided by language. Obviously, rocks as minerals signify some-
thing more in a group that has learned to work iron than it signifies
either to sheep and tigers or to a pastoral or agricultural group.
The meanings of related symbols, which form the language of a
group, also, as was shown in the last chapter, introduce a new type
of attitudes and hence of modes of response. I shall designate the
environment in which human beings are directly involved the
common sense environment or "world," and inquiries that take
place in making the required adjustments in behavior common
sense inquiries.
As is brought out later, the problems that arise in such situations
of interaction may be reduced to problems of the use and enjoy-
ment of the objects, activities and products, material and ideologi-
cal, (or "ideal") of the world in which individuals live. Such
inquiries are, accordingly, different from those which have knowl-
edge as their goal. The attainment of knowledge of some things
is necessarily involved in common sense inquiries, but it occurs
60
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 61
for the sake of settlement of some issue of use and enjoyment,
and not, as in scientific inquiry, for its own sake. In the latter,
there is no direct involvement of human beings in the immediate
environment — a fact which carries with it the ground of distin-
guishing the theoretical from the practical.
The use of the term common sense is somewhat arbitrary from
a linguistic point of view. But the existence of the kinds of situa-
tions referred to and of the kind of inquiries that deal with the
difficulties and predicaments they present cannot be doubted.
They are those which continuously arise in the conduct of life
and the ordering of day-by-day behavior. They are such as con-
stantly arise in the development of the young as they learn to make
their way in the physical and social environments in which they
live; they occur and recur in the life-activity of every adult,
whether farmer, artisan, professional man, law-maker or adminis-
trator; citizen of a state, husband, wife, or parent. On their very
face they need to be discriminated from inquiries that are distinc-
tively scientific, or that aim at attaining confirmed facts, "laws"
and theories.
They need, accordingly, to be designated by some distinctive
word, and common sense is used for that purpose. Moreover, the
term is not wholly arbitrary even from the standpoint of linguis-
tic usage. In the Oxford Dictionary, for example, is found the
following definition of common sense: "Good sound practical
sense; combined tact and readiness in dealing with the ordinary
affairs of life." Common sense in this signification applies to be-
havior in its connection with the significance of things.
There is, clearly, a distinctively intellectual content involved;
good sense is, in ordinary language, good judgment. Sagacity is
power to discriminate the factors that are relevant and important
in significance in given situations; it is power of discernment; in
a proverbial phrase, ability to tell a hawk from a hernshaw, chalk
from cheese, and to bring the discriminations made to bear upon
what is to be done and what is to be abstained from, in the "ordi-
nary affairs of life." That which, in the opening paragraphs, was
called the mode of inquiry dealing with situations of use and en-
joyment, is, after all, but a formal way of saying what the dic-
tionary states in its definition of common sense.
62 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
There is, however, another dictionary definition: 'The general
sense, feeling, judgment of mankind or a community." It is in
this sense that we speak of the deliverances of common sense as
if they were a body of settled truths. It applies not to things in
their significance but to weaning* accepted. When the Scottish
school of Reid and Stewart erected "common sense" into an ulti-
mate authority and arbiter of philosophic questions, they were
carrying this signification to its limit. The reference to practical
sagacity in dealing with problems of response and adaptation in
use and enjoyment has now gone into the background. "Com-
mon" now means "general" It designates the conceptions and
beliefs that are currently accepted without question by a given
group or by mankind in general. They are common in the sense
of being widely, if not universally, accepted. They are sense, in
the way in which we speak of the "sense of a meeting" and in
which we say things do or do not "make sense." They have some-
thing of the same ultimacy and immediacy for a group that
"sensation" and "feeling" have for an individual in his contact
with surrounding objects. It is a commonplace that every cultural
group possesses a set of meanings which are so deeply embedded
in its customs, occupations, traditions and ways of interpreting
its physical environment and group-life, that they form the basic
categories of the language-system by which details are interpreted.
Hence they are regulative and "normative" of specific beliefs and
judgments.
There is a genuine difference between the two meanings of
common sense. But from the standpoint of a given group there
is a definite deposit of agreement. They are both of them con-
nected with the conduct of life in relation to an existing environ-
ment: one of them in judging the significance of things and events
with reference to what should be done; the other, in the ideas that
are used to direct and justify activities and judgments. Tabus
are, first, customary ways of activities. To us they arc mistaken
rather than sagacious ways of action. But the system of meanings
embodied in the language that carries tradition gives them authority
in such highly practical matters as the eating of food and the be-
havior that is proper in the presence of chieftains and members of
the family configuration, so that they control the relations of males
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 63
and females and persons of various kinship degrees. To us, such
conceptions and beliefs are highly impractical; to those who held
them they were matters of higher practical importance than were
special modes of behavior in dealing with particular objects. For
they set the standards for judging the latter and acting in reference
to them. It is possible today, along with our knowledge of the
enormous differences that characterize various cultures, to find
some unified deposit of activities and of meanings in the "common
sense and feeling of mankind" especially in matters of basic social
cohesion.
In any case, the difference between the two meanings may be
reduced, without doing violence to the facts, to the difference be-
tween phases and aspects of special practical situations that are
looked into, questioned and examined with reference to what
may or should be done at a particular time and place and the
rules and precepts that are taken for granted in reaching all con-
clusions and in all socially correct behavior. Both are concerned,
one directly and the other indirectly, with "the ordinary affairs
of life," in the broad sense of life.
I do not suppose that a generalization of the inquiries and con-
clusions of this type under the caption of "use and enjoyment"
needs much exposition for its support. Use and enjoyment are
the ways in which human beings are directly connected with the
world about them. Questions of food, shelter, protection, de-
fense, etc., are questions of the use to be made of materials of the
environment and of the attitudes to be taken practically towards
members of the same group and to other groups taken as wholes.
Use, in turn, is for the sake of some consummation or enjoyment.
Some things that are far beyond the scope of direct use, like stars
and dead ancestors, are objects of magical use, and of enjoyment in
rites and legends. If we include the correlative negative ideas of
disuse, of abstinence from use, and toleration and suffering, prob-
lems of use and enjoyment may be safely said to exhaust the do-
main of common sense inquiry.
There is direct connection between this fact and the concern
of common sense with the qualitative. It is by discernment of
qualities that the fitness and capacity of things and events for use
is decided; that proper foodstuffs, for example, are told or dis-
64 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
criminated from those that are unfit, poisonous or tabued. That
enjoyment-suffering is qualitative through and through and is con-
cerned with situations in their pervasive qualitative character, is
almost too obvious for mention. Furthermore, the operations and
responses that are engaged in use and enjoyment of situations are
qualitatively marked off. Tanning skins is a process qualitatively
different from that of weaving baskets or shaping clay into jars;
the rites that are responsive to death are qualitatively different
from those appropriate to birth and weddings. Inferiors, superiors
and equals are treated in modes of greeting and approach that are
qualitatively unlike.
The reason for calling attention to these commonplace facts is
that they bring out the basic difference between the subject-mat-
ters characteristic of common sense and of scientific inquiries; and
they also indicate the differences between the problems and pro-
cedures of inquiry that are characteristic of common sense in dif-
ferent stages of culture. I shall first consider the latter point
Common sense in respect to both its content of ideas and beliefs,
and its methods of procedure, is anything but a constant. Both
its content and its methods alter from time to time not merely in
detail but in general pattern. Every invention of a new tool and
utensil, every improvement in technique, makes some difference
in what is used and enjoyed and in the inquiries that arise with
reference to use and enjoyment, with respect to both significance
and meaning. Changes in the regulative scheme of relations within
a group, family, clan or nation, react even more intensively into
some older system of uses and enjoyments.
One has only to note the enormous differences in the contents
and methods of common sense in modes of life that are respectively
dominantly nomadic, agricultural and industrial. Much that was
once taken without question as a matter of common sense is for-
gotten or actively condemned. Other old conceptions and con-
victions continue to receive theoretical assent and strong emotional
attachment because of their prestige. But they have little hold
and application in the ordinary affairs of life. For example, ideas
and practices which, in primitive tribes, were interwoven with
practically every concern of ordinary affairs, are later relegated
to a separate domain, religious or esthetic.
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 65
The business of one age becomes the sport and amusement of
another age. Even scientific theories and interpretations continue
to be affected by conceptions that have ceased to be determinative
in the actual practice of inquiry. The special bearing of the fact
that "common sense" is anything but a constant upon logical for-
mulations, will concern us in the sequel. Here it is enough to call
attention to a point which will later receive detailed examination:
namely, the very fitness of the Aristotelian logical organon in
respect to the culture and common sense of a certain group in the
period in which it was formulated unfits it to be a logical formu-
lation of not only the science but even of the common sense of the
present cultural epoch.
I recur now to the bearing of the fact that common sense u>
quiries are concerned with qualitative matter and operations upon
their distinction from scientific inquiries. Fundamentally, the
distinction is that brought out in the previous chapter: Namely,
that between significances and meanings that are determined in
reference to pretty direct existential application and those that
are determined on the ground of their systematic relations of co-
herence and consistency with one another. All that the present
mode of statement adds is that, in the first case, "existential appli-
cation" means application in qualitative use and enjoyment of the
environment. On the other hand, both the history of science and
the present state of science prove that the goal of the systematic
relationship of facts and conceptions to one another is dependent
upon elimination of the qualitative as such and upon reduction to
non-qualitative formulation.
The problem of the relation of the domain of common sense to
that of science has notoriously taken the form of opposition of
the qualitative to the non-qualitative; largely, but not exclusively,
the quantitative. The difference has often been formulated as the
difference between perceptual material and a system of conceptual
constructions. In this form it has constituted, in recent centuries,
the chief theme of epistemology and metaphysics. From the
standpoint that controls the present discussion, the problem is not
epistemological (save as that word means the logical) nor is it
metaphysical or ontological. In saying that it is logical, it is
affirmed that the question at issue is that of the relation to each
68 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY _
event as such but only to determine what it signifies with respect
to the way in which the entire situation should be dealt with, the
opposition and conflict do not arise. The object or event in ques-
tion is perceived as part of the environing world, not in and by
itself; it is rightly (validly) perceived if and when it acts as clew
and guide in use-enjoyment. We live and act in connection with
the existing environment, not in connection with isolated objects,
even though a singular thing may be crucially significant in decid-
ing how to respond to total environment.
Recurring to the main topic, it is to be remarked that a situation
is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality. When we
describe it from the psychological side, we have to say that the
situation as a qualitative whole is sensed or felt. Such an expres-
sion is, however, valuable only as it is taken negatively to indicate
that it is not, as such, an object in discourse. Stating that it is felt
is wholly misleading if it gives the impression that the situation is
a feeling or an emotion or anything mentalistic. On the contrary,
feeling, sensation and emotion have themselves to be identified and
described in terms of the immediate presence of a total qualitative
situation.
The pervasively qualitative is not only that which binds all con-
stituents into a whole but it is also unique; it constitutes in each
situation an individual situation, indivisible and unduplicablc. Dis-
tinctions and relations are instituted ivitlmz a situation; they are
recurrent and repeatable in different situations. Discourse that is
not controlled by reference to a situation is not discourse, but a
meaningless jumble, just as a mass of pied type is not a font much
less a sentence. A universe of experience is the precondition of a
universe of discourse. Without its controlling presence, there is
no way to determine the relevancy, weight or coherence of any
designated distinction or relation. The universe of experience
surrounds and regulates the universe of discourse but never ap-
pears as such within the latter. It may be objected that what was
previously said contradicts this statement. For we have been dis-
coursing about universes of experience and situations, so that the
latter have been brought within the domain of symbols. The ob-
jection, when examined, serves to elicit an important considera-
tion. It is a commonplace that a universe of discourse cannot be a
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 69
term or element within itself. One universe of discourse may,
however, be a term of discourse within another universe. The
same principle applies in the case of universes of experience.
The reader, whether he agrees or not with what has been said,
whether he understands it or not, has, as he reads the above
passages, a uniquely qualified experienced situation, and his re-
flective understanding of what is said is controlled by the nature
of that immediate situation. One cannot decline to have a situa-
tion for that is equivalent to having no experience, not even one of
disagreement. The most that can be refused or declined is the
having of that specific situation in which there is reflective recogni-
tion (discourse) of the presence of former situations of the kind
stated. This very declination is, nevertheless, identical with initia-
tion of another encompassing qualitative experience as a unique
whole.
In other words, it "would be a contradiction if I attempted to
demonstrate by means of discourse, the existence of universes of
experience. It is not a contradiction by means of discourse to
invite the reader to have for himself that kind of an immediately
experienced situation in which the presence of a situation as a
universe of discourse is seen to be the encompassing and regulat-
ing condition of all discourse.
There is another difficulty in grasping the meaning of what has
been said. It concerns the use of the word "quality." The word
is usually associated with something specific, like red, hard, sweet;
that is, with distinctions made within a total experience. The
intended contrasting meaning may be suggested, although not
adequately exemplified, by considering such qualities as are desig-
nated by the terms distressing, perplexing, cheerful, disconsolate.
For these words do not designate specific qualities in the way in
which hard, say, designates a particular quality of a rock. For
such qualities permeate and color all the objects and events that are
involved in an experience. The phrase "tertiary qualities," hap-
pily introduced by Santayana, does not refer to a third quality like
in kind to the "primary" and "secondary" qualities of Locke and
merely happening to differ in content. For a tertiary quality
qualifies all the constituents to which it applies in thoroughgoing
fashion.
70 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY _
Probably the meaning of quality, in the sense in which quality is
said to pervade all elements and relations that are or can be in-
stituted in discourse and thereby to constitute them an individual
whole, can be most readily apprehended by referring to the
esthetic use of the word. A painting is said to have quality, or a
particular painting to have a Titian or Rembrandt quality. The
word thus used most certainly does not refer to any particular line,
color or part of the painting. It is something that affects and
modifies all the constituents of the picture and all of their relations.
It is not anything that can be expressed in words for it is something
that must be had. Discourse may, however, point out the qualities,
lines and relations by means of which pervasive and unifying
quality is achieved. But so far as this discourse is separated from
having the immediate total experience, a reflective object takes
the place of an esthetic one. Esthetic experience, in its emphatic
sense, is mentioned as a way of calling attention to situations and
universes of experience. The intended force of the illustration
would be lost if esthetic experience as such were supposed to ex-
haust the scope and significance of a ''situation." As has been said,
a qualitative and qualifying situation is present as the background
and the control of every experience. It was for a similar reason
that it was earlier stated that reference to tertiary qualities was not
adequately exemplary. For such qualities as arc designated by
"distressing," "cheerful," etc., are general, while the quality of
distress and cheer that marks an existent situation is not general but
is unique and inexpressible in words.
I give one further illustration from a different angle of approach.
It is more or less a commonplace that it is possible to carry on
observations that amass facts tirelessly and yet the observed "facts"
lead nowhere. On the other hand, it is possible to have the work
of observation so controlled by a conceptual framework fixed in
advance that the very things which are genuinely decisive in the
problem in hand and its solution, are completely overlooked.
Everything is forced into the predetermined conceptual and the-
oretical scheme. The way, and the only way, to escape these two
evils, is sensitivity to the quality of a situation as a whole. In
ordinary language, a problem must be felt before it can be stated.
If the unique quality of the situation is had immediately, then there
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 71
is something that regulates the selection and the weighing of
observed facts and their conceptual ordering.
The discussion has reached the point where the basic problem of
the relation of common sense material and methods to that of
scientific subject-material and method, can be explicitly discussed.
In the first place, science takes its departure of necessity from the
qualitative objects, processes, and instruments of the common
sense world of use and concrete enjoyments and sufferings. The
scientific theory of colors and light is extremely abstract and
technical. But it is about the colors and light involved in every-
day affairs. Upon the common sense level, light and colors are
not experienced or inquired into as things in isolation nor yet as
qualities of objects viewed in isolation. They are experienced,
weighed and judged in reference to their place in the occupations
and arts (including social ceremonial arts as well as fine arts) the
group carries on. Light is a dominant factor in the daily routine
of rising from sleep and going about one's business. Differences
in the duration of the light of sun and moon interpenetrate almost
every tribal custom. Colors are signs of what can be done and of
how it should be done in some inclusive situation — such as, judg-
ing the prospects of the morrow's weather; selection of appropriate
clothing for various occasions; dyeing, making rugs, baskets and
jars; and so on in diverse ways too obvious and tedious to enumer-
ate. They play their part either in practical decisions and activities
or in enjoyed celebrations, dances, wakes, feasts, etc. What holds
of light and color applies to all objects, events and qualities that
enter into everyday common sense affairs.
Gradually and by processes that are more or less tortuous and
originally unplanned, definite technical processes and instru-
mentalities are formed and transmitted. Information about things,
their properties and behaviors, is amassed, independently of any
particular immediate application. It becomes increasingly remote
from the situations of use and enjoyment in which it originated.
There is then a background of materials and operations available
for the development of what we term science, although there is still
no sharp dividing line between common sense and science. For
purposes of illustration, it may be supposed that primitive astron-
omy and primitive methods of keeping track of time (closely con-
72 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
nected with astronomical observations) grew out of the practical
necessities of groups with herds in care of animals with respect to
mating and reproduction, and of agricultural groups with reference
to sowing, tilling and reaping. Observation of the change of
position of constellations and stars, of the relation of the length of
daylight to the sun's place in relation to the constellations along
the line of the equinox provided the required information. In-
strumental devices were developed in order that the observations
might be made; definite techniques for using the instruments
followed.
Measurement of angles of inclination and declination was a
practical part of meeting a practical need. The illustration is,
from a historical point of view, more or less speculative. But
something of this general kind certainly effected the transition
from what we call common sense to what we call science. If we
were to take the practical needs of medicine in healing the sick
and dealing with wounds, in their relation to the growth of
physiological and anatomical knowledge, the case would be even
clearer. In the early history of Greek reflective thought, art, or
techne, and science, were synonymous.
But this is not the whole of the story. Oriental cultures,
especially the Assyrian, Babylonian and Egyptian, developed a
division between "lower" and "higher" techniques and kinds of
knowledge. The lower, roughly speaking, was in possession of
those who did the daily practical work; carpentering, dyeing,
weaving, making pottery, trading, etc. The higher came to be the
possession of a special class, priests and the successors of primitive
medicine men. Their knowledge and techniques were "higher"
because they were concerned with what were supposed to be
matters of ultimate concern; the welfare of the people and
especially its rulers — and this welfare involved transactions with
the powers that ruled the universe. Their kind of practical
activity was so different from that of artisans and traders, the ob-
jects involved were so different, the social status of the persons
engaged in carrying on the activities in question was so enormously
different, that the activity of the guardians and administrators of
the higher knowledge and techniques was not "practical" in the
sense of practical that applied to the ordinary useful worker.
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 73
These facts contained dualism in embryo, indeed in more or less
mature form. This, when it was reflectively formulated, became
the dualism of the empirical and rational, of theory and practice,
and, in our own day, of common sense and science. 1
The Greeks were much less subject to ecclesiastic and autocratic
political control than were the peoples mentioned. The Greeks
are pointed to with considerable justice as those who freed thought
and knowledge from external control. But in one fundamentally
important way they fixed, for subsequent intellectual history, the
division just mentioned — although changing its direction and in-
terpretation. Science and philosophy (which were still one)
constituted the higher form of knowledge and activity. It alone
was "rational" and alone deserved the names of knowledge and of
activity that was "pure" because liberated from the constraints of
practice. Experiential knowledge was confined to the artisan and
trader, and their activity was "practical" because it was concerned
with satisfaction of needs and desires — most of the latter, as in the
case of the trader, being base and unworthy anyway.
The free citizen was not supposed to engage in any of these
pursuits but to devote himself to politics and the defense of the
city-state. Although the scientist-philosopher was compelled by
constraint of the body to give some time and thought to satisfaction
of wants, as a scientist-philosopher he was engaged in exercising his
reason upon rational objects, thereby attaining the only possible
complete freedom and perfect enjoyment. The definitely socio-
practical division between workers and non-citizens who were
servile, and the members of the leisure class who were free citizens,
was converted by philosophic formulation into a division between
practice and theory, experience and reason. Strictly scientific-
philosophic knowledge and activity were finally conceived to be
supra-social as well as supra-empirical. They connected those who
pursued them with the divine and cut them off from their fellows.
I have engaged in what seems to be a historical excursus not
for the sake of giving historical information but in order to indi-
cate the origin of the distinction between empirical knowledge
and practice on one hand and rational knowledge and pure
activity on the other; between knowledge and practice that are
^•See L. Hogben, Mathematics for the Millions, Ch. 1.
74 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
admittedly of social origin and intent and the insight and activity
that were supposed to have no social and practical bearings. This
origin is itself social-cultural. Such is the irony of the situation.
Relatively free as were the minds of Greek thinkers, momentous as
were their accomplishments in certain directions, after Greek
culture ceased to be a living thing and its products were carried
over into different cultures, the inheritance from the Greeks be-
came an incubus upon the progress of experience and of science,
save in mathematics. Even in the latter field it kept mathematics
for a long time subservient to strictly geometrical formulation.
The later revival of genuine science undoubtedly drew stimulus
and inspiration from the products of Greek thought. But these
products were reanimated by contact and interaction with just the
things of ordinary experience and the instruments of use in
practical arts which in classic Greek thought were supposed to
contaminate the purity of science. There was a return to the
conditions and factors mentioned earlier: qualitative materials,
processes and instruments. Phenomena of heat, light and electricity
became matters to be experienced under controlled conditions
instead of matters to receive rational formulation through pure
intellect. The lens and compass and a multitude of the tools and
processes of the practical arts were borrowed and adapted to the
needs of scientific inquiry. The ordinary processes that had long
been at home in the arts, weakening and intensifying, combining
and separating, dissolving and evaporating, precipitating and in-
fusing, heating and cooling, etc. etc., were no longer scorned.
They were adopted as means of finding out something about
nature, instead of being employed only for the sake of accomplish-
ing objects of use and enjoyment.
Symbolic instrumentalities, especially, underwent tremendous
reconstruction; they were refined as well as expanded. On one
hand they were constructed and related together on the basis of
their applicability, through operations, to existence, and they were
freed, on the other hand, from reference to direct application in
use and enjoyment. The physical problems that emerged in
pursuit of experiential knowledge of nature thus required and
evoked new symbolic means of registration and manipulation.
Analytic geometry and calculus became primary modes of concep-
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY IS
tual response as quantity, change and motion were found to be not
irrational accidents but the keys with which to solve the mysteries
of natural existence. Language was, nonetheless, an old and
familiar qualitative achievement. The most exact comprehensive
mathematical language hardly compares as an achievement with
the creation of intelligible speech by primitive peoples. Finally,
the test of the validity of conceptions formulated and developed in
rational discourse was found to reside in their applicability to
existential qualitative material. They were no longer taken to be
"true" as constituents of rational discourse in isolation but valid in
the degree in which they were capable of organizing the qualitative
materials of common sense and of instituting control over them.
Those semantic-conceptual constructions that indicate with the
greatest degree of defmiteness the way in which they are to be
applied are, even as conceptions, the most truly rational ones. At
every point in the practice of scientific inquiry, the old separation
between experience and reason, between theory and doing, was
destroyed.
In consequence, the contents and techniques of common sense
underwent a revolutionary change. It was noted earlier that com-
mon sense is not a constant. But the most revolutionary change it
has ever undergone is that effected by the infiltration and incor-
poration of scientific conclusions and methods into itself. Even
the procedures and materials that are connected with elementary
environmental conditions of life, such things as food, clothing,
shelter and locomotion, have undergone tremendous transforma-
tion, while unprecedented needs and unprecedented powers of
satisfying them have also emerged. The effect of the embodiment
of science in the common sense world and the activities that deal
with it in the domain of human relationships is as great as that which
has taken place in relation to physical nature. It is only necessary to
mention the social changes and problems that have arisen from the
new technologies of production and distribution of goods and
services. For these technologies are the direct product of the new
science. To relate in detail the ways in which science has affected
the area of common sense in respect to the relationships of person
to person, group to group, people to people, would be to relate
the story of social change in the last few centuries. Applications
76 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
of science in revolutionizing the forces and conditions of produc-
tion, distribution and communication have of necessity tremen-
dously modified the conditions under which human beings live
and act in connection with one another, whether the conditions be
those of interchange and friendly association or of opposition and
war.
It is not intimated that the incorporation of scientific conclusions
and operations into the common sense attitudes, beliefs and intel-
lectual methods of what is now taken for granted as matters of
common sense is as yet complete or coherent. The opposite is the
case. In the most important matters the effect of science upon the
content and procedures of common sense has been disintegrative.
This disintegrative influence is a social, not a logical, fact. But
it is the chief reason why it seems so easy, so "natural/' to make a
sharp division between common sense inquiry and its logic and
scientific inquiry and its logic.
Two aspects of the disintegration which creates the semblance
of complete opposition and conflict will be noted. One of them is
the fact, already noted, that common sense is concerned with a
field that is dominantly qualitative, while science is compelled by
its own problems and goals to state its subject-matter in terms of
magnitude and other mathematical relations which are non-
qualitative. The other fact is that since common sense is con-
cerned, directly and indirectly, with problems of use and enjoy-
ment, it is inherently teleological. Science, on the other hand, has
progressed by elimination of "final causes" from every domain
with which it is concerned, substituting measured correspondences
of change. It operates, to use the old terminology, in terms of
"efficient causation," irrespective of ends and values. Upon the
basis of the position here taken, these differences are due to the
fact that different types of problems demand different modes of
inquiry for their solution, not to any ultimate division in existential
subject-matter.
The subject-matter of science is stated in symbol-constellations
that are radically unlike those familiar to common sense; in what, in
effect, is a different language. Moreover, there is much highly
technical material that has not been incorporated into common
sense even by way of technological application in "material" af-
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 77
fairs. In the region of highest importance to common sense,
namely, that of moral, political, economic ideas and beliefs, and the
methods of forming and confirming them, science has had even
less effect. Conceptions and methods in the field of human re-
lationships are in much the same state as were the beliefs and
methods of common sense in relation to physical nature before
the rise of experimental science. These considerations fix the
meaning of the statement that the difference that now exists be-
tween common sense and science is a social, rather than a logical,
matter. If the word "language" is used not just formally, but to
include its content of substantial meanings, the difference is a
difference of languages.
The problems of science demand a set of data and a system of
meanings and symbols so differentiated that science cannot rightly
be called "organized common sense." But it is a potential organ
for organizing common sense in its dealing with its own subject-
matter and problems and this potentiality is far from actualization.
In the techniques which affect human use of the materials of
physical nature in production, science has become a powerful
agency of organization. As far as issues of enjoyment, of con-
sumption, are concerned, it has taken little effect. Morals and
the problems of social control are hardly touched. Beliefs, con-
ceptions, customs and institutions, whose rise antedated the modern
period, still have possession of the field. The union of this fact
with the highly technical and remote language of science creates
and maintains the feeling and idea of a complete gap. The paths
of communication between common sense and science are as yet
largely one-way lanes. Science takes its departure from common
sense, but the return road into common sense is devious and
blocked by existing social conditions.
In the things of greatest import there is little intercommunica-
tion. Pre-scientific ideas and beliefs in morals and politics are, more-
over, so deeply ingrained in tradition and habit and institutions, that
the impact of scientific method is feared as something profoundly
hostile to mankind's dearest and deepest interests and values. On
the side of philosophical formulation, highly influential schools of
thought are devoted to maintaining the domain of values, ideas
and ideals as something wholly apart from any possibility of ap-
78 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
plication of scientific methods. Earlier philosophic conceptions of
the necessary separation between reason and experience, theory
and practice, higher and lower activities, are used to justify the
necessity of the division.
With respect to the second point, that of a seeming funda-
mental difference due to the fact that common sense is profoundly
teleological in its controlling ideas and methods while science is
deliberately indifferent to teleology, it must be noted that in spite
of the theoretical difference, physical science has, in practical
fact, liberated and vastly extended the range of ends open to
common sense and has enormously increased the range and power
of the means available for attaining them. In ancient thought,
ends were fixed by nature; departure from those ends that were
antecedently set and fixed by the very nature of things, was im-
possible; the attempt to institute ends of human devising was taken
to be the sure road to confusion and chaos. In the moral field,
this conception still exists and is even probably dominant. But in
respect to "material" affairs, it has been completely abandoned.
Invention of new agencies and instruments create new ends; they
create new consequences which stir men to form new purposes.
The original philosophical meaning of "ends" as fixed comple-
tions is almost forgotten. Instead of science eliminating ends and
inquiries controlled by teleological considerations, it has, on the
contrary, enormously freed and expanded activity and thought in
telic matters. This effect is not a matter of opinion but of facts
too obvious to be denied. The same sort of thing holds of the
qualities with which common sense is inextricably concerned.
Multitudes of new qualities have been brought into existence by
the applications of physical science, and, what is even more im-
portant, our power to bring qualities within actual experience
when we so desire, has been intensified almost beyond the pos-
sibility of estimate. Consider, as one instance alone, our powers
with respect to qualities generated by light and electricity.
The foregoing survey is made for a double purpose. On the
one hand the outstanding problem of our civilization is set by the
fact that common sense in its content, its "world" and methods, is
a house divided against itself. It consists in part, and that part the
most vital, of regulative meanings and procedures that antedate
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 79
the rise of experimental science in its conclusions and methods. In
another part, it is what it is because of application of science. This
cleavage marks every phase and aspect of modern life: religious,
economic, political, legal, and even artistic.
The existence of this split is put in evidence by those who con-
demn the "modern" and who hold that the only solution of the
chaos in civilization is to revert to the intellectual beliefs and
methods that were authoritative in past ages, as well as by radicals
and "revolutionaries." Between the two stand the multitude that
is confused and insecure. It is for this reason that it is here
affirmed that the basic problem of present culture and associated
living is that of effecting integration where division now exists.
The problem cannot be solved apart from a unified logical method
of attack and procedure. The attainment of unified method means
that the fundamental unity of the structure of inquiry in common
sense and science be recognized, their difference being one in the
problems with which they are directly concerned, not to their re-
spective logics. It is not urged that attainment of a unified logic,
a theory of inquiry, will resolve the split in our beliefs and pro-
cedures. But it is affirmed that it will not be resolved without it.
On the other hand, the problem of unification is one in and for
logical theory itself. At the present time logics in vogue do not
claim for the most part to be logics of inquiry. In the main, we are
asked to take our choice between the traditional logic, which was
formulated not only long before the rise of science but when also
the content and methods of science were in radical opposition to
those of present science, and the new purely "symbolistic logic" that
recognizes only mathematics, and even at that is not so much con-
cerned with methods of mathematics as with linguistic formula-
tion of its results. The logic of science is not only separated from
common sense, but the best that can be done is to speak of logic
afid scientific method as two different and independent matters.
Logic in being "purified" from all experiential taint has become so
f ormalistic that it applies only to itself.
The next chapter deals explicitly with the traditional logic as
derived from Aristotle, with a view to showing (1) that of neces-
sity the scientific conditions under which it was formulated are so
different from those of existing knowledge that it has been trans-
80 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
formed from what it originally was, a logic of knowledge, into a
purely formal affair, and (2) that there is a necessity for a logical
theory based upon scientific conclusions and methods. These are
so unlike those of classic science that the need is not revision and
extension of the old logic here and there, but a radically different
standpoint and a different treatment to be carried through all
logical subject matter.
CHAPTER V
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC
■^here are not many today who would echo the saying of
Kant about logic: "Since Aristotle it has not had to retrace
. a single step . . . and has not been able to make a single step
in advance so that, to all appearance, it may be considered as com-
plete and perfect." Nevertheless the prestige of that logic is still
enormous. It forms the backbone of most logical texts that are
taught in the schools, with additional chapters on "inductive logic"
which are introduced, apparently, out of a feeling of need to pay
some deference to what are supposed to be the methods of modern
science.
Even those who realize the imperfections of classic logic in, for
example, its assumption of the conception of fixed substances as
necessary subjects of every proposition, do, nevertheless, pay
homage even in their formal symbolic statements to traditional
forms, contenting themselves with revisions and additions here and
there. Those who, like John Stuart Mill, have systematically
criticized the traditional theory and who have attempted to build
a logic in accord with modern scientific practices, have disastrously
compromised their case by basing their logical constructions
ultimately upon psychological theories that reduced "experience"
to mental states and external associations among them, instead of
upon the actual conduct of scientific inquiry.
No apology is needed, therefore, for discussion of Aristotelian
logic in relation to the theory of logic developed in this volume.
For the former enters so vitally into present theories that considera-
tion of it, instead of being historical in import, is a consideration of
the contemporary logical scene. The competency of traditional
logic as an organ of inquiry into existing problems of common
sense and science is an urgent question. This chapter is, accord-
81
82 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
ingly, a critical exposition of the main features of the Aristotelian
logic in reference (1) to the conditions of science and culture
which provided its background and substantial material, and (2)
to their contrast with the conditions of culture and science which
now obtain. The first point involves the attempt to show the
intimate and organized way in which the classic logic reflected
the science of the period in which it was formulated. The second
point concerns the revolutionary change that has since taken
place in science as the ground for a correspondingly radical change
in logic.
A recent writer on logic has said: "Science seeks today to
establish for the most part what are called 'laws of nature'; and
these are generally answers rather to the question: 'Under what
conditions does such and such a change take place?' or 'What are
the most general principles exemplified in such and such a change?'
than to the question, 'What is the definition of such and such a
subject?', or 'What are its essential attributes?' It is more in
respect of the problems to be answered, than of the logical char-
acter of the reasoning by which we must prove our answers to
them, that Aristotle's views (as represented in the Topics) are
antiquated." 1
The implication of this passage, especially when it is extended to
apply to logical works other than the Topics, would seem to be
that a radical change in the problems and objects of inquiry
(like the change from unchanging substances and their necessary
essential forms to correlations of change) can take place with little
change in logical forms. This implicit assumption is characteristic
of much current logical writing. A contrary postulate is the
ground for the present examination of Aristotelian logic in its
relation to Greek science and culture in the fifth century u.c.
The more adequate that logic was in its own day, the less fitted is
it to form the framework of present logical theory.
Greek culture was extraordinarily rich in artistic accomplish-
ment. It is noted also for acute and varied observations of natural
phenomena and for comprehensive generalizations of what was
observed. Medicine, music and astronomy, meteorology, language,
1 H. W. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, pp. 387-8.
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC 83
and political institutions were all studied with the means at com-
mand in ways freer from external control than was the case
in any previous civilization. Moreover, the special results in
these varied fields were welded into that single comprehensive
view which, following the Greek example, has ever since gone by
the name of philosophy. Especially notable is the fact that, in
the absence of the later sharp division between "subject" and
"object," psychology was a science allied to biology which in
turn was allied to physics, while morals and politics were parts of
theory of Nature. Man was conceived in relation to nature, not
as something set apart. Moral and political studies were not
separated by sharp boundaries from cosmology. Mathematics,
moreover, was thought to be an existential science.
Because of these facts, the conception that was entertained of
Nature as a whole became the finally decisive consideration. One
does not have to go into controversies that have arisen regarding
the meaning of the word nature as used by the early scientist-
philosophers, to be aware that earlier meanings finally bifurcated
into two significant directions. "Phusis" the word translated as
"nature" is etymologically connected with a root meaning "to
grow." Now growth is change; it is coming into Being and
passing out of Being, altering between the two extremes of birth
and death. The adjective "physical" was employed by Aristotle
to designate this aspect of Nature. The physical was not set over
against the mental and psychical, for these were also "physical"
in the sense of being marked by change. But, as we speak today of
the "nature of things," so Nature in its most emphatic and eulogis-
tic sense consisted of unchanging substances with their fixed es-
sential characters or "natures." The distinction and relation of the
permanent, the fixed, from and to the variable and changing, was
the ultimate problem of science and philosophy. The philosophy
of Aristotle is a systematic exposition and organized solution of
this problem carried through all subjects with which inquiry was
there concerned.
This basic fact has a fundamental connection with Aristotelian
logic. On the negative side, this logic was not formal in the
sense in which forms are independent of existential subject-matter.
It was formal, but the forms were those of existence in so far as
84 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
existence is known — known as distinct from being merely sensed,
or discursively thought about, or an object of guess and opinion.
That the significance of the words "subject" and "object" has
undergone reversal in the history of philosophic thought is a well
known fact. What we call "objects" were in Greek terminology
subjects; they were existences taken in their status as subject-mmtx
of knowledge. Their logical forms were determined by the basic
division supposed to exist in Nature between the changing and
the eternal. Things that change are too unstable to be subjects
of knowledge in its exact and complete sense. Knowledge as
distinct from sense and opinion is fixed; truth does not alter.
Hence its subjects ("objects" in our sense) must also be in-
variable. Seen from this point of view, Nature presented the
scientific mind with an ordered grade or hierarchy of qualitative
things from emptiness up to Being in its full sense.
That which truly is cannot change; the existence of change is
thus proof of lack of complete Being, of what the Greeks some-
times called, because of emphasis upon lack of substantiality, Non-
being. The various grades of intellectual apprehension corre-
sponded, with their logical forms, point for point with the graded
ranking of subjects in their qualitative degrees of Being.
Idiomatic speech today often uses the words whole and perfect
as synonyms in contradistinction to the broken, the partial and
imperfect. It is not too much to say that the implications of the
identifications and the distinctions involved were determinative of
Greek cosmology and theory of Being. Greek culture in its
characteristic attitudes was definitely esthetic. Works of art are
qualitative wholes; "pieces" of them are merely physical. The
Greek urn as well as the Greek statue and temple were works of
art; complete and, as we still say, finished. Measure, fixed limits,
fixed ratio and proportions, are the mark of everything that truly is.
Such objects, or subjects, are substances having design and form
in an objective sense. Change and susceptibility to variation lack,
on the other hand, measure. They are marks of the presence of
the indefinite; the finite, finished and complete are such because of
fixed limits and measure. Change as such escapes intellectual ap-
prehension. It can be known only in so far as it can be included
within fixed boundaries which mark its beginning and its objective
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC M
end or close; that is, as far as change tends to move toward a
final and unchanging limit. Change, is known, in other words,
only as it is enclosed within fixed limits. From the side of knowl-
edge and logical forms, the changing is sensible, particular or
partial, while the measured whole, defined by limits, is the rational.
The syllogism is the form of complete enclosure. It is of two
types; in one, that which is enclosed as well as the limiting and
enclosing is permanent; in the other, that which is held within
bounds is itself in process of change or is "physical" not rational
The first type of syllogism is that of rational knowledge, which
is knowledge in its complete sense. This syllogistic form is strictly
necessary and demonstrative in its contents. The other type of
syllogism expresses contingent knowledge, which has various
degrees of probability but in no case is necessary, because its
subject-matter sometimes is and sometimes is not. The relation of
inclusion is basic in both forms. Inclusion, however, involves ex-
clusion. That which is fixed and permanent by nature excludes
every other substance by its very nature. Being just what it is
by reason of its eternal nature or essence, it is not anything else.
Thus in addition to the fundamental logical form of universal
(complete because dealing with what is whole by nature) and
necessary propositions and relations of propositions, there are
positive and negative propositions corresponding to ontological
inclusions and exclusions. 2
The so-called major and minor propositions respectively set
forth the including and included "subjects," while the "middle
term" is the ratio or logos, reason, the principle of measure and
limit, which is the ground of inclusion or exclusion. It is in-
dispensable in reasoning not because of any peculiar property of
"thought" but because of the inherent connections in nature which
bind "subjects" together and prevent their mingling. Since the
middle term represents the principle of inclusion and exclusion in
nature, it expresses a universal or whole. If it represented that
which is particular (broken and partial) it could not be the ground
or reason of that omclusion which is the exhibition in knowledge
of delusions and inclusions in Nature.
2 The technical scheme of figures of syllogisms and their relations to one
another follows so directly that the topic will not be taken up.
S6 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
That which is included or excluded is of necessity of a kind or
species. For singular objects, a man, a rock, a particular com-
munity, come into being and pass out of being. They are particu-
lar (partial), not complete. The species or kind of which the
singular is a part is eternal. Humanity is a species, and as a
substantial species it does not originate nor pass away with the birth
or death of Socrates, Alcibiades, Xenophon, etc. The substantial
species is necessarily present in every particular or part, making it
to be what it is, whether man, horse, oak tree or rock. That which
belongs inherently and necessarily to a species is its nature or
essence. Definition is the form which essence takes qua known.
Far from being verbal or even a convenient process or product of
"thought," definition is cognitive grasp of that which defines
(marks out) ontological substance. It marks it off from every-
thing else and grasps its eternal self -same character.
Species, moreover, form a graded hierarchy. There are "sensible
species" represented by the qualities wet-dry, hot-cold, heavy-
light. Here the phase of change, of the physical, is at its maximum.
These qualities are always transient and always tending to pass into
their opposites. Nevertheless, while particular existential qualities
change, their kinds are fixed. Therefore, a lowest kind of cognitive
apprehension, that of sense, can exist with respect to them. Even
sense, in order to apprehend a quality, red, hard, must include it in
its appropriate species — must classify it. At the other extreme, are
species devoid of matter and change. The objects in which their
essential nature is embodied, are constant and unswerving in their
activities and movements.
The typical Aristotelian instance is that of the fixed stars, each
of which pursues its eternal round without any variation. Be-
tween these two types of species come all the other kinds of
phenomena and objects in the universe. To go into detail about
them would be to rehearse the physics and cosmology of Aristotle.
Suffice it to say that each kind is fixed in the order of Nature, and
hence in degree of scientific or demonstrative knowledge, by the
relative degree of variation to which it is subject. The latter trait
marks the extent in which matter, the principle of instability and
variation, is present. The higher species are marked by regularity
of movement toward a fixed end or completion.
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC 87
It is to be noted that the activities of living things are marked by
an unusual degree of regular recurrence. This fact means that
they are actuated by an unusual degree of self -movement. Their
energy of self -movement is such that it resists change due to ex-
ternal circumstance much more than is the case not only with
sense qualities (which are subject to change from all things about
them) but also than in the case of such phenomena as weather
and all inanimate things. This self-moving and self-governing
trait of living creatures is of special importance because there is a
qualitative hierarchy among living creatures. At the lower and
inferior end are plants and their "vegetative functions," which per-
sist in absorption and assimilation of food. Energy of self -move-
ment marks also the various species of animal life.
At the apex is man. He retains both vegetative and animal
functions; sensation, appetite, and locomotion. But in so far as
man attains to rationality as such, pure in the sense of freedom
from need, sensation and sense-perception, the energy of self-
movement comes to completion. Reason is pure self-moving
activity, having no dependence upon and no truck with anything
outside itself. Such pure self-activity defines God and so far as
mortals attain to it, they put off mortality.
From this survey, certain main points about the Aristotelian
logic emerge. In the first place, the forms recognized are not
formalistic. They are not independent of "subjects" known. On
the contrary, they are the forms of these subjects as far as the
latter are actualized in knowledge. In the second place, knowl-
edge, in its logical forms, consists exclusively of definition and
classification. Neither of these processes is linguistic, psychologi-
cal, nor yet an aid in reflection. Definition is grasp of the essence
which makes things to be what they truly are. Classification con-
cerns the ontological exclusions and inclusions of real natural
kinds or species. Definition and taxonomic classification are neces-
sary forms of knowledge because they are expressions of necessary
forms of Being.
In the third place, there is no room for any logic of discovery
and invention. Discovery was thought of under the head of learn-
ing, and learning was merely coming into possession of that al-
ready known — as a pupil comes to know that already known by
SS INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
teacher and textbook. Learning belonged in the inferior region of
change, and like every mode of change comes to something
amounts to something, only as it falls within fixed limits of knowl-
edge. In the case of learning (the sole form of discovery) the
limits are apprehension of the species present in objects of percep-
tion on one hand and rational grasp of some essence defining a com-
plete species or whole on the other hand. Learning merely brings
these two antecedently given forms of knowledge into connection
with each other. Similarly, invention of the new had no place.
It had only its literal etymological meaning of coining upon some-
thing already there.
These considerations explain the ease with which a logical
theory which was strictly ontological or existential in its original
reference became a merely formal logic when the advance of
science destroyed the background of essences and species upon
which the original logic was based. The latter had no place for
discursive or reflective operations save as processes of personal de-
velopment (such as might now be called psychological but are
rather pedagogical) by means of which individual persons arrived
at direct apprehension of essences and of relations of inclusion and
exclusion. Hence the perpetuation of the forms of the Aristotelian
tradition, with elimination of the subject-matter of which they
were the forms, also ruled out inquiry (which is effective reflec-
tion) from the proper scope of logic. The syllogism in the origi-
nal logic was in no way a form of inferring or reasoning. It was
immediate apprehension or vision of the relations of inclusion and
exclusion that belong to real wholes in Nature.
In its final and complete sense all knowledge in the classic scheme
is immediate rational apprehension, grasp or vision. Reflection and
inquiry were of the nature of the maneuvering that an individual
may be forced to engage in so as to get a better view of something
already there, like making a journey to a museum to inspect the
objects found in it. Form (eidos) and species are views of wholes.
Because of the weakness of mortal flesh men have to engage in re-
flective inquiries, but the latter are of no inherent logical impor-
tance. Knowledge, when arrived at, is grasp and possession: of
the nature of "intuition" in modern theory, only having none of
the vagueness of "intuition" as that word is now used.
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC 89
From our present point of view, Aristotle's saying that things
of sense are better known in relation to us while rational objects
are better known in themselves, is at least obscure. If, however,
the etymological connection between gignoskai, gnoscere and
know with note is borne in mind, the obscurity vanishes. To
know was to note, and all that could be truly noted was that which
already marked the subject of knowledge in Nature. Sensible and
changing things are themselves noted, not merely notable, in rela-
tion to us; rational objects are noted and marked off in and of
themselves, so that knowledge is attainment to vision of existential
defining marks or objective notations. 3
I come now to the fundamental difference between the Greek
conception of Nature as it is expressed in Aristotelian cosmology,
ontology and logic, and the modern conception as that has been de-
termined in the scientific revolution. The most evident point of
difference concerns the entirely different position given to the
qualitative and the quantitative in their relations to one another.
It is not merely that classic cosmology and science were consti-
tuted in terms of qualities, beginning with the four qualitative ele-
ments, earth, air, fire and water (themselves constituted by
combinations of the contraries wet-dry, cold-hot, heavy-light) , but
that all quantitative determinations were relegated to the state of
accidents, so that apprehension of them had no scientific standing.
"Accident" is, of course, here a technical term. It does not imply
that there is no cause for things existing in one amount rather than
another, but that the cause is so external to the thing in question
as not to be a ground or reason in knowledge.
The meaning of "accident" is determined by contrast with es-
sence. That which is accidental is no part of essence and does
not follow in any way from essence. Since the latter is the proper
subject of knowledge, and since quantity (magnitude, amount) is
wholly irrelevant to essence, consideration of it is outside the scope
of knowledge in any grade except that of sense. As matter of
sense it tends, moreover, to prevent ascent above sense to under-
3 Were epistemological considerations pertinent, attention would have to be
called to the fact that the classic logic cannot be understood in terms of the
relation of subject and object, but only in that of the relation of potentiality and
actuality, where change as potentiality occurs between the limits fixed in
actuality by Nature.
90 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
standing. There was, therefore, on the basis of the Aristotelian
theory of Nature and knowledge no point or purpose in making
measurements except for lower "practical" ends. Quantity, the
thing to be measured, fell wholly within the scope of more and
less, fewer and greater, larger and smaller, or the changing. Meas-
uring was useful to the artisan in dealing with physical things, but
that very fact indicated the gulf which separated quantity and
measuring from science and rationality. Observe by contrast the
place occupied by measuring in modern knowledge. 1 Is it then
credible that the logic of Greek knowledge has relevance to the
logic of modern knowledge?
Another closely connected difference is found in the fact that
because of the qualitative nature of the subject-matter of knowl-
edge in the Greek conception of Nature, heterogeneity was postu-
lated, as a matter of course, where modern science postulates
homogeneity, endeavoring to substitute homogeneity for qualita-
tive diversity. The difference is illustrated in the contrast between
the present theory of "chemical" elements and the four qualitative
elements (five, including the etherial substance of the fixed stars).
The most striking instance, however, is found in the conception
of qualitatively different kinds of movement that controlled
science until, say, the sixteenth century. Instead of motion as
measured change of position in space occupying a measured
amount of time, circular movement, to and fro, and up and down,
movements were conceived to be qualitatively exclusive of one
another. They marked substances of different natures occupying
places of different values in the hierarchy of species; different ends
or completions respectively controlled them. Earth comes down
or falls by its nature and by the nature of its proper place; fire and
light move up for a similar reason. Levity is as much an inherent
quality as is gravity, and so with the "essences" of other modes of
movement.
Because of the teleological principle that knonjoable change tends
toward a limiting fixed end, all motion was thought to tend nat-
urally to come to a state of rest. This notion controlled science
till, say, the time of Galileo. Note in contrast the place of homo-
4 Measuring as something we do is radically other than the measure, or relation
of fixed limits, that controls change.
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC 91
geneous motion in modern science, a homogeneity differentiated
by angular direction, momentum and velocity, which are all capa-
ble of measurement. The difference cannot be dismissed as simply
a difference in the details of subject-matter and without relevance
for logic. Self-returning qualitative movement is at the heart of
the classic conception of reason and rational subjects. Its qualita-
tive difference from other kinds of movement is the criterion by
which forms of knowledge are graded. In addition, the difference
of scientific concern with measurement and magnitude is involved.
A third closely connected difference is found in the fact that
modern science is concerned with institution of relations, while
classic logic is based on a theory of nature which treated all rela-
tions — save that of inclusion and exclusion of species (which was
not conceived to be a relation) as accidental, in the same sense in
which quantity is accidental. To be related meant in the Aris-
totelian scheme to be dependent upon something outside itself.
But this dependence was not generalized and regarded as forming
the very structure of a scientific object. On the contrary, it was
put in sharp opposition to the independence, self-sufficiency and
self-activity of "subjects" (substances) that are the only objects of
scientific and demonstrative knowledge. Now to be here and
then to be somewhere else was dismissed once for all as the sign
of inferior matter, while in modern science such a change sets the
problems of scientific inquiry.
Taking both measurement and relations into account, it is not
too much to say that what Greek science and logic rejected are
now the head corner-stone of science — although not yet of the
theory of logical forms. Contemporary logic has moved far
enough to criticize the old logic form. To recognition, for
example, of propositions of the subject (substance) -predicate
form it has added relational propositions. This is a marked ad-
vance. But up to a certain point the addition has increased con-
fusion in logical theory as a whole, since no consistency of theory
can be attained as long as the theory of antecedent subjects given
ready-made to predication is retained. 5
5 Some specific instances of this confusion will be pointed out later. The
underlying logical point at issue is not the special Aristotelian conception of sub-
stance, but the idea that any kind of subject, such as "this" or a sense datum, can
be given ready-made to predication.
92 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
The next difference to be mentioned is found in the central place
occupied by ends and teleology in Aristotelian logic. In convert-
ing that logic into a merely formal logic the teleological factor has
disappeared. But teleology was so central in classic logic that it
may be affirmed that with its disappearance, the reason for the
Aristotelian logic has also vanished. Nothing is left but an empty
shell; forms without subject-matter. In concluding this phase of
the discussion I shall refer to the foundation of all the differences
that have been mentioned — the reversed attitude of science toward
change. Completion of the cycle of scientific reversal may be con-
veniently dated from the appearance of Darwin's Origin of Species.
The very title of the book expresses a revolution in science, for the
conception of biological species had been a conspicuous mani-
festation of the assumption of complete immutability. This con-
ception had been banished before Darwin from every scientific
subject save botany and zoology. But the latter had remained the
bulwark of the old logic in scientific subject-matter.
When eternal essences and species are banished from scientific
subject-matter, the forms that are appropriate to them have nothing
left to which they apply; of necessity they are merely formal.
They remain in historic fact as monuments of a culture and science
that have disappeared, while in logic they remain as barren formali-
ties to be formally manipulated. A striking illustration is afforded
in the change that has taken place in the status of mathematics. In
Greek logical theory, mathematics was an existential science. The
discovery that the relation of the hypothenusc of a right-angled
triangle whose other sides have the value of one is not numerically
expressible, showed that magnitude and number as such are com-
pletely "irrational" or illogical. The fact that a ratio remained con-
stant, no matter what the magnitude of the size and area of the
triangle, together with the paradoxes of Zeno, helped to produce
the doctrine of the "accidental" nature of quantity. It led to the
notion that true number, as distinct from quantity, is geometrical
in essence. For geometry was based on the conception of limit-
ing measures, which determined the forms of objects in the sense
of their configurations. The movement, represented at first in
Cartesian algebraic geometry, that effected determination of all
figures by formulae of generalized numerical coordinates was more
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC 93
than a new instrument of scientific analysis and record. It marked
the beginning of the logical movement by which all mathematical
propositions became formulae for dealing with possible objects,
not descriptions of their existing properties — so that they are
logically non-existential in their content, save when taken to pre-
scribe operations of experimental observation.
The entire matter may be summed up by reference to the differ^
ent conceptions of Nature that are involved respectively in ancient
and modern science. In Greek science, Nature was a qualitative,
a bounded and closed, whole. To know any special subject was
to know it as a whole in its proper place in the comprehensively
inclusive whole, Nature. It is not true that ancient science at-
tempted to deduce knowledge of the included wholes from the
conception of the final and complete whole. The notion that
Greek science was deductive in this sense is a profound misappre-
hension. In the Greek scheme, knowledge consisted in placing
each relative species, or whole, defined and identified by its own
essence, in relation to other species within Nature as the final
whole. The necessity of referring all special kinds and modes of
knowledge to Nature as a closed whole explains why, in the classic
conception, there could be no sharp distinction between science
and philosophy. The subject-matter of modern natural science
consists of changes formulated in correspondence with one an-
other. This fact not only gives a radically different status to
change but it radically affects the conception of Nature.
The formulation of correlated correspondences becomes more
and more comprehensive in scope. But no scientist today would
dream of setting up an all-inclusive formula for the universe as a
whole. That job has been taken over by certain philosophic
schools. The change in the conception of Nature is expressed in
summary form in the idea that the universe is now conceived as
open and in process while classical Greece thought of it as finite in
the sense in which finite means finished, complete and perfect.
The infinite was the indefinite in Greek science, and the indefinite,
as such, could not be known.
It would be completely erroneous to regard the foregoing as a
criticism of the Aristotelian logic in its original formulation in
96 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
mon sense and the science of his day. The unification was effected
in a way which is no longer possible. We can no longer take the
contents and procedures of both common sense and science as in-
herently fixed, differing only in qualitative grade and rank in a
qualitatively fixed hierarchy. The fixity of the contents and logi-
cal forms of both common sense and science in the Aristotelian
scheme precluded the possibility of the reaction of science back
into common sense and the possibility of the ever-continuing rise of
new scientific problems and conceptions out of the material of
common sense activities and materials. All that science could do
was to accept what was given and established in common sense
and formulate it in its relation to the fixed subjects of higher ra-
tional knowledge. The present need is for a unified logic that
takes account of a two-way movement between common sense
and science.
The common sense culture which was formulated was of a high
order. As far as free citizens — those who freely shared in the
culture — were concerned, it was dominated by esthetic and artistic
categories of harmony, measure, proportion, objective design and
wholeness. In addition, the leading conceptions of philosophic
science were but translations into philosophic vocabulary of con-
ceptions that dominate common sense in every period. ( 1 ) The
category of substance is the reflection of the conception that things
exist in stable form in the world — an idea not only familiar to, but
basic in, all those common sense beliefs that have not been modified
by the impact of modern science. These things arc designated by
the common nouns in general use. (2) The category of fixed
species corresponds to common sense belief in natural kinds, some
of which are inclusive of others, while some are exclusive. For
common sense these natural kinds do not permit of transition from
one to another nor of any overlapping. The evidence for the
existence of fixed natural kinds and of substantial objects is over-
whelming from the standpoint of ordinary common sense. (3)
Common sense ideas, beliefs and judgments in every culture are
controlled by teleological conceptions, by ends; in modern lan-
guage, by considerations of value. (4) Common sense thinks of
the world of things and social relations in terms which, when they
are reflectively organized, become the doctrine of graded ranks or
THE NEEDED REFORM OF LOGIC 97
hierarchies. Distinctions of low and high, inferior and superior,
base and noble, and all manner of similar qualitative opposites of
value, are almost the stuff of common sense beliefs which have not
been transformed by the impact of science. They seem to be
guaranteed by the obviously perceived structures of both nature
and human society.
When I say that the philosophic science, of which logical theory
was an integral member, organized these and like beliefs and ideas
of common sense, it is not meant that the former merely mirrored
the latter. The very idea of reflective organization negates such a
notion. Not only were implications of which common sense was
unaware made explicit, but the framework of conceptions was
vastly extended by investigations of subjects with which common
sense held no commerce. Above all, the very fact of organization
involved an ordered arrangement foreign to common sense. Com-
mon sense, for example, would hardly have entertained the idea that
the philosopher-scientist was higher in rank as to his objects and
activities than the general and the statesman; or that the happiness
of the former was> of a godlike character in comparison with the
happiness open to others. But none the less there were things
involved in Athenian culture which, when they were put in or-
dered arrangement with one another, took the form of this con-
clusion.
We are brought back to the conclusions of the last chapter. The
subject-matter and methods of modern science have no such direct
affinity with those of common sense as existed when classic science
and logic were formulated. Science is no longer an organization
of meanings and modes of action that have their presence in the
meanings and syntactical structures of ordinary language. Yet
scientific conclusions and techniques have enormously altered the
common sense relation of man to nature and to fellow-man. It
can no longer be believed that they do not profoundly react to
modify common sense, any more than it can now be supposed
that they are but an intellectual organization of the latter.
Science has, however, affected the actual conditions under
which men live, use, enjoy and suffer much more than (aside from
material technologies) it has affected their habits of belief and in-
quiry. Especially is this true about the uses and enjoyments of
98 INTRODUCTION: THE MATRIX OF INQUIRY
final concern: religious, moral, legal, economic, political. The de-
mand for reform of logic is the demand for a unified theory of
inquiry through which the authentic pattern of experimental and
operational inquiry of science shall become available for regula-
tion of the habitual methods by which inquiries in the field of
common sense are carried on; by which conclusions are reached
and beliefs are formed and tested. In the next chapter the nature
of this common pattern forms the theme of discussion.
Part Two
THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENTS
CHATTER VI
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY
^jhe first chapter set forth the fundamental thesis of this
volume: Logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the
, latter is subjected to controlled inquiry. It also set forth
some of the implications of this thesis for the nature of logical
theory. The second and third chapters stated the independent
grounds, biological and cultural, for holding that logic is a theory
of experiential naturalistic subject-matter. The first of the next two
chapters developed the theme with reference to the relations of the
logic of common sense and science, while the second discussed
Aristotelian logic as the organized formulation of the language of
Greek life, when that language is regarded as the expression of the
meanings of Greek culture and of the significance attributed to
various forms of natural existence. It was held throughout these
chapters that inquiry, in spite of the diverse subjects to which it ap-
plies, and the consequent diversity of its special techniques has a
common structure or pattern: that this common structure is applied
both in common sense and science, although because of the nature
of the problems with which they are concerned, the emphasis upon
the factors involved varies widely in the two modes. We now come
to the consideration of the common pattern.
The fact that new formal properties accrue to subject-matter in
virtue of its subjection to certain types of operation is familiar to
us in certain fields, even though the idea corresponding to this fact
is unfamiliar in logic. Two outstanding instances are provided
by art and law. In music, the dance, painting, sculpture, literature
and the other fine arts, subject-matters of everyday experience are
transi ormed by the development of forms which render certain
products of doing and making objects of fine art. The materials
of legal regulations are transactions occurring in the ordinary
101
102 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
activities of human beings and groups of human beings; transac-
tions of a sort that are engaged in apart from law. As certain
aspects and phases of these transactions are legally formalized, con-
ceptions such as misdemeanor, crime, torts, contracts and so on
arise. These formal conceptions arise out of the ordinary trans-
actions; they are not imposed upon them from on high or from
any external and a priori source. But when they are formed they
are also formative; they regulate the proper conduct of the activi-
ties out of which they develop.
All of these formal legal conceptions are operational in nature.
They formulate and define 'ways of operation on the part of those
engaged in the transactions into which a number of persons or
groups enter as "parties," and the ways of operation followed by
those who have jurisdiction in deciding whether established forms
have been complied with, together with the existential consequences
of failure of observation. The forms in question are not fixed and
eternal. They change, though as a rule too slowly, with changes in
the habitual transactions in which individuals and groups engage
and the changes that occur in the consequences of these transac-
tions. However hypothetical may be the conception that logical
forms accrue to existential materials in virtue of the control exer-
cised over inquiries in order that they may fulfil their end, the con-
ception is descriptive of something that verifiably exists. The de-
velopment of forms in consequence of operations is an established
fact in some fields; it is not invented ad hoc in relation to logical
forms.
The existence of inquiries is not a matter of doubt. They enter
into every area of life and into every aspect of every area. In
everyday living, men examine; they turn things over intellectually;
they infer and judge as "naturally" as they reap and sow, produce
and exchange commodities. As a mode of conduct, inquiry is as
accessible to objective study as are these other modes of behavior.
Because of the intimate and decisive way in which inquiry and its
conclusions enter into the management of all affairs of life, no
study of the latter is adequate save as it is noted how they are af-
fected by the methods and instruments of inquiry that currently
obtain. Quite apart, then, from the particular hypothesis about
logical forms that is put forth, study of the objective facts of in-
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 103
quiry is a matter of tremendous import, practically and intellec-
tually. These materials provide the theory of logical forms with
a subject-matter that is not only objective but is objective in a
fashion that enables logic to avoid the three mistakes most charac-
teristic of its history.
1. In virtue of its concern with objectively observable subject-
matter by reference to which reflective conclusions can be tried
and tested, dependence upon subjective and "mentalistic" states
and processes is eliminated.
2. The distinctive existence and nature of forms is acknowl-
edged. Logic is not compelled, as historic "empirical" logic felt
compelled to do, to reduce logical forms to mere transcripts of the
empirical materials that antecede the existence of the former. Just
as art-forms and legal forms are capable of independent discus-
sion and development, so are logical forms, even though the "in-
dependence" in question is intermediate, not final and complete.
As in the case of these other forms, they originate out of experien-
tial material, and when constituted introduce new ways of oper-
ating with prior materials, which ways modify the material out of
which they develop.
3. Logical theory is liberated from the unobservable, trans-
cendental and "intuitional."
When methods and results of inquiry are studied as objective
data, the distinction that has often been drawn between noting
and reporting the ways in which men do think, and prescribing
the ways in which they ought to think, takes on a very different
interpretation from that usually given. The usual interpretation
is in terms of the difference between the psychological and the
logical, the latter consisting of "norms" provided from some source
wholly outside of and independent of "experience."
The way in which men do "think" denotes, as it is here inter-
preted, simply the ways in which men at a given time carry on
their inquiries. So far as it is used to register a difference from
the ways in which they ought to think, it denotes a difference like
that between good and bad farming or good and bad medical prac-
tice. 1 Men think in ways they should not when they follow meth-
ods of inquiry that experience of past inquiries shows are not
1 Cf. pp. 6 and 10 of Introduction.
104 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
competent to reach the intended end of the inquiries in question,
Everybody knows that today there are in vogue methods of
farming generally followed in the past which compare very un-
favorably in their results with those obtained by practices that
have already been introduced and tested. When an expert tells a
farmer he should do thus and so, he is not setting up for a bad
farmer an ideal drawn from the blue. He is instructing him in
methods that have been tried and that have proved successful in
procuring results. In a similar way we are able to contrast various
kinds of inquiry that are in use or that have been used in respect
to their economy and efficiency in reaching warranted conclusions.
We know that some methods of inquiry are better than others in
just the same way in which we know that some methods of sur-
gery, farming, road-making, navigating or what-not are better than
others. It does not follow in any of these cases that the "better"
methods are ideally perfect, or that they are regulative or "norma-
tive" because of conformity to some absolute form. They are the
methods which experience up to the present time shows to be the
best methods available for achieving certain results, while abstrac-
tion of these methods does supply a (relative) norm or standard
for further undertakings.
The search for the pattern of inquiry is, accordingly, not one
instituted in the dark or at large. It is checked and controlled by
knowledge of the kinds of inquiry that have and that have not
worked; methods which, as was pointed out earlier, can be so com-
pared as to yield reasoned or rational conclusions. For, through
comparison-contrast, we ascertain how and why certain means and
agencies have provided warrantably assertible conclusions, while
others have not and cannot do so in the sense in which "cannot"
expresses an intrinsic incompatibility between means used and
consequences attained.
We may now ask: What is the definition of Inquiry? That is,
what is the most highly generalized conception of inquiry which
can be justifiably formulated? The definition that will be ex-
panded, directly in the present chapter and indirectly in the follow-
ing chapters, is as follows: Inquiry is the controlled or directed
transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so de-
terminate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to con-
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 105
vert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole. 2
The original indeterminate situation is not only "open" to in-
quiry, but it is open in the sense that its constituents do not hang
together. The determinate situation on the other hand, qua out-
come of inquiry, is a closed and, as it were, finished situation or
"universe of experience." "Controlled or directed" in the above
formula refers to the fact that inquiry is competent in any given
case in the degree in which the operations involved in it actually
do terminate in the establishment of an objectively unified existen-
tial situation. In the intermediate course of transition and trans-
formation of the indeterminate situation, discourse through use of
symbols is employed as means. In received logical terminology,
propositions, or terms and the relations between them, are intrinsi-
cally involved.
I. The Antecedent Conditions of Inquiry: The Indeterminate
Situation. Inquiry and questioning, up to a certain point, are
synonymous terms. We inquire when we question; and we in-
quire when we seek for whatever will provide an answer to a
question asked. Thus it is of the very nature of the indeterminate
situation which evokes inquiry to be questionable; or, in terms of
actuality instead of potentiality, to be uncertain, unsettled, dis-
turbed. The peculiar quality of what pervades the given materials,
constituting them a situation, is not just uncertainty at large; it is a
unique doubtfulness which makes that situation to be just and only
the situation it is. It is this unique quality that not only evokes
the particular inquiry engaged in but that exercises control over
its special procedures. Otherwise, one procedure in inquiry would
be as likely to occur and to be effective as any other. Unless a
situation is uniquely qualified in its very indeterminateness, there is
a condition of complete panic; response to it takes the form of
blind and wild overt activities. Stating the matter from the per-
sonal side, we have "lost our heads." A variety of names serves to
characterize indeterminate situations. They are disturbed, trou-
bled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure,
etc.
It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because
2 The word "situation" is to be understood in the sense already expounded,
ante, pp. 66-7.
106 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY _^
the situation is inherently doubtful. Personal states of doubt that
are not evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation
are pathological; when they are extreme they constitute the mania
of doubting. Consequently, situations that are disturbed and trou-
bled, confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up
and put in order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind.
The attempt to settle them by such manipulations involves what
psychiatrists call "withdrawal from reality." Such an attempt is
pathological as far as it goes, and when it goes far it is the source
of some form of actual insanity. The habit of disposing of the
doubtful as if it belonged only to us rather than to the existential
situation in which we are caught and implicated is an inheritance
from subjectivistic psychology. The biological antecedent condi-
tions of an unsettled situation are involved in that state of imbal-
ance in organic-environmental interactions which has already been
described. 3 Restoration of integration can be effected, in one case
as in the other, only by operations which actually modify existing
conditions, not by merely "mental" processes.
It is, accordingly, a mistake to suppose that a situation is doubt-
ful only in a "subjective" sense. The notion that in actual exist-
ence everything is completely determinate has been rendered
questionable by the progress of physical science itself. Even if it
had not been, complete determination would not hold of existences
as an enviromnent. For Nature is an environment only as it is
involved in interaction with an organism, or self, or whatever
name be used. 4
Every such interaction is a temporal process, not a momentary
cross-sectional occurrence. The situation in which it occurs is in-
determinate, therefore, with respect to its issue. If we call it con-
fused, then it is meant that its outcome cannot be anticipated. It
is called obscure when its course of movement permits of final
consequences that cannot be clearly made out. It is called con-
flicting when it tends to evoke discordant responses. Even were
3 See, ante, pp. 26-7.
4 Except of course a purely mentalistic name, like consciousness. The alleged
problem of "interaction ism" versus automatism, parallelism, etc., is a problem (and
an insoluble one) because of the assumption involved in its statement — the assump-
tion, namely, that the interaction in question is with something mental instead of
with biological-cultural human beings.
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 107
existential conditions unqualifiedly determinate in and of them-
selves, they are indeterminate in significance: that is, in what they
import and portend in their interaction with the organism. The
organic responses that enter into the production of the state of
affairs that is temporally later and sequential are just as existential
as are environing conditions.
The immediate locus of the problem concerns, then, what kind
of responses the organism shall make. It concerns the interaction
of organic responses and environing conditions in their movement
toward an existential issue. It is a commonplace that in any trou-
bled state of affairs things will come out differently according to
what is done. The farmer won't get grain unless he plants and
tills; the general will win or lose the battle according to the way
he conducts it, and so on. Neither the grain nor the tilling,
neither the outcome of the battle nor the conduct of it, are "men-
tal" events. Organic interaction becomes inquiry when existential
consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are ex-
amined with reference to their potentialities; and when responsive
activities are selected and ordered with reference to actualization
of some of the potentialities, rather than others, in a final existential
situation. Resolution of the indeterminate situation is active and
operational. If the inquiry is adequately directed, the final issue is
the unified situation that has been mentioned.
II. Institution of a Problem. The unsettled or indeterminate
situation might have been called a problematic situation. This
name would have been, however, proleptic and anticipatory. The
indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process
of being subjected to inquiry. The indeterminate situation comes
into existence from existential causes, just as does, say, the organic
imbalance of hunger. There is nothing intellectual or cognitive in
the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary
condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves they
are precognitive. The first result of evocation of inquiry is that
the situation is taken, adjudged, to be problematic. To see that a
situation requires inquiry is the initial step in inquiry. 5
5 If by "two- valued logic" is meant a logic that regards "true and false" as the
sole logical values, then such a logic is necessarily so truncated that clearness and
consistency in logical doctrine are impossible. Being the matter of a problem is
a primary logical property.
108 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
Qualification of a situation as problematic does not, however,
carry inquiry far. It is but an initial step in institution of a prob-
lem. A problem is not a task to be performed which a person
puts upon himself or that is placed upon him by others — like a so-
called arithmetical "problem" in school work. A problem repre-
sents the partial transformation by inquiry of a problematic situa-
tion into a determinate situation. It is a familiar and significant
saying that a problem well put is half-solved. To find out 'what
the problem and problems are which a problematic situation pre-
sents to be inquired into, is to be well along in inquiry. To mis-
take the problem involved is to cause subsequent inquiry to be
irrelevant or to go astray. Without a problem, there is blind grop-
ing in the dark. The way in which the problem is conceived de-
cides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dis-
missed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion
for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual struc-
tures. On the other hand, to set up a problem that does not grow
out of an actual situation is to start on a course of dead work, none-
theless dead because the work is "busy work." Problems that are
self -set are mere excuses for seeming to do something intellectual,
something that has the semblance but not the substance of scientific
activity.
III. The Determination of a froblem-Solutloii. Statement of a
problematic situation in terms of a problem has no meaning save
as the problem instituted has, in the very terms of its statement,
reference to a possible solution. Just because a problem well
stated is on its way to solution, the determining of a genuine prob-
lem is a progressive inquiry; the cases in which a problem and its
probable solution flash upon an inquirer are cases where much
prior ingestion and digestion have occurred. If we assume, pre-
maturely, that the problem involved is definite and clear, subse-
quent inquiry proceeds on the wrong track. Hence the question
arises: How is the formation of a genuine problem so controlled
that further inquiries will move toward a solution?
The first step in answering this question is to recognize that
no situation which is completely indeterminate can possibly be
converted into a problem having definite constituents. The first
step then is to search out the constituents of a given situation
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 109
which, as constituents, are settled. When an alarm of fire is
sounded in a crowded assembly hall, there is much that is inde-
terminate as regards the activities that may produce a favorable
issue. One may get out safely or one may be trampled and
burned. The fire is characterized, however, by some settled traits.
It is, for example, located somewhere. Then the aisles and exits
are at fixed places. Since they are settled or determinate in exist-
ence, the first step in institution of a problem is to settle them in
observation. There are other factors which, while they are not as
temporally and spatially fixed, are yet observable constituents; for
example, the behavior and movements of other members of the
audience. All of these observed conditions taken together consti-
tute "the facts of the case." They constitute the terms of the
problem, because they are conditions that must be reckoned with
or taken account of in any relevant solution that is proposed.
A possible relevant solution is then suggested by the determina-
tion of factual conditions which are secured by observation. The
possible solution presents itself, therefore, as an idea, just as the
terms of the problem (which are facts) are instituted by observa-
tion. Ideas are anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will
happen when certain operations are executed under and with
respect to observed conditions. 6 Observation of facts and suggested
meanings or ideas arise and develop in correspondence with each
other. The more the facts of the case come to light in consequence
of being subjected to observation, the clearer and more pertinent
become the conceptions of the way the problem constituted by
these facts is to be dealt with. On the other side, the clearer the
idea, the more definite, as a truism, become the operations of ob-
servation and of execution that must be performed in order to re-
solve the situation.
An idea is first of all an anticipation of something that may
happen; it marks a possibility. When it is said, as it sometimes is,
6 The theory of ideas that has been held in psychology and epistemology
since the time of Locke's successors is completely irrelevant and obstructive in
logical theory. For in treating them as copies of perceptions or "impressions," it
ignores the prospective and anticipatory character that defines being an idea.
Failure to define ideas functionally, in the reference they have to a solution of a
problem, is one reason they have been treated as merely "mental." The notion,
on the other hand, that ideas are fantasies is a derivative. Fantasies arise when the
function an idea performs is ruled out when it is entertained and developed.
HO THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
that science is prediction, the anticipation that constitutes every
idea an idea is grounded in a set of controlled observations and of
regulated conceptual ways of interpreting them. Because inquiry
is a progressive determination of a problem and its possible solu-
tion, ideas differ in grade according to the stage of inquiry reached.
At first, save in highly familiar matters, they are vague. They
occur at first simply as suggestions; suggestions just spring up,
flash upon us, occur to us. They may then become stimuli to
direct an overt activity but they have as yet no logical status.
Every idea originates as a suggestion, but not every suggestion is
an idea. The suggestion becomes an idea when it is examined
with reference to its functional fitness; its capacity as a means of
resolving the given situation.
This examination takes the form of reasoning, as a result of
which we are able to appraise better than we were at the outset,
the pertinency and weight of the meaning now entertained with
respect to its functional capacity. But the final test of its posses-
sion of these properties is determined when it actually functions —
that is, when it is put into operation so as to institute by means of
observations facts not previously observed, and is then used to
organize them with other facts into a coherent whole.
Because suggestions and ideas are of that which is not present in
given existence, the meanings which they involve must be cm-
bodied in some symbol. Without some kind of symbol no idea; a
meaning that is completely disembodied can not be entertained
or used. Since an existence (which is an existence) is the support
and vehicle of a meaning and is a symbol instead of a merely physi-
cal existence only in this respect, embodied meanings or ideas are
capable of objective survey and development. To "look at an
idea" is not a mere literary figure of speech.
"Suggestions" have received scant courtesy in logical theory.
It is true that when they just "pop into our heads," because of the
workings of the psycho-physical organism, they arc not logical.
But they are both the conditions and the primary stuff of logical
ideas. The traditional empiristic theory reduced them, as has
already been pointed out, to mental copies of physical things and
assumed that they were per se identical with ideas. Consequently
it ignored the function of ideas in directing observation and in
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 111
ascertaining relevant facts. The rationalistic school, on the other
hand, saw clearly that "facts'' apart from ideas are trivial, that
they acquire import and significance only in relation to ideas.
But at the same time it failed to attend to the operative and func-
tional nature of the latter. Hence, it treated ideas as equivalent
to the ultimate structure of "Reality." The Kantian formula that
apart from each other "perceptions are blind and conceptions
empty" marks a profound logical insight. The insight, however,
was radically distorted because perceptual and conceptual contents
were supposed to originate from different sources and thus re-
quired a third activity, that of synthetic understanding, to bring
them together. In logical fact, perceptual and conceptual ma-
terials are instituted in functional correlativity with each other,
in such a manner that the former locates and describes the prob-
lem while the latter represents a possible method of solution.
Both are determinations in and by inquiry of the original prob-
lematic situation whose pervasive quality controls their institution
and their contents. Both are finally checked by their capacity to
work together to introduce a resolved unified situation. As dis-
tinctions they represent logical divisions of labor.
IV. Reasoning. The necessity of developing the meaning-
contents of ideas in their relations to one another has been inci-
dentally noted. This process, operating with symbols (consti-
tuting propositions) is reasoning in the sense of ratiocination or
rational discourse. 7 When a suggested meaning is immediately
accepted, inquiry is cut short. Hence the conclusion reached is
not grounded, even if it happens to be correct. The check upon
immediate acceptance is the examination of the meaning as a
meaning. This examination consists in noting what the meaning
in question implies in relation to other meanings in the system of
which it is a member, the formulated relation constituting a propo-
sition. If such and such a relation of meanings is accepted, then
we are committed to such and such other relations of meanings
because of their membership in the same system. Through a se-
ries of intermediate meanings, a meaning is finally reached which
7 "Reasoning" is sometimes used to designate inference as well as ratiocination.
When so used in logic the tendency is to identify inference and implication and
thereby seriously to confuse logical theory.
H2 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
is more clearly relevant to the problem in hand than the originally
suggested idea. It indicates operations which can be performed to
test its applicability, whereas the original idea is usually too vague
to determine crucial operations. In other words, the idea or mean-
ing when developed in discourse directs the activities which, when
executed, provide needed evidential material.
The point made can be most readily appreciated in connection
with scientific reasoning. An hypothesis, once suggested and en-
tertained, is developed in relation to other conceptual structures
until it receives a form in which it can instigate and direct an
experiment that will disclose precisely those conditions which
have the maximum possible force in determining whether the
hypothesis should be accepted or rejected. Or it may be that
the experiment will indicate what modifications are required in
the hypothesis so that it may be applicable, i.e., suited to interpret
and organize the facts of the case. In many familiar situations,
the meaning that is most relevant has been settled because of the
eventuations of experiments in prior cases so that it is applicable
almost immediately upon its occurrence. But, indirectly, if not
directly, an idea or suggestion that is not developed in terms of
the constellation of meanings to which it belongs can lead only
to overt response. Since the latter terminates inquiry, there is then
no adequate inquiry into the meaning that is used to settle the
given situation, and the conclusion is in so far logically un-
grounded.
V. The Operational Character of Facts-Meanings. It was
stated that the observed facts of the case and the ideational con-
tents expressed in ideas are related to each other, as, respectively,
a clarification of the problem involved and the proposal of some
possible solution; that they are, accordingly, functional divisions
in the work of inquiry. Observed facts in their office of locating
and describing the problem are existential; ideational subject-
matter is non-existential. How, then, do they cooperate with
each other in the resolution of an existential situation? The prob-
lem is insoluble save as it is recognized that both observed facts
and entertained ideas are operational. Ideas are operational in
that they instigate and direct further operations of observation;
they are proposals and plans for acting upon existing conditions
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY IB
to bring new facts to light and to organize all the selected facts
into a coherent whole.
What is meant by calling facts operational? Upon the negative
side what is meant is that they are not self-sufficient and complete
in themselves. They are selected and described, as we have seen,
for a purpose, namely statement of the problem involved in such
a way that its material both indicates a meaning relevant to resolu-
tion of the difficulty and serves to test its worth and validity. In
regulated inquiry facts are selected and arranged with the express
intent of fulfilling this office. They are not merely results of
operations of observation which are executed with the aid of
bodily organs and auxiliary instruments of art, but they are the
particular facts and kinds of facts that will link up with one an-
other in the definite ways that are required to produce a definite
end. Those not found to connect with others in furtherance of
this end are dropped and others are sought for. Being functional,
they are necessarily operational. Their function is to serve as
evidence and their evidential quality is judged on the basis of their
capacity to form an ordered whole in response to operations pre-
scribed by the ideas they occasion and support. If "the facts of
the case" were final and complete in themselves, if they did not
have a special operative force in resolution of the problematic
situation, they could not serve as evidence.
The operative force of facts is apparent when we consider that
no fact in isolation has evidential potency. Facts are evidential
and are tests of an idea in so far as they are capable of being or-
ganized with one another. The organization can be achieved only
as they interact with one another. When the problematic situa-
tion is such as to require extensive inquiries to effect its resolution,
a series of interactions intervenes. Some observed facts point to
an idea that stands for a possible solution. This idea evokes more
observations. Some of the newly observed facts link up with
those previously observed and are such as to rule out other ob-
served things with respect to their evidential function. The new
order of facts suggests a modified idea (or hypothesis) which
occasions new observations whose result again determines a new
order of facts, and so on until the existing order is both unified
and complete. In the course of this serial process, the ideas that
114 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
represent possible solutions are tested or "proved."
Meantime, the orders of fact, which present themselves in con-
sequence of the experimental observations the ideas call out and
direct, are trial facts. They are provisional They are "facts"
if they are observed by sound organs and techniques. But they
are not on that account the facts of the case. They are tested or
"proved" with respect to their evidential function just as much as
ideas (hypotheses) are tested with reference to their power to
exercise the function of resolution. The operative force of both
ideas and facts is thus practically recognized in the degree in
which they are connected with expeiivicm. Naming them "op-
erational" is but a theoretical recognition of what is involved
when inquiry satisfies the conditions imposed by the necessity
for experiment.
I recur, in this connection, to what has been said about the ne-
cessity for symbols in inquiry. It is obvious, on the face of mat-
ters, that a possible mode of solution must be earned in symbolic
form since it is a possibility, not an assured piescnr existence.
Observed facts, on the other hand, are existentially present. It
might seem therefore, that symbols arc not required for referring
to them. But if they are not carried and treated by means of
symbols, they lose their provisional character, and in losing this
character they are categorically asserted and inquiry comes to an
end. The carrying on of inquiry requires that the facts be taken
as representative and not just as presented. This demand is met
by formulating them in propositions — that is, by means of sym-
bols. Unless they are so represented they relapse into the total
qualitative situation.
VI. Common Sense and Scientific Inquiry. The discussion up
to this point has proceeded in general terms which recognizes no
distinction between common sense and scientific inquiry. We
have now reached a point where the community of partem in these
two distinctive modes of inquiry should receive explicit attention.
It was said in earlier chapters that the difference between them
resides in their respective subject-matters, not in their basic logical
forms and relations; that the difference in subject-matters is due
to the difference in the problems respectively involved; and, fi-
nally, that this difference sets up a difference in the ends or ob-
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 115
jective consequences they are concerned to achieve. Because
common sense problems and inquiries have to do with the inter-
actions into which living creatures enter in connection with en-
vironing conditions in order to establish objects of use and
enjoyment, the symbols employed are those which have been
determined in the habitual culture of a group. They form a
system but the system is practical rather than intellectual. It is
constituted by the traditions, occupations, techniques, interests,
and established institutions of the group. The meanings that
compose it are carried in the common everyday language of com-
munication between members of the group. The meanings in-
volved in this common language system determine what individuals
of the group may and may not do in relation to physical objects
and in relations to one another. They regulate what can be used
and enjoyed and how use and enjoyment shall occur.
Because the symbol-meaning systems involved are connected
directly with cultural life-activities and are related to each other
in virtue of this connection, the specific meanings which are pres-
ent have reference to the specific and limited environing condi-
tions under which the group lives. Only those things of the
environment that are taken, according to custom and tradition,
as having connection with and bearing upon this life, enter into
the meaning system. There is no such thing as disinterested in-
tellectual concern with either physical or social matters. For,
until the rise of science, there were no problems of common sense
that called for such inquiry. Disinterestedness existed practically
in the demand that group interests and concerns be put above
private needs and interests. But there was no intellectual disinter-
estedness beyond the activities, interests and concerns of the
group. In other words, there was no science as such, although, as
was earlier pointed out, there did exist information and techniques
which were available for the purposes of scientific inquiry and
out of which the latter subsequently grew.
In scientific inquiry, then, meanings are related to one another
on the ground of their character as meanings, freed from direct
reference to the concerns of a limited group. Their intellectual
abstractness is a product of this liberation, just as the "concrete"
is practically identified by directness of connection with environ-
116 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
mental interactions. Consequently a new language, a new system
of symbols related together on a new basis, conies into existence,
and in this new language semantic coherence, as such, is the con-
trolling consideration. To repeat what has already been said, con-
nection with problems of use and enjoyment is the source of the
dominant role of qualities, sensible and moral, and of ends in
common sense.
In science, since meanings are determined on the ground of
their relation as meanings to one another, relations become the
objects of inquiry and qualities are relegated to a secondary status,
playing a part only as far as they assist in institution of relations.
They are subordinate because they have an instrumental office,
instead of being themselves, as in prescientific common sense, the
matters of final importance. The enduring hold of common sense
is testified to historically by the long time it took before it was
sttn that scientific objects are strictly relational. First tertiary
qualities were eliminated; it was recognized that moral qualities
are not agencies in determining the structure of nature. Then
secondary qualities, the wet-dry, hot-cold, light-heavy, which were
the explanatory principles of physical phenomena in Greek science,
were ejected. But so-called primary qualities took their place, as
with Newton and the Lockeian formulation of Newtonian ex-
istential postulates. It was not until the threshold of our time
was reached that scientific inquiries perceived that their own
problems and methods required an. interpretation of "primary
qualities" in terms of relations, such as position, motion and
temporal span. In the structure of distinctively scientific objects
these relations are indifferent to qualities.
The foregoing is intended to indicate that the different objec-
tives of common sense and of scientific inquiry demand different
subject-matters and that this difference in subject-matters is not
incompatible with the existence of a common pattern in both
types. There are, of course, secondary logical forms which re-
flect the distinction of properties involved in the change from
qualitative and teleological subject-matter to non-qualitative and
non-teleological relations. But they occur and operate within
the described community of pattern. They are explicable, and
explicable only, on the ground of the distinctive problems gen-
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY 117
erated by scientific subject-matter. The independence of scien-
tific objects from limited and fairly direct reference to the en-
vironment as a factor in activities of use and enjoyment, is
equivalent, as has already been intimated, to their abstract char-
acter. It is also equivalent to their general character in the sense
in which the generalizations of science are different from the
generalizations with which common sense is familiar. The gen-
erality of all scientific subject-matter as such means that it is
freed from restriction to conditions which present themselves
at particular times and places. Their reference is to any set of
time and place conditions — a statement which is not to be confused
with the doctrine that they have no reference to actual existential
occasions. Reference to time-place of existence is necessarily in-
volved, but it is reference to whatever set of existences fulfils the
general relations laid down in and by the constitution of the
scientific object. 8
Summary. Since a number of points have been discussed, it
will be well to round up conclusions reached about them in a
summary statement of the structure of the common pattern of
inquiry. Inquiry is the directed or controlled transformation of an
indeterminate situation into a determinately unified one. The
transition is achieved by means of operations of two kinds which
are in functional correspondence with each other. One kind of
operations deals with ideational or conceptual subject-matter.
This subject-matter stands for possible ways and ends of resolu-
tion. It anticipates a solution, and is marked off from fancy be-
cause, or, in so far as, it becomes operative in instigation and di-
rection of new observations yielding new factual material. The
other kind of operations is made up of activities involving the
techniques and organs of observation. Since these operations are
existential they modify the prior existential situation, bring into
high relief conditions previously obscure, and relegate to the
background other aspects that were at the outset conspicuous.
8 The consequences that follow are directly related to the statement in Ch. IV
that the elimination of qualities and ends is intermediate; that, in fact, the con-
struction of purely relational objects has enormously liberated and expanded
common sense uses and enjoyments by conferring control over production of
qualities, by enabling new ends to be realistically instituted, and by providing
competent means for achieving them.
118 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
The ground and criterion of the execution of this work of em-
phasis, selection and arrangement is to delimit the problem in
such a way that existential material may be provided with which
to test the ideas that represent possible modes of solution. Sym-
bols, defining terms and propositions, are necessarily required in
order to retain and carry forward both ideational and existential
subject-matters in order that they may serve their proper func-
tions in the control of inquiry. Otherwise the problem is taken
to be closed and inquiry ceases.
One fundamentally important phase of the transformation of
the situation which constitutes inquiry is central in the treat-
ment of judgment and its functions- The transformation is ex-
istential and hence temporal. The pre-cognitive unsettled situa-
tion can be settled only by modification of its constituents. Ex-
perimental operations change existing conditions. Reasoning,
as such, can provide means for effecting the change of conditions
but by itself cannot effect it. Only execution of existential opera-
tions directed by an idea in which ratiocination terminates can
bring about the re-ordering of environing conditions required
to produce a settled and unified situation. Since this principle also
applies to the meanings that are elaborated in science, the experi-
mental production and re-arrangement of physical conditions
involved in natural science is further evidence of the unity of the
pattern of inquiry. The temporal quality of inquiry means,
then, something quite other than that the process of inquiry takes
time. It means that the objective subject-matter of inquiry under-
goes temporal modification.
Terminological. Were it not that knowledge is related to in-
quiry as a product to the operations by which it is produced, no dis-
tinctions requiring special differentiating designations would exist.
Material would merely be a matter of knowledge or of ignorance
and error; that would be all that could be said. The content of
any given proposition would have the values "true" and "false"
as final and exclusive attributes. But if knowledge is related to
inquiry as its warrantable assertible product, and if inquiry is
progressive and temporal, then the material inquired into reveals
distinctive properties which need to be designated by distinctive
names. As undergoing inquiry, the material has a different logical
THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY H9
import from that which it has as the outcome of inquiry. In its
first capacity and status, it will be called by the general name
subject-matter. When it is necessary to refer to subject-matter
in the context of either observation or ideation, the name content
will be used, and, particularly on account of its representative
character, content of propositions.
The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as
it has been produced and ordered in settled form by means of
inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives of inquiry. The
apparent ambiguity of using "objects" for this purpose (since the
word is regularly applied to things that are observed or thought
of) is only apparent. For things exist as objects for us only as
they have been previously determined as outcomes of inquiries.
When used in carrying on new inquiries in new problematic situa-
tions, they are known as objects in virtue of prior inquiries which
warrant their assertibility. In the new situation, they are means
of attaining knowledge of something else. In the strict sense, they
are part of the contents of inquiry as the word content was de-
fined above. But retrospectively (that is, as products of prior de-
termination in inquiry) they are objects.
CHAPTER VII
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 1
"n terms of the ideas set forth in the last chapter, judgment
may be identified as the settled outcome of inquiry. It is
. concerned with the concluding objects that emerge from in-
quiry in their status of being conclusive. Judgment in this sense is
distinguished from propositions. The content of the latter is inter-
mediate and representative and is carried by symbols; while judg-
ment, as finally made, has direct existential import. The terms af-
firmation and assertion are employed in current speech inter-
changeably. But there is a difference, which should have linguistic
recognition, between the logical status of intermediate subject-
matters that are taken for use in connection with what they may
lead to as means, and subject-matter which has been prepared to be
final. I shall use assertion to designate the latter logical status and
affirmation to name the former. Even from the standpoint of ordi-
nary speech, assertio?i has a quality of insistence that is lacking in
the connotation of the "word "affirmation." We can usually substi-
tute the phrase "it is held" or "it is said" for u it is affirmed" How-
ever, the important matter is not the words, but the logical
properties that are characteristic of different subject-matters.
A literal instance of judgment in the sense defined is provided
by the judgment of a court of law in settling some issue which,
up to that point, has been in controversy. 1. The occurrence of
a trial-at-law is equivalent to the occurrence of a problematic
situation which requires settlement. There is uncertainty and
dispute about what shall be done because there is conflict about
the significance of what has taken place, even if there is agree-
ment about what has taken place as a matter of fact — which, of
course, is not always the case. The judicial settlement is a settle-
x The word "construction" is here used to cover the operation of construction
and the structure which results.
120
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 121
ment of an issue because it decides existential conditions in their
bearing upon further activities: the essence of the significance of
any state of facts.
2. This settlement or judgment is the outcome of inquiry con-
ducted in the court-hearings. The inquiry exemplifies the pattern
described in the last chapter. On the one hand, propositions are
advanced about the state of facts involved. Witnesses testify to
what they have heard and seen; written records are offered, etc.
This subject-matter is capable of direct observation and has
existential reference. As each party to the discussion produces
its evidential material, the latter is intended to point to a deter-
minate decision as a resolution of the as yet undetermined situation.
The decision takes effect in a definite existential reconstruction.
On the other hand, there are propositions about conceptual subject-
matter; rules of law are adduced to determine the admissibility
(relevancy) and the weight of facts offered as evidence. The
significa?2ce of factual material is fixed by the rules of the existing
juridical system; it is not carried by the facts independent of the
conceptual structure which interprets them. And yet, the quality
of the problematic situation determines which rules of the total
system are selected. They are different in civil and criminal cases;
in cases of trespass and of breach of contract. Conceptions have
been organized in the past under definite rubrics which summarize
the kinds of interpreting principles that past experience has shown
to be applicable in the variety of special cases that normally arise.
The theoretical ideal sought to guide judicial deliberation is a net-
work of relations and procedures which express the closest possible
correspondence between facts and the legal meanings that give
them their significance: that is, settle the consequences which, in
the existing social system, flow from them.
3. The final judgment arrived at is a settiement. The case is
disposed of; the disposition takes effect in existential consequences.
The sentence or proposition is not an end in itself but a decisive
directive of future activities. The consequences of these activities
bring about an existential determination of the prior situation
which was indeterminate as to its issue. A man is set free, sent
to prison, pays a fine, or has to execute an agreement or pay
damages to an injured party. It is this resulting state of actual
affairs — this changed situation — that is the matter of the final
122 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
settlement or judgment. The sentence itself is a proposition,
differing, however, from the propositions formed during the trial,
whether they concern matters of fact or legal conceptions, in
that it takes overt effect in operations which construct a new
qualitative situation. While prior propositions are means of in-
stituting the sentence, the sentence is terminal as a means of insti-
tuting a definite existential situation.
Judgment figures, however, in determination of the intermediate
propositions. When it is ruled that certain evidence is admissible
and that certain rules of law (conceptual material) arc applicable
rather than others, something is settled. It is through a series of
such intervening settlements that the final settlement is constructed.
Judgment as final settlement is dependent upon a series of partial
settlements. The judgments by which propositions are deter-
mined is recognized and marked off linguistically by such words
as estimates, appraisals, evaluations. In resolution of problems
that are of a looser quality than legal cases we call them opinions
to distinguish them from a warranted judgment or assertion. But
if the opinion held is grounded it is itself the product of inquiry
and in so far is a judgment. 2 Estimates and appraisals are pro-
visional; they are means, not ends. Even a judgment of appraisal
by judges on the bench may be reversed in a higher court, while
in freer conduct of scientific inquiry such judgments arc expressly
made subject to modification. The consequences they produce
in the conduct of further inquiry is the criterion of their value.
Judgments which intervene are ad- judgments.
I. Final Judgment is Individual. This caption is elliptical. It
means that the subject-matter (objects) of final judgment is a
situation in the sense in which the meaning of that word has been
explained; it is a qualitative existential whole which is unique.
"Individual" as here used has nothing to do with simplicity of
constituents. On the contrary, every situation, when it is ana-
lyzed, is extensive containing within itself diverse distinctions and
relations which, in spite of their diversity, form a unified qualita-
tive whole. What is designated by the word individual has, ac-
cordingly, to be distinguished from that which is designated by
2 Opinion in common speech often means a belief entertained without examina-
tion, being generated by custom, tradition or desire.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 123
the word singular. Singulars are named by demonstratives, such
as this, that, here, noiv, or in some cases by proper nouns. The
difference between a singular and an individual is the same as
that previously pointed out between an object (or set of objects
in their severalty) and a situation. 3 Singular objects exist and
singular events occur within a field or situation. This or that star,
man, rock or whatever, is always a discrimination or selection
made for a purpose, or for the sake of some objective consequence
within an inclusive field. The singular has no import save as a
term of differentiation and contrast. If its object is taken to be
complete in itself, loss of differential force destroys all power of
reference on the part of the demonstrative act. The very ex-
istence of differentiation, on the other hand, shows that the sin-
gular exists within an extensive field.
It follows that determination of a singular is also instrumental
in determination of a situation which is itself not complete and
self-sufficient. It is a means of identifying a situation in reference
to the problem set to inquiry. It represents, at a given stage of
inquiry, that which is crucial, critical, differentiatingly significant.
An artisan in carrying on his work at any given time takes note of
certain aspects and phases of the situation in which his activities
are involved. He notes just that object or occurrence which is
decisive in the stage of development arrived at in the whole
situation which is determinative of what is to be next. The ob-
jects which are this and that, to which his inquiry and activity are
immediately directed, are, therefore, constantly changing. As
one phase of the problem offered by his work is resolved, another
phase, presented by a new object or occurrence, takes its place.
Were not the sequence determined by an inclusive situation, whose
qualitative nature pervades and holds together each successive
step, activity would be a meaningless hop-skip- jump affair. Ob-
jects observed and dealt with would be a shifting panorama of
sudden disconnected appearances and disappearances. Exactly
the same account may be given of the succession of observations
which deal with singular objects and occurrences in scientific in-
quiry. The singular is that upon which inquiry into an individual
situation pivots under the special conditions that at a given time
3 Ante, pp. 66-7.
124 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
fix the problem with respect to the conditions to be dealt with
forthwith.
The discriminative or differential aspect of the demonstrative
act and its singular object is suggested in ordinary speech by the
expression "pointing out." It is impossible merely to point at
something. 4 For anything or everything in the line of vision or
gesture may be equally pointed at. The act of pointing is wholly
indeterminate as to its object. It is not selective within a situation,
because it is not controlled by the problem which the situation
sets and the necessity for determining the conditions which then
and there point to the way in which it shall be resolved.
The point just made has its logical meaning in disclosure of the
ambiguity of the word given as that is currently employed in
logical texts. That which is "given" in the strict sense of the
word "given," is the total field or situation. The given in the
sense of the singular, whether object or quality, is the special
aspect, phase or constituent of the existcntiatly present situation
that is selected to locate and identify its problematic features with
reference to the inquiry then and there to be executed. In the strict
sense, it is taken rather than given. This fact decides the logical
status of data. They are not isolated, complete or self-sufficient.
To be a datum is to have a special function in control of the
subject-matter of inquiry. It embodies a fixation of the problem in
a way which indicates a possible solution. It also helps to provide
evidence which tests the solution that is hypothctically enter-
tained. This theme will be developed in the discussion that follows
of "thought," that is, inquiry.
II. The Subject of Judgment. What was said in the last chap-
ter concerning the pattern of inquiry enables us to identify the
structure of judgment as conjugate distinction and relation of
subject-predicate. Observed facts of the case in their dual func-
tion of bringing the problem to light and of providing evidential
material with respect to its solution constitute what has tradition-
ally been called the subject. The conceptual contents which
anticipate a possible solution and which direct observational opera-
tions constitute what has traditionally been called the predicate.
4 Cf. the conditions and results of the pointing reported in the incident de-
scribed on p. 53.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 125
Their functional and operative correspondence with each other
constitutes the copula.
In this section, I shall consider the subject of judgment. The
bearing of the conclusions reached up to this point may be fo-
calized by contrasting them with a doctrine current in logical
theory. This latter view holds that the existential matter, which
has ultimately the form of this object or this quality, is given or
presented in a literal sense to judgment. Judgment proper is then
confined to the work of predicating something of it, of character-
izing what is handed out ready-made either to sense-perception
or to judgment. I select one statement as typical: "In every
proposition we are determining in thought the character of an
object present to thought." 5 The contrasting position here taken
holds that the subject-matters of subject and predicate are de-
termined in correspondence with each other in and by the process
of "thought," that is, inquiry.
Examination of the two opposed theories will start from the
negative side. We begin by pointing out the difficulties, amount-
ing to impossibilities, in the customary view advanced in many
standard treatises. (1) It leaves judgment, as predication, and
just at the point where its existential material is concerned, en-
tirely at the mercy of the accidental flux of objects which happen
to present themselves. It thereby destroys the possibility of
sequential continuity in "thought." Predication would at one
moment be characterizing one object, and at the next moment
some other object, according as changes and shifts in environ-
ing conditions took place. The occurrence of successive "given"
or "presented" singulars would be wholly determined by condi-
tions outside of inquiry and therefore accidental and irrelevant.
(2) The view would be another version of the old doctrine of
passive receptivities, were it not that some active response is de-
manded in order to institute something to which a demonstrative
term may be applied. Even then, there is nothing to ground the
act of pointing so as to select one "this" rather than another. (3)
Nor is there anything in a mere given "this" to ground one char-
acterizing predicate rather than another. Either "this" is so
empty that nothing can be said of it except "this is this" where
" W. E. Johnson, Logic, Part I, pages 9 and 11.
126 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
"this" signifies nothing beyond the mere presence of an indefinite
somewhat, or else any one of a large number of predications can
equally well be made. The truth is that the view criticized can be
intelligibly stated only after inquiry has already made out some fact
or set of facts and when the emphatic problem has become that of
knowing how it should be characterized. The view owes whatever
plausibility it appears to have to the fact that it begins its account
of judgment after inquiry has been operative and has already
established a partial judgment or appraisal. As was indicated in
the prior chapter, in situations whose recognized constituents are
similar to those of prior experiences, certain objects are likely to
stand out sufficiently so as to afford clews. But (a) they do so as
products of prior judgments, and (b) in any case they are pro-
visional as evidential data. For they may be misleading clews be-
cause they turn out to be not "the facts of the case," or what is
significant in respect to the present problem.
Suppose that in a given case, this is characterized "Washington
Monument/' The act of pointing does not determine any one
"this" rather than another since everything in the line of pointing
is pointed at. In the second place, even when we suppose that
the act of pointing happens to land, so to speak, upon one singular
rather than another, it is only a group of sensible qualities that is
indicated. There is nothing in these qualities, apart from the con-
trol of their interpretation by an inclusive situation, to justify
characterizing them as the Washington Monument — or as a me-
morial of any kind. The most that could be said is that the
qualities observed in consequence of the demonstrative act are
just the qualities they are. The nub of any existential identifica-
tion or characterization of a thing as such-and-such lies in the
ground it offers for giving the object a description in terms of
what is not then and there observed. Apart from an inclusive
situation which determines in correspondence with each other the
material that constitutes the observed singular this and the kind
of characterizing predicate applicable to it, predication is to-
tally arbitrary or ungrounded. There must be some one question
to which both the subject "this" and the predicate (say, Washing-
ton Monument) are relevant. That question grows out of and is
controlled by some total situation. Otherwise propositions made
are pointless.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 111
Any proposition in which "this" appears is then instituted by a
judgment of appraisal in which "this" is determined in order to
provide evidential grounds for the qualification attached to it by
the predicate. This fact is inconsistent with "this" being a mere
this. There is, however, no incompatibility between the fact that
it is just what it existentially is and the estimate that it is the needed
evidential ground of a definite characterization. Stating the
matter positively, the operations that institute a "this" as subject
are always selective-restrictive of something from out of a larger
field. What is selected and what is rejected flows from an estimate
of their probable evidential significance.
III. Subjects and Substances. According to the original Aris-
totelian logic, certain objects, such as species, are logical subjects
by Nature, since they are substances in Nature, so that only propo-
sitions having substances for their subjects can enter into rationally
demonstrative knowledge or science. This theory of the nature
of the logical subject at least recognizes that the logical subject
has a determinate nature capable of grounding what is predicated
of it. But the progress of science has destroyed the idea that
objects as such are eternal substances, even such objects as the
"fixed stars." 6 It also destroyed the notion of immutable kinds
marked off from one another by fixed essences. The following
problem accordingly arises: If the logical subject cannot be iden-
tified either with an object or sense-datum directly given to judg-
ment for qualification through predication, nor yet with an
ontological "substance," what is meant by being an object sub-
stantial in any sense that makes it capable of serving as a subject?
The answer to this question is implicit in what has been said.
The subject is existential, either a singular this, or a set of singulars.
But there are conditions of inquiry which must be satisfied by
anything taken to be a subject. (1) It must delimit and describe
the problem in such a way as to indicate a possible solution. (2) It
must be such that new data, instituted by observational operations
directed by the provisional predicate (representing a possible so-
lution), will unite with its subject-matter to form a coherent whole.
6 The Newtonian theory of atoms represented a survival of the old conception
of changeless substances. Within the context of the theory, however, they were
transferred from the region of common sense objects to that of strictly scientific
objects.
US THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
The latter constitutes a substantial object in the logical sense of
that term, or is on its way to becoming such an object. For it is
union of connected distinctions so held together that it may be
acted upon or with as a whole; and it is capable of incorporating
into itself other predicated qualifications until it becomes, as
such, a unity of inter-connected distinctions, or "properties."
Take, for an example, such an elementary proposition as "this
is sweet." This, as has been shown, marks a selective-restriction,
made for a definite purpose, within an inclusive qualitative prob-
lematic situation. The purpose is the final consequence of a
resolved situation in attainment of which "this" has a special func-
tion to perform. If the predicate "is sweet" is an anticipation of
the resolved situation, it means "this" 'will sweeten something if
that operation is performed which is required to generate definite
perceptible consequence. Or, it may record the achieved result
of the execution of the operation: "This has sweetened some-
thing." When the operation is completed, this is definitely qualified
as sweet. This fact is manifest not in a proposition (although a
proposition may report it for purposes of record or communication
of information) nor in symbols, but in a directly experienced
existence. Henceforth, "this" is a sweet somewhat. The quality
sweet does not stand alone but is definitely connected with other
observed qualities. As thus characterized, it enters into further
situations in which it incorporates into itself additional qualifica-
tions. It is a sweet, white, granular, more or less gritty thing or
substance, say, sugar.
"Substance" represents therefore, a logical, not an ontological,
determination. Sugar, for example, is a substance because through
a number of partial judgments completed in operations which
have existential consequences, a variety of qualifications so cohere
as to form an object that may be used and enjoyed as a unified
whole. Its substantial character is quite independent of its physi-
cal duration, to say nothing of its immutability. The object,
sugar, may disappear in solution. It is then further qualified; it is
a soluble object. In a chemical interaction its constitution may
be so changed that it is no longer sugar. Capacity for undergoing
this change is henceforth an additional qualification or property
of anything that is sugar. The condition — and the sole condition
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 129
that has to be satisfied in order that there may be substantiality,
is that certain qualifications hang together as dependable signs
that certain consequences will follow when certain interactions
take place. This is what is meant when it is said that substan-
tiality is a logical, not a primary ontological determination.
It is a form that accrues to original existence when the latter
operates in a specified functional way as a consequence of opera-
tions of inquiry. It is not postulated that certain qualities always
cohere in existence. It is postulated that they cohere as depend-
able evidential signs. The conjoined properties that mark off
and identify a chair, a piece of granite, a meteor, are not sets of
qualities given existentially as such and such. They are certain
qualities which constitute in their ordered conjunction with one
another valid signs of what will ensue when certain operations
are performed. An object, in other words, is a set of qualities
treated as potentialities for specified existential consequences.
Powder is what will explode under certain conditions; water as
a substantial object is that group of connected qualities which will
quench thirst, and so on. The greater the number of interactions,
of operations, and of consequences, the more complex is the con-
stitution of a given substantial object. With the progress of
technology, clay and iron have acquired new potentialities. A
piece of iron is now a sign of many things of which it was not
once a sign. When it was discovered that wood-pulp could be
used for making paper if its material was subjected to operations in
which it entered into new conditions of interaction, the signifi-
cance of certain forms of lumber as objects changed. They did
not become entirely new substantial objects because old poten-
tialities for consequences remained. But neither was it the same
old substance. The habit of supposing that it is the same all
the time is the result of hypostatizing the logical character of
being a sign or having significance into something inherent. Be-
ing a substantial object defines a specific function.
We speak regularly of chemical substances. A chemical sub-
stance is represented not by enumeration of qualities as such, but
by a formula which provides a synoptic indication of the various
types of consequences which will result. The perceptible quali-
ties of table sugar and sugar of lead are much the same. Even
130 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY ^
common sense learns to distinguish them as different "substances"
in virtue of some of the different consequences which ensue from
their operational use. In the scientific statement of their chemical
substance, even common sensible qualities are ignored. Different
formulae enable us to anticipate differences which are not sensibly-
discernible at the time. To common sense, water is that which
is potable, which will cleanse, upon which many things will float,
etc. Chemically, it is H2O — a description in terms of a set of
possible interactions and specified consequences. Some qualities
are actually, sensibly, present. But as such they do not constitute
an object. For common sense and for science alike, they consti-
tute an object in virtue of the consequences of which the existent
qualities, be they few or many, are signs, and of which they are
the conditions provided operations institute certain interactions
not then and there occurring.
The contrast between the conception of substance that has
been set forth here with the Aristotelian ontological conception
is, of course, intimately connected with the great change which
has taken place in science, i.e., its complete shift from immutable
objects to correspondences of changes. Aristotle said, "It is absurd
to make the fact that the things of this earth change and never
remain the same the basis of our judgments about the truth. For
in pursuing the truth one must start from things that are always
in the same state and never change. Such are the heavenly bodies;
for they do not appear to be now of one nature and now of an-
other, but are always manifestly the same and do not change." 7
Such immutable things alone were complete substances and fit
to be subjects of "true" propositions. In present science, on the
other hand, such transitory events as lightning and such variable
things as the weather become subjects of scientific judgments when
they are determined as constituents of a systematic set of changes
which as changes are in functional correspondence. Such facts
exemplify what is meant by the functional nature of substantial
objects. In the light of dependable inferences that can be drawn,
of the correlations of changes that are established, an event like a
flash of lightning has logical solidity and endurance in spite of its
existential transitivity. It is substantial. It is representable by a
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1063 % Ross' translation.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 131
substantive, which even when it is a verbal noun has constancy in
discourse as a means of identification of the kind of which the
singular is a specimen.
IV. The Predicate of Judgment. The logical meaning of predi-
cate has been anticipated in the discussion of the logical subject,
because of the strict correlativity of respective existential and
ideational contents. The meanings which are suggested as pos-
sible solutions of a problem, which are then used to direct further
operations of experimental observation, form the predicational
content of judgments. The latter is related to the factual content,
that is, the subject, as the possible to the actual. For example,
in the illustration considered above, when "this 77 is estimated be-
fore the act of tasting to be sweet, a certain consequence is an-
ticipated to which is assigned a definite connection in the total
situation. If, however, it is at once asserted "this is sweet," the
assertion is logically premature and ungrounded. The anticipa-
tion functions logically "to instigate and direct an operation of
experimental observation. When the consequences of the latter
combine with facts already ascertained so as to constitute a uni-
fied total situation, inquiry comes to an end. But there is always
danger that the congeniality or plausibility of the content of the
predicate-meaning will lead directly to its acceptance. In that
case, it is not operationally checked. It possesses logical status
only as it is taken for what it is qua predicate — namely, a method
of solution not itself a solution. There is also danger that pains
will not be taken, even when an operation is performed, to scru-
tinize its results in order to ascertain whether the existential con-
ditions actually cohere in a unified way. These two failures are
the common source of premature, hasty, and therefore ungrounded
assertion.
The essential error of the "rationalistic" tradition in logical
theory consists in taking the consistency of the constituents of the
conceptual contents (which form the predicate) as a final cri-
terion of truth or assertibility. Subject-matter which, in its logical
form, is a means for performing experimental activities to modify
prior existences is mistaken to be final and complete in itself.
Thereby an inherent ontological status is imputed to it. As has
been pointed out, subject-matter endowed with "rational" form
132 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
was treated in classic logic as constituting a superior realm of
"Reality," in comparison with which material capable of sensible
observation was by Nature metaphysically inferior. The latter
was "known" only in so far as it could be directly subsumed
under the conceptual material. A more recent tendency is to
regard the conceptual subject-matter as constituting a realm of
abstract possibility also taken as complete in itself, not as indi-
cating possibilities of operations to be performed. While the
resulting metaphysical status assigned is very different from that
of classic ontology, there is nevertheless the same hypostization
of a logical function into a supra-empirical entity. Meantime,
the practice of scientific inquiry has provided the foundations for
a correct logical interpretation.
The conceptual and "rational" contents are hypotheses. In
their more comprehensive forms they are theories. As such they
may be and usually are abstracted from application to this and
that immediate existential situation. But on that very account,
they are instruments of a wide, indefinite scope of operational
application, actual application being made as special conditions
present themselves. In reaction against the inherently "superior"
position assigned to conceptual material, and because of its recog-
nition of the necessity of observational experience to guarantee
existential reference, "empiristic" logical tradition went to the
other extreme. It denied the logical necessity of conceptual
meanings and theories, reducing them to mere practical conven-
iences. Traditional empiricism supposed it was following the
pattern set by scientific inquiry. But in fact it was engaged in
corrupting formulation of scientific inquiry by subjecting the
latter to uncritically accepted conclusions of a subjectivistic
psychological theory.
V. The Copula. The logical import of copulation is involved
in the prior account of subject and predicate. It is neither a
separate and independent element nor yet does it affect the predi-
cate alone, attaching the latter to an independently and externally
given singular subject, whether the latter be taken to be an object,
a quality, or a sense-datum. It does express the act of predica-
tion. But it also expresses the act or operation of "subjection";
that is, of constituting the subject. It is a name for the complex
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 133
of operations by means of which (a) certain existences are re-
strictively-selected to delimit a problem and provide evidential
testing material, and by which (b) certain conceptual meanings,
ideas, hypotheses, are used as characterizing predicates. It is a
name for the functional correspondence between subject and
predicate in their relation to each other. The operations which
it expresses distinguish and relate at the same time.
The fact that judgment as such has a subject-predicate struc-
ture, and that in this structure subject-and-predicate contents are
at the same time distinguished and related, has been made a ground
for holding that judgment has an inherently self-contradictory
character. 8 This position is unanswerable unless it be recognized
(1) that the copula stands for operations, and (2) that judgment
is a process of temporal existential reconstitution.
1. Inquiry demands, as we have seen, operations of both observa-
tion and ideation. There would be no control of the process of
inquiry if each of these operations were not expressly formed
with reference to the other. It is easy to see what would
happen if observation were directed to material which had no
connection with entertained ideas and hypotheses, and if the latter
went off on a track of their own, having no connection with the
material obtained by observation. In the process of reasoning,
especially in scientific inquiry, there is often a considerable period
in which conceptual material is developed on its own account,
leaving observed material temporarily in abeyance. But none-
theless in controlled inquiry, the entire object of this seemingly
independent development is to obtain that meaning or conceptual
structure which is best adapted to instigate and direct just those
operations of observation that will secure as their consequence
just those existential facts that are needed to solve the problem
in hand.
2. Final judgment is attained through a series of partial judg-
ments! — those to which the name estimates or appraisals has been
given. Judgment is not something occurring all at once. Since
it is a manifestation of inquiry, it cannot be instantaneous and
yet be inquiry. Short of attainment of a finally resolved situa-
8 For example, by F. H. Bradley in both his Logic and his Appearance and
Reality.
134 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
tion (the result of final judgment and assertion) respective subject-
and-predicate contents are provisionally instituted in distinction
from and correlation with each other. Were subject-and-predi-
cate contents final rather than provisional, distinction and relation
would constitute a state of irreconcilable opposition. Since they
are functional and operative, there is no more conflict than there is
in the fact that in the course of every complex productive ac-
tivity, industrial or social, divisions of labor are instituted which
nevertheless are functionally connected with one another. For
they are instituted as cooperating means of a common unified out-
come. Were a complex undertaking in which extensive division
of labor prevailed arrested short of its temporal issue, and were
the various activities and their respective partial products taken
at the moment of arrest to provide a final interpretation of what
is going on, the conclusion might not be that there was inherent
contradiction among them, but the idea that irrelevancy and dis-
organization existed would be justified. The result of the discus-
sion is, then, to show how indispensable it is to acknowledge that
judgment, like inquiry, is temporal. It is temporal not in the
external sense that the act of judging takes time, but in the
sense that its subject-matter undergoes reconstitution in attaining
the final state of determinate resolution and unification which is the
objective that governs judgment.
It is necessarily involved in what has been said that the linguistic
form which expresses, or is the symbol of, judgment is a true
verb; that is, one expressing action and change.
When is appears in judgment it has temporal force, distinct from
was or will be, and distinct from the "is" of a proposition where
"is" designates a non-temporal or strictly logical relation between
meanings. When it is stated that "the boy is running" the reference
to change, time and place lies on the surface. When one says "this
is red" the temporal reference is linguistically disguised. But the
statement certainly does not mean that this is inherently red or is
always red. Color quality changes to some extent with every
change in light. It is red now, but only under a specifiable set of
consequences, and a completely grounded judgment demands
that the conditions be stated. "Is red" sets forth what in ordinary
language is called an effect or a change brought about, or else a
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 135
capacity to produce change, a power to redden other things. 9
Etymologically, the word is derives from a root meaning to
stand or to stay. To remain and endure is a mode of action. At
least, it indicates a temporal equilibrium of interactions. Now
a spatio-temporal change is existential. Consequently the copula
in judgment, whether as a transitive or intransitive verb, or in the
ambiguous form "is," has inherent existential reference. In such
a proposition as "Justice is a virtue," is, on the other hand, stands
for a relation between two abstractions or meanings, and accord-
ingly is non-temporal. It is a mark of a logical relation such that
in any proposition in which "justice" appears there is an im-
plicatory relation to some proposition in which "virtue" appears. 10
The situation to which the sentence refers determines unambigu-
ously whether "is" has an active force, expressing a change going
on actually or potentially, or whether it stands for a relation be-
tween meanings or ideas. In a sentence having no contextual
situation, its logical force is indeterminate. For any sentence iso-
lated from place and function in inquiry is logically indeterminate.
The copula in a judgment, in distinction from the term of
formal relation, expresses, accordingly, the actual transformation of
the subject-matter of an indeterminate situation into a determinate
one. So far is the copula from being an isolable constituent that
it might be regarded as what sets the subject-and-predicate con-
tents at work executing their functions in relation to one another.
In complex undertakings a plan for division of functions is usually
laid out on paper. But this plan is not the actual division of labor.
The latter consists in the actual distribution of the active factors
of what is doing in their cooperation with one another. The dis-
tribution, as well as the cooperation, is arranged with reference
to an end or objective consequence.
The plan may be set forth and explained in propositions; its
propositional exposition may be a means of criticism and of re-
arrangment of the plan of distribution. But the actual division
can only be enacted. As just indicated, it may be stated in symbols,
and symbolic representation of the division may be an indis-
9 Cf . the previous analysis of "It is sweet."
10 In other words, "the ambiguity of the copula," depends upon failure to
determine whether in any given instance it has temporo-spatial reference or stands
for a relation of meanings as such.
136 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY ^
pensable means of an actual enactment. But it no more is a func-
tioning division of labor than a blueprint is a house in process of
building or a map is a journey. Blueprints and maps are proposi-
tions and they exemplify what it is to be propositional. Moreover,
a map is no less a means of directing journeys because it is not
constantly in use. Similarly, general propositions are no less a
means of constructing judgments because they are not always op-
erative in the existential work of reconstituting existential material
Like a chart, indeed, like any physical tool or physiological
organ, a proposition must be defined by its function. Further-
more, there is the same sort of advantage in having conceptual
frameworks manufactured and on hand in advance of actual oc-
casions for their use, as there is in having tools ready instead of
improvising them when need arises. Just as a complex under-
taking in any field demands prepared materials as well as pre-
pared instrumentalities, so propositions which describe conjunc-
tions of existential materials — ultimately reducible to space-time
connections — are required in effective inquiry. At the outset
substantial object-events serve this purpose as more or less sec-
ondary by-products or deposits from prior inquiries. But finally
they are deliberately constituted by critical inquiry intended to
produce objects that will operate as effective and economical
means when they are needed — a differentia of common sense and
scientific objects. Propositions about subject-contents, about
spatial-temporal conjunctions of properties of existence, thus un-
dergo independent development just as do propositions about
meanings and their relations. The former will be called material
means and the latter procedural means, it being remembered that
both are operational since they are means of determining the final
situation and judgment.
Despite the decay and abandonment of the cosmological foun-
dation of the Aristotelian theory of the structure and the constitu-
ents of judgment, conceptions which were essential to it still play
an important part in many logical texts under the name of the
theory of predicables. That which can be predicated was classified
in respect to its logical force or form under the following heads:
essence, property, genus, differentia and accident. They ex-
pressed the ways in which predication can take place because of
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDGMENT 111
the different kinds of connection that were supposed to exist among
things.
A substantial species is what it is in virtue of its eternal and
fixed essence. To predicate an essence of a substance is accord-
ingly to define it, definition being, as previously noted, neither
verbal nor an aid in inquiry, but an apprehension ("re-marking"
in a literal sense) of that which makes the substance to be what
it is. A definition is stated and communicated by means of the
predicables, genus and differentia, these being logical, not onto-
logical like species and essence. A genus differed from a species;
it was not, as in modern theory, simply a kind that is more compre-
hensive than the kinds called species. It has no existence while
a species must be. It cannot, therefore, be the subject of any
final judgment. 11
Plane figure is generic as compared with triangle, and triangle
is generic with respect to isosceles, scalence and right-angle tri-
angles. But even the latter were only qualifications of species
existing in nature. In setting forth a definition, in leading another
to learn to grasp a defining essence or in enabling one's self to
regrasp it, we start with the proximate genus and then give the
differentia which distinguish a species within that genus from
every other species falling within it. Thus the differentia of the
genus plane figure in the case of a triangular figure is having three
sides. A genus is the logical "matter" of definition, related to it
as potentiality is to actuality in ontological material.
A property is no part of an essence but flows necessarily from
it. It may, therefore, be predicated universally and necessarily
of a subject just as the defining essence may be. It is not part
of the essence of man to be a grammarian. But it flows neces-
sarily from the essence of man as rational. Theorems that flow
from the definitions and axioms of the Euclidean geometry have
a similar logical status. But some things can only be predicated
accidentally — that is, when they are neither part of an essence
nor flow from it, nor are of the nature of genus and differentia.
All changing things which cannot be enclosed within fixed limits
11 Upon its logical side, the Aristotelian polemic against Platonic Ideas and
Numbers (geometrical figures) was based upon the fact that the latter are genera,
not species, and hence cannot exist by themselves, but only in thought.
138 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
are of this character. They bear a purely contingent relation to
that of which they are predicated. It may be affirmed that "most
blue-eyed persons are blonde"; "days in summer are warm as a
rule or upon the whole"; etc. But there is no necessary connec-
tion between subject and predicate. They just happen, as it were,
to be that way — not in the sense that there is no cause for their
happening that way rather than in some other way, but in that
the cause is itself another change, which also has a contingent
relation to what is permanent, universal and necessary. There is
no reason why accidents occur as they do in the sense of reason
proper to the Aristotelian scheme.
This theory of the forms of predication was acute and com-
prehensive under the scientific conditions in which it was for-
mulated. In the light of the theory and practice of modern
scientific inquiry it has no validity. I shall take one instance as
exemplary. Seeming exceptions to law or general principle ("ac
cidents" in the old sense) are now the nutriment upon which
scientific inquiry feeds. They have a ground or "reason" in the
correlated conditions of their occurrence. General propositions
are not only possible about these correlations but every existential
general proposition or law is about them. In any other sense of
the word, that which is "accidental" is that which is irrelevant in
any given situation, and which, therefore, is to be ruled out be-
cause of absence of evidential function in the given problem. If
not ruled out it is likely to carry inquiry into a wrong track. In
short, there are no prior fixed and ready-made determination of
what may be predicated and of ways of predication. Every
predicate is ideational or conceptual. It must be so constituted as
to direct operations whose consequences throw light upon the
problem dealt with and provide additional evidence for its solu-
tion. Apart from the limits set by the problem in hand, there are
no rules whatever for determining what may or should be predi-
cated. As far as present logical texts still continue to take about
essences, properties and accidents as something inherently different
from one another, they are repeating distinctions that once had an
ontological meaning and that no longer have it. Anything is "es-
sential" which is indispensable in a given inquiry and anything is
"accidental" which is superfluous.
CHAPTER VIII
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE:
UNDERSTANDING AND INFERENCE
^he considerations adduced in discussion of the pattern of
inquiry and of the structure of judgment, entail the con-
, elusion that all knowledge as grounded assertion involves
mediation. Mediation, in this context, means that an inferential
function is involved in all warranted assertion. The position here
defended runs counter to the belief that there is such a thing as im-
mediate knowledge, and that such knowledge is an indispensable
precondition of all mediated knowledge. Because of the wide cur-
rency of this latter doctrine and the intrinsic importance of the
logical issue involved, this chapter will be devoted to the discussion
of the theme of immediate knowledge.
Logical schools as opposed to each other as are the rationalistic
and the empiristic agree in accepting the doctrine of immediate
knowledge. On this point they differ only with respect to the
objects and organs of such knowledge. Rationalist schools hold
that ultimate principles of a universal character are the objects of
immediate knowledge and that reason is the organ of their ap-
prehension. Empiristic schools believe that sense-perception is
the organ of knowledge and that the things immediately known
are sensory qualities or, as they are now more usually called,
sense-data. Some logical theories maintain that both kinds of
immediate knowledge exist and that mediation and inferential
knowledge result from the union of the two; a union in which
a priori first truths and empirical material are brought into con-
nection with each other.
The doctrine of immediate knowledge would not be so widely
held unless there were prima facie grounds of great plausibility to
139
140 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
suggest it and apparent evidence that can be marshalled in its
support. I shall introduce critical discussion of the doctrine by
stating how these grounds are to be interpreted from the stand-
point of the position already taken in this book.
1. There is continuity in inquiry. The conclusions reached in
one inquiry become means, material and procedural, of carrying
on further inquiries. In the latter, the results of earlier inquiries
are taken and used without being resubjected to examination. In
uncritical reflection the net outcome is often an accumulation of
error. But there are conceptual objects, and objects of perceptual
experience, which have been so instituted and confirmed in the
course of different inquiries, that it would be a waste of time and
energy in further inquiries to make them objects of investigation
before proceeding to take and use them. This immediate use of
objects known in consequence of previous mediation is readily
confused with immediate knowledge.
2. It was noted in the previous chapter that final judgment is
constructed by a series of intermediate partial judgments, to which
the name estimates or appraisals was given. The content of these
intermediate judgments, which cover both matters of fact and
conceptual structures, is carried in propositions. In any inquiry
of extensive scope (because of the nature of the problem with
which it is concerned) these propositions gain relative inde-
pendence. While they are ultimately means for determining final
judgment, for the time being they are absorbing ends; just as, we
have seen, in physical production and construction, tools are
apparently independent objects complete and self-sufficient in
themselves. Their function and the potential consequence of the
exercise of their function become completely integrated into their
immediate structure. As soon as it is forgotten that they are
means and that their value is determined by their efficacy as oper-
ative means, they appear to be objects of immediate knowledge
instead of being means of attaining knowledge.
When, however, their functional character is recognized, the
mistake which is committed in these interpretations is evident:
1. While the direct use of objects, factual and conceptual,
which have been determined in the course of resolving prior
problematic situations is of indispensable practical value in the
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 141
conduct of further inquiries, such objects are not exempt in new
inquiries from need for reexamination and reconstitution. The
fact that they have fulfilled the demands imposed upon them in
previous inquiries is not a logical proof that, in the form in which
they have emerged, they are organs and instrumentalities which
will satisfy the demands of a new problematic situation. On the
contrary, one of the commonest sources of error is the premature
assumption that a new situation so closely resembles former ones
that conclusions reached in these earlier cases can be directly
carried over. Even the history of scientific inquiry shows how
often this error has been made and for what long periods it has
gone undetected. One indispensable condition of controlled in-
quiry is readiness and alertness to submit the conclusions of even
the best grounded conclusions to re-inquiry with reference to their
applicability in new problems. There is a presumption in their
favor but the presumption is no guarantee.
2. A similar order of considerations applies to propositional
contents which are taken and used. They may have proved
completely valid in dealing with some problems and yet not be
the fit means for dealing with problems which prima facie present
the same features. One may point to the revisions of the proposi-
tions of classic mechanics that were required when applied to ex-
tremely minute bodies of high velocities. For centuries, the axioms
and definitions of Euclidean geometry were regarded as absolute
first principles which could be accepted without question. Preoc-
cupation with a new order of problems disclosed that they were
both overlapping and deficient as logical grounds for a generalized
geometry. The result has made it clear that instead of being
"self-evident" truths immediately known, they are postulates
adopted because of what follows from them. In fact, the belief
that they are true by their intrinsic nature retarded the progress
of mathematics because it prevented freedom of postulation. With
this change in the conception of the character of mathematical
axioms, one of the chief bulwarks of immediate knowledge of uni-
versal principles crumbled.
The denial of the existence of immediate knowledge does not
then deny the existence of certain facts alleged to support the
doctrine. It is the logical interpretation of these facts which is
142 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
in question. Denial of the particular interpretation now under
critical discussion was positively foreshadowed in the considera-
tions which established the provisional and operational standing
of the factual and conceptual contents of judgment. It is no-
torious that a hypothesis does not have to be true in order to be
highly serviceable in the conduct of inquiry. Examination of
the historical progress of any science will show that the same thing
holds good of "facts": of what has been taken in the past as evi-
dential. They were serviceable, not because they were true or
false, but because, when they were taken to be provisional work-
ing means of advancing investigation, they led to discovery of other
facts which proved more relevant and more weighty. Just as it
would be hard to find an instance of a scientific hypothesis that
turned out to be valid in precisely the same form in which it was
first put forward, so it would be hard in any important scientific
undertaking to find an initial proposition about the state of facts
that has remained unchanged throughout the course of inquiry
in respect to its content and its significance. Nevertheless, propo-
sitions about hypotheses and about conjunctions of existences have
served an indispensable purpose because of their operational char-
acter as means. The history of science also shows that when
hypotheses have been taken to be finally true and hence un-
questionable, they have obstructed inquiry and kept science com-
mitted to doctrines that later turned out to be invalid.
These considerations dispose of a dialectical argument which
has been used ever since the time of Aristotle, and is still current
today. It is argued that inference must rest upon something
known from which it starts, so that unless there are true premises
which serve as such a basis it is impossible, no matter how adequate
inference and discursive reasoning may be, to arrive at true con-
clusions. Hence the only way of avoiding a regressus ad Infinitum
is said to be the existence of truths immediately known. Even if
the argument were dialectically unanswerable, it would still be con-
fronted by the stubborn facts which show that correct conclusions
have been progressively reached from incorrect "premises." But
the dialectical reply is simple. It suffices to have hypothetical
(conditional) material such that it directs inquiry into channels
in which new material, factual and conceptual, is disclosed, ma-
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 143
terial which is more relevant, more weighted and confirmed, more
fruitful, than were the initial facts and conceptions which served
as the point of departure. This statement is but a restatement of
the functionally operative status of the contents of judgment up
to enactment of final judgment.
A certain ambiguity in words has played a very considerable
role in fostering the doctrine of immediate knowledge. Knowl-
edge in its strictest and most honorific sense is identical with war-
ranted assertion. But "knowledge" also means understanding, and
an object, or an act (and its object) that may be — and has been
— called apprehension. I can understand what the word and the
idea of centaur, sea-serpent, transmutation of chemical elements,
mean, without thereby knowing them in the sense of having
grounds for asserting their existence. No intelligent search for a
new invention, no controlled inquiry to discover whether a certain
conception of, say, the nature of atoms is or is not borne out by
the hcts, can be conducted without a direct grasp or understand-
ing of the meaning-content of some idea. As the very descrip-
tion of this kind of "knowledge" shows, it is not knowledge in the
sense of justified assertion that a state of existence is thus-and-so.
It is easy, however, as the history of philosophy illustrates, to
carry over the first meaning into the second. Since the first is
direct or immediate when it occurs, it is assumed that the second
also has the same properties. Just as, after considerable experience,
we understand meanings directly, as when we hear conversation
on a familiar subject or read a book, so because of experience we
come to recognize objects on sight. I see or note directly that
this is a typewriter, that is a book, the other thing is a radiator,
etc. This kind of direct "knowledge" I shall call apprehension;
It is seizing or grasping, intellectually, without questioning. But
it is a product, mediated through certain organic mechanisms of
retention and habit, and it presupposes prior experiences and me-
diated conclusions drawn from them.
But the important point for the purpose of the present topic is
that either an immediate overt response occurs, like using the
typewriter or picking up the book (in which cases the situation
is not a cognitional one), or that the object directly noted is part
of an act of inquiry directed toward knowledge as warranted
144 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
assertion. In the latter case, the fact of immediate apprehension
is no logical guarantee that the object or event directly appre-
hended is that part of the "facts of the case" it is prima facie
taken to be. There is no warrant for assuming that it is evidential
with respect to the final assertion to be reached. It may be ir-
relevant in whole or part, or it may be trivial in its significance for
the problem in hand. Its very familiarity may be obstructive,
tending to fix indications that are suggested in old grooves when
the need is to search for data which will start suggestions in an
unaccustomed direction. In other words, immediate apprehension
of an object or event is no more identical with knowledge in the
logical sense required than is immediate understanding or co7n~
prehension of a meaning. From these general considerations, I
turn to an examination of certain theories of immediate knowledge
which have exercised historical influence.
I. The Empiristic Theory of Mill. Mill denies that there are
general self-evident truths, or general a priori truths. Since he
does not deny the existence of general truths, he is committed to a
statement of a theory concerning their grounds or "proof."
His position on this point is unambiguous. They not only arise,
genetically, in the course of sense perception, but they are proved,
if proved at all, by means of such particulars. These particulars,
in so far as they are ultimate, are then immediately known. For
them to exist in sense-perception is identical with their being
known. When this statement does not itself appear to be self-
evidently true, it is said to be such because we are dealing with com-
plexes of particulars, not with ultimate simple particulars. The
latter Mill calls indifferently sensations or feelings, or even states
of consciousness which are known when and because they exist.
"Truths," he says, "are known in two ways: some are known
directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other
truths. . . . The truths known by intuition are the original
premises from which all others are inferred. . . . The province
of logic must be restricted to that portion of our knowledge
which consists of inferences from truths previously known. . . /
Examples of truths known to us by immediate consciousness are
our bodily sensations and mental feelings. I know directly and of
1 John Stuart Mill, Logic, Introduction, Sec. 4.
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 145
my own knowledge, that I was vexed yesterday, or that I am
hungry today." 2
The question of whether states of consciousness exist which
necessarily "know" themselves in virtue of being states of con-
sciousness, Mill calls "metaphysical." In reality, the belief in then-
existence was part of a provincial psychological tradition; it no
longer generally obtains. His position in respect to "immediate"
knowledge of particulars can be discussed, however, without
reference to any special assumption concerning the constitution
of the particulars. Leaving out all reference to sensations and
states of consciousness, it should be obvious that his examples fall
far short of exemplifying what he alleges they illustrate.
Take the phrase "I was vexed yesterday." The meaning of "I"
is so far from being immediately given that it has long been the
theme of controversial discussion; an immediate knowledge of
"yesterday" is certainly an extraordinary occurrence; differentia-
tion of "vexation" from other emotional states is a rather slow
acquisition in human development. The case is no different in
principle from "I am hungry today." It is possible to feel hungry
when one is not hungry; the "feeling" can be produced artificially
without the organism being in a state of need for food. The
discrimination between the two states may be a difficult problem.
If "today" means anything more than the present moment, it
involves a fairly elaborate intellectual construction, and any
number of passages could be quoted from Mill himself to the
effect that a given immediate state can be characterized as hunger
only by going beyond that state and assimilating it inferentially to
other states. That common sense directly grasps certain occur-
rences as having the significance of vexation, hunger, yesterday,
today, is undeniable. But the "self -evidence" bred by familiarity,
while a fact of practical importance, is very different from cogni-
tive self -evidence, and often leads common sense astray even in
practical matters. We are forced to the conclusion, which a more
detailed analysis would bear out, that Mill's whole doctrine of
immediate-knowledge is itself an inference from a psychological
theory which is itself inferential. In its strictly logical bearing it
rests upon the uncritical acceptance of the old notion that no
2 John Stuart Mill, Logic, loc. ck.
H6 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY __^
proposition can be "proved" unless it follows from "truths" al-
ready known.
II. The Lockeian Version. Locke's account of immediate
knowledge is important not only because of its historic influence,
in that his original objective view of sensations and ideas was the
source of their later transformation into states of consciousness, but
because of his clear grasp of the epistemic issue involved — an
issue that was obscured and dodged in later developments. He
holds, on the one hand, that all knowledge of material existence
depends upon sensation, and he points out, on the other hand,
that sensations (which he takes to be bodily states) come between
us and knowledge of objects in nature in such a way as to render
impossible scientific knowledge of the former. In the first place,
most sensory qualities do not belong to natural objects, which
possess only the primary qualities of figure, size, solidity and
motion; in the second place, even the latter as experienced qualities
do not enable us to get knowledge of the "real constitution" of
objects.
"If," says Locke, "we could discover the figure, size, texture
and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies we
should know without trial [experience] several of their operations
upon one another as now we do know the properties of a square
or triangle." But "if" here represents a condition contrary to fact.
For we are destitute of senses acute enough to discover the minute
particles of bodies and to give us ideas of their mechanical con-
stitution. Nor is this the whole story. Even if we had senses
acute enough to meet this condition (and it might now be argued
that recent physics with the aid of artificial devices has supplied
the lack), the dependence of knowledge of the real constitution of
objects upon sense would still stand immovably in the way.
"Knowledge about natural objects extends as far as the present
testimony of the senses employed about particular objects that do
then affect them and no further. Hence, we shall never be able
to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths about natural
objects." 3 The italicized words, present and then indicate the
impassable barrier existing between sense, which is particular and
3 John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. 3 on the
Extent of Knowledge.
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 147
transient, and objects which are permanent and have identical
ultimate "constitutions" or structures.
This thoroughgoing negative conclusion of Locke, which neces-
sarily follows from regarding sense-data as themselves objects of
knowledge, might have acted as a warning to later theorists against
assigning inherent cognitive import to sense-data; as a warning to
examine any premise that leads to the conclusion that knowledge
of physical objects is impossible. If sense-data, or any other data,
are final and independent (isolated) objects of knowledge, then
no predicates having objective existential reference can be war-
rantably attached to them.
At times, when Locke rebels at his own conclusion, and is
desirous of justifying the ways of God and Nature to man, he lays
down a principle which, if he had followed it out consistently,
might have set subsequent theory upon a different track. Upon oc-
casion he says that qualities are marks of differences in things
"whereby we are able to discern one thing from another, and so
choose them for our necessities and apply them to our uses" — as,
say, the quality of white, which enables us to tell milk from water. 4
Had this mode of interpretation of sensory qualities been made
fundamental, it would have appeared that they are not objects
of cognition in themselves but that they acquire cognitive func-
tion when they are employed in specific situations as signs of some-
thing beyond themselves. Qualities are the sole means we have
for discriminating objects and events. Their use in this capacity
is constant. For practical purposes no harm results in identifying
the function with the quality as an existence, just as no harm re-
sults from identifying an object as a spade because the operative
use and the consequences of the use of the object are integrated
with its existence. But failure for the purposes of theory to dis-
tinguish existence and function has been the source of continued
doctrinal confusion.
III. Atomic Realism. Mill's interpretation suffered as we saw
from two serious blemishes. It regarded qualities as states of
consciousness and it treated such complex objects as today, yester-
day and vexation as simple primitive data. Recent theory has
avoided both of these errors. Qualities are given objective status
4 Ibid., Book IV, Ch. 4, on the Reality of Knowledge.
148 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
as sense-data, and the supposedly immediately given existential
contents of propositions are treated as complexes to be reduced to
data that are irreducibly simple. Apprehension of immediate
simple qualities constitutes propositions which are "atomic," while
propositions containing an inferential coefficient are "molecular."
Such propositions as "This is red, hard, sweet," etc., are atomic.
According to the theory, this in such propositions is devoid
of any descriptive qualification. For were this anything more
than a bare demonstrative, it would be complex and hence, on
the theory, not immediately given. In "This ribbon is red," what
is designated by ribbon is not given in the sense in which "this"
and "red" are given. Some writers also include in the domain of
atomic propositions, such propositions as "This is before that" as
a simple and ultimate immediately given relation.
The notion that there is such a thing as a merely demonstrative
"this" lacking all descriptive content has already been criticized.
According to the atomic logical theory, each this, as a subject of a
proposition, must be exactly identical logically (though not in
quality) with every other. Each is determined by the mere act of
pointing at and each such act contains, by statement, nothing that
marks it off from any other demonstrative act. It follows that
there is no ground or reason for predicating one quality of it
rather than any other. The case is not bettered if it is said that
"this red" is what is irreducibly given. For even here we have no
proposition, only a bare "subject" which is the subject of no
predicate. As in the first case, there is no ground whatever for
any determinate predication.
It would not be denied, I suppose, that in fact it requires a
series of experimental operations, involving definite techniques,
to warrant the assertion that a given present quality is red. A
scientific determination differs from a loose common sense asser-
tion of the existence of a specific quality just in the fact that such
techniques are employed. A strictly grounded scientific de-
termination of red would, for example, involve the techniques by
means of which the presence of a definite number of vibrations
per unit of time was ascertained. In other words, it is not held, I
take it, that the atomic quality is primitive in a psychological sense.
It is logically primitive in that any existential proposition finally
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 149
rests upon determination of some simple quality. Now, while in
most cases inquiry does not actually go as far as this, it is admitted
that in theory experimental observation must proceed to determine
an irreducible quality in order that an existential proposition be
fully warranted. But the more clearly this fact is recognized the
more clearly does it stand out that such a determination is not
complete and final in itself but is a means to the resolution of some
problem. It is a factor in the institution of what may warrantably
be taken and used as evidence. For example, consider the case in
which the utmost pains are taken in a case of spectrum analysis to
reach a grounded proposition that such-and-such a color quality is
present.
The fallacy in the theory of logically original complete and self-
sufficient atomic propositions is thus an instance of the same fallacy
that has been repeatedly noted: The conversion of a function in
inquiry into an independent structure. It is an admitted fact that
ideally, or in theory, propositions about irreducible qualities are
necessary in order adequately to ground judgment having existen-
tial reference. What is denied is that such propositions have com-
plete and self-sufficient logical character in isolation. For they are
determinations of evidential material in order to locate the problem
in hand and secure evidence to test a solution. The doctrine
under criticism rules out the context in which such propositions
occur and the logical end for which and logical ground upon
which they are instituted. This may be verified by any one who
calls to mind a case in which, either in common sense or science,
such propositions are present and have weight. As to their
ground, I call attention again to the fact that there is no this which
is merely and exclusively red or any other single quality and that,
therefore, there must be some ground for selection of one quality
as predicate rather than another.
Although further discussion of the logical principles involved
will require some retraversing of matters already gone over, the
basic importance of the issue justifies repetition, especially as the
territory will be surveyed from a somewhat different point of
view. It has been usual for some time in philosophy (1) to view
the common sense world in its distinction from the domain of
scientific objects as strictly perceptual in character; (2) to regard
150 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
perception as a mode of cognition; and (3) what is perceived
whether object or quality, to be therefore cognitive in status and
force. None of these assumptions is warranted, (a) The common-
sense world includes, to be sure, perceived objects, but these are
understood only in the context of an environment. An environ-
ment is constituted by the interactions between things and a living
creature. It is primarily the scene of actions performed and of
consequences undergone in processes of interaction; only secondar-
ily do parts and aspects of it become objects of knowledge. Its
constituents are first of all objects of use and enjoyment-suffering,
not of knowledge, (b) In relation to perception, an environment
forms an extensive temporal-spatial field. Only occasionally are
reflexes directed in the life behavior of an organism toward isolated
excitations. The maintenance of life is a continuous affair. It
involves organs and habits acquired in the past. Actions performed
have to be adapted to future conditions or death will speedily
ensue. The material towards which behavior is directly impelled
is but the focal aspect of an environing field. The kind of be-
havior which occurs must, in order to be adaptive and responsive,
vary with the kind of field of which the immediate object is focal.
It follows, then, that when objects or qualities are cognitively
apprehended, they are viewed in reference to the exigencies of the
perceived field in which they occur. They then become objects
of observation, observation being defined precisely as the
restrictive-selective determination of a particular object or quality
within a total environing field. Usually the total environing
field is "understood," or taken for granted, because it is there as
the standing condition of any differential activity to be performed.
The psychological theory of perception has been framed in terms
of what happens in these specific differential acts of observation-
perception of an object or a quality, an orange, a patch of yellow.
For the purpose of a report of just what occurs in an observation
and for the psychological problem involved, it is not necessary to
criticise this procedure. But when the results are carried over into
logical theory and taken to provide the basis for a theory of data
in their logical status and bearing, complete distortion results.
For isolated objects or qualities are then taken in their isolation to
be the givens or data.
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 151
For logical purposes, it makes no difference whether the data,
when reduced to their simplest contents, are taken to be Lockeian
simple ideas, sensations, Humeian impressions, the sense-data of
contemporary theory, or "essences." For the same isolation, self-
sufficiency, and completeness is ascribed to them in each case.
What has actually occurred, then, in the formation of the con-
temporary theory of atomic propositions is that the conclusions of
psychological theory, reached in dealing with a special psycho-
logical situation, have been bodily transferred into logic and made
the basis of the entire doctrine of atomic propositions having
existential reference. This uncritical adoption of psychological
conclusions as the foundation of an important branch of the logical
theory of propositions has occurred in spite of the fact that the
logicians who proceed in this way are particularly urgent about
the necessity of freeing logic completely from psychological
matters. 5
I turn now to certain popular and empirical considerations
which are taken to substantiate the notion of immediate knowl-
edge. 1. The distinction between acquaintance-knowledge and
knowledge-about and the validity of the distinction is generally
acknowledged. I am acquainted with my neighbor; I know some-
thing about Julius Caesar. Acquaintance-knowledge has a direct-
ness and intimacy lacking in knowledge-about. The latter can
only be expressed in propositions that certain things are so-and-so.
The former is expressed in actual commerce with the individual;
it is marked by affection and dislikes. It takes effect in expecta-
tions as to the conduct of the person or object with which one is
acquainted so that appropriate ways of overt conduct are ready in
advance in the person having the acquaintance. I am acquainted,
say, with the French language when I am prepared to speak and
read it; I may know about its grammar and something of its
vocabulary and yet have no ability to speak. The distinction be-
tween the two modes of knowledge was embodied in linguistic
expressions long before theoretical attention was called to it:
Cognoscere and scire; connaitre and savoir; konnen and <wi$sen;
5 A by-product of this dependence upon a special psychological analysis is that
the doctrine of atomic propositions as ultimate existential propositions makes
necessary the assumption of a priori universal propositions, for the atomic proposi-
tions, by description, are incapable of grounding inference and reasoning.
152 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
in earlier English idiom, to ken (with its association of can, ability
to act) and to wit.
The existence and the importance of the difference is acknowl-
edged. But it is far from supporting the logical theory of im-
mediate knowledge. The immediacy involved is that of intimate
connection with emotion and ability to act. In the first place,
acquaintance-knowledge is not primitive, but acquired, and in so
far depends upon prior experiences into which mediation has
entered. In the second place (and of more importance for the
present point), acquaintance-knowledge is frequently not knowl-
edge in the sense of being warrantably assertible. It enables us
to form practical expectations which are perhaps often fulfilled.
But the familiarity that attends acquaintanceship often blinds us
to things of primary importance in reaching conclusions. Ac-
quaintance with certain habits of speech is no guarantee against
blunders and solecisms; it may be their source. From a logical
point of view acquaintance-knowledge is subject to critical in-
quiry and revision. As a rule, it invites it.
2. The existence of recognitions, which are practically in-
stantaneous, is another empirical ground for the theory under
examination. The same considerations apply here as in the case
of acquaintance-knowledge. In fact, recognition may be re-
garded as a special limiting instance of the latter. We recognize
persons with whom we have only slight acquaintance; we may
recognize words in a foreign language without being so acquainted
with the language that we can speak or read it. Recognition of an
object is also (a) a product of experiences which have involved
doubt and search, and (b) while of immense practical importance,
is not exempt from the necessity of inquiries to determine the
correctness of a given recognition and its pertinency to the
problem in hand. Recognition is not re-cognition in the sense of a
re-knowing. It is rather an acknowledgement of a certain object
or event as having a specified place in a situation.
The doctrine that "simple apprehension" is complete in itself is
often accompanied by a certain fallacy. It is supposed that because
the act of apprehension is simple and single, therefore, the object
apprehended must also be. But complex scenes are also appre-
hended simply — as when one returns to the scene of his childhood.
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 153
Moreover, relatively simple objects are important not in virtue of
their inherently simple structure but because of some crucially
evidential role their simplicity permits them to play — as for ex-
ample, in the relation of finger-prints to personal identifications.
Similarly, we recognize a familiar person by his voice alone with-
out having to observe him in his physical entirety. It saves time
and energy to be able to make the relatively simple a means of
identification.
Such facts suggest the peculiar function of simples or elements
in inquiry. The more complex the structure of an object, the
greater the number of possible inferences that can be drawn
from its presence; its different constituents point in different
directions. The less complex a given object or event the more
restricted it is in its constitution and hence the more definite is its
indicative signifying capacity. There is abundant evidence in the
history of science to show that reduction of objects to elements is
one of the most effective means of both safeguarding and extend-
ing inferential inquiry. There is no evidence that such simple
elements exist by themselves in nature. It is foolish to object to
analysis and its outcome in institution of elements. But the very
foolishness of this objection goes to show that the concept of
"simple" and "element" is functional and that giving simples and
elements independent existential standing, whether in physics,
psychology, anatomy or politics, is but one more case of hypostiza-
tion of an instrument.
IV. Understanding and Comprehension. So far the detailed
discussion has been occupied with existential subject-matters, for
grasp of which the word apprehension is generically employed.
It is advisable to say something about direct grasp of meanings
and conceptual structures for whose designation the words under-
standing or comprehension is used. We take, see, and "twig,"
the force of an argument; we have insight into general principles.
The seeing and insight are often direct and practically instantane-
ous. A meaning, previously obscure, may come to us "in a flash."
The same type of considerations adduced with respect to direct
apprehension of objects and qualities applies in the case of the
present topic, and discussion may be abbreviated. Attention has
already been called to the fact that one meaning of to know is to
154 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
understand, and that this meaning is not to be confused with
warranted affirmation of validity. A person must understand the
meaning of authorship in order to consider intelligently the ap-
plication of that term to a given person, say, of the Waverley
Novels. The understanding is a necessary condition of any
particular ascription having validity. But evidently it is not a
sufficient condition.
The series of propositions which constitute a chain of ordered
discourse should be such that the meanings of their constituent
terms are as unambiguous and determinate as possible. But ful-
filment of this condition does not guarantee the validity of their
application in a given problem. Hence understandings like appre-
hension, is never final. No proposition about a relation of mean-
ings, however determinate and adequate the proposition is, can
stand alone logically. Nor is its incapacity to stand alone re-
moved by union with other propositions of the same sort; although
the union may result in getting meanings into such a shape that
they are fitted for application.
The two doctrines, that there is an immediate knowledge of
existential objects or of qualities as sense-data, and that there is an
immediate knowledge of rational principles — necessarily go to-
gether. Atomistic empiricism and rational a priorism are cor-
relative doctrines. Kant's categories of the a priori understanding
are the logical counterpart of the doctrine of independent sense-
material which he took over from Hume, just as T. H. Green's
"necessary relations of thought" are required to balance the view
of sensations he took over from the psychology of the school of
the Mills. When the existential material of experience is reduced
to immediately given atomic cases of "this," connection between
the atoms (such as is involved in every molecular proposition),
is impossible unless non-empirical or a priori propositions are recog-
nized. Postulation of self-evident existential "facts" requires
postulation of self-evident rational "truths."
A strictly logical formulation of this state of affairs is given by
Bertrand Russell. After stating that "in every proposition and in
every inference there is, besides the particular subject-matters
concerned, a certain -forvi, a way in which the constituents of the
proposition are put together," he gives the following example of
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 155
what is meant by form: "If anything has a certain property, and
whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the
thing in question has the other property." He then goes on to
draw the theoretical conclusion considered in the next paragraph. 6
The proposition cited as an example of form is said to be "ab-
solutely general; it applies to all things and all properties, and it is
quite self-evident." Moreover, it is a priori: "Since it does not
mention any particular thing, or even any particular quality or
relation, it is wholly independent of the accidental facts of the
existent world, and can be known, theoretically, without any
experience of particular things or their qualities and relations."
This conclusion follows from its being laid down as a logical truth
that "General truths cannot be inferred from particular truths
alone, but must, if they are to be known, be either self-evident, or
inferred from premises of which one at least is a general truth.
But all empirical evidence is of particular truths. Hence if there
is any knowledge of general truths at all there must be some
knowledge of general truths which is independent of empirical
evidence, i.e., does not depend upon sense-data."
In the latter passage there is not only an implicit but an explicit
identification of ultimate ("primitive") existential propositions
with atomic propositions. If empirical (here employed in the
sense of existential) propositions are atomic, then it certainly fol-
lows that any propositions about the logical forms by which they
are related to one another must be supra- and extra- empirical, or
a priori. They must be known by some kind of rational intuition,
a conception involved, although in a somewhat disguised way, in
calling them "self-evident." The apodosis clause of the above
if-then proposition follows with such neat necessity from the
protasis clause that it invites attention to the latter. If the ante-
cedent clause is invalid, the validity of the consequent clause is
indeterminate, while if the consequent clause is false or doubtful,
then so is that of the antecedent clause. In other words, the
passage quoted sets forth a problem. The very necessity of the
relation of the two clauses merely accentuates the importance of
the problem. I shall not repeat here the reasons previously given
6 Bertrand Russell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, and further quotations,
p. 42, and pp. 56-7.
156 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
for rejecting the clause which postulates atomic existential proposi-
tions as primitive in independence of their function in inquiry,
Nor shall I rehearse the reasons for doubting the existence of a
faculty of pure reason independent of any and all experience, a
faculty gifted with the power of infallible intuition. 7
The points directly relevant to the problem are, first, that what
is "self-evident" in the general logical proposition cited, is its
meaning. To say that it is self-evident means that one who re-
flects upon it in the meaning system of which it is a member will
apprehend its meaning in that relation — exactly as one might ap-
prehend the meaning, say, of the empirical proposition "that rib-
bon is blue." The question of the logical force and function of
the proposition, of the interpretation to be given it, remains open
— just as does the truth of the empirical proposition after its
meaning is grasped.
Secondly, the theoretical interpretation of the significance of
the meaning directly apprehended is far from self-evident. There
is, for example, the alternative represented by the theoretical
position which was stated by Peirce, to the effect that all proposi-
tions about logical forms and relations are leading principles, not
premises. They are, from this point of view, formulations of
operations, which (a) are hypotheses about operations to be per-
formed in all inquiries which lead to warranted conclusions; and
(b) are hypotheses that have been confirmed without exception in
all cases which have led to stable assertions; while (c) failure to
observe the conditions set forth have been found, as a matter of
experience of inquiries and their results, to lead to unstable con-
clusions.
Such propositions about logical forms as are exemplified in the
dictum about possession of properties that arc "independent" of
the specific subject-matter of existential propositions are not (it is
admitted) conclusions drawn merely from subject-matters as
purely particular, and they are not proved by these particular
propositions. But there is nothing in this admission inconsistent
7 Attention may, however, be called to the fact that the assumption of both
atomic existential propositions and of rationally intuited truths destroys the
autonomy of logical theory, rendering it dependent upon psychological and
epistemological considerations declared by definition to be outside the province
of logic.
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE 157
with their being drawn from operations of inquiry as existential
and empirical occurrences. In the degree in which we understand
what is done in inquiries that result in warranted assertions, we
understand the operational conditions which have to be observed.
These conditions, when formulated, are the content of general
propositions about logical forms. The conditions of the required
operations (required in order that a certain kind of consequence
may issue) are as much matters of experience as are factual con-
tents: which are themselves also discriminated in order to serve as
conditions of a warranted outcome.
It is not claimed that this proposition about logical propositions
is "self-evident" as to its truth. It is claimed that it has an intel-
ligible meaning, capable of being directly grasped as a meaning,
and that this meaning, when it is used or applied to the problems
of logical theory serves to clarify and resolve them. The con-
ception, on the other hand, that "experience" is reducible to im-
mediately given atomic propositions, that are possessed of self-
evident truth, introduces complications and confusions. Universal
propositions about logical forms are propositional functions and as
such are in themselves neither true nor false. They state modes of
procedure in inquiry which are postulated as applicable and as
required in any controlled inquiry. Like mathematical axioms,
their meaning, or force, is determined and tested by what follows
from their operative use.
As far as the doctrine of immediate knowledge is directly con-
cerned, the discussion has reached an end. But there are certain
things which may be added from the side of the mediated character
of all knowledge in order to guard against misapprehension, (a)
It is not held that inferred interpretations are tested, confirmed,
verified (or the opposite) by particular objects in their particu-
larity. On the contrary, it is the capacity of the inferred idea
to order and organize particulars into a coherent whole that is the
criterion, (b) It is not held that inference by itself exhausts
logical functions and determines exclusively all logical forms. On
the contrary, proof, in the sense of test, is an equally important
function.
Moreover, inference, even in its connection with test, is not
logically final and complete. The heart of the entire theory
158 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
developed in this work is that the resolution of an indeterminate
situation is the end, in the sense in which "end" means end-k-vie<w
and in the sense in which it means close. Upon this view, inference
is subordinate although indispensable. It is not as, it is for example,
in the logic of John Stuart Mill, exhaustive and all-inclusive. It is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition of warranted assertions.
CHAPTER IX
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION
^he previous chapter was devoted to enforcing the necessity
of mediation in knowledge as warranted assertion. This
. necessity does not stand alone, for it is a necessary phase of
the theory of inquiry and judgment that has been developed. It
received separate development because of the traditional and still
current doctrine of self-evident truths and self -grounded proposi-
tions. There is, however, another phase of our basic theory which
stands equally (and possibly to a greater degree) in opposition to
accepted logical theory, and which accordingly stands also in
need of explicit treatment. For, contrary to current doctrine, the
position here taken is that inquiry effects existential transforma-
tion and reconstruction of the material with which it deals; the
result of the transformation, when it is grounded, being conversion
of an indeterminate problematic situation into a determinate re-
solved one.
This emphasis upon requalification of antecedent existential
material, and upon judgment as the resulting transformation, stands
in sharp contrast with traditional theory. The latter holds that
such modifications as may occur in even the best controlled inquiry
are confined to states and processes of the knower — the one con-
ducting the inquiry. They may, therefore, properly be called
"subjective," mental or psychological, or by some similar name.
They are without objective standing, and hence lack logical force
and meaning. The position that is here taken is to the contrary
effect: namely, that beliefs and mental states of the inquirer cannot
be legitimately changed except as existential operations, rooted
ultimately in organic activities, modify and requalify objective
matter. Otherwise, "mental" changes are not only merely mental
159
160 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
(as the traditional theory holds) but are arbitrary and on the road
to fantasy and delusion.
The traditional theory in both its empiricistic and rationalistic
forms amounts to holding that all propositions are purely de-
claratory or enunciative of what antecedently exists or subsists,
and that this declarative office is complete and final in itself. The
position here taken holds, on the contrary, that declarative proposi-
tions, whether of facts or of conceptions (principles and laws) are
intermediary means or instruments (respectively material and
procedural) of effecting that controlled transformation of subject-
matter which is the end-in-view (and final goal) of all declarative
affirmations and negations. It is not, be it noted, the occurrence
of purely declarative propositions that is denied. On the contrary,
as will be shown later in detail, the existence of such propositions,
setting forth relationships that obtain between factual data on one
hand and between conceptual subject-matter on the other hand, is
expressly affirmed. The point at issue concerns not their being
but their function and interpretation.
The position may be stated in the following language: All con-
trolled inquiry and all institution of grounded assertion necessarily
contains a practical factor; an activity of doing and making which
reshapes antecedent existential material which sets the problem of
inquiry. That this view is not assumed ad hoc but represents what
certainly occurs (or is a vera causa) in at least some cases, will be
shown by considering some forms of common sense inquiry which
aim at determining what is to be done in some practical predica-
ment.
Inquiries of this type are neither exceptional nor infrequent.
For the stock and staple of common sense inquiries and judg-
ments are of this sort. The deliberations of daily life con-
cern in largest measure questions of what to make or to do. Every
art and every profession is faced with constantly recurring prob-
lems of this sort. To put their existence in doubt is equivalent to
denying that any element of intelligence enters into any form of
practice; to affirming that all decisions on practical matters are the
arbitrary products of impulse, caprice, blind habit, or convention.
Farmer, mechanic, painter, musician, writer, doctor, lawyer,
merchant, captain of industry, administrator or manager, has
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 161
constantly to inquire what it is better to do next. Unless the de-
cision reached is arrived at blindly and arbitrarily it is obtained by
gathering and surveying evidence appraised as to its weight and
relevancy; and by framing and testing plans of action in their
capacity as hypotheses: that is, as ideas.
By description, the situations which evoke deliberation resulting
in decision, are themselves indeterminate with respect to what
might and should be done. They require that something should
be done. But what action is to be taken is just the thing in question.
The problem of how the uncertain situation should be dealt with
is urgent. But as merely urgent, it is so emotional as to impede and
often to frustrate wise decision. The intellectual question is what
sort of action the situation demands in order that it may receive a
satisfactory objective reconstruction. This question can be
answered only, I repeat, by operations of observation, collection of
data and of inference, which are directed by ideas whose material
is itself examined through operations of ideational comparison and
organization.
I did not include the scientist in the list of persons who have to
engage in inquiry in order to make judgments upon matters of
practice. But a slight degree of reflection shows that he has to
decide what researches to engage in and how to carry them on — a
problem that involves the issue of what observations to undertake,
what experiments to carry on, and what lines of reasoning and
mathematical calculations to pursue. Moreover, he cannot settle
these questions once and for all. He is continually having to judge
what it is best to do next in order that his conclusion, no matter
how abstract or theoretical it may be as a conclusion, shall be
grounded when it is arrived at. In other words, the conduct of
scientific inquiry, whether physical or mathematical, is a mode of
practice; the working scientist is a practitioner above all else, and is
constantly engaged in making practical judgments: decisions as to
what to do and what means to employ in doing it.
The results of deliberation as to what it is better to do are,
obviously, not identical with the final issue for the sake of which
the deliberative inquiries are undertaken. For the final issue is
some new situation in which the difficulties and troubles which
elicited deliberation are done away with; in which they no longer
162 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY __
exist. This objective end cannot be attained by conjuring with
mental states. It is an end brought about only by means of
existential changes. The question for deliberation is what to do
in order to effect these changes. They are means to the required
existential reconstruction; a fortiori, the inquiries and decisions
which issue in performance of these acts are instrumental and inter-
mediate. But what should be done depends upon the conditions
that exist in the given situation and hence require a declarative or
enunciatory proposition: "The actual conditions are so-and-so.'*
These conditions are the ground of inference to a declarative
proposition that such and such an act is the one best calculated to
produce the desired issue under the factual conditions ascertained.
Declarative propositions as to the state of facts involved set
forth the obstacles and resources to be overcome and administered
in reaching the intended goal. They state potentialities, positive
and adverse. They function as instrumentalities. The proposi-
tions which set forth the way existing conditions should be dealt
with stand in functional correlation with the enunciatory proposi-
tions which state existing conditions. The propositions as to pro-
cedure are not carriers of existential or factual materials. They are
of the general form: "If such and such a course is adopted under
the existing circumstances, such and such will be the probable re-
sult." Logically, the formation of these hypotheses as to methods
of action involves reasoning, or a series of declarative propositions
stating relationships of conceptual materials. For it is only rarely
that the idea of the procedure which first suggests itself can be
directly set to work. It has to be developed; this development
constitutes rational discourse, which in scientific practice usually
takes the form of mathematical calculation.
Preliminary to offering illustrations of what has been said, I
shall summarize formally what is logically involved in every situa-
tion of deliberation and grounded decision in matters of practice.
There is an existential situation such that (a) its constituents are
changing so that in any case something different is going to hap-
pen in the future; and such that (b) just 'what will exist in the
future depends in part upon introduction of other existential con-
ditions interacting with those already existing, while (c) what
new conditions are brought to bear depends upon what activities
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 163
are undertaken, (d) the latter matter being influenced by the inter-
vention of inquiry in the way of observation, inference and reason-
ing.
The illustration I shall employ to exemplify these four condi-
tions is that of a person who, being ill, deliberates about the proper
course to adopt in order to effect recovery. (1) Bodily changes
are already going on which in any case will have some existential
issue. (2) It is possible to introduce new conditions that will be
factors in deciding the issue — the question for deliberation being
whether they should be introduced and if so, which ones and how.
(3) Deliberation convinces the one who is ill that he should see a
physician. A proposition to this effect is equivalent to the con-
clusion that the consequences of the visit are calculated to intro-
duce the interacting factors which will yield a desired issue. (4)
Hence, the proposition when executed actually introduces inter-
vening conditions which interact with antecedent existing condi-
tions to modify their course and thus influence the issue. The latter
is different from what it would have been if inquiry and judgment
had not intervened — even if recovery of health is not attained.
Whenever there is genuine deliberation, there are alternatives at
almost every step of the way. There is something to be said or
tentatively affirmed at each step on both sides of the questions that
come up. Reflection on past experience indicates that it is often
well to let "nature take its course." But is the present case of that
kind? The question of financial expense may enter in; that of
whether a competent physician is available or what physician to
consult; the question of the patient's engagements for the next few
days and weeks, and the bearing of the physician's advice upon the
patient's possibility of fulfilling them, etc., etc.
. Such factual matters as these are examined and formulated in
propositions. Each state of facts presented in a proposition sug-
gests its own alternative course of action, and if there is genuine
inquiry the suggestion has to be formulated. The formulation
or proposition has then to be developed in terms of the probable
consequences of adopting it. This development occurs in a series
of if-then propositions. If the man finally decides to see such and
such a doctor, the resulting proposition represents, in effect, an
inference that this mode of procedure stands the better chance of
164 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
introducing those factors which will yield, in their inter-action
with existing conditions, a desired future existential situation: an
inference that it will give to factors already in operation a direc-
tion that they would not take if left to themselves.
The contents of the propositions framed about matters of fact
and about alternative courses of action (including the one adopted)
are neither self-determined nor self-sufficient. They are de-
termined with reference to an intended future issue and hence are
instrumental and intermediate. They are not valid in and of them-
selves, for their validity depends upon the consequences which
ensue from acting upon them— as far as these consequences ac-
tually ensue from the operations the propositions dictate and are
not accidental accretions. Let the factual proposition be repre-
sented by "I am seriously ill." In the context indicated, the propo-
sition is without point if taken to be final and complete. Its logical
force consists in its potential connection with a future situation.
The declarative proposition "I should or shall see a doctor" is simi-
larly functional. It formulates the possible operation which, if per-
formed, will aid in existential production of a future situation dif-
ferent in quality and significance from that which will exist if the
indicated action is not taken. The same considerations will be
found to apply to declarative propositions made by the attending
physician about the facts which locate and describe the illness on
the one hand, and the course of action he prescribes for dealing
with the illness on the other.
This analysis^ if accepted, carries with it recognition that de-
clarative propositions (themselves the results of judgments of pro-
visional appraisal) are factors which enter actively "into the actual
constitution of the existential subject-matter of the final judgment.
This final subject-matter may not be that which was hoped for and
intended. But in any case it is somewhat different from what it
would have been if the operations, dependent upon intervening
instrumental propositions, had not taken place. According to the
commonly accepted interpretation of declarative propositions it
is a straight contradiction that they should enter into the ultimate
structure of the very situation they are "about." But the con-
tradiction results from the theory which is accepted, not from
the propositions themselves; it is a consequence of ignoring the
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 165
intermediary and operational force of the propositions that are
formed.
The standard account of the example discussed on the basis of
traditional theory would be somewhat as follows: The proposi-
tions "I am ill" and "When one is ill, one should consult a doc-
tor" are taken respectively as the minor and major premises of a
syllogism from which the conclusion "I should see a doctor" nec-
essarily follows. This interpretation rests upon taking advantage
of an ambiguity. It may be but a linguistic rendering of a genu-
ine judgment already made. In this case, the analysis of the text
is confirmed. For then both major and minor state decisions
reached in inquiry as to what the state of affairs should be in
order to modify them in a given direction. Taken literally, how-
ever, the interpretation means that there was no inquiry and no
judgment. It only means that the person in question, whenever he
fancies he is ill has the habit of going automatically to a physician.
There is no element of doubt or indeterminateness, no inquiry and
no forming of propositions. There is a direct stimulus and it is re-
sponded to in accord with a previously formed habit. The alleged
syllogism is but an externally imposed account of what has taken
place in action in which no logical forms are involved.
This situation is of significance because it brings out by con-
trast the situations in which judgment does occur. A man may
have a regular habit of consulting physicians because he is vale-
tudinarian and on that account does not exercise judgment. Or
he may have the tendency to go whenever his symptoms are se-
vere and yet on this particular occasion be in doubt whether he is
sufficiently ill to justify going. Then he engages in reflection.
Moreover, in the concrete a man does not decide to see a doctor;
he decides to see some given doctor, and he may need to investi-
gate what physician to see. He may have reasons for thinking his
financial state renders it better to take a chance about getting well,
etc. The account which reduces a proposition of practice to a
formal combination of a singular and a general proposition thus
applies only to ex post -facto linguistic analyses of either an act
performed from habit without the intermediation of judgment
or else of a judgment that has been completed. If deliberation and
appraisals involving propositions actually intervene in reaching the
166 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY _^
decision "I shall see a physician," then a judgment of practice is a
factor in the ultimate determination of the existential material
which the preliminary judgments of appraisal are about.
The particular instance chosen can hardly be supposed to settle
the larger question at issue. This problem is so important that I
shall continue its discussion through a series of instances.
1. There are cases in which judgments of practice have to de-
termine what to do next, "right away," in order to produce a spe-
cific existential situation as the result of the activity the judgment
prescribes. One notes, for example, a motor car bearing down
upon him. He may automatically swerve. In this case, there
is no judgment and no proposition. But the situation may be such
as to evoke deliberation. In this case, there will be observation
of existing conditions (locating the problem) and formation of a
plan of action to meet the emergency (solve the problem). The
decisions made by an umpire in the course of a game afford an
even better illustration. He has to form propositions about ob-
served facts and about the rule that is applicable to their inter-
pretation. Both his estimate of facts and of the rule that is ap-
plicable may be questioned, but in any case the final judgment of
"Safe" or "Out" enters as a determining factor in the subsequent
existential course of events. This fact shows that the action and
position of, say, a runner in a baseball game are not that which
is judged. The object of judgment is the total situation in which
action occurs. Propositions about just what a batter or runner has
done and about the rule (conception) which is applicable, are
intermediate and instrumental, not final and complete.
The two instances cited illustrate what is meant by the phrase
"procedural means" applied to the predicate of judgment. The
subject-matter of the predicate represents an end-in- view, which
is an anticipation of an existential consequence, an end in the
sense of a fulfilling close and termination. The end-iii-view of
the man who sees an automobile approaching him is getting to a
place of safety, not safety itself. The latter (or its opposite) is
the end in the sense of close. Unless the anticipation or end-in-
view is an idle fantasy, it takes the form of an operation to be
performed. Similarly, the proposition "Out" or "Safe" in the
case of the runner in the game is operational in that it decides
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 167
what the runner shall then proceed to do and how the game shall
go on. If the existential end in the sense of final outcome or close,
were a term in a proposition, it would be taken to be already com-
pleted. Only if the end figures as a directive means to perform
the action by which the actual termination is brought about is it
other than self-defeating.
The predicate is not a "realistic" apprehension and enunciation
of something already in existence; it is an estimate, based on real-
istic observation of facts as conditions of possible issues, of some-
thing to do. Likewise, the ideas of a goal for a runner in a race
or of a target for an archer are obstructive not helpful unless they
are translations of the final mark as an existence into means
whereby — procedural means. The runner employs the thought of
the goal as means of regulating his pace, etc., at different stages
of his running; the archer uses the thought of the target, in con-
nection with observations of the direction and force of wind,
etc., as a guide or direction in taking aim. The difference between
the two senses of end, namely, end-in-view and end as objective
termination and completion, is striking proof of the fact that in
inquiry the termination is not just realistically apprehended and
enunciated but is stated as a way of procedure. Confusion of the
two senses of "end" is the source of the notion that a judgment
of practice is either purely declarative or else is so merely practical
that it has no logical status.
2. Moral evaluations are also a case in point. The common, per-
haps prevailing, assumption is that there are objects which are
ends-in-themselves; that these ends are arranged in a hierarchy
from the less to the more ultimate and have corresponding au-
thority over conduct. It follows from this view that moral "judg-
ment" consists simply in direct apprehension of an end-in-itself in
its proper place in the scheme of fixed values. It is assumed that
apart from this hierarchy of fixed ends, a moral agent has no al-
ternative save to follow his desires as they come and go. Accord-
ing to the position here taken, ends as objective termini or as
fulfilments function in judgment as representative of modes of
operation that will resolve the doubtful situation which evokes
and demands judgment. As ends-in-vie*w they denote plans of
action or purposes. The business of inquiry is to determine that
168 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
mode of operation which will resolve the predicament in which the
agent finds himself involved, in correspondence with the observa-
tions which determine just what the facts of the predicament are.
The notion that a moral judgment merely apprehends and
enunciates some predetermined end-in-itself is, in fact, but a way
of denying the need for and existence of genuine moral judgments.
For according to this notion there is no situation which is problem-
atic. There is only a person who is in a state of subjective moral
uncertainty or ignorance. His business, in that case, is not to
judge the objective situation in order to determine what course of
action is required in order that it may be transformed into one that
is morally satisfactory and right, but simply to come into intel-
lectual possession of a predetermined end-in-itself. Goods pre-
viously experienced assuredly are material means of reaching a judg-
ment as to what to do. But they are means, not fixed ends. They
are material to be surveyed and evaluated in reference to the kind of
action needed in the existing situation.
The position which holds that moral judgment is concerned
with an objective unsettled situation and that ends-in-view are
framed in and by judgment as methods of resolving operations is
consistent with the fact that, because of recurrence of similar situ-
ations, generic ends-in-view, as ways of acting, are built up and
have a certain prima facie claim to recognition in new situations.
But these standardized "prepared" propositions are not final; though
highly valuable means, they are still means for examining the ex-
isting situation and appraising what mode of action it demands.
The question of their applicability in the new situation, their
relevancy and weight with respect to it, may and often does lead to
their being re-appraised and re-framed.
3. Interrogative Propositions. Whether questions are proposi-
tions in any logical sense is not a matter often discussed. Logi-
cians who do raise the problem usually take the position that they
are not genuine propositions. Upon the position here taken, all
propositions as distinct from judgment have an interrogative as-
pect. Since they are provisional, they are not only subject to
being questioned but they themselves raise questions of pertinency,
weight and applicability. When either facts or conceptions are
taken to be completely assured (whether because of earlier sue-
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 169
cessful use or for any other reason), direct action, not judgment,
ensues. It is a matter of great practical convenience that many-
facts and ideas may be so taken and directly used. But conver-
sion of this practical value into assured logical status is one of the
commonest ways of establishing the dogmatism which is the great
enemy of free and continued inquiry.
Bosanquet is one of the comparatively few writers who has
dealt expressly with the logical status of interrogations. He says
they are only tentative and that "a tentative judgment lacks the
diif erentia of judgment. It does not assert; it does not claim truth;
a question as such cannot be an object of thought as such ... it
is not an attitude which the intellect can maintain within itself.
... It is a demand for information; its essence is to be directed
to a moral agent in which it may produce action." 2
The passage quoted involves a point previously discussed,
namely, the double character of judgment as provisional appraisal
or estimate and as conclusive or final. What Bosanquet said evi-
dently applies to judgment in its latter capacity. In ruling out from
the meaning of judgment all preliminary estimates and evaluations
concerning the force and relevancy of facts and ideas, his view
leads to the conclusion he draws; namely, that inquiry is not a
form of judgment and therefore as such is not logical in status.
This position is of crucial significance in its far-reaching implica-
tions.
It is surely not unscientific to regard the actual work of science
as one of inquiry. A position which rules science out of the
field and scope of logic, save as a body of propositions that are
accepted independently of the methods of inquiry by which they
are reached, is with equal certainty not one to be lightly accepted.
Ordinary language uses the expression "the matter in question"
as a synonym for the subject-matter with which inquiry is oc-
cupied. From the standpoint of both science and common sense,
it would seem more correct to say that a question (in the sense of a
questionable and questioned subject-matter) is the object of
"thought," than to say, with Mr. Bosanquet, that "a question can-
not be the object of thought."
That a question is a demand for action on someone's part is
1 logic, Vol. I, p. 35.
170 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
a statement which, taken in isolation, is in full agreement with the
position of this work. Judgment as appraisal may enter even
into the formation of questions addressed to another person, since
just the question which should be asked is far from being a self-
evident matter. Nevertheless, the statement that a question by its
nature is something addressed to another person, ignores the
basic fact that questions are addressed to existential subject-mat-
ter. A scientific inquiry may be regarded as a request "for in-
formation." But the needed information is not handed out ready-
made by nature. It requires judgment to decide what questions
should be asked of nature, since it is an affair of formulating the
best methods of observation, experimentation and conceptual in-
terpretation.
The last statement brings our discussion face to face with the
problem concerning the relation of inquiry to judgments of prac-
tice. For determination of what questions to ask and how to ask
them is an affair of judging what should be done in order to se-
cure the material, factual and conceptual, which is necessary and
sufficient to resolve an unsettled situation. One has only to bring
to mind the procedure of a lawyer or a physician in any given case,
to see how fundamentally his problem is one of framing right
questions — the criterion of "rightness" being capacity to bring
out the material which is relevant and effective in settling the
situation that evokes inquiry.
4. Deliberation is involved in all the instances considered. But
one aspect of deliberation, in its emphatic sense, is so important
that it is advisable to treat the topic in a separate heading. Gen-
uine deliberation proceeds by institution and examination of al-
ternative courses of activity and consideration of their respective
consequences. This fact throws light upon the functional nature
of disjunctive and hypothetical propositions. Taxonomic systems,
such as are exemplified in botany and zoology, are large scale
examples of disjunctive propositions. They were once regarded
as marking the final goal of science — a view that followed con-
sistently from the classic conception of fixed species. They are
now treated as useful means for the conduct of inquiry and of
value only in this function; for any given taxonomic system is
treated as flexible and subject to constant revision. But unfor-
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 171
tunately, logical texts are given to treating disjunctive propositions
as a separate theme. Consequently they employ, as illustrative
material, disjunctions established by prior inquiry without refer-
ence to the inquiries by which they are established and without
reference to those in which they further operate; while in the
actual work of science taxonomic disjunctions are so regularly
treated as purely instrumental devices as to lose all independent
standing. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that em-
phatic regard for taxonomy exposes a given scientific worker to
something approaching contempt on the part of scientific workers
in more advanced fields.
Disjunctive propositions are connected with practical judgment,
for deliberation upon matters of policy requires (a) that alter-
native possibilities be instituted and explored, and (b) that they
be such as to be readily comparable with one another. For ex-
ample, a man who has come into possession of a large sum of
money proceeds to deliberate as to what he shall do with it. His
deliberation gets nowhere unless it takes the form of setting up
alternative possible uses for the funds at command. Shall it be
placed in a savings bank to draw interest? Invested in stocks, in
bonds, in real estate? Or shall it be used for purposes of travel,
or to buy books, apparatus, etc.? The problematic situation is
made relatively determinate by analysis into alternatives, each of
which is represented in a disjunctive proposition as a member of a
system.
In the example given it is clear that each proposition is formed
as a means of determining what to do, and that the resulting de-
termination is a means of bringing into existence a certain eventual
situation. Experts in special fields soon establish a set of alterna-
tives. For new cases these alternatives are prepared materials, just
as an artisan has at hand a set of tools relevant to his line of
activity. In such cases, judgment goes rather to the question which
one of the disjunctive set to employ rather than to formation of
disjunctive propositions. But, nevertheless, the latter remain in-
struments. Hypostization of instruments into something final and
complete places a restriction on further inquiry. For it subjects
the conclusion to be reached to a preconception which is as-
sumed to be beyond question and examination.
172 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
The relation of hypothetical to disjunctive propositions needs
only to be suggested at this point. The meaning of each alterna-
tive mode of action is constructed in terms of the consequences
which acting upon it will produce. The development of this
meaning takes place through reasoning in the form "If such an
alternative be adopted, then such and such and such consequences
may be expected to follow." The derived consequences, com-
pared with the consequences of other hypothetical propositions,
provide the ground for tentative acceptance or rejection. In
actual practice, the development of if-then propositions of this
sort is often not carried far. But from the standpoint of war-
ranted final judgment as to what should be done, disjunctives
should be exhaustive, and development of each disjunctive mem-
ber of the system, as a hypothesis, should be thorough.
5. Evaluation. A standing ambiguity in the word value, both
as verb and noun, has frequently been pointed out. In one of its
meanings "to value" is to enjoy and the resulting enjoyment is
figuratively called a value. There is neither reflection nor inquiry
in these cases of enjoyment as far as they occur spontaneously.
The fact of an enjoyment may, however, be recorded and com-
municated linguistically. The resulting linguistic expression will
have the outward form of a proposition. But unless a question has
arisen it is a social communication rather than a proposition, unless
the communication is made to provide a datum in resolving a new
situation. If, however, the question is raised whether the subject-
matter is worthy of being directly enjoyed; if, that is, the question
is raised as to the existence of adequate grounds for the enjoy-
ment, then there is a problematic situation involving inquiry and
judgment. On such occasions to value means to weigh, appraise,
estimate: to evaluate — a distinctly intellectual operation. Reasons
and grounds one way and the other have to be sought for and
formulated.
That such situations arise regarding persons once loved and
admired, regarding objects upon which esteem (as distinct from
estimation) was once lavished, is as indisputable as it is significant
for the point at issue. For their occurrence shows that we evaluate
only when a value, in the sense of material enjoyed, has become
problematic. The propositions in this case are of a very different
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 173
logical order from verbally similar sentences which only record
and communicate the fact that a certain enjoyment, admiration or
esteem has actually taken place. The latter "propositions' ' in-
deed record an occurrence, but if they have any logical status it is
when they are material of an investigation conducted to reach a de-
cision whether they were justified when they were enjoyed, or
are justifiable in the present situation. Should we now commit
ourselves to such an attitude? If we do, may we not regret it later?
Such questions arise in a wide range and variety of cases, from
cases of eating a food which one knows from past experience will
be immediately enjoyed, to serious moral predicaments. The only
way of answering the questions, of resolving the doubts that have
arisen, is to review the existential consequences which will prob-
ably occur if esteem, admiration, enjoyment are engaged in. For
attitudes, esteem, etc., are active attitudes; they are ways of act-
ing which produce consequences, and consequences can be ground-
edly anticipated only as consequences of conditions that are
operative. The fact of enjoyment is only one of the operative
conditions. It produces consequences — as in the act of eating
the immediately enjoyed food — only through interaction with
other existential conditions. The latter must, therefore, be in-
dependently surveyed. There is no way to estimate their probable
consequences save in terms of what has happened in similar cases
in the past, either one's personal past or in the recorded experience
of others. On their bare face, existing conditions do not tell what
their consequences will be. We have to investigate connections
— usually that of cause-effect. Connections are then formulated
in abstract generalized conceptual propositions, in rules, princi-
ples, laws. But the question of the applicability of the rules and
principles at hand (however tested they have been) to the special
situation in question always enters in. Choice has to be made
among them. Consequently, in order to obtain a grounded final
judgment there also has to be evaluation or appraisal of principles.
An evaluative proposition is not, then, merely declarative with
respect either to facts or to conceptual subject-matter. The facts
may be undoubted; I certainly have enjoyed this object in the
past; I will get immediate enjoyment from it now. Certain gen-
eral principles may be accepted as standards. But neither the
174 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
facts nor the standardized rules as they present themselves are
necessarily decisive in the evaluation being made. They are,
respectively, material and procedural means. Their relevancy and
weight in the present situation is the matter to be determined by
inquiry before an evaluative appraisal can be grounded.
Such evaluative judgments are clearly an instance of judgments
of practice; or, more strictly, all judgments of practice are evalua-
tions, being occupied with judging what to do on the basis of
estimated consequences of conditions which, since they are existen-
tial, are going to operate in any case. The more it is emphasized
that direct enjoyment, liking, admiration, etc., are themselves
emotional-motor in nature, the clearer is it that they are modes of
action (of interaction). Hence a decision whether to engage
or indulge in them in a given situation is a judgment of practice —
of what should be done.
A point still more important for logical theory is that these
evaluative judgments (as was brought out in the earlier discus-
sion of judgment) enter into the formation of all final judgments.
There is no inquiry that does not involve judgments of practice.
The scientific worker has continually to appraise the information
he gathers from his own observations and from the findings of
others; he has to appraise its bearing upon what problems to under-
take and what activities of observation, experimentation and cal-
culation to carry out. While he "knows," in the sense of under-
standing, systems of conceptual materials, including laws, he has to
estimate their relevancy and force as conditions of the particular
inquiry undertaken. Probably the greatest source of the relative
futility—or at least infertility — of that part of many logical texts
which deal with scientific method, is failure to relate the material
which they expound to the operations by which they are reached
and the further operations they suggest, indicate and serve to direct.
6. Appreciation. The fact has been emphasized that a judg-
ment of value is not identical with a statement that such and such
a person arouses admiration and liking or that such and such an
event or object was or is enjoyed. Such "propositions" have the
property of truth only in a moral sense; that is, in opposition to
being deliberate lies. Such propositions may, however, become
constituents of a judgment of value, or an evaluation. They
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 175
take on this status when they are employed as material means of
determining whether a given person or action should be admired
or a given object enjoyed. When the statement "I like this pic-
ture" is changed into the proposition "This picture is beautiful,"
the issue shifts to the picture as object. To be valid, the latter
proposition must be grounded upon discernible and verifiable
qualities of the picture as an object. It depends, on one hand,
upon discrimination of observable qualities and, on the other,
upon the conceptual meanings which constitute, when they are
made explicit, the definition of beauty. These statements are so
far from being inconsistent with the existence of immediate non-
judgmental esthetic experience that esthetic judgment must, to be
genuine, grow out of the latter. But the immediate experience is
not expressed in the statement "I like it." Its natural expression
is rather the attitude of the observer or an interjection.
The last remarks bear upon the topic of appreciation. It is not
bare enjoyment but enjoyment as consummation of previous proc-
esses and responses that constitutes appreciation. These previous
states and operations involve reflective observation that partakes of
the nature of analysis and synthesis, of discrimination and inte-
gration of relations. Appreciation, if genuine, is toward a subject-
matter that is representative. It is not representative of something
outside the appreciated object. The object in question is repre-
sentative of that which has led up to it as fulfilment or consum-
matory close. Appreciation thus differs in a fundamental way
from casual enjoyments that are just hit upon or let drop.
Words such as climax, peak, culmination, refer to consummatory
objects. Any object or event that can be called by such names
has an intrinsic reference to what went before. The words in-
dicate that what preceded did not merely occur before the time
of the peak but that they were such as to have the climacteric
outcome as their own issue. Wherever there is appreciation there
is the heightened quality produced by intrinsic connection of the
object appreciated with its casual conditions. Its opposite is not
dis-like or dis-enjoyment but de-preciation — disparagement of a
result or product in its connection with the conditions and efforts
of which it is the fruit. A man may take a drink of water almost
automatically to quench thirst. If he is journeying in a barren
176 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
land and forms an estimate of where he may find water and upon
going to the spot quenches his thirst, he has a heightened quality
of experience. Water is appreciated as he does not appreciate it
when all he has to do is to turn a faucet and hold a tumbler under
the stream that flows out. His experience has the representative
quality of being an eventuation, a consummation.
There is, accordingly, an element of evaluation involved in
appreciation. For such objects are not ends in the sense of being
merely termini, but in the sense of being fulfilments: satisfactions
in the literal sense in which that word means "inaking jwf-ficient"
something &-ficient. Consequently, judgments of appreciation
are found wherever subject-matter undergoes such development
and reconstruction as to result in a satisfying complete whole.
Consider the following quotation as an illustrative of this point:
"Classical thermo-dynamics form a self-consistent and very ele-
gant theory, and one might be inclined to think that no modifica-
tion of it would be possible which did not introduce arbitrary
features and completely spoil its beauty. This is not so since
quantum mechanics has now reached a form in which it can be
based on general laws, and is, although not yet quite complete,
even more elegant and pleasing than the classic theory in the
problems with which it deals." *
The words beauty, elegance, show clearly that here is a case of
appreciation. Even slight analysis of the passage shows that the
theory is elegant and has beauty because its subject-matter presents
a consummated harmonious ordering of diverse facts and concep-
tions. Intellectual activity, science, has its phases of appreciation
as truly as have the fine arts. They arise whenever inquiry has
reached a close that fulfils the activities and conditions which led
up to it. Without these phases, sometimes intense, no inquirer
would have the experiential sign that his inquiry had reached its
close.
Judgments of appreciation are not confined, however, to the
final close. Every complex inquiry is marked by a series of stages
that are relative completions. For complex inquiries involve a
constellation of sub-problems, and the solution of each of them is a
resolution of some tension. Each such solution is a heightening of
# Dirac, Quantum Mechanics, p, 1.
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 177
subject-matter, in direct ratio to the number and variety of dis-
crepant and conflicting conditions that are brought to unification.
The occurrence of these judgments of completion, not different in
kind from those ordinarily called esthetic, constitutes a series of
landmarks in the progress of any undertaking. They are signs of
the achieved coherence of factual material and the consistency of
conceptual material. They are indeed so important in their func-
tion of being clews and giving direction that the sense of harmony
which attends them is too readily taken as evidence of truth of the
subject-matter involved. 2 This error is due to isolating the feeling
of harmony and congruity from the operations by which discrep-
ant material is brought into harmonious union. The immediate
experience of congruity, which is a valuable guide in conduct of
inquiry, is converted into a criterion of objective truth.
This hypostization has affected the three most generalized forms
of appreciation and produced the concepts of the Good, the True
and the Beautiful as ontological absolutes. The actual basis of
these absolutes is appreciation of concrete consummatory ends.
In the case of intellectual, esthetic and moral experiences, the ob-
jective completion of certain unsettled existential conditions is
brought about with such integrity that the final situation is pos-
sessed of peculiar excellence. There is the judgment "This is
true, beautiful, good" in an emphatic sense. Generalizations are
finally framed on the ground of a number of such concrete reali-
zations. Being true, beautiful, or good, is recognized as a common
character of subject-matters in spite of great differences in their
actual constituents. They have, however, no meaning save as
they indicate that certain subject-matters are outstanding consum-
matory completions of certain types of previously indeterminate
situations by means of the execution of appropriate operations.
Good, true, beautiful, are, in other words, abstract nouns desig-
nating characters which belong to three kinds of actually attained
ends in their consummatory capacity.
Classic theory transformed ends attained into ends-in-themselves.
It did so by ignoring the concrete conditions and operations by
means of which the fulfilments in question are brought about.
2 Cf. what was said in Chap. V about the esthetic nature of standards in Greek
science, pp. 84, 96.
178 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
The traits which marked subject-matters in virtue of their being
successful resolutions of problems of intellectual inquiry, of artis-
tic construction and of moral conduct, were isolated from the con-
ditions which gave them their standing and significance. Being
thus isolated, they were necessarily hypostatized. In isolation
from the means by which consequences are reached, they were
taken to be the external ideals and standards of the very opera-
tions of inquiry, artistic creation and moral endeavor, of which
in fact they are generalized results. This hypostization always
happens when concrete ends in their terminal nature are erected
into "ends-in-themselves."
The generalized and abstract conceptions of truth, beauty and
goodness have a genuine value for inquiry, creation and conduct.
They have, like all genuine ideals, a limiting and directive force.
But in order to exercise their genuine function they must be taken
as reminders of the concrete conditions and operations that have
to be satisfied in actual cases. In serving as such generalized in-
struments, their meaning is exemplified in their further use, while
is also clarified and modified in this use. The abstract meaning of
truth, of being true, for example, has changed with development
of the methods of experimental inquiry.
In conclusion, the paradox that seems to attend the conception
of judgments of practice which has been presented, will be re-
curred to. Irrespective of the question of paradox, there are but
two alternatives regarding the intellectual status of deliberation:
Either the intermediate and tentative propositions formed during
the course of deliberation must be admitted to exercise a deter-
mining influence upon the very subject-matter they are about, or
else all intellectual standing and bearing must be denied to them.
The apparent paradox enters if the first interpretation is adopted.
The idea is paradoxical, moreover, only from the standpoint of a
prior conception of the nature of propositions: viz., that they are
purely declaratory and are final and complete in this declaratory
capacity. The problem takes on a very different aspect if it be
admitted, even as a hypothesis, that what they declare is the need
and advisability of performing certain operations as means of at-
taining a final subject-matter which may be groundedly asserted.
For upon this basis, the idea that propositions are factors in deter-
JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE: EVALUATION 179
mining the very subject-matter they are about is exactly what is
to be expected instead of being paradoxical.
The issue will perhaps be clarified if we note in this connec-
tion that a certain ambiguity is attached to the word about. On
the one hand, a proposition is said to be about something which
does not appear as a term in the proposition. On the other, it is
said to be about one of the terms of the proposition, usually about
that term which is the grammatical subject of the sentence which
expresses the affirmation or denial in question. For example, a
man inquires into the subject-matter which relates to some per-
plexing question of foreign relations — his inquiry as a whole is
about the perplexing situation. In the course of the inquiry, he
makes propositions about states of fact and about rules of inter-
national law; the facts and rules are explicit constituents of the
propositions. But these propositions are about (or refer to) sub-
ject-matters which are not a constituent of any of the propositions.
Their point and force lies in that which they are about, the sit-
uation they serve to determine, and a situation that does not appear
as a term in any proposition.
The net conclusion is that evaluations as judgments of practice
are not a particular kind of judgment in the sense that they can be
put over against other kinds, but are an inherent phase of judg-
ment itself. In some cases, the immediate problem may so directly
concern appraisal of existences in their capacity as means, positive-
negative (resources and obstacles), and so directly concern ap-
praisal of the relative importance of possible consequences that
offer themselves as ends-in-view, that the evaluative aspect is the
dominant one. In that case, there are judgments which in a rel-
ative sense may be called valuational in distinction from the sub-
ject-matter of other judgments where this aspect is subordinate.
But since selection of existences to serve as subject-data and of
ideas to serve as predicate-possibilities (or ends in view) is neces-
sarily involved in every judgment, the valuation operation is in-
herent in judgment as such. The more problematic the situation
and the more thorough the inquiry that has to be engaged in,
the more explicit becomes the valuational phase. The identity of
valuational judgment with judgments of practice is implicitly
recognized in scientific inquiry in the necessity of experiment for
180 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
determination of data and for the use of ideas and conceptions—
including principles and laws— as directive hypotheses. In sub-
stance, the present chapter is then a plea that logical theory be
made to conform with the realities of scientific practice, since in
the latter there are no grounded determinations without operations
of doing and making.
CHAPTER X
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION:
JUDGMENT AS REQUALIFICATION
-nJHERE is a contrast between the traditional theory of positive
and negative propositions and what occurs in the conduct
. of inquiry. The contrast invites examination. In scientific
inquiry there is scrupulous attention to exceptions and whatever
appear to be exceptions. The technique of inquiry is concerned
as much with effective eliminations as with noting agreements.
No amount of agreement among the traits of phenomena investi-
gated suffices of itself to establish a conclusion; agreements have
to be safeguarded at every point by observation of differences.
Experimental operations are undertaken with the express object
of instituting deliberate variations of conditions in order to bring
out negative traits which serve to test currently accepted con-
clusions. Should logical theory take its cue for interpretation of
affirmative and negative propositions from what happens in the
conduct of inquiry, it would be evident that (1) such propo-
sitions are functional in resolution of a problematic situation, and
are (2) conjugate or functionally correspondent in relation to
each other.
Traditional theory, however, takes the propositions as given ready-
made and hence as independent and complete in themselves. They
are just there to be noticed, with description of whatever proper-
ties they present. This mode of treatment becomes intelligible
when it is viewed in conjunction with its derivation from the onto-
logical logic of Aristotle, whence it ultimately derives. In the
latter logic, species or kinds are the ultimate qualitative wholes or
real individuals. Some of these species are by nature, or by in-
herent essence, exclusive of others. The negative proposition was
181
182 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
thus a cognitive actualization of a fundamental ontological form.
Species also are ordered hierarchically. Hence affirmation of in-
clusion of some species in species that are more comprehensive was
also a cognitive actualization of the ontological.
Positive and negative propositions are on this basis immediate
apprehensions or "notations" of what exists in and by nature.
What has just been said applies also to universal propositions — i. e.,
to those about wholes. Similar considerations apply to particular
propositions, and hence to the so-called square of opposition with
its relations of contrariety, sub contrariety, contradiction and sub-
alternation. Things that change are by inherent nature incom-
plete and partial. Hence they are apprehended in particular
propositions. The connection between partial and particular was
more than etymological. In traditional formal theory "some,"
the verbal mark of the particular, has come to mean "some, per-
haps all." But in the Aristotelian theory, some meant some only.
By the ontological nature of the case, wherever the affirmative
"some are" applies, the negative proposition "some are not" holds
also. The relation of subcontrariety was as ontological as was
that of the contrariety of mutually exclusive universals. Particu-
lars, or that which by nature is incomplete, because changing,
can be known only through fixed limits imposed by the essence
that defines a universal. Consequently, subalternation is in so
far ontologically grounded. As for contradiction, it is evident
that a proposition which is restricted by its ontological subject-
matter to some only contradicts a proposition which by nature is
about a whole.
The development of modern science destroyed the conceptions
of fixed species, defined by fixed essences, upon which the Aris-
totelian logic rested. This destruction affected, therefore, the
classic conceptions of universal and particular, whole and part, and
the scheme of their relationships with one another. Modern logic,
however, attempted to retain the scheme but with the understand-
ing that it is purely formal, devoid of ontological import. The
inevitable consequence is the mechanical way in which affirm-
ative and negative propositions and their relationships are con-
ceived in both traditional and modern formalistic logic. They
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 183
have lost their ontological basis without gaining a functional re-
lation to the conduct of inquiry.
The old designation, quality of propositions, is retained in con-
nection with affirmative and negative propositions but is hardly-
more than a mechanical label. From the standpoint of the func-
tional connection of positing and negating with determination of
unsettled or indeterminate situations, they are means, through the
operations of selection and elimination they respectively prescribe,
of ^qualifying the original indeterminate situation. Affirmative
propositions represent the agreement of different subject-matters
in their evidential capacity; they agree in that they support or
are taken to support one another cumulatively in pointing in the
same direction, in spite of the fact that existentially the subject-
matters involved occur at different times and places. Negative
propositions, on the other hand, represent subject-matters to be
eliminated because of their irrelevancy or indifference to the
evidential function of material in solution of a given problem. Ul-
timately, the fact that certain facts or ideas are excluded means that
the original indeterminate situation can be transformed or re-
qualified into a determinate one only through existential experi-
mental operative elimination of some of its constituents; affirma-
tion of certain data or ideas means that they are operatively
selected to reinforce one another in institution of a unified situa-
tion. If these statements sound odd in contrast with the traditional
interpretation of affirmation and denial, one has only to think of
what happens in the conduct of scientific inquiry to see that they
have a solid base and a pertinent meaning.
That inquiry selects appropriate evidential data by means of
comparison of what is found to exist or occur in different existen-
tial cases is a commonplace. Without collection of phenomena
observed at different times and places under different conditions,
grounded inquiry, whether of common sense or science, can make
no headway. Deliberate experimentation is resorted to for the
express purpose of varying conditions, or so that observed conse-
quences will so vary that comparison may have more extensive
and more definite subject-matter to operate with. Collection of
many cases with a view to institution of differences and agreements
(in evidential force) is a kind of relatively uncontrolled experi-
184 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY ___
mentation. Comparison is so involved in all inquiries that reach
grounded conclusions it is usually taken for granted. 1
Now it is impossible to define comparison except operationally.
It is a name for all operations in which identities and incompati-
bilities in evidential force are determined. It is a name for any and
all of the operations by means of which alleged or provisional data
are determined to be data with respect to the problem set by a
given indeterminate situation; by which some facts are determined
to be the "facts of the case" in hand and other facts not to be.
It is impossible to give an independent definition of comparison
and then derive the operations of establishing agreements and
differences in evidential capacity from that definition. It is a
blanket term for the entire complex of operations by which some
existences are selectively instituted as data and other existential
materials are eliminated as having nothing to do with the case; as, in
fact, obstructive in the required work of requalification of the
existential situation.
Mr. Bosanquet, one of the idealistic logicians referred to above,
says "Comparison in the ordinary sense is a name applied to the
intentional cross-reference of two or more given contents, in
order to establish between these contents as given, a general or
special identity, or partial identity (likeness)." 2 The view ex-
pressed in this passage serves to bring out, by contrast, the meaning
of the position here held. The italicized words of the text cited,
as given, involve, positively, an affirmation of the antecedent on-
tological basis of comparison and, negatively, a denial of the func-
tional or operative force of propositions of identity — agreement —
and difference — contrariety, subcontrariety, and contradictoriness.
In contrast, the position of the text is that what is meant by com-
parison is institution of selected facts on the basis of equivalent
(similar) evidential force in a variety of cases which are existen-
tially different, this determination being grounded only as the
operations of observation involved in the selection eliminate, pari
1 Examination of logical texts will show that the word rarely appears. The
exception to this statement is found in the case of the writings of logicians of the
rational idealistic school. They are interested in it as a somewhat elementary
exemplification of their ontological proposition that "reality" as such is always
a system of differences-in-identity or identity-in-diiferences, or what is called
the "concrete universal."
2 Logic, Vol. II, p. 21, italics in original text.
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 185
passu, other existential constituents as irrelevant to the problem in
hand; as non-evidential, and indeed misleading unless eliminated.
The view of Mr. Bosanquet reduces comparison to an act that can
be and is performed within the "mind." The view here taken is
that it is operational in the existential sense of effecting modifica-
tions in what antecedently existed — as does controlled experimenta-
tion. "Similarity" is the product of assimilating different things
with respect to their functional value in inference and reasoning.
There is much common sense inference in which similarity is im-
plicitly postulated. When the assumption is stated in a proposition
(as it needs to be if the conclusion of inquiry is to be grounded) a
proposition of similarity is, in effect, an affirmation that there is
sufficient probability of equal values to serve as ground for tenta-
tive assimilation.
The foregoing discussion has contrasted a theory of affirmation
and negation based upon the practice of present scientific inquiry
with the Aristotelian doctrine and with that later formalization of
his doctrine which emptied it of all content. The connection of
our view with the general theory of judgment will now be con-
sidered. Indeterminate situations are marked by confusion, ob-
scurity and conflict. They require clarification. An unsettled
situation needs clarification because as it stands it gives no lead
or cue to the way in which it may be resolved. We do not
know, as we say, where to turn; we grope and fumble. We
escape from this muddled condition only by turning to other
situations and searching them for a cue. What is borrowed pro-
vides a new attitude as the means for directing observational
operations — performed on the common sense level through sensori-
motor organs. These operations make some aspects of the given
situation stand out. The attitude, when made explicit, is an idea
or conceptual meaning.
The very operations that select certain conditions, taken as
potential clews to the problem to be dealt with, also rule out other
conditions and qualities of the total given situation. Selection
involves rejection and the latter act is rudimentary negation. The
unsettled situation is also usually such as to evoke contrary modes
of response. Attitudes and habitual modes of treating situations
clash. This conflict is involved in confused and blind situations.
186 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
But sometimes the conflict is so uppermost that the main problem
is that of reduction to unified significance rather than clarification.
Some constituents stand out but point in opposed directions. To
solve the problem resort must be had to other experienced situa-
tions. These suggest additions and eliminations which, when ef-
fected, will bring together the materials that first evoked conflicting
responses.
The process of eliminating materials that are irrelevant and
obstructive goes hand in hand with that of rendering other ma-
terials definite in their indicative force. Negation is thus the
restrictive side of the selection involved in all determination of
material as data. What is selected is provisionally positive. This
positive phase is at first identical with taking and using the ma-
terial in order to try it out. But control of this taking and using
demands that the material be formulated. The propositions (that
are the formulation) thus differ from the final assertion which is
characteristic of judgment. Dependence of the rejection-selection
operation upon suggestions supplied by other situations explains
the emphasis put, in the traditional theory, upon "common" factors
and upon agreement. Comparison is at the same time contrast,
expressed in the rejection and the elimination of those elements
and qualities in the situation which other situations indicate are
irrelevant.
It is sometimes said that affirmation and negation cannot be
made coordinate with each other because there then arises a re-
gressus ad infinitum. Such would be the result if they trod upon
each other's heels. But in fact they are strictly conjugate. Not
only is all determination negation but all negation is (or moves
in the direction of) positive determination. The relation of
affirmation-negation is no more successive than the taking of food
by an animal is prior to or after rejection of other materials as non-
food. Acts "which at one and the same time accept for use and
that shut out are not sequential.
The connection between organic selection-rejection and logical
affirmation-negation is, moreover, a special case of a general prin-
ciple already laid down. The organic function provides the
existential basis of the logical. Transition from one to the other
occurs when the direct existential commitment involved in organic
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 187
acceptance-rejection is deferred till the functional capacity of
materials has been determined in inquiry. This postponed de-
termination is made possible by language, by propositions about
final decisive action. There are, for example, historical reasons for
believing that processes of blame and accusation in connection with
attempts to support and refute allegations were a main factor in
developing the positive-negative aspect of inquiry. Then came
argumentation pro and con in relation to some proposal advanced
for social adoption. Argument still means reasoning. Crimen
means judgment in the Latin tongue, and its root is found in our
words discrimination and crime. The Greek aitia, usually trans-
lated cause, had a definitely legal origin. Transition from the
cultural to the logical status is manifest in the change from assent
and dissent to affirmation and denial on specified grounds. To
admit and to refuse to admit may be acts performed either for social
reasons or because of reference to demands that are imposed by
grounded inquiry. In the latter, they have explicit logical status.
Affirmation is unambiguously a logical term. We affirm only that
which we take to be capable of confirmation.
There is another objection to the idea that affirmation is logically
coordinate with denial. When the functional nature of affirma-
tive propositions is overlooked — that is, their office in institution
of data and meanings to be operatively employed— they are given
direct existential reference. They are taken to be declarative of
what is existentially there. The same thing cannot be said of
negative propositions. Hence it is denied by some writers that
negative propositions have any logical import at all. They are
at most, according to them, rejections of suggestions that have
arisen in our own minds and hence they have only a personal or
psychological standing. In the words of one writer on logic
"There is no such thing as a negative copula but only a negated
copula." 3
Mere negation, however, reminds one unpleasantly of the dis-
putes of children, consisting of reiterations of "Tis, Tisn't." The
important point is that the view in question follows from the
postulate that all propositions about fact are complete and final
because enunciative of antecedent existence. The doctrine which
3 Sigwart, Logic, Vol. I, p. 122.
188 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
denies logical standing to denials thus gives indirect support to the
position they are instrumental and functional. Existences and
meanings are referred to, both in affirmation and negation, not
just for the sake of mentioning them, but with respect to their
function in requalification of an indeterminate situation; for this
requalification can be effected (with respect to negation) only by
elimination of obstructive materials and of suggestions that lead
nowhere. If negative propositions are ruled out of the logical
domain, comparison must go too.
In short, negation is other than mere omission or dropping out
of certain considerations, factual and ideational. Some facts and
some meanings have to be actively eliminated because they are
obstacles that stand in the way of resolution of an unsettled situa-
tion. The idea that negation is connected with change, with be-
coming other or different, is at least as old as Plato. But in Plato
change, altering or othering, has a direct ontological status. It
is a sign of the defective ontological character of that which
changes, its lack of full Being. The negative proposition, which
dealt with change, was thus the counterpart in knowledge of the
ontological inferiority of one kind of existential material. But in
modern science, correlations or correspondences of change are the
chief object of determination. It is no longer impossible to treat the
relation of the negative proposition to change and alteration as
declarative of defective being. On the contrary, the negative
proposition as such formulates a change to be effected in existing
conditions by operations which the negative proposition sets forth.
It is an indication of an experimental operation to be performed
such that conditions will be so varied that the consequences of the
operation will have an evidential significance lacking in the condi-
tions as they existed at first.
The affirmative proposition also has intrinsic connection with
change. Take the proposition "This is red." On its face, it is
purely affirmative; it carries with it no suggestion of negation or
elimination. But the bare existence of a red thing is not a suffi-
cient ground for the affirmation that "It is red." To be grounded,
alternative possibilities must be ruled out. There is no logical
necessity why this should be red; it may have been some other
color a moment ago and become another color a moment from
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 189
now. The proposition is "synthetic" in the Kantian sense; it can-
not be grounded in a mere intellectual analysis of this. Valid
determination that "this is red" depends upon (1) exhaustive dis-
junction of alternative possibilities of color and (2) upon elimina-
tion of all other possibilities than the one affirmed, the elimination
resulting (3) from a series of hypothetical propositions such as
"If blue, then such and such consequences," etc., in contrast with
the proposition "If red, then such and such other and differential
consequences." I do not mean of course that as a matter of fact
such an elaborate process of determination is often gone through.
I do mean, however, that for complete logical validity there is
required a proposition like the following: "Only if this is red,
will observed phenomena be what they are." "Ofily" in this prop-
osition depends upon a series of eliminations expressed in negative
propositions. Whenever a scientific determination of color quality
is required in solution of a scientific problem, inquiry proceeds in
the direction of just such an exhaustive disjunctive system and of
systematic elimination of all alternatives save one for which positive
grounds are found.
The connection of this determination with deliberate institution
of change should be obvious. A series of experimental operations
has to be performed with and upon the existential material indi-
cated by the demonstrative this. The changes which follow as
consequences of the execution of these experimental operations
provide grounds for denying that it is blue, yellow, purple, green,
etc., and for affirming that it is red. If one is inclined to doubt
this account, especially on the ground that the proposition in ques-
tion, if not "self-evident," is at least not nearly as highly mediated
as the account assumes, let him recall that scientifically color is
determined only by operations which identify colors with certain
rates of vibration, and red with one particular exclusive number.
In other words, the proposition "This is red" means, logically,
that a certain differential change has occurred or may be predicted
to occur when certain operations are undertaken. In the latter
case, the logical meaning is "This will become red or will redden
something else," certain conditions being postulated. If the propo-
sition be interpreted to mean "This has been red for a long time,"
even more extensive mediation is required to warrant a con-
190 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
elusion about the added trait of temporal duration. If it is taken
to mean "It is red by nature or necessity," reference to change
is excluded but this is the only case in which the proposition is
not about a change.
Impersonal propositions such as "It is raining" have been the
theme of more or less discussion. The natural interpretation of
such propositions is that in them a total prior qualitative situation
is negated-affirmed by specification of a change. "It" refers to
the gross environing perceptual field; "rain" to the gross alteration
it is undergoing. If the proposition is "It is only sprinkling" or
"It is raining hard," the qualification is more differentiated because
more specific negations have been introduced. Propositions of
gross qualitative change are the starting points for a set of dis-
junctive propositions in which a single continuous change is
formulated in terms of a scale or spectrum of degrees. It is not
sufficient to take a gross change in its given discreteness. It has
to be resolved into a series of changes, each of which is determined
by reference to its position in a continuum of changes. Such
determination involves a disjunctive set of propositions. In each
determination of position in the scale a negation of all disjunctive
possibilities except one is involved. 4
After these general remarks, I come to the specific forms of the
relations of affirmative and negative propositions designated as
contrariety, subcontrariety and contradiction. From what has
been said, it follows (1) that these relations have to be understood
in the functional office they exercise in inquiry, (2) as correlative
or conjugate determinations, not as independent sets of propo-
sitions which happen to sustain to each other the relation des-
ignated. (The ordinary square of opposition is likely to be
interpreted in the latter sense, since failure to connect the proposi-
tions which are contrary, etc., with the process of inquiry has the
effect of setting-up a purely mechanical scheme of propositions
each logically independent of the other.)
I. Contrariety or logical opposition obtains between affirmative
and negative propositions when both are general. The relation is
such that only one can be valid and both may be invalid. The
relation between "All marine vertebrates are cold-blooded" and
4 The topic of scales receives further attention in the next chapter.
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 191
"No marine vertebrates are cold-blooded" exemplifies the relation
of contrariety. Contrariety of propositions sets the limits within
which specific determinations must fall In themselves, they are
indeterminate; that is, if they are taken as final and complete,
rather than as expressing a certain necessary stage in the progress
of controlled inquiry, they are logically defective. This logical
defect is apparent in the fact that both may be invalid. Contraries
are a stage in institution of the set of exhaustive disjunctives which,
as we have seen, are required for adequate affirmative-negative
determinations. They do not of themselves constitute the re-
quired disjunctives, for (as is evident in the illustration just given)
they permit of alternatives, such as "Some are and some are not."
But they set the limiting termini for intermediate alternatives.
They serve to delimit the field of inquiry, and thereby to give
direction to subsequent observational and ideational operations.
The traditional A and E propositions represent the limits within
which alternatives fall, but the fact that both may be invalid
proves that they do not do more than that. As contraries, they
represent, then, not conclusions but the results of a preliminary
survey of the total problematic field, the survey being made to
circumscribe the field within which further determinations must
occur. A process of groping reaches its initial termination when
we can state the extreme boundaries within which a solution must
be sought.
We have, then, the following logical situation. (1) On the one
hand, the field of possible propositions must be bounded or else
inquiry will roam all over the lot. This delimitation is effected
by means of contrary general propositions. (2) On the other
hand, when the strictly functional nature of the propositions
having the relation of contrariety to each other is overlooked,
these delimiting propositions are supposed to exhaust possible
alternatives. Then the rigid type of Either-Or reasoning results,
a type which is common in thought about social and moral
issues. Either "The Individual" or "Society" as a fixed entity;
either freedom from all restraint or coercion from without; either
the bourgoisie or the proletariat; either change or the unchanging;
either the continuous or the discrete, and so on. Only when the
strictly functional nature of contrary propositions is seen do we
192 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
escape from the unending and inherently endless round of con-
troversies generated by this mode of thought. When their func-
tional and instrumental nature is perceived, they are seen to be
necessary, but necessary only because they set the boundaries
within which a set of more determinate disjunctive alternatives
are to be sought for. They are functional directives for further,
more discriminating, determinations. 5
In logical theory, the rigidity and hence apparent finality of
contrary propositions is often enforced by use of symbols that
have no meaning or content of their own. A and Not~A are, for
example, such symbols. These purely formalistic contraries can-
not possibly have directive force. For if, say, "virtue" be assigned
to A as its meaning, then Not-A includes not only vice but trian-
gles, horse races, symphonies and the precession of the equinoxes.
Since the time of Aristotle, the nugatory nature of "infinitation of
the negative" has been generally recognized. "What has not been
so generally recognized is ( 1 ) that failure to recognize the inter-
mediary function of contrary proposition tends in the direction
of infinitation, and (2) that any purely formalistic either-or formu-
lation of contraries (such as A and Not-A) eliminates reference
to any universe of discourse and, hence, when any value is assigned
to the positive expression, renders the negative wholly inde-
terminate. Nevertheless, the institution of opposites in hypo-
thetical form, when interpreted as a means of fixing the limits
within which determinate disjunctive alternatives fall, is a necessary
preparatory logical procedure.
II. Subcontrary propositions of the form "Some are . . ." and
"Some are not" may both be valid while one must be valid, when
they are determinate. "Some marine vertebrates are cold-blooded"
and "Some are not" are subcontraries both of which are now
known to be valid. The phrase "are now known" is related to
5 The dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis recognizes that the initial con-
traries are not final. But it suffers from the logical vice of supposing that the
"synthesis" grows directly out of the contraries, instead of from determinate in-
quiries which the contraries indicate. In scientific inquiry, thesis and antithesis are
never treated as generating a synthesis. For example, the relationship between
"heredity" and "environment" as contraries sets an important problem, as at one
time in physics a problem was set by the relation of centrifugal and centripetal
"forces." But the scientific problem is handled by means of analysis of the
subject-matter of these highly general terms into specific conditions, not by
manipulation of the concepts.
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 193
the clause in the previous sentence "when they are determinate."
The formal logical relation involved is, in other words, a form of
existential contents determined by observation. However, like
any form, it may be abstracted, while the abstract form has logical
meaning only in its possible application to material contents. As
far as mere form is concerned, both of the propositions cited might
be invalid. For apart from what is existentially determined, the
valid proposition might be "No marine vertebrates have blood."
Only because a conjunction of the traits of possessing a spinal
column and possessing blood has already been established, are the
propositions subcontraries.
Subcontraries are more determinate than contraries but are still
indeterminate as compared with final judgment. For fully de-
terminate propositions regarding the subject-matter in question
would be u All marine vertebrates marked by -such-and-such traits
(say, bringing forth young alive and breathing with lungs) are
warm-blooded" and u All marine vertebrates having such-and-such
other differential traits are cold-blooded." If they were final and
complete, subcontrary propositions as logical forms would be even
more slovenly than contraries. As a matter of fact, however,
they record the results of observation in such a way as to provide
factual data that set a definite problem. The subcontrary proposi-
tions cited represented the state of zoology at a given date when
the discovery of two kinds of marine vertebrates, marked off by
differences in quality of blood, definitely set a problem; namely,
the problem of discovering the conditions in which some marine
animals are of one kind and others of another kind. It did so
because of a material postulate, namely the postulate that blood
plays such an important role in animal life that a difference with
respect to it is, to a high degree of probability, bound up with
other important characteristics. Propositions marked by "some,"
affirmative and negative, thus present the results of a relatively in-
complete empirical state of inquiry, where "empirical" means a
valid statement of results of actual observation without insight
into the conditions upon which observed traits depend. The de-
pendence of valid conclusions in existential matters upon factual
observation shows that such propositions, while not final, represent
194 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
a definite stage in the conduct of inquiry and perform a necessary
office in carrying it forward to a conclusion.
Inquiry with respect to light is at the present time in this
stage. There are grounds for holding that "Light in some respects
is a radiant phenomenon and in some respects is not, being cor-
puscular." Granting the adequacy of the observations upon
which these propositions rest, no one will deny that they mark
a scientific advance. On the other hand, few would contend that
scientific inquiry can be content with these propositions as final.
They institute a definite problem for further investigation: Under
what conditions is light vibratory and under what conditions is it
discrete?
III. The discussion of subcontrariety leads up to the conception
of subalternation. If it has once been determined that all marine
vertebrates marked by a specified conjunction of traits are warm-
blooded, the so-called subaltern that some such animals are warm-
blooded is trivial. Reference to the general proposition may serve
upon occasion as a reminder to some person who is temporarily
forgetful, but it has no logical force. Suppose that inquiry at a
certain stage has determined only that in the case of a shipwreck
some passengers have been saved and some lost. Suppose further
inquiry determines specifically the names of all who are saved and
all who are lost. In the latter case, it is silly to recur to the
weakened form "some" when the tabulated list of all of each kind
is at hand. The name of any given person must appear in one
list or the other. About a specified person there are no alternatives.
The real function of the proposition of the form of some is in
the opposite direction from that of the traditional table. Instead
of movement from "all" to "some," there is a reaction from some
into all. At an early stage of inquiry that "some" are saved indi-
cates that perhaps "all" on board have been saved. At the stage
when the inquiry is completed, the transition is from the indefinite
"some" of "all" who were on board, to all of a specified group.
In a strictly empirical proposition (in the sense of "empirical"
defined above), there is no difference in logical form between the
proposition "All cases so far observed are such and such" and the
proposition "Some cases out of all existential cases, past, present
and future, are such and such." The logical sense of both lin-
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 195
guistic forms is "Perhaps all cases are such and such." When the
conditions under which phenomena are such and such have been
exclusively determined (through a set of affirmative-negative prop-
ositions) then a general proposition in the form of a law is possible:
Whenever conditions are such and such, consequences are such
and such. 6
IV. The foregoing analysis has one main purpose, namely to
indicate, on one side, that when affirmative and negative proposi-
tions are taken to be final and complete (as they must be when
their operative connection with the progressive conduct of inquiry
is ignored) the forms in question are mechanical and arbitrary;
and, on the other side, to indicate that when their functional ca-
pacity is taken into account the relations of contrariety, sub-
contrariety and subalternation mark definite stages in the advance
of inquiry toward a final warranted judgment. These considera-
tions come, as it were, to a head in the case of contradictory propo-
sitions, those that are such that if one is valid, the other is
invalid, and if one is invalid the other is valid. In the traditional
square of opposition this relation of contradiction is symbolized by
the diagonal lines from the general affirmative to the negative
particular (some, meaning one or more) and from the general
negative to the affirmative particular. Formally speaking, it is
certainly true that the proposition "all men are white" is contra-
dicted if a single case of a colored person is observed, while the
proposition "No men are red" was negated as soon as the first
North American Indian was encountered.
But the essential logical point here is that the general (affirmative
or negative) is negated not by the indeterminate "some" but by the
determinate singular. "Some" is logically either excessive or de-
ficient. It is excessive, if a singular case has been determined (not
in fact an easy matter) ; it is defective, if "some" is understood in
its strict logical force, namely, as an indication of a possibility, of
the form "may be" or "perhaps." The fact that a given Z or O
proposition may be invalid is enough of itself to prove that it can-
not contradict in any strict logical sense a general proposition of
the opposite quality. The proposition "Some men are not white"
6 The difference between the two kinds of general propositions in both of
which the word all may appear is discussed in Chap. XIII.
196 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
indicates that an object may be colored and yet be a human being,
or may be a human being and yet not be white. We are familiar
with the warning against vague generalities. The warning is de-
cidedly relevant at this point. "Some," if unspecified with refer-
ence to singulars, is of the nature of a vague generality. If it is
specified, then it assumes one of two forms: "Such and such
determinate singulars are of a given kind," which negates a general
proposition that "all are of some other kind"; or, still more deter-
minately, "All singulars marked by specified traits are of a certain
kind." In either case, it is not an indeterminate "some" which
contradicts the general A or E proposition.
As has already been indicated, the proposition about a number
of (or some) singulars being such and such sets a problem. It
suffices to negate a general proposition of the opposite quality.
But the negation is in so far incomplete or indeterminate. It does
not of itself establish a valid, universal proposition. It warrants
a contradictory universal only when two logical conditions are
satisfied: (1) Determination of a set of alternative disjunctives
as exhaustively as possible, and (2) determination of the differen-
tial traits which are evidential signs of one and not another kind.
At a given stage of scientific inquiry, an exception is discovered
to some previously accepted generalization. If careful inquiry
substantiates the authenticity of the exceptional singular, then the
generalization in its previous form is certainly negated. But no
scientific inquirer would suppose for a moment that this negation
was equivalent to establishment of a valid universal proposition.
The question at once arises as to the exact conditions under which
the exceptional and negative case occurs. As soon as this is done,
we have another generalization: "All cases marked by certain
traits are such and such." In short, the discovery of singulars or
a singular that negates a generalization is but the antecedently
conditioning means to further inquiries. The proposition in
which it is embodied is not final or complete, for it functions as
occasion and stimulus of further inquiries with view to determin-
ing honv and ivhy the exception occurs. When these inquiries are
satisfactorily concluded, then and only then do we have a final
proposition, which takes the form of a new general proposition.
In no case of controlled inquiry is a flat negation of a generaliza-
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION 197
tion taken to be final If it were so taken, a former generalization
would simply be abandoned and that would be the end of the
matter. What actually happens is that the prior generalization
is modified and revised by discovery of the contradictory instance.
Certain data discovered by using the Einsteinian theory of rela-
tivity contradicted the Newtonian formula of gravitation. If such
negations had the independent and final logical status attributed to
them by traditional formalistic logic, either the Newtonian for-
mula would have been declared invalid and the matter would have
ended there, or else the observational data would have been de-
clared false and impossible because they contradicted the general
proposition. Even in the cases in which an exception turns out
to be apparent rather than actual, the older generalization is not
simply confirmed, but gains a new shade of meaning because of
its capacity to apply to the unusual and seemingly negative in-
stance. It is in this sense that "the exception proves the rule."
The logic of the contradictory relation of propositions thus af-
fords a crowning proof of the functional and operative import of
affirmative-negative propositions. Nothing is more important in
inquiry than institution of contradictory propositions. Since one
must be valid and the other invalid, they are determinate in a way
in which contraries and subcontraries are not. But if the tradi-
tional theory were sound, inquiry would have to stop right there.
There would be no ground upon which to decide which one of
the two is valid and which is invalid. Those who prefer to trust
to the "evidence of the senses" would hold that the generalization
had been proved false. Those who distrust sense and exalt "rea-
son" would be inclined to reverse the conclusion and hold the
singulars are not "really" what they seem to be. Institution of
contradictories in the actual procedure of scientific inquiry is
crucially important just because it does not adopt the canons of
any theory that makes contradictories final and complete. In the
conduct of inquiry, institution of a contradictory negation is
treated as a step in the continuation of inquiry towards final
judgment. The final effect is to revise the generalization reached
in earlier inquiries. Through this modification a generalization
becomes applicable to both the old evidential material which sup-
198 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
ported it and to the new evidential material which contradicts
the earlier generalizations.
The original Aristotelian conception of affirmation and nega-
tion at least corresponded to what was supposed to be the onto-
logical nature of the objects to which affirmative and negative
propositions apply. The functional conception here advanced
denies that affirmative and negative propositions have a one-to-one
correspondence with objects as they are. But it gives them the
operative and instrumental force of means of transforming an
unsettled and doubtful existential situation into a resolved de-
terminate one. The modern theory, derived, as has been said,
from the attempt to retain forms after their material or existential
content had been abandoned, is grounded in nothing and leads
nowhere. It is formal only in the sense of being empty and
mechanical. In neither reflects existence already known nor for-
wards inquiry into what may and should be known. It is a logical
vermiform appendix.
In view of the fact that the metaphysical problem of the One
and the Many has at various times had a very considerable influ-
ence upon logical theory, it may be appropriate, in concluding
this chapter, to say a few words on that topic as it affects logical
theory. Unity, or what is termed The One, is the existential
counterpart of the product of operations which, by institution of
agreement of different contents in evidential force, establish war-
ranted identities. Negation, on the other hand, discriminates and
produces differences. The latter when hypostatized constitute the
Many. The problem when approached from the logical side is
one of operations of unifying and discriminating. These oper-
ations have of course an existential basis and matrix. Integration
and differentiation are biological processes foreshadowing the logi-
cal operations just mentioned. They are themselves prepared for
and foreshadowed in physical processes of conjunction and sepa-
ration. The insoluble problems which have led to speculative
metaphysical constructions about the One and the Many arise
from making entities, expressed in nouns, out of processes and
operations properly designated by active verbs and adverbs.
CHAPTER XI
THE FUNCTION OF PROPOSITIONS OF
QUANTITY IN JUDGMENT
"n traditional formal logic, the topic of quantity of proposi-
tions follows after that of quality. The traditional theory,
. applying to propositions with respect to both quality and
quantity, holds that propositions are capable of interpretation on
the basis of both extension and intension. In the former case, a
proposition is of a relation of classes; in the latter, it states that
members of a specified class are affirmed to be marked by a speci-
fied attribute. As applied to quantity, in extensive interpretation
a proposition declares either that a class as such is contained in
another class and then is general in quantity; or that some unspeci-
fied portion of it is so contained, and is particular in "quantity."
When read in intension, a proposition states either that any mem-
ber of the class has a certain "attribute" or that some unspecified
portion of it has a given attribute. Thus, the "general" proposi-
tion "All men are mortal" means either that the class men is con-
tained as a sub-class in the class mortals, or that any man whatever
has the attribute mortality. In any case, quantity, so-called, is
according to this doctrine marked by the two forms all (none, not
any) and some (some-not), a distinction which, in combination
with that of the affirmative-negative yields the four forms of
A E I O propositions. The slightest inspection thus reveals that
the distinction or form called quantity is, in fact, that of the
definite class and an indefinite part of a class.
The extremely restricted conception of quantity involved in
this theory hardly needs to be pointed out — restricted, that is, in
comparison with propositions of common sense and of science
which have quantitative marks. In common sense, there are
199
202 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
Given the latter, propositions are marked both by quality and
quantity. For purposes of discussion we must deal with one
aspect or the other separately, but the separation is made purely
for the sake of discussion. It has no counterpart in the subject-
matter which is the ground and result of comparison. The
connection of the function of elimination with the work of
comparison need not be gone over again. What is here significant
is that all comparison is of the nature of measurement. Compari-
son obviously involves selection-rejection, for objects and events
cannot be compared in toto. The positive import of this fact is
that in order to be compared, subject-matters must be reduced to
"parts"; that is, to constituents that are capable of being treated
as of the same kind or homogeneous. To compare is to pair, and
things that are paired are thereby made commensurate with respect
to carrying out some operation in view.
The only difficulty standing in the way of recognition of the
equipollence of comparison and measurement is the fact that the
results of many measurements are stated qualitatively, not in nu-
merical terms. There is at the very outset a fundamental ambi-
guity in the conception whole-part. In one sense, it is entirely
qualitative. To be a whole is to be complete, finished; to be of
seamless quality throughout. If parts are mentioned in connection
with such a whole, nothing separable and removable is denoted.
The most familiar instance of such "parts" are the organic mem-
bers of a living body. If they are removed, they are no longer
what they were as living "parts" of the living organism, while the
latter is no longer a complete whole. It is not necessary, however,
to go to so-called organic relations to find instances of qualitative
whole-parts. In what is termed a situation, an immediate quality
pervades everything that enters into that situation. If the situation
experienced is that of being lost in a forest, the quality of being
lost permeates and affects every detail that is observed and thought
of. The "parts" are such only qualitatively.
The term "all" is still frequently employed in connection with
qualitatively unified wholes: "It is not all of life to live," "All flesh
is as grass which today is and tomorrow is cast into the fire," "It
is all gone," "The fire is all out," "All the invited guests have now
arrived" in the sense that the gathering is now complete — not in
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 203
the sense of an enumeration. The quantitative meaning of whole-
part is, on the other hand, either that of a collection or of an aggre-
gation of homogeneous units such that the whole in question has its
magnitude or amount determined by counting comprised units.
There are cases of comparison-measurement which lie between
the two limits set by the strictly qualitative and quantitative
wholes. Common sense propositions marked by more-less, by the
so-called comparative degree, as hotter-colder, taller-shorter, many-
few, much-little, etc., are of this category. They represent meas-
urements, but not measurements carried to the point of numerical
determination. It is these intermediate cases which tend to ob-
scure the connection of comparison with measurement.
From these introductory remarks, discussion proceeds to con-
sideration of propositions marked by quantitative terms (1) to
indicate more explicitly their connection with comparison, (2) to
indicate their operational and intermediate force in determination
of final judgment, and (3) to indicate the various logical forms
they assume. The first topic is introduced by noting that the
situation which evokes inquiry and which induces the formation
of propositions as means to its final determination is indeterminate
for the reason that, as it stands, it is both too wide and too narrow
to provide the data that signify and that test proposed methods of
resolution. The indeterminate situation is both deficient and
redundant. Elimination of what is superfluous and obstructive
and provision of what is lacking with respect to evidential ca-
pacity, are indispensable. The satisfaction of these requirements
through the function of affirmation-negation has been dealt with.
But redundancy and deficiency are also quantitative concepts in
a quasi-qualitative form. What is termed in logic the undistrib-
uted middle is an instance of a too great width of subject-matter
which incapacitates it to serve as ground; so also is the fallacy of
affirming the antecedent because the consequent is affirmed.
The rule that from two particular propositions nothing can be
inferred is on the other hand a warning that material in hand is
too narrow to warrant a grounded inference. It is in effect a
statement of the need for supplementation. In examples used in
standard texts, the fallacies which result from too wide and too
narrow subject-matter are readily detected, because they concern
204 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
material already cooked or loaded. In actual inquiry a large part
of the task is to determine just what subject-matter needs to be
eliminated and provided and how. It required, for example, two
centuries before the too great width of Newtonian conceptions of
space and time was detected, and it took inquiry much more time
than that to discover the narrowness of the ancient conception of
atoms and corpuscles that unfitted it for scientific use. The
only method for modifying subject-matter which is indeterminate
because of overlappings and because of insufficiency is the weight-
ing secured through measurement.
Measurement, as has been said, assumes at first a qualitative
form. Propositions marked by such words as much, little, few,
many, a whole lot, scanty, abundant, small, great, high, low, etc.,
etc., express measurement as far as they go. For there is nothing
which is much, little, etc., absolutely or by itself. Moreover,
these determinations not only involve comparison but they also
involve the means-consequence relation. There is too much or
too little for a specified end, not per se; "I should like to buy that
article but I haven't enough money"; "Some people in this country
have too much money for their own good and for that of the
country." The beginning of the formation of a balance sheet in
such cases takes the form of subcontrary propositions. "Some
money is at hand and some is not." "Everybody needs some
money, but no one needs more than a certain (not definitely speci-
fied) amount." Such propositions have rudimentary quantifica-
tions, but the quantities involved are still predominantly qualitative.
Measurement or comparison becomes definite by means of count-
ing and summing units. Then we have a whole-of-parts in specifi-
cally quantitative meanings of this term. Much becomes how
much; many, how many.
It is not, however, to be inferred that in all cases qualitative
measurement is so defective that, in order to be adequately de-
terminate, it needs to pass into numerical measurement. For ex-
ample, a painter at work upon a picture may decide that there
is not enough red in a certain part of the picture to give the desired
esthetic effect. He determines how much red should be added
by "intuition" and trial, stopping when he gets the qualitatively
unified whole he is after. He appraises or evaluates the amount
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 205
needed on the basis of a net qualitative outcome, not by weighing
a pigment upon a scale having numerical indices. Were the case
one of regulated economical industrial production, the weighing
of amounts would certainly take the form of numerical determina-
tion. In most moral as well as esthetic final judgments, qualitative
measurement answers the end to be reached. Insistence upon nu-
merical measurement, when it is not inherently required by the
consequence to be effected, is a mark of respect for the ritual of
scientific practice at the expense of its substance.
In the case of both qualitative and numerical measurement, some-
thing has to be taken away and something added. In this sense,
measurement in qualitative terms, more, less, enough, etc., ap-
proximates the quantitative part-whole relation. The difference
between the two cases concerns the method and criterion of
measurement, not its presence or absence. The nature of the end
to which measuring is relative determines both criterion and the
method employed. It is as absurd to insist upon numerical meas-
urement when the end to which the quantitative proposition is
related as means to consequence is qualitative, as it is to be content
with qualitative measurement (which is then guess-work) in the
case of other ends-in-view.
In the case of the painter, the intended end is the picture as a
qualitative whole. More of this color and less of that is therefore
capable of measurement by direct qualitative observation. More
red here affects not just the spatial part of the picture in which it
is applied but the picture as a whole; other hues and shades are
made qualitatively different by its application. In the case of a
medical prescription, on the other hand, too much of an ingredient
may change a medicine into a poison and too little may render it
medically innocuous. Numerical measurement is then demanded
by the end to be attained. It is ultimately the nature of the prob-
lem in hand which decides what sort of comparison-measurement
is required in order to obtain a determinate solution. There are
some persons who deplore the reduction by the scientist of all
materials to numerical terms on the ground that it seems to them
to destroy value which is qualitative. There are other persons
who insist that every subject-matter must be reduced to numerical
terms. Both are guilty of the same logical error. Both miss the
206 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
logical meaning of measurement, which is determined by the in-
strumental reference of quantified propositions to an intended ob-
jective consequence. Both take propositions as ultimate and
complete, when, in fact, they are intermediate and instrumental.
That one important difference between common sense and
science is constituted by the tendency of the former to be satisfied
with measurement that is dominantly qualitative is obvious. For
practical ends it is enough to speak of a big crowd, or of the room
growing warmer or colder, the day becoming brighter or duller,
etc., whereas to satisfy the demands of technology, business, and
science numerical comparisons are required. The box-office, for
example, wants to know just how large or how small is the "crowd"
in the theater; the careful householder wants a thermostat to keep
variations of temperature within definite limits; the worker in the
laboratory has to measure numerically just how much of each
material and of each form of energy is involved in production of
the phenomenon he is studying. All cases, however, whether of
common sense, technology, business or science, explicitly reveal,
when they are examined, the means-consequence relation, thereby
disclosing the intermediate nature of propositions of quantity as
instrumental in determinate resolution of an otherwise indeter-
minate situation.
It is often said that the conception of quantity rests upon com-
plete indifference to quality. On this ground it is claimed, par-
ticularly by logicians of the idealistic school, that the concept of
quantity so abstracts from the "real" world as to represent a low
grade of "thought." This view is based upon failure to realize
the operational character of propositions about quantity, whether
extensive or intensive. But the notion of indifference to quality
is also exposed to radical misconception. For the correct state-
ment is that propositions about magnitude are based upon an
underlying pervasive quality, and are indifferent only to differ-
ences within this basic quality; that is, they are indifferent to those
qualities and only those qualities within the basic quality which are
irrelevant as means to the consequences to be established. If, for
example, a person is trying to frame a proposition about the num-
ber of sheep he owns or the area of the pasture in which they
feed, he neglects qualitative differences that mark off individual
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 207
sheep from one another and qualitative differences in different
portions of the field in which they feed. But he has to observe the
quality in virtue of which objects are sheep, or else he will count,
say, dogs and stones. He has similarly to observe the quality in
virtue of which grass-land is of the kind it is. The logical import
of this commonplace remark is that it indicates in general (1) the
control of propositions of magnitude by the quality of the situation
to which the problem of inquiry is relevant, and in especial, (2) the
importance and logical nature of limits.
The first point has already been sufficiently emphasized. 1 The
import of the second point is at least suggested by the negative
fact that the presence of limits in all counting and measurement
that have existential reference (and it is only propositions having
such reference that are under discussion) affords a complete an-
swer to the objection brought by idealistic logicians against the
validity of such propositions: viz., that they necessarily involve a
regressus ad infinitum. Stated positively, all such measurement
(including the case of enumeration) has its limits set, on one side,
by the problematic subject-matter in hand and, on the other side,
by the definite resolution which inquiry undertakes to effect.
These considerations determine the meaning of the determinate
all and of the indefinite some. They also fix the difference be-
tween two kinds of collective propositions in each of which the
word all appears: "All the books on that shelf are novels"; "All
the guests have arrived"; "The tide is all in or all out" — that is, is
high or low; "The iron is tf/ready soft enough to work"; "The
bowl is full of as much water as it will hold." In the last three
cases qualitative wholeness predominates, though the propositions
are certainly dependent upon comparison and involve measure-
ment. In the first two cases, there has to be observation of each
singular in order to warrant the propositions made though not in
the later propositions.
Nevertheless, there is an aspect of totality involved and hence of
inherent objective limitation in each instance. The propositions
are not collective in the sense of mere aggregates of enumerated
x It is sufficient, however, to negate the idea that a scientific proposition is
merely a numerical-index, to the exclusion of any symbol having reference to the
qualitative.
208 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
units. The shelf is full of books of a kind; the quota of guests is
complete. All in some other propositions has still a third meaning,
and this meaning, in spite of the word all, relegates the propositions
in question to the category of the particular form. "AH of the
beans in this bag which have so far been examined are white." "No
person who has as yet entered the hall is an acquaintance of mine."
"Altogether the stamps in this collection number 874." In such
instances, the enumeration of singulars does not determine a limit
nor yet even indicate that a limit has been reached; there is no
intimation that anything having entirety is exhaustively deter-
mined. For logical purposes, the first proposition is equivalent to
the proposition "some beans in this bag are w T hite, and perhaps all
are," the probability depending upon the number examined in its
ratio to the total number in the bag — the latter setting a qualitative
limit. Confusion arises when application of the word collective
to such propositions is used to assimilate them, in logical theory, to
collections in which a limit is reached or set. That a regiment
consists of so many companies and each company of so many
men is a collective proposition in a very different sense from a
proposition about the number of books in a library or the number
of stamps in a "collection," just as the proposition that "this room
contains so many cubic feet" is different in form from the propo-
sition "this sand pile contains so many grains of sand." The dif-
ference will hereafter be noted by calling only the former col-
lective, while the latter will be called aggregative.
The distinction that has been drawn bears directly upon the
status of propositions in which some is explicitly present. We may
recur to the illustration in the last chapter regarding persons on a
shipwrecked vessel, placing the emphasis now not upon affirma-
tion, but upon some "are saved" and some "are lost." The affirma-
tion "Some are saved" and the negative proposition "Some are not
saved" are clearly indeterminate; the indeterminacy is manifest if
we suppose that a person having a friend on board is solicitous
about his friend's fate. Until singulars are determined and then
gathered together in a proposition that reaches an objective limit,
the propositions cited refer to indeterminate aggregates. When the
needed operations are performed we have a collection that is other
than aggregative. "All the following persons (definitely specified)
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 209
were saved and all the following named persons were lost." There
is now a double qualitative limitation. There is the qualitative limit
of completion set by the total number of persons on board and by
the quality of being lost or saved.
So far it has been shown in what sense "all" is the mark of a
quantitative proposition, differentiating such a proposition, (1)
from mere aggregates (which in their indefiniteness do not differ
logically from propositions in which "some" appears); and (2)
from the "all" of non-existential propositions (such as "all triangles
have the sum of their angles equal to right angles") which, when
valid, are necessary propositions; and (3) from "all" in such
propositions as "All men are mortal," where all applies to each and
every one of a specified kind although the singulars are not
capable of enumeration. That "all" has these four meanings is a
warning against using words as a clew to logical form apart from
their context in inquiry.
I now come to the topic of measurement by enumeration. A
measured collection is identical with the kind of collection just
said to have the property of totality in contrast with a merely num-
bered aggregate. In the latter, subject-matter sets no limits, and
consequently fails to prescribe a whole. Measured collections in-
volve (1) limits from which to which; (2) something specified as a
unit for counting; and (3) progressive accumulation of these units
until the limit ad quern is reached. The word accumulation as here
used involves something different from the aggregation found in the
merely numerical set. When we measure the cubic capacity of a
liquid container the successive addition of units is cumulative be-
cause it progressively tends toward a limit. Even if we were able
to count the number of drops of water that are contained, we
should have at most simply an aggregation; as if it just happened
there are so many drops — no less, no more.
The cumulative aspect in genuine collective propositions signifies
that such propositions depend upon some principle of arrangement
or order which is derived from the involved means-consequences
relation. Suppose, for example, that there are a number of ship-
wrecked persons in a boat. The number is definite; and there is a
definite amount of food and water on board, and the distance from
land is also approximately known. The length of stay on board,
210 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
the distance from a ship that might rescue them, weather-condi-
tions, etc., are, however, indeterminate, depending upon con-
tingencies that cannot be accurately determined. Food and water
are measured not just for the sake of enumeration but as a means of
allotment, of distribution. Were there a store of food and water
at hand that would last beyond the remotest date that could be set
for rescue there would be no point in measuring. In the Garden
of Eden it may be presumed that waste and stringency were both
impossible. And in a similar situation no end is served by proposi-
tions as to quantity. But in cases of excess and deficiency, de-
termined to be such by reference to an end to be reached as a
limit, apportionment is necessary if conduct is to be intelligent.
Allotting, meting out, involves a principle of distribution, and this
principle controls the subordinate operation of counting. There
must be enough if the end is to be attained and just enough in
the interest of economy and efficiency.
The illustrations have been taken from the field of common
sense, of situations of use-enjoyment. In this domain, control by
the qualitative is most clearly evident. Indeed, as was indicated
earlier, common sense propositions of quantity are likely to be
themselves semi-qualitative. Emergence from this state was
probably a slow historic process, being produced by exigencies of
technology, exchange and science. The word few, for example, is
derived from a root meaning poor; many from a root meaning
abundance, fullness. While physical science depends upon meas-
urement by means of enumerated homogeneous units, it is equally
true of it that counting is for the sake of measuring and that
measuring is controlled by the problem set by some qualitative
situation, as one limit, and the objective consequence of a resolved
situation as the other limit. Mere counting and mere measuring are
childish (that is, immature) imitations of scientific procedure.
The homogeneous units that are required for numerically de-
terminate measurement are fixed first in the case of bodies ex-
tended in space. An object that fills a span or stretch can be
readily marked off into sub-spans or sub-stretches of approximately
equal extent. Enumeration of these smaller intervals as units
measures the extent of the larger body. The span of the hand, the
pace in walking, were presumably the first such units evolved. A
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 211
string can be doubled and redoubled and knots made at required
points. By the use of a string knotted at approximately equal
intervals notches can be cut in a stick, and the stick placed against
some object. The length of the latter is measured by counting the
number of notches in the superimposed rod as far as its extent and
that of the object have the same ends or limits. The relatively
qualitative long and short are refined into terms of so long or so
short. Until the rise of geometry, however, the problem of com-
plete reduction of the qualitative to quantitative relation was not
solved — or even seen to be a problem. For the equality of in-
tervals of the string and rod remained, after all, a matter of qualita-
tive appraisal since it was conditioned by direct sensory-motor
processes.
The measurement of discrete objects is the case that on its face
comes closest to being not a case of measuring but of mere count-
ing. One counts the number of chairs in the room; the shepherd
counts the sheep in his flock; a man counts the number of bills or
coins in his pocketbook. But if there is no end-in-view in the
counting (in which case there is no measuring and weighing) such
counting is like that of children who, after they have learned to
count, count for the fun of it — and even then there is some
limiting object, like seeing if they can count up to a million. The
shepherd counts in order to see if his flock is "all there"; if it is
increasing or decreasing, etc. A man keeps track of his funds be-
cause he has something to do with them, etc. More important is
the fact that mere physical separation is not the ground of count-
ing in the cases mentioned, provided "mere" means apart from
consequence to be effected. So-called numerical identity is not
something given to inquiry but is determined in inquiry. A
book is the unit for one problem and purpose; a page for another;
perhaps even a word or a letter is the unit as means to another
end. A library, a whole set of books, may thus be the unit that has
"numerical identity." The materials that appear in propositions as
(numerical) identities are determined, like all other identifications,
for and by operational use in solving some problem.
A derived but ultimately more important mode of measurement
has for its object increase and decrease in changes which ex-
istentially are continuous — intensive as distinct from extensive
212 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
quantity. That a body is getting colder or warmer, is moving at
greater or less speed, (or in general is tending toward a contrary
quality) are comparisons expressing vague qualitative measure-
ments that can be made on the basis of ordinary observations. The
problem of converting these qualitative estimates into definite, that
is to say, numerical form, involves overcoming difficulties that do
not exist in the case of extended magnitudes. Continuous change
of quality does not lend itself to division into homogeneous units,
since by description the quality is continuously becoming heter-
ogeneous to what it was. From the standpoint of the content of
Greek science, with its disparaging view of change, all that was
necessary was to classify the diverse kinds of qualitative change that
occurred; as from warm to cold, wet to dry, soft to hard, up to
down, and the reverse. In classic science it thus sufficed to say that
all qualities of sense-perception change between opposite limits;
cold and only cold is that which becomes warm and so on. There
was no need for measurement and hence none for units by which to
measure.
The concept of series is not found in Greek science or logic. It
did not appear until change was found capable of reduction, for
the purpose of instituting controlled comparisons, to motion, and
was thereby found capable of measurement in terms of homogene-
ous units of space and time. Then the theory of celestial mechanics
became for a time the model for all scientific descriptions and ex-
planations. The problem set to inquiry was that of translating con-
tinuous change of quality with which qualitative measurements can
deal only in terms of intensive degree (more-less, least-most) into
numbered extent, direction, velocity and acceleration of motion
correlated with numbered units of duration.
The problem was met by devices which permitted continuous
qualitative change to be placed in functional correspondence with
continuous extended stretches marked off into discrete homo-
geneous units that can be counted. By the use of, say, a mercury
thermometer, changes in the intensity of heat, which are not
directly comparable with one another, are rendered comparable
with fixed units of extension — fixed, that is, as far as other condi-
tions can be kept constant. A numerical degree of temperature is
a unit or sum of units of heat or cold indirectly. In itself it is the
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 213
interval between two lines on a scale in which there is a column
marked off on a glass tube containing, say, mercury. Change in
temperature is measured by counting the number of such intervals
and their fractional parts that are traversed by the enclosed
mercury during a given time — which in turn is measured by a
similar device in which the movement of an index or hand over a
number of equally extended intervals on a dial or face yields
enumerable units. The device is practicable because of the "law"
of expansion and contraction of mercury, air or alcohol, with
changes of temperature, conditions of pressure being maintained as
constant as possible. The difference between immediate qualities
of heat and cold is thus entirely eliminated, "absolute" or zero
temperature being the point at which molecules cease to change
position or move. The relation, or ratio, of qualitative changes
to one another is thus determined through a proportion of which
the other terms are the ratio which changes of position bear to one
another, 2
All of three types of comparison-measurement that have been
discussed involve the operation of matching. In the first case, a
certain extent of a rod is matched against an extent of a piece of
cloth, side of a room, linear dimension of land, etc., etc. Measure-
ment in the second case is made possible because objects can be
matched against other objects taken as symbols — such sounds and
marks, for example, as the numerals and figures one, two, three,
four, etc. A word still in use, namely digits, suggests that the
objects counted were first matched against toes and fingers. Al-
though the latter are themselves existential, they are so when used
in counting in the representative sense of sounds, and marks on
paper, in linguistic communication. Toes and fingers as thus used
are as symbolic as are the marks: 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. In the third case,
changes in a continuum of change are matched against extended in-
tervals, like those upon a glass tube or clock-face. In the first and
third cases alike there is, in addition, a matching against syrnbols,
such as are characteristic of the second case. The use of linguistic
symbols, of mm&yvr-names, is the invention which permitted quan-
2 The numerical determination of intelligence quotients will, for example^ be-
come scientifically significant in the degree with which they can be definitely
correlated with other specified changes. By themselves they simply set a problem.
214 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
tity and number to become objects of independent or mathematical
investigation. For the relations of symbols to one another in a
meaning-symbol system can be examined on their own account,
independent of the relations existential objects and changes sustain
to one another. 3
Matching or correspondence in some form is thus the basic
operation in all propositions in which determination of quantity,
having existential reference, appears. This fact explains the sense
in which number and magnitude are relational. The relation in-
volved is complex. For example, suppose a stick is measured off
into twelve equal intervals. It can then be affirmed that the rod is
twelve such intervals long and that each interval is one-twelfth as
long as the entire stick. But if the matter ended here, there would
be no measurement. The propositions are not only circular but
trivial. The rod and its subdivisions become a measure only when
applied to other objects so that the rod and its intervals are matched
against differences of interval in these other things. Until a foot-
rule is used to measure other things it is not a rule, but merely a
stick that happens to be notched or lined in a certain rather curious
fashion. Even when one foot-rule or yard-stick is compared with
another, there is, as such, no measurement, but only a check upon
the accuracy of the measuring capacity of one or other or both.
The standard meter is a bar of platinum kept under as constant
conditions of temperature and pressure as possible in the city of
Paris. But if that were the whole of the story, the word meter
would not have the connection with measuring it actually has. By
itself the bar is just a particular bar and nothing else; it is neither
a standard of measurement nor is itself measured. It is a measure
of length because (1) all other rods of a meter's length in use any-
where in the world may be checked by being matched against it,
and (2) because, and only because, these other rods are themselves
used in matching still other things. It is just as true that the length
of the bar of platinum (or any other measuring rod) is determined
by its application in measuring cloth, walls, sides of fields, etc.,
as that the length of the latter is determined by comparison with it.
3 See, ante, pp. 54, 110. Discussion of the relations existing among symbols as
such takes us out of the field of number and magnitude that have direct existential
reference into the domain of mathematics. Hence it is no part of the subject-
matter here considered. It is taken up in Chap. XX.
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 215
In short, when we apply the word measure to pounds, gallons,
yards, etc., "measure" is an elliptic expression for means of
measuring. Apart from operational use, the fact that pounds are
relative to one another and to ounces and tons, has no measuring
import. Moreover, foot and yard are not measures just because
they can be matched against such qualitative objects as pieces of
cloth (themselves qualitatively unlike), rolls of paper, boards,
roads, fields, but are measures because this latter matching enables
these other unlike qualitative things to be indirectly compared
with respect to one another — just as, for example, matching dol-
lar bills against a bushel of wheat would be of trivial importance if
the matching of the bills against books, railway travel, groceries
and houses did not enable indirect measurements or calculations to
be undertaken about the values in exchange of these other things in
relation to one another. The negation of quality or indifference to
it which is sometimes ascribed to quantity and number (and a
ground made for their disparagement) is not final but, on the
contrary, positive means for controlled construction of new ob-
jects and institution of new qualities. Just as a piece of paper,
enacted by law into legal tender, is a means for comparing values in
exchange of things qualitatively unlike, thus promoting and con-
trolling new transactions with qualitative objects — so science
renders things qualitatively unlike (as sounds and colors, pressures,
light and electricity) comparable with one another, in such ways
that controlled interchanges are capable of being brought about. 4
What has been said has a definite bearing upon so-called stand-
ards of value or more properly of valuation. It contradicts the
notion that there are some entities that are standards "absolutely,"
that is, in themselves. 5 In the case of the platinum bar mentioned
above no one would suppose that it is a standard measure of length
because of some inherent property of absolute length. But in
discussion of art, morals, economics and law it is a fairly usual as-
sumption that critical evaluative judgments are impossible unless
there is a standard of values which is such because of its own in-
4 The ontological hypostization of a method, an instrumentality, of inquiry used
to effect objective consequences, into something ontological, is the source of the
mechanistic metaphysics of "reality."
5 This notion is a twin of the notion of ends-in-themselves already criticised;
see pp. 167-8.
216 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
herent constitution and properties. In economics it has been a
fairly common assumption that gold is a standard measure of the
value of other things because of its own "intrinsic" value. This
idea appears almost always when paper money is denied the
capacity to serve as a standard. Instead of a comparison of the
capacity of gold and paper money to serve as standards on the
ground of actual consequences operationally produced by their
respective applications in determining exchange, an alleged absolute
or "intrinsic" value in the case of gold is appealed to.
In morals, it is a common assumption that the fairness of particu-
lar actions cannot be determined unless there is some absolute
standard with which they may be compared. The true and the
beautiful are similarly hypostatized. But in fact, we institute
standards of justice, truth, esthetic quality, etc., in order that
different objects and events may be so intelligently compared ivkh
one another as to give direction to activities dealing with concrete
objects and affairs: — exactly as we set up a platinum bar as a
standard measurer of lengths. The standard is just as much subject
to modification and revision in one case as in the other on the basis
of the consequences of its operational application. Belief in magic
is not confined to primitive peoples. The superiority of one con-
ception of justice to another is of the same order as the superiority
of the metric system to the more or less haphazard set of weights
and measures it has replaced in scientific practice, although not of
the same quality.
Yard and mile, ounce and pound, gill and gallon, are conceptual
meanings of the same general type as common sense conceptions,
which, as we have seen, are related to one another on socio-historic
grounds. They are means of facilitating and executing all kinds of
social transactions with reference to use and enjoyment. The
metric system of measurements is rather of the type of the system
of symbol-meanings which is framed on the basis of inter-relation
and free translatability. The propositions that result from their
application are still instrumental, although to a different end; in
the latter case, that of facilitation of inquiry. Conceptions and
principles that serve to measure or evaluate moral conduct and re-
lations are logically of the same kind, and should be so treated in
social practice.
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 111
It should be pointed out, by way at least of anticipation, that,
according to the principle expounded, space and time are in science
not what we measure but are themselves results of measurements of
objects and events, in the interest of objective determination of
problematic situations. This fact has, in the context of present
discussion, definite bearing on the relation of discrete and con-
tinuous magnitude, as these are found in propositions having ex-
istential reference. A unit of measurement is, when it is taken as
a unit of measurement, discrete. But it is internally continuous
whether it be a millimetre or a kilometer. What is taken as discrete
in one functional use is used as continuous in resolution of another
problem and conversely. The same principle applies in proposi-
tions of temporal dates (discrete) and temporal durations (con-
tinuities). Even if there are, existentially, indivisible discrete
pulses of change such that each change comes as a unitary whole,
nevertheless, (1) such pulses must have direction if they can be
used in determination of change as continuous, and (2) they are
units of temporal measurement only when they are taken and
used as means of comparison and measurement. Direction is nec-
essary because it is required to effect that overlapping which is
characteristic of all gross and observed change, since the latter
could not arise by laying discrete pulses of change end to end.
These unitary pulses if they exist are as qualitative as is the
bar of platinum referred to. They become units of magnitude
only as they are functionally employed to connect into a unified
scheme changes that by themselves are disparate and heterogeneous.
Schematization of time as a straight line indefinitely extended in
one direction may be useful for some purposes. But duration as it
enters into an existential (non-mathematical) proposition has the
thickness which is constituted by overlapping of sequential changes
and by the fact that determination of any specific change re-
quires reference to changes occurring contemporaneously. To
say, for example, that a certain reign lasted from 1800 to 1830
would have no meaning if the interval in question had no other
content than this reign.
It may be advisable to refer explicitly to the existential opera-
tions involved in comparison-measurements. In the matching char-
acteristic of common sense it takes the obvious form of scoring and
218 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
tallying, along with the activity of juxtaposing or superimposing.
When the matching takes place by means of number-names, the
names, even though they are but symbols, have to be pronounced
or marked down, if counting is to be effected. Counting is as
existential an operation as is whistling or singing. Calculations
in scientific work may go on in the head as well as they may be
written down on paper. But symbols as symbols do not have
physical efficacy. They have to be existentially manipulated if
calculation occurs. The habit of ruling out the existential acts of
counting and calculation from the domain with which logic is
concerned is simply another instance of the systematic neglect of
operations, so characteristic of formalistic logic, a neglect which is
due to the doctrine that propositions are merely enunciative or
declarative of antecedent existence or subsistence.
Finally, qualitative control of existential propositions of number
and magnitude is relevant to the difference between unity and a
unit. Only that is unified or a unity which is a qualitative whole.
In the language employed earlier in this chapter, it has members but
is not an aggregate nor a collection of parts. When a qualitative
whole is internally conflicting the pervasive whole affects the
quality of the conflict, just as a civil war is what it is because it is
disruption of and within a unity of a nation or people. The con-
flict can only be resolved and a new qualitative unified situation be
produced by going outside the situation that is antecedently in
existence so as to eliminate some of its factors and to introduce other
new factors. Hence the necessity of comparison-contrast, which
as we have seen is a name for the operations by which this elimina-
tion and introduction are effected. Control of the operations
performed is exercised by the intent of production of a new
unified situation. Propositions are the means by which the intent
is carried out. The means are economical and effective (as in the
reaching of any objective consequence) in the degree in which
comparison takes the form of measuring and weighing. Without
results secured by these operations, means employed either fail to
bring about the intended end or they produce more than is in-
tended, thereby creating a situation that perhaps is more trouble-
some and conflicting than the original one which the means used
were intended to unify. Qualitative wholes as such are incom-
QUANTITY AND MEASUREMENT 219
mensurable, just because they are uniquely qualitative. But they
are the limits or "ends" from which and to which propositions are
means. As such limits they provide the criteria by which the
relevancy and force of propositions of measurement, qualitative
and quantitative, are measured.
CHAPTER XII
JUDGMENT AS SPATIAL-TEMPORAL
DETERMINATION: NARRATION-DESCRIPTION
"udgment is transformation of an antecedent existentially in-
determinate or unsettled situation into a determinate one.
As such, judgment is always individual in a sense in which
individual is distinguished from both particular and singular, in
that it refers to a total qualitative situation. In this sense there are
no different kinds of judgment, but distinguishable phases or em-
phases of judgment, according to the aspect of its subject-matter
that is emphasized. 1 In the opening statement existential trans-
formation is the point of emphasis. Existential subject-matter as
transformed has a temporal phase. Linguistically, this phase is
expressed in narration. But all changes occur through interactions
of conditions. What exists co-exists, and no change can either
occur or be determined in inquiry in isolation from the connection
of an existence with co-existing conditions. Hence the existential
subject-matter of judgment has a spatial phase. Linguistically, this
is expressed in description. For purposes of analysis and exposition
the two phases must be distinguished. But there is no separation
in the subject-matter which is analyzed. Whatever exists in and
for judgment is temporal-spatial. In a given proposition, either the
temporal or the spatial aspect may be uppermost. But every nar-
ration has a background which, if it were made explicit instead of
being taken for granted, would be described; correspondingly,
what is described exists within some temporal process to which
"narration" applies.
1 The two previous chapters have indicated, for example, that "quantity" and
"quality" in judgment must be distinguished in discourse but that they cannot be
separated.
220
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 221
I. I begin with consideration of that phase of the development of
judgment in which temporal considerations are dominant. Their
simplest form is found in propositions about changing present
existential subject-matter linguistically expressed through active
verbs in the present tense. Examples are such observations as "The
Sun is rising; it is growing brighter; the room is getting cold; he is
coming closer; the clock is striking; the fire is dying down, etc."
In such a proposition as, "He was here a few minutes ago but has
now gone," the subject-matter is of the same kind, but the words
"was" — "ago" and "has gone" make explicit a reference to the past
that is involved in the first set of sentences but that is there a matter
of understood context. For it is indispensable to note that a limit-
ing reference to both past and future is present in every existential
proposition. There is reference to a limit ab quo and ad qitem.
Without this limitation, a change is not characterized or qualified.
No mere flux can be noted, appraised or estimated. A change is
characterized in terms of direction — fro?n something to something.
"The sun is rising" — that is, it was below the horizon, but is now
moving further and further above the horizon. Such propositions
as "It is sweet or red" state (as has already been noted) either that
something is becoming or has become a changed quality, or
else that it has the capacity to change — to redden or sweeten —
something else.
The point just made has a fundamental importance for the
theory of the temporal and historic phase of judgment which may
not be apparent at first sight. For it signifies that the unitary
subject-matter of every temporal proposition is a round, cycle,
period, circuit, or hora. To judge is to render determinate; to
determine is to order and organize, to relate in definite fashion.
Temporal order is instituted through rhythms which involve
periodicities, intervals, and limits; all of which are inter-involved.
Absolute origins and absolute closes and termini are mythical.
Each beginning and each ending is a delimitation of a cycle or
round of qualitative change. A date, a moment or point of time,
has no meaning except as such a delimitation. >
That which exists is, as existent, indifferent to delimitation in
respect to beginnings and endings. There are no absolute origina-
tions or initiations or absolute finalities and terminations in nature.
222 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
The "from which" and "to which" that determine the subject-
matter of any particular narration-description are strictly relative
to the objective intent set to inquiry by the problematic quality of
a given situation. Such an event as, say, daybreak is the initial
limit of subject-matter in one problem; the terminal limit in an-
other, and an intermediate event in still a third problem — as, for
example, in a proposition about the diurnal rotation of the earth.
Generalized measures of temporal sequences, (such as are desig-
nated by the words second, minute, hour, day, year, century,
period, epoch) stand for kinds of cycles which, like all measures,
are procedural means of furthering and directing the inclusions-
exclusions (affirmations-negations) by which determinate subject-
matter of propositions is instituted. 2
Since every change when it is subjected to inquiry is a round
or cycle of events whose beginning and ending are determined by
the indeterminate situation undergoing resolution (and hence are
not absolute), every given change may be narrated in terms of an
indefinite variety of included minor events as incidents, episodes or
occurrences. To a layman a flash of lightning comes close to being
an isolated instantaneous occurrence. A scientific account of it is a
narration of a prolonged history of which the flash is one incident;
with the growth of scientific knowledge the tale becomes longer.
On the other hand, a mountain, which to the layman is a standing
symbol of permanence, is to the geologist the scene of a drama of
birth, growth, decay and ultimate death. Unless the difference
between existential change as barely existential and as subject-
matter of judgment is borne in mind, the nature of event becomes
an inexplicable mystery. Event is a term of judgment, not of
existence apart from judgment. The origin and development of
the Appalachian Mountain Range is an event, and so is the loosen-
ing and rolling of a particular pebble on a particular ledge on a
particular foot-hill. There may be a situation in which the latter
sort of episode is much more important in judgment than is the
history of long duration: as, for example, when a rolling pebble is
2 The above considerations have definite bearing upon the probability-function
of all existential propositions. For selection of events as initial and terminal with
respect to solution of a giv^n problem involves a risk which can never be com-
pletely eliminated. It also has a definite bearing (taken up in Chap. XXIII)
upon the category of causation.
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 223
the "cause" of a sprained ankle. In the story of the cyclical
weathering of the mountain, the roll of the pebble would hardly
be an event at all; it would be but a specimen, unnoted in itself, of
a kind of thing that is significant only en masse. An event is,
strictly, that which comes out; that which issues forth; the net
outstanding consequence, the eventuation. It involves a teleologi-
cal concept; it is capable of description-narration only in terms of
a delimiting beginning, an interval and a termination.
Propositions in which temporal connections enter explicitly into
the formation of judgment may be conveniently considered under
three heads: (1) Those about one's personal past, (2) those about
special events not coming directly within one's own experience,
and (3) consecutive historical narrations.
1. Judgments of Recollection. These are often disposed of by
attributing them directly to a faculty of memory. This procedure
consists in giving a name to the fact that judgments about one's
past and history are possible and actual, and then treating the fact
as if it were a causal force. To affirm that I did a given thing
yesterday, or that I was ill last month, is to form an appraisal of a
temporal sequence. It differs from any other historical reconstruc-
tion only in the fact that its subject-matter falls within my own
biography. If the affirmation is grounded, it is mediated and hence
depends upon evidential data instituted by observations. Like
every mediated outcome, it is subject to error even though its
subject-matter is something done or suffered five minutes ago.
While in explicit linguistic statement the content of the proposi-
tion is usually a particular deed or something undergone at a
particular time in the past, the actual logical object is a course of
events, one limit of which is the present while the other is what
happened at the specified past time.
The instance in question thus exemplifies the principle that a
cycle or period is the object of every temporal proposition. Take
the proposition "I went to Yonkers yesterday," or any other sen-
tence about a particular act. On its face, it refers to an isolated
occurrence. But "I" in this sentence has no meaning except as the
/ of today and of yesterday and of the days which preceded.
Moreover, the particular act mentioned has background and fore-
ground. If it were not involved in a continuing course of exist-
224 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
ence, out of which it grows and to which it contributes, that is, if
it were completely isolated and self -enclosed, neither assigned date
nor "I" would have the slightest meaning.
Some present state of affairs is always the occasion of the re-
construction of the past event. But as a mere occasion, it has no
logical standing. By some organic mechanism (of the general
nature of the physical modification called habit) it calls out or
"suggests" something not present. This suggested something as
such also lacks logical status. It may be a whimsy or castle in the
air, and, in any case, if what is suggested is immediately accepted,
without inquiry and test, as representative of something in my past
history, there may be a proposition in the outer form of linguistic
expression but not in its logical status. For the affirmation is with-
out ground — a fact that is celebrated as a virtue by those who im-
pute it to an intuition of the "faculty" of memory, but who in
reality take the product of the working of a psycho-physiological
mechanism as a case of knowledge. In order to figure in a proposi-
tion having logical character, the idea of a past event suggested by
the associative mechanism has to be critically scrutinized. Did I
really do thus and so? Or did I merely think of doing it? Or
was it just something that I heard and that left a vivid impres-
sion on me? Or perhaps it is something that I now wish I had
done?
Even those who hold that at least some "memory ideas" or
"images" bring with them as part of themselves a tag to the effect
that something corresponding to them actually happened in one's
past experience, do not, nevertheless, go so far as to maintain that the
idea or image brings the exact date of its occurrence with it. Since
(1) the temporal place (date) of an occurrence in a sequential
event is integrally involved in any recollection of one's past, and
since (2) such temporal place, or date, is not an inherent part of
what is suggested (since, that is, the suggested past event does not
carry its date stamped upon it), the matter of the recollection is
evidentially mediated; it is a matter of judgment. Its validity is
as much dependent upon the material used as evidential data as is
that of an inference about some event wholly outside of one's
own personal past.
Dating, moreover, is nothing absolute. It depends upon con-
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 225
necting a particular occurrence with other events coming before
and after in such a way that taken together they constitute a
temporal series or history. If I say that "I was at home at five
o'clock yesterday," I am in fact constructing as an object of
grounded belief a sequential course of events. "Yesterday" has
no significance save in connection with today, the day-before-
yesterday and a series of tomorrows. "Five o'clock" has no sig-
nificance save in connection with four and six o'clock, and so on.
The problem presented by the enduring situation undergoing de-
termination gives the date fixed upon its crucial significance. Were
the facts as isolated and independent in existence as they appear
to be in a sentence when the latter is separated from context, the
latter would have no more meaning than if uttered by a parrot,
and were the sentence uttered by a phonograph, its meaning would
be fixed by the context, say of the story or dramatic reproduction
in which it appears. Here, as in so many cases, the context is
linguistically suppressed just because it is taken for granted.
If a memory-affirmation is questioned either by another or by
one's self it is supported by making explicit the temporal con-
textual sequence. "At half past four I was leaving my office and
it takes me just about half an hour to get home; I came straight
back and remember looking at the clock as I came in and then I
picked up the evening paper and was reading when so and so came
in," and so on. Satisfactory as such a consecutive reconstruction
may be for most practical purposes, it does not logically suffice.
For these other incidents are also matters of recollection and them-
selves demand the same kind of grounded substantiation as the
original judgment of recollection. It is at this point that the ref-
erence to objective evidential confirmation comes into play. The
consistency of an account of an event alleged to have occurred
with accounts of other specified events alleged to have occurred
before and after is good as far as it goes, but is subject to the
limitations that affect all cases of merely internal consistency.
Paranoiac reconstructions of the past often have marvellous inter-
nal consistency. In crucial instances, such as sometimes present
themselves, for example, in law courts, external evidence of docu-
ments, direct observations of other persons, etc., is imperatively
demanded. Whenever there is reason to suspect collusion or com-
226 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
mon interest in establishing belief in a fictitious state of affairs,
an even more external kind of evidence, more external in being
independent of any personal element, will alone logically suffice —
although, of course, in many cases we have to act upon evidence
that falls far short of complete logical conclusiveness.
In other words, such judgments, like those about all existential
matters, have probability, not "certainty." Hence the actions
that are performed in consequence of accepting them are not
logically ex post facto or mere practical appendages to a com-
pleted judgment. They are operations that provide additional
evidence, which confirms, weakens, or in some way modifies, the
provisionally accepted appraisal. Suppose I am in doubt whether
I mailed a certain letter after writing it. I assume temporarily
that I did mail it, and perform the operation of waiting for the
reply which it called for. The consequence serves to determine
the correctness of my assumption: I receive a reply or do not
receive it. Or, I fear strongly that I did not mail the letter. I
perform the operation of looking through all the places where I
might probably have laid it. Not finding it I still am unwilling
to accept as conclusive the idea that I mailed it. I write another
letter inquiring to make sure whether it was mailed or not. What
these illustrations bring out is that the consecutive qualitatively
continuous history which is constructed is not confined to the past.
Events occurring in the future stand in such relations of continuity
to those that have occurred and those now occurring that they
serve as evidential matter for testing provisional appraisals of recol-
lection about what we have done and what has happened to us in
the past.
A marked breach of continuity in the sequence of future or
ensuing events with what we suppose happened in the past is
enough, as a rule, to make us believe our belief invalid if not
imaginary. On the other hand, the recurrent frequency with
which subsequent events bear out reliance upon reconstructive
temporal judgments gives us pragmatic confidence in their general
dependability. Consequences of the method in the continuity of
inquiry are the ground upon which data are relied upon when they
themselves are materially inadequate. This confidence causes us
as a matter of routine to act upon their accuracy without sub-
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 227
mitting them to special logical tests. The very cases which
superficially viewed give rise to the belief that recollections of
one's past are not mediated judgments, but are cases of "immediate
or intuitive knowledge," are just the ones which, when they are
closely examined, show that they are instances of construction of
extensive durational sequences of events. Upon the whole, the
trustworthiness of our reconstructions of personal past experience
is so repeatedly confirmed by the course of ensuing events that we
come to depend upon them without applying special tests. Only
in cases of crucial doubt do we resort to the latter.
It may perhaps seem that much time has been spent in arguing a
point that is quite obvious on its face, or that if not obvious, is in
any case not a matter of much importance. Such is not the case.
For the point that every temporal proposition is a narrative propo-
sition means that the proposition is about a course of sequential
events, not about an isolated event at an absolute point in time.
This thesis is of such fundamental importance that it is necessary
to establish it beyond reasonable doubt. The simplest instance is
that of recollection. Since, as a result of borrowing from un-
criticized psychological doctrine, the idea has become current that
recollection is a case of "immediate" re-instatement of the past, it
possesses crucial logical significance.
The net conclusion of the foregoing discussion will, accord-
ingly, be formally set forth. A continuous course or round of
events, a period marked by limits and interval, is the subject-
matter undergoing determinate settlement in propositions of recol-
lections of a personal past. In such determinations provisional
judgments (of the nature of appraisals or estimates) have to be
made about both present objects or events and past occurrences.
Such judgments are not final and complete. They are the means
by which conclusive and complete judgment about an entire
course of sequential events, a history, extending from the past
through the present into the future, is groundedly instituted. It is
for the sake of resolving a total qualitative situation that the pro-
visional judgments about past and present events — in the temporal
sense of past and present— are made. When it is said that judg-
ments of recollection are not complete in themselves but are in-
strumental means of requalifying a present situation, otherwise
228 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
problematic, the word "present" does not mean a temporal event
that may be contrasted with some other event as past. The situa-
tion that I am determining when I attempt to decide whether or
not I mailed a certain letter is a "present" situation. But the pres-
ent situation is not located in and confined to an event here and
now occurring. It is an extensive duration, covering past, present
and future events. The provisional judgments that I form about
what is temporally present (as for example in going through my
pockets now) are just as much means with respect to this total
present situation as are the propositions formed about past events
as past and as estimates about ensuing events. 3
2. Judgments of Events Outside of Personal Recollections. We
constantly make judgments which reconstruct past scenes that are
so completely outside of personal experience that there is no pos-
sibility of applying the doctrine of immediate or self-evident
knowledge. A man is found dead under circumstances which
prima facie provide no evidence as to the time and manner of his
death. There are, however, conditions capable of observation.
Analytic examination, employing available instruments and tech-
niques, are brought into play. Present data are thus obtained as
the basis of inference as to what took place in the past. Medical
examination supplies data from which inference fixes approxi-
mately the time of the death and something concerning its im-
mediate conditions; it happened, say, about eight hours before from
a bullet fired from a revolver of a certain calibre, etc. The bare
data do not, of themselves, provide these conclusions. The in-
ferential conclusions drawn are an interpretation of directly ob-
served facts mediated by conceptions drawn from prior experience;
these conceptions being logically adequate in the degree that past
experience has been critically analyzed. Moreover, the proposi-
tions that formulate the inferred conclusions are clearly interme-
diary, not final.
The data are such, we will say, as to preclude the possibility or
idea of suicide. They suggest murder, but do not signify it. The
man may have been shot accidentally or in self-defense during a
struggle. Other investigations look for evidences of robbery; for
3 The ambiguity of the term "present"— like that of "given"— has already been
noted. See, ante, pp. 124-5.
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 229
men who had a motive for the act; for witnesses who may have
heard a shot fired or seen a struggle, etc. When the dead body is
identified, there is investigation of the person's movements when
alive; whether he carried money; his enemies, previous threats
against him, etc. Since it is not here a matter of writing a detec-
tive story, I only need to point out that evidential data consist
(1) of facts that are now observable, stated in propositions that
refer to temporally contemporaneous facts, and (2) of data derived
from recollections of earlier observations. Given these proposi-
tions, the problem is to weave them into a grounded conclusion
that the man in question met his death at the hands of another
person at a certain time and under such circumstances as to bring
the act under the legal conception of murder of the first degree.
(For no matter how detailed are the material data they constitute
a problem of this general logical type.) Solution of such a prob-
lem is impossible save upon the postulate that the subject-matter
under inquiry is that of a temporal course of sequential events and
upon the condition that the material in question satisfies this
postulate. There are propositions on the one hand about things
now observable; as, for example, there is no legal ground for ac-
cusing any one unless there is a corpus delicti On the other hand,
there are propositions about events that happened in the past. But
neither set of propositions has probative force unless temporal con-
tinuity can be reasonably established between their respective
subject-matters. It is the course of events constituting this history
that is the object of logical determination. The propositions that
are accumulated about past facts and facts now observable are but
means to the formation of this historic narrative judgment. In
themselves they are so many separate items. They are not com-
plete and final. Moreover, the history under determination ex-
tends into the future. Something to ensue hangs upon the
detection and conviction of a given person as the murderer: execu-
tion or imprisonment.
Take the case of a man who after a certain lapse of time pre-
sents himself as the legal claimant to an estate of a dead man, the
estate having in the meantime been awarded to another person as
the heir. The case, we will assume, is such that if the claimant is
the man he claims he is, there is no doubt on the legal side that he
230 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
is the one who is entitled to the estate. The problem is one, in
short, of identification. A proposition to the effect that the claim-
ant is or is not so-and-so, say Tichborne, is thus required to de-
termine the matter in dispute, while this proposition does not
represent the object of final determination. It is intermediate and
instrumental to a judgment about the conclusive disposition of the
estate. The proposition of identification operates as an instrumen-
tality, moreover, only by instituting historic continuity or ab-
sence of such continuity between the given individual about whose
past certain propositions are offered, and the individual about
whom propositions are formed on the basis of contemporary ob-
servations. Here, as in our previous case, propositions have to be
formed about contemporary facts and past events. But neither
set of propositions proves anything nor do both of them together
until they are filled out by propositions which bring their contents
into temporal continuity with one another. Furthermore, a future
consequence, the final disposition of the estate, is involved. This
outcome also is historical, being the completion of a course of
events. Taken in isolation, it is no more the object of determina-
tion than is the subject-matter constituted by past events or is that
constituted by contemporary observable date: — such as, physical
constitution, appearance, birthmarks, etc.
What is true in the two instances just mentioned is true of all
judgments of events in their temporal qualifications. There is no
such thing as judgment about a past event, one now taking place,
or one to take place in the future in its isolation. The notion
that there are such judgments arises from taking propositions that
are indispensable material means to a completely determined situa-
tion as if they were complete in themselves.
3. Judgments Recognized to be Historical. The distinctively
logical importance of the conclusions so far reached appears even
more clearly when we come to the theme of historical judgments
in the ordinary sense of history. In the latter case, there is no such
need to dwell upon the issue of temporal continuity of subject-
matter as there was in the topics that have been discussed. For
history is admittedly history. The logical problem involved now
takes a more restricted form: Given temporal continuity, what is
the relation of propositions about an extensive past durational
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 231
sequence to propositions about the present and future? Can the
historical continuum involved in admittedly historical propositions
of the past be located in the past or does it reach out and include
the present and future? There are of course, many technical
methodological problems that have to be met by the historian.
But the central logical problem involved in the existence of
grounded judgment of historical subject-matter is, I take it, that
which has just been stated. What conditions must be satisfied in
order that there may be grounded propositions regarding a sequen-
tial course of past events? The question is not even whether
judgments about remote events can be made with complete war-
rant much less is it whether "History can be a science." It is:
Upon what grounds are some judgments about a course of past
events more entitled to credence than are certain other ones?
That evidential data for all historical propositions must exist
at the time the propositions are made and be contemporaneously
observable is an evident fact. The data are such things as records
and documents; legends and stories orally transmitted; graves and
inscriptions; urns, coins, medals, seals; implements and ornaments;
charters, diplomas, manuscripts; ruins, buildings and works of art;
existing physiographical formations, and so on indefinitely. Where
the past has left no trace or vestige of any sort that endures into
the present its history is irrecoverable. Propositions about the
things which can be contemporaneously observed are the ultimate
data from which to infer the happenings of the past. This state-
ment, in spite of its obviousness, needs to be made. Although it is
taken for granted as a matter of course by those who work with
source material, readers of the works which historians compose on
the basis of available source-material are likely to suffer from an
illusion of perspective. Readers have before them the ready-made
products of inferential inquiry. If the historical writer has dra-
matic imagination, the past seems to be directly present to the
reader. The scenes described and episodes narrated appear to be
directly given instead of being inferred constructions. A reader
takes conclusions as they are presented by the historian to be di-
rectly given almost as much as he does in reading a well con-
structed novel.
Logical theory is concerned with the relation existing between
232 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
evidential data as grounds and inferences drawn as conclusions,
and with the methods by which the latter may be grounded. With
respect to logical theory, there is no existential proposition which
does not operate either (1) as material for locating and delimiting
a problem; or (2) as serving to point to an inference that may be
drawn with some degree of probability; or (3) as aiding to weigh
the evidential value of some data; or (4) as supporting and testing
some conclusion hypothetically made. At every point, exactly
as in conducting any inquiry into contemporary physical condi-
tions, there has to be a search for relevant data; criteria for selec-
tion and rejection have to be formed as conceptual principles for
estimating the weight and force of proposed data, and operations
of ordering and arranging data which depend upon systematized
conceptions have to be employed. It is because of these facts that
the writing of history is an instance of judgment as a resolution
through inquiry of a problematic situation.
The first task in historical inquiry, as in any inquiry, is that of
controlled observations, both extensive and intensive — the collec-
tion of data and their confirmation as authentic. Modern his-
toriography is notable for the pains taken in these matters and in
development of special techniques for securing and checking data
as to their authenticity and relative weight. Such disciplines as
epigraphy, paleography, numismatics, linguistics, bibliography,
have reached an extraordinary development as auxiliary techniques
for accomplishing the historiographic function. The results of
the auxiliary operations are stated in existential propositions about
facts established under conditions of maximum possible control.
These propositions are as indispensable as are those resulting from
controlled observation in physical inquiry. But they are not final
historical propositions in themselves. Indeed, strictly speaking
they are not in their isolation historical propositions at all. They
are propositions about what now exists; they are historical in their
•function since they serve as material data for inferential construc-
tions. Like all data they are selected and weighed with reference
to their capacity to fulfill the demands that are imposed by the
evidential function.
In consequence, they are relative to a problem. Apart from
connection with some problem, they are like materials of brick,
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 233
stone and wood that a man might gather together who is intend-
ing to build a house but before he has made a plan for building
it. He ranges and collects in the hope that some of the materials,
he does not yet know just what, will come in usefully later after
he has made his plan. Again, because of connection with a prob-
lem, actual or potential, propositions about observed facts corre-
spond strictly with conceptual subject-matter by means of which
they are ordered and interpreted. Ideas, meanings, as hypotheses,
are as necessary to the construction of historical determinations
as they are in any physical inquiry that leads to a definite conclu-
sion. The formation of historical judgments lags behind that of
physical judgments not only because of greater complexity and
scantiness of the data, but also because to a large extent historians
have not developed the habit of stating to themselves and to the
public the systematic conceptual structures which they employ in
organizing their data to anything like the extent in which physical
inquirers expose their conceptual framework. Too often the con-
ceptual framework is left as an implicit presupposition.
The slightest reflection shows that the conceptual material em-
ployed in writing history is that of the period in which a history
is written. There is no material available for leading principles
and hypotheses save that of the historic present. As culture
changes, the conceptions that are dominant in a culture change.
Of necessity new standpoints for viewing, appraising and ordering
data arise. History is then rewritten. Material that had formerly
been passed by, offers itself as data because the new conceptions
propose new problems for solution, requiring new factual material
for statement and test. At a given time, certain conceptions are
so uppermost in the culture of a particular period that their ap-
plication in constructing the events of the past seems to be justified
by "facts" found in a ready-made past. This view puts the cart
before the horse. Justification if it is had proceeds from the
verification which the conceptions employed receive in the pres-
ent; just as, for example, the warrant for the conceptual structures
that are employed to reconstruct what went on in geological ages
before the appearance of man or indeed of life on the earth, is
found in verified laws of existing physical-chemical processes.
For example, the institution of paleolithic, neolithic and bronze
234 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
ages of "prehistoric times," with their subdivisions, rests upon a
knowledge of the relation between technological improvements
and changes in culture which is obtained and verified on the
ground of contemporaneous conditions. Since differences in, say,
the refinement of quality of the edges of stone implements do not
bring their relative dates engraved upon them, it is clear that their
use as signs of successive levels of culture is an inference from
conceptions that are warranted, if at all, by facts that now exist.
An extensive doctrinal apparatus is required in order to correlate
with one another such varied data as fossil survivals, artefacts,
ashes, bones, tools, cave-drawings, geographical distributions, and
the material that is drawn from study of existing "primitive"
peoples. Yet without these extensive correlations the reconstruc-
tion of "prehistoric" times could not proceed.
Recognition of change in social states and institutions is a pre-
condition of the existence of historical judgment. This recogni-
tion in all probability came about slowly. In early days it was
confined, we may suppose, to emergencies so great that change
could not escape notice: such as mass migrations, plagues, great
victories in war, etc. As long as these changes were supposed to
constitute isolated episodes, history cannot be said to have emerged.
It came into existence when changes were related together to con-
stitute courses, cycles or stories having their beginnings and clos-
ings. Annals are material for history but hardly history itself.
Since the idea of history involves cumulative continuity of move-
ment in a given direction toward stated outcomes, the fundamental
conception that controls determination of subject-matter as his-
torical is that of a direction of movement. History cannot be
written en masse. Strains of change have to be selected and ma-
terial sequentially ordered according to the direction of change
defining the strain which is selected. History is of peoples, of
dynasties; is political, ecclesiastical, economic; is of art, science,
religion and philosophy. Even when these strains are woven to-
gether into an effort to construct a comprehensive strand that
covers a movement taken to be relatively complete, the various
strains must first be segregated and each followed through its
course.
From acceptance of the idea that inferential determinations of
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 235
history depend upon prior selection of some direction of move-
ment, there follows directly a consideration of basic logical im-
portance. All historical construction is necessarily selective. Since
the past cannot be reproduced in toto and lived over again, this
principle might seem too obvious to be worthy of being called im-
portant. But it is of importance because its acknowledgment com-
pels attention to the fact that everything in the writing of history
depends upon the principle used to control selection. This prin-
ciple decides the weight which shall be assigned to past events,
what shall be admitted and what omitted; it also decides how the
facts selected shall be arranged and ordered. Furthermore, if the
fact of selection is acknowledged to be primary and basic, we are
committed to the conclusion that all history is necessarily written
from the standpoint of the present, and is, in an inescapable sense,
the history not only of the present but of that which is con-
temporaneously judged to be important in the present.
Selection operates in a three-fold way. The first selection in
order of time is made by the people of the past whose history is
now written, during the very time when they lived. Herodotus
wrote, he said, "in order that the things which have been done
might not in time be forgotten." But what determined his selec-
tion of the things which should not be forgotten? To some minor
extent, doubtless, his personal preferences and tastes; such factors
cannot be wholly excluded in any case. But if these factors had
been the only or main agency, his history would itself have soon
been forgotten. The decisive agency was what was prized by the
Athenian people for whom he directly wrote; the things this people
judged worthy of commemoration in their own lives and achieve-
ments. They themselves had their appraisals of worth which were
operating selectively. The legends they transmitted and the things
they forgot to retell, their monuments, temples and other public
buildings, their coins and their grave-stones, their celebrations and
rites, are some of the selective evaluations they passed upon them-
selves. Memory is selective. The memories that are public and
enduring, not private and transitory, are the primary material
within which conscious and deliberate historians do their work.
In more primitive peoples, folklore, implements, enduring relics,
serve, in spite of the accidental ravages of time, the same function
236 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
of self-appraisal that is passed by living peoples upon their own
activities and accomplishments.
The historiographer adds a further principle of selection. He
elects to write the history of a dynasty, of an enduring struggle,
of the formation and growth of a science, an art or a religion, or
the technology of production. In so doing, he postulates a career,
a course and cycle of change. The selection is as truly a logical
postulate as are those recognized as such in mathematical proposi-
tions. From this selection there follow selective appraisals as to
(1) the relative weight and relevancy of materials at his disposal
and (2) as to the way they are to be ordered in connection with
one another. There is no event which ever happened that was
merely dynastic, merely scientific or merely technological. As
soon as the event takes its place as an incident in a particular his-
tory, an act of judgment has loosened it from the total complex of
which it was a part, and has given it a place in a new context, the
context and the place both being determinations made in inquiry,
not native properties of original existence. Probably nowhere else
is the work of judgment in discrimination and in creation of
syntheses as marked as in historical evocations. Nowhere is it
easier to find a more striking instance of the principle that new
forms accrue to existential material when and because it is sub-
jected to inquiry.
What has been said finds its conspicuous exemplification in the
familiar commonplace of the double sense attached to the word
history. History is that which happened in the past and it is the
intellectual reconstruction of these happenings at a subsequent
time. The notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates the
events that once happened "as they actually happened" is in-
credibly naive. It is a valuable methodological canon when in-
terpreted as a warning to avoid prejudice, to struggle for the
greatest possible amount of objectivity and impartiality, and as an
exhortation to exercise caution and scepticism in determining the
authenticity of material proposed as potential data. Taken in any
other sense, it is meaningless. For historical inquiry is an affair
(1) of selection and arrangement, and (2) is controlled by the
dominant problems and conceptions of the culture of the period
in which it is written. It is certainly legitimate to say that a cer-
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 237
tain thing happened in a certain way at a certain time in the past,
in case adequate data have been procured and critically handled.
But the statement "It actually happened in this way" has its status
and significance within the scope and perspective of historical
writing. It does not determine the logical conditions of historical
propositions, much less the identity of these propositions with
events in their original occurrence. Das geschichtliche Geschehen,
in the sense of original events in the existential occurrence, is called
"geschichtlich" only proleptically; as that which is subject to se-
lection and organization on the basis of existing problems and con-
ceptions.
A further important principle is that the writing of history is
itself an historical event. It is something which happens and which
in its occurrence has existential consequences. Just as the legends,
monuments, and transmitted records of, say, Athens, modified the
subsequent course of Athenian life, so historical inquiry and con-
struction are agencies in enacted history. The acute nationalism
of the present era, for example, cannot be accounted for without
reckoning with historical writing. The Marxian conception of
the part played in the past by forces of production in determining
property relations and of the role of class struggles in social life has
itself, through the activities it set up, accelerated the power of
forces of production to determine future social relations, and has
increased the significance of class struggles. The fact that history
as inquiry which issues in reconstruction of the past, is itself a part
of what happens historically, is an important factor in giving
"history" a double meaning. Finally, it is in connection with
historical propositions that the logical significance of the emphasis
placed upon temporal continuity of past-present-future in dealing
with the first two themes of this chapter most fully comes to light.
Our entire discussion of historical determinations has disclosed
the inadequacy and superficiality of the notion that since the past is
its immediate and obvious object, therefore, the past is its exclusive
and complete object. Books treat of the history of Israel, of
Rome, of Medieval Europe, and so on and so on; of nations, in-
stitutions, social arrangements that existed in the past. If we de-
rive our logical idea of history from what is contained within the
covers of these books, we reach the conclusion that history is
238 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
exclusively of the past. But the past is of logical necessity the past-
of-the-present, and the present is the-past-of-a-future-living pres-
ent. The idea of the continuity of history entails this conclusion
necessarily. For, to repeat, changes become history, or acquire
temporal significance, only when they are interpreted in terms of
a direction from something to something. For the purposes of a
particular inquiry, the to and from in question may be intelligently
located at any chosen date and place. But it is evident that the
limitation is relative to the purpose and problem of the inquiry; it
is not inherent in the course of ongoing events. The present state
of affairs is in some respect the present limit-to- which; but it is it-
self a moving limit. As historical, it is becoming something which
a future historian may take as a limit ab quo in a temporal con-
tinuum.
That which is now past was once a living present, just as the
now living present is already in course of becoming the past of an-
other present. There is no history except in terms of movement
toward some outcome, something taken as an issue, whether it be
the Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire, Negro Slavery in the
United States, the Polish Question, the Industrial Revolution or
Land Tenure. The selection of outcome, of what is taken as the
close, determines the selection and organization of subject-matter,
due critical control being exercised, of course, with respect to the
authenticity of evidential data. But the selection of the end or
outcome marks an interest and the interest reaches into the future.
It is a sign that the issue is not closed; that the close in question is
not existentially final. The urgency of the social problems which
are now developing out of the forces of industrial production and
distribution is the source of a new interest in history from the
economic point of view. When current problems seem domi-
nantly political, the political aspect of history is uppermost. A
person who becomes deeply interested in climatic changes readily
finds occasion to write history from the standpoint of the effect
of great changes that have taken place over large areas in, say, the
distribution of rainfall.
There is accordingly, a double process. On the one hand,
changes going on in the present, giving a new turn to social prob-
lems, throw the significance of what happened in the past into a
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 239
new perspective. They set new issues from the standpoint of
which to rewrite the story of the past. On the other hand, as
judgment of the significance of past events is changed, we gain
new instruments for estimating the force of present conditions as
potentialities of the future. Intelligent understanding of past
history is to some extent a lever for moving the present into a cer-
tain kind of future. No historic present is a mere redistribution,
by means of permutations and combinations, of the elements of
the past. Men are engaged neither in mechanical transposition of
the conditions they have inherited, nor yet in simply preparing for
something to come after. They have their own problems to solve;
their own adaptations to make. They face the future, but for the
sake of the present, not of the future. In using what has come to
them as an inheritance from the past they are compelled to modify
it to meet their own needs, and this process creates a new present
in which the process continues. History cannot escape its own
process. It will, therefore, always be rewritten. As the new
present arises, the past is the past of a different present. Judg-
ment in which emphasis falls upon the historic or temporal phase
of redetermination of unsettled situations is thus a culminating evi-
dence that; judgment is not a bare enunciation of what already
exists but is itself an existential requalification. That the requalifi-
cations that are made from time to time are subject to the condi-
tions that all authentic inquiry has to meet goes without saying.
II. In what has been said attention has been given to the narra-
tional propositions of existential judgment to the neglect of the
descriptive. But things which happen take place in the literal
sense of the word. The historian, as narrator, is primarily con-
cerned with sequential occurrences with respect to their sequence.
But he is quite aware that events do not occur just in time. They
take place somewhere, and the conditions of this "somewhere"
stand in coexistence with one another and also in coexistence with
things taking place elsewhere. Locations, places, and sites are rela-
tive to one another; they co-exist. Abstract time as a mathematical
entity may be conceived as a unilinear dimension. But events do
not occur in an abstraction; the historic line of sequence consists
of many dimensions. If only one event occurred in, say, 1492, the
year 1492 would not be a date in a historical calendar but a purely
240 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
mathematical conception, a pure number. It is not because of the
sheer choice of historians nor because of literary quality and color
that history cannot be written apart from geography, nor narra-
tion proceed without description.
Nor, on the other hand, has description significance apart from
narration. In a biography, a portrait may be given by means of
words or by a reproduction of a painting or a photograph. But the
portrait is meaningless save in connection with a statement or esti-
mate of the age of the person — whether explicitly given or in-
ferred from the description, verbal or pictorial. A description
consists always of coexisting characteristics that are so conjoined
as to frame or outline an object or event in a way that affords the
means for the identification of what is being described as the singu-
lar existence which it is. The terms of the description are evi-
dential marks. Whatever is the literary or esthetic office of
description, its sole logical function is to enable identification to
be made for the sake of determining the relevancy of this and that
proposition. A man is said to answer to a certain description; it is
found that a certain arrangement of coexisting finger-whorls is the
most effective means of identification. To describe a geometrical
figure is to traverse its outline not for an esthetic purpose but to
set forth just that conjunction of traits which enables it to be
surely identified. A scientific description is logically adequate
in the degree in which it consists of a group of coexistent traits
which so identify an object that anything having these traits, and
only those having them, is of such and such a kind. To be of such
and such a description is to be of such and such a kind. In the
Aristotelian scheme of science, as we saw, the proper description
was also ipso facto, the proper and final definition. In modern
science, proper description is strictly a means of identification,
while the particular identifications made are relative to the problem
in hand. It may be physical, psychological, or moral, according to
the identification needed in order to warrant special predica-
tions. And any predication, as we have seen, is a requalification,
or operational means of instituting a requalification, and so in-
volves a change, which, when stated, is temporal-narrational.
Descriptions are, then, existential propositions which are means
to judgment but are not themselves final and complete — not judg-
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 241
merit itself. A single quality may serve as a diagnostic mark, as a
certain quality of yellow in a flame is a sign of the presence of
sodium. But a single trait is only the beginning of a description;
it is an incomplete description. Thus "the man in the iron mask"
is part of a description, but is not itself a description. It would
be a description only if it were conjoined with other coexisting
traits. The same thing is true of "the author of the letters of
Junius"; "the man who invented the first wheel," and a multitude
of other expressions. If the man in the iron mask should be
identified (a complete description formed), then he would at once
enter into a narrational sequence. When the partial description
"the author of the Waverly Novels" was completed by uniting it
with the characteristics of Sir Walter Scott, a large number of his-
torical propositions about the author of the Waverly Novels at
once became possible. If, however, "Sir Walter Scott" had no
known characteristic except that of being the author of the
Waverly Novels, there would be no coexistential conjunction, and
we should be no better off than we were before. The sentence
"Sir Walter Scott is the author of the Waverly Novels" is a com-
plete proposition only because a number of other traits can be
ascribed to him than that of being the author of the novels — a man
born at a certain time, living in a certain place, having written
poems, having a certain circle of friends, possessed of such and
such qualities. From another point of view, the proposition links
the life career of a certain man to the developing literature of the
country — also a historical proposition.
A conjunction of traits or a description is the basis of institu-
tion of a kind, as will be shown in detail in the ensuing chapter.
A proposition about a kind is general. Propositions which are
linguistically expressed by proper names and by words like this,
involve demonstrative reference to singulars. Hence it is often
assumed in contemporary logical theory that there are such things
as pure demonstrative propositions — "pure" in the sense that they
involve no descriptive element. For example, in "That is a
church," that would be called merely demonstrative, while in
"That church is the Cathedral of St. John the Divine," that church
would be called a mixed demonstrative descriptive term. While
the notion of the logical difference between the two expressions
242 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
rests heavily upon a mere linguistic difference, it also goes back to
a logical error which has been dealt with in other connections. 4
It assumes that the subject-matter demonstratively present, which
forms the logical subject, is immediately given. But determi-
nation of a singular or this, requires selective discrimination.
This discrimination must have a ground. The ground involves
some conjunction of traits and hence provides at least a minimum
of description. Only functional position in a contextual situation
can discriminate an actual this from an indefinite number of po-
tential thises. No one can tell what is pointed at in a given act of
demonstration unless there is an idea of what is to be pointed out —
that is, discriminatively selected. Mere pointing is completely in-
determinate. 5
Supposing it is asked "What is that?" That is certainly highly
indeterminate. Otherwise there would not be the question as to
'what it is. But there must be some minimum of descriptive de-
termination involved, or otherwise neither the one asking the ques-
tion nor the one of whom it is asked would know what the question
was about. It might be any one of the great variety of objects
that are in the general line of, say, the extended hand and index
finger. In fact, that which is pointed to is that dark object or that
suddenly moving thing, or is partially described, while the question
shows that the descriptives dark or suddenly moving do not de-
scribe sufficiently to determine its kind in connection with the
problem in hand. It is an incomplete description for this reason.
But the instance does not show that all identifying and demarcat-
ing description is lacking, for such lack would be identical with
complete absence of ground for further description. A person on
a vessel at sea states, "There is a mountainous island." The person
addressed replies, "No, it is a cloud." Unless there is some descrip-
tive qualification that identifies what is meant by there and it, the
two persons may be talking about entirely different objects.
Common reference requires at least a minimum of description. 6
Given that minimum, the difference between qualification as "is-
land" and as "cloud" is a direct invitation to further observations
4 See ante, p. 124 and p. 148.
5 Cf. the illustration given on p. 53.
6 As is exemplified in the ambiguity of reference of pronouns in a non-
declensional language.
NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION 243
which will so analyze it as to discover, if possible, traits which
justify one descriptive qualification or another. The theory criti-
cized confuses an inadequate description of this (which is the basis
for further operations of observation in order to ascertain the con-
junction of traits upon which rests identification of it as one of a
kind) with total lack of descriptive qualification.
Propositions about a singular as one of a kind are dealt with
later. At this juncture our discussion calls attention, in effect, to
the double meaning of the words demonstration and proof. On
the one hand, there is rational demonstration, an affair of rigor-
ous sequence in discourse. On the other hand, there is ostensive
demonstration. In the difference of opinion as to whether that is
an island or a cloud, there is first an idea of the respective con-
junctions of traits which describe the two kinds, and then there
are the operations of observation which decide to which of the two
descriptive prescriptions the object answers. If "this" does not
turn out to be marked by traits which describe differentially the
conceptions of mountains and islands, then it does not answer to
that description. Were the theory of mere or pure demonstrative
propositions sound, the failure to answer would have to be at-
tributed to some property of the act of pointing — which is absurd.
The important positive logical principle involved is that in all
propositions of existential import, proof or demonstration is a mat-
ter of the execution of delimiting analytic operations of observa-
tion. Evidence not discourse is here what has probative force.
The operations of observation executed are, however, controlled
by conceptions or ideational considerations which define the con-
ditions to be satisfied by differential traits in descriptive determina-
tion of kinds.
There is another mode of narrative-descriptive propositions the
nature of which will be dealt with later. 7 Propositions that refer
to courses of natural events are of this mode. The contents of
physical laws and of the physical existences to which they refer
are usually taken in logical theory to be non-historical. It is recog-
nized, of course, that they are concerned with events that occur in
time and in space. Although the conceptions of absolute time
and space have been abandoned, the idea persists in logic that
7 In Chapter XXII.
244 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
events in space-time can be regarded simply as specimen cases of
laws. Because of this idea the determination of events is isolated
in current logical formulation from the continuum of events with
which they are constituents. This isolation is equivalent to ignor-
ing the need for determining them as constituents of extensive
historical events, in a sense in which "historical" has the same
meaning that it has in determination of the course of human his-
tories. The problem that is involved can be adequately discussed,
however, only in connection with discussion of methods of scien-
tific inquiry. Consequently, consideration of it is deferred until
that topic is taken up.
CHAPTER XIII
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT:
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS
-^ xperience has temporal continuity. There is an experien-
ced rial continuum of content or subject-matter and of opera-
J^/ tions. The experiential continuum has definite biological
basis. Organic structures, which are the physical conditions of
experience, are enduring. Without, as well as with, conscious in-
tent, they hold the different pulses of experience together so that
the latter form a history in which every pulse looks to the past
and affects the future. The structures, while enduring, are also
subject to modification. Continuity is not bare repetition of identi-
ties. For every activity leaves a "trace" or record of itself in the
organs engaged. Thereby, nervous structures taking part in an
activity are modified to some extent so that further experiences
are conditioned by changed organic structure. Moreover, every
overt activity changes, to some extent, the environing conditions
which are the occasions and stimuli of further experiences.
Hume, who carried the atomization of experiences to its ex-
treme, was obliged on that account in order to obtain even a
semblance of enduring objects, to introduce a counterbalancing
principle, habit. Without this bond of connection neither memory
nor expectation (to say nothing of inference and reasoning) could
exist. Each new "impression" would be an isolated world of its
own, without identifiable quality. He regarded habit as a "mys-
terious tie" — but a tie he had to have in order to account for
even the illusion of stable objects and of a self that endured
through the succession of experiences. The development of bio-
logical knowledge has now done away with the "mysterious"
quality of the tie. Some sort of sequential connection is seen to be
245
246 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
as inherent a quality of experience as are the distinctive pulses of
experience that are bound together. Cultural conditions tend to
multiply ties and to introduce new modes of tying experiences
together.
The process of inquiry reflects and embodies the experiential
continuum which is established by both biological and cultural
conditions. Every special inquiry is, as we have seen, a process of
progressive and cumulative re-organization of antecedent condi-
tions. There is no such thing as an instantaneous inquiry; and
there is, in consequence, no such thing as a judgment (the conclu-
sion of inquiry) which is isolated from what goes before and comes
after. The meaning of this thesis is not to be confused with the
trivial, because external, fact that it takes time to form a judgment.
What is affirmed is that inquiry, which yields judgment, is itself a
process of temporal transition effected in existential materials.
Otherwise, there is no resolution of a situation but only a substitu-
tion of one subjective unwarranted belief for another unwarranted
one.
While continuity of inquiry is involved in the institution of any
single warranted judgment, the application of the principle extends
to the sequence of judgments constituting the body of knowledge.
In this extension, definite characteristic forms are involved. Every
inquiry utilizes the conclusions or judgments of prior inquiries in
the degree in which it arrives at a warranted conclusion. Proposi-
tional formulations are the means of establishing conclusions.
They consist of symbols of the contents that are derived from those
phases and aspects of former inquiries that are taken to be relevant
to the resolution of the given problematic situation. Scientific
inquiry follows the same pattern as common sense inquiry in its
utilization of facts and ideas (conceptual meanings) which are the
products of earlier inquiries. It differs from common sense in the
scrupulous care taken to ensure both that the earlier conclusions
are fitted in advance to be means for regulation of later inquiries,
and the care taken to ensure that the special facts and conceptions
employed in the later ones are strictly relevant to the problem in
hand. In common sense, the attitudes and habits formed in earlier
experiences operate to a large extent in a causal way; but scientific
inquiry is a deliberate endeavor to discover the grounds upon
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 247
which attitudes and habits are entitled to operate causally in a
given case.
That earlier conclusions have the function of preparing the way
for later inquiries and judgments, and that the later are dependent
upon facts and conceptions instituted in earlier ones, are common-
places in the intellectual development of individuals and the
historic growth of any science. That continuity is involved in
the maturing of individuals and the building up of the procedures
and conclusions of bodies of knowledge is too obvious to demand
argument. It would even be too obvious to be w^orth mentioning
were it not that this continuity is something more than an in-
dispensable condition of intellectual growth. It is the only prin-
ciple by which certain fundamentally important logical forms
can be understood; namely, those of standardized general concep-
tions and of general propositions. The theme of the present
chapter is then the connection between the continuum of inquiry
and generality as a logical form.
Singular events and objects are recognized, or in logical lan-
guage, identified and discriminated, as such-and-such, or so-and-so.
"Such" designates relation to something else to which a singular is
likened in respect to quality, degree or extent, or to which it
stands in some relation of dependence. Illustrations of the ex-
plicit use of "such" in the first sense are found in such expressions
as "such dire want"; "such soft music"; "such a hero"; "such
opinions," etc. Examples of the second use are found wherever
a comparison is made in which "as" (or so) and "such" are cor-
relative: for example, "as is the teacher, so is the school," and other
proverbial expressions, such as, "such the master, such the servant,"
while so as an equivalent of hence always indicates continuative
logical force.
All propositions regarding this or any singular, having the for-
mal "is" as connective, express assimilation of this to other singulars
in quality, degree or extent, as in "This is red," "This is rust," "This
is oxide of iron," or "This is a noise," "It is a bang," "It is the back-
firing of an automobile." The predicates, when formally gener-
alized as descriptive terms, are represented as "such and such."
The singular is described (discriminated and identified) as one of
a kind by means of a conjunction of traits which make it like
248 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
certain other things already determined and that are likely to occur
for determination in the future. These simple considerations are
enough to establish a strong presumption of the connection be-
tween the general and the principle of continuity, while the mean-
ing to be ascribed to "likeness" constitutes a problem for further
discussion.
It is not uncommon to interpret the logical form under consid-
eration by reference to a "common" factor which is instituted
through recurrence. In some sense, this interpretation in terms
of recurrence is justified since it marks recognition of some sort of
continuity. But the problem is to ascertain the particular sense
in which "recurrence" is to be taken. For when this conception
is examined it is found to involve already the conception of kind,
so that explanation of the conception of kind by that of recur-
rence is simply a substitution of one word for another. For
example, a given singular event is followed by the proposition
"This is a flash of lightning." This flash is certainly not recur-
rence in the sense of re-appearance of an object or event which has
presented itself before and which has endured in existence during
the interval. Clearly, recurrence here is practically synonymous
with identification of the flash as one of a kind. We surely can-
not, in this case, employ recurrence as something already under-
stood by means of which to understand the conception of kind.
At best, the explanation of kinds, which are general, on the basis
of recurrence would apply only in the case of enduring objects
which reappear in experience from time to time. We see the
same mountain over and over again under a great variety of chang-
ing circumstances. But this fact only guarantees the continuing
existence of a singular. It leaves us without guidance or support
in identifying another singular, not previously experienced, as a
mountain, although it would support the inference that "// it is a
mountain, it is enduring in temporal span." Recurrence is, in
other words, one of the chief grounds for accepting belief in
enduring objects which are not, like flashes of lightning, of very
short duration. But it leaves the question of kinds just where it
was.
Moreover, the difference in question is at most but one of length
of duration. A mountain lasts longer than a cloud, but we know
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 249
that mountains had an origin and that they will, given a sufficiently
long time, decay and pass out of existence. We also know that the
span of a given object's duration is not determined by an inherent
eternal essence, but is a function of the existential conditions which
produce it and which sustain it for a few seconds, or minutes, or
many thousands of years. In existential principle, there is no
difference between the passing rain and the "everlasting" ocean.
Propositions about the length of the duration of an object are
matters of evidence, not of deduction from the concept of sub-
stance.
It is said that there are savage peoples who believe that the light-
bringing object which sets at night is not the same object as that
which rises and brings light the next morning. They are said to
believe that there is a new sun every day. Whether the belief is
actually held or not makes no difference for the purpose of illus-
tration. For in any case, the experience is unique and non-recurrent.
On what grounds do we draw a distinction between its unique
character and the identity of the object which is its subject-
matter? It will be a year before the sun presents itself again in
the same position in the heavens, and perhaps it will never appear
again under exactly the same conditions. The question is not
meant to suggest any doubt about the enduring quality of the
object in question. It is meant to indicate that the reasons for the
belief are matters of fact, of evidence, which warrant a conclusion
as an inference.
Take the grounded proposition that the evening and the morn-
ing star are the same planet. This is not an idea or a fact given
in immediate experience. It is not an aboriginal datum within the
experience. It is warranted in and by a highly complex set of
observations as these are systematized by certain conceptions of
the structure of the solar system. The case of the identity of
the sun is simpler but it is of the same order. The only conclusion
which can be drawn for logical theory from these considerations
is that the problem of the sameness of the singular object is of the
same logical nature as the problem of kinds. Both are products of
the continuity of experiential inquiry. Both involve mediating
comparisons yielding exclusions and agreements and neither is a
truth or datum given antecedent to inquiry.
250 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
They are not only products of the same operations of inquiry
but are bound up together. The determination that a singular is
an enduring object is all one with the determination that it is one
of a kind. The identification of a sudden light as a flash of light-
ning, of a noise as the banging of a door, is not grounded upon
existential qualities which immediately present themselves, but
upon the qualities with respect to the evidential function or use
in inquiry they subserve. What is recurrent, uniform, "common,"
is the power of immediate qualities to be signs. Immediate quali-
ties in their immediacy are, as we have seen, unique, non-recurrent.
But in spite of their existential uniqueness, they are capable, in the
continuum of inquiry, of becoming distinguishing characteristics
which mark off (circumscribe) and identify a kind of objects or
events. As far as qualities are identical in their functional force,
as means of identification and demarcation of kinds, objects are
of the same kind no matter how unlike their immediate qualities.
Scientific kinds are determined, for example, with extreme dis-
regard of immediate sensible qualities. The latter are irrelevant
and often obstructive in the institution of extensive systems of
inference and hence are not employed to describe kinds.
A singular as a mere this, always sets a problem. The problem
is resolved by ascertaining ivhat it is — that is, the kind it is of.
This fact alone is enough to show the identity of the two appar-
ently different matters of determining the temporal endurance of
an event and determining its kind. "This" is an intellectual puzzle
until it is capable of being described in terms of what, linguisti-
cally, is a common noun. The description is qualification of the
singular as one of a kind. The question, then, concerns the way
in which the general form is instituted, it being noted that recur-
rence is connected with inference and not with existences apart
from their function in inference.
A starting point for further discussion is found in the fact that
verbal expressions which designate activities are not marked by the
distinction between "singular" (proper) names and "common"
names, which is required in the case of nouns. For what is des-
ignated by a verb is a "way of changing and/or acting. A way,
manner, mode, of change and activity is constant or uniform. It
persists, although the singular deed done or the change taking
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 251
place is unique. An act and a change can be demonstratively
pointed out, and qualified as one of a kind, for example, a foot-
race or a fire. But racing and burning are 'ways of acting and
changing. They are exemplified in singulars but are not them-
selves singular. They may recur; they represent possibilities of
recurrence. A way of operating employed to characterize a
singular gives the latter potential generality. When the potential
activity of, say, walking, is actualized, there comes into existence
a walk. When the process of burning is actualized in a singular
there is a fire. It is still a singular or this but it is a singular of a
kind.
Because of the operation of tasting and touching, this is affirmed
to be sweet and hard. The operation, being a constant, recurs.
Its consequence may be that the particular this of a new experi-
ence is affirmed to be sour and soft. Discrimination occurs because
of consequences of agreement and difference — because agreements
and exclusions are instituted by recurring operations in the experi-
ential continuum. The outcome is that the presence of certain im-
mediate qualities is so conjoined with certain other non-immediate
qualities that the latter may be inferred. When this further opera-
tion of inference takes place, the potential generality, due to the
presence of the same modes of change and activity, is actualized.
The resulting inference is grounded in the degree to which differ-
ential consequences are instituted so that some conjoined traits
are inferable while other traits are excluded.
The connection of inference with expectation was correctly
pointed out by Hume. He obtained a merely sceptical conclusion
from this connection because (1) he never pursued his analysis
of the "mysterious" principle of habit to the point of seeing its
identity with a uniform mode of operation and change, and be-
cause (2) he failed to note that explicit formulation of an ex-
pectation renders it capable of being checked and tested by
consequences, positive and agreeing, negative and excluding, while
(3) such formulation transfers expectation from the field of
existential causation to the logical realm. A generality is involved
in every expectation as a case of a habit that institutes readiness
to act (operate) in a specified way. This involvement yields
what was called potential logical generality. Explicit formulation
252 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
in prepositional form of the expectation, together with active use
of the formulation as a means of controlling and checking further
operations in the continuum of inquiry, confers upon the poten-
tiality a definite logical form.
The burnt child dreads the fire— an expectation and a potential
generalization on the part of the child. The Egyptians looked
forward to the occurrence of eclipses at specified dates. In so
far as past occurrences had been analyzed sufficiently to furnish
the ground for the expectation, the latter partook of the nature of
inference. In as far, however, as merely temporal occurrences
were the ground of the prediction, the latter was not inference in
its definitive logical sense. It became such inference when certain
constant modes of natural operation were ascertained to be the
reason why certain conjunctions of circumstantial conditions
could be used to ground a prediction. 1
We are brought to the conclusion that it is modes of active
response which are the ground of generality of logical form, not
the existential immediate qualities of that which is responded to.
Qualities which are extremely unlike one another in their imme-
diate (or "sensible") occurrence, are assimilated to one another
(or are assigned to the same kind) when the same mode of response
is found to yield like consequences; that is, consequences subject
to application of one and the same further operation. A flash of
lightning is very different in its sensible setting from the electric
spark which had been observed before the time of Franklin, as
well as from the attraction exercised by amber when rubbed, as
also from the tingling sensation experienced when under certain
atmospheric conditions a person who has scuffed his feet touches
another person. The assimilation of such phenomena and a great
many others to one another, as of the kind electro-magnetic, did
not come about by searching for and finding "common" imme-
diate qualities. It was effected by employing modes of operation
and noting their consequences. Similarly, the generalization of
the three states of matter, solid, liquid and gaseous, was obtained
by operations of experimental variation of temperature and pres-
1 In the sense in which "empirical" is distinguished from "rational" on the
ground of likeness of existential conditions, "empirical" inference is a mixture of
expectations causally produced and inference in its logical sense.
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 253
sure and noting their consequences. Until this was done, certain
things like air, seemed to be inherently or by their "essence" a
gas. One has only to note the way in which scientific kinds are
formed to be convinced that assimilation of different objects and
events into kinds is not constituted by comparison of immediately
given qualities along with "extraction" of those which are "com-
mon" but by the performance of operations which determine the
presence of modes of interactions having specified consequences.
"Common" designates, not qualities, but modes of operation. 2
As has already been noticed, such expressions as "This is red,
liquid, soluble, hard" are not primary, but express the consequences f
actual or anticipated, of execution of operations. As qualifications,
or as actual and possible predications, they are effected by the
cumulative force of the recurrence of operations, similar and dif-
ferentiating. The cumulative force of these observations issues
in such propositions as "This is sugar," "That is a race horse," etc.
In these propositions, the predicates represent potentialities which
will be actualized when certain further operations are performed
that produce interactions by introduction of new conditions. An
actual, immediate quality thus becomes a sign of other qualities
that will (or would) be actual if additional operations producing
conditions for new modes of interaction w T ere performed. When
it is said, for example, "This is iron," the significance of the qualifi-
cation iron consists of potentialities not then and there actualized.
The qualities of "this" are actual. But they are taken not in their
bare actuality but as evidential signs of consequences that will be
actualized when further interactions are instituted. The impor-
tance of scrupulous determination, by observation, of existing
qualities, is instrumental; it is a matter of instituting data for a
controlled and grounded inference. Fulfilment of this condition
demands, logically, variation of the operations of observation. The
immediate qualities of iron pyrites suggest the proposition "This
is gold." If the suggestion is immediately acted upon, the one
who drew that conclusion finds himself, after a waste of time and
energy, to be deluded. Care is taken in scientific inquiry, as
distinct from the formation of common sense expectations, to
2 Compare what was said earlier about exclusion and negative as active processes,
See pp. 181 seq.
254 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
determine in advance whether given qualities are such as to be
the differential traits which describe the thing as of a specified
kind. 3
The discussion has so far been occupied with generals in the
form of a set of conjoined traits describing a kind. It has been
shown that qualities become traits descriptive of a kind when they
are the consequences of operations which are modes or ways of
changing and acting. This fact indicates that the operations are
themselves general, although in another sense from the generality
attached to sets of conjoined traits. It indicates, indeed, that the
type of generality which constitutes the logical form of the latter
is derivative, depending upon the generality of the operations
executed or possible. The discussion has thus arrived at a point
where it is necessary to discriminate between two types or logical
forms of generality. Historically, the generality of kinds came
first. For men are customarily more concerned with the conse-
quences, the "ends" or fruits of activity, than with the operations
by means of which they are instituted. The direct result of this
historical fact in logical theory was the conception of natural
kinds or species (or "classes") and the construction of classificatory
and taxonomic science. Even after the logical priority of opera-
tions in determination of kinds had become a commonplace of
scientific practice, the priority and prestige of the conception of
"classes" operated in logical theory to obscure recognition of the
form of generality which is logically prior and conditioning. In-
deed, it has done more than obscure it. It has resulted in the
widespread confusion found in the attempt to interpret all logical
generals on the ground of a theory of classes. Accordingly, not
only the intrinsic merits of the case, but a prevalent confusion in
logical theory, demands that special attention be given to the
distinction and the relation of the two forms of generality.
The conclusion of the discussion of this point will be antici-
pated by the use of certain words to mark the distinction. Propo-
sitions about kinds and classes in the sense of kinds will be called
3 The proposition "This is iron pyrites" is not in such a case itself an inference
but an expectation. For the proposition is determined directly and sufficiently
only by operations of experimental analysis which determine qualities as traits
descriptive of a definitive kind. This point has important bearings upon the theory
of induction, as is pointed out later. (See Chap. XXI)
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 255
generic propositions (in the sense in which species are also, as
kinds, generic), while propositions whose subject-matter is pro-
vided by the operation by means of which a set of traits is
determined to describe a kind, will be called universal. Corre-
spondingly, the universals as such, will be called categories, in order
to avoid the ambiguity found in the current use of the term
"classes" in logical theory — the word "class" being used to desig-
nate both kinds and universals, which in logical function and
form are distinct, as is shown later.
There are words in common use whose meaning is systemati-
cally ambiguous, for instance such words as "if, when, conditions."
Sometimes they refer to the existential and sometimes to the idea-
tional. When it is said, "If he doesn't come in five minutes I
shan't wait any longer" — "if" refers to a set of contingent temporal-
spatial circumstances. Similarly, when it is asked, "When does
the sun rise tomorrow?" the reference is clearly to an occurrence
in time. But the word "when" in the clause u <when it is asked"
has quite a different force. It means "whenever," or if at any
time such a question should be asked, without implying that it
has been asked or will, as a fact, ever be asked. The proposition
"When angels appear, men are dumb" does not of itself imply
that angels exist or will ever appear. In science, there are many
propositions in which the clause introduced by "if" is known to
be contrary to conditions set by existential circumstances; that is,
to be such that they cannot be existentially satisfied, as "If a
particle at rest is acted upon by a single moving particle, then,"
etc. In such propositions, if and when designate a connection of
conceptual subject-matters, not of existential or temporo-spatial
subject-matters. If the word "conditions" is used, it now refers to
a logical relation, not to existential circumstances.
In certain contexts, the distinction is recognized in present logi-
cal theory: for example, in the doctrine that an A or E proposition
does not imply an / or O proposition, and in the distinction made
between mathematical and physical propositions. These considera-
tions alone indicate the necessity of systematic recognition of two
distinct logical forms of generality. The failure to carry the dis-
tinction through in a systematic way appears to be due to an at-
tempt to reduce general propositions about kinds (under the name
256 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
of classes) to the form of abstract universal propositions. The
ultimate source of this attempt appears in turn to have its source
in the fact that in the Aristotelian logic, kinds, as species, were
interpreted as ontological universals. The development of modern
logic, especially under the influence of mathematical science, has
shown that universal propositions are abstract hypothetical propo-
sitions, or non-existential in import. Hence confusion arises in
logical theory when propositions about kinds (general in the sense
of generic) are identified with universal propositions.
Every modern text on logic points out the ambiguity in such
propositions as "All men are mortal." In one interpretation, that
sanctioned by tradition, it means that the class of men (in the
sense of kind), is included within the class of mortal things.
Stated explicitly in its existential import it means "All men have
died or will die" — a spatio-temporal proposition. On the other
hand, it means that "If any thing is human, then it is mortal": a
necessary interrelation of the characters of being human and being
mortal. Such a proposition does not imply nor postulate that
either men or creatures who die actually exist. It would be valid,
if valid at all, even if no men existed, since it expresses a necessary
relation of abstract characters. On the other hand, the proposition
"All men are mortal" interpreted in its existential reference is
logically an / proposition, and being of the inductive order is
subject to the contingencies of existence and of matter-of-fact
knowledge. It is a proposition of a certain order of probability.
The connection between the fact of life and the -fact of death is of
a different logical form from the relation between being human
and being mortal. The latter is valid, as just stated, if valid at all,
by definition of a conception. The former is a matter of evi-
dence, determined by observations.
So far there is relatively clear sailing. But the distinction is
often followed in contemporary logical texts by the assumption,
explicit or implicit, that propositions about kinds are ultimately
of the same logical dimension as are if-then universal propositions.
The reasoning that leads to this assumption — or conclusion — is as
follows. Propositions about kinds are not about the individuals
of the kind, but about a relation of characteristic traits which de-
termine the kind. The affirmation that "All individuals of the
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 257
kind men are included in the more extensive kind mortals" does
not involve acquaintance with all individuals, or even with a
specified person. It applies to men not yet born as well as to an
indefinite multitude of others with whom we have no acquaint-
ance. Such propositions are therefore different in logical form
from any proposition about a singular.
The proposition "Socrates is a man" is, for example, of a differ-
ent logical form from the proposition "All Athenians are Greeks."
The former is restricted to a singular who must, in order to warrant
the proposition, be capable of demonstrative reference. The latter
by its nature goes beyond singulars capable of being demonstra-
tively referred to — this is the essence of its generality. The rela-
tion between the traits or distinguishing characteristics which
determine the kind, men or Athenians, and the distinguishing
characteristics which determine the kind, mortals or Greeks, is
affirmed independently of demonstrative reference to any particu-
lar given singular. Hence it is frequently said to be affirmed
independently of reference to singulars as such. It is assimilated in
form to the abstract non-existential universal proposition.
The fallacy of the argument resides in identification of absence
of reference to specified individuals or singulars with absence of
reference to singulars as such. There is a clear difference between
a proposition that refers to each and every individual who
has certain characteristics (whether or not all individuals are
known who have such characteristics), and a proposition
that refers in its own content to no individual. It is true
that the former is directly about a conjunction of characteristics
and not about singulars as such. But it is equally true that it
is about a set of characteristics that so describes a kind as to have
reference to all (each and every) singular existences having the
set of traits in question. "Each and every whale, whether ob-
served or not, or whether now existent or not, is a mammal." "If
an animal is cetacean, it is mammalian." When we compare these
two propositions as to their logical form, it is evident that the latter
expresses a necessary relation of characters and holds whether
whales exist or not. The first proposition refers to each and every
existence marked by a certain conjunction of traits. Independence
of reference to that which exists at a particular time or place can-
258 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
not be identified, save by radical confusion, with the absence of
reference to spatial-temporal circumstances as such, the latter being
inherent in the universal proposition.
The confusion is fostered by the logically ambiguous character
of language— as in the double sense of "all" already mentioned.
Linguistically, propositions about kinds are expressed by common
nouns, and hypothetical universal propositions by means of abstract
nouns; both of them being distinguished, of course, from proper
nouns and from demonstratives like "this" and "here." But in
many cases words in use fail to indicate by their linguistic form
of which category they are. "Mankind," for example, designates
explicitly a kind; "Humanity" may be an equivalent common
noun or it may designate a relation of universal characters: the
quality or state of being genuinely human. An even better ex-
ample is "color." When it is said that red, green, blue, etc., are
colors, the reference is clearly to kinds included in a more generic
kind. But there is no abstract noun "colority" in common use.
When Mill says that when it is affirmed "Snow is white, milk is
white, linen is white, we do not mean that these things are 2. color
but that they have a color," he speaks, of course, correctly. But
then he proceeds to state "Whiteness is the name of the color
exclusively." 4 Now a statement like Mill's implies that the dif-
ference between having a color and being colority is simply that
between a quality referred to a thing as its property and the same
quality taken without reference to a thing. But whiteness does
not designate a color as a quality at all. It designates a certain
way or mode of being colority, the abstract universal. A white
thing may suggest whiteness, but whiteness is not a color which
things have or can have. We may dwell upon a given quality of
color without reference to other qualities indefinitely in isolation.
But it still remains a quality, white, not whiteness. The scientific
conception of colority is of a different logical dimension from
that of colors and a color. Colority or being color is defined in
terms of rates of vibration and whiteness is defined as the functional
correlation of the radiating-absorptive capacity of these vibrations
combined in a stated proportion. It is in effect a definition of
4 Mill, Logic. Book I, Ch. 2, Sec. 4.
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 259
conditions to be satisfied if a proposition, "This is white," is war-
ranted.
Mill goes on to raise the question whether abstract words like
whiteness are general or singular. Perplexed by certain considera-
tions which will be presently noticed, he concludes that "the best
course would probably be to consider these names as neither
general nor individual, and to place them in a class apart." The
conclusion does Mill's sense for logical forms credit: the "class
apart" is, in fact, that of abstract universal. When he says they
are not "general," he is using the word in the sense in which
common nouns like color are general. His perplexity was then
due to a belief that some abstract terms are names of an exten-
sive kind. Color, for example, includes, according to him, white-
ness, redness, blueness, etc.; and whiteness, in turn, includes
various degrees. The same thing holds, he says, of magnitude and
weight with reference to their various degrees. But such terms
as equality, squareness, etc., designate, he says, an attribute "that
is one and does not admit of plurality." Curiously enough he in-
cludes "visibility" in the same category — although it is evident
that it does have degrees.
It is evident, I think, that Mill, when he speaks of abstract terms
which, like common nouns, have extension of kinds or degrees,
has slipped over from the abstract to existential objects and then-
qualities. Objects do have various sizes or degrees of magnitude
and various weights. It is impossible to see how the abstract con-
ception of magnitude or heaviness can have degrees any more than
can squareness or equality. Since different objects may be equal
to one another in magnitude, while they differ in size from
some other objects, his reasoning in the case of magnitude would
logically lead to the conclusion that equality is also a name "for
a class of attributes," since objects have different sizes and yet
some are nevertheless equal to others. With respect to magnitude,
a big object exemplifies it in no other way than a small one; with
respect to exemplification of weight in the abstract there is no
difference between a heavy object and a light one. Redness, blue-
ness, whiteness, are ways of being colority, not kinds of color (in
the concrete), like red, blue and white.
The reference to Mill will be misunderstood if taken to apply
260 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
to him peculiarly among writers on logic. He simply makes ex-
plicit a confusion that is implicit in many writers on logical theory.
Exactly the same confusion exists when propositions like "All
whales are mammals" are equated in logical form to propositions
like "All squares are rectangular." For the latter proposition is
not one about inclusion of kinds, but about a mode or way of
being rectangular. 5
I close this phase of the discussion by mentioning some distinc-
tions of terminology which will be instituted and observed in
order that there may be a suitable measure of linguistic protection
against the confusion which has been described. As already stated,
general propositions about kinds, or generals having existential
reference, will be called generic propositions and terms. General
propositions of the abstract if-then form will be called universal
propositions. The word class is now used to designate both kinds
and the different ways of being universal; for example, triangle
is said to be a class including right-angled, scalene and isosceles
triangles, thus making it much easier to confuse the logical form
appropriate to kinds with the logical form appropriate to mathe-
matical subject-matter. I propose to use the word class, when it
is employed, as an equivalent of kind, and to use the word category
for the other logical meaning. Triangularity, for example, is a
category of which various ways of being triangular are sub-
categories. Qualities which descriptively determine (distinguish
and identify) kinds, I shall indifferently call traits or characteris-
tics, while the related contents of an abstract universal proposition
are called characters*
More will be said later about the ambiguity of the conception
of "inclusion." When kinds are affirmed to be included in a kind
5 The verbal ambiguity already mentioned is found in the word "square" when
used mathematically. It looks like a concrete word, while in fact it means square-
ness, so that the proposition that reflects its logical meaning would be expressed
in verbal form "Squareness is a mode of rectangularity." Similarly, "circle" in its
mathematical use means circularity; its analytic expression in an equation obviously
has no direct reference to objects or to qualities. The connection of the point
here under discussion with the conception of operations developed in the first
section of this chapter is taken up in the next chapter.
6 Mill set the example of using the term "attributes" so loosely as to apply to
qualities in the concrete, to traits and to what are here called characters. If the
word "attributes" is used at all, it would be better, I think, to use it as a synonym
for "characters."
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 261
of wider extension, the reference of "included" is clearly existen-
tial. But when a definition of polygon in geometry is said to
"include" that of triangles, rectangles, etc., the meaning is very
different. The Oxford Dictionary has a quotation which may be
used to illustrate this type of meaning. "It is necessary to include
in the idea of Labour all feelings of a disagreeable kind . . . con-
nected with the employment of one's thought or muscles or both
in a particular occupation."
"Inclusion" is here connected with definition of an idea or
conception. The quotation is saying that any definition of labor
(here employed as an abstract word) is defective which does not
contain as an integral or necessary part of its conception the idea
of disagreeableness. If, or when, the definition is accepted, it af-
fords a necessary logical condition of determination whether a
given occupation is of a kind to be included (in the other sense of
inclusion) in the kind of occupations that are laborious. Ac-
cording to the definition, a proposition that such and such an
occupation is or is not labor will depend for its differentia upon
the presence or absence of a disagreeable quality attending its
pursuit. A different definition or conception of labor might yield
a different set of traits by which to assign an activity to a kind
and to determine the relation of kinds. The instance illustrates
the necessary relation subsisting between determination of generic
propositions and the universal abstract propositions which are
definitions of conceptual or ideational meanings. But it also in-
volves their difference with respect to logical form, covering also
the formal difference in the conceptions of inclusion and exclusion.
A rule for inclusion and exclusion is not itself a case of the in-
clusions or exclusions which its application effects. To preclude
or rule out by definition is a different logical matter from refusing
on evidential grounds to place one kind within another kind.
In the next chapter, we shall return to a detailed consideration
of generic and universal propositions in the light of the distinction
of logical forms which has been formulated. In the state in which
logical theory now exists, it is necessary, however, to engage in
a discussion which would be an irrelevant excursus if the distinc-
tion were acknowledged and systematically adhered to. The pres-
ent phase of the discussion may be concluded by saying that three
262 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
logical motifs seem to have converged to bring about failure to
recognize the distinction of logical forms. One of them is the
influence of the Aristotelian identification of classes, as fixed on-
tological species defined by a formal essence, with the universal.
The second is the desire to maintain the strictly formalistic con-
ception of logic (ruling out of all existential and material refer-
ences) by setting up mathematical propositions as the logical form
normative for the interpretation of the form of all general propo-
sitions — a conception, however, which if it were rigorously main-
tained would demand elimination of all demonstrative reference
and hence, ultimately, of singular and generic propositions. The
third influence springs from a consideration inherent in inquiry
itself, namely, the necessary function of universal propositions in
determination of warranted singular and generic propositions, a
point discussed at length in the ensuing chapter.
The problem of the nature of the general has been such a
crucial issue in the history of both philosophic logic and meta-
physical theory that a few words are added to indicate the traits
which differentiate the position taken in this chapter from the
views traditionally known as realism, conceptualism and nominal-
ism—to differentiate it rather than here to argue for it and against
the other interpretations. The theory agrees with the "realistic"
interpretation of generals in affirming that ways of acting are as
existential as are singular events and objects. It disagrees in that
it holds that while these ways of interaction are necessary condi-
tions, they are not sufficient conditions of logical generality, since
the latter accrues only when and as the existentially general is used
as a controlling function, in the continuity of inquiry, to attain
warranted assertibility.
In consequence, the theory agrees with "nominalism" in holding
not only that immediate qualities are the ground required for
determination of a specified generality which is possessed of ex-
istential reference and also for test of its applicability in a given
case, but (what is here more important) that the logically general,
whether generic or universal, has necessarily the character of a
symbol. For since it is not a literal transcription of a general in
existence but is a utilization of the latter for the special purpose
of inquiry (being, that is, a distinctively logical form), the status
THE CONTINUUM OF JUDGMENT 263
and function of a symbol is that of a required member of a propo-
sitional form, while propositional formulation is inherently neces-
sary for controlled inquiry. It differs fundamentally from
nominalism in holding not only that the general has its ground in
existence (and hence is not a mere convenient memorandum or
notation for a number of singulars), but that symbolization is a
necessary condition of all inquiry and of all knowledge, instead of
being a linguistic expression of something already known which
needs symbols only for the purposes of convenient recall and
communication.
Consequently, it agrees with "conceptualism" in the one point
that the general is conceptual or ideational in nature. But it differs
radically in its conception of what conceptions intrinsically are.
Negatively, as has already been pointed out, it rejects completely
the view that a conception represents simply a selection of material
that is found to be antecedently "common" to a number of singu-
lars. This rejection depends (1) upon interpreting the "common"
in terms of the function performed by existential qualities in in-
ference, and (2) upon the necessity of the abstract universal in
order to warrant inferential use of qualities in any inquiry. The
latter consideration is the more important in that it indicates the
logical necessity of conceptions which, while they are suggested
by singulars, are not logically derived from them, even from that
which is common among them. For an idea or conception is the
nature of a possibility and hence is of a different dimension from
actuality, no matter how frequently repeated or "common" the
actual quality may be. This conceptual dimension is, further-
more, held to be logically an objective necessary condition in all
determination of warranted beliefs or knowledge, not a psycho-
logical accretion — as seems to be implied in traditional conceptual-
ism.
CHAPTER XIV
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS
I. Introduction. There are two forms of general propositions,
the generic and the universal. Universal propositions are formu-
lations of possible ways or modes of acting or operating. Proposi-
tional formulation is required for control of a way of acting that
effects discrimination and ordering of existential material in its
function as evidential data. Execution of the operation that is
prescribed and directed by the universal proposition in serving
this function also tests the force and relevancy of the universal
proposition as a means of solution of the problem undergoing
resolution. For the universal is stated as a relation of an antecedent
if content and a consequent then clause. When its operational
application determines existential conditions which agree with the
contents of the then clause, the hypothesis is in so far confirmed.
But its affirmation is not sufficiently warranted; agreement is a
necessary but not sufficient test. For an affirmation of the ante-
cedent merely because the consequent is afflrmable is fallacious.
Eliminations or negations have to be affected which determine
that only if the antecedent is affirmed does the consequent follow.
Application to existential material of the operation that is for-
mulated in the universal proposition determines the material in
question to be of specified kinds, and, by means of conjoint execu-
tion of operations of inclusion-exclusion, determines the kinds to
be the included members of an inclusive kind, and the only in-
cluded kinds as far as the logical conditions of inclusion and
exclusion are completely satisfied — a satisfaction which in fact can
never be completely achieved because of the contingent nature of
existential material, although the required satisfaction is approxi-
mated in the continuity of inquiry as a long run procedure.
There are organic activities upon the biological level which
264
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 265
select and order existential conditions in a & facto way. If a
lower organism were equipped with powers of symbolization the
result would be its ability to refer some things to certain gross
generalizations or kinds — to sort them out, for example, as foods,
as inedibles, and as poisons; and into things harmful and adverse
and things helpful and favorable — foes and friends. The cultural
matrix not only supplies, through the medium of language, means
for explicit formulation of kinds but also extends vastly the
variety and number of kinds. For culture institutes and consists
of a vast number of ways of dealing with things. Moreover,
certain ways of action are formulated as standard and normative
rules of action and of judgment on the part of members of the
cultural group. As was shown earlier, common sense consists, in
its generalized phase, of a body of such standardized conceptions
which are regulative (or are rules) of the actions and beliefs of
persons as to what is proper and improper, required, permitted and
forbidden in respect to the objects of the physical and social
environment. Thus things and persons are sorted out into dis-
tinctive kinds on the ground of allowable and prohibited modes
of acting toward and with them: a practical foreshadowing of
operations of inclusion and exclusion in the logical sense.
But there is only a foreshadowing. For human beings are "nat-
urally" interested in consequences, outcomes and fruits, good and
bad, rather than in the conditions, material and procedural, by
which they are obtained. Moreover, the standardized conceptions
and rules are for the most part products of habit and tradition.
Hence they are so fixed that they are not themselves open to
question or criticism. They operate practically to determine kinds
but the grounds or reasons for the kinds that are acknowledged in
practice are not investigated or weighed — it is enough that the
customary rules are what they are. From the logical standpoint,
there is a vicious circle. Fixed, unquestioned rules determine the
recognized kinds, while kinds are so fixed by the rules that
they do not serve to test and modify the ruling conceptions but
are taken rather to exemplify and support the rules. At best,
inquiry is confined to determining whether or not given objects
have the traits that bring them under the scope of a given stand-
266 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
ardized conception— as still happens to a large extent in popular
"judgments" in morals and politics.
The process of inquiry as inquiry consists, accordingly, of treat-
ing the general propositions that are formulations of ways of
action as hypotheses— a mode of treatment that is equivalent to
treating the formulated modes of action as possible, instead of as
required or necessary. This way of treating conceptions has its
direct impact also upon formation of kinds. For it demands that
grounds for them be searched for, and the grounds must be such
as to satisfy (inclusively and exclusively) the requirements of the
hypothesis that has been adopted and employed. Since existence
is existence and facts about it are stubborn, ascertained facts serve
to test the hypothesis employed; so that when there is recurrent
discrepancy of observed facts with the requirements of the con-
ception (hypothesis or theory), the material ground is provided
for modification of the hypothesis. Here also is a circular move-
ment, but it is a movement within inquiry, controlled by the
operations by means of which problematic situations are resolved.
II. Inference from Case to Case. It is convenient to begin the
discussion by reference to the view of Mill, since he holds that
generalizations proceed from singulars to other singulars and are
proved by a sufficient number of particular cases, while he also
admits that a "generalizing propensity" is involved when we pro-
ceed from one observed singular to others that are unobserved.
"We conclude," he says, "from known to unknown cases by the
impulse of the generalizing propensity." 1 The generalizing im-
pulsive propensity may be fairly identified with the mode of action,
organic or acquired, of which mention has been made. But in
Mill's account of generalization, the need for propositional for-
mulation of the active propensity is not recognized. Consequently,
his account of the production and nature of general propositions
sets forth, quite precisely, what happens in the case of those gen-
eralizations which fail to satisfy logical conditions: the generaliza-
tions (of which mention was made in the introductory paragraphs)
that do not rest upon ascertained grounds and which, therefore,
are unwarranted.
His well-known illustration of the village matron and her
1 Logic, Book I, ch. 3, sec. 8.
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 267
neighbor's child affords, when it is analyzed, proof of this state-
ment. The matron infers from case to case by virtue of a gen-
eralizing propensity. Since this remedy cured my child, it will
cure yours. No doubt there are many cases in which just this
procedure is followed. If it were not, patent medicine testimonials
would not have the vogue they have. But the fact that the pro-
pensity operates simply as a propensity and not through the me-
dium of a general proposition of the if-then form (and hence
checked by the consequences that ensue from its operation) is
precisely the reason for the relative worthlessness of the inferences
which result. The propensity is a cause of the inferences that are
made but is no sense their ground.
There is (1) no reason or ground for the village matron's as-
sumption that it was the medicine recommended that in fact cured
her own child. There is (2) no reason for the assumption that
the disease of the neighbor's child is similar to — of the same kind
— as the disease of her own Lucy. And yet that assumption was
made, unless the matron carried her "propensity" to the point of
recommending it for every case of illness in the village. Stated
positively, inference from one case to other cases (which is a most
important form of inference, being, as will be shown later, of the
essence of the inductive function), 2 is grounded only through the
intervention and intermediation of general propositions. Examina-
tion of the two cases of illness in question is required to establish
that they are similar or of the same kind. This examination is
carried out by means of analytic comparison of both cases, a com-
parison that establishes agreements and differences by using opera-
tions that institute affirmative and negative propositions in strict
correlation with each other. Moreover, this analytic comparison
is effected (when it yields a grounded conclusion) by the oper-
ative use of a conceptual apparatus of if-then propositions: If
diphtheria, then certain characteristic traits; if typhoid, then cer-
tain others; if measles, then certain others, and so on. Moreover,
the conceptual apparatus is adequate only if the if-then proposi-
tions that are employed form the content of a disjunctive system
of propositions, theoretically (though not in practice) covering all
possible cases of illness in such a way as to provide the procedural
2 See Chap. XXI.
268 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
means of identifying and demarcating any case of illness whatever.
For these reasons it was stated above that inference is made from
one case to other cases only by the intermediary of general propo-
sitions, instead of saying by a single general proposition. For
there is the proposition that this case is of a kind, and there is the
generalization of the if-then form which is required to ground the
proposition about a kind.
It will be noted that it is not denied that we do infer from one
case to other cases. What is affirmed is that such inferences have
logical standing — or are grounded — only as the inference takes
place through the mediation of propositions of the generic and of
the universal form.
III. The Nature of Generic Propositions. Every proposition
that involves the conception of a kind is based upon a set of
related traits or characteristics that are the necessary and sufficient
conditions of describing a specified kind. These traits are se-
lectively discriminated by observation out of the total perceived
field. What is the criterion upon which some traits are taken and
others are omitted and rejected? From the standpoint of ex-
istence, independently of its subjection to inquiry, there is no
criterion. Everything in the world is like everything else in some
respects, and is unlike anything else in other respects. From the
existential point of view, comparison can form an infinite number
of kinds and there is no ground whatever in any situation why one
kind rather than another should be formed. For example, there
are persons who have the quality of being cross-eyed, of being bald
and being shoemakers. Why not form a kind on the basis of these
qualities? The answer is that such a set of conjoined traits is
practically worthless for the purpose of inference. This set of
traits has no evidential value in respect to inferring other traits
that are also conjoined but not observable at the time. It leads
nowhere in inquiry.
Such a conjunction of qualities as viviparous, warm-blooded
and lung-breathing is taken, on the other hand, to describe the
kind mammalian, because and only because this conjunction of
characteristics promotes and controls extensive inference. It per-
mits grounded conclusions to be made regarding singulars. For
singulars are affirmed or denied to be mammals according as to
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 269
whether this conjunction of traits is or not found to exist upon
observational inquiry. If it were not for the conception of related
traits, the inquirer would not know what to look for or how to
estimate what he found. The set of traits also enables inferences
to be made regarding relations of kinds. The traits selected fall
within, through additive determinants, the set of traits which de-
scribe the kind vertebrates, and is such as to enable demarcation to
be made between the kind mammals and other kinds such as
fishes. There was a time when the traits, walking, swimming,
creeping and flying, were believed to provide the ground for iden-
tifying and differentiating diverse kinds of living creatures. In
the continuum of experiential inquiry, it was found to be both
too wide and too narrow. It put insects, birds and bats in one
and the same kind; fish and seals in another kind; reptiles and
worms in a third kind. Scientific inquiry showed that, on the
contrary, seals, birds and reptiles should be included in one in-
clusive kind, because the traits by which that kind is descriptively
determined enable inference to be ready and secure from case
to case when they are found by directed observation to exist and
sets barriers to inference when they are not found.
The theory which has been most generally current (or at least the
most popular notion) about the formation of general conceptions
is that they are formed by processes of comparison which extract
elements that are common to many cases and drop out those that
differ. The point already made, namely, that formation of kinds
is rendered purely arbitrary, since everything is like and unlike
other things, applies to this view. A more important objection
in the present connection is that it puts the cart before the horse,
taking for granted the very thing that ■ is to be accounted for.
Common qualities are already general qualities. For example, it
is said that we form the general conception of a horse by compar-
ing horses and taking the residuum of qualities they have in com-
mon. But generalization has already been effected when the
singulars are adjudged to be horses.
If sound generalizations could be formed by placing, mentally,
a number of singulars in a row and then throwing out unlike
qualities until a number of "common" qualities remains, institution
of kinds and of general conceptions would be an ultra-mechanical
270 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
and easy operation. One only has to consider the traits that de-
scribe a kind in scientific inquiry to note that their institution is an
arduous process, and does not proceed in the way that is here
criticised. For scientific kinds, say that of metals, are instituted by
operations that disclose traits that are not present to ordinary
observation but are produced by operations of experimentation,
as a manifestation of interactions that are taking place. For only
qualities that are capable of being treated as signs of definite in-
teractions facilitate and control inference.
We are thus brought back to the thesis that the traits which
descriptively determine kinds are selected and ordered with ref-
erence to their function in promoting and controlling extensive
inference. In other words, while every characteristic trait is a
quality, not every quality is a trait. No quality is a trait in and
of itself, or in virtue of existence. Qualities are existential and are
produced and destroyed by existential conditions. For a quality
to be a trait it must be used as an evidential sign or diagnostic
mark. The very fact that qualities as traits are used to direct and
to control inference is the reason why their fitness to perform
the signifying function, to serve as evidential, is and must be itself
a matter for careful investigation.
We habitually employ qualities as signs although we do not
habitually or "naturally" investigate their qualifications to be so
taken and used. As a rule only artists and those of strong esthetic
inclinations pay much heed to qualities as qualities. A red light
on a street corner is a traffic signal; except in this function little or
no attention is paid to its intrinsic quality. Moreover, the quality
as an existence is constantly changing. It varies with atmospheric
conditions, with changes of sunlight, with the distance and optical
apparatus of the percipient, etc. It is constant and uniform only
in its function. Variations in its quality as existential are indif-
ferent—until they pass a definite limit— to its function as a stop-
signal.
It follows that the view that qualities are themselves general, as
much so as relations and relationships, is as logically fallacious as
is the doctrine that generals are determined by selection of "com-
mon" qualities. Nothing more intrinsically unique and non-
general than a quality as an existence can be imagined. The
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 271
actual red of the traffic light is always varying, for existentially it
is a manifestation of a vast complex of changing conditions. The
function and only the function of a quality in grounding inference
is constant and general.
IV. The Nature of Universal Propositions, As has been said,
the existential basis of a universal proposition is a mode of action.
A universal proposition is not, however, merely a formulation of a
way of acting or operating. It is such a formulation as serves to
direct the operations by means of which existential material is
selectively discriminated and related (ordered) so that it functions
as the ground for warranted inferential conclusions. In other
words, a content of a proposition has the form of universality in
virtue of the distinctive function it performs in inquiry. Ways
of acting are, as has been pointed out repeatedly, at first practical
and actual. Through symbolization of propositional formulation
they represent possible ways of action. Entertained and developed
as possibilities of ways of acting which are existentially general
(because they are ways and not singular acts or deeds) they acquire
logical form.
In a universal proposition, possibility of a mode of operation
is expressed in an if-then form. If certain contents, then neces-
sarily certain other contents. Traditionally, the if clause is called
the antecedent and the then clause the consequent. But the rela-
tion is purely logical, and the terms "antecedent" and "consequent"
are to be understood in a logical, not in an existential sense.
When an if-then proposition is formed in the process of delibera-
tion about a specific matter of conduct, the two words have a more
literal sense. "If I first do this, then certain consequences may
be anticipated to follow." The relation in question is one of tem-
poral priority and consequence. In the proposition, "If an act
of trespassing, then liability to a penalty," the terms are abstract
and the relation is non-temporal and non-existential, even though
the contents, the ideas of trespassing and penalty, have indirect
existential reference. When it is said "If a plane figure is a tri-
angle, then the sum of its three interior angles is equal to two right
angles," not only is the relation non-existential, but the contents
are free from any prescribed existential reference even of the most
indirect sort. In such a proposition there is not even a semblance
272 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
of antecedent and consequent even in a logical sense. The mean-
ing would be the same if the proposition read "If the sum of the
three interior angles of a plane figure is equal to two right angles,
the plane figure is a triangle."
In neither of the two cases cited does one clause follow from
the other. For in their necessary interrelation they present the
analysis of a conception into its integral and exhaustive contents.
Hence it is misleading to say that one clause implies the other;
not only because implication holds between propositions, not be-
tween clauses, but because such a statement obscures from view
the primary logical consideration — namely, that the two clauses
represent the analysis of a single conception into its complete and
exclusive interrelated logical constituents. For this reason a uni-
versal hypothetical proposition has the form of a definition in its
logical sense. Thus the proposition "If anything is a material
body, it attracts other material bodies directly as its mass and
indirectly as the square of the distance" may read equally well
in the linguistic form "All material bodies, etc." It is a (partial)
definition of being a material body. It expresses a condition which
any observed thing must satisfy if the property "material" is
groundedly applicable to it. On the other hand, if things are
found that on grounds provided by other universal propositions are
determined to be material which yet fail to answer to the require-
ments prescribed by the proposition quoted, then one or other of
the involved universal propositions must be revised and re-
formulated.
The foregoing paragraphs are intended to show (1) what is
meant by the functional character of the universal proposition and
(2) in what special way it is functional. This special way may
be restated as follows: A universal proposition prescribes the con-
ditions to be satisfied by existential material, so that if singular it
is determined to be one of a specified kind, or if a kind, it is in-
cluded in and/or is inclusive of certain other specified kinds. It
accomplishes this function by means of actual execution of the
mode of operation which as a proposition it formulates. For an
actualized operation is performed upon existential conditions and
has consequences in the literal or existential sense. Simple agree-
ment of these actual consequences with the content of the
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 273
apodosis clause of the hypothetical universal is not, however, as
already explained, a complete test of the hypothesis. The actual
consequences must be shown, as nearly as possible, to be the only
ones which would satisfy the requirements of the hypothesis. In
order that determination of this mode of satisfaction can be ap-
proximately attained, the universal in question must be one of a
system of interrelated universal propositions. A universal propo-
sition which is not a member of a system could, at the most, only
produce consequences that agree with the conditions it prescribes,
without excluding the possibility of their also agreeing with condi-
tions prescribed by other conceptions.
V. The Conjugate Relation of Universal and Generic Proposi-
tions: Implication and Inference. In the previous chapter it was
said that "category" would be employed to designate the concep-
tions which are formulated in universal propositions instead of the
word class, since the latter word is also used to denote generals of
the form of kinds. Every conception which functions as repre-
sentative of a possible mode of operation may be called a category.
Although in the history of philosophy, the word has been used
to a large extent to designate only the conceptions that were taken
to be ultimate (even so with little regard to their operational
nature) , yet ordinary language uses the word more widely. When
it is said, for example (taking the example from a dictionary quo-
tation), that "this object falls within the category of machines,"
something more is meant than that it is included within the kind
machines. What is meant is that it exemplifies the principle or
order of principles by which being machinery is defined. A cate-
gory is the logical equivalent of what practically is an attitude.
It constitutes a point of view, a schedule, a program, a heading or
caption, an orientation, a possible mode of predication; as, in Aris-
totle, to categorize is to predicate. Civil and criminal laws fall
into kinds. But being civil or criminal law are categories. They
are points of view from which certain forms of conduct are ap-
proached and regulated. A law is a formula for treatment. It
determines whether certain agents can be brought before a court
and how they shall be treated if and when so brought. Principles,
prudential and moral, are categories. They are rules for conduct.
While rules may themselves fall into classes in the sense of kinds,
274 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
being a principle is not a kind but is a prescription for forming
kinds and thus for determining whether a given action or line of
conduct is of a specified kind.
Once it is recognized that a universal proposition is a formula
of a possible operation, the chief logical problem about such
propositions concerns their relation with generic propositions; that
is, their relation with determination of the distinguishing traits
which describe kinds. According to the view here stated, the
relation is conjugate. Universals and generics bear the same rela-
tion to each other in inquiry that material and procedural means
sustain to each other in institution of judgment. Propositions
about kinds and singulars as of a specified kind provide the subject-
matter that forms the logical subject of final judgment. Proposi-
tions about the operations to be undertaken in order to effect the
transformation of problematic subject-matter into a unified con-
tinuous existential situation provide the predicational subject-matter.
An operation not formulated in a proposition is logically un-
controlled, no matter how useful it may be in habitual practice.
For until it is propositionally formulated, there is no ground for
determining what consequences or what aspects of ensuing con-
sequences are due to it and what consequences are due to extraneous
unformulated conditions. The universal hypothetical states the
relation between the operation and its consequences, the conse-
quences being taken as themselves of operative force in the con-
tinuum of experience, not merely as final and hence isolated.
Thus they bear the same relation to propositions arranged in
reasoning or ordered discourse, that propositions about kinds do
to promotion and regulation of inference. ¥ articular consequences
do not of themselves lead on to further consequences. In delibera-
tion, the "if" of any action proposed as possible will have for
its "then" certain contemplated consequences. But what the further
consequences of these consequences will be, remains a separate
problem, and one readily lost from view, especially when the
special consequences are agreeable. When the "consequences"
are themselves possible operations, their formulation leads naturally
to propositions about further operations with which they are re-
lated, or to discourse, until in mathematical discourse there is no
set limit to the possibility of ensuing operations.
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 275
Recurring to the topic of conjugate relationship in its bearing
upon the relation of generic and universal propositions, we have,
first, the fact (already noted) that the operations which constitute
the content of predicate subject-matter are such as determine
evidential data. In the second place, the data which are thus
constituted become the tests of operations already executed and
the ground upon which new operations (or modifications of old
ones) are suggested and executed. An executed operation first
transforms antecedently existent material so that the material ob-
tained becomes more indicative or signifying, and then this changed
material calls for further operations, and so on until a resolved
situation is instituted. In short, the raison d'etre of a given opera-
tion is that by it there is brought about approach towards the
existential consequences that constitute a resolved situation. Prop-
ositional formulation of the operation in advance of its perform-
ance is a necessary condition of satisfactory execution of this
office. On the other hand, scrupulous discriminative observation
of the consequences of its actual performance, together with
comparison of these consequences with those which are hypo-
thetically determined, tests the validity (relevancy and force) of
the propositional formulation of an operation, and thus reacts, when
needful, to modify the operation and the proposition that are sub-
sequently employed.
Stating this conclusion in formal terms: — No grounded generic
propositions can be formed save as they are the products of the
performance of operations indicated as possible by universal prop-
ositions. The problem of inference is, accordingly, to discriminate
and conjoin those qualities of existential material that serve as
distinguishing traits (inclusively and exclusively) of a determinate
kind. The distinguishing traits that were once taken to describe
the kind metals were peculiar lustre, opacity, malleability, high
density and tenacity. The traits were observable qualities pro-
duced by the ordinary operations of the body, seeing, touching,
etc., conjoined with activities of craftsmen in manipulating things
for the ends of use and enjoyment. Valuable as the consequences
of these activities were for strictly practical purposes, they failed
to guide inquiry as inquiry. They gave no aid in searching for
other metals than those ordinarily in use (then some seven in all);
276 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY
they gave no aid in linking metals with non-metals in a common
system of inferential conclusions; they did not even ensure ac-
curate discrimination of a metal from an alloy. The net conse-
quence was that, even from the standpoint of practical use, the
art of metallurgy was restricted within narrow bounds.
The transition to the present scientific conception of being
metallic and the determination of the traits by which the kind,
metals, and its subkinds (more than sixty) are described was
brought about when the point of view changed. It changed from
consequences connected with direct use and enjoyment to conse-
quences brought about by interactions of things with one another,
human intervention consisting of the experimental operations that
institute these interactions. The result was that immediate sensible
qualities lost the significance previously given them as distinguish-
ing traits. For example, an important element in the present
definition of being metallic is "affinity" or capacity for interaction
with certain non-metallic substances, especially oxygen, sulphur
and chlorine, together with the capacity of oxides thus produced
to interact as bases with acids to form salts. Another element is
high positive electric capacity. It is obvious that such traits
could never have been extracted as were lustre and opacity from
immediate sensible qualities, or as tenacity and malleability were
from operations executed by artisans. The traits are such as to
promote (1) determination of previously unrecognized metals;
(2) accurate discrimination of subkinds; and, (3) above all, to
relate inferences made about metals to inferences about all chemi-
cal changes in that extensive system which constitutes chemical
science.
The illustration has been developed in some detail because it
illustrates so clearly both the distinction and the relation of (1)
definition and description; of (2) categories and kinds; of (3) char-
acters and characteristics. In these distinctions, the first term in
each of the three pairs refers to a possible operation of the nature
of an interaction while the second refers to the existential conse-
quences of the actual execution of the operation. As distinctions,
they are inherently related. The relation is that of operations as
procedural means to existential conditions as consequences. "If
metallic, then certain specified characters; if iron, sodium, tungsten
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 277
. . . then certain additional differential consequences." The defi-
nition thus forms a rule for the performance of (1) an experimental
operation and (2) for guiding further operations of discrimination.
The latter are selective of special qualities as inclusive and exclusive
evidential signs of subkinds within an inclusive kind.
The illustration up to this point has put its emphasis upon the de-
pendence of propositions about kinds upon the definition provided
by universal hypothetical propositions. Were the actual historical
development of the latter in the progress of physico-chemical in-
quiry followed out, the conjugate role played by existential propo-
sitions of kinds in testing and revising previous universal
conceptions would be equally evident. The later conceptions of
being metallic, being iron, etc., did not appear out of the blue.
They were suggested by conclusions as to matters-of-fact already
obtained. The conversion of the suggestion into a proposition
prescribed further operations, which yielded new matters-of-fact,
and hence new ideas in the continuum of inquiry, until, on one
side, the present conceptions and definitions were arrived at, and
on the other side, the present set of differential descriptions and
kinds. In short, the relation between the two forms of the uni-
versal and the generic is functional: it is exactly similar in logical
status and function to the relation between the logical subject and
predicate of final judgment.
The distinction of forms that has been discussed is, then, that
between propositions facilitating and regulating inference and
those constituting reasoning as ordered discourse. The movement
from one existential proposition to another through inference de-
pends, as we have seen, upon non-existential universal propositions
as an instrumental intermediary — a consideration which demands
that there be scrupulous attention to formation of the universal
propositions employed in discourse. But the movement of infer-
ence cannot be identified with that of rational discourse without
radical doctrinal confusion. Nor can either one of the two logical
movements be identified with the application of the universal
proposition to existential material. No amount of reasoning can
do more than develop a universal proposition; it cannot, of itself,
determine matters-of-fact. Only operational application can effect
the latter determination. On the other hand, existential data can-
278 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY ^
not of themselves prove a universal. They can suggest it. But
proof is effected by (1) the formulation of the idea suggested in
a hypothetical proposition, and (2) by the transformation of
data into a unified situation through execution of the operations
presented by the hypothetical as a rule of action. ^
The condition to be satisfied in reasoning or discourse is con-
stituted by the implicatory relation. Problems of discourse have
to do with ascertainment of rigorous and productive implications.
Inference, on the other hand, is conditioned upon an existential
connection which may be called involvement. The problems of
inference have to do with discovery of what conditions are in-
volved with one another and how they are involved. 3 A person
engaged in a business undertaking is involved with others in the
conditions of the situation in which the undertaking is to be carried
out. In a criminal conspiracy one person is involved with his ac-
complices in certain activities and consequences. But the scope of
involvement is not confined to personal cases. An increase in the
supply of gold involves, usually, a decrease in its price and an in-
crease in the price of other commodities. The sudden and excessive
rise of the customary level of a river is involved in heavy rain storms
and involves with its occurrence perils to life and property, im-
passable roads, etc. An outbreak of bubonic plague involves a
rise in death-rate with, perhaps, a campaign to exterminate rats.
There is no need to multiply instances. Every case of the causal
relation rests upon some involvement of existential conditions with
one another in a joint interaction. The entire principle of func-
tional correlations of changes rests upon involvements, as when,
in the case of many substances, increase of heat is ground for an
inference to their expansion; or when the volume of gases is said
to be a function of pressure and heat. The essential consideration
is that the relation is a strictly existential one, ultimately a matter
of the brute structure of things.
Reasoning and calculation are necessary instruments for de-
termining definite involvements. But the relations of terms and
1 owe the word "involvement" and explicit recognition of its logical import
as the conjugate counterpart of implication to Dr. Percy Hughes. See his article,
"Involvement and Implication," Philosophical Review, Vol. XL VII, (1938), pp.
267-274. He was kind enough to show me the manuscript in advance of pub-
lication.
GENERIC AND UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS 279
propositions within reasoning and calculation (discourse) is im-
plicatory and non-existential while description of kinds is a matter
of involvement. Because the universal hypothetical propositions
which constitute ordered discourse arise from analyses of single
meanings or conceptions, their constituents sustain a necessary
relation to each other. But propositions about objects and traits
which are involved with one another in some interaction have ref-
erence to the contingencies of existence and hence are of some
order of probability. Therefore, an indispensable factor of in-
quiry is determination of the order of probability presented in any
given case. The traits or characteristics which describe a kind
are taken to go together in existence. The ground of their selec-
tion is logical but the ground of their going together is existential.
The ground is that, as a matter of existence, they do go together
or are existentially so conjoined that when one varies the other
varies. When no reason why they should go together is seen
(such as forms the content of a universal hypothetical proposi-
tion), the ground for selection of a given conjunction may prop-
erly be called "empirical." In the degree in which the selection
of a conjunction is determined by the operational application of
a universal proposition (and this proposition in turn is one of a
system of universal propositions which have been severally tested
in experimental application) the probability of the validity of a
given existential proposition is of a high order. But it never at-
tains the status of inherent logical necessity. It remains a brute fact,
even after a law has indicated why and how a proposition about
the brute fact is fruitful in promotion and control of inquiry.
On the basis of the distinction and relation of existential in-
volvement and logical implication, the point already made about
the conjugate connection of generic and universal propositions
may be illustrated as follows: One who is convicted of being an
accomplice in a crime is so involved with the principals as to be
involved in the consequences of the crime. But the involvement
in, say, the penal consequences, results only because of the defini-
tions of "crime," "principal" and "accomplice" instituted in a
given legal system of conceptions. These definitions are cate-
gories set forth in if-then propositions. By application of these
categories, the presence or absence of the conjunction of traits
280 THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY ^
which indicates that a given action is of a kind involving specified
consequences is decided. On the other hand, it is clear that the
definitions and categories in question did not emerge from the
blue, but were evolved and explicitly formulated in terms of con-
ditions set by the need of dealing with actual cases of human action.
As another example, one may scribble his name on a piece of
paper and no legal consequences follow. But under conditions
which are determined by an abstract definition, he may be held
liable for payment of a given sum when he signs his name.
Finally, the legal definitions and conceptions are evolved and are
modified with respect to' their function in regulation of situations
which existentially arise in the field of human relationships. Ef-
fectiveness in regulation of human conduct is their final criterion
of validity.
The functional correspondence, or conjugate relationship, of
involvement and implication, kinds and categories, characteristics
and characters, generic and universal propositions, signifies, to sum
up, that they represent cooperative divisions of function in the in-
quiry which transform a problematic situation into a resolved and
unified one. The internecine logical war between empiricists of
the type of Mill and the school of rationalism will continue as
long as adherents of the one school and of the other fail to recog-
nize the strictly intermediate and functional nature of the two
forms of propositions as cooperative phases of inquiry. But the
needed recognition cannot be effected until the field of logic is
taken to be as broad as that of controlled inquiry. The relations
of terms and propositions in discourse is such as to make possible
purely formal statements — purely formal in the sense that it is the
very nature of ordered discourse to deal with possibilities in
abstraction from existential material. But any theory of "pure"
logic which assumes that forms of discourse necessarily constitute
the total subject-matter of logic is arbitrary. Fundamentally, it
makes the personal interest which actuates a particular logician or
group of logicians the criterion for logical subject-matter. In ad-
dition, it fails to provide the logical ground for discourse and its
forms, and to provide a rational explanation of their applicability to
existence, which remains a matter of a mysterious preestablished
harmony between the possible— which is not efficacious — and the
actual.
Part Three
PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
CHAPTER XV
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS
"Udgment has been analyzed to show that it is a continuous
process of resolving an indeterminate, unsettled situation
into a determinately unified one, through operations which
transform subject-matter originally given. Judgment, in distinc-
tion from propositions which are singular, plural, generic and
universal, is individual, since it is concerned with unique qualitative
situations. Comparison-contrast is, upon this position, the funda-
mental operation by which re-determination of prior situations is
effected; "comparison" being a name for all the processes which
institute cumulative continuity of subject-matter in the ongoing
course of inquiry. Comparison-contrast has been shown to be in-
volved in affirmation-negation, in measurement, whether qualitative
or numerical, in description-narration, and in general propositions
of the two forms, generic and universal. Moreover, it is a
complex of operations by which existential conjunctions and elimi-
nations, in conjugate connection with each other are effected — not
a "mental" affair.
Propositions are logically distinct from judgment, and yet are
the necessary logical instrumentalities of reaching final warranted
determination or judgment. Only by means of symbolization (the
peculiar differentia of propositions) can direct action be deferred
until inquiry into conditions and procedures has been instituted.
The overt activity, when it finally occurs, is, accordingly, intelli-
gent instead of blind. Propositions as such are, consequently, pro-
visional, intermediate and instrumental. Since their subject-matter
concerns two kinds of means, material and procedural, they are of
two main categories: (1) Existential, referring directly to actual
conditions as determined by experimental observation, and (2)
ideational or conceptual, consisting of interrelated meanings, which
283
284 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
are non-existential in content in direct reference but which are
applicable to existence through the operations they represent as
possibilities. In constituting respectively material and procedural
means, the two types of propositions are conjugate, or functionally
correspondent. They form the fundamental divisions of labor in
inquiry.
A contemporary movement in logical theory, known as logical
positivism, eschews the use of "propositions" and "terms," substitut-
ing "sentences" and "words." The change is welcome in as far
as it fixes attention upon the symbolic structure and content of
propositions. For such recognition emancipates logical theory
from bondage to preconceived ontological and metaphysical be-
liefs, permitting the theory to proceed autonomously in terms of
the contents and functions of propositions as they actually present
themselves to analysis. In emphasizing the symbolic element, it
brings propositions into connection with language generically;
and language, while about things directly or indirectly, is acknowl-
edged to be of another dimension than that which it is about.
Moreover, formulation of logical subject-matter in terms of sym-
bols tends to free theory from dependence upon an alleged sub-
jective realm of "sensations" and "ideas" set over against a realm
of objects. For symbols and language are objective events in
human experience.
A minor objection to the use of "sentences" and "words" to
designate what have been called propositions and terms, is that
unless carefully interpreted it narrows unduly the scope of symbols
and language, since it is not customary to treat gestures and
diagrams (maps, blueprints, etc.) as words or sentences. How-
ever, this difficulty may be guarded against. A more serious ob-
jection is that without careful statement, the new terminology does
not discriminate between language that is adapted to the purposes
of communication (what Locke called "civil" language) and
language that is determined solely by prior inquiries related to the
purposes of inquiry— the latter alone being logical in import.
This serious difficulty cannot be overcome by considering sentences
and words in isolation, for the distinction depends upon an intent
which can be adjudged only by means of context.
In so far as it is not determined in a given case whether the
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 285
intent is communication of something already known, or is use of
what is already taken as known as means of inquiry into the as yet
unknown and problematic, fallacies in logical theory are bound
to arise. Take, for example, the matter of subject-predicate. The
grammatical subject is the subject-matter that is taken to be
common, agreed upon, "understood" as between the communicator
and the one communicated to. The grammatical predicate, is that
which is taken to be in the knowledge or thought of the one
giving information or advice, but not in the knowledge or thought
of the receiver. Suppose the sentence to be "The dog is lost."
The meaning of "the dog" is, or is supposed to be, common for
all parties; that of "is lost" to be in possession of the speaker, and
while relevant to the experience and beliefs of the hearer, not
previously known by him.
Now if the logical theory of the subject-predicate is taken over
from grammatical structure, it is likely, in fact, practically certain,
to be concluded that the material of the logical subject is some-
thing already completely given independently of inquiry and of
the need of inquiry, so that only the characterizations provided
in predication have logically to be taken into account. Indeed, it
is not too much to surmise that the direct movement from gram-
matical to logical structure had much to do with the Aristotelian
formulation of the logical subject-predication relation. It led, on
the one hand, to the theory that the ultimate subject is always
some ontological substance and, on the other hand, to the classic
theory of predicables. Again, it may not be too much to surmise
that the doctrine, which has been criticized, regarding the im-
mediately given character of the subject-content of propositions is
an inheritance from the translation of grammatical into logical
form, carried out under the influence of an uncriticized psychology
of sensory-qualities as something immediately presented.
An even more serious objection is that logical positivism as
usually formulated is so under the influence of logical formalism,
derived from analysis of mathematics, as to make an over-sharp
distinction between matter and form, under the captions of "mean-
ing of words" and "syntactical relations." Now there is no
question that logical theory must distinguish between form and
matter. But the necessity for the distinction does not decide
286 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
whether they are or are not independent of each other: — -Whether
they are or are not, for example, intrinsically related to each
other in logical subject-matter and distinguishable only in the-
oretical analysis. While sentences or language invite making a
distinction between the meanings of the words constituting its
vocabulary and syntactical arrangements, this fact but poses in
a new way the old fundamental problem of the relation, or absence
of relation, between matter and form, or meanings and syntax. A
tacit or explicit assumption that the distinction proves the in-
dependence of matter and form, identifying the logical simply
with the latter, only begs the fundamental point at issue.
Ultimately, in spite of the nominal rejection of all "metaphysical"
principles and assumptions, the idea that there is a sharp distinc-
tion, if not a separation, between form and matter, rests on a
special purely metaphysical tradition. The admittedly formal
character of mathematics does not prove the separation of form
and matter; it rather poses that problem in a fundamental way. A
more direct objection along the same line is that the identification
of the logical with syntactical form is obliged to assume, as given,
the distinctions between nouns, verbs, adjectives, prepositions and
connectives, etc. No attempt has been made, and I do not see
how one can successfully be made, to determine what words have
the distinctive force postulated in the above classification (are
nouns, verbs, etc.) without taking account of their meaning, which
is a matter of material content.
It would be absurd, of course, to hold that the separation just
mentioned is inherently involved in the substitution of "words"
and "sentences" for "terms" and "propositions." But the fact that
in the present state of logical theory the substitution is associated
with the notion of this separation affords a reason for using the
older terminology. This reason is linguistically reinforced by the
fact, already mentioned, that the word "sentence" as ordinarily
used expresses the close of inquiry rather than its initiation or con-
tinuing execution. The word "proposition," on the other hand,
at least suggests something proposed, propounded for further con-
sideration, and thereby something entering integrally into the con-
tinuum of inquiry.
The basic issue regarding the logic of propositions concerns the
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 287
intrinsic conflict between the theory that holds to the intermediate
and functional status of propositions in institution of final judg-
ment, and the theories, traditional or contemporary, which isolate
propositions from their contextual position and function in de-
termination of final judgment. According to one variety of the
latter position, judgment alone is logical and propositions are but
linguistic expressions of them — a position which is consonant with
the idea that logic is the theory of thought as mental Another
variety holds that since judgment is a mental attitude taken to-
wards propositions, the latter alone are logical in nature. Sharp as
is the opposition between these views, both of them hold that
judgment — and "thought" generally — is mental. Both of them
stand, accordingly, in opposition to the position here taken, which
is that inquiry is concerned with objective transformations of
objective subject-matter; that such inquiry defines the only sense
in which "thought" is relevant to logic; and that propositions are
products of provisional appraisals, evaluations, of existences and of
conceptions as means of institution of final judgment which is
objective resolution of a problematic situation. Accordingly,
propositions are symbolizations, while symbolization is neither an
external garb nor yet something complete and final in itself.
The view most current at the present time is probably that which
regards propositions as the unitary material of logical theory.
Propositions upon this view have their defining property in the
property of formal truth-falsity. According to the position here
taken, propositions are to be differentiated and identified on the
ground of the function of their contents as means, procedural and
material, further distinctions of forms of propositions being in-
stituted on the ground of the special w T ays in which their respective
characteristic subject-matters function as means. The latter point
is the main theme of this chapter. But at this point it is pertinent
to note that, since means as such are neither true nor false, truth-
falsity is not a property of propositions. Means are either effective
or ineffective; pertinent or irrelevant; wasteful or economical, the
criterion for the difference being found in the consequences with
which they are connected as means. On this basis, special proposi-
tions are valid (strong, effective) or invalid (weak, inadequate);
loose or rigorous, etc.
288 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS ^
Validity-invalidity is thus to be distinguished not only from
truth-falsity but from formal correctness. Any given proposition
is such that it promotes or retards the institution of final resolution.
It cannot be logically adjudged, therefore, merely on the basis of its
formal relations to other propositions. The syllogism "All satel-
lites are made of green cheese; the moon is a satellite; therefore, it
is made of green cheese" is formally correct. The propositions
involved are, however, invalid, not just because they are "ma-
terially false," but because instead of promoting inquiry they
would, if taken and used, retard and mislead it. 1
The basic division of propositions has been said to rest upon
their functional place in judgment. I return to this point.
Grounded judgment depends upon the institution of facts which
(1) locate and circumscribe the problem set by an indeterminate
situation and which (2) provide the evidence which tests solutions
that are suggested and proposed. Such propositions determine one
of the two main divisions of propositions, those of subject-contents.
But grounded judgment also depends upon meanings or conceptual
structures which (1) represent possible solutions of the problem in
hand, and which (2) prescribe operations which, when performed,
yield new data tending in the direction of a determinate existential
situation. These are propositions of predicate-contents — the other
main division.
The subject-matter or content of the first main division of
propositions consists of observed data or facts. They are termed
material means. As such they are potentialities which, in interac-
tion with other existential conditions produce, under the influence
of an experimental operation, the ordered set of conditions which
constitute a resolved situation. Objective interaction is the overt
means by which the actualized situation is brought into existence.
What was potential at a given time may be actualized at some
later time by sheer change of circumstantial conditions, without
intervention of any operation which has logical or intellectual
intent as, when water freezes because of a specified change in
temperature. But in inquiry a deliberate operation intervenes;
first, to select the conditions that are operative, and secondly, to
1 These remarks are not supposed to cover the whole ground the relation of
form and matter. That topic receives more extended consideration later.
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 289
institute the new conditions which interact with old ones. Both
operations are so calculated that as close an approach as possible
may be made to determining the exact kind of interaction, in-
clusively and exclusively, necessary to produce a determinate set
of consequences. The relation between interacting conditions and
actualized consequences is general, and is functionally formal,
because it is freed from reference to any particular space-time
actualization.
Potentialities are to be distinguished from abstract possibilities.
The former are existential "powers" that are actualized under given
conditions of existential interaction. Possibility, on the other hand,
is a matter of an operation as such — it is operability. It is ex-
istentially actualized only when the operation is performed not
with or upon symbols but upon existences. A strictly possible
operation constitutes an idea or conception. Execution of the
operation upon symbolized ideational material does not produce
the consequences constituting resolution of tension. It produces
them, as indicated in the previous paragraph, only by operationally
introducing conditions that institute a determinate kind of interac-
tion. The idea of taking a drink of water, for example, leads to
actual drinking only because it institutes a change in prior condi-
tions — if only by pouring from a pitcher or turning a spigot to
bring water into connection with a new set of conditions. From
these preliminary general statements discussion proceeds to con-
sideration of the different kinds of propositions which are the
sub-classes of the two main kinds just described.
I. EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS
1. Particular Propositions. Propositions of the kind called
particular represent the most rudimentary form of propositions of
subject-content. They are propositions which qualify a singular,
this, by a quality proceeding from an operation performed by
means of a sense organ — for example, "This is sour, or soft, or red,
etc." The word "is" in such instances as these has existential force
not that of the timeless (because strictly logical) copula. "This is
sour" means either that the actual performance of an operation of
tasting has produced that quality in immediately experienced
existence, or that it is predicted that if a certain operation is per-
290 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
formed it will produce a sour quality. "This is soft" means that it
yields easily to pressure and will not cause most other things to
yield when applied to them. When it is said of this "It is bright,"
an actual consequence of physical interaction with light is indi-
cated. In short, the proposition is particular not because it ap-
plies to a singular but because the qualification is of something
taking place at a definite here and now, or is of an immediate change.
In the strictly particular proposition there is no ground for intimat-
ing that the this in question will remain sour, sticky, red, bright or
whatever. "Is" is a verb of the strictly temporal present tense;
or, if it is an anticipation of what will happen, it refers to an equally
transitory local time in the future.
When the above propositions are called, as they sometimes are,
Propositions of Sense Perception, there is confusion of the causal
conditions under which the particular quality occurs with the
logical form of the quality. For practical purposes it is highly im-
portant to know the causal conditions under which anything be-
comes hard, sour, or blue. Without this knowledge there are no
means of controlling the occurrence of such qualities. But the
logical import of a "particular" is determined by the strictly
limited local and temporal occurrence of the quality in question.
Hence such propositions represent the first stage in determination
of a problem; they supply a datum which, when combined with
other data, may indicate what sort of a problem the situation
presents and thereby provide an item of evidence pointing to and
testing a proposed solution. There are, however, instances in
which the same linguistic expression has the force of a singular
proposition — a form next discussed. In a given context of in-
quiry, "This is sweet" may not mean that some particular change
is occurring which needs to be taken into account in formulating a
problem. For in a special context, it may mark the resolution of
some problem, as for example, a problem in which discovery of
something which will sweeten something else is the object sought
for. When a linguistic form is separated from the contextual
matter of problem-inquiry it is impossible to decide of what
logical form it is the expression.
2. Singular Propositions. Singular propositions are such as
determine this to be one of a kind. Take the two possible meanings
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 291
of 'This is sweet." When the proposition is particular, it in-
dicates, as has been said, an immediate change that has occurred
or is about to occur. The same expression when it presents the
solution of a problem, means that "this" is one of the kind of
sweet things: or that this has the potentialities which are properties
of any sweet thing. The sweet quality is no longer simply a
change which has occurred; it is a sign of a conjoined set of con-
sequences that will occur when certain interactions take place.
Take for example the propositions "He is cruel," or "He is kind."
The qualification represented by "cruel" or "kind" marks a
disposition to act in a certain way, not limited to a change occur-
ring at a given time; what occurs at the time is being taken as
evidence of the permanent traits which describe a kind. If the
expression were phrased to read "He is a cruel -person" the presence
of traits describing a kind would be obvious.
Such propositions as "This is an elm tree," or "This is sugar, is
granite, is a meteorite, etc.," unambiguously identify and demarcate
a singular as one of a kind. It is not necessary here to repeat what
has been said about the force of the conception or category of
kind in promotion of grounded inferential conclusions. It may be
necessary to point out that when an adjective, like "benevolent,"
"mammalian," has the same logical force as a common noun, there
is postulated the existence of other qualifying characteristics in
conjunction with the one explicitly stated. When it is said, "This
is iron," iron clearly refers to traits not now immediately present,
but which as potential consequences stand in conjunction with the
immediately present quality of color or touch. Similarly, the
difference between the propositions "He is (now and here) acting
kindly" and "He is kind," is constituted by the fact that the latter
involves inference from the immediate datum of change stated in
the former to a set of traits not then and there observable.
The singular proposition thus takes us back to what was said
in the previous chapter regarding the continuum of judgment. The
propositions "This has vitreous lustre; cannot be scratched by a
knife; scratches glass; is not fused by a blowpipe; breaks with
conchoidal fractures" are propositions which, taken separately, set
forth special modes of change. Applied concurrently and cumula-
tively to this they yield the set of conjoined traits describing the
292 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS __
kind quartz. (I) A change is not merely noted as a brute fact,
but the conditions are noted under which it occurs. (2) These
changes are found to be so involved with one another that, in spite
of variations in the circumstances in which they present them-
selves, the presence of one is a valid sign that the others will present
themselves if specified interactions occur. Similarly, the proposi-
tion "This turns litmus paper red," of and by itself, records simply
an isolated observation. In the course of cumulative progressive
inquiries yielding other propositions about this, the proposition
"This is an acid," (i.e., is one of a specified kind) is warranted.
We are thus enabled to make definite the logical differences be-
tween quality, characteristic trait, and property which have
previously been noted. "Turning paper red," is, as the object of a
particular observation, a quality. As enabling reasonably safe
inference to be made as to the occurrence of other qualities under
certain conditions, it is a distinguishing trait or characteristic de-
scriptive of a kind. It becomes a property when it is determined
by negative as well as positive instances to be a constant dependable
sign of other conjoined characteristics. It then belongs inherently
to all cases of the kind.
Propositions of the class under consideration are often termed,
in contemporary logical texts, propositions of membership in a
kind. Membership, however, implies an articulation which is not
involved. Propositions that "This is of specified kind," constitute
"this" a case or representative of a kind, a specimen, rather than a
member. 2 In one direction, determination of a singular as one of a
kind involves a limitation of the singularity of this. It is no longer
taken in its full qualitative existence, but is reduced to a character-
istic which promotes identification and demarcation of it as of
a kind. In another direction, namely, that of the range of grounded
inferences that may be drawn, the limitation is conjugate with
widening. Ordinary linguistic form is here, as in so many other
instances, not a safe guide. "Paul was a Roman citizen," may
merely state a particular historic fact, but in the context in which
it was once uttered it signified that he was a representative of a
kind of citizenship which carried with it certain rights. A mere
2 The bearing of this distinction upon the concept of extension is considered
below: See Chap. XVIII.
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 293
succession of particulars cannot, therefore, determine that an
existence is one of a kind. The particular changes that occur must
have representative capacity. This fact is fatal to the assumption
often made that a quality like red and hard, is inherently general
or universal. It becomes such in cumulative inference in the
continuum of inquiry; that is, when determined to be capable of
application to an indefinite number of singulars not actually
present. In and of itself it is particular to the point of uniqueness.
Reference has been repeatedly made to contextual "conditions"
as necessarily required for determination of the conceptions of
characteristics, potentiality, and inference. The specific nature
of these conditions is usually "understood" or taken for granted.
Even in scientific inquiry and inference they are never completely
stated. For a complete statement is impossible since it would have
to exhaust practically everything. Standardized conditions are
postulated, and are explicitly stated because, and as far as, they have
differential effect. There are certain organic conditions under
which sugar will not taste sweet and certain material conditions
under which it will not sweeten another material. Only in special
cases, is it necessary to state the conditions which cause conse-
quences to be other than those normally postulated. For example,
it is not safe to infer that a thing is sticky because it is sweet. But
when differential conditions are adequately stated it is safe to
infer that "This sweet thing is of the class of sticky things."
Postulation, implicit or explicit, of the environing conditions that
are required in a given case is equivalent to standardization of that
set of conditions. 3
3. Propositions of Relationship of Kinds, or Qeneric Proposi-
tions. It is now generally recognized that the proposition "Atheni-
ans are Greeks" is of different logical form from "Socrates is
(was) an Athenian," and "This is iron" is of a different logical
form from "Iron is a metal." The second proposition in each of
the above pairs includes a lesser kind in a more extensive kind, as
a species in a genus, while the first one of the pairs does not in-
clude the singular in a class or kind. In them the kind, described
3 1 owe to Dr. Nagel the observation that when formal symbols are employed
to express this type of propositions, it is necessary to have a symbol standing
for the postulated standardized conditions.
294 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
by means of specified traits, serves to identify and demarcate the
singular, so that from directly observed characteristics other char-
acteristics, not then observed or observable, may be inferred under
given conditions. The membership of a kind in another kind not
only extends enormously the number of characteristics that are
inferable, but, what is even more important, it orders observed and
inferred traits in a system. From the proposition "Roses are
monocotyledonous angiosperms," it can be inferred that any ob-
ject which is a rose has two seed leaves; that the parts of its flowers
are not arranged by threes; that its leaves have reticulate venation,
etc. And the wide range of inference is based upon general prin-
ciples and not simply upon special observations.
This extension of the range of inference is then more than a fact
of great practical importance, although it is that. It has definite
logical import. For it reacts to determine the ground upon which
conjoined characteristics are employed to describe any one of the
kinds in question. It is not enough to select traits which permit
inference within the limits of the specific kind directly involved.
The traits must be selected and ordered so that as far as possible
there will be a series of kinds each included in another until the
most inclusive kind is reached. Not only are barriers to special
inference broken down, but the extension of the range of inference
depends upon formation of kinds in systematic relation to one an-
other. Such systematization is one of the chief differences between
common sense and scientific kinds. It is this systematic serial re-
lationship which renders the category of membership or inclusion
applicable to included kinds and not to the case in which a singular
is simply identified and demarcated as one of a kind. The proposi-
tion of a relation of kinds thus provides the logical ground of the
singular proposition. For in the proposition of the form "This
is one of a kind," there is implicitly postulated that there are
other kinds related to the one specified. For characteristics which
suffice to ground the reference of this to a kind must be such as to
demarcate it from other kinds. The adequate grounding of such a
proposition demands, accordingly, that related but excluded kinds
be determinately established. This condition is satisfied when
(1) an inclusive kind is determined, and (2) when the differentia
are ascertained which exclusively mark out included kinds from
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 295
one another: — in other words, a set of conjoined affirmations-
negations. 4
Otherwise, the characteristics which are used to describe a kind
may be such as either to overlap (and thereby the reference of the
object or objects in question to another kind is possible) or else the
characteristics taken are insufficient to justify reference to the kind
specified: that is, they are too wide or too narrow. For ex-
ample, when bats were assigned to the kind, birds, and whales to
the kind, fishes, the characteristics of flying and swimming re-
spectively were both too broad (inclusive) and too narrow (ex-
clusive) to warrant the reference that was made. Only when
coordinate kinds are determined, together with their differentia,
and their subordination to (inclusion in) a more extensive kind,
are logical conditions satisfied, and only then can inference pro-
ceed warrantably in the case of singular propositions.
The consideration that propositions of one of a kind and of a
relation of kinds are related to inference is equivalent to surrender
of the old system of rigid taxonomy; i.e., "classificatory" systems.
As long as kinds were supposed to be ontological species marked
off in nature, rigid taxonomic classification was inevitable. The
substitution for such schemes of flexible relational kingdoms,
orders, families, species, varieties, etc., in zoology and biology, was
equivalent to determination of the relation of kinds on the ground
of relationship to regulated systematic inference. The immediate
effect of destruction of the idea of fixed natural species was, how-
ever, logically disintegrative. For it led to the idea, which still
obtains in traditional empiristic logical theory, that all division into
related kinds is merely a matter of practical convenience without
intrinsic logical meaning. However, the discovery of progressive
derivation, through differentiation under environing conditions,
from a common ancestor, institutes an objective basis. In com-
parison with the theory of fixed species it marks restoration of an
objective status of classification but upon a different basis. Ex-
ternally, the difference is marked by the substitution of belief in
"the origin of species" for the assumption of fixed natural kinds.
The logical equivalent of this change is a working postulate—
4 See Chap. X pp. 183-4, 197-8 and, below, the discussion of conjunctive-
disjunctive functions, Chap. XVIII.
296 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
viz., that the arrangement of singulars in the classes which
promote and control extensive inference, is that of genetic der-
ivation or descent, where differentiation into kinds is conjoined
with differentiations of environing conditions. On this basis,
reptiles, for example, are found to be more nearly akin to birds
than to toads and salamanders, with which they were originally
classified. This change to a genetic principle of classification is
identical, logically, with the shift from antecedents to consequences
as the ground upon which to institute the conjunction of character-
istics which describe kinds. It conforms to the emphasis placed
upon interaction of conditions.
At this point, it is well to revert to the basic difference between
generic propositions and universal propositions. It is not neces-
sary here to repeat in detail what has been said about the ambiguity
of "all" as sometimes having existential reference, in which case
it represents an inference having at best a high order of probability,
and sometimes having non-existential reference, when it stands for
a necessary relation which follows, by definition, from analysis of
a conception. 5 It is, however, in place to say something here
about the contrast of the present logical interpretation and the
traditional theory which holds that all propositions, except rela-
tional ones, are either classificatory or attributive, according as they
are taken, at will, in "extension" or "intension." The contrast goes
back to the fact that the position of the text affirms that all
existential propositions are concerned with determination of
changes; specifically of those changes which effect the transforma-
tion of an indeterminate unsettled situation into a determinate
unified existential situation. Initial particular propositions, as we
saw, are concerned with particular changes determined for the
purpose of locating the problem set by a doubtful situation. These
changes are linguistically expressed by verbs of action such as
tastes, touches, hears, breaks, hits, runs, loves, moves, grows, stays,
5 It would not, however, be hard to show that texts which recognize and
explicitly state this ambiguity nevertheless tend to carry over the kind of
generality marking the subject-matter of non-existential propositions to the
subject-matter of existential generalizations. In this case they treat the prob-
ability property of the latter as a failure in logical status, since genuine logical
form is defined on the basis of that necessity which is the property of rational
discourse or the inter-relations of conceptions. Induction then becomes a
logical scandal, since it is practically necessary and theoretically illegitimate.
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 297
etc., and then by adjectives which indicate the consequences of
the change effected by the action expressed by a true verb. In
the form in which a relation of kinds is determined, the changes in
question become modes of interaction. The traditional interpreta-
tion of the classificatory nature of propositions rests upon ignor-
ing connection with change. There is substituted for change a re-
lation designated by is in the sense of a logical (non-existential)
copula. "Jdm runs," (expressing change) then becomes "John is
a runner." "John runs," even when it takes the form "John is
running," refers to some definite time and place; "is" in "is run-
ning" is a verb of action having tense and spatial reference; he is
running now and here. "John is a runner," in the traditional
interpretation, subordinates the singular, John, to a kind. It would
hardly be a valid proposition unless John was by profession one
who engaged in the sport of racing or at least showed a disposition
to run on every suitable occasion.
Take again the proposition "John gives an apple to James."
He does it at a certain time and place. The proposition marks an
existential change then and there going on. The change may never
have taken place before and may never occur again. But the
proposition is often translated into the following: "John is a donor
of an apple to James." The change is not merely verbal. It marks
a shift in logical form. The relation of donor and donee is generic,
and hence free from limitation to a specified time and place. Taken
literally, the proposition in its translated form indicates that John
makes a business of giving apples to James or at least that he is
disposed to do so. Suppose, for example, we take the proposition
"John Smith made a will in favor of George Jones." This is an
act (change) which takes place at a given time and place. There
must be witnesses, observers, of its occurrence. The relation be-
tween testator and legatee is, however, generic. Statement of the
special act in terms of the relation brings the former within a
system of legally defined categories whose application determines
differential consequences. Apart from being one of the kind
which is determined by legal categories, the special act could not
be described as making a will. It would still be something which
occurred at a given time and place, but might not be differentiated
from scribbling one's name on a piece of paper.
298 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
In contrast with propositions just discussed, propositions affirm-
ing a relation of kinds such that one kind is included along with
others in an extensive kind are, truistically, "classificatory." But it
is a serious logical confusion to extend this classificatory character
to singular propositions in intension as well as extension, when,
truistically, they are supposed to be attributive. For logical con-
fusion of forms occurs when it is concluded from the attributive
character of the characteristics which determine a relation of kinds
that "sweet" in the proposition "This is sweet," is attributive. Sweet
is in no sense necessarily an attribute of "this." It may mark simply
a particular change that has occurred, is now occurring, or that
will occur at some particular time-place. So far, there is a restate-
ment in other language of a point already made. We come to an
additional point of logical importance when it is noted that the
interpretation of all propositions in terms of classification or at-
tribution (and of extension and intension) obscures their inter-
mediary and functional nature.
The proposition "Iron is a metal" certainly means that the kind
designated "iron" falls within the kind designated "metals." Or,
stated attributively, it certainly means that the interrelation of
characters by which being metallic is defined applies also to the
interrelation of characters by which being iron is defined. But in
whichever of the two ways the proposition is read, the proposi-
tion is instrumental to inference. And the sole logical ground for
discrimination of the logical form thus presented from that of
propositions such as "This is iron," resides in the kind of inference
promoted. When an artisan determines "This is iron" he can in-
fer what consequences will ensue if he treats it in a certain way:
for example, that if he heats it, it will become soft enough to work.
But the propositions "Iron is a metal" and "if anything is metallic
it is a chemical element" are, as pointed out, grounds for inference
of a different order.
4. Contingent Conditional Propositions. There is a type of
propositions which are linguistically hypothetical and which never-
theless refer to singulars. The proposition "If this drought con-
tinues the harvest will be very poor" and "If that is dropped, an
explosion will probably follow" refer to existential changes which
are taken to be involved with one another. The same thing holds
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 299
of such a proposition as "If the rain continues, the scheduled ball
game will be postponed." Such propositions exemplify a very
common type of proposition. They are marked by the words "If-
then." But, as was remarked in an earlier chapter, in such cases
there is postulated an existential connection between existential
conditions in which the terms "antecedent" and "consequent"
have literal or existential meaning. The drought, the bomb, are
now in existence; if something happens (designated by "continues"
and "dropped"), then certain physical results will follow in the
temporal sense of follow. The connection is contingent and the
propositions are of some order of probability. They are, more-
over, preparatory. They are of the nature of advice or warning
with respect to getting ready for future probable occurrences.
"Get ready for a shortage of grain"; "Don't drop that thing unless
you want an explosion to result"; "Don't take a trip to the ball
park until you are sure about the weather." They are marked
off from abstract universal hypotheticals in form, since they have
specific spatio-temporal reference.
Logically speaking, such propositions are means of determining
a problem. Take propositions of wider import, such as "If the
Phaedo is historical, Socrates believed in the immortality of the
soul," and "If the dialogue is dialectical, it does not necessarily fol-
low that Socrates personally was committed to that belief."
The propositions decide nothing. But they indicate a problem.
How far is Plato, in his dialogues in general and in this dialogue in
particular, purporting to recount actual conversations that took
place at definite dates and places? How far is he using the figure
of Socrates to develop certain conceptions of his own? The
propositions thus direct inquiry into channels where evidence for
the solution of this problem may, it is hoped, be found. Both
problem and solution, if the latter be found, are existential in
reference. 7
5. Matter-of-fact or Contingent Disjunctive Propositions. The
necessity for determination, through negation and exclusion, of the
6 The first of these propositions is taken from Joseph, An Introduction to
Logic, p. 185.
7 The difference in logical form from universal if-then propositions indicates
the necessity for differential symbols when formal symbols are employed. "If
A 9 then B" is wholly indeterminate in this respect.
300 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
characteristics that describe other kinds included along with the
given kind in question in an including kind, has been pointed out.
Observance of this condition generates existential disjunctive
propositions. That "Iron is a metal" is not a proposition grounded
simply by discovery that it possesses certain characteristics also
found in tin, copper, lead, mercury, zinc, etc., for it is not grounded
until the distinguishing characteristics which exclusively dif-
ferentiate iron as a kind from those that describe other metals
have been determined. Otherwise, iron might conceivably be an
alloy like brass or bronze, since without exclusive or negative
propositions not all the conditions are satisfied which are imposed
by the definition of being a metal; — for example, that of being a
chemical element. That a kind is ivarrantably included in another
kind is thus dependent in logical ideal upon the formation of a
set of exhaustive disjunctive propositions, such as "Metals are
either ... or ... or ... or .. , and these kinds are all the
kinds of metals there are."
The dots (. . .) in the last sentence are meant to suggest that
such disjunctive propositions are materially conditioned and hence
are contingent, since there can be no guarantee that the formal
condition of exhaustiveness is satisfied. The spectroscope has
widened the area of observation. But until everything in all
universes and galaxies has been analytically observed there is no
assurance that the list of metals is complete. And even if this
condition were fulfilled, it would still be a matter of fact, not of
theory, that the disjunction is exhaustive. Only on the ground of
theory which would prove that the existence of other metals is
logically impossible, because involving contradictions, would the
disjunctives be otherwise than contingent.
II. UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS
1. Hypothetical Propositions. The organic condition of predi-
cation is a mode of action, native or acquired, as in the case of a
habit. A mode of active response, when it is inhibited from overt
manifestation and expressed in a symbol, is a suggested meaning
presenting a possible way of solving a problem. It retains its
kinship with its organic source in standing for a way of active
response, a way of dealing with existing conditions. It passes from
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 301
the status of suggestion to that of idea (In its logical sense) only as
it is developed in relations to other symbols; that is, only as its
meaning is developed in relation with other meanings. The first
stage in this process is explicit formulation of the suggested mean-
ing: its conversion into a proposition. The propositional form ex-
pands the idea into a relation of meanings. This expansion is not
effected by conjoining or annexing an additional meaning to the
original suggestion while leaving the latter unchanged. It con-
sists of analysis of that which was first suggested. In an inde-
terminate situation, certain observed data suggest the presence of a
man at a distance who is beckoning. If some other meaning were
then merely added on, the effect would be that meanings would
be accepted as they occur. This is the road that leads to phantasy.
Inquiry or critical examination, such as is required to transform
what is suggested into a logical idea or a meaning, must of neces-
sity be applied to the constitution or structure of the suggested
meaning: such a statement is truistic. The inquiry resolves it into
related terms: // a man, then certain other things which are in-
herent constituents of being a man: that is, conversion of a con-
ception into a definition. 8
As soon as a meaning is treated as a meaning, it becomes a
member of a system of meanings. This statement is implied in the
remark of the previous paragraph that a meaning must be de-
veloped in relation with other meanings. This development con-
stitutes reasoning or rational discourse — where discourse is a matter
of sequential implications rather than communication of some-
thing already possessed. A universal proposition, in other words,
has meaning as a member of a system not in isolation. The rela-
tion of implication is an expression of this fact, so that the de-
velopment of an expanded meaning or hypothetic universal in
terms of implied propositions, is the determination of "what that
meaning is. The emergence of contradictions, as in reductio ad
absurdum, is proof that the original meaning was not what it was
8 Among other things, this formulation is a safeguard against a current notion
that the relation of antecedent and consequent is that of implication. Implication
holds between propositions, not between constituents. The necessary relation
obtaining between "antecedent" and "consequent" in the universal hypothetical
is an expression of the fact that there is but one and the same meaning involved,
the "antecedent" and "consequent" being taken to be its constituent parts.
If the "taking" is correct the relation is (truistically or tautologically) necessary.
302 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
taken to be. The logical difference between universal and par-
ticular propositions is sharply marked at this point. The latter
are determinations of the data that set the problem to be dealt with.
Different particulars, independent in their material content, are
connected with one another in that they all have the same func-
tion—that of logically determining a problem. In the earlier
illustration, the determination 'This is quartz" occurs through a
cumulative series of materially independent operations of observa-
tion such as "This has vitreous lustre; it scratches glass but it is not
scratched by a knife, etc." The force of these propositions is
cumulatively evidential only in the degree in which their contents
are materially independent, having no content in common with
one another save "this." Exactly the opposite is the case with
universal propositions. In the latter a break in community of
meaning is a break in rigor of reasoning.
It has previously been shown that universal propositions are
formulations of possible operations. As long as the operations are
not executed, the subject-matter of such propositions is therefore
abstract or non-existential. Take the proposition "Only if men
are free, are they justly blamed." Neither the existence of free-
dom nor of just blame is affirmed. While it may be said that the
existence of men is postulated, it is not implied nor is it expressly
affirmed. The relation affirmed between freedom and just blame,
if it is valid at all, will still be valid if all human beings are wiped
out of existence. Freedom, justice and blame designate abstract
characters. Nevertheless, the proposition formulates possible
operations which, if actually performed, are applied to the actual
conduct of men so as to direct observations into the conditions
and consequences of actual cases of blame. Apart from such ap-
plication, the proposition represents merely an abstract possibility
depending upon a definition of freedom and justice which, as far
as existence is concerned, might very well be arbitrary. The
proposition may hence be countered by the contrary proposi-
tions "Only if men's actions are causally conditioned, can blame
be effective, and only if it is effective is it justifiable."
Save as the two propositions are employed to direct operations of
inquiry to systematic observation of the facts of human conduct
(with respect to the conditions and consequences of blame) is
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 303
there any ground for deciding in favor of one of these abstract
possibilities rather than the other. Reasoning or dialectic (leaving
the subject of mathematics for later discussion) thus has ultimately
the function of directing operations of observation to the de-
termination of the existential data which test proposed possible so-
lutions, contrary propositions being (as we have seen) means of
delimiting the field of inquiry. 9
An even more crucial instance is provided by hypothetical
universals contrary to fact such as are constantly employed in
science, as for example the proposition "If bodies interact with-
out friction, then . . ." or "If a body moves upon impact of one
body only without being affected by other bodies, then. . . ." The
value of such propositions is proved by their constant use in scien-
tific calculations. Upon any other theory than that of the ultimate
connection of hypothetical universals with conduct of observa-
tional experimental operations in inquiry, the proved utility of
propositions contrary to fact presents an insoluble paradox. The
attempt has been made to resolve the paradox by saying that while
the propositions in question do not affirm anything of existence,
they "ascribe to reality a character which is the ground of the
connection stated in the hypothetical judgment." Regarding
this mode of interpretation, it has been pertinently asked "How
can there be the ground in the real universal of something which
nevertheless does not exist?" 10 The seeming paradox completely
disappears when it is seen that such propositions do not intend or
purport to have reference to existence but to be relevant to inquiry
into existence — a very different matter.
There is indeed something of the nature of contrary ~to-factness
in all definitions. For they are ideal as well as ideational. Like
ideals, they are not intended to be themselves realized but are
meant to direct our course to realization of potentialities in existent
9 The formation of alternatives which are contrary to one another, as in the
above instance, is required in order to conduct observations that yield negations
or eliminations, while if negative propositions are neglected the final proposition
is subject to the fallacy of affirming an antecedent because the consequent is
affirmed. Dialectical reasoning, provided it proceeds disjunctively, can and
should clarify the conceptions involved. But only systematic observation of
cases of blame can decide which of two contrary abstract propositions in the
disjunction can be converted into a valid proposition.
10 Joseph, Op. cit., p. 185.
304 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
conditions — potentialities which would escape notice were it not
for the guidance which an ideal, or a definition, provides. We
may not think the better of the mathematical circle because it
cannot be matched by figures that exist, nor worse of actual figures
because none of them possesses the roundness defined in the
mathematical conception. To sanctify the ideal and to disparage
the actual because it never copies the ideal, are two connected
ways of missing the point of the function of ideal and actual. A
vision is not a scene but it can enable us to construct scenes which
would not exist without it. To suppose that a vision is worthless
unless it can be directly determined to be a scene is for those who
take the idea seriously, the high road to pessimism, and for others
the road to fantasy. To ignore or depreciate the ideal because it
cannot be literally translated into existence is to acquiesce not only
to things "as they are" — as is sometimes said — but also to things
"as they are not" because all things that are have potentialities.
Without retraversing ground already gone over, it may be
pointed out that linguistic form, apart from content does not
determine whether a sentence is logically about existential relation-
ships or about abstract possibilities. Thus, "if grain is scarce, it
is dear," may mean that in all known cases there is a conjunction
of the characteristics of scant crops with high prices (both char-
acteristics referring to actual occurrences), or it may mean that
there is a necessary relation between the abstract characters
scarcity and clearness. The ease with which the two forms of
logical force are identified is explicable upon the basis of the con-
jugate relation or functional correspondence already mentioned.
Unless it can be shown as matter of theory that there is an inherent
relation between scarcity and dearness, the observed conjunction
between small crops of grain and high prices may be circumstantial
and coincidental. Stated from the other side, uniformity of an
observed conjunction instigates search for the reason of the con-
junction, which, when found, is stated in a proposition of relation-
ship of abstract characters, in this instance, scarcity and dearness.
The conjugate relation of universal and generic propositions thus
serves to explain an ambiguity in the meaning of empirical, and to
throw light upon the logical relation of the empirical and the
rational. In one sense, the more comprehensive one, empirical
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 305
is Identical with being proved (by means of controlled observa-
tional operations) to be existential. In this sense it is opposed to
the merely ideational and merely theoretical. In a more restricted
sense, empirical means that the subject-matter of a given proposi-
tion which has existential reference, represents merely a set of
uniform conjunctions of traits repeatedly observed to exist, with-
out an understanding of <why the conjunction occurs; without a
theory which states its rationale. In the latter sense only, is there
opposition between the empirical and the rational. When the
opposition exists, it sets a problem for further inquiry. It is a
sign that propositions already formed do not satisfy the conditions
which must be met in order to ground final judgment. Logical
theories which fail to note the relativity of propositions to the
given stage of inquiry attained, erect the distinction of empirical
and rational into a rigid difference in the ontological natures of
their respective subject-matters. The falsity of this interpreta-
tion is shown in the fact that observed uniformity of conjunction
of traits is in every scientific case a stimulus to the formation of
conceptions (expressed in hypothetical propositions) which indi-
cate a reason for the observed uniformity of conjunction. On
the other hand, the suggested reason is but an abstract possibility
until its formulation, through the intermediary of experimental
operations has produced existential consequences. These opera-
tions are conducted from a point of view different from those
which yielded the previously observed conjunctions, since they
are conducted to vary the conditions under which previous uni-
formities were observed. Hence, even when consequences reached
agree with the phenomena previously observed, the probability
that the conjunction is inherent and not merely circumstantial is
greatly increased, since the new consequences are produced under
conditions of conceptual experimental control. The clinching evi-
dence is provided to the degree in which, by elimination or pro-
duction of negative cases, other abstract possibilities are ruled
out. 11
2. Disjunctive Universal Propositions. Disjunctive form, in the
case of universal propositions, is not to be identified with disjunc-
11 It is hardly necessary to point out that there is an ambiguity in the words
rational and theoretical which is the counterpart of that attending empirical.
306 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
tion in the case of generic propositions. The propositions that
triangles are equilateral, scalene or right-angles is not of the same
form as the proposition that metals are either tin, zinc, iron,
mercury. . . . The difference is related with the ambiguity in
"included" and "including" which has already been noted. Singu-
lar items are comprised in a collection. Singular objects indefinite
in number, such that each and every one, having specified char-
acteristics is one of a class (in the botanical and zoological sense
of class) form or constitute the class of which they are of. To
say that they are contained or included in it is but a back-handed
way of saying they constitute it. They are certainly not contained
existentially as pennies are contained in a box or cows enclosed in
a field, nor are they contained as kinds are logically contained in
a more extensive kind. To affirm that Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt
is "included" in the class of Presidents of the United States is
only an awkward way of saying that he is one of the Presidents,
past, present, and future, who make up the collection. For
ultimately any class (as kind) is composed of an indefinite number
of singulars.
A kind is properly said to be contained in another wider kind
whenever the characteristics which describe the wider kind are
a conjoined part of the set of characteristics which describe every
included kind, and are also such as to enable, through a series of
negative and disjunctive propositions, all included species to be
exclusively demarcated from one another. The contrast with
inclusion of singulars in a collection is seen in the absurdity of
the notion that the conception of the "presidential" kind will en-
able different Presidents to be discriminated from one another.
The relation of kinds to an inclusive kind and of included kinds
to one another is suitably expressed by the traditional scheme of
circles, the relation of the including genus to other genera being
expressed by circles which lie entirely outside its boundaries. The
sense in which "inclusion" applies to definitions and conceptions
determines a different logical form. It cannot be symbolized by
circles but may be symbolized appropriately by brackets or
parentheses. Suppose it is a question of the definition of wealth in
political economy. What shall be "included" in the conception?
Shall wealth be defined in terms of utility as satisfaction of desire
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 307
or as forwarding of purpose; or as exemption from "labor" in
the sense of cost and sacrifice? Or, as power to command other
commodities and services? There is here no question of kinds.
But the conception or definition adopted will, when applied ex-
istentially, decide what things fall within and what without the
kinds of things that are wealth. Similarly, existential figures may
be classified as kinds of plane figures or of triangles. But, mathe-
matically, "triangle" means triangularity, an abstract universal or
category. As has been repeatedly stated, there are not three kinds
of triangles but three modes of being triangular. Hence in the
case of what is "included" in an idea or definition, any division
of being such-and-such, if it is valid at all, is necessarily exhaustive,
while in the case of kinds it is contingent. In the case of univer-
sal, to "include" means to be an integral part of an operative rule,
which when applied determines what falls within the domain of
operation. To exclude means to rule out, to debar; being a
principle for determining inadrnissability in the abstract. Ex-
haustiveness of disjunctions is, thus, a necessary character of ab-
stract propositions. They must form an interrelated system.
III. RELATIONAL PROPOSITIONS
Logical theorists who retain as much of the Aristotelian logic
as possible (although in a purely formalistic interpretation) criticise
that logic because it recognizes only the subject-predicate form.
They have shown the importance of relational propositions and
of a logic of relatives. Relational propositions, like if-then propo-
sitions are, however, of two forms that must be distinguished.
"This (town) is south of that"; "that table is farther away than
this stand"; "the book you want is to the right of where you
are looking," are relational. But they are singular and of ex-
istential reference. The word "is" in these propositions is the
temporal verb, not the non-temporal logical copula. The relation
is one of a spatio-temporal fact. Yesterday the table and stand
and the books in question may have been differently situated with
respect to that which is nearer or to the right of; they may be differ-
ently placed tomorrow. While the relative position of towns is
not so readily shifted, there is nothing logically necessary in their
present space-relationship. This principle holds of all singular
308 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
relational propositions. For example, in the proposition "George
is heavier (taller, darker, etc.) than James," heavier means weigh-
ing more; taller means subtending more space in a vertical direc-
tion. "Is" is not the logical copula for like all verbs of action it
expresses a mode of action or interaction at a given time, just as
north-south, right-left have to do with directions of movement.
Logically speaking, there is no difference between the form of
such propositions and the form of such propositions as "This is
(growing, becoming) warm, red, soft, bright." They are particu-
lar propositions.
In other words (and this is the important consideration), all
particular propositions are relational. They do not have a subject-
predicate form save grammatically. "This is red" means, when
it is analyzed from a logical point of view, that an object has
changed from what it was, or is now changing into something
else. It expresses a temporo-spatial connection as truly as do those
which are relational in obvious grammatical form. Propositions
of one of a kind are also relational. Their reference is not to a
particular change taking place, but (as was shown earlier) to dis-
positions or potentialities of change. "This is iron" means that
this, under specifiable conditions, will interact in certain ways and
produce certain consequences. Only grammatically is "this" a
subject and "iron" a predicate. Its relational character is seen
in the fact that what is expressed can be put in the passive voice
"Certain specified consequences will be produced by "this? under
certain conditions." The grammatical form can be changed with-
out changing the sense, just as "James strikes John" is completely
equivalent to "John is struck by James."
Propositions about a relation of kinds are also relational, having
no logical subject-predicate form. When it is said that "Iron is a
metal" the proposition does not appear to be relational because we
cannot convert it simply into "metal is iron." But the proposition
as it stands is not logically a complete proposition. It does not
indicate or even suggest its own grounds. At most it is either a
sentence communicating information or is a proposition prelimi-
nary to further inquiries. The complete proposition is "Iron is a
metal possessed of such-and-such differential characteristics." Any
metal having these specified properties is iron, so that the proposi-
GENERAL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS 309
tion is logically, not verbally, a proposition regarding a relation
of kinds.
The relational character of universal hypothetical propositions
is also obscured by the fact that as they are reached and formu-
lated they are often not completely determinate. In consequence,
affirming the "consequent" is not a ground for affirming the
"antecedent" nor denying the latter a ground for denying the
former. Obviously, certain conditions necessary for complete
logical reciprocity and equivalence are lacking. But this lack is
not due to the form of the universal hypothetical; it marks a failure
of its contents to satisfy logical conditions. The strictly formal
character of such propositions (that is, their complete satisfaction
of logical demands) is found when the proposition is so fully
grounded that "only" is a proper qualifier. When the proposition
is "Only if . . . then. . . ." the proposition is seen to be strictly
relational.
This part of the discussion may be concluded by reverting to
the distinction between contingent conditional and universal (nec-
essary) hypothetical propositions. Take the proposition "If A
is to the right of B and B to the right of C and C to the right
of D, then D is to the left of A." If A, B, C and D are singulars,
the proposition may be invalid. It is invalid, for example, if A,
B, C and D are persons or chairs placed around a table. If, how-
ever, the proposition is understood to mean "Given a straight
linear arrangement, then the relations are such that anything
symbolized by D is to the left of whatever is symbolized by A,"
the proposition is in effect a definition of a specified form of space
relationship and as such is necessary. A, B, C, D now stand not
for singulars but for abstract characters.
The special import for logical theory of the present chapter
is that the various forms of propositions discussed are shown to
mark stages of progress in the conduct of inquiry. Current theory
is given to taking the various forms of propositions as given ready-
made, so that all theory has to do is to fix the appropriate labels
310 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
on them; particular, general, hypothetical, etc. When they are
considered functionally, as they have been considered in this
chapter, (and throughout this work) it clearly appears that par-
ticular propositions function as instruments for determining the
problem involved in an indeterminate situation, while the other
forms listed represent stages in attainment of the logical means for
solution of the problem. Only if propositions are related to each
other as phases in the divisions of labor in the conduct of inquiry,
can they be members of a coherent logical system. When their
distinctive roles in the institution of final judgment is omitted
from theoretical interpretation, it just happens that there appear
to be a number of independent isolated propositional forms. A
final point is that while the findings of this chapter regarding the
relational character of all propositions were not developed in
order to support the doctrine that all propositional forms are
instrumental to judgment (which alone has subject-predicate
form), nevertheless the findings are just what would be anticipated
on the ground of the general theory advanced regarding proposi-
tions and judgment.
CHAPTER XVI
PROPOSITIONS ORDERED IN SETS AND SERIES
Inquiry is progressive and cumulative. Propositions are the
instruments by which provisional conclusions of preparatory
inquiries are summed up, recorded and retained for subse-
quent uses. In this way they function as effective means, material
and procedural, in the conduct of inquiry, till the latter institutes
subject-matter so unified in significance as to be warrantably
assemble. It follows (1) that there is no such thing as an isolated
proposition; or, positively stated, that propositions stand in ordered
relations to one another; and (2) that there are two main types
of such order, one referring to the factual or existential material
which determines the final subject of judgment, the other refer-
ring to the ideational material, the conceptual meanings, which
determine the predicate of final judgment. In the words of ordi-
nary use, there are the propositions having the relation which
constitutes inference, and the propositions having the serial rela-
tion which constitutes reasoning or discourse.
The following discussion is concerned, in respect to both types,
with the logical order of propositions rather than with the tem-
poral order of propositions in carrying on a given inquiry. In an
inquiry of any high degree of difficulty many propositions are
entertained during its course only to be discarded or modified in
subsequent inquiry. For they are not propositions which sub-
stantiate the final conclusion even though in a given investigation
an inquirer would not have reached that conclusion unless he
had at one time entertained them. The order with which we are
concerned is of the sort that can be instituted only after an inquirer
has reached a valid conclusion and surveys the grounds upon which
it is taken to be justified. The propositions in question are such,
in other words, as are usually termed premises of a conclusion,
311
3n PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
subject to the condition that there is no fixed limit to their number.
This negative proviso is made because the theory of the syllogism
reduces premises to two, called the major and minor. It will be
shown later that the conception of but two premises, one universal
and the other singular or generic, represents the logical structure
of judgment as a union (copulation) of propositions of predicate
and subject contents. The doctrine of a duality of premises thus
provides an analysis of the logical conditions to be satisfied by a
conclusion, rather than a statement of the premises upon which a
conclusion actually rests. There is, I repeat, no fixed limitation
upon the number of premises involved in substantiation of a con-
clusion.
1. Dyadic and Polyadic Propositions. If no proposition is a
proposition in isolation, it follows that the related terms of a given
proposition are ultimately determined by reference to the related
terms of other propositions. This consideration applies to the
number of terms in a given proposition as well as to its contents.
Recent logical theory has paid much attention to the number of
terms, distinguishing dyadic propositions, such as "Justice is a
virtue"; triadic propositions, such as "The point M is the middle
point between A and 5"; tetradic propositions, such as "European
nations owe the United States N dollars on account of war loans";
etc. Current theory, however, tends to take propositions as com-
plete in isolation; hence, the current classification is made on
linguistic rather than logical grounds. From a logical point of
view, there are but two divisions, dyadic and polyadic. Proposi-
tions of predicate contents, or universal propositions, have but two
terms, those of a definition and hypothesis. Propositions about
factual data which serve as subject-content of judgment are, on
the other hand, polyadic. Linguistically, there may be only two
terms. But logically any existence has to be determined with
respect to date and place. For example, "This is further away
than that," "James is taller than John," express a relation between
two-terms as far as words are concerned. But these propositions
are not necessarily valid but hold of conditions at a particular time
and locality. The first proposition, for example, obviously means
further away from the speaker, hearer, or some specified object,
thus involving a third term. Something of the same sort holds of
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 313
the proposition "A is the husband of B." A date is postulated if
not expressed, since "is" here has a temporal present tense, not an
intrinsic logical relation. Any proposition having direct existential
reference applies to conditions or circumstances. "This is red"
not always and necessarily, but under specifiable conditions.
"Socrates is mortal" is not two-termed, because it means Socrates
is (was) a human being living at some specific time and place,
who died under specific temporal-spatial circumstances. How-
ever, there is no need to multiply instances.
On the other hand, "Man is mortal," is strictly dyadic, when it
means "If anything is human, then it is mortal," for both terms
are abstract and the relation affirmed is of abstract nonexistential
character. The proposition states a relation between conceptual
contents. The Newtonian formula for gravitation is equally two-
termed, for it expresses a universal if-then relation between being
material and being reciprocally "attracted" in a specified way.
Regarding propositions of predicate contents, it is also needless to
multiply examples. For they are (1) independent of space-time
reference, and (2) state a necessary relation between antecedent
and consequent. No matter how linguistically complex the for-
mulation may be, no matter how many clauses and phrases are
involved, the clauses and phrases belong to one or another of the
two characters that are affirmed to be intrinsically related together.
A mathematical equation or statement of a mathematical function
may contain many symbols but they all fall on one side or the
other of the function which is formulated.
2. Equivalence of Propositions. So far the discussion has dealt
with logical properties belonging to both of the main types of
propositional forms. I come now to a character which belongs
only to propositions of conceptual or predicational contents, a
character which marks them off from matter-of-fact propositions.
When a problematic situation is present, some meaning is sug-
gested as a possible mode of solution. Unless this meaning is
formulated propositionally, it is at once accepted and inquiry
ceases. The conclusion reached is then premature and un-
grounded. But the meaning suggested is also a member of some
constellation of meanings. Hence, it is not enough to formulate
it in a separate proposition. The meaning has to be developed
314 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS ^
in terms of a set of other propositions which formulate other mean-
ings that are also members of the system to which it belongs.
In a word there is reasoning, argument, or ratiocination: Dis-
course. Furthermore, the development of related propositions in
discourse has direction. For it is regulated by the nature of the
problem in which a meaning is to function as a manner or method
of solution. Apart from reference to the use or application to
be made of the meaning, a given proposition can be related to
other propositions in the system of meanings to which it belongs
in an indefinite or indeterminate variety of ways. But in any
given discourse a meaning, propositionally formulated, is developed
in that specially related series of propositions which have direction
towards a proposition applicable in the stated conditions of the
special problem in hand. Direction is such an obvious property
of all reasoning and relevant discourse that it would be superfluous
to note explicitly its presence were it not for its bearing upon the
logical problem under discussion.
There are two logical conditions which ordered discourse must
satisfy. The order of propositions must be rigorous and produc-
tive — a proposition in which "and" has other than enumerative
force. The order must be productively rigorous and rigorously
productive. To say that the order must be rigorous is to say
that each proposition following from the initial one — "initial"
in a logical but not temporal sense — must be equivalent in logical
force to that which preceded it; otherwise it follows after but
not from. The phrase "in logical force" is emphasized because of
the equivocal meaning attaching to "tautology" in current logical
theory. The principle of equivalence is not identical with that
of tautology unless tautology is given a special meaning — a mean-
ing which does not preclude but rather satisfies the condition of
productivity. The conceptions or meanings found in subsequent
propositions in the order of rational discourse are identical with
those of antecedent propositions in operational force not in content
and hence lead rigorously to meanings having another content.
It is this difference of content that constitutes productivity in
reasoning. The principle of direction is applicable at this point.
What is demanded is a formulation of the meaning set forth in
abstract universal form in the initial proposition such that it
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 315
operatively leads to a proposition existentially applicable in a way
in which the content of the initial proposition was not applicable.
Satisfaction of the condition of rigor does not mean tautology in
the sense that the dyadic terms of the initial abstract universal
propositions are repeated in linguistic forms that are synonymous.
For example, in the proposition "An electric current is equal to
the potential difference divided by the resistance," the term poten-
tial divided by resistance does not have the same immediate denota-
tive or existential reference as "electric current." But the
equivalence of conceptual contents affirmed in the proposition
enables a subsequent proposition to be stated about something
which is in turn equivalent to "potential divided by resistance,"
and so on. The term current does not appear in the proposition
following it, and potential divided by resistance is replaced in the
proposition which follows it by a relation between it and some-
thing else which is its equivalent. And so on until a proposition
appears in a form operationally applicable in an experimental
situation which yields material indispensable to the solution of the
problem in hand, or at least to an improved statement of what
the problem is. The conceptions of currents, of differences in
the conductivity and resistance of metals, and of differences in
the strength of currents, are ideas that must have arisen at a com-
paratively early time. They certainly arose long before the law
mentioned above was arrived at. The statement of a determinate
ratio or relation between previously independent conceptions was
in effect a new way of conceiving all of them. It was, moreover,
a way of conceiving them which enabled generalized relations to
be followed out in a rigorous way. Equivalence is thus capacity
for substitution of meanings in the series of propositions which
constitute reasoning. There is, therefore, nothing miraculous in
the fact that "deduction" yields propositions having contents
which are other than that of those from which they were derived.
For the propositions employed in demonstrative discourse or de-
duction are themselves framed with express reference to per-
formance of this function. The trick of science, so to speak, does
not consist in its dialectic or reasoning aspect, though here, too,
sagacity is demanded save in all cases so familiar that calculation
becomes mechanical. The chief difficulty and the chief insight
316 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
in overcoming the difficulty consists in the formulation of related
meanings such that equivalent propositions are progressively and
productively (and yet rigorously) substitutable in development
of propositions in series.
The conjugate relation already noted between propositions of
abstract or ideational contents and of matter-of-fact propositions
arises from the fact that the subject-matter of a hypothesis is first
suggested by the original problem and is then tested and revised
on the ground of its consequences. The guiding criterion is the
power of these consequences to promote solution of the problem
in hand. The requirement set by continuity of inquiry is satisfied
to the degree in which the range of substitutibility is enlarged.
When equivalences are established only within a limited frame of
existential reference, say, of problems of heat, or of mechanical
changes (changes described in terms of motions spatially and
temporally formulated) in isolation from each other, the domain
of productive reasoning is in so far restricted, even though it is
much wider than that of common sense. When hypotheses are
formed so comprehensively in scope that they are applicable to
the facts of temperature, electricity, light and mechanical motion,
the degree of freedom enjoyed in the institution of equivalences,
and therefore in reasoning, is enormously increased. Special "sys-
tems" then become members of a comprehensive system. Because
of the conjugate relation of propositions of this form to matter-of-
fact observational propositions the range of inference is corre-
spondingly widened.
What has been said is directly applicable to the conception of
indemonstrable propositions as the original ground of all rational
demonstration. It is certainly true that in every instance of reason-
ing there is an initial proposition, not derived or "deduced" in
that particular discourse, since to say that it is initial is the same as
saying that it does not follow from predecessors. But (1) there
is nothing inconsistent in its being initial in that set of propositions
with its being a successor or final proposition in some other series.
The continuity of inquiry involves, on the contrary, that conclu-
sions in one problem or set of problems become starting points of
discourse in dealing with new problems. The very conception
of a system (alluded to in the previous paragraph) and of a system
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 317
of sub-systems means just this sort of prepared possibilities of
cross-reference, reciprocal borrowing and lending between differ-
ent instances of reasoning. (2) The initial proposition is a hypo-
thetical universal taken and used for the sake of what it will lead
to. It is tested and retested as a hypothesis by its productive
capacity in the institution of other universal propositions, while
it is finally tested by the existential consequences of its application
to matter-of-fact conditions. Its proof lies in these consequences,
as the proof of a pudding is in the eating. When propositions
are produced which contradict either an initial or a successor
proposition, a new problem is set. In such cases it is usually found
that the predecessor proposition in the series can be so modified as
to meet the requirements of rigor only by meanings arising from
new experimental operations.
It follows from what has been said that rigor-productivity are
logical conditions which universal propositions in series have to
satisfy; they are not, primarily, properties of any given series. They
are rather limiting ideals which state the intent of any proposition
of predicative content. They are not premises — save in logical
theory itself — but are leading principles. The deliberate attempt
to satisfy the formal conditions prescribed by rigor-productivity
in abstraction from material subject-matter constitutes mathemat-
ics. This statement does not mean there is some domain marked
off in advance to which mathematical propositions and reasoning
apply. The meaning is the contrary: the regulated attempt to
satisfy these conditions is mathematics. 1
3. Independence and Cumulative force in Alatter-of~Fact Prop-
ositions: Propositions which determine the subject-content of final
judgment are ordered by a different principle. One does not
follow from another in the sense of being implied, or directly
substitutable in logical force. On the contrary, the force of each
such proposition is measured, first, by its having an independent
subject-matter which is determined by an independent experi-
mental operation; and, secondly, by its conjunction with other
propositions about independent subject-matters by which cumu-
lative convergence may be reached. Existential propositions are
1 There is much in common between the account of the text and James 7
exposition of skipped intermediaries. See his Psychology, Vol. II, 645-51.
318 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS _^
ordered because they are controlled by reference to the same
problematic situation, and in so far as they promote its resolution,
However, they do not form a series, but a set. In reasoning, serial
propositions may be likened to the arrangement of the rungs of a
ladder. Propositions about factual data, which serve to provide
the evidence which grounds inference, are more like lines that
intersect one another and which, in intersecting, describe a con-
figurate area. In series of the ladder type sequential order is
essential. With respect to propositions which determine evidential
properties, ordinal position is not important. The logical order
of the series (as distinct from the historical order of operations
by which relevant and weighty data are secured) is constituted by
the relations of inclusion (affirmation) and exclusion (negation,
elimination) which define comparison. Operations of experimental
observation (1) narrow the field of relevant evidential material
and (2) effect intersections that converge towards a unified signify-
ing force and hence to a unified conclusion.
For example, a physician in his diagnosis executes independent
operations which yield a variety of independent data, regarding
temperature, heart-beat, respiration, kidney excretions, state of the
blood, metabolism, history of patient, perhaps his heredity, etc.
These independent explorations are carried on as long as the
significance of the data obtained by them remains obscure — that
is, as long as they cumulatively fail to point in a determinate
direction. What is usually called correlation of data is a matter
of convergence in significance, of cumulative evidential force.
Taken separately, such propositions have indicative force as to
the nature of the problem and its possible solution. As they con-
verge, they have probative force. Indicative force, when it is
determined by elimination of alternative possible modes of solution,
becomes signifying force. The conjugate connection of factual
and conceptual propositions has the effect of enabling the con-
ceptions already in hand (a matter depending upon the state of
theory and the systematization of conceptions at the time), to
determine the operations by means of which new, independent
explorations are made and their results interpreted.
It is a familiar logical principle that affirmation of the consequent
does not warrant complete affirmation of the antecedent. Denial of
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 319
the consequent grounds, however, denial of the antecedent. When,
therefore, operations yield data which contradict a deduced con-
sequence, elimination of one alternative possibility is effected.
Recurrent agreement of the indicative force of data, provided they
are secured by independent experimental operations, gives cumula-
tive weight to the affirmation of an antecedent whenever we can
affirm the consequent. The affirmation of any given hypothesis
proceeds in this way. But the possibility of the fallacy of affirm-
ing the antecedent still remains. Elimination of other possibilities
progressively reduces the likelihood of fallacious inference. But
there is never assurance that all alternative possibilities have been
exhausted, because there is no assurance that the disjunction of
alternatives is exhaustive. Hence probability is the mark of every
proposition effected by inference from the set of matter-of-fact
propositions, just as necessity — or rigor — is the mark of the non-
existential proposition instituted through demonstrative discourse.
Hence, exhaustiveness is not a property of any actual disjunctive
set, but is a logical condition to be satisfied.
Comparison, as we saw, is a mode of measurement. It is deter-
minate in the degree that measurement results in numerical state-
ments. Measurement is possible because observed phenomena are
enduring and extensive. The techniques of measurement translate
endurance and spread, which are purely qualitative in immediate
experience, into spatial-temporal relations, numerically formulated.
It is of course a basic property of numbers that relations of equiva-
lence can be instituted between them. In the actual practice of
science, it is the agreement of numerical measurements of observed
phenomena with those theoretically deduced from a hypothetical
proposition which has the maximum of probative force. Qualita-
tive endurances and extensive spreads run into one another. The
existential conditions of any existence are indefinitely circum-
stantial. Otherwise stated, there can be no absolute guarantee
that the selection of the phenomena which are numerically deter-
mined effects only those discriminations that are necessary to
yield probative data. Hence precision of measurement and agree-
ment of its results with deduced conclusions, is, as far as final
evidential significance is concerned, subject to a condition which
cannot be completely or absolutely controlled: namely, the validity
320 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
of the original selective discrimination of the subject-matter of
observation. 2
Even were it possible to find a piece of gold that is pure gold,
that is gold and nothing but gold, it could not be completely
isolated from interactive connection with an indefinite variety of
circumstantial conditions. A high degree of control of conditions
is effected by the scientific techniques now available. But there al-
ways remains the theoretical possibility that some conditions which
affect the observed phenomenon have not been brought under con-
trol. The postulate of a closed existential system is thus a limiting
ideal for experimental inquiry. It is a logical ideal which points the
direction in which inquiry must move but which cannot be com-
pletely attained. Hence, the statistical character of all factual
generalizations is not a matter of defective techniques (although
defective technique represents a failure to observe the conditions
imposed by the logical condition to be satisfied), but is a matter
of the intrinsic nature of the existential material dealt with.
The assumption that qualities literally recur (or are universals)
is a fallacy (as was earlier noted) arising from confusing the con-
stancy of evidential function — a product of continued inquiry —
with immediate existential qualities. No quality as such occurs
twice. What recurs is the constancy of the evidential force of
existences which, as occurrences, are unique. When it is held
that there is strict or implicatory necessity in the series of proposi-
tions "John is taller than James, James than William, and, there-
fore, John is taller than William"; it is overlooked that tall is a
quality subject to change, by change in conditions. Practically
speaking, no one would doubt that in some cases the conclusion
is valid. But if we take the case of three things of approximately
the same length, it is obvious that during the operation of measure-
ment one of them may change its quality of length in spite of
all efforts to maintain constant conditions. Hence, in theory the
inference is of a certain order of probability, not necessary. The
proposition "If A is longer than B, and if B is longer than C, then
A is longer than C" is necessary when and since its contents are
2 This fact agrees with the indefinitely extensive character of the perceptual
field, and is in so far a confirmation of what was said earlier. See, ante, pp.
66-7.
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 321
abstract, not when A, B and C are singulars. The proposition
is necessary as a definition. But that John, James and William
as existences actually satisfy the conditions imposed by the defi-
nition does not follow from the definition. The conception
that propositions about the existences in question, have the im-
plicatory "transitivity" characteristic of the terms of the univer-
sal proposition is a fallacy depending upon doctrinal confusion of
the logical properties of non-existential and existential propositions.
It requires independent experimental operations to determine
whether connections between existences satisfy the conditions laid
down in a universal hypothetical proposition. In some cases, there
is, as was just said, no practical difficulty in the way of perform-
ing the required operations. But the validity of the resulting con-
clusion rests wholly upon involvements among observed facts, not
upon a necessary implicatory relation. The latter prescribes the
operation to be performed, but is not identical with the circum-
stantial connection of existences with one another.
4. Transposition of Terms. Every logical text states the rules
according to which the terms of a proposition may be transposed
without affecting the logical force of a proposition. When a
sentence is taken in isolation and not as a member of a serial ar-
rangement in reasoning or inference such changes are merely
grammatical. But every proposition in the logical sense of the
term is a member of an ordered set or series of propositions.
Every such set and series is framed w T ith reference to the function
to be served by either its final member or by cumulative con-
vergence in effecting final judgment. Certain arrangements of
terms within a. proposition are more effective than are other ar-
rangements in carrying forward the needed progression to a termi-
nal proposition or else in giving it the form that best indicates its
force in the set of independent propositions. This accounts for
the logical importance of the changes in position called conver-
sion, obversion, obverted converse, inversion, contraposition and
obverted converse. It follows that no initial existential proposition
can be converted simply. No one would suppose that the logical
force of "All crows are black" is identical with that of "Any
black thing is a crow." The legitimate transposition is "A black
thing may be a crow." Stated in this form, the proposition has a
322 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
new functional force. It indicates an investigation to be under-
taken with a view to finding out whether black in this case is 0r
is not conjoined with other traits which describe the kind crom,
Blackness is in some actual cases a suggestion worth developing!
Such propositions as "Iron is a metal" are ambiguous apart from
context. The more obvious interpretation is that it refers to
a relation of kinds. It might, however, mean that "If anything
has the characters which define being iron, then it has the char-
acters which define being metallic." In the latter interpretation
it is, as we have said, universal In either case, convertibility de-
pends upon the completeness of terms related in the proposition in
question. As the proposition cited stands, the term metal is wider
than the term iron, so that simple conversion is not possible. Con-
version would then again give the transposed form the force of
may, and so be a step in further observational investigations. But
if the relations of sub-kinds with the kind metal have their differ-
ential traits already determined, as of iron with respect to tin,
zinc, copper, etc., then the proposition is convertible simply,
though with an order of probability dependent upon the exhaus-
tiveness of the disjunction involved. That is, "metal" limited by
specified differential traits is iron just as iron is a metal. 3
The exact relation of what is called immediate inference to trans-
position of terms is a somewhat ambiguous matter. In some cases
they are synonymous. Such is not the case in immediate inference
by added determinants and by subimplication. In any significant
instances of the two latter processes, inference is not, however,
immediate. The ordinary textbook illustrations of "added deter-
minants" are trivial because their subject-matter is familiar and
standardized. The significant cases are those in which determi-
nants are added because a proposition as it stands is too broad (or
too general in the sense in which general means vague). In this
case, an independent proposition or propositions is (are) required
in order to determine whether the limiting determinant has an
equivalent force when applied to both terms of the vague propo-
sition. In such cases there is mediation. An example of sub-
implication is the following: "The sum of three angles of a
Euclidean triangle is two right angles." Hence "The sum of the
3 CF. ante, pp. 308-9.
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 323
three angles of a scalene triangle is two right angles." Here the
second form does follow by implication; it is called ^implication
simply because the particular inquiry in hand happens to call for
a specific limitation or narrowing in the movement toward a
terminal proposition. When however, logical texts state that the
relation of a verifying case, expressed in an existential proposition,
to a universal proposition (theoretical law or hypothetical for-
mula) is that of subimplication, there is a plain fallacy involved.
No non-existential proposition implies an existential one.
5. The Syllogism. A syllogism is an analysis of final judgment
into its logically constituent propositional conditions. As has been
pointed out, these logical constituents are (1) a proposition re-
garding matters-of-fact and, (2) a proposition regarding a relation
of abstract characters, or conceptual contents. The formulation
of the matter-of-fact ground constitutes the minor premise; that
of ideational and hypothetic content constitutes the major prem-
ise. The syllogism is thus a generalized formula for logical
conditions that must be satisfied if final judgment is to be grounded.
It is, so to speak, a warning that in order to warrant a final judg-
ment a conjugate connection between observed data and a con-
ception, defined in a universal if-then form, must be instituted.
Supposing the conclusion has been reached that a bat is a bird —
the explicit minor would be "The bat has wings." In order to
ground the conclusion "A bat is a bird" it would be necessary to
lay down a general proposition to the effect that "all winged
creatures are avian" where all has the force of a relation of char-
acters. To warrant the conclusion completely, it would be neces-
sary to establish the proposition "Birds and only birds are winged."
Statement of the predicate-content in a proposition as a major
premise is a necessary check upon drawing a conclusion. It func-
tions as a directive for observational inquiries whose consequences
tend in the direction of an inclusive-exclusive proposition.
The above account does not agree with the traditional theory.
For the latter theory identifies, as a rule, the syllogistic with the
ratiocinative or deductive form. It thus (1) leaves no room for
an existential proposition and (2) makes a fetich of the idea that
there can be only two "premises" in a ratiocinative series, an idea
negated by every form of mathematical reasoning. The idea that
324 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
a minor existential proposition can be deduced from a universal
proposition represents a confusion which has been repeatedly com-
mented upon. No matter whether the minor proposition is singu-
lar (one of a kind) or is generic (a relation of kinds), it has to be
instituted by independent operations of experimental observation.
When the syllogism is of the A A A form, the proposition which
is the minor premise is a generic but not a universal proposition
since it is existential in reference. In any actual case it is therefore
of a certain order of probability,. i.e., an / proposition. This fact
shows that the syllogism of the form of Barbara cannot, when the
minor premise has existential reference, be regarded as setting
forth properties possessed by any actual inference. When treated,
however, as a formula setting forth the logical conditions to be
ideally satisfied by an inferential conclusion, the case is different.
The general character of the minor proposition is then a way
of stating that, ideally, or in strict theory, there should be a strictly
conjugate relationship between the definition set forth in the
major and the matters-of-fact constituting the minor premise.
The syllogism, thus construed, means that a conclusion is logically
warranted, and is only so warranted, when the operations involved
in discourse and in experimental observation of existences, con-
verge to yield a completely resolved determinate situation.
Such an interpretation gives the syllogism logical importance
and indispensability. It involves, however, a marked revision of
the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. For in Aristotle's logic,
the major premise, or definition, was the statement of an essence
which ontologically determines a species, while the minor premise
affirmed that some species fell existentially within that wider
species — or else was an actualization of the logical potentiality
represented by a genus. Here, as in other cases previously men-
tioned, the bare form has been retained in traditional logic after
its ontological ground (of fixed species and essences) has been
repudiated. Hence it was exposed to Mill's criticism. However,
Mill retained the logical error of the traditional theory although
in a reversed direction. The traditional theory holds that major
and minor are of the same logical form, failing to recognize that
one is non-existential and the other existential; and that, therefore,
they have to be instituted by operations which are as different as
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 325
are observation and rational discourse. Mill's theory makes the
same error, save that now both major and minor are treated as
existential, so that instead of assimilating the form of the minor
to that of the major (as the traditional theory does), Mill assimi-
lated the form of the major to that of the minor. That is to say,
Mill holds that the major or general proposition is a summary
memorandum of an indefinite number of particular existential
propositions.
It is not correct to say, as is sometimes done, that Mill held that
the syllogism involves a petitio principiL What he affirmed was
that if the major be taken to prove the conclusion, then the con-
clusion of the syllogism begs the question, since in that case the
latter is already included in the major premise. He says the major
provides the formula "according to which but not by which the
conclusion is drawn." It is, he says, "an assertion of the existence
of evidence sufficient to prove any conclusion of a given descrip-
tion." 4 Proof on this view is provided exclusively by the various
particular observed cases which the general or major premise sums
up. Not an iota to probative force is added, he says, by the gen-
eral as such. That he assimilates the form of the major to that
of the minor is not only involved in his whole treatment but is
explicitly affirmed, as when he says "the mortality of John,
Thomas, and others, is, after all, the whole evidence we have for
the mortality of the Duke of Wellington" — or any other person
who has not as yet died. 5
Mill's interpretation would be sound if evidential force were a
matter of ^//-evidence; that is, if no principle or universal were
required to decide what is evidence and what is not and how
weighty and relevant are specific data in any given case. As it is,
he begs the question by assuming that particulars as such are al-
ready equipped with adequate evidential capacity. In the language
we have already used, particulars suggest a certain idea (which is
general) but they do not validly signify, much less prove it. The
whole problem of inquiry, upon the observational side, is to de-
termine what observed conditions are evidential data or are "the
facts of the case." What has already been determined to be evi-
* Logic, Book II, Chap. 3, Sec. IV and Sec. VI.
*Md. } Sec. in.
326 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
dence has probative force; that statement is a mere truism, since
evidence and probative force are synonyms. What Mill fails
to see is that observations, in order to yield evidential material,
have to be directed by ideas and that these ideas have to be made
explicit — formulated in propositions, and that these propositions
are of the if-then universal form. What Mill has in mind by "suf-
ficiency" of evidence is simply the number of particulars at hand,
not the principle by which the evidential force of any particular
is determined.
Mill's sense for fact leads him, however, into a deviation from—
indeed, into a contradiction of — his official doctrine. This devia-
tion approximates, if it is not identical with, the interpretation of
the syllogistic form which has been given. The official doctrine
is that the general proposition is "an aggregate of particular
truths." But he also states that "Truth can only be successfully
pursued by drawing inferences from experiences which, if 'war-
rantable at all, admit of being generalized, and which, to test their
tuarrantableness, require to be exhibited in generalized form." 6
Again, instead of treating the general proposition as a bundle of
particulars as particulars, he says at times that it states the "co-
existence of attributes" — that is of characters, and expressly adds
that "coexistence" is not to be understood in a temporal sense but
in the sense of the property "of both being jointly attributes." 7
Mill also states that the general or major is reached by induc-
tion, and while his theory of induction is confused, it assuredly
involves operations of analyzing the material of gross observations
together with operations of elimination, and of determination of
agreement in evidential function, while he is obliged to admit the
importance of hypotheses although he gives them only a "sub-
sidiary" place.
Traditional theory affords another instance of the ambiguity
of ally since it rests upon taking all in both an existential and non-
existential sense. Supposing it is said "All whales are mammals:
all mammals are warm-blooded, therefore all whales are warm-
blooded " If the example is an exemplification of analysis of a
logically grounded judgment, then the major is an if-then uni-
*Ibid. 9 Sec. IX; italics not in original text.
1 Ibid., Sec. IV, and footnote.
SERIES AND SETS OF PROPOSITIONS 327
versal proposition, affirming that there is a necessary relation be-
tween being mammalian and being cetacean such that a negation
of the relation involves contradiction. The proposition, if valid
at all, is valid even if whales have ceased to exist. As an opera-
tional proposition, it directs observation to ascertain whether in
the case of existential singulars the traits of suckling young, pro-
ducing them alive, etc., are found in conjunction with one another.
On the other hand, all in the proposition "All whales are mam-
mals" may mean that so far as singular whales have been observed,
they have been found to be, without exception, mammalian. This
proposition means "Whales may be mammals" and indicates that
possibility so strongly as to instigate search for the reason why the
traits are conjoined — that is, it instigates search for a relation of
characters which will institute an if-then proposition. Until some
reason is instituted capable of this formulation final judgment is
not reached. Inquiry is still in the propositional stage in which
singulars are observed and hypotheses are formed and tried out.
Upon examination it will be found that the difficulties which
have been alleged to inhere in the syllogistic form arise from
identifying it with properties possessed by reasoning or of infer-
ence taken in separation from each other. They vanish when it
is seen that it does not purport to be the form of either inference
or rational discourse. It is the form of the conjugate connection
of the factual and conceptual subject-matters of judgment, stated
in such a way as to indicate the conceptual and observational con-
ditions to be fulfilled if judgment is to be adequately grounded.
Interpreted in this way, the "utility" of the syllogistic form
resides in the fact that it serves as a check in the case of specific
judgments, holding up the logical conditions that are to be satisfied.
It represents a limiting ideal Even though no actual judgment
really satisfies the ideal conditions, a perception of failure to do so
occasions and directs further inquiry upon both the observational
and the conceptual sides. It promotes and supports the continuum
of inquiry.
CHAPTER XVII
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS
A ccording to the doctrine developed in previous chapters,
/_\ every term (meaning) is what it is in virtue of its mem-
A )V bership in a proposition (its relation to another term),
and every proposition in turn is what it is in virtue of its member-
ship in either the set of ordered propositions that ground inference
or in the series of propositions that constitute discourse. It fol-
lows from this position that the logical content and force of
terms and propositions are ultimately determined by their place
in the set of propositions found in either inference or discourse.
Order is thus the fundamental logical category with respect to
determination of the meaning of terms, directly in propositions and
indirectly in sets and series of propositions.
I. FORMAL RELATIONS OF TERMS
The fundamental rules of logical ordering of terms are known,
technically, as transitivity, symmetry and correlation, while con-
nexity is an important instance of their conjunction. Failure of
terms to satisfy required logical conditions of order constitutes
them intransitive and asymmetrical, while non-transitive and non-
symmetrical characterize terms in their status as still indeterminate
and problematic. The statement as respects intransitivity and
asymmetry will be justified in later discussion. But it holds
truistically in the case of 72072-transitivity and non-symmetry,, since
these relations by definition are of terms which may be either of
one type or the other and hence are ambiguous in logical form.
The list, just given, of different types of relations sustained by
terms to other terms, is one found in all modern logical treatises.
The usual doctrinal interpretation is, however, quite different
from that here given. For in current treatment, it is assumed that
328
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 329
terms sustain these relations in and of themselves by the inherent
nature of their own content. If this assumption is not always
explicitly stated, it is implicit in failure to interpret terms on the
ground of their functional force in satisfaction of the logical con-
ditions of order that are imposed by the demands of valid infer-
ence and discourse. Stated positively, the doctrinal position
expounded demands that formal relations of terms be interpreted
as conditions which terms must satisfy in any inquiry that yields
warranted conclusions, not as their inherent possession.
The reason why the relations that have been mentioned are
usually illustrated by isolated terms is not far to seek. Many
terms have been so standardized in the course of prior inquiries
that their relational meaning can now be taken for granted and
treated as if it belonged to them apart from their status and force
in the conduct of continuous inquiry. This is strikingly true in
the case of mathematical terms. It is also true in the case of such
terms as father of, wife of, spouse of, etc. For their meaning is
now settled by their place in some (contextual) ordered system
of conceptions, which is so familiar that it is first taken for granted
and then so completely ignored as to be virtually denied. There
are said to be Australian tribes that do not have the conception
of begetting, and in which therefore the conception "father of"
can hardly be said to exist. There are many tribes in which
"father of" expresses the relation called in our system "uncle of."
Such facts indicate the relativity of these relative terms to a system
of related meanings, biological or legal or both.
Before dealing severally with the different forms of relation,
it is advisable, in the interest of avoiding doctrinal confusion, to
recur to the basic logical distinction between terms having re-
spectively existential and non-existential import. For relation and
related are highly equivocal terms. There are terms that are
relative but whose meaning is not exhausted in the relation speci-
fied. "Father of" is clearly a relative term; its meaning depends
upon connection with another term, "offspring of." The same
thing is true of terms like short, small, rich, near, next, between,
etc. Indeed, it is true of all existential terms that have been pre-
pared so as to function in inferential operations. But the singular
who is father of has traits in excess of being a father; traits, more-
330 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
over, that must exist independently of and antecedent to the "rela-
tion" in question. Any one who is of the kind "fathers" must, for
example, possess the independent characteristics of being an ani-
mal, a male, having sexual potency, ttc. Similarly, that which is
short, small, near, etc., has an existence independent of the content
expressed in these relative terms. Abstract terms, however, like
fatherhood, length, magnitude, nearness, nextness, are exhaustively
and exclusively relational. This exhaustiveness is what constitutes
them abstract and universal terms. The same thing holds of words
that are pure connectives, like conjunctions, prepositions, and in
general, what Chinese grammarians have aptly called "empty
words." It holds strikingly of all mathematical terms as such.
In order to avoid the latent confusion present in the words "rela-
tive" and "related," the words "relatives" will here be reserved
for existential terms that have a multitude of connections with a
multitude of things other than that specified in the given related
term — as a father is also, say, a citizen, a Republican, a Methodist,
a farmer, etc., all of these words expressing relations which are
logically independent of the relation designated by "father." The
term "relational" on the other hand, will be used to designate
abstract terms whose meaning is exhaustively contained in the
terms. 1
1. Transitivity and Intransitivity. In order that inference may
be grounded from one set of traits to another or from one kind
to another, and in order that propositions may be so ordered in
discourse that subsequent ones follow necessarily from antecedent
ones, the terms involved must be ordered in that relation to one
another known as transitivity. Take such terms as "older than"
(greater, brighter, etc.), or any property expressed linguistically
by a comparative word. If A is more (or less) in any designated
trait than B, and B sustains this same relation to C, and C to D, and
so on, then A sustains it to the last term in the series, whatever that
may be. The terms satisfy the condition of transitivity. Inter-
mediaries may be skipped whenever terms have been constituted
to satisfy this form of order* The relation is found also in terms
that have to one another the serial order designated by after or
before, in both the spatial and temporal sense of these words.
1 The distinction is identical with that between involvement and implication.
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND C AXONS 331
The importance of serial orders prepared in advance in the case of
relations designated by comparative terms and terms expressing
spatial and temporal contiguities, together with the need of a
principle that functions as a method or rule of so determining
them, may be illustrated as follows: It would be theoretically
possible to pick out members of a random crowd so as to rank
them in the order of age from the oldest to the youngest. The
transitive function expressed in "older than" would then be satis-
fied. But nothing would come of it. Nothing could be inferred
as to any other traits of the singulars thus ordered. In similar
fashion, take a row of books placed haphazardly on a shelf. Each
book, after the first one, is "after" the one before so that the last
book on the shelf is after every other one. Nothing, how r ever,
follows. When, on the other hand, singular persons insured in a
life insurance company are arranged by yearly intervals in the
order of older than, something does follow. There is inference to
probable risks assumed, and hence to the amount of premiums to
be paid by those occupying different positions in the series.
Take the case of after in its temporal sense. As I write, the
sound of a motor car comes after the sound made by a typewriter
key, and the sound of rustling leaves after that, and then the sound
of a voice. Hence the last sound comes "after" that of the type-
writer. The logical import of transitivity is obviously not satis-
fied by such a succession. It is artificial and trivial. One of the
most pressing problems of scientific inquiry is to distinguish cases
in which there is mere succession from those in which there is
sequence. Repeated observation may determine an order of suc-
cessions but an inference based upon it will be a case of the fallacy
of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, unless some principle, stated in a
universal proposition, gives, as it is operatively applied, a reason for
the order. Such illustrations provide convincing evidence of the
logical necessity for interpreting the relation of transitivity as a
condition to be satisfied in the continuum of inquiry instead of
being a relational property that just happens to belong to some
terms.
The relation of transitivity is also exemplified in terms denoting
kinds when, and only when, an extensive or inclusive kind has
been determined with respect to included kinds in an order of
332 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
progression. To take a simple example: When whales have been
determined to be mammals and mammals to be vertebrates, there
is warranted transitivity from whales to vertebrates. This
transition is logically possible only when the set of conjoiried
characteristics that describe each kind has been previously in-
clusively-exclusively determined by the functions of affirmation-
negation. Scientific natural inquiry is notoriously concerned to
establish related kinds. This concern is not final, its purpose being
to institute terms that satisfy the condition of transitivity, so that
systematic inference is promoted and controlled.
So far, we have been concerned with transitivity as it affects
terms, singular or generic, having existential reference. But the
discussion has also shown that only terms that are serially ordered
by means of a general principle can actually possess the relation
in question. This principle is a rule for ordering, and is expressed
in a universal proposition. This universal proposition must itself
be in turn a member of a series of propositions in ordered dis-
course. Mathematical terms are typical examples of non-existential
terms instituted so as to warrant transitivity in discourse. They
are strictly relational, not merely relative. The abstract relational
terms -fatherhood, sonship, unclehood, nephewship, etc., in their
distinction from the relatives "father-son, uncle-nephew," desig-
nate relationships which are independent of related existences.
One cannot infer from the related term father the related terms
grandson or nephew. The offspring in question may not them-
selves have offspring, and the fathers in question may not have
brothers or sisters; and if they have, the persons in question may
not have sons. The relations are intransitive. But paternity,
grandfathership, brotherhood, uncleship, cousinship, etc., consti-
tute a system of relationships such that each is transitively related
to every other.
The nature of intransitivity is illustrated in the previous para-
graph. Terms exemplifying this relation constitute as they stand
the conditions of a problem. They suggest or indicate the need
of operations which will transform them into terms that satisfy
the requirement of transitivity. They indicate, on one side, the
incompleteness of inquiry in a given case, and, on the other side,
the operations by which the terms in question may be so ordered
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 333
that their meanings will be such as to fall into a determinate
order. All terms designating particular acts and changes are logi-
cally intransitive. Take for example, the meanings of A and B as
related in the proposition CC A killed B " where "killed" stands for
an act performed by a singular at a particular place and time which
effects a change in something else. Every particular proposition
(in the logical sense of "particular") is of this sort. Every such
proposition expresses a problem or a special condition in the de-
termination of a problem. 2
Hence, such terms are intransitive not because of some pecu-
liarity they possess in and of themselves, but precisely because as
they stand they are not ordered with reference to determination
of a spatial or temporal relation, or a relation of kinds, such that
inference is warranted. When the act of killing is determined in
connection with a graded series of kinds, as it is in a legal system,
to be a case of accident, self-defense, or murder in a definite degree,
it then acquires a meaning satisfying the condition of transitivity.
Grounded inference is then possible to other previously unob-
served traits, and to specified existential consequences. This trans-
formation is effected, as has been previously shown, by ascertaining
traits which are consequences of modes of interaction and employ-
ing them, instead of immediate qualities, as the ground of infer-
ence. For a mode of interaction is general, while a change is not.
Hence the latter provides no ground for transition, while a kind
of change which is a specified mode of a more extensive mode of
interaction has the ordered relation necessary for transitivity. The
equivalent of this condition in scientific inquiry is the requirement
that every given change be determined to be a constituent of a
definite set of correlated changes.
2. Symmetry and Asymmetry . Terms are relative to each other
in the sense of symmetry when each one of the related pair bears
the same relation to the other. "Partners," for example, is a sym-
metrical relation. If A is a partner of B, then B is a partner of A.
"Spouse" is a term applied to objects each of which is symmetri-
cally relative to the other. In other pairs, there exists the relation of
converse symmetry. The relation of "husband-wife" is itself asym-
metrical but the terms have the relation of converse symmetry.
2 See, ante, pp. 201, 220.
334 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
"Testator-heir" are terms that sustain this relation to each other.
The relation of converse symmetry exists in all cases of particular
acts and changes, as in the examples of intransitivity given above.
The relation is expressed grammatically by the active and passive
voices of the verb. If A kills B, then B is killed by A. The same
relation holds in the cases of action and of being acted toward
(though not upon) linguistically expressed by intransitive verbs.
The logical import of the relation of symmetry is constituted in its
conjunction with transitivity. This conjunction is typically ex-
pressed in the formula: "Things that are equal to the same thing
are equal to one another." The conjunction of symmetry and
transitivity constitutes the meanings which validate substitutability
in inference and discourse. Equality of magnitudes is an obvious
case of terms that have symmetrical-transitive relativity.
The scope of the conjunction is not limited to quantities con-
stituted by operations having existential reference. One who
measures the floor of a room with reference to determining the
amount of carpet to be purchased does so in order to institute
terms having symmetrical transitive relations to each other. Al-
gebraic equations exemplify terms having this conjunct relation
in respects other than that of magnitude. Physical functions are
generalizations which warrant substitutability in inference as to
existential matters by satisfaction of conjunct symmetrical-
transitivity. In short, the import of instituting meanings which
have this conjoint relativity is that it is the logical ground of the
fundamental logical category of equivalence. This consideration
alone makes it unnecessary to dwell upon the fact that no term
has this relation as its inherent property, but that the relation ex-
presses a condition to be satisfied in institution of meanings entitled
to function in controlled inquiry.
3. Correlation. For the purpose of inference and of ordered
discourse, it is important in many problems that the relation be-
tween relata-referents be determinate with respect to its scope, or
its range and comprehensiveness. Correlation is the name techni-
cally used to designate this form of order. In a monogamous legal
system, the relation of husband-wife is one-one; in a polygamous
system it is one-many; in a polyandrous system, it is many-one.
A simple example of the force of the principle in inquiry is had
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND C AXONS 335
when a man or woman is tried for bigamy. For it illustrates that
the kind of "correlation" which holds among terms is conditioned
upon the extent to which a given field of subject-matter has been
systematically determined in prior inquiry, a result that is brought
about only through abstract universal propositions as rules of
operation. In the case cited, for example, only legal rules as to
marriage determine the import of a given relation so that conse-
quences may be inferred.
The relation of friend-friend is symmetrical in a given or speci-
fied case. But it is many-many. A and B are friends in a recipro-
cal sense. But A may have C, D 7 E . . . as friends and B may
have N, O, P . . . as friends. Nothing follows as to the relation
of friendship, indifference, or enmity existing among these other
terms as between friends of B and A. However, in the situation
illustrated in the saying "Love me, love my dog," the relation of
friend-friend is so conditioned that B cannot be a friend of A
unless B is also the friend of C, who is a friend of A. This type
of relation is exemplified in the case of some blood-kinship, blood-
brotherhood, and secret-society relations, where each related mem-
ber is bound to defend and support every other member,
independently of prior acquaintance. The relation is still many-
many, but a system is so constituted that the relation of transitivity
holds between the elements of the system that have many-many
relations taken severally. When the relation is not determined by
co-presence in a system, the many-many relation is too indeter-
minate to permit of transitivity. Mathematics is the outstanding
exemplar of a system in which terms have many-many relations
to one another, and yet the rules of operations determining the
system are such that one-one relations can be instituted whenever
it is necessary. 3
4. Connectivity. Relational terms satisfy the condition of con-
nexitivity whenever symmetrical terms are also transitive. Equiva-
lence is, as we have seen, an instance of symmetrical transitivity,
grounding, as it were, back-and-forth movement in inference and
discourse. The term "connexitivity" may be extended to include
such cases. Asymmetrical transitivity is exemplified in such terms
3 Any cardinal number, for example, is both a sum (product, power) and
also a unit factor and root with regards to other numbers.
336 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
as greater-than, hotter-than, and in comparative terms generally,
in which terms have the relation of converse symmetry. Con-
nectivity is not so much a coordinate relation as it is a complex
of relations, the function of transitivity being basic in all modes
of logical relation.
The discussion has been conducted upon the basis of distinctive
forms of the relative and relational terms that are commonly recog-
nized. But these forms have been interpreted upon the doctrinal
ground that the relations in question indicate either (1) formal
conditions that terms (meanings) must satisfy in order to function
in inquiry yielding warranted conclusions, or (2) as warnings that
the conditions required have not been fulfilled. An example of
the latter would be the case of asymmetrical intransitivity or the
many-many relations in which elements have not been determined
to be elements in an ordered system. It is difficult to avoid the
impression in reading some logical texts (even those in which the
necessity of strict formalism is emphasized) that meanings (terms)
are taken just as they happen to present themselves in isolation
and certain labels are then placed upon them.
II. FORMAL RELATIONS OF PROPOSITIONS
It has been noted that (1) terms are logically related in a propo-
sition only as the proposition of which they are related members
is itself in ordered relation to other propositions, and that (2) cer-
tain terms have purely relational force, so that their meaning is
wholly exhausted in their office of instituting relations between
other terms. Terms that exemplify the latter condition are all
the words that are grammatically called connectives, such as and,
or, that (which), only (none but), etc. These strictly relational
terms appear in propositions. But their logical force and function
in a proposition, in its severalty, have to do with the function of
that proposition in a set or series of related propositions — a logical
character expressed in contemporary logic by calling the proposi-
tions in which they appear "compound" propositions. 4 In other
words, connectives represent satisfaction of the logical conditions
4 According to the position developed in this book, the "simple" propositions,
with which other propositions are contrasted as "compound," are logically in-
complete, being instituted only for the sake of arriving at the complete proposi-
tions which are called compound.
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 337
that are required to constitute any given proposition a member of
an ordered set or series of propositions.
It was shown in Chapter X that comparison-contrast is the
means by which contents are determined in that relation which
constitutes a proposition. It was also shown that comparison-
contrast can be defined only in terms of the institution of con-
jugately related affirmative and negative propositions, which
express the results of operations of inclusion-exclusion. The scope
and necessity of the latter operations in strict correspondence with
each other, is such that propositions logically related to one another
(in sets or series) must satisfy the formal conditions of conjugate
exclusiveness-inclusiveness, or be conjunct-disjunct in relation to
one another. The purely relational terms and, or, that, only, along
with other formally relational terms, such as, if, then, either-one-
or-other-but not-both, some, is, is~not, are the symbols by which
are designated the conjunctive-disjunctive functions which render
a given proposition formally capable of being a related member of
a set or series of ordered proposition. However, not all of the
relational terms listed stand on the same logical plane, or are of
coordinate force. Some of them mark a relation that satisfies (or
is taken as if it satisfied) the functions of conjunction-disjunction,
while others mark contents still in process of complete determina-
tion with respect to satisfaction of these functions — that is, mean-
ings whose force is still problematic. "Any" is of the former type;
"a or an" (when not a synonym of "any") and "some" are of the
latter type, as are also "this? and "the" in the cases in which "the"
is a synonym of this.
The doctrinal conclusion reached may, accordingly, be formu-
lated as follows: Sets and series of propositions are so ordered as
to constitute in their functional correspondence (conjugate rela-
tion) with each other a scientific system (one satisfying necessary
formal conditions) only when taken severally they are co-alternate
(exclusive) and, taken together, they are co-conjunct or inclusive
and exhaustive. This formulation is intended, on one side, to state
that the functions in question are not inherent properties of propo-
sitions but are logical conditions to be satisfied; and, on the other
side, that they are highly generalized logical "leading principles,"
338 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
since they set forth operations to be performed which are logically
basic.
It remains only to introduce certain further distinctions, the
most important of which are designated by words borrowed from
mathematics but which are given logical meaning: namely, additive
and multiplicative. Conjunction-disjunction is additive in appli-
cation to existential subject-matter whether singular or generic;
it is multiplicative in application to the interrelation of characters
constituting abstract universal propositions. Illustrations will
render the import of this statement evident. Additive summative
conjunction is symbolized by and (of which a comma is often the
logical equivalent) while additive alternate conjunction is ex-
pressed by or. In the case of singulars, "and" as an additive con-
junction constitutes a collection, as "This regiment is composed
of this and that and the other enumerated person" until every
member is listed. An instance of alternate additive conjunction of
singulars is found in the following: "Any member of the Cabinet
of the Federal Government is either Secretary of State, or of the
Treasury, of the Interior, or . . ." until all members of the col-
lection are listed.
The logical force of and-or applied to kinds is different from
this case of singulars. For example, such a proposition as that just
stated (as to singulars composing a collection) is denied by deny-
ing the presence of any one of the singulars listed, while its com-
pleteness may be denied by affirming that some other singular
should be added. In the case of kinds, denial applies to the
relation of conjunction as such. The validity of the proposition
"James, John, Robert and Henry were present on a given occa-
sion" is impeached when it is shown that any one of the four was
absent. The generic proposition "Birds, bats, butterflies are sub-
kinds of one and the same inclusive kind" is invalidated whenever
it is shown that the trait of being flying-creatures is not a con-
junction of characteristics sufficient to determine an inclusive
kind, and that differences in modes of flying are not sufficient to
differentiate included kinds. Denial applies not to kinds taken
severally but to the relation of inclusive-included; or, more strictly,
to the set of generic differential characteristics by which kinds
are determined as inclusive and included.
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 339
The proposition "Birds, fishes, reptiles, simians, human beings,
... are vertebrates," is a summative conjunctive proposition
about relations of kinds in forming an including kind. The al-
ternate conjunctive form of proposition is "Vertebrates are birds
or fishes or reptiles or simians or human beings or . . ." It might
seem as if the difference were merely linguistic, not logical, con-
sisting simply in the fact that in the case of summative addition
(expressed by and) sub-species are enumerated first, and in the
case of logical addition by alternates (expressed by or) the in-
cluding kind is stated first. There is, however, a genuine logical
difference. There is nothing in the case of summative addition
taken apart from the alternative form to warrant either the com-
pleteness (sufficiency) of the included kinds in relation to the
inclusive kind, or their non-overlapping character. The logical,
as distinct from the verbal, force of or consists in satisfaction of
the condition that the kinds which are summatively added do not
overlap, being described by differential characteristics. Take for
example, the proposition: "Birds and whales and mammals are
vertebrates." Since whales and mammals are defined by the same
set of traits, "and" does not here determine exclusion. The logical
force of or means the necessity for institution of sub-kinds that
are descriptively determined by traits that are so differential as to
be reciprocally exclusive within the set of characteristics describing
the including kind. Kinds connected by and may constitute
propositions valid as far as they go but that are not sufficiently
inclusive.
So far it has been assumed rather than shown that the additive
function in its summative and alternative modes applies only to
the relation of terms in propositions having existential reference.
The simplest way of showing the validity of the position taken is
to consider the relation of characters which constitute the content
of a universal non-existential proposition. In the case of charac-
teristics describing kinds, whether including or included, it is
necessary that the traits employed be materially independent of
one another and yet so involved that in cumulative conjunction they
form a set of traits that suffice to determine kinds inclusively
and exclusively. The relation of characters in an abstract propo-
sition is, on the other hand, an interrelation. Only as the meaning
340 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
of each character is constituted in reciprocal dependence upon all
other characters involved does a universal proposition satisfy
logical conditions. It is this form of relationship which is desig-
nated by the term multiplicative. The conjunction in question is
not of contents that are capable of independent observation or
independent determination. The "conjunction" is one of "na-
tures" not of traits. The necessity of the relation marking univer-
sal propositions in distinction from the contingency of existential
propositions is constituted by the multiplicative conjunction of its
related characters.
Being mammalian, for example, is determined by the multipli-
cative conjunction of the characters, warm-blooded, viviparous
and suckling young. If this universal proposition is valid as a defi-
nition, it is (1) independent of the existence of creatures marked
by corresponding qualitative traits; while (2) it involves the idea
that these characters are necessarily interrelated, so that any one
of the three characters is meaningless in the definition apart from
its modifying and being modified by the other terms. In other
words, if warm-blooded, then viviparous, etc. Suppose, however,
a proposition about a relation of kinds were as follows: "Mam-
mals are warm-blooded, and (or) viviparous, and (or) offspring-
suckling." It is clear, on its face, that such a proposition is a dis-
guised definition of being mammalian.
Alternate multiplication is necessary to determine sufficiency
in the case of the relation of characters, as in the case of the con-
junction of characters describing related kinds. Irrelevant and
superfluous characters must be ruled out. In the case, say, of the
conception of triangularity magnitude is excluded from the defi-
nition, while shape is no part of the conception outside the limits
determined by the relations of the characters of right-angularity,
equilateralness and scaleness. This conception is now so stand-
ardized that elirnination of these characters may seem too trivial to
be worth mentioning. But there was a time when inquiry into
geometrical relationships was retarded because size was thought
to be a necessary property of triangles. For as long as triangles
were supposed to have existential reference, size ivas a generic
trait. If we take the relations of characters that define, say, being
metallic, completeness of the characters in question can be de-
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 341
termined only as they are disjoined from characters whose inter-
relation defines being chemically elemental in other ways than
being metallic as well as in ways that are reciprocally exclusive.
To repeat in this context a point made in other contexts: When
it is affirmed that triangularity is either right-angular, scalene or
isosceles, it is affirmed (1) that these ways of being triangular
exhaust all the possibilities of relationship of the lines and angles
in question, and (2) that the relationships constituting being
triangular are so interrelated that these ways of being triangular
are necessary to the conception of the triangular.
Functional correspondence of propositions which satisfy re-
spectively the conditions of additive and multiplicative conjunc-
tion-disjunction is necessary for final warranted judgment. Only
copulation of propositions of subject-contents and predicate con-
tents determines, on one side, that the universal propositions em-
ployed are operationally relevant, and, on the other side, that the
conjoined traits used to describe kinds are exclusive-inclusive be-
cause of a ground or reason. For otherwise the basis of their
conjunction is merely recurrent observations, so that the con-
junction observed constitutes a problem. The logical form of
the conjugate correspondence is expressed in the relational terms
"either-one-or-other-but-not both." Take the following proposi-
tion: "Mankind consists of Europeans, Africans, Australians,
Americans . . ." where . . . indicates that addition is summa-
tively exhaustive. There is nothing in the proposition as it stands
to preclude hyphenated membership, or kinds that are, say,
European-American. Only a rule expressed in a universal propo-
sition can determine such kinds that this possibility is ruled out.
Such a determination is not particularly important in the example
selected, although the question of dual political citizenship may be
an actual one. But there are scientific inquiries in which it is
indispensable to determine that kinds are related so that any
singular must be of one-or-another kind but-not-of-more-than-
one. Indeed, satisfaction of this condition is necessary to any
valid set of disjunctive propositions. It cannot be achieved except
upon the basis of a set of disjunctive universal-hypothetical propo-
sitions whose operational application determines kinds exclusive of
one another within an exhaustive including kind.
342 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
1. Certain corollaries follow. It is usual in texts to find such
propositions as have been considered termed "compound," where
"compound" postulates "simple" propositions that are prior to and
independent of the conjunctive-disjunctive function. But from
the position taken (namely, that any symbolic expression has the
logical status of being a proposition only as a member of an or-
dered set or series) it follows truistically that there are no "simple"
propositions in the sense alleged. There are, of course, proposi-
tions that are relatively simple. But they have logical status only
in institution of so-called "compound" propositions. For exam-
ple, a particular proposition, one about a change which at a given
time is incapable of analysis into a complex of interactions, is a
simple or elementary proposition. But (1) it is only conditionally
such, for its determination depends upon the available techniques
of experimental observations. As these improve, changes which
are more elementary may be discovered, while (2) in any case
their simple nature is functional. For its content as simple is deter-
mined by its capacity to serve as a condition in delimitation of a
problem. Hence the degree of "simplicity" required varies with
the problem in hand.
2. Save as the conjugate nature of the functions of additive-
multiplicative conjunction-disjunction is acknowledged there is no
logical ground for making a distinction between division and
classification. The process is then called "division" when it pro-
ceeds from the inclusive kind to the included kinds, and
"classification" when the movement is in the reverse direction.
Subject-matter is identical in both cases. If, however, "division"
in its logical sense is reserved for discrimination of differential
traits describing mutually exclusive kinds within the more com-
prehensive conjunction of traits that describe an including kind,
it has a distinctive logical meaning. "Classification" would then
be used to stand for the discriminated interrelation of characters
that mark off "classes" (in the unambiguous sense of categories)
within the comprehension of the category of the widest applica-
bility. "Division" is applicable to kinds in extension and "classi-
fication" to conceptions in comprehension.
3. The classic theory of genus and fixed included species fur-
nished an ontological ground for definition. The latter consisted
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 343
of statement of the genus and the differentia which together
marked off and identified the species in question. Abandonment
of the cosmological ground for this conception of definition left
the logical status of definition in the air. It has been treated, for
example, as a purely linguistic matter in which the meaning of a
single word is set forth in a set of words whose several meanings
are taken to be already understood. Taken literally, this concep-
tion leaves the combination of the defining words wholly unex-
plained and ungrounded. And yet it is in virtue of their
conjunction, additive or multiplicative, that they form a definition,
either in the sense of description of a kind or in the stricter sense
of analysis of an abstract conception. That symbols, of which
words in their ordinary sense are a limited kind, are necessary to
definition, and that in a definition a single symbol having a total
meaning is resolved into an interrelation of meanings is sound doc-
trine. It provides the element of plausibility in the merely lin-
guistic interpretation of definition.
But the logical import of definition is radically different. Con-
ceptual meanings are instituted in their office as representatives of
possibilities of solution. They are capable of performing this of-
fice only as they are resolved into characters that are necessarily
interrelated just because they are an analysis of a single conception.
The value (validity) of any given analysis of any given conception
(this analysis being the definition) is finally fixed by the power of
the interrelated characters to institute a series of rigorous sub-
stitutions in discourse. Only such a conception of definition ac-
counts for the indispensable role played by definitions in inquiry,
and explains how and why a given selection and conjunction of the
terms of a definition is logically grounded instead of being arbitrary
III. FORMAL CANONS OF RELATIONS OF PROPOSITIONS
The functions of additive and multiplicative conjunction-dis-
junction go back, as we have seen, to the conjugate relation of
affirmation-negation, inclusion-exclusion. Hence they may be fur-
ther generalized. When so generalized, the fundamental functions
involved take the form of logical principles to which the name
Canons is traditionally applied. These canons are Identity, Con-
tradiction and Excluded Middle. On the ground of the position
344 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
taken, it follows truistically that they express certain ultimate
conditions to be satisfied, instead of being properties of proposi-
tions as such. Upon the basis of the cosmological-ontological
assumptions of the classic logic, it was a sound logical doctrine
that treated identity, etc., as necessary structural properties. Spe-
cies, which alone were capable of definition, classification, and
scientific demonstration, were immutable. Hence they were in-
herently self-identical. Any species is always and necessarily just
what it is. The canon of identity expressed symbolically in the
form A is A was, accordingly, the proper form in which any
proposition having scientific status should be stated. Species were
also ontologically exclusive of one another. No transitions or
derivations were possible among them because of their necessary
ontological exclusion of one another. Hence, tertiwm non datur. 5
1. Identity. From the standpoint of the position that it is nec-
essary for propositions to satisfy conditions set by membership in
a set or a series of propositions, identity means the logical require-
ment that meanings be stable in the inquiry-continuum. The
direct and obvious meaning of this statement is that a meaning
remain constant throughout a given inquiry, since any change in
its content changes the force of the proposition of which it is a
constituent, thus rendering it uncertain upon what meanings and
relation of meanings the conclusion reached actually depends.
Fulfilment of this condition does not mean, however, that a given
symbol shall have the same meaning in all inquiries. If it did have
this meaning, progress in knowledge would be impossible. But
the judgment which is the final issue of inquiry modifies to some
extent, sometimes crucially, the evidential import of some observed
fact and the meaning previously possessed by some conception.
5 That Aristotle's formulation of the principle of contradiction is somewhat
equivocal is frequently noticed by modern exponents of his logical doctrine.
It would seem to be a combination of two considerations; one, that any con-
tradiction violates the principle of the necessary identity of a species; the other,
that contrary propositions not only exist in the case of changes, as signs of lack
of complete Being, but are inevitable, since in his cosmology it is the hot which
becomes cold, the moist which alters into the dry, etc. Plato, without formulat-
ing the principle of contradiction, had argued against the complete reality of
change on the ground that if it had a full measure of Being contradictory
propositions were inevitable, since it then followed that something both was
and was not. On the whole, contradiction seems to have been employed as
evidence for the principle of identity rather than as an independent principle.
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 345
Unless identity has functional force in relation to the subject-
matter undergoing inquiry, the canon of identity is violated in
every scientific advance.
The deeper and underlying import of the principle of identity
is, accordingly, constituted in the very continuum of judgment.
In scientific inquiry, every conclusion reached, whether of fact
or conception, is held subject to determination by its fate in further
inquiries. Stability or "identity," of meanings is a limiting ideal,
as a condition to be progressively satisfied. The conditional status
of scientific conclusions (conditional in the sense of subjection to
revision in further inquiry) is sometimes used by critics to dis-
parage scientific "truths" in comparison with those which are
alleged to be eternal and immutable. In fact, it is a necessary
condition of continuous advance in apprehension and in under-
standing. 6
2. Contradiction. The logical condition to be satisfied for the
canon of contradiction is independent of that of identity, although
necessarily conjunctive with it. Violation of the principle of
identity may lead to contradiction. But the logically important
instances are those in which observance of the principle of identity
results in a contradiction. For establishment of propositions
one of which must be valid if the other is invalid is an indispen-
sable step in arriving at a grounded conclusion. 7 Contradiction
is not then just an unfortunate accident which sometimes happens
to come about. Complete exclusion, resulting in grounded dis-
junction, is not effected until propositions are determined as pairs
such that if one is valid the other is invalid, and if one is invalid
the other is valid. The principle of contradiction thus represents
a condition to be satisfied. Direct inspection of two propositions
does not determine whether or not they are related as contradic-
6 The best definition of truth from the logical standpoint which is known to
me is that of Peirce: "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented by
this opinion is the real." Op. cit., Vol. V, p. 268. A more complete (and more
suggestive) statement is the following: "Truth is that concordance of an ab-
stract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would
tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may
possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this
confession is an essential ingredient of truth." (Ibid., pp. 394-5).
7 Cf. ante, pp. 195-8 and pp. 337-41.
346 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
tones, as would be the case if contradiction were an inherent rela-
tional property. The contrary doctrine is often affirmed, as when
it is said that the two propositions A is M and A is not M directly
contradict each other. But unless A has already been determined
conjunctively-disjunctively, by prior inquiry, some part of A, or
A in some relation, may be M, and some other part of A, or A
in some other relation, may be not M. The relation of A to M
and not M can be determined only by operations of exclusion
which reach their logical limit in the relation of contradiction.
3. Excluded Middle. It was stated earlier that complete satis-
faction of the conditions of conjunctive-disjunctive functions,
additive and multiplicative, is formally represented in the form
either-one-or-other-but-not-both. The principle of excluded mid-
dle presents the completely generalized formulation of conjunctive-
disjunctive functions in their conjugate relation. The notion that
propositions are or can be, in and of themselves, such that the
principle of excluded middle directly applies is probably the source
of more fallacious reasoning in philosophical discourse and in
moral and social inquiries than any other one sort of fallacy.
That fact that disjunctions which were at one time taken to be
both exhaustive and necessary have later been found to be in-
complete (and sometimes even totally irrelevant) should long ago
have been a warning that the principle of excluded middle sets
forth a logical condition to be satisfied in the course of continuity
of inquiry. It formulates the ultimate goal of inquiry in complete
satisfaction of logical conditions. To determine subject-matters
so that no alternative is possible is the most difficult task of in-
quiry.
It is frequently argued today that the three principles in ques-
tion have become completely outmoded with the abandonment of
their foundations in the Aristotelian logic. The Aristotelian in-
terpretation of them as ontological, and any interpretation which
regards them as inherent relational properties of given proposi-
tions, must certainly be abandoned. But as formulations of formal
conditions (conjunctive-disjunctive) to be satisfied, they are valid
as directive principles, as regulative limiting ideals of inquiry. An
example sometimes put forward to show the meaninglessness of
the principle of excluded middle is its inapplicability to existences
FORMAL FUNCTIONS AND CANONS 347
in process of transition. Since all existences are in process of
change it is concluded that the principle is totally inapplicable.
For example, of water that is freezing and of ice that is melting,
it cannot be said that water is either solid or liquid. To avoid this
difficulty by saying that it is either solid, liquid or in a transitional
state, is to beg the question at issue: namely, determination of the
transitional intermediate state. The objection is wholly sound on
any other ground than that the canon expresses a condition to be
satisfied. But taken in the latter sense, it shows the scientific
inadequacy of the common sense conceptions of solid and liquid.
As scientific existential inquiry has become occupied with changes
and correlations of change, the popular qualitative ideas of solid,
liquid, gaseous states have been expelled. They are now replaced
by correlations of units of mass, velocity and distance-direction
formulated in terms of numerical measurements. The necessity
of instituting exclusive disjunctions, satisfying the condition of
excluded intermediates, has been a factor in bringing about this
scientific change.
This chapter has been concerned with formal conditions which
propositions must satisfy in order to fulfil their functions in in-
quiry. The logical conditions in question concern, on one side,
sets of propositions in the relations which ground an inferential
conclusion, and, on the other side, series of propositions in the
relations that constitute ordered discourse. In each case, the con-
cluding proposition is said to "follow" from preceding propositions
while the reverse process is called "going or proceeding from."
The nature of the "following" is different in inference and in
discourse. The traditional (and essentially conventional) state-
ment of the difference is that in the former we go from particular
propositions to the general, and in the other from the general to
the particular. This mode of statement had genuine import and
foundation in the Aristotelian logic. But it lacks both ground
and logical meaning in scientific inquiry as that is now carried on.
A conclusion in mathematical discourse is as universal (since it is
an abstract hypothetical proposition) as are those from which it
follows. While it may have less comprehension, or scope of ap-
plicability, it may also have greater or less comprehension, ac-
348 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
cording to the exigencies of the problem in hand. The idea that
general propositions are arrived at by "going" from particular
ones is more plausible, since particular propositions are necessary
in order to formulate the problems that required general proposi-
tions for their solutions. But formulation of the operations that
determine a generalization with respect to particulars is much
more complex than can be covered by the words "following" or
"going." The institution of the general proposition includes, for
example, performance of operations prescribed by the idea of a
possible solution such that facts not previously observed are their
consequences. The nature of the "going" and the "following"
which are involved constitutes a logical problem which carries
logical discussion into the subject of the nature of scientific method.
It involves specifically the problem of the nature of induction and
deduction and their relations to each other. The field thus indi-
cated forms the subject of Part III and will be taken up after the
discussion of Terms found in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XVI11
TERMS OR MEANINGS
In older logical texts it was the usual practice to deal first with
terms, then .with propositions and finally with propositions
ordered in relation to one another. According to the position
developed in this book, the procedure is reversed, for inquiry, in-
volving propositions so determined and arranged as to yield final
judgment, is the logical whole upon which propositions depend,
while terms as such are logically conditioned by propositions. It
follows that the discussion of terms undertaken in this chapter in-
troduces no new principles. Special discussion of terms may,
however, serve to review and clarify some of the conclusions al-
ready arrived at. The word "term" was used by Aristotle to
designate an elementary constituent of a proposition as its bound-
ary; and the word term is derived from the Latin terminus mean-
ing both boundary and terminal limit. Like other boundaries, for
example those of political institutions and tracts of real estate,
terms both demarcate and connect, and hence no term has logical
force save in distinction from and relation to other terms.
This statement is not contradicted by the fact that all familiar
words carry some meaning even when uttered in isolation. They
have such meaning because they are used in a context in which
relation to other words is involved; furthermore, their meaning
is potential rather than actual until they are linked to other words.
If the words sun, parabola, Julius Caesar, etc., are uttered, a line
of direction is given to observation or discourse. But the objective
of the direction is indeterminate until it is distinguished from
alternative possible terminations, and is thus identified by means
of relation to another term. Uncertainty as to boundaries is the
source of disputes and conflicts about meanings. Indeterminate
terms either claim too much and are loose because overlapping,
349
350 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
or are too restricted and result in an unoccupied no-man's-land.
In other words, no term can be fully determinate save as the
terms to which it is related are also determinate in both conjunctive
and disjunctive reference. Terms, as logical limits, look, like other
boundaries, in two directions. They are settled as the outcome of
prior activities and they exercise jurisdiction in further inquiries.
They possess both of these traits and exercise both of these func-
tions in their capacity of instruments. Like all instrumentalities
they are modifiable in further use.
Traditional texts on logic have usually distinguished between
terms as concrete and abstract; denotative and -connotative; ex-
tensive and intensive; singular (plural), collective and general.
These recognized distinctions will be taken as the material of
discussion. But their interpretation on the ground of the prin-
ciples formulated in previous chapters will necessarily differ in
important respects from that which is traditional. It will also
involve introduction of some additional distinctions, as for exam-
ple, resolution of general terms into generic and universal. In its
departure from traditional interpretations, the discussion also in-
volves disagreement with some recent texts that have also departed
from tradition. For example, some texts make a sharp distinction
between names and terms on the ground that names are designa-
tions of subject-matters which are irrelevant to strict logic while
terms are purely formal. Strictly adhered to, this position would
eliminate completely all so-called "concrete" terms and would also
exclude all existential propositions since the latter ultimately in-
volve either proper names or some equivalent expression such as the
demonstrative "this."
The texts in question are never wholly consistent in this matter.
In further distinction from them the position here taken involves
the impossibility of making a sharp division between form and
subject-matter. For it holds that subject-matter is what it is in
virtue of its determination by the forms which make inquiry to be
what it is, while forms in turn are adapted to institution of subject-
matters such as serve the requirements of controlled inquiry.
There are other schools that limit the application of names to
existential things and which therefore assign to terms a wider scope.
But names are designations by means of symbols. And while it is
TERMS OR MEANINGS 351
fundamentally important to note whether what is designated by a
symbol is material or is formal (as in the case of and-or), it is
purely arbitrary to hold that the latter words do not designate or
name what they do designate, namely formal relations. It seems
to be a superstition taken over from traditional grammar that a
name must designate something concrete. In fact every symbol
names something; otherwise it is totally without meaning and is
not a symbol. A diagram or a map has some reference and desig-
native force, even though linguistic usage does not treat either of
them as a name.
The basic distinction of terms which is here proposed follows
from the theory of judgment. Any given term applies ultimately to
the content of either subject or predicate of judgment; it is either
existential or conceptual in reference. All other distinctions are
either aspects of this fundamental distinction in logical office or are
derived from it. A simple example of this distinction occurs be-
tween the following terms.
1. Concrete and Abstract Terms. Words designating imme-
diately experienced qualities are concrete par excellence. For ex-
ample, sweet, hard, red, loud when they are used to characterize
observed subject-matter so as to discriminate and identify it: that
is, as evidential marks or signs. Demonstrative words, this, that,
now, then, here, there, are also concrete. So are common nouns
which designate kinds, and such adjectives as designate character-
istics by which kinds are identified and discriminated. Abstract
words are such as stand for conceptions, including relations which
are taken without reference to actual application to things, for
example, sweetness, solidity, redness, loudness, presence, absence,
position, location, fatherhood, angularity, etc. While certain
endings, such as ity, ness, tion, differentiate abstract nouns from
common nouns, there are many words which are abstract or con-
crete according to the context in which they function, independ-
ently of verbal endings. Color and sound, for example, are con-
crete when they refer to traits that are properties of existential
objects, but in science they are abstract, meaning colority or
visibility and audibility as possibilities. In order to be applicable
in directing scientific inquiry they are defined in terms of nu-
merical rates. Many adjectives are striking instances of indeter-
352 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
minateness with respect to the difference in question. As applied
directly to things they are of course existential, but they may also
stand for simple possibilities. The words circular or oblong are
concrete when used to describe actual objects, as in "circular
saw" or "oblong table." In mathematics, circle means circularity,
and oblong means rectilangularity. As the example shows, nouns
that are formed from adjectives may be abstract in use without
indicating that form when the word does not function in a given
proposition. Thus "solid" may be used to characterize things
in distinction from "liquid," while in mathematics it designates a
character which defines possible ways of being figurate in distinc-
tion from the way designated by plane.
Traditional nominalistic empiricism has tended to treat abstrac-
tion as such as "vicious" when taken to be other than a convenient
linguistic procedure for referring to a number of singulars having
a "common quality." Even now, it is regarded as a mark of
sophistication to contemn an abstract word because a concrete
"referent" cannot be pointed out. There is without doubt great
abuse of abstractions, but it is to be corrected by noting that their
referents are possible modes of operating. The counterpart logical
error is that an abstraction is mere selection of a universal quality
already possessed by objects. Then it is said that the abstract idea
of smoothness arises from apprehending the quality "smooth"
apart from any particular thing that possesses it. The universal,
smoothness, according to this view is logically prior to the concrete
smooth, the latter being an embodiment of the universal in a sin-
gular. Generalized, this view holds that all qualities and all rela-
tions are intrinsically universal, even such qualities as sweet, hard,
red, etc., as well as such relations as are expressed by active verbs
which connect existential objects together, as kill, eat, give. In
"Brutus murdered Caesar" for example "murdered" is regarded as
having the same logical form as is has when it is affirmed that
"Honesty is a virtue"; or that the form of "different from" is
identical when it is affirmed that "Pride is different from conceit,"
as it is when it is said "This object is different from that in shape,
or size," etc.
We cannot arrive at the abstract from the concrete merely by
considering a quality apart from other qualities with which it is
TERMS OR MEANINGS 353
conjoined in a thing. There exists, we shall say, a horse which
is roan, male, five years old and fifteen hands high. We can select
any one of these qualities for further consideration without think-
ing of, or inquiring into, other qualities. For example, if a buyer
is considering buying a horse to form one of a team, his inquiry
may attach itself either to color or height or age as matters which
decide whether or not the two horses w T ill "go well" together.
But the quality still remains "concrete." Roan is not roanness;
so-many-years-old is not age as an abstraction; so-high is not tall-
ness. The comparison in which a given quality is selected out of
a complex is a condition of abstraction, but the quality selected is
not, on that account, a universal. Moreover, a quality is not a uni-
versal merely because it characterizes a number of singulars. In that
capacity it serves, like any trait, to describe a kind. To become a
universal it must be so defined as to indicate a possible mode of
operation. Its function is to determine the characteristics which
must be found to exist in order to warrant the inference that a
given singular is of specified kind. Genuine illustrations of ab-
straction are found in the conception of heat as a mode of molecu-
lar motion; just as a pseudo-abstraction is found in the old con-
ception that heat is califoricity — which only repeats in an abstract
word the experienced quality. The quality smooth is warrantably
affirmed of objects only as the universal, smoothness, is such as to
prescribe operations of technical measurement. The common
sense conception of smoothness, derived from operations executed
by touch and sight, serves many ordinary practical ends but is in
no sense a scientific conception. Only a mathematical formula
defines smoothness. It can no more be derived from directly
experienced qualities by selection, inspection and comparison of
them than the definition of heat as molecular motion can be de-
rived from direct inspection and comparison of the quality of
various hot things.
2. Singular, Generic and Universal Terms. Each conceptual
term of predicative force is universal since it designates an opera-
tion possible of performance, independently of whether the condi-
tions to which it applies are actually observed or not. Singular
and generic terms are existential in reference and are conjugate.
The individual as such is a unique nonrepeatable qualitative
354 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
situation. The singular, represented, say, by this, is a subject-
matter discriminate^ selected from a total qualitative situation so
as to serve the function of determining a problem and providing
facts which, as evidence, test any proposed solution. As has been
previously said, qualities are not recurrent in themselves but in
their evidential function. As evidential, they are characteristics
which describe a kind. Consequently, singular and generic repre-
sent two emphases of a subject-matter of a proposition which has
existential import. "This is a meteorite" is singular with respect
to this; generic with respect to meteorite. Context determines
upon which of the conjugate forms emphasis falls in a given case.
When meteorites are included within a more extensive kind, the
proposition is that of a relation of kinds. There is no explicit
reference to a singular or this; the proposition holds, if valid, in-
dependently of whether any meteorite is observed to exist at this
or that particular time and place. But the proposition postulates
that meteorites do exist at some time and place. Thus it possesses
a conjugate, although indirect, reference to singulars. The case
is not otherwise when it is said that "Ogres are fabulous animals."
It postulates the existence of fabulous or mythical beliefs, and
affirms that belief in ogres has existed and that such beliefs are of
the kind called fabulous, since observation has not established the
existence of ogres although it warrants affirmation of the existence
of beliefs about them.
"General" as a logical term is ambivalent. As has been re-
peatedly noted, it is employed to designate both the generic and
the universal. The confusion of the two and its consequences in
logical doctrine, namely, failure to observe the logical difference
of the existential and non-existential, the factual and ideational,
have been dealt with. We append, however, some comments
upon the double meaning of the word law. It is employed to
designate the content of physical generalizations both when (1) a
specified conjunction of traits has been observed and confirmed
without an exception being found, and (2) when the relation in
question is itself a member of a system of interrelated universal
propositions. In the former case, it designates what we call a
general fact, such as "tin melts at the temperature of 232° C."
There is no objection to the double use of the word "law." But the
TERMS OR MEANINGS 355
use should not be allowed to disguise the fact that law in one case
is existential in reference, while in the other it is definitely non-
existential in reference. A law in mathematical physics is uni-
versal in as far as its mathematical content enables deduction to
other propositions in discourse to be made. As a law of physics,
its content is existential and contingent.
3. Denotative and Connotative Terms. The logical difference
between these two kinds of terms is once more that between terms
of subject-content, which has existential reference, and terms of
predicative and conceptual import. Terms are denotative when
they refer, directly or indirectly (as in propositions of a relation of
kinds) to existence. Common nouns, demonstratives, and verbs that
denote change or action are denotative. Mill revived the scholastic
term "connotation" (giving it, however, a different and confused
meaning) to designate the adjectival contents which constitute
the meaning of a generic term, stating that connotation determines
the meaning of such terms. According to this view one and the
same term is both denotative and connotative, with some definite
exceptions to be noted hereafter. Thus, "ship" is denotative in
respect to its application to an indefinite number of objects, while
its connotation consists of the traits which any object must possess
in order that the term ship can be warrantably applied to it. The
confusion here involved is not particularly subtle. It is between
characteristics which are the meaning of ship as a denotative term
and the characters which ground, inclusively and exclusively, the
logical capacity of traits to describe a kind. The first is de facto.
It states the set of traits which are in empirical fact used as the
ground of calling an object a ship instead of, say, a canoe or yacht.
When questions arise as to whether or not a certain object is of the
kind "ship," a definition of what it is to be a ship is demanded.
Suppose the definition consists of the following (multiplicative)
conjunction of characters; floating on water, having curved sides,
of sufficient capacity to transport a considerable number of goods
and persons, and being used regularly for commercial transporta-
tion of goods and passengers. Such a term is not descriptive of
traits which form the meaning of ship; they are prescriptions of the
traits an object should have if it is to be a ship. The terms in
356 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
question are all abstract. They define shipness; they do not de-
scribe existential ships.
When connotation is restricted to the meaning of a denotative
term (as it must be when a term is said to be both denotative and
connotative) exactly the same thing is said twice. Ship as a term
denotes primarily a set of traits and secondarily denotes a kind of
objects because they are marked by these traits. When it is said
that connotation determines the applicability of a set of traits to
describe the kind, inquiry has moved into another logical dimen-
sion, that of abstract universals. If "connotative" means some-
thing other than descriptive, then the same term cannot have both
denotation and connotation. Existential terms are denotative;
abstract terms are connotative. Every denotative term is related
to a corresponding or conjugate connotative term as far as its
denotative capacity is warranted — substantially the scholastic use
of connotation. If instead of ship, whose meaning is more or less
conventional, we had taken a scientific term, such as chemical
element^ or metal, the dependence of grounded denotative applica-
tion upon defining conceptions of being chemically simple and be-
ing metallic would be obvious. When a descriptive term is said to
possess connotation in addition to denotation, not only is there
bald repetition but no place is left for attributive terms or abstract
universals. The word "connotation" should either be dropped
or be reserved for the latter.
The following quotation from Mill, whose loose use of the word
"attributes" to designate both characteristics and characters is
unfortunately followed by writers who do not agree with his basic
postulates, illustrates the confusion discussed. When it is cleared
of confusion, the quotation exemplifies both the difference and the
relation of descriptive terms and prescriptive "connotative" terms.
"The word man denotes Peter, Jane, John and an indefinite
number of other individuals, of whom, taken as a class (kind) it is
the name. But it is applied to them because they possess, and to
signify that they possess, certain attributes. These seem to be
corporeity, animal life, rationality, and a certain external form,
which for distinction we call the human." x
According to his official doctrine, the "connotation" ought to be
1 Mill, Logic, Book I, Ch. 2, Sec. 5.
TERMS OR MEANINGS 357
simply the set of existential qualities which constitute the meaning
of the general term "men." In that case, however, the concrete
word "men" simply possesses a dual denotation; namely, one point-
ing both to certain qualities used as marks and also to the objects hav-
ing these qualities. It is accordingly significant that Mill actually
illustrates connotation by means of abstract words, corporeity,
rationality, which are not possessed properties of the objects in
question, but which do have the force of indicating what qualities
(namely, possession of a body and of power to reason) must be
traits of objects if the name men is properly applied to them. For
existent objects no more are or have corporeity and rationality
than a sunset is or has redness.
Mill's denial that proper names are connotative is thus correct
on the basis of the interpretation of connotation just given
(namely, that it belongs to abstract terms) and incorrect on the
ground of his own theory. For proper names are certainly not
abstract; there is nothing about them which determines the ground
and right of their applicability to singulars. But since Mill has
identified connotation with the meaning of a word, his denial
signifies that proper names have no meaning whatever. At the
same time, he assigns meaning to generic terms, which, according
to him, are only collections of singulars. However, aside from this
inconsistency, denial of meaning to a proper name deprives it of
that denotative force with respect to a singular which Mill never-
theless holds it does possess. If such words as London, Rocky
Mountains, (which certainly are not names of abstract attributes)
had no meaning, they would not be symbols or names at all. They
would be mere noises having no application to one thing more
than to any other. To all appearances, Mill's position rests upon a
confused mixture of two different things. There are causes why
the proper name "London" is applied to a given singular thing;
there are no reasons, in the sense of logical ground, for its applica-
tion. As to rationale the word lacks meaning. Moreover, while
there are causes why the object to which the proper name is ap-
plied is what it is, there is no logical ground for its having just the
qualities it does in fact have. On the other hand, while there is no
logical ground (but only historical causes) for the general term
"horse" as a word being used to designate a kind of objects, there is
358 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
logical ground or reason for the selection of the special set of
traits employed to describe horses qua a kind. In the sense of
rationale or ground, the term or name "horse" has a kind of mean-
ing which "London" does not have. But London or any proper
noun does have a referent and it consequently has meaning in the
sense of designating the distinctive traits which mark off and
identify the singular to which it refers.
Mill's essential error has been revived in another form by writers
on logic, who are critics of Mill's views in general, in their denial
that "this" has descriptive qualification. I shall not repeat the
criticisms already made of the view which holds to a sharp logical
distinction between the demonstrative and the descriptive. But
two arguments that are advanced in support of the separation may
be referred to. One of them is the confusion (previously pointed
out) between an indeterminate descriptive qualification and a
determinate one, as in the case of dispute whether "it" — an object
seen at sea — is a mountain or a cloud. That such cases occur can-
not be doubted. But their occurrence does not prove that "&"
is wholly lacking in meaning. It only shows that its qualities,
so far as yet observed, do not suffice for a grounded proposition as
to its kind. The case does not differ, save in degree, from a case
in which the object is warrantably affirmed to be a mountain, while
a question still exists as to what kind of a mountain it is. It should
be evident that unless there are some observed qualities constituting,
in the instance cited, means for identification of "this" — there is
no ground for holding that the two persons who differ as to the
kind of which this is, are referring to one and the same "this."
Unless they are, it is obvious that both propositions may be valid.
Every existential inquiry into existential qualities as a basis for
inference involves during its process exactly the same indeterminate
descriptive qualification that is found in the demonstrative this.
The only difference is that "this" has a relative minimum of
descriptive determination.
Another reason offered in support of the notion that purely
demonstrative terms are merely denotative, or have no "meaning,"
proceeds from the side of descriptive terms. For there are de-
scriptive terms which lack demonstrative reference, such as glass-
mountain, the present king of France, etc. There is again no
TERMS OR MEANINGS 359
doubt as to the correctness of the fact brought forward, but
again it does not show what it is intended to prove. No contradic-
tion would be involved if perchance the objects referred to did
exist. A glass-mountain might be manufactured, and there have
been kings of France. All that descriptions not having demonstra-
tive application show is that at a given time observation cannot
disclose any object answering to them. What is more important is
that such descriptions are inherent in a large number of important
inquiries. Take, as a comparatively trivial instance, the question
whether or not a sea-serpent exists. Obviously, investigation can-
not proceed without some description of the term. Again, let it
be the question of whether the ether or atoms actually exist. Un-
less these terms have a descriptive content there is absolutely
nothing to direct observation in the attempt to determine whether
there are existences answering the description. Another instance
is to be found in the case of inventions, plans and intentions prior
to their execution, indeed at any time short of their final comple-
tion. They are in this stage without determinate demonstrative
reference and yet they are necessary to the operations which will
render such demonstrative reference possible. We conclude, there-
fore, that neither of the arguments offered gives any ground for
modifying the position that there is a strictly conjugate relation-
ship between generic terms (which are admitted to have meaning)
and singular terms, whether the latter are proper names or demon-
stratives such as this and it.
5. Extension, Intension, and Comprehension. Traditional theory
has held that some terms have both intension and extension, just as
it has been held that some terms are both denotative and con-
notative. This doctrine seems to be a hold-over from the
Aristotelian logic. For in that system, definition is existential,
being a grasp of the essence which determines a species. In-
tension is then a suitable name for the definition, while the species
determined by the definition has extension. After abandonment
of the ontological basis of this position, confusion was introduced
into logical doctrine by identifying extension with denotation,
and intension with connotation in disregard of the basic considera-
tion, viz., whether the terms involved are existential or conceptual.
The confusion is increased and in practice supported by (1) the
360 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
ambivalence of the word object, which has the signification both
of existential things and of strictly conceptual and mathematical
entities, and by (2) failure to distinguish between designation and
denotation. Combination of the two confusions is found in such
a sentence as the following: "Conic sections connote certain
characters or attributes and denote all the objects that have these
characters. The objects denoted by conic sections are the mem-
bers of the class conic sections." In such a statement, object means
non-existential entities. The fact that only existences can be de-
noted is ignored, the ignoring being covered up by using denoting
as a synonym for designating. Any intelligible word designates
something; otherwise it is a mere combination of sounds or visible
marks, not a word at all. Xypurt, for example, designates nothing
whatever in the English language. It is not a word. Denotative or
existential terms and attributive or conceptual words are alike in
designating something: they both have signification, for the mean-
ing of words used can be understood. The important logical
matter is the difference in what is designated. 2
Modern logicians recognize the difference in logical form be-
tween a singular affirmed to be one of a kind and kinds as related
members of a more extensive kind. They accordingly recognize
that difficulties arise when the extension of a term is said to cover
both of these cases. They have, however, been unwilling to admit
that the "difficulties" in question amount to violation of logical
integrity, and hence they still go on speaking of the range of singu-
lar objects denoted as the extension of a term. Thus in the case of a
ship, it is said that its extension is that of all objects, past, present
and future, to which the term ship applies. This conclusion both
follows from and perpetuates the identification of denotation and
extension. Logically, it gives the same force or form to a singular
and to a kind, since various kinds of ships (sloops, schooners,
steamboats, war vessels) are also said to be the extension of the
term: this in spite of explicit recognition, in another connection, of
2 The distinction made earlier between signifying and meaning is at least a
help in avoiding confusion. The meaning of words and symbols is different
from the signifying power of the existential things that are designated by the
words, and only words that have existential meaning in the sense of intent or
reference are denotative, while all words are designative, or are "names" of
either existential or conceptual subject matter.
TERMS OR MEANINGS 361
the difference between the propositions, say, Hitler is a Nazi and
Italians (or Germans) are Fascists.
Aside from confusion in logical theory, the confusion is ma-
terially important. For were the genuine difference consistently
recognized, it would compel recognition that (1) extension is a
property of some denotative terms (namely those terms that refer
to kinds instead of to singulars); that (2) denotation and ex-
tension are not two names for the same logical form or function,
and that (3) non-conceptual terms have neither denotation (al-
though they designate) nor extension. The extension of ship is
simply and strictly the kinds of ships that exist or have existed or
will exist; it is not singular ships, although the latter are denoted by
ship. The definition of ship, or being of the ship-character, on the
other hand, has no extension. The definition permits of different
ways of being that union of interrelated characters which define
ship. But these different ways are not the characteristic properties
of different kinds of ships. The example is perhaps not well
chosen since there is no abstract term, shipness, in use. Let us
then take a mathematical term as such. Conic sections are circles,
ellipses, parabolas and hyperbolas. As a linguistic expression, the
sentence is grammatically of the same form as one about kinds of
ships, flowers, metals or any existential kind. But as mathematical
terms, the words have non-existential force. Hence, circle, ellipse
are not lands of conic sections, but are ways of being the abstract
universal in question. Conic section is a multiplicative conjunction
of the characters of conicity and sectionality; circle is circularity,
etc. Circle, ellipse, etc. do not constitute the extension of the
term in question, for they are the category (abstract universal)
"conic sectionality" when that is made determinate.
What has been said indicates the need for a distinctive word to
designate the scope of the necessary conceptual contents of an
abstract universal or "class" in the sense of category as distinct
from the range of applicability of a denotative term. The use of
the word comprehension for this purpose is arbitrary as far as the
mere word is concerned. It is not arbitrary as far as a distinct
logical form, demanding some word by which to designate it, is
concerned. Right-angled, scalene and isosceles constitute, con-
junctively and disjunctively, the logical scope or comprehension of
362 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
triangularity. Such comprehension is necessary and therefore
must be differentiated from the contingency of extension of kinds. 3
It is not necessary to say much in addition about intension. It is
now used in at least three ways: To designate "meaning" in the
sense (1) of the signification of words of whatever logical form
words may be; (2) as a synonym for the set of characteristics con-
stituting the descriptive force of a denotative term; and (3) as a
synonym for the logical import of a connotative or attributive
abstract term. It is an arbitrary matter to which of the three uses
the application of the word intension is confined in a given context.
But in the interests of logical consistency it is far from being
arbitrary that it be restricted to one, and only one, application in
the same treatise. There are available the symmetrical terms
connotation (attribution) and comprehension with respect to
universals. Hence the use of intension to pair with extension in
the case of denotative terms is suggested by linguistic symmetry,
and also by the fact that otherwise there is no distinctive term to
designate the differential kind of meaning which belongs in-
trinsically to denotative terms; namely, a set of conjoined traits
employed to describe a kind. In any case, some linguistic device is
required to avoid the ambiguity otherwise attached to the word
meaning, and to differentiate the characteristic logical forms, of
description and definition. The two pairs, extension and intension
for use in connection with denotative terms — and comprehension
and definition (for use in connection with connotative terms)
meet the needs of clarity and completeness.
6. Collective Terms. The ambiguous nature of the word "col-
lection" has been pointed out in discussion of the quantitative
phase of propositions. Collection is applied indifferently to an
indefinite aggregate of units, illustrated by a heap or pile; to a
group of units limited by description, as a regiment, and to a
qualitative whole in which the characteristics of units comprised
are modified by the whole of which they are parts — as when it is
affirmed, "The first regiment of New York fought bravely at the
battle of Chateau Thierry," in which it is not necessarily involved
3 Cf. the earlier remarks about circles and brackets as modes of symbolization
of two logical forms; ante } pp. 306-7.
TERMS OR MEANINGS 363
that every individual soldier was brave. The old puzzles about the
last straw which broke the camel's back, or the particular hair by-
losing which a man becomes bald, are further illustrations of a
qualitative meaning.
The subject of collective terms is of special importance in re-
lation to the general position that is taken for two reasons. One
concerns certain difficulties which have arisen in the logic of
mathematics. It is said, for example that numbers form an infinite
collection in the sense of aggregate. This notion tends to as-
similate numbers to existential objects to which the word collec-
tion is usually applied and in the case of which units are theoreti-
cally capable of enumeration. Puzzles then arise which would
not arise if it were recognized that number (being number, as
distinct from a number) is an operative formula for determining
aggregates and collections, but it is not itself a finite collection, nor
an infinite aggregate. Even if it be necessary to define number in
such a way as to permit or prescribe an infinite aggregate as a mode
or way of being number, it follows in no way that number as
defined is itself any kind of a collection or aggregate.
The second reason is connected with certain alleged paradoxes.
There is the example of the "self -representative series." The map
of England is said to constitute a reflexive serial collection. A map
is drawn of England. It is asserted that in order to be complete
the map must itself include the map drawn, a condition which re-
quires drawing another map and so on in a non-terminating collec-
tion of maps. But drawing the map is an existential operation. As
such it takes place at a given date. There is nothing in the act of
drawing or in its product to require the drawing of another map.
If, for some practical, non-logical reason, it is desirable to draw
another map of England on which the old map is represented, that
action is another temporal occurrence. The supposed paradox
arises only when there is a shift from the existential to the concep-
tual. When, the phrase "drawing a map" stands for something
purely conceptual, or a mode of operation, it is a definition or a
formula for an operation to be executed. In this case the number
of maps to be drawn and the objects they are to be maps of are inde-
terminate as far as the conception is concerned. A map or a collec-
364 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
tion of maps thus depends upon conditions and operations that are
existential in nature and hence are not "implied" by the concep-
tion.
There is also the alleged paradox in the case of the soldier barber
who is ordered by his superior office to shave all the men and only
the men in his company who do not shave themselves. It is then
asked, is the barber himself comprised in the collection of men to
be shaved? If he is one who does belong in the collection of those
who do not shave themselves, he disobeys the order if he does
not shave himself. In case, however, he obeys the order and does
shave himself, he is one who shaves himself, and hence equally
disobeys the order. The appearance of contradiction vanishes the
moment reference to time and date is introduced, and since the act
of shaving a given person is existential, such a reference must be
introduced implicitly in the context or else explicitly. When the
act of shaving is interpreted existentially and temporally, the com-
mand is unambiguous and there is no difficulty in determining how
it is to be obeyed. If the barber is one who has not in the past
shaved himself, then he obeys the order by now shaving himself;
if he has shaved in the past, he obeys the order by nonj) abstaining
from shaving himself.* The contradiction alleged to exist arises
only when the existential and the conceptual are confusedly
identified.
So-called reflexives are said to involve a self -representative and
hence non-terminating collection. Similar analysis applies. Take,
for example, such seemingly reflexive relations as "love of love,"
"hate of hate." The love and hate forming the first member of
each pair are concrete nouns, having existential reference. They
designate acts performed at some time or place, whether once or
repeatedly. The love and hate which are second members of the
paired terms are of a different form. They are identifiable with
the first terms members only verbally. For they designate abstract
characters, which, of course, are conceptual, not existential.
Change the wording to read "love of benevolence" and "hatred of
malevolence" and any shadow of a reflexive relation and of a self-
_ *Cf. P. W. Bridgman, Scripta Mathematics ■, Vol. II, p. 113. The interpreta-
tion given above is not identical with that of Bridgman but he shows clearly
that the temporal quality of acts of shaving is the reason there is no paradox.
TERMS OR MEANINGS 365
representative collection disappears. "Hating" is a concrete act;
"hate" as the object of the act is abstract.
A collection is distinguished in form from both a kind and from
a class in the sense of category. A dictionary is, from one point of
view, a collection of words. At a given place and time, the number
of words is definitely enumerable, although a dictionary may exhibit
increase or decrease in the number of words forming the collection
in subsequent or former editions. Like a postage stamp collection, it
is capable of variation in number at different times, but at a given
time it has just the number of units which it does have. The generic
terms applying to a kind of objects, applies to all of an indefinite
number of objects marked by specified characteristics, but while
it is indefinite, instead of definite, in the number of singulars to
which it refers, it is ideally completely determinate as to the set of
characteristics it denotes. A category is constituted by the interre-
lation of two abstract universals, each of which may be complex.
Hence, once more, number is not a collection but is a formula for
operatively determining collections, while a number, 2 or 1700, is a
collection satisfying the conditions prescribed by the definition of
number. The collection, however, is not a collection of objects or
existential singulars but is a collection of operations: namely, the
operations which determine, according to the definition of number
in the abstract, units. Thus 2 means that the operation which
constitutes 1 is performed twice.
7. T articular Terms. The word "particular" is ambivalent. It is
sometimes a synonym for "certain" in its sense of definitely
specified, as in the phrase "the particular man of whom you are
speaking." In this usage, "particular" is a synonym for "singular,"
and there is nothing further to be said of its logical meaning. The
logical force of "particular" as distinct from singular, is found when
the word is applied to existential materials which have not as yet
been ordered with respect to their status as evidential data. At an
early stage of inquiry, there may be an accumulation of observed
materials whose relevancy and force in respect to the problem in
hand is uncertain. They are fragmentary and partial, and in this
capacity are particular. As a rule, the plural form "particulars"
designates possible data while the word "particular" designates a
specified determinate existential subject-matter.
366 PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS
I return, in closing, to a point already discussed, now taking
it up in its wider theoretical bearings. There is a controversy as to
the intension of singular terms. Mill, as we have seen, holds that
proper names have no "meaning," while other logicians hold that
demonstratives have no meaning except as expressly qualified by a
descriptive term. Jevons, on the other hand, says "Logicians have
erroneously asserted that singular terms are devoid of meaning in
intension, the fact being that they exceed all other terms in that
kind of meaning." 4
With respect to Mill's contrary position, we may cite in addition
to what has already been quoted, his statement that proper names,
like the mark made by the robber in the story Arabian Nights,
are "simply marks used to enable individuals to be made subjects of
discourse." If a word is understood simply in the sense of sounds
or visible marks employed, then it is true of any word that it is
either "simply a mark used" to enable something, whether a singular
or a kind, to be used as a subject of inquiry, or else an indicator of
something to be said about them during the course of inquiry — the
latter being the case in words which designate conceptual material.
But as a word or symbol, every word has the meaning, either in
intension or comprehension, of that which it stands for — its
referent. That an existential term, denoting a singular, enables that
for which it stands to be a subject of discourse and inquiry, is
possible only because it already has some differentiated and dif-
ferential intension; otherwise it would be so completely indetermi-
nate that it could not identify and mark out anything in such a way
that the latter could be the subject of one mode of discourse or one
inquiry in distinction from thousands or millions of other predica-
tions that would be possible. When Mill admits that a "mark" has
a special intent he admits in effect what he denies in words.
It follows that Jevons' position is the only one that can be taken.
What is demonstratively denoted by a proper name is inexhaustible
in its meaning or intension, instead of being lacking in all such
meaning. Take London, England, for example, as a conventional
mark enabling a singular object to be the subject of discourse and
inquiry. Its meaning in intension is first of all topographical, but it
extends far beyond physical location and area. Its meaning in in-
4 W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, p. 27.
TERMS OR MEANINGS 367
tension is historic, political, cultural; it includes a past, a present and
potentialities not yet realized. What is true of its intension is that
it cannot be completely circumscribed at any given time by any set
of descriptive qualifications; i.e., its meaning in intension is inex-
haustible. The same statement holds in principle of any singular
term, for such a term denotes a spatio-temporal career.
The wide theoretical bearings that were mentioned render the
particular point at issue a critical one for logical doctrine. It links
up with the view that the subject-matter of the logical subject of
judgment is a discriminated determination of certain elements
within a larger qualitative situation, the material in question being
selected to describe a problem and to provide conditions which test
any proposed solution. Secondly, it links up also with the doctrine
that singulars and kinds are determined in correspondence with
each other, there being no singular which is not of some kind (or
having characteristics which descriptively determine a kind), and
no kind which is not ultimately a kind of existential singulars.
Thirdly, it is consistent with the denial of atomic particulars and
atomic propositions. For the ultimate ground of belief in atomic
terms and propositions is the idea that demonstratives lack all
descriptive qualification. It also discloses the gratuitous nature of
that doctrine of names which holds that in an ideal language every
singular would have its own unique name standing in one-one
correspondence with it. It also points to the fallacy in the doctrine
that while the conception of kinds and of generic propositions has a
place in logical theory, the theory about the latter should be so
formal as to provide no place for concrete existential subject-
matters. Current logical formalism in logic claims to be allied ex-
clusively with non-existential propositions such as are exemplified in
mathematics, while at the same time it recognizes propositions of
existential import, covering up the inconsistency by confusing the
two modes of the general, the generic and the universal.
Part Four
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
CHAPTER XIX
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE:
FORM AND MATTER
It is commonplace that logic is concerned in some sense with
form rather than with matter. Such words as "and, or, any,
only, none, all, if, then, is and is not" are not material con-
stituents of propositions. They express ways in which material is
arranged for logical purposes, no matter how "logical" is defined.
Such sentences as "John loved Mary" and "Peter disliked Joan"
have the same form but different material contents, while "Two
plus two equals four," and "The sum of three interior angles of a
triangle equal two right angles" are of the same form in spite of the
difference of material content. 1 Again, the proposition "Carnegie is
wealthy" and "Millionaires are wealthy" are of different forms,
since the first proposition is about a singular as one of a kind, and
the other is about a relation of kinds.
The intrinsic place of form in logical subject-matter is more than
a commonplace. It states the character which marks off logical
subject-matter from that of other sciences. It provides the funda-
mental postulate of logical theory. Recognition of this fact does
not, however, settle the question of what the relation of form and
matter is; whether there is any relation, what it is, or whether there is
complete absence of relation. This problem is so fundamental that
the way in which it is dealt with constitutes the basic ground of
difference among logical theories. Those which hold there is no
relation between form and matter are formalist^. They differ
among themselves; some hold the doctrine that forms constitute a
realm of metaphysical possibilities; others that forms are syntactical
1 "Material" as used in the connection above is not to Jbe identified with
existentially material. Conceptual subject-matter is material in a non-existential
proposition.
371
372 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
relations of words in sentences. The opposed type of logical theory
holds that forms are forms- of -matter. The differential trait of the
variety of this type of theory expounded in this book is that logical
forms accrue to subject-matter in virtue of subjection of the latter in
inquiry to the conditions determined by its end — institution of a
warranted conclusion.
1. Introduction. There is no need to repeat or summarize here
the arguments that have been adduced in support of this position.
It is pertinent, however, to repeat, with some expansion, a point
earlier made; namely, that the idea in question (that forms accrue to
material which did not possess them in its original form) is a vera
hypothesis, not a conception invented to serve the ad hoc need of
a special logical theory. There are many instances in which original
crude material takes on definitive form because of operations which
order that material so that it can subserve a definite end. Indeed,
this sort of thing happens wherever original raw materials are re-
arranged to meet requirements imposed by use of them as means to
consequences. The supervening of form upon matter did not await
the rise of logic. It would be truer, on the contrary, to say that
logic itself had to wait until various arts had instituted operations by
means of which crude materials took on new forms to adapt them
to the function of serving as means to consequences.
Of the numerous illustrations which might be given, two will be
selected as exemplary, namely, legal forms, and esthetic forms. The
formal nature of juristic conceptions is notorious, so much so that
many times during the history of law there has been good ground
for complaint that forms of procedure had become the controlling
factor at the expense of substance. In such cases, they ceased to be
forms-of-matter and were so isolated that they became purely
f ormalistic — a fact which perhaps contains an instructive lesson for
logic, since it is clear that legal forms should be such as to serve the
substantial end of providing means for settling controversies. More-
over, the objective aim is to provide in advance, as far as possible,
means for regulation of conduct so that controversies are not so
likely to arise. Rules for ordering human relations, by prescribing
the ways in which transactions should be conducted exist in order
to avert conflicts, to settle them when they occur and to obtain
redress for the injured party. These rules of law provide multi-
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 373
farious examples of the ways in which "natural" modes of action
take on new forms because of subjection to conditions formulated
in the rules. As new modes of social interaction and transactions
give rise to new conditions, and as new social conditions install
new kinds of transactions, new forms arise to meet the social need.
When, for example, a new type of industrial and commercial
enterprise required large capital, the form known as limited liability
supervened upon the forms constituting the legal rules of partner-
ship.
A simpler example is found in the legal form known as contract.
Agreements between persons who combine their activities for a
joint end in which one person promises to do something to con-
tribute towards reaching the end and the other person agrees to do
something else, are examples of "natural" or crude modes of action.
Such reciprocal engagements must have arisen at an early period in
social life. But as agreements multiplied and the problem of their
execution became pressing, as business became less and less a matter
of direct barter and more and more a matter of agreement to ex-
change goods and services at a future time, certain forms arose to
differentiate among kinds of reciprocal engagements. Some of them
were treated as mere promises, failure to execute which brought
no enforceable penalties, while others were such that failure to
execute them imposed a liability upon one party and conferred an
enforceable claim upon the other party.
There is nothing in the mere act of promising which differen-
tiates one kind from the other. Certain purely formal traits had
to be added to the making of a promise in order to render it en-
forceable; say, a seal, and evidence of a "consideration." The sum
of these forms define a contract. But while the conception of
contract is purely formal, it is (1) a form-of -material, and (2) it
accrued to prior non-formalized material in order that the ends
served by that material might be attained on a wide scale in a
stabilized way. As commercial transactions became more com-
plex, sub-kinds of contract arose, each kind of transaction having
its own distinctive formal traits.
Men did not wait for the rise of logical theory to engage in
inquiry in order to reach conclusions, any more than they waited
for the law of contracts to make reciprocal promises. But experi-
374 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
ence in inquiry, as in conduct of business transactions, made it
evident that the purpose for which inquiry is carried on cannot be
fulfilled on a wide scale or in an ordered way except as its ma-
terials are subject to conditions which impose formal properties on
the materials. When these conditions are abstracted, they form
the subject-matter of logic. But they do not thereby cease to be,
in their own reference and function, forms-of -subject-matter.
That the objects of the fine arts, of painting, music, architecture,
poetry, the drama, etc., are what they are as esthetic objects in
virtue of forms assumed by antecedent crude materials is too ob-
vious for argument. No one acquainted with the material is at any
loss to distinguish between Doric and Gothic forms in architecture
or between symphonic and jazz forms in the arrangement of tonal
material. Similarly, in respect to land, there are forms of record,
etc., that have to be conformed to in order to give ownership a
legal status. No one has any doubt about the difference between
this sort of form with respect to land and that which makes a
landscape an esthetic object. Poetry is marked off from prosaic
description by some special form. That its material existed inde-
pendently of and prior to artistic treatment, and that the relations
by which that material takes on esthetic form (rhythm and symme-
try for example) also exist independently, is undeniable. But it re-
quires the deliberate effort which constitutes art, and the deliberate
efforts constituting various arts, to bring the antecedent natural
materials and relations together in the way that forms a work of
art. The forms that result are capable of abstraction. As such
they are the subject-matter of esthetic theory. But no one could
construct a work of art out of the forms in isolation. Esthetic
forms very definitely accrue to material in so far as materials are
re-shaped to serve a definite purpose. 2
2. The Failure of Formalism. The issue of strict logical for-
malism, of any theory which postulates forms apart from mat-
ter of logical forms versus forms-of-matter, comes to a head in the
question of the relation to method in the natural sciences. For if
f ormalistic logic is unable to deal with the characteristics of scien-
tific method, a strong, if indirect, confirmation of the position
*What I have said in Art and Experience, in chapter VII, on The Natural
History of Form can be carried over, mutatis mutandis, to logical forms.
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 375
taken in this volume is obtained. It would at first seem as if pure
formalism should lead those who accept that doctrine to abstain
entirely from any reference whatever to method in the natural
sciences, since that method is truistically concerned with factual
materials. Such, however, is not the case. Formalistic logic is not
content to leave the topic of method in the existential sciences
severely alone. Belief in some sort of connection is usually ex-
pressed by the phrase "logic and scientific method." Another
expression conveying the idea of connection is the phrase "ap-
plied logic."
Both expressions serve to beg the issue, or at least to disguise the
fact that there is an issue. In the case of the seemingly innocent
phrase "applied logic," the real issue is whether or not the expres-
sion has any meaning at all when logic is defined in terms of forms
entirely independent of matter. For the issue is precisely whether
such forms can be applied to matter. If they cannot, applied logic
is a meaningless term. For the question is not whether logical
forms are applied, in the sense of being used, in inquiry into exis-
tential subject-matter, but whether they could be so used if they
were purely formalistic. The fact that investigation into natural
phenomena, when it is scientifically conducted, involves mathe-
matical propositions, certified purely formally, may be cited, for
example, as an instance of "applied" logic. The fact is not only
admitted, but, as has been shown in the course of previous dis-
cussions, is necessary. The admission proves nothing, however, as
to absence of relation between form and matter. It but raises the
problem of the conditions under which the application or use of
non-existential propositions in determination of propositions hav-
ing material content and import takes place.
It is precisely on this fundamental matter of conditions of ap-
plication that the formalistic theory breaks down. It would seem
to be evident in the very nature of the case that a form which is
completely indifferent to matter is not applicable to any one
subject-matter rather than to another, much less capable of indicat-
ing in any selective way to what matter it shall be applied. If the
matter in question were completely determined as formed matter
when it is given, the problem would not arise, and it may be argued
with a certain show of plausibility that such is the case in mathe-
376 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
matics. But with respect to the subject-matter of the natural
sciences, no such plea can be made. Either logical forms have
nothing at all to do with it (so that the question of applicability
does not arise) or their application is such as to introduce into, or
cause to supervene upon, the original subject-matter those prop-
erties which give it scientific standing. It is not easy to see how
this supervention can take place unless logical forms are capable
of somehow selecting just that specific subject-matter to which
they should apply in any given scientific investigation, and are
also capable of arranging or ordering that subject-matter so that
conclusions of scientific validity are arrived at. For the minimum
meaning that can be assigned to "application" in physical inquiry
is selection (involving elimination) and arrangement. The brunt
of the issue, moreover, is not faced until it is recognized that in
any case the problem of what existential materials are to be se-
lected and of how just those materials are to be ordered, is a
differential one. For purely in the abstract, forms if they apply
to any one subject-matter, apply equally and indifferently to all
subject-matters, while in natural inquiries there is always the prob-
lem of determining some special materials in some special order.
Whatever may be thought of this general argument, it at least
serves to define what is meant by the necessity of determining the
conditions under which pure and empty forms are applicable.
Discussion recurs, accordingly, to this problem. It is admitted
that non-existential propositions, in the way of hypothetical uni-
versal^ are necessary in order to arrive at fully grounded conclu-
sions in natural science. This consideration is conclusive against
traditional empiristic logic (of the type of Mill) which holds that
a sufficient number of singular propositions will "prove" a gen-
eralization. But refutation of this position is far from substantiat-
ing the doctrine of the merely formal character of such proposi-
tions as they are used in natural science. For the crux of the
problem is how in any given case the universal propositions em-
ployed acquire that content which is a condition of their determi-
nate applicability. It is not enough that the propositional function
"If Y, then X" should be seen to be a required form for reaching
any scientifically grounded conclusions. It is necessary that Y
should be given a determinate value such that X may also be given
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 377
a determinate value. In addition, it is an acknowledged principle
that no universal proposition "implies 5 ' singulars, so that in any
case there is no direct transition from universal to existential
propositions. Suppose, for example, that, in some unexplained
way, the purely formal "If Y, then X" has acquired content, as in
the following: "If anything is human, then it is mortal." It is
one thing to hold that such a proposition has directive force in
instituting operations of controlled observation that determine
whether any existing object has the characteristic traits describing
the kind "human" from which it may be warrantably inferred that
anything of this kind is "mortal." But logically it is a very differ-
ent thing to hold that, apart from its operational function in
instituting controlled observation, it is applicable to existence. In
short, we are brought to the conclusion that application is a mat-
ter of existential operations executed upon existential materials, so
that in the natural sciences at least, a universal proposition has a
purely functional status and form.
In the above illustration, it was assumed that somehow or other
the purely formal propositional function "If Y, then X," has ac-
quired some content so that Y has the meaning "human" neces-
sarily related to the value "mortal." It is evident without argument
that unless definite values are "insertible," the formal propositional
functions have no application even operationally to any one exis-
tential subject-matter rather than to another. In what way then
are these special values given to X and Y? Why in a specific in-
quiry can we not substitute the values that would give the proposi-
tion "If angelic, then mortal"? Or, "If diseased, then immortal"?
Such illustrations, capable of indefinite multiplication, make it
clear that the necessary relation in question is one of contents hav-
ing a certain form, not one of mere forms apart from content.
The question recurs with added force: How can pure forms ac-
quire related contents? What are the logical conditions under
which they acquire those contents without which the application
to existence, that marks inquiry in the natural sciences, is impos-
sible?
Suppose that somehow the propositional form u y0x" (or yRx)
has in some unspecified way gained enough content so that it is
expressed as "x is assassinated." Ignoring the problem of how the
378 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
material content "assassinated" was introduced, the question still
remains why one value rather than any other of an indefinite num-
ber of possible values is given to x. It is doubtless a matter of
common knowledge that Julius Caesar and Presidents Lincoln and
Garfield were assassinated, and that Cromwell and George Wash-
ington were not. But how did it become a matter of public in-
formation? It would be absurd to say that it became such because
of the form of the propositional function. The alternative is the
obvious one that it was established by observation and record.
The conception of "assassination," exclusively distinct from other
modes of dying, is necessarily involved. Logically, the disjunc-
tive form just noted, and the hypothetical proposition "If such
and such differential characteristics, then this specific kind, assassi-
nation" are logically necessary. But they are conditions to be
satisfied, not inherent properties; and they can only be satisfied by
means of extensive and complex existential operations performed
upon existential materials.
The assumption that pure forms constitute the required applica-
tion is one more instance of confusion of the functional and direc-
tive force of a formal logical relation in prescribing conditions to
be satisfied with an intrinsic structural property. Take the ex-
ample frequently used in contemporary logical texts, "X is mortal,"
which, it is said, becomes a proposition when Socrates is "substi-
tuted" for X. Now either "Socrates" is here an empty symbol,
devoid of content and reference, or (1) it has meaning and (2) that
meaning is such as to be existentially applicable. If it is a formal
symbol, nothing is gained by substituting it for X. If it has mean-
ing in application, the meaning does not follow from the proposi-
tional function save by means of observations and observable records
which determine (1) that an object, Socrates exists (or has existed
at some definite place-time) and (2) that this object possessed the
characteristics describing the kind men.
The propositional function "X is man" is then an expression of
highly equivocal form. As soon as it is stated in its proper form
(as a hypothetical universal), it is evident that operations indicated
by the formula as a rule for something to be done, are necessary
to determine the existence of an object satisfying the conditions
laid down in the function. "X is human," in other words, formu-
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 379
lates a problem: — that of discovering the object or objects that
are such as to possess the properties prescribed by the term "hu-
man" — a condition which requires that the meaning of "human"
be already determinate. It follows that existential "application"
necessarily (1) involves an existential problem with reference to
which the contents of the non-existential propositions have been
selected and ordered, and (2) the operational use of the formally
non-existential proposition as a means of observational search for
objects that satisfy the conditions it prescribes.
It is pertinent to repeat in this context the point which has been
repeatedly made about doctrinal confusion of the two forms of the
general proposition, namely the generic and the universal. For
this confusion is absolutely indispensable for direct passage from
universal propositions to propositions about a singular as of a kind
and to propositions about a relation of kinds. The usual line of
reasoning in support of the confusion runs about as follows: A
general proposition (in the sense of generic) such as "All men are
mortal," in the sense that "Each and every man who has ever
lived, who is now living or who will ever live, has died or will
die" (evidently a proposition of existential import) is said, quite
correctly, not to refer to any specific singular but to any one of an
indefinite number of singulars, the existential range of which in-
cludes many singulars not now capable of observation. It affirms,
in other words, a connection between the set of traits which de-
scribes mankind and the set of traits which describes the kind
mortal; or those subject to the occurrence of the event, dying. It
is also affirmed (correctly) that ultimately the warrant for assert-
ing this connection is a proposition which affirms that the charac-
ters "being human" and "being mortal" are necessarily interrelated.
Short of such a proposition, the proposition in its existential force
is at best a generalization, in the sense of an extension, of what has
been observed in some cases to an indefinite number of unobserved
cases. Such an extension is "empirically" confirmed by observa-
tion of a large number of events actually occurring. But it is, in
theory, open to nullification as a generalization at any time, as
much so as is the proposition "All swans are white." What takes
the proposition out of this precarious form is, as a matter of fact,
biological and physiological investigations which indicate a neces-
380 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD ^
sary interrelation between the characters that define "living" and
those which define "dying"— as conceptual structures.
So far there is no confusion. But the fact that the proposition
"All men are mortal" does not refer to any specified singular as
such, or to any one man rather than to any other, is illegitimately
interpreted to mean that it does not refer to any singular whatever.
The proposition is then converted into the non-existential proposi-
tion, "// human, then mortal" The conversion is illegitimate be-
cause it is one thing, logically, to make propositions about traits
or characteristics which describe a kind in "abstraction" from any
given singular of the kind, and a radically different thing to make
a proposition about abstractions qua abstract. The absence of
specific reference to one singular rather than another is no ground
for a proposition free from any existential reference. There is no
logical road from "No specific singular" to "No singular what-
ever" in the sense of abstraction from existential reference as such.
Yet this is the impossible road taken by logical doctrine when it
assimilates the form of generic propositions to those of universals.
The fact that in the context of discussion of logical forms it is
expressly pointed out that singular and generic propositions — all
propositions of the / and O form — have existential reference, while
no universal of the A or E form has existential reference, shows
that the confusion in question is not an accidental slip, or a case of
occasional carelessness. The confusion is inherently essential to
any doctrine which (1) holds that logical forms are formal in the
sense of being independent of content, factual or conceptual, and
yet (2) are capable of material application — as is inherently in-
volved in the methods of the natural sciences if the latter have any
connection at all with logic. In spite of the appearance of the
word all in the proposition "All men are mortal" (as a proposition
referring to each and every singular of the kind described by the
sets of distinguishing traits that determine respectively the kinds
"human beings" and "subject to death"), the proposition is logi-
cally an / proposition — a fact recognized in the doctrine expressly
stated (in another context) that / and O propositions alone refer
to existence. 3
3 A conspicuous case of the confusion in question is found in the treatment of
the null class. That the kinds Indian Popes, Emperors of the United States,
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 381.
I recur to the earlier statement that while scientific method
is not possible without non-existential if-then propositions, and
while such propositions are necessary conditions of scientific
method, they are not its sufficient conditions. An hypothesis con-
cerns what is possible, and a proposition regarding possibles is in-
dispensable in inquiry that has scientific standing. The hypothesis
is formulated in an abstract if-then proposition. It then formu-
lates a rule and method of experimental observation. Conse-
quences of the execution of the indicated operations define
application in the only logically coherent sense of that conception.
One indispensable condition of application in the case of method
in natural science is, therefore, that the contents of the hypotheti-
cal proposition be themselves determined by prior existential in-
quiries in such a way that the contents are capable of directing
further operations of observation. Moreover, even in such cases,
the fallacy of affirming the antecedent because the consequent is
afErmed is committed, unless independent operations of extensive
observation have affected the afErmed relation of contents with a
probability coefficient. The validity of any such coefficient is
conditioned upon the nature of other existential propositions and
their material consequences.
The case of ordered discourse in which all propositions are, as
such, non-existential in import, and which form a series in virtue
of the implicatory, as distinct from the inferential, function affords
at best but a seeming exception to the principle that forms are
forms-of -matter. For the sequential order of any such series is
determined in all cases, in which the final proposition has ap-
plicability, by material conditions. Theoretically or in the ab-
have no members, and are instances of a "null class" is a statement having
radically different logical form from expressions like, say, circular-square, or
vicious-virtue. The first is an instance of contingency; up to a given date, no
such singular has existed or, if it has existed, has not been observed. The second
set of examples express necessary exclusion of an instance, since the related
conceptions contradict each other. The case of vicious-virtue is perhaps es-
pecially instructive. There can be no doubt that there occur actions which
conventionally are called virtuous but which, from the standpoint of some
ethical theories, are inherendy vicious and vice versa. This fact does not
signify that the definitions of vice and virtue are compatible with each other,
but that from the standpoint of one ethical theory the definitions of vice and
virtue held by its adherents are incompatible with the conceptions held by ad-J
herents of another ethical theory.
382 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
stract, an indefinite variety of series of implicatory propositions is
possible— as in mathematics. But— as appears in mathematical
physics— mathematical implicatory series, in all instances in which
applicability enters as a condition, have their contents and their
order (in determining a final hypothetical proposition) controlled
by the observed existential conditions that form the problem re-
quiring a generalized solution. Otherwise, contents would be
taken and ordered in such an indeterminate way that even if the
order were necessary with respect to rigor of implication, there
would be no assurance whatever of any kind of final applicability.
We are again forced to the conclusion that formal relations state
conditions to be materially satisfied.
The arguments adduced show incontestably that pure forms,
where "pure" means "completely independent of relation to
meaning-contents" (factual and conceptual) cannot possibly de-
termine application in the sense in which application is necessary
in the natural sciences. There is one especial instance frequently
given in recent logical treatises which is supposed to prove that a
universal proposition is capable of direct determination of an in-
ference regarding existential matters. It is, accordingly, worth
examining, since this will disclose the typical fallacy involved in
all instances of the doctrine in question. The example referred
to is the following: From the if-then proposition "If there are
more inhabitants in a town than there are hairs on the head of any
inhabitant of that town, then some two (or more) inhabitants
have the same number of hairs on their heads." There is, of course,
no possible doubt that if the conditions stated in the antecedent
clause are satisfied, then the state of affairs set forth in the conse-
quent clause will follow. But as far as an existential proposition
about a person or persons in any actual town are concerned, the
proposition only raises a question: Are the conditions satisfied?
This question is one of material fact. It can be answered only
by independent operations of observation that are directed by the if-
then proposition in question. This proposition, when so employed,
renders it unnecessary to count the hairs on the head of every
person in a town. It is necessary only to have a dependable esti-
mate of the number of hairs on the head of the bushiest-haired
person that can be found and also have a dependable estimate of
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 383
the number of inhabitants of the town. Given these existential
data, the inferred proposition that some two persons do (or do
not) have the same number of hairs on their heads will be war-
ranted. The conclusion that they do not have, would be more
likely in the case of a hamlet where there are only a few in-
habitants. Observational data would suffice in the case of a very
large city like London or New York to warrant the existential
proposition that two or more (unspecified) persons do have the
same number of hairs on their heads. But it would do so not be-
cause that proposition is "implied" by the hypothetical proposi-
tion in question, but because of determination by observations of
existential data, taken in connection with the hypothetical proposi-
tion as the rule for their selection and ordering.
A similar mixing of propositions of two different logical forms
is found in the notorious case of Epimenides and Cretans as liars.
Epimenides who is a Cretan, according to an existential proposi-
tion, affirms that "All Cretans are liars." Hence, it is argued, a
contradiction or "paradox" inevitably arises. Unless Epimenides
speaks the truth, it does not follow that All Cretans are liars, and
if he speaks the truth, then the proposition follows that "Some Cre-
tans tell the truth" and hence the proposition that "All Cretans
are liars" is false. Only a little analysis is required to show that
if the proposition "All Cretans are liars" is a generic proposition,
meaning that a disposition to lie is one of the characteristic traits that
mark off Cretans as a kind from other kinds of Greeks (or of human
beings) , it does not follow that every Cretan is necessarily a liar and
that he always lies. For the trait of lying describes a Cretan only
in conjunction with other circumstantial, or temporo-spatial, con-
ditions which are contingent since they are existential. In other
words, if the proposition is generic, some Cretan may sometimes
tell the truth, and there is no contradiction. On the other hand,
if the ambiguous term "all" is interpreted in the sense of a neces-
sary relation between being a Cretan and being a liar, or as the
contents of a universal, instead of a generic, proposition, it poses a
question as far as any existential proposition is concerned. If
Epimenides tells the truth when he says "All Cretans are liars"
then by definition he is not in fact a Cretan. For denying the
consequent denies the antecedent. If on the other hand, it is
384 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
found, by adequate observation of existential data, that he is lying
then it is necessary to revise the hypothetical universal proposition
in question— a state of affairs that always occurs when application
of a universal proposition to existential condition is found to yield
data that are not in accord with the requirements of the universal.
The conclusion of the analysis is that only a mixing of the two
forms, the generic and the universal, produces the alleged contra-
diction. 4
Exactly the same analysis applies to the existential conclusion
that in a country having a monogamous system, it can be inferred
that the number of husbands and wives is equal without having to
go through the tedious process of enumeration of the actual num-
ber of husbands and wives. For independent operations of ob-
servation are required to determine whether a given country has
or has not a monogamous system. The same holds in the case of
the inference that in a given hall the number of seats and the num-
ber of persons may be determined to be equal without counting
the number of either. For again, it requires independent observa-
tion to determine that every seat is in fact occupied. The source
of fallacy in all these instances is that, first, cases are taken
whose materials have been prepared by prior existential operation,
and, secondly, that the way in which they were prepared is ig-
nored, the ignoring being here equivalent to denial.
The discussion, so far, has supported the doctrine that logical
forms are forms-of-matter on a negative ground: namely, the
contradictions that exist upon the alternative basis. The positive
support of the doctrine is the fact that in scientific inquiry, specific
contents, factual or conceptual, as well as forms in which they
are ordered, are determined in strict correspondence with each
other. An attempt to justify this statement at this juncture would
be to repeat the analyses and conclusions of the whole two pre-
vious Parts. Instead of engaging in this superfluous task, the point
of issue will be approached by consideration of the principle that
is present in analogous subject-matters. The basic category of
4 A similar analysis applies to the alleged paradox of the "autological" and the
"heterological." In one set of propositions, the words have to do with a con-
ception or a category and in the other case with a word, which is existential.
These "paradoxes" occur only when the logical ambiguity of "class" (as meaning
both kind and category) is taken advantage of.
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 385
logic is order. It is also the basic category of all the arts. The
universal order of material contents in every intelligently directed
procedure is that of means-to-consequences; actual existential ma^
terials providing the "stuff," while the status of the material as
means requires operations of selection and of re-arrangement so
that special interactions may be instituted to effect the conse-
quences intended. At the outset, when a certain result is desired,
some existing material in its "natural" or crude state may be used
— as a stick conveniently at hand is used to pry a stone. In such
a case, required operations of observation are directed merely to
selection of a suitable stick. But when need for a certain kind
of consequence is recurrent, it becomes advisable to select just the
materials that lend themselves to formation of the tools that most
expeditiously and economically effect the intended end in a great
variety of temporal-spatial circumstances. Materials are then se-
lected and shaped to be levers. At a certain level of culture, the
lever may be simply a crowbar. But as need develops that con-
sequences be brought about in a widened variety of circumstances,
the principle of leverage is expanded and refined to include a
variety of physical devices, which, scientifically stated, avail them-
selves of the law of momenta to obtain mechanical "advantage."
An expert mechanic thus becomes acquainted, even apart from
comprehension of a scientifically formulated law, with a variety
of contrivances all of which are levers because, in spite of their
different sizes and shapes, they have the functional relation of be-
ing means to a specified distinctive kind of consequence.
Every tool, appliance, article of furniture and furnishings, of
clothing, every device for transportation and communication, thus
exemplifies practically and existentially the transformation of crude
materials into intentionally selected and ordered means so that
they are formed-matter; or, stated from the side of form, so that
there are forms-of -matter. Form and matter may become so in-
tegrally related to one another that a chair seems to be a chair and
a hammer a hammer, in the same sense in which a stone is a stone
and a tree is a tree. The instance is then similar to that of the
cases in which prior inquiries have so standardized meanings that
the form is taken to be inherent in matter apart from the function
of the latter; or (as in the case of some of the formalistic argu-
386 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
ments which have been criticized) matter is treated as if it were
itself purely formal— a conclusion drawn because integration of
form and matter is so completely accomplished.
These instances exemplify the principle stated in the first part
of this chapter; namely, that forms regularly accrue to matter in
virtue of the adaptation of materials and operations to one another
in the service of specified ends. They are here brought forward,
however, for a different but related purpose — namely, to illustrate
the principle that in all cases of f ormed-materials, form and matter
are instituted, develop and function in strict correspondence with
each other. Every tool (using the word broadly to include every
appliance and device instituted and used to effect consequences) is
strictly relational, the relational form being that of means-to-
consequences, while anything which serves as effective means has
physical existence of some sort.
1. The abstract relation of means-consequence may be formally
analyzed. It involves correspondence of material and procedural
means, a correspondence illustrated, in the field of tools, utensils,
articles of dress, etc., in the fact that materials and techniques are
reciprocally adapted to each other. Technical processes of reshap-
ing raw materials are invented so that they are capable of reshaping
the crude material to which they are applied to make the latter
function as means. The processes must be such as to be capable of
just those modes of application that are suited to the materials
with which they deal. Techniques once initiated are capable of in-
dependent development. As they are perfected, they not only
transform old materials expeditiously and economically, but they
are applied to crude materials previously not capable of use as
means. The new formed-matter thus produced leads to further
development of techniques and so on indefinitely, with no pos-
sibility, from the theoretical side, of setting a limit.
2. Any technique or set of procedural means must satisfy cer-
tain conditions of order so that it possesses formal properties. The
crudest technical procedure in reshaping crude material has, of
necessity, a definite initiation, termination and an intermediation
that connect the two limits. It has the formal properties of first,
last and intermediates — the latter being so essential as to define
even the word "means." The ordered transitive relation of first,
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 387
last and middle operations is formal and capable of abstraction be-
cause it constitutes a necessary interrelation of characters. Change
any one of them and the others are necessarily also modified.
Generalize the point here made and there emerges the conception
of serial order as an order necessary to matter qua formed-matters
from the point of view of all intelligent activity.
3. Because of the first point mentioned (the conjugate corre-
spondence of material and procedural means or techniques), the
serial order of procedure determines formal relations in the mate-
rials to which the techniques are applied. Even the crude primitive
techniques employed to effect objective consequences brought
about a crude differentiation between characteristic properties of
materials. Certain materials were found to be "good for" the
techniques by which clothing was produced; other materials for
making utensils in which to store or to cook materials, etc. As
techniques of smelting developed, characteristic differences in
mineral materials were automatically, so to say, noted in such a
way as to mark off different kinds of metals. The principle here
exemplified is generalized in the statement that differential charac-
teristics, describing different kinds, are instituted when and only
when materials are adjudged as means in connection with opera-
tions to accomplish specified objective consequences. An ac-
complished end, say, clothing, is generic. But it comes about
that different kinds of clothing are appropriate to different seasons,
occasions, and social castes. Different materials are such as to be
"good for" these differential ends: one kind for winter, another
for summer; one for war and another for peace; one for priests,
another for chiefs, and another for "common" people. Kinds
are distinguished and related in strict correspondence with each
other.
Were we to recur to the considerations adduced in the chapter
on the biological matrix of inquiry, we should note that the formal
relations of serial order are prefigured in organic life. There are
needs (in the sense of existential tensions); these needs can be
satisfied only through institution of a changed objective state of
affairs. Effectuation of this close, or consummatory state, de-
mands an ordered series of operations so adapted to one another
that they are co-adapted to arriving at the final close. If we com-
388 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
pare these natural organic cases of means in ordered relation to a
consequence one difference of importance appears. The "end" in
the case of the relation of activities and material conditions is, in
the case of the former, an end in the sense of a close or termina-
tion. In the case of the latter, there is an additive character. The
objective close in being foreseen and intended, becomes an end-m-
vieiv and thereby serves to direct intelligent selection and arrange-
ment of techniques and materials. But there is a common pattern
of relationship.
Upon the practical side, the considerations which have been
brought forward are so familiar as to be commonplaces. They
may seem, therefore, not worth noticing in the discussion of logi-
cal theory. But they are pertinent because they bring out a num-
ber of points that are fundamentally significant in logical theory.
The main considerations may be recapitulated as follows: (1) The
accruing of forms to matter in the case of inquiry is not a gratui-
tous hypothesis. (2) Whenever materials become formed-ma-
terials, there is involved a definite order, the serial. (3) This
order, being formal, may be abstracted and be formulated in such
a way that its implications are developed in discourse. (4) There
is continuity of development from the orderly relations of organic
life through the deliberately ordered relations of the cultural arts
to these characteristic of controlled inquiry.
It is important, in this connection, not to confuse the categories
of potentiality and actuality. Crude materials must possess quali-
ties such as permit and promote the performance of the specific
operations which result in formed-matter as means to end. But
(1) these qualities are but potentialities, and (2) they are dis-
covered to be the potentialities which they are only by means of
operations executed upon them with a view to their transformation
into means-to-consequences. At the outset, these operations of
transformation may be random and "accidental." In the progress
of culture, they become so controlled that they are experimental
in the scientific sense of that word. The first point is illustrated
in the fact that with the emergence of animal life certain materials
became foods. We may then say that these materials were foods
all the time and even that they are intrinsically or "by nature" foods.
Such a view confuses potentiality with actuality. Looking back,
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 389
we can validly affirm that these materials were edible. But they
are not foods in actuality until they are eaten and digested, i.e., un-
til certain operations are performed that give crude materials those
new properties which constitute them of the special kind foods.
The second point is illustrated in the fact that the difference be-
tween edible, non-edible, and poisonous properties was discovered
only by processes of trying and testing. Even tribes regarded as
primitive have found ways of instituting technical operations
which transform stuffs that are poisonous in their crude state into
means of nourishment. That qualities qua potentialities are ascer-
tained by experimental operations is proved by the fact that with
extension and refinement of physico-chemical operations the
range of things that are edible has been indefinitely extended.
Whether, for example, the attempt to produce milk "artificially"
will succeed or not is wholly a matter of available techniques, not
a theoretical matter save in the sense that some theory is necessary
to guide practical effort.
This relativity to operations of the qualities that constitute the
characteristic traits which describe kinds, together with the rela-
tivity of the discovery of the latter to execution of operations, is
fatal, as we saw earlier, to the classic doctrine that inherent natures
or essences define kinds. But it has another important bearing
upon logical theory. The previous discussion has been limited
to doctrines that make a sharp separation between form and mat-
ter. But there still exist logical theories which assign direct onto-
logical status to logical forms, although in a different way from
that of Aristotelian logic. These theories rest upon a basis of fact.
For they recognize that logical forms can apply to existential ma-
terial only in a thoroughly ungrounded, external, arbitrary fashion
unless material as existential has its own intrinsic capacity for tak-
ing on these forms. But this valid insight is misinterpreted by
means of the precise confusion of potentiality with actuality just
mentioned. Existence in general must be such as to be capable of
taking on logical form, and existences in particular must be capable
of taking on differential logical forms. But the operations which
constitute controlled inquiry are necessary in order to give actual-
ity to these capacities or potentialities.
The particular way in which in recent theory, logical forms
390 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
are given direct existential status (instead of indirect status
through their functions in inquiry) is a metaphysical interpreta-
tion of invariants. The use of certain mathematically formulated
constants in physical inquiry is an illustration, as far as it goes, of
the meaning of an invariant in its logical sense. If we generalize
what is involved, logical forms are invariants. For example, there
is no ordered discourse apart from the implicatory relation as a
constant, and there is no grounded inference apart from the in-
variant formal relation of conjunction of traits to descriptive de-
termination of kinds. But it does not follow from the fact that
"invariants" are necessary for the conduct of inquiries that yield
warranted knowledge that they are therefore necessary in and to
the existence which knowledge is about. Under the guise of a
valid principle, namely, that logical forms have existential refer-
ence, there is slipped in quite another principle; namely, a particu-
lar metaphysical conception about existence, and this special
preconception is then used to settle the meaning of logical in-
variants. Thereby logic is rendered heteronomous; or dependent
upon a metaphysical principle not itself arrived at by logically de-
termined methods. In scientific procedure, moreover, an invariant
is such in relation to a specified set of operations, while the view
criticized assumes that invariants are such absolutely.
The external character of the metaphysical assumption is strik-
ingly evident in that by definition it concerns existence, whereas
inquiry into existence can only arrive at conclusions having a co-
efficient of some order of probability. And it is obvious that con-
ceptions of a probable invariant and an immutable structure are
self-contradictory. Moreover, the conception is gratuitous. For
the necessary operational presence of invariant forms in arriving
(through inquiry) at warranted conclusions is completely ex-
plicable on the ground of competently controlled conduct of in-
quiry itself. Assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between
the forms of authentic knowledge and the forms of existence does
not arise from necessary conditions within the logic of inquiry.
It proceeds from some outside epistemological and metaphysical
source. r J
The net conclusion of both the critical and constructive por-
tions of the foregoing discussion is that the phrase "logic and
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 391
scientific method" has no valid meaning when "and" is taken to
mean an external relation between the two terms. For scientific
method both constitutes and discloses the nature of logical forms.
It constitutes them in the actual practice of inquiry 7 ; once brought
into being, they are capable of abstraction: — of observation, analy-
sis and formulation in and of themselves. In connection with this
conclusion, it is pertinent to summarize briefly the outcome of
some previous discussions.
1. The history of actual scientific advance is marked by the
adoption and invention of material devices and related techniques:
- — of complex and refined forms of apparatus and definite related
techniques of using apparatus. Even in the last half-century,
astronomical science has been revolutionized by invention and
use of such material instruments of inquiry as the spectroscope,
bolometer, ultra-violet glass, chemical emulsions in photography,
use of aluminum instead of mercury for coating mirrors, and the
techniques which have made possible construction of lenses eighty
inches in diameter and mirrors having a diameter of two hundred
inches. 5
2. The new data thus instituted do much more than provide
facts for confirming and refining old conceptions. They institute
a new order of problems whose solution requires a new frame of
conceptual reference. In particular, it was by the use of new
instruments and techniques that changes and relations of change
were disclosed in what had previously been taken as fixed; a proc-
ess that has gone on at an accelerated rate since the seventeenth
century. This change in the nature of data was both the source
and the product of the universal adoption of the experimental
method and of the new order of conceptions demanded by its suc-
cessful execution.
3. Upon the conceptual side, this scientific revolution was ac-
companied by a revolution in mathematical conceptions; again,
5 Cf. ante, pp. 252-3. The following passage is worth citation as one of the
comparatively few instances of recognition, from the side of theory, of the
importance of this point: "The reason why we are on a higher imaginative
level [in science] is not because we have finer imagination but because we
have better instruments. In science, the most important thing that has happened
in the last forty years, is the advance in instrumental design. . . . These instru-
ments have put thought on a new level." A. N. Whitehead, Science and the
Modern World, p. 166.
392 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
partly as cause and partly as effect. As long as Euclidean geome-
try was taken to be the exemplary model of mathematical method,
the underlying categories of mathematics were such as to be ap-
plicable only to structures fixed within certain limits. The logic
of deduction from first, and immutable truths then remained
supreme, wherever the necessity for general principles was ac-
knowledged. Cartesian analytics, the calculus, and subsequent de-
velopments were called for by the radically new emphasis placed
in scientific inquiry upon correlations of change, while independ-
ent development of mathematical conceptions disclosed in their
application to existence new, more refined and extensive problems
of correlated change.
In the meantime, the development of a genuinely empirical
theory of logic, one in accord with actual scientific practice, was
seriously retarded and deflected by adherence to an order of ideas
that had developed in the prescientific epoch. The incompatibil-
ity of this conceptual framework with the actual procedures and
conclusions of scientific inquiry strengthened, by reaction, the
position of the non-empirical a priori school. Mill's logic, as
representative of the earlier type of empiricism, is a noteworthy
combination of genuine concern for scientific method as the sole
source of valid logical theory with a misinterpretation of that
method, which is due to an adherence to notions about sensations,
particulars, and generalizations, that were formulated before the
rise of modern scientific method. The outcome was his denial of
the importance of conceptions; reduction of hypotheses to a
secondary "auxiliary" position; the idea that mere particulars can
"prove" a generalization, etc.
This chapter, in both its critical and constructive phases, is, then,
preparatory to detailed examination of the logic of scientific
method, as that is exhibited in the mathematical and in the natural
sciences. In a certain sense, the order of exposition of topics in
this treatise is the reverse of the order in which their contents
have actually developed. For, as just indicated, the special logical
interpretations which have been advanced represent the conclu-
sions of analysis of the logical conditions and implications of
scientific method, while in the interpretations that form the pre-
vious chapters they have been taken up, for the most part, on the
LOGIC AND NATURAL SCIENCE 393
ground of their logical status as such. The following chapters
thus serve both as an explicit formulation of the ultimate founda-
tions of the views previously expressed, and as a test of their
validity.
Because of the critical role of mathematics in physical science
and because also of the peculiarly formal character of mathemati-
cal subject-matter, the logical conditions of mathematical dis-
course will be taken up first in order of the topics that are
discussed.
CHAPTER XX
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE
hrs/x iHE ability of any logical theory to account for the distin-
guishing logical characteristics of mathematical conceptions
)[ and relations is a stringent test of its claims. A theory such
as the one presented in this treatise is especially bound to meet and
pass this test. For it has the twofold task of doing justice to the
formal character of the certification of mathematical propositions
and of showing not merely the consistency of this formal charac-
ter with the comprehensive pattern of inquiry, but also that
mathematical subject-matter is an outcome of intrinsic develop-
ments within that pattern. For reasons suggested in the closing
sentence of the last chapter, the interpretation of the logical
conditions of mathematical conceptions and relations must be
such as to account for the form of discourse which is intrin-
sically free from the necessity of existential reference while at the
same time it provides the possibility of indefinitely extensive exis-
tential reference— such as is exemplified in mathematical physics.
L Transformation as a Fundamental Category. The end of in-
quiry (in the sense in which "end" means both end-in-view, or
controlling intent, and terminating close) is institution of a unified
resolved situation. This end is accomplished by institution of
subject-matters which are respectively material means and pro-
cedural means— factual data and conceptual meanings. These in-
strumental subject-matters are instituted by operations in which
the existential material of a given problematic situation is experi-
mentally modified in a given direction. Conceptual subject-matters,
consisting of possibilities of solution, are at the same time so con-
structed as to direct the operations of experimental selection and
ordering by which transformation of existential material toward
the end of a resolved situation is effected. The conceptions that
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 395
represent possibilities of solutions must, moreover, if inquiry is
controlled, be propositionally formulated- and these propositions
must be developed in ordered series so as to yield a final general
proposition capable of directing in operations definitely applicable
to the material of the special problem in hand. Otherwise, there
is an inference so premature as to yield an ungrounded proposition.
In short, ordered discourse is itself a series of transformations
conducted according to rules of rigorous (or necessary) and fruit-
ful substitution of meanings. Such transformation is possible only
as a system of interrelated abstract characters is instituted. Com-
mon sense conceptions, for example, do not satisfy the conditions
of systematic interrelation. Hence the change of content they un-
dergo in science as they are modified to satisfy this condition.
Transformation of conceptual contents, according to rules of
method that satisfy determinate logical conditions, is thus involved
both in conduct of discourse and in the formation of the concep-
tions that enter into it even when discourse is intended to have
final existential application.
The logical principle involved may be restated in the following
ways: (1) The subject-matter or content of discourse consists of
possibilities. Hence the contents are non-existential even when
instituted and ordered with reference to existential application.
(2) As possibilities, they require formulation in symbols. Sym-
bolization is not a convenience found to be practically indispensa-
ble in discourse, nor yet a mere external garb for ideas already
complete in themselves. It is of the very essence of discourse as
concerned with possibilities. In their functional capacity, how-
ever, symbols have the same logical status as existential data. For
this reason they are themselves subject to transformations. His-
torically, the operations by which symbol-meanings are trans-
formed were first borrowed from and closely allied to physical
operations — as is indicated in the words still used to designate
rational operations; in gross, in such words as deliberation, ponder-
ing, reflection, and more specifically in counting and calcidation.
As meanings were modified to satisfy the conditions imposed by
membership in an interrelated system, operations were also modi-
fied to meet the requirements of the new conceptual material.
They became as abstract as the materials to which they are ap-
396 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
plied and hence of a character expressed, and capable only of ex-
pression, in a new order of symbols.
In the chapters preceding the present one, we have been con-
cerned with the relation of meanings and propositions in discourse
where discourse is conducted in reference to some final existential
applicability. In discourse of this type application is suspended
or held in abeyance but relationship to application is not eliminated
in respect to the content of the conceptions. When, however,
discourse is conducted exclusively with reference to satisfaction
of its own logical conditions, or, as we say, for its own sake, the
subject-matter is not only non-existential in immediate reference
but is itself formed on the ground of freedom from existential
reference of even the most indirect, delayed and ulterior kind.
It is then mathematical. The subject-matter is completely abstract
and formal because of its complete freedom from the conditions
imposed upon conceptual material which is framed with refer-
ence to final existential application. Complete freedom and com-
plete abstractness are here synonymous terms.
Change in the context of inquiry effects a change in its intent
and contents. Physical conceptions differ from those of common
sense. For their context is not that of use-enjoyment but is that
of institution of conditions of systematic extensive inference. A
further new context is provided when all reference to existential
applicability is eliminated. The result is not simply a higher degree
of abstractness, but a new order of abstractions, one that is insti-
tuted and controlled only by the category of abstract relationship.
The necessity of transformation of meanings in discourse in order
to determine warranted existential propositions provides, neverthe-
less, the connecting link of mathematics with the general pattern of
inquiry.
The effect of change of context upon the intent and contents
of operations was exemplified in some of the illustrations that were
adduced in the previous chapter. Categories of selection and
order, having an implicit esthetic quality, are involved in the writ-
ing of history. These categories when liberated from their origi-
nal context gave rise to the historical novel. Carried further, they
give rise to the "pure" novel with its distinctive contents. In
similar fashion, music did not create in either nature or in speech
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 397
sounds and their ordered arrangement. Music, however, de-
veloped the potentialities of sounds and their cadenced arrange-
ment in activities having their own distinctive subject-matter. An
analogy with development of mathematics is not forced. Numeri-
cal determinations first arose as means of economic and effective
adjustment of material means to material consequences in qualita-
tive situations marked by deficiency and excess. 1 But not only was
there nothing in the operations that were involved to obstruct
development on their own account, but they invited such de-
velopment.
The complete execution of the abstraction involved was a slow
historical process. Doubtless numbers were first closely con-
nected with things. For example, 2, meant two fingers or two
sheep, and, as the word geometry still suggests, geometrical con-
ceptions were associated with physical operations of measuring
physical areas. Greek mathematicians and philosophers effected a
partial liberation from existential reference. But abstraction was
not complete. Conceptions of arithmetic and geometry were
freed from reference to particular things but not from all ontologi-
cal reference. For they were supposed to refer to the metes and
bounds existing in nature itself by which nature was an intelligible
structure and by which limits were set to change. Since geometry
was the science of these existential cosmic "measures," number
was geometrically conceived. The story of liberation of mathe-
matical subject-matter from any kind of ontological reference is
one with the story of its logical development through a series of
crises, such as were presented by irrationals, negatives, imaginaries,
etc.
II. The Two Types of Universal Propositions. The foregoing
introductory remarks are intended to indicate that the category
of transformation extends through the whole pattern of inquiry
from (1) existential transformations that are required in order
to warrant final judgment, to (2) meanings in discourse, and to
(3) the formal relations of completely abstract subject-matters, in
which transformation as abstract possibility takes the form of
trmsiormability in the abstract. As a consequence of the last
named development, two logical types of universal propositions
1 See, ante, pp. 209-10.
398 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
must be distinguished. In the course of previous discussions it has
been held that a physical law, such as is expressed as a relation of
abstract characters, is a universal hypothetical proposition. For
example, the law of gravitation is a formulation of the interrelation
of the abstract characters mass, distance and "attraction." But
while the contents of the proposition are abstractions, nevertheless,
since the proposition is framed with reference to the possibility of
ultimate existential application, the contents are affected by that
intent. Such hypothetical universals do not exhaust the possible
existential affairs to which they may be applied, and as a conse-
quence may have to be abandoned in favor of other hypothetical
universals which are more adequate or appropriate to the subject
at hand. This is illustrated by the change from the Newtonian
law of gravitation to the Einsteinian formulation. Although both
are hypothetical universals in this sense, each is an empirically
significant contrary of the other. In such propositions (including
all those of mathematical physics) the strictly mathematical phase
resides in the necessary relation with propositions sustain one to
another, not in their contents.
But in a mathematical proposition, such as 2 -f 2 = 4, the inter-
pretation to be put upon the contents is irrelevant to any material
considerations whatever. The final applicability of a physical
law, even when stated as a universal hypothesis, demands that some
preferred and therefore some limiting interpretation be placed
upon the terms or contents that are related. The contents of a
mathematical proposition are freed from the necessity of any
privileged interpretation. Take the physical law of the parallelo-
gram of forces, as that provides the basis of calculations ultimately
applicable in existential determination. The status of "forces'' in
that law affects the meaning of "parallelogram"; it limits the other-
wise mathematical conception to subject-matters having properties
of direction and velocity. That is, it requires what was called a
preferred or privileged interpretation, which is restrictive. The
contents of a mathematical proposition, qua mathematical, are
free from the conditions that require any limited interpretation.
They have no meaning or interpretation save that which is for-
mally imposed by the need of satisfying the condition of trans-
formability within the system, with no extra-systemic reference
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 399
whatever. In the sense which "meaning" bears in any conception
having even indirect existential reference, the terms have no mean-
ing — a fact which accounts, probably, for the view that mathe-
matical subject-matter is simply a string of arbitrary marks. But
in the wider logical sense, they have a meaning constituted ex-
clusively and wholly by their relations to one another as deter-
mined by satisfaction of the condition of transformability. This
type of universal hypothetical proposition is therefore logically
certifiable by formal relations, because formal relations determine
also the terms or contents, the "material," as they cannot do in
any universal proposition having ultimate existential application.
The type of relation which subsists between propositions in mathe-
matical physics becomes here the determinant of the contents.
To summarize, transformation of meanings and their relations
is necessary in the discourse that is conducted to take ultimate effect
in existential transformations. The involved operations of trans-
formation are capable of being themselves abstracted; when ab-
stracted and symbolized, they provide a new order of material in
which transformation becomes transform^iitfy in the abstract.
Control of transformations that take place in this new dimension
of subject-matter is exercised solely by reference to satisfaction of
conditions of transformability in the abstract.
III. The Category of Possibility. This theory of mathematical
subject-matter continues the emphasis that has throughout been
placed upon operational determination of the subject-matters of
inquiry. The logical import of this operational determination in
this particular context may be brought out by contrasting the
operational interpretation of possibility (with respect to trans-
formability) with another theoretical interpretation of its nature.
This other theory differs in holding to an ontological as over
against an operational interpretation of possibility, for it relates
mathematical (and logical) forms to a Realm of Possibility con-
ceived to have ontological status. The realm of possibility is in-
definitely more extensive than the realm of actuality, and, since
what is actual must be first possible, it provides the ultimate logi-
cally limiting ground for whatever is actual. The applicability
of logic and mathematics to existence is accordingly explained to
be a special instance of the general relation of the realm of possible
400 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Being to that of actual Being. This theory is here brought under
discussion because it affords, by way of contrast, opportunity to
bring out more explicitly the implications of the functional-
operational interpretation of possibility. For the question does
not concern the basic importance of that category but its inter-
pretation.
It is not a simple matter to find illustrative material such as will
take the discussion out of the domain of direct clash of philo-
sophical theories into the domain of logic proper. A point of de-
parture may be found, however, in the question of the relation
a map of a country bears to the country of which it is a map.
The illustration is but a point of departure, for clearly it cannot
be supposed to provide a direct analogy. For the country mapped
is an example of the existential Realm of Being, and the map refers
to the country of which it is the map as to an existence. The force
of the illustration, as analogical, resides somewhere else; namely,
in the isomorphism of the relations of the map and the country, in-
dependently of the existential nature of the relations of the latter.
That the isomorphism in question is one of relations is evident
in the fact that it does not exist between a point marked on the
map and an element of the country mapped, town, river, moun-
tain, but between the relations sustained by the former and the
relations sustained by the latter. Relations of up-down in the
map are isomorphic with relations of north-south in the country,
and those of right-left with those of east-west of the country.
Similarly, relations of distance and direction of the map are iso-
morphic with those of the country, not literal copies of actual
existences. The illustration will be used to indicate that the iso-
morphic relation which subsists between the relations of the map
and those of the country, or between patterns of relation, should
be interpreted in a functional and operational sense. 2
A beginning may be made by noting the ambiguity of the word
relation. It stands not only for existential connections, for logical
relations between the terms of a proposition, and for reference or
applicability of the proposition to existence — but also for relation-
ship. 3 The first set of ambiguities does not concern the argument
2 In other words, the issue concerns the meaning of isomorphic patterns, not
their existence or importance.
3 For the former, see ante, pp. 54-5. For the latter, ante, pp. 330-2.
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 401
regarding isomorphism in the case of mathematics. For while on
general logical principles it is necessary to distinguish the existen-
tial connections of the country from the logical relations of the
map as a proposition, and both of these from the reference which
the map has to the country, the distinctions are not relevant to the
present issue, since the order of Being with which mathematical
relations are said to be isomorphic is non-existential. Nevertheless,
two points about the "relation" (reference) of a map to the
country mapped will be made because of their bearing upon the
nature of isomorphism.
1. The relations of the map are similar (in the technical sense
of that word) to those of the country because both are instituted
by one and the same set of operations. As far, then, as this case
of similarity of relations is an illustration of isomorphism, it throws
no light on the ontological isomorphism said to subsist in the case
of mathematics. For that doctrine is at the opposite pole. It does
not hold that operations that determine the relations of mathemati-
cal subject-matter also determine those of the "Realm of Possi-
bilities." The position here taken does hold, however, that the
operations of transformability which determine mathematical sub-
ject-matter are, or constitute, the Realm of Possibilities in the only
meaning logically assignable to that phrase.
The statement that the relations of the map are similar to those
of the country mapped because both are instituted by one and the
same set of operations is readily seen by noting the fact that both
are products of execution of certain operations that may be summed
up in the word surveying. The elements of the country are cer-
tainly existentially connected with one another. But as far as
knowledge is concerned, as far as any propositions about these
connections can be made, they are wholly indeterminate until the
country is surveyed. When, and as far as, the country is surveyed,
a map is brought into being. Then, of course, there is a common
pattern of relations in the map and in the country as mapped. Any
errors that result in the map from inadequacy in the operations of
surveying will also be found in propositions about the relations of
the country. The doctrine of structural (in the sense of non-
operational) similarity of the relations of the map and those of the
country is the product of taking maps that have in fact been per-
402 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
fected through performance of regulated operations of surveying
in isolation from the operations by which the map was constructed.
It illustrates the fallacy that always occurs when propositions are
interpreted without reference to the means by which they are
grounded.
2. Given the map as a pattern of relations, the "relation" of the
the pattern to that of the country mapped is functional. It is con-
stituted through the intermediation of the further operations it
directs — whose consequences, moreover, provide the means by
which the validity of the map is tested. The map is instrumental
to such operations as traveling, laying out routes for journeys,
following movements of goods and persons. If this consideration
is employed with respect to mathematical subject-matter, it must,
of course, be noted that the further operations which the two
respective subject-matters direct are of different forms. In the
case of mathematics the operations and consequences are not ex-
istential as they are in the relation of the map to traveling, etc.,
and their consequences. But as far as development of mathemati-
cal subject-matter as such is concerned the analogy concerning the
functional use of operations is precise. The reference of mathe-
matical subject-matter that is given at any time is not ontological
to a Realm of Possibilities, but to further operations of transforma-
tion.
As far as the map is usable as an illustration of mathematics, the
isomorphic relation is definitely exemplified in the relation to one
another of maps that are drawn upon different projection systems.
The pattern of relations of a map drawn upon the Mercator pro-
jection is isomorphic with that of maps drawn upon conic, cylin-
drical and stereographic projections, while theoretically still other
isomorphic projection-systems are possible. There is a morpho-
logical enlargement of polar regions in the Mercator style of map;
in the cylindrical, their shape is distorted, while areas are correct;
in the stereographic, areas are correctly patterned but the scale
is not constant throughout all parts of the map, etc. When the
directive function of the map is left out of consideration it must
be said that no map is "true," not only because of the special "dis-
tortions" mentioned but because in any case a map represents a
spherical upon a plane surface. On the functional interpretation,
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 403
any map in any system is "true" (that is, valid) if its operational
use produces the consequences that are intended to be served by
the map. 4 Considering only the relationship of their patterns,
there is isomorphism because the relations characteristic of one are
transformable inclusively and exclusively into the relations of every
other.
What is involved in the last paragraph, as far as illustration of
mathematical subject-matter is concerned, introduces the topic of
the ambiguity in the term relations and relational with respect to
the distinction of form between relatives and relationships. Terms
are related to each other in the sense of being relative whenever
they involve, in addition to the specific relation designated, singu-
lars or kinds which have traits and relations over and above the
relation which is specified: when, that is, the relation in question
does not exhaust the significance of the related terms. Father and
son are relative terms whether applied to two given singulars or
to two kinds. But the singulars who are fathers and sons have
many other traits and relations. Indeed, they are related to each
other only because they have other properties. But paternity -
sonship is a term in which the "relation" exhausts the meaning of
the terms. The difference is that expressed linguistically re-
spectively by "concrete" and "abstract" nouns. Furthermore,
there is no necessary relation such that the man who is related as
a father is also related as a brother. The question of whether he
is a brother is a question of fact to be determined by observation.
But there is possible a system of relationships , such that "within the
system paternity and brotherhood are necessarily related, while also
both are interrelated, by the very structure of the system, with
uncleship, cousinship, and so on, as in an abstract genealogical
table which exhaustively includes every relationship in a system
of possibilities of kinship. In the ordinary Mercator map, if the
polar regions were taken to be relative (in the sense defined) to
equatorial regions, there would be misrepresentation. But given
the coordinates which define the projective system, they have a
necessary relationship within the system. When mathematical
4 Interpretation of "truth" as correspondence in terms of literal reproduction
would demand that a "true representation" be another globe just like the earth
itself. Such a reproduction would be useless for the purpose representation ful-
fills. It would, in fact, only duplicate the problems of the original.
404 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
subject-matter is said, then, to consist of relations of relations, the
statement is ambiguous. In the case of singulars and of kinds,
"relations of relations" always involve reference, implicit or ex-
plicit, to materials (of singulars and kinds) whose existence or
non-existence can be determined only through observation. With-
out such reference to elements as terms of the relations that are
related, it (relations of relations) is an absurd conception. But
relationships by their very nature are interrelated in a system—,
the nature of the system being determined in mathematics by a
set of postulates.
A system of relationships defined as being of a given order — as in
the case of a map projection or an abstract genealogical table—
constitutes, therefore, the ground of operations of transformation
within that system. Indeed, this statement is too weak in that it
fails to note that the system of interrelated meanings is so defined
as to make possible a set of operations of transformations in which,
on formal grounds — those determined by the postulates of the
system — any given transformation is logically necessary. In a
weakened sense, the relationships of maps drawn on different pro-
jective systems and the relationships of the abstract genealogical
system are mathematical in quality. But mathematics proper is
constituted by abstraction of the operation of possible transforma-
tion (transformability) so that its subject-matter is universalized
in a way which is not found in the instances cited. While it is
not claimed that this operational-functional interpretation of iso-
morphic patterns of relationships disproves the interpretation of
mathematics that refers it to an ontological ground, it is claimed
that it renders that interpretation unnecessary for logical theory,
leaving it in the position of any metaphysical theory that must be
argued for or against on metaphysical grounds.
IV. The Fostulational Method. The previous discussion is
meant to indicate that and how the general pattern of inquiry is
reflected in mathematics — the function of abstraction which is in-
volved in all existential inquiry being itself abstracted and uni-
versalized. Further discussion will attempt to show in more specific
terms how the pattern is exhibited in the postulational method of
mathematics.
1. The initiation of every inquiry springs from the presence of
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 405
some given problematic subject-matter. In its early history,
problems of strictly existential subject-matter provided the occa-
sion for mathematical conceptions and processes as means of re-
solving them. As mathematics developed, the problems were set
by mathematical material as that itself stood at the given time.
There is no contradiction between the conceptual, non-existential
nature of mathematical contents and the existential status of mathe-
matical subject-matter at any given time and place. For the latter
is an historical product and an historical fact. The subject-matter
as it is at a given time is the relatively "given." Its existing state
occasions, when it is investigated, problems whose solution leads
to a reconstruction. Were there no inconsistencies or gaps in
the constituents of the "given" subject-matter, mathematics would
not be a going concern but something finished, ended.
2. As was intimated in an earlier context, material means and
procedural means operate conjugately with each other. Now
there are material means, having -functionally the status of data, in
mathematics in spite of their non-existential character. They con-
stitute the "elements" or "entities" to which rules of operation
apply, while the rules have the function of procedural means.
For example, in the equation 2 + 3=5, 2 and 3 are elements
operated upon, while + and = are operations performed. There
is no inconsistency in the identity between the logical junction
of existential data and mathematical elements or entities and the
strictly non-existential character of the latter. On the contrary,
the condition of transformability which mathematical contents
must satisfy demands that there be "data" which are determined
exclusively and exhaustively by reference to the operations and
rules of operations executed or to be executed with and upon
them.
In any existential inquiry also, material data are selected and
ordered with reference to operations to be performed, the latter
being possibilities formulated in hypothetical propositions. But
the qualities which are selected and ordered as evidential traits are
selected from out of a total existential situation and are themselves
existential. Hence they are capable of only a specific and limiting
interpretation, since anything existent is spatially and temporally
circumstantial and local. Consequently, as we have seen, the
406 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
contents of physical non-existential generalizations are determined
with reference to final existential applicability; the fact that they
are formulated so as to be as comprehensive as possible (as applica-
ble to the widest possible range of existences) does not eliminate
their final determination in terms of existential applicability. The
generalizations instituted do eliminate reference to all existential
qualities and circumstances that might restrict the applicability of
the generalization; but such elimination is compensated for, and,
indeed, is constituted, by selection of more generic extensive ex-
istential traits. 5 The conceptual nature of the material data of
mathematics means that they are determined exclusively and
wholly in reference to the possibility of operations of transforma-
tion, the latter constituting procedural means. This property is
all one with that freedom from specific and hence limiting in-
terpretation that has already been mentioned.
Discussion is thus brought to explicit consideration of the postu-
lational method of mathematics. Any scientific system, when
logically analyzed and ordered, is found to involve certain propo-
sitions that are, for that system, primitive. These primitive propo-
sitions are postulates in that they state demands to be satisfied by
the derived propositions of the system. In the systems of natural
science, the demands to be satisfied involve (1) elements deter-
mined by controlled or experimental observation and (2) opera-
tions which are capable of existential execution. The primitive
propositions which are the postulates of a mathematical system
are, as has been shown, free from both of these conditions. For
their contents with respect to both elements and methods of
operation are determined exclusively with reference to trans-
formability.
The postulates of a mathematical system, in other words, state
elements and ways of operating with them in strict conjugate
relation each to the other. Take, for example, such a postulate
as the following: "If a and b are elements of the field K, then ab
{a X b) are elements of K." The postulated elements are a, b.
The postulated operations are represented by "and" and by "X"
5 The concrete bearing of this determination is considered later with reference
to M, T and L, as standard conceptual means of selecting and ordering data.
Ch. XXIII, pp. 481-3.
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 407
or ab. The primitive proposition does not first postulate certain
elements, and thereby means of another primitive proposition pos-
tulate a certain operation in two separate postulates. The elements
and the operations are laid down in a single postulate in logical de-
pendence each upon the other, a is defined to be such that if the
operation designated by and is applicable, then the operation sym-
bolized by X is necessarily applicable. The elements are insti-
tuted in relation to the operations by which they are related and
the operations and their rules are determined in reference to the
elements. The operations which are introduced by the postulates
are specified in no other way than by the combinations into which
they are permitted to enter by the postulates. For example, the
operation denoted by "X" is any operation whatsoever, provided
only that it satisfies the conditions of commutativity, associatativ-
ity, and distributivity with respect to the operation denoted
by"+."
For this reason description and definition, which are of different
logical forms in the case of existential material, coincide with re-
spect to the elements or material data of mathematical subject-
matter, as do also inference and implication. The elements are
what they are defined to be; constituted by definition and nothing
but definition. The methods of operation, which are postulated
in conjugate relation with the elements are, on the other hand,
resolutions rather than definitions. Neither the definitions nor the
resolutions can be identified with axioms in the traditional sense of
self-evident truths. The resolution concerns methods of procedure
to be strictly adhered to, and the definition posits elements to be
operated with and upon by these specified methods of combina-
tion, yielding transformations stated in the theorems that follow.
There is no other control of their meaning, which means that the
control is strictly formal. They are not controlled, as in the early
logical philosophy of mathematics, by extra-systemic reference to
some "essence."
Every scientific system is constituted by a set of postulates,
which in logical ideal are independent of one another, or that do
not overlap as to operations to be performed. For a combination
of operations is the only way in which development in discourse
can take place. The postulate mentioned above is a way of setting
408 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
forth the principle that any element subject to the condition of
logical summation is also subject to that of alternation. Another
postulate, namely, that if a is an element of the field K, then a is
also an element, states that any posited element that can be affirmed
is also subject to the operation of negation, thereby fulfilling the
logical condition of the conjugate relation of the functions of
affirmation and negation. Since the constituent primitive proposi-
tions of a set of postulates prescribe a complex of operations by
means of which the results of one operation may be combined
with results of other operations, postulates in one system may
appear as theorems in another system and vice-versa. For the sole
ultimate logical condition to be satisfied is that the postulates define
elements and prescribe ways of dealing with them in combinations
of operations such that theorems follow which satisfy all the con-
ditions of formal conjunction-disjunction.
Any single operation taken by itself is indefinitely recurrent or
non-terminating. This is true of even a physical operation like
walking or chopping wood. Single operations do not provide
the conditions of their own termination. They are brought to a
close only when cut across or intercepted by an operation of an
opposite direction. In other words, a combination of operations
and of their results may be called interceptive, a typical, although
limiting, instance being the relation of affirmation and negation
already mentioned. At this point, however, we are concerned
with the indefinitely iterative nature of any operation in and of
itself. For this character gives the ground for what has been
called "mathematical induction." Its nature is illustrated by the
following: The sum of the first n add integers is n 2 . For this prop-
erty holds for the case when n is equal to 1 ; and we can show that
if this property holds for n = k it also holds for n = k + 1.
Consequently, it holds for every value of n, since every value of n
can be obtained from 1 by the recurrent operation of adding 1.
Because of inability to derive this principle from other proposi-
tions, it has been held, as by Poincare, to be an "intuition of the
mind." In fact, it is a formulation of the inherently recurring
nature of any operation until it is intercepted by combination
with another operation or is delimited by a field like the transfinite
numbers in which operations do not have the inductive property.
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 409
It is neither a postulate nor an intuition, but a partial description
of the nature of the operations that are postulated in a given
system.
Combination of operations that are integrated with another and
also intercepted by a limiting operation, yield in the case of the
system of numbers, numbers which are sums (or products, differ-
ences), and w T hich, in virtue of the integration of operations, are
also integers. 6 Thus 748 which is a sum, or a difference or a
product with respect to the operations by which it is instituted is
also a number which may be treated as itself an integer in further
operations. Were it not for the principle illustrated in this com-
monplace instance the indefinite because abstract transformability
characteristic of mathematical subject-matter would not exist.
— 1 X 1
1, i, 1 X 1, V 1 , 1\ , — - — ' are products of different operations
and with respect to the operations by which they are instituted
are distinct, as is perhaps more obvious in the case of 1 as the limit-
ing sum of the infinite series i, i, i, . - . But further operations
may operate with any one of these results either with or without
reference to the operations by which it was instituted according
to the exigencies of the problem in hand, if only the postulates of
the system are not violated. If this were not so, the conditions of
abstract transformability could not be satisfied, for barriers would
be set up such as once were supposed to exist in the case of "ir-
rationals."
This principle is the basis of the operations of contraction (sim-
plification) and expansion (composition) which play such a role
in mathematics. The operative combination of a variety of
operations is symbolized by a vinculum or bracket. The result
of the combination of operations may be represented by a simple
expression which can then be operated with and upon without
reference to the complex of operations symbolized by the contents
within a parenthesis. This simplification is another exemplification
of the principle that transformability is the ultimate logical cate-
gory, and that all mathematical operations must be such as maintain
6 1 owe to Dr. Joseph Ratner the point that a "transfinite" number is such
because the operations by which it is instituted are non-integratable. By defini-
tion it is not an integer. This does not mean that operations of transforma-
tion cannot be executed with and upon transfinites.
410 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
or promote transformations with respect to the postulates of the
system. 7
Within a given system, accordingly, equivalence is always an
end-in-view or object to be attained. In accordance with the
position previously set forth, as an end-in-view it functions also
as a means in discriminative ordering of the conditions of its at-
tainment. In mathematics, equivalence takes the form of an
equation. In existential inquiry, equivalence and substitutability
are effected with reference to final existential applicability and are
hence limited by the condition thus imposed. In mathematics,
since equivalence (equations) is the end-in-view to be attained
within a given system and an operative rule in discriminative or-
dering of elements, differences in the operations by means of which
contents in the system are determined are irrelevant with respect
to further operations (as they are not in discourse intended to
yield universal propositions that are existentially applicable), pro-
vided their results so satisfy the condition of a finally attained
equivalence or equation that they are capable of being taken, either
in simplified or expanded form, as the material of further opera-
tions of transformation.
Equivalence is the end-in-view within the system determined by
a given set of postulates. When different sets of postulates de-
termine different systems, the conditions for satisfaction of
equivalence as between them are not found. But universal trans-
formability demands that the theorems of any one system be trans-
latable into the theorems of the other systems. This reciprocal
translatability is effected through institution of isomorphism; that
is, isomorphism (like that of maps of different projection systems)
is to transf ormability between systems what equivalence is to trans-
formation within a system. The institution of inter-systemic
7 The reader who is familiar with current logical literature may have noticed
that the canons discussed in Chap. XVII were limited to identity, contradiction
and excluded middle, while it is now usual to include along with them reitera-
tion, association, distribution, simplification, absorption, composition, etc. The
omission of the latter was deliberate. For the first three canons represent condi-
tions to be satisfied in final judgment while the others mentioned belong to the
calculus of propositions, stating rules of abstract transformability of proposi-
tions. Hence, their applicability is relative to the postulates of a given system.
Commutation with respect to combination of vectors has, for example, a dis-
tinctive mathematical content.
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 411
transf ormability requires, however, the institution of a new system
as intermediary. It is as if translation of Greek, Latin, German,
French, English, etc., into one another required the institution of
a new language or set of symbols. For example, the distinctive
results of algebra and geometry were rendered isomorphic by in-
stitution of analytic geometry. It is characteristic of the abstract
universality^ of the transf ormability category in defining mathe-
matical subject-matter that the institution of any given mathe-
matical system sooner or later sets the problem of instituting a
further branch of mathematics by means of which its characteristic
theorems are translatable into those of other systems— a considera-
tion that helps to explain the indefinite fertility of mathematical
developments.
Interceptive combination of operations determines the important
mathematical category of periodicity or grouping. The orioinal
historic source of periodic arrangement was doubtless existential.
It has been surmised, for example, that the first name for 2 was
derived from some natural grouping, such as the wings of a bird,
and the name for 3 from, say, the symmetrical arrangement of
leaves in trefoil. However this may be, there is no doubt that
the periodic grouping constituting our decimal system was derived
by suggestion from the existential fact of ten fingers and/or ten
toes. While the decimal system is conventional in historic origin,
some form of periodic grouping (independent of course, of ex-
istential considerations) is necessary, not conventional. Unless
combinations took the form of recurrence of groupings of opera-
tions (or were it limited to recurrence of operations in their
severalty) there would be no integration of operations already
performed. While grouping is especially conspicuous in the re-
current position of 10 in our decimal system, the principle is ex-
emplified in any number, say 2. Otherwise there would be simply
a non-numerical succession as in the successive ticks of a clock
when they are not integrated in relation to one another. In an
infinite series, periodicity is dependent upon the partially non-
integratable character of the operations by which it is instituted,
and conversely any number as an integer is an integration of opera-
tions that express and determine some periodicity of arrangement.
The concepts of line, plane, solid, with their subcategories, are
412 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
examples of integrated groupings. If prima facie the same state-
ment does not seem to hold of the conception of a point, the
identity appears when the complete relativity of its conception to
that of lines, planes and solids is noted. Indeed, it may be said
that the mathematical point, like the mathematical instant, makes
explicit the conception of abstract intervalness involved in abstract
periodicity.
The conclusions reached may be applied to the interpretation of
zero and infinity. The conjugate relation of affirmation and nega-
tion (identification-demarcation, inclusion-exclusion) in determi-
nation of any completely warranted conclusion has been repeatedly
pointed out in the context of different logical topics. This condi-
tion cannot be completely satisfied in existential inquiry because
the existential conditions of any inferred proposition do not consti-
tute a closed system. Hence, the probable, as distinct from neces-
sary, nature of such propositions. Mathematical subject-matter
is so formally instituted that the condition is fulfilled. The posi-
tive and negative are completely conjugate with each other, so that
it might be said that a primary standing rule is that no operation
should do anything that another operation cannot undo. is not,
then, a symbol for sheer nullification of operations, nor yet, as in
the case of the null class in existential propositions, a symbol of
a kind that is empty at a given time. It is a symbol for the com-
plete and necessary balance of operations of identification-demarca-
tion, inclusion-exclusion. This conjugation finds a simple expres-
sion in such an equation as a — b — 0.
The positive logical function performed by is that without it
operations that effect complete transformability are lacking. In
the series of integers, for example, negative numbers have no legiti-
mate warrant without 0, which, as a number, introduces the func-
tion of direction. A better example is found in analytics in which
is the point of origin of all vectors within the system. With
respect to it, as the center of a system of co-ordinates, free gen-
eralized possibility of operations in all directions is instituted, with
results that are so determined that they are related contents within
a defined system of transformations. On the other side, as the
symbol of the center of a coordinately determined system, is a
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 4H
symbol for the completely integrated relation that affirmative and
negative functions sustain to each other.
The infinite in the sense of the non-terminating is a symbol for
the intrinsically recurrent nature of any operation whatever taken
in its severalty. The infinitude of number or the infinitude of a
line (as distinct from lines as segments characteristic of Euclidean
o-eometry) is not then an infinite number or an infinite line. In
modern mathematical philosophy, another and more generalized
meaning is given to the conception of the infinite. The meaning
is that of correspondence, and in particular that of the corre-
spondence of a proper part to the whole of which it is a part
Since the category of correspondence is involved in the possibility
of transformation (in the case both of equivalence within a system
and isomorphism between systems), a logical problem arises as to
whether correspondence in this definition of the infinite is to be
interpreted operationally or in some other way. In its operational
sense, the doctrine that infinity means that sets are "equal" to
proper parts of themselves sets forth the possibility of operational
institution of correspondences of an isomorphic nature. It might
almost be interpreted to stand for "correspondence" in the ab-
stract.
"Equal" does not mean in this instance the equivalence which is
the end-in-view and the control of operations within a given
system. For example, 7 in the series of odd integers corresponds
to 4 in the series of all integers even and odd. The correspondence
is genuine, as it is in the case of 9 to 5, 11 to 6, etc. While it is
correct to say that the odd numbers in question are but a "part"
of the "whole" set consisting of both even and odd numbers, it
does not follow, however, that the relation between the two sets
is that of w T hole and part in the sense in which "whole" and "part"
relation is exemplified within the set of all integers. The succession
of odd numbers is a part of the whole set of integers since it oc-
curs by the very operations that determine that set. But as
the set of odd numbers they are determined by a different opera-
tion and as such they are not a part of the other set. Taking the
relation as one of "whole-part" in its usual sense is like saying that
a map of England existing in that country is a^ "part" of th;
"whole" country, while its significant relation is that of isr
414 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
morphism. That one-to-one correspondence between constitu-
ents of the two sets should be capable of being instituted is a
special example of transformability. The number of operations
to be performed in ordering odd numbers is always the same as the
number of operations involved in some number of the set of odd
and even numbers taken together, as in the instances of 7 and 4,
9 and 5, and so on. But in the case of 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., as parts, say,
of 10 as a whole, although the difference between them as parts
is a matter of integration of operations, the method of operation is
not the same as that which discriminates the 1, 3, 5, 7 of the set of
odd numbers. Hence these numbers are operationally different
from the 1, 3, 5, 7 of the other set of integers. The correspond-
ence between them (although it is not one of equivalence) can be
regarded as that of isomorphism. As in the case noted above of
isomorphisms generally, it institutes the possibility of a new order
of mathematical conceptions. The category of infinity may thus be
regarded as a formulation of correspondency in the abstract.
I conclude this part of the discussion by reference to the mean-
ing of "functions" in physical and mathematical inquiry respec-
tively. When it is said that "the volume of a gas is a function of
temperature and pressure," it is affirmed that any existential varia-
tion in volume is correlated with variations in temperature or/and
pressure. The formula is arrived at and tested by operations of
experimental observation. Hence it is contingent, so that Boyles'
formulation (cited above) was further refined to meet newly
ascertained facts in Van't Hoff 's formulation. Given the formula-
tion of the function, special values can be given to volume, pres-
sure and temperature only by means of independent operations of
existential observation. The values do not "follow" from the
formula in the sense of being implied by them. In the case of the
proposition y — x 2 , any operation which assigns a value to either
x or y necessarily institutes a corresponding modification of the
value of the other member of the equation, and the operation of
assigning a value is determined wholly by the system of which
the equation is a part, and is not dependent upon extra-systemic
operations, such as those of observation. Hence the logical im-
possibility of interpreting the form of physical generalizations
(which are formulable as functional correlations) by carrying
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 415
over inro thern the form of propositional and mathematical func-
tions.
An illustration of what is implied in the foregoing paragraphs
may be drawn from interpretation of points and instants by the
method of "extensive abstraction." A point in the mathematical
sense cannot be "abstracted" in the sense of selective prescission
from relations of physical lines, places or volumes. A point is of
a different logical dimension from any physical area, however
minute the matter may be. Nor is a point a mere negation of
extension. Aside from the logical difficulties attending the merely
negative, or negative "infinitation" in any case, the point serves
a positive function. It is no more mere absence of extension than
is the mere absence of number. It is a strictly relational (not
relative) term. In the literal sense of "extensive," it cannot be
derived by abstraction no matter how extensive. Point designates
a relationship; and the relation^ip of enclosing-enclosed cannot be
logically instituted by any selection out of the relations of things
enclosed in and enclosed by one another; though this latter relation
may suggest the abstract relationship. It bears the same relation
to enclosed and enclosing physical volumes that fatherhood does
to those who are fathers. The statement "A line is composed of
points" is only a way of saying that operations of interception may
be combined with the operation that institutes a mathematical line
such that points are determined, while the statement "a line is
composed of an infinite number of points" is only a way of saying
that the complex operation in question is such that, like any opera-
tion in this domain, it is not terminating.
V. The Possibility of Existential Reference. It was stated at
the outset that a logical theory of mathematics must account both
for that absence of necessity of existential reference which renders
mathematical propositions capable of formal certification, and for
the generalized possibility of such reference. Up to this point
we have been occupied with the first of these two considerations.
The use of arithmetic in ordinary commercial transactions and
the role of mathematics in physical science suffice to show that
applicability is a possibility and that the possibility is actualized on
a wide scale. Two points will be made with respect to the matter
of possibility.
416 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
1. The first point is that applicability is indefinitely compre-
hensive precisely because of freedom from the necessity of appli-
cation. That the range of existential applicability of mathematical
subject-matter is in direct ratio to its abstractness is shown by the
history of physical science in its relation to the history of mathe-
matical science. As long as Euclidean geometry was supposed to
have direct ontological reference, the application of geometry in
physics was highly restricted, and when it was applied it usually
led physics into wrong paths. Riemanian and Lobechewskian
geometries not only freed geometry from its alleged existential
reference (assumed not only by the ancients but by Kant in his
theory of a connection of geometry with space and of space with
an a priori form of conception), but in so doing it provided in-
strumentalities for development of the physical theory of general
relativity. Highly important developments in the special theory
of relativity and the theory of quanta would not have been pos-
sible without a prior independent development of branches of
mathematics which, at the time of their origin, had, like tensor alge-
bra and the algebra of invariants, no imaginable physical bearing.
Such examples as these, which might be greatly multiplied, are
not matters of coincidence. Without an idea, in itself a possi-
bility and in so far abstract, existential transformations are brought
about only by organic instrumentalities. The limited range of
the activities of lower animals illustrates the result. The more
extensive the domain of abstract conceptions and the more ex-
tensive and abstract the operations by which they are developed
in discourse, the more instrumentalities there are for possible ways
of performing the physical operations which institute data as
appropriate grounds for extensive systematic inference. How far
these possibilities are actualized at a given time depends upon the
state of physical knowledge at that time and particularly upon
the physical instruments and techniques then available. But the
possibilities are there awaiting occasion for their operative mani-
festation.
The Alexandrian mathematicians, it has been pointed out, had
m their possession all the conceptions that were needed for attack
upon problems of velocity and acceleration of motion. Hence
theoretically they might have anticipated some of the leading
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE 417
conceptions of modern physics. 8 But Euclidean geometry exer-
cised compulsory restrictive influence, and this influence rested
on the supposed necessity of interpreting mathematical concep-
tion in terms of ontological essences. The resulting restriction of
numbers to geometrical ratios assigned specific contents to axioms
and definitions and thereby to all theorems, so that space, time and
motion could not be conceived in that freedom from qualitative
considerations that is required in order to render them capable of
free mathematical treatment, a treatment that led to an immense
widening of application.
2. Reference of mathematical conceptions to existence, when
it does take place, is not direct. That reference is made by means
of existential operations which the conceptions indicate and direct
is a basic principle of this work. "What is here added is that in
many cases the mathematical conceptions are instruments of di-
rection of calculation by the results of which interpretation and
ordering of existential data is promoted. In such cases, there is no
direct application, even of an operative kind, to institution of data.
Irrational numbers, for example, are not obtained by any process
which involves only direct physical measurement. Such numbers
are not the direct results of such operations, irrespective of whether
these operations are conducted within the framework of concep-
tions which involve the irrational numbers or not. Irrational
numbers are not descriptive of the immediate outcome of opera-
tions of measurement. But irrationals do make possible the use
of methods of calculation whose results facilitate the ordering of
experimental results. The same statement holds for continuous
functions. Neither they nor irrationals permit of interpretation
in terms of direct operational application even in those cases where
through the medium of calculations they make possible, they enter,
into final formulation of existential propositions. Such instances
as these are conspicuous illustrations of the functional, non-
descriptive, character of mathematical conceptions when used in
natural science. They are logically significant as special evidence
s The reference is to an essay by George H. Mead on "Scientific Method"
in the volume Creative Intelligence. The entire passage, pp. 179-188 should be
consulted, since it provides, as far as I am aware, the first explicit formulation of
the connection between absence of necessary existential reference and the
extensive possibility of such reference.
418 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
of the intermediate and instrumental status of universal proposi-
tions. Unless this interpretation is given to the results of many
calculations, the propositions that result have to be denied validity
because nothing corresponding to their contents can be found to
be existential.
The considerations here adduced have an obvious bearing upon
the nature of test and verification (See ante, p. 157). They prove
that in the practice of inquiry verification of an idea or theory is
not a matter of finding an existence which answers to the demands
of the idea or theory, but is a matter of the systematic ordering of
a complex set of data by means of the idea or theory as an instru-
mentality.
CHAPTER XXI
SCIENTIFIC METHOD:
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION
- hatever else scientific method is or is not, it is con-
cerned with ascertaining the conjunctions of charac-
teristic traits which descriptively determine kinds in
relation to one another and the interrelations of characters which
constitute abstract conceptions of wide applicability. The prop-
ositions which result are generalizations of two forms, generic and
universal; one existential in content, the other non-existential. The
methods by which generalizations are arrived at have received the
name "induction"; the methods by which already existing gener-
alizations are employed have received the name "deduction."
These considerations at least delimit the field of discussion. Any
account of scientific method must be capable of offering a co-
herent doctrine of the nature of induction and deduction and of
their relations to one another, and the doctrine must accord with
what takes place in actual scientific practice.
With respect to both induction and deduction, the logical ter-
rain is still occupied with remnants, some more or less coherent
and some more or less of the nature of debris, of logical concep-
tions that were formed prior to the development of scientific
method. There is, accordingly, no field of logical subject-matter
in which the need of thoroughgoing reform of theory (the theme
of an earlier chapter) is so urgent as in the case of induction and
deduction. It has become traditional to repeat the statement that
induction goes from particulars to the general and deduction from
the general to the particulars. The extent to which these concep-
tions are valid, i.e., in harmony with scientific practice, is not
critically examined. The result too frequently is that actual scien-
419
420 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
tific procedure is forced into the straitjacket of irrelevant precon-
ceptions. Escape from this procedure depends upon analysis of
induction and deduction from the point of view of actual methods
of inquiry.
The traditional and still current conceptions of induction and
deduction are derived from Aristotelian logic, which, as has been
shown, was a systematization of logical forms on the basis of
certain cosmological beliefs. Since the actual progress of scientific
inquiry has led to an abandonment of these underlying beliefs con-
cerning the structure of Nature, it might be antecedently ex-
pected that the doctrines about induction and deduction, which
are found in Aristotelian logic, will be so irrelevant to existing
scientific practice as to be the source of confusion and uncertainty
when they are employed as rubrics of interpretation. Discussion
will not, however, be based upon this antecedent probability. I
shall first set forth briefly the original Aristotelian doctrines in
respect to its cosmological foundation; then give a brief summary
of how induction and deduction are to be understood on the basis
of logical principles already developed in this treatise, and, finally,
present an independent analysis.
I. Induction and Deduction in Aristotelian Logic. The concep-
tion of induction as a procedure that goes from particulars to the
general, and of deduction as the reverse movement, has its origin
in the Aristotelian formulation. More important than the mere
question of its historical derivation, is the fact that the Aristotelian
conceptions were relevant to, and grounded in, the subject-matter
of natural science as that subject-matter, the structure of nature,
was then understood. There is no need at this point to expound
at length the characteristic features of the conception of Nature
entertained by Aristotle. The distinction between immutable Be-
ing, existing at all times in identical form, and the mutable, which
in its mutability is convincing proof of partial and incomplete
Being, provided the ground of the distinction made between in-
duction and rationally complete, scientific demonstration or de-
duction. Since the immutable was constituted by fixed species,
each of which was defined by an essence, it followed that strictly
scientific or demonstrative knowledge consisted in a classificatory
ordering of fixed species, in which inclusive species hierarchically
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 421
determined Included species of a more limited range. This order-
ing is effected in the demonstrative syllogism. Scientific know 1-
edge of changing things is, on the contrary, possible only when
and as these things are caught and placed within the fixed limits
constituted by essences that define species. The result here was
also expressed in the syllogism, but in a contingent syllogism as
distinct from the rational necessity of the demonstrative syl-
logism. 1
1. The Deductive. In each of these forms, the deductive is
identified with the syllogistic. Given the underlying cosmological
assumptions, there is genuine meaning in the conception of going
from the general to the particular. In the case of the demonstra-
tive syllogism, the movement is from the more to the less inclusive,
where "particular" is to be understood in a strictly logical sense: —
as equivalent to the more specific in its distinction from the uni-
versal inclusive species. In the case of the contingent syllogism,
"particular" has a different meaning. Anything which is mutable
is particular in the sense of being partial, incomplete. Now the
objects of sense perception are observed things in their severalty
in distinction from the species to which they belong. They are,
as just noted, truly known only when and as they are subsumed
under universal propositions which state the inherent nature of
species. As thus subsumed, they "follow" as particulars from the
general.
At this point, I shall briefly indicate the difference between
this conception of rational demonstration and that which is In
accord with present scientific practice. Mathematical discourse
is now the outstanding exemplar of deductive demonstration; but
(1) no mathematician would regard it as logically important to
reduce a chain of related mathematical propositions to the syl-
logistic form, nor w r ould he suppose that such reduction added
anything to the force of his demonstrations; and (2) such deduc-
tions do not necessarily proceed from the more general to the less
general even with respect to conceptions; while (3) as has already
been shown (and, indeed as is generally acknowledged), it is
a To express the contingent nature of this form of syllogism, Aristotle fre-
quently uses the expression "dialectic syllogisms." Their conclusions are true as
a rule, "upon the whole," usually, but not always, since they are not derived
from subject-matters which are themselves necessary.
422 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
impossible to proceed directly from a universal proposition to one
about an existential particular or singular. It is true (with regard
to the second point) that sometimes in mathematical reasoning the
final proposition has less scope or "comprehension," a narrower
range of applicability, than do the preceding propositions from
which it "follows." When, for example, an ellipse is defined as
a curve so moving that its distance from a fixed line bears a con-
stant ratio to its distance from a fixed point, the logical movement
is from a conception of wider applicability to one restricted by
introduction of a special limiting condition. But when the prop-
erties of an ellipse are defined by reasoning from the properties
of a conic section, the logical movement is from the narrower to
the wider range of applicability. When the equilateral is derived
from the equiangular, there is neither gain nor loss in compre-
hension or scope. The fact is that about mathematical reasoning,
as an example of deduction, no general statement whatever can be
made as to the breadth of the premises in relation to that of the
conclusion. Such differences as may be present depend upon
the special methods used and the nature of the problem dealt with.
So much, in general, for the irrelevancy of the Aristotelian con-
ception of deduction to modern scientific practice. 2
2. The Inductive. With respect to the formulation of the in-
ductive procedures of ancient and modern science respectively
there exists a verbal similarity. Both start from scattered data (or
particulars) and move toward institution of generalizations. But
the similarity does not extend beyond the vague formula of "going
from particulars to generals." For (1) particulars are conceived
in radically different ways and (2) the process of "going," or the
way in which generals are arrived at from particulars, is very dif-
ferent. The nature of inductive procedures in present day science
is the special subject of later analysis. But, apart from the con-
clusions of this analysis, a survey of the Aristotelian conception of
induction suffices to show its intrinsic unfitness to serve the logical
conditions of present science. The cosmological theory of Aris-
totle postulates that every knowable thing is of some kind or
2 The important difference, not touched upon in the above paragraphs, is
that the status and force of general propositions in the classic scheme represented
a direct notation of an inherent static structure, or essence, while in mathematics
(as we have just seen) such propositions are operational.
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 423
species. Even sense-perception is a mode of low-grade knowledge
in so far as what is seen, heard and touched is apprehended as being
of a kind. The very lowest grade of knowledge, mere sensation,
directly apprehends qualities determined by "sensible forms," such
as, in touch, hard-soft. Sensation and sense-perception are modes
of knowledge in which "matter," the principle of change and
hence of lack of Being, predominates, as, e.g., when the dry changes
to the wet. In general, the "particular" which is "known" in
sense perception is subject to generation and dissolution, to "birth"
and "death," as a tree grows from seed, decays and vanishes.
Recurrent perceptions then constitute experience. In persons who
are happily constituted by natural endowment, who have the
scientific and philosophic nisus or potentiality, the form is gradu-
ally apprehended as such, first as subduing matter, and finally as
completely free from any connection with matter. Definition
and classification are thus instituted and there is scientific knowl-
edge on the basis of rational apprehension or notation; in short,
the universal is grasped in its own inherent nature. This process
constitutes in the classic scheme the "going" from particulars to
the universal which is induction. "Forms" which are immutable,
necessary and universal, are present from the first in qualities and
objects of sensation and sense perception. Induction is but the
process by which these forms are so elicited from entanglement
in "matter" that they are perceived, by reason, in their own
essential nature, "reason" being defined precisely as this actualiza-
tion in knowledge of pure forms of Being.
"Induction" on this basis is a psychological process, although not
in the subjective sense of "psychological" which has controlled
so much of modern speculation. The process in question is rather
biological, and the biological is an actualization of the cosmologi-
cal. It is, accordingly, perhaps better to think of it as a pedagogical
process, in which certain select persons in whom the potentiality
of reason is brought to actuality by means of the forms that are im-
plicit in objects of experience, are led up to or induced to appre-
hend universals which have been necessarily involved all the time
in sense qualities and objects of empirical perception. Epagoge,
the word translated by our word "induction," is then precisely
the process of being led or brought up to apprehension of fixed
424 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
and essential forms in and of themselves. 3 It is unnecessary, even
apart from the detailed examination of inductive procedures which
is later undertaken, to point out the marked difference from
induction as it is now commonly understood. The only similarity
is the expression "going from particulars to the general," but the
sense of every term in the verbal formula is different.
II. The Nature of Induction on the Ground of Prior Analyses.
Before engaging in analysis of induction from a material point of
view I shall give a brief formal statement of its nature in the light
of previous discussion.
1. Particulars are selectively discriminated so as to determine a
problem whose nature is such as to indicate possible modes of solu-
tion. This selective redetermination of perceived objects and their
qualities necessarily involves experimental transformation of ob-
jects and qualities in their given "natural" state, whereas in the
classic logic they are taken "as is." According to the latter theory,
any modification experimentally produced is itself of the nature of
change. It falls, accordingly, in the domain of inferior partial
Being. Hence, it would be self -contradictory to treat experimen-
tation as a means of attaining knowledge of what "really" is.
Moreover, from a socio-cultural point of view, transformations of
given objects and qualities occur in the activities of the lower class
of artisans, mechanics and craftsmen. Such activities and proc-
esses are, therefore, ruled out from the start as merely "empirical"
and "practical," and hence connected with desire and appetite,
with need and lack. They are sharply distinguished from knowl-
edge, which is "theoretical" and inherently self-sufficing: a direct
grasp of Being in its finality and completeness.
3 The best account known to me of the theory of induction actually held by
Aristotle is that of Joseph. He says, "There are two passages where the passive
verb takes a personal subject; as if it were meant that in the process a man is
brought face to face with the particulars, or perhaps brought, and, as we should
say, induced, to admit the general proposition by their help." In some other
cases, as he points out, the conclusion is spoken of as that which is induced.
(Joseph, Logic, p. 378;— italics not in original). Were it stated that the man
in question is brought face to face with particulars in the way which induces
apprehension of general form as a result, there would be no logical difference
between the cases in which it is said that a person is induced and those in which
it is said the conclusion is induced. The process is in any case one of natural
eduction or eliciting, rather than of induction as it occurs in modern scientific
method.
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 425
2. The particulars of observations which are experimental! v
instituted not only form the subject-matter of a problem so as to
indicate an appropriate mode of solution, but are also such as to
have evidential and testing value with respect to indicated modes
of solution. Operations are deliberately performed that experi-
mentally modify given antecedent objects of perception so as to
produce ne r d) data in a new ordered arrangement. Institution of
new data, w T hich are relevant and effective with respect to any
conclusion that is hypothetically entertained, forms the most in-
dispensable and difficult part of inquiry in the natural sciences.
Objects and qualities as they naturally present themselves or as
they are "given," are not only not the data of science but constitute
the most direct and important obstacle to formation of those ideas
and hypotheses that are genuinely relevant and effective.
The primary meanings and associations of ideas and hypotheses
are derived from their position and force in common sense situa-
tions of use-enjoyment. They are expressed in symbols developed
for the sake of social communication rather than to serve the con-
ditions of controlled inquiry. The symbols are loaded with
meanings that are irrelevant to inquiry conducted for the sake of
attaining knowledge as such. These meanings are familiar and
influentially persuasive because of their established associations.
The result is that the historic advance of science is marked and
accompanied by deliberate elimination of such terms and institu-
tion in their stead of a new set of symbols constituting a new
technical language. The progress of every science — physics,
chemistry, biology, and even mathematics — in general and in par-
ticular, is evidence both of the difficulty and the necessity of
instituting data of a new order.
Any special illustration offered may, accordingly, hinder rather
than help precisely because of its limited nature. But I venture
to cite a typical case: Consider how the development of astronomic
science was arrested because the earth as an object of direct per-
ception seemed fixed, while the sun was perceived to move across
the heavens every day, and to move, together with the "erratic"
planets, from north to south and back again during each yearly
period. Consider the enormous obstructions which had to be
removed before present astronomical conceptions could be reached
426 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
along with the extensive and refined institution of new data of ob-
servation, dependent upon inventions of new instruments and tech-
niques. It was not for lack of ingenuity in ordering data but
because of what were taken to be data that astronomical theory
was so wide of the mark for many centuries. It should be evident,
without argument, that any theory which fails to take as basic
in its conception of induction experimental operations of trans-
formation of given objects of perception, and institution of new
orders of data, is radically defective.
3. The operations by which the given material of common sense
qualitative situations is reconstituted (so as to provide subject-
matter that delimits a problem and that is also evidential) have
been shown to be those of affirmation and denial in correspondence
with each other. The prepared outcome is a set of inclusive and
exclusive factual materials which reciprocally condition and sup-
port one another. That scientific inquiries search out relevant
data for their problems by means of experimental determination
of identities and differences is a matter of common knowledge.
At this point, therefore, it is only necessary to note the complete
agreement of this recognized scientific procedure with the logical
requirements of the theory which has been developed. It is also
to be noted that the operations of inclusion and exclusion are
active and existential (not "mental") and that they substitute
qualities which are products of interactions for qualities that are
perceived directly.
III. Inductive Scientific Procedures. The material of the two
previous sections is designed to show first the inadequacy of tradi-
tional logic to furnish the principles by which induction is actu-
ally effected, and then to set forth certain aspects of inductive
procedure which follow formally from the position taken in this
treatise. I come now to the analysis of those scientific procedures
to which the name "induction" may be applied if the word has
any application at all. For the question is not about the meaning
of a word, even of a word that has been sanctioned by long usage,
but of the actual procedures by which generalizations are estab-
lished in the natural sciences. Moreover, generalizations are of
two forms: There are those which institute a relation of including
and included kinds, and there are those which institute universal
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION
if-then propositions as hypotheses and theories. Any adequate
account of scientific methods as the means by which warranted
generalizations are achieved must, therefore, be applicable to both
of these two forms. This consideration is, in effect, a warning in
advance of the impossibility of making a sharp division between
"induction" as the operations by which existential generalizations
are established, and "deduction" as the operation concerned with
the relations of universal propositions in discourse. As far as
physical inquiry, at least, is concerned, induction and deduction
must be so interpreted that they will be seen to be cooperative
phases of the same ultimate operations.
I begin with a summary statement of the conclusions to be
reached regarding the distinctively inductive and deductive phases
of inquiry, and their interrelation, or functional correspondence,
with each other. ( 1 ) The inductive phase consists of the complex
of experimental operations by which antecedently existing condi-
tions are so modified that data are obtained which indicate and
test proposed modes of solution. (2) Any suggested or indicated
mode of solution must be formulated as a possibility. Such formu-
lation constitutes a hypothesis. The if-then proposition which
results must be developed in ordered relation to other propositions
of like form (or in discourse), until related contents are obtained
forming the special if-then proposition that directs experimental
observations yielding new data. The criterion for the validity of
such hypotheses is the capacity of the new data they produce to
combine with earlier data (describing the problem) so that they
institute a whole of unified significance. (3) The nature of the
interrelation or functional correspondence of these two phases of
inquiry directly follows. The propositions which formulate
data must, to satisfy the conditions of inquiry, be such as to de-
termine a problem in the form that indicates a possible solution,
while the hypothesis in which the latter is formulated must be such
as operationally to provide the new data that fill out and order
those previously obtained. There is a continued to-and fro
movement between the set of existential propositions about data and
the non-existential propositions about related conceptions.
This formulation agrees up to a certain point with current state-
ments about scientific inquiry as hypothetical-deductive in nature.
428 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
But it emphasizes two necessary conditions which are usually
slurred in statement of that position: (1) The necessity of ob-
servational determinations in order to indicate a relevant hypothe-
sis, and (2) the necessity of existential operational application of
the hypothesis in order to institute existential material capable of
testing the hypothesis. These conditions place the hypothetical-
deductive stage of inquiry as intermediate. When this stage is
taken in isolation from the initial and terminal stages of inquiry
(concerned with existential observations), it is disconnected from
its occasion in problems, and from its application in their solution.
It is probable that in the current formulation of the position, these
stages are taken for granted or are "understood." But it is
necessary to state them explicitly in order that the hypothetical-
deductive stage may be relevant and controlled in its contents
and their order of relation. Otherwise it >is assumed (a) that
existential propositions are "implied" by universal propositions,
and (b) that affirming the antecedent when and because the
consequent is affirmed, is valid. (3) The conjugate relation of
the inductive and deductive is exemplified in the correlative
nature of inference and proof, where "proof" means ostensive
demonstration. That it is highly uneconomical from the practical
point of view to separate the two functions of inference and test
is clear without extensive argument. Economy alone makes it
important that the material from which an inference is drawn
should also be such as far as is possible to test the inference that is
made. For it is important that the inference drawn should be
such as to indicate what new kinds of data are required and give
some suggestion as to how they are to be obtained. But the im-
portance of including within one and the same set of methodic
procedures the operations which produce material that is both
evidentially indicative and probative is much more than a
matter of practical economy. It is logically necessary. For an
"inference" that is not grounded in the evidential nature of the
material from which it is drawn is not an inference. It is a more or
less wild guess. To say that an inference is grounded in any de-
gree whatever is equivalent to saying that the material upon which
it is based is such as to be a factor in warranting its validity: not
in its isolation but in connection with the new data obtained as
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 429
consequences of the operations to which the inference, as an
hypothesis, led. The progress made by inquiry in any branch
may, then, be measured by the extent to which it has succeeded in
developing methods of inquiry that, at one and the same time,
provide material data having conjunct inferential and testing force.*
Satisfaction of this condition provides the definition of inductke
procedures.
After this introductory material, I come to the main theme:
analyses of inductive procedures from the material standpoint.
The material taken for purposes of initial illustration will be the
inquiries that have led to a generalization about the formation and
nature of dew. Common sense observation suffices in this case to
identify, for the most part, the singular phenomena to which the
name "dew" is given. Certain traits sufficiently characteristic to
mark off the phenomena as a kind, that is different from other
kinds, are easily and recurrently observable. Such traits are the
time when drops of dew are found, their position and distribution
on the ground, their shape, etc. The chief problem regarding
the phenomena was not to discover identifying traits. It was to
determine the including kind within which the kind deiv is in-
cluded. From the time of Aristotle, and probably much earlier,
the accepted idea was that dew is a subkind of the more extensive
kind rain; in other words, that drops of dew fell. This belief was
entertained till the early days of the nineteenth century.
It is noteworthy, on one side, that such an inferential conclusion
was virtually inevitable as long as immediately given qualities
were supposed to suffice in fixing a kind; and, on the other side,
that the change in the conception of kind took place only after
certain general conclusions regarding conduction and radiation of
heat had been instituted. For these generalizations demanded that
the existential traits employed to determine descriptively a kind
should be conceived in terms of modes of interaction not in terms
of directly perceived qualities. (1) The new conception regard-
ing dew was suggested after specific traits that are consequences of
heat, conduction and radiation between bodies of different tem-
4 As has been remarked, the word "proof" is unfortunately ambiguous, being
often used exclusively for demonstration in discourse — which at best, in existen-
tial inquiry, is but intermediate.
430 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
perature had been ascertained to be connected with traits of bodies
as solid, liquid and gaseous. The new hypothesis as to dew was di-
rectly suggested by this subject-matter, not by any data previously
observable. (2) The obvious observable qualities then assumed
the status of conditions of a problem to be solved, losing that of
traits that could be depended upon for a solution. For conceptions
of radiation and conduction, of heat, of pressure, are strictly
relational in content, being constituted as connections of modes of
change. (3) Finally, while generalizations regarding tempera-
ture and pressure were sufficiently warranted to be accepted in
general, their bearing upon the phenomena of dew was doubtful
and hypothetical. It was a highly plausible hypothesis that dew is
explicable by these conceptions. The hypothesis was capable of
development in discourse in such a way that deduced propositions
were in close harmony with observed phenomena. Absence of
the sun's heat at night means lowering of temperature of the
atmosphere. This reduction of temperature, in turn, according
to recognized laws, means that moisture in the atmosphere is
condensed and deposited upon near-by objects. This conclusion
could be arrived at in discourse. Upon the basis of the old logic,
the inherent "rationality" of the conclusion would have led to its
immediate acceptance and affirmation. The scientifically im-
portant thing in the logic of scientific inquiry is that it was
treated simply as an hypothesis to be employed in directing
operations of observation, an idea to be tested or "proved" by the
consequences of these operations. There were certain conditions
postulated in the content of the new conception about dew, and it
had to be determined whether these conditions were satisfied in
the observable facts of the case.
The hypothesis assumed, for example, the presence of invisible
vapor in the atmosphere sufficient in amount to account for the dew
deposited. Elaborate experimental observations were conducted to
see if this condition was fulfilled. The observations showed that
dew is deposited most copiously upon substances that were known,
by independent observations and measurements, to have poor
conducting and good radiating capacity; as far as possible, numeri-
cal correlations were established between the independently as-
certained capacities of radiation-conduction and measured amounts
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 431
of deposited vapor. It had also to be determined by experimental
observation that, other things being equal, the amount of change in
the temperature of the air and the amount of change in the
temperature of the things upon which vapor is deposited, bear a
constant ratio to each other. Experiments were also conducted in
which variations of temperature artificially produced were cor-
related with appearance of drops of moisture on glass and polished
sheets of metal.
Even so, while the inference was plausible that dew is of the
kind that accorded with the hypothesis entertained, what was
"proved" was that dew might be formed in this way. It was not
shown to be the only way in which it could be formed. The
conditions of agreement, constituted by multiple satisfaction of
the function of affirmation, were strongly confirmative of the
hypothesis. But until the conditions of negation (exclusion) were
conjunctively satisfied, there existed the fallacy of affirming the
antecedent because the consequent was affirmed. While the
nature of the case forbids complete satisfaction of the logical re-
quirement, operations of variation and elimination of conditions
were undertaken so that the inferred conclusion would have a
high order of probability. These limiting conditions were ex-
perimentally produced, while certain familiar cases, like the lesser
amount of dew on windy nights, the effect of the presence of
clouds, etc., had, as far as they went, the power to effect elimina-
tions. 5
1. Before taking up another case as illustrative, it is worth while
to summarize certain conclusions that emerge from the analysis so
5 While a comparatively simple case has been chosen for illustrative material,
the formulation is greatly simplified in comparison with actual scientific investi-
gations; and this qualification would still be present in lesser measure if as many
pages were taken to describe actual experimental observations as there are
sentences in the above account. There is nothing more deceptive than the
seeming simplicity of scientific procedure as it is reported in logical treatises.
This specious simplicity is at its height when letters of the alphabet are used.
They are an effective device for obscuring the fact that the materials in ques-
tion are already highly standardized, thus concealing from view that the whole
burden of inductive-deductive inquiry is actually borne by the operations
through which materials are standardized. It is not too much to say that this
symbolic device, although unconsciously adopted, arises from the doctrine
(later dealt with in some detail) that induction is a process of inferring from
"some to all," and then becomes the chief support of that fallacious doctrine.
And, it may be said, Mill is far from being the only sinner in this matter.
432 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
far. The outstanding conclusion is that inductive procedures are
those which prepare existential material so that it has convincing
evidential weight with respect to an inferred generalization. The
idea that induction consists in going from "some" cases (whether
"some" means logically, one or several) is at best trivial. For as
soon as inquiry has determined existential data which suffice to
warrant a conclusion, the latter is already arrived at. There is
no further "going" involved. If, on the other hand, the material
data from which the generalization is inferred have not been
prepared through prior experimental observations, no number of
cases, no matter how extensive, will ground an inference, or oc-
casion anything other than a more or less happy guess. The
operations that prepare the material must be so directed by ideas
(as hypotheses), as to satisfy, conjunctively and disjunctively, the
functions of affirmation-negation. This satisfaction is obtained
only through operational comparisons and contrasts. These opera-
tions, experimentally performed, disclose agreements in phenomena
that are materially or existentially independent of one another,
and they check the agreements (identities) obtained by systematic
eliminations, or ascertainment of differences. The inductive phase
of inquiry, if induction has any meaning certifiable in terms of
actual scientific practices, can be defined here only in terms of
operations of transforming antecedently given material of per-
ception into prepared material. When the material is so prepared
as to satisfy the conditions named, the work of induction is done
and over with. The generalization is ipso -facto reached.
2. The operations of experimental observation which prepare
standardized materials need direction by conceptions. Until the
conceptions in question are formulated as hypotheses and their
meanings developed in ordered discourse, observation and as-
semblage of data are carried on at random — though even then there
is at least some vague anticipation or guess which leads to the ob-
servation of some phenomena in preference to others. In any
case, the value of these more or less indeterminate explorations
lies in their power to give rise to suggestions which will direct
more determinate experimental observations. The development
in discourse of the directive conception that is involved provides
the sole verifiable material for identifying the deductive phase of
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 433
scientific method. The functional correspondence of deductive
and inductive phases of scientific method is thus evident, while it
may be worth while to note, once more, that what "scientific
method" means is adequate satisfaction of logical conditions im-
posed by control of inquiry.
In the case of scientific method just analyzed, the problem of
generalization involved concerns primarily the institution of a
generic proposition. The main problem is to ascertain the related
kind to which phenomena of dew belong. Generalizations of the
type of the universal hypothetical were involved, such as laws of
temperature and pressure. But they were taken as already estab-
lished, so that the main problem was to decide whether the
phenomena of dew was of the kind that is determined as a
special instance of application of these laws. The illustrative case
now to be considered is one in which primary emphasis falls upon
determination of a generalization in the sense of a law, the de-
termination of a kind being secondary. The case in question is
that of malaria. Inquiries have determined it to be a kind,
marked by special differentia, within the extensive kind of parasitic
diseases. But the chief scientific (as distinct from practical) im-
portance of the conclusion resides in the confirmation thereby
afforded to a general theory about a whole category of diseases.
The conception of the cause of malaria long entertained is
expressed by the literal signification of the word: namely, bad air.
This conception had a certain practical value for it had conse-
quences, like closing windows at night, which had some influence
on the actual production of the disease. But its scientific value
was virtually nil. It did nothing to further inquiry into the
nature of the illness; it had no power to order the phenomena
exhibited in the course of the disease. It merely pigeon-holed
them by subsuming them en gross under the conception adopted.
While in logical form the idea of causation that was held seemed
to constitute an hypothesis, its content was incapable of per-
forming the operative function which defines being an hypothesis.
The symptoms of recurrent fever and chills were so pronounced
that there is no reason to suppose that failure to understand the
nature of the disease often occasioned failure to identify cases of it.
But for scientific purposes the identification led nowhere. More-
over, this failure, is characteristic of every attempt to arrive at
a law by collecting cases as they happen, comparing them, and
then "abstracting" so-called common properties. The result of
such a procedure is simply to repeat, under the caption of a word,
what is already known about singular phenomena, explanatory
power being attributed in effect to the word.
Scientific understanding of the phenomena of malaria could
hardly have commenced until some diseases were known to be of
parasitic origin — an example of the value of hypothesis and of
deduction from it in scientific inquiry. But the hypothesis had a
material content that was derived from knowledge of what hap-
pened in some existential cases; it was not merely formal. More-
over, regarded as a generalization that might lead from known
cases to as yet unknown cases, it did not yield a conclusion. It was
an hypothesis by which to direct further observations and experi-
ments. It was at first (that is, prior to such operational use) only
a suggestion — a mere idea, expressing an indeterminate possibility.
Deduction from the hypothesis was required in order to put it in a
form which increased such operative applicability. But it was in-
capable of determining in and of itself a conclusion as to the
nature of malaria. Even Laveran's discovery (by microscopic
examination of the blood) of parasites in the blood of a malarial
patient, was not sufficient. It failed to show the origin of the
parasites and failed to decide whether they were causal factors or
merely accompaniments or products of the disease.
Moreover, at that period it had also been discovered that some
diseases had a bacillic origin, and this suggestion seemed so ap-
plicable to the case of malaria as to reduce the force of the sugges-
tion that came from Laveran's discovery. As a mere mat-
ter of -formal theory, one hypothesis was as good as the
other, illustrating again the impotency of mere deduction to decide
an issue. However, the conception of parasitic origin gradually
acquired sufficient force to direct systematic observations of the
actual course of the disease in connection with recurrent search
for parasites in the blood. It was thereby discovered that changes
in the progress of the disease corresponded closely to changes in
the life-history of the parasite, and that different forms of parasites
were found at different stages of the disease. These findings were
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 435
reasonably adequate to establish belief in the parasitic nature of the
disease. They did not suffice to show the source of the parasite so
that the problem of its nature or character was only partially
solved. The discovery that another disease, filiarsis, was due to
the bite of a mosquito, suggested that mosquitoes were the active
factor in introduction of the parasite in the case of malaria. This
suggestion was used as a working hypothesis in further observa-
tion of mosquitoes. Ross discovered that when a mosquito sucked
the blood of a patient already suffering from malaria, new forms,
finally becoming free, developed in the body of that insect. Later
he discovered that mosquitoes of the anopheles variety that fed
on the blood of malarial patients, developed pigmented cells that
were identical with the blood parasites of the human host at an
early stage of the disease.
Logical conditions for scientific determination of a law* or
universal proposition were, however, not yet fully satisfied. Cer-
tain conditions for exclusion of alternative possibilities had to be
met. For example, it had to be shown that other varieties of
mosquitoes did not carry or introduce the parasite and that the
bite of the anopheles did not produce the characteristics marking
the disease when they had previously fed only on the blood of
healthy patients. Even then, when these possibilities had been
eliminated, the scientific work was not complete. Experiments
were performed upon human beings by which it was shown that
if the anopheles bit a malarial patient, and after a depute time
(which was identical with the time independently shown to be
required for the development of the parasite in the body of the
mosquito) bit a healthy person, the latter developed the char-
acteristic traits of the disease in question. On the negative side,
experiments were undertaken to show that persons completely
protected against the bite of the anopheles did not develop the
disease even in regions in which malaria was rife. Negative con-
ditions were further fulfilled when it was shown that measures
which prevented the anopheles from breeding, such as putting oil
on the water in which it bred, draining swamps, etc., led to the
disappearance of the disease. Finally, it had long been empirically
known that taking quinine gave a certain immunity from malaria
and was a specific remedy when the disease was contracted. The
436 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
hypothesis as to inherent connection between the development of
the disease and of the parasite of the mosquito in the blood was
clinched when this empirical fact was experimentally shown to
follow from the relation between chemical properties of quinine
and the condition requisite for maintenance of life on the part of
the parasite. A universal proposition of the "if-and-only-if, then"
was finally grounded as far as any such proposition is capable of
conclusive grounding.
The theoretical conclusion which emerged from examination of
the previous instance need not be repeated here. The point there
made about the futility of the "from some to all" formula may,
however, be amplified. The content and validity of the general
proposition hangs wholly upon the contents of the singular proposi-
tions by which it is grounded. This grounding depends in turn
upon the nature of the operations by which these contents are
instituted. When it is affirmed that inductive inference proceeds
from what happens in some cases to what is true of all cases,
the phrase "all cases" must, of course, be limited to all cases of
specified kind. But if the kind is already determined in the "some"
cases from which the inference is said to proceed, the alleged in-
ference is a matter of pure tautology, since a kind is the kind which
it is. G Stated positively, everything depends upon what is de-
termined to happen in "some" cases. If there is any reason for
believing that what is then found is representative, then the gener-
alization is ipso facto already instituted. If it is not representative,
then there is no warranted inference in any case.
We arrive again at the conclusion that "induction" is a name for
the complex of methods by which a given case is determined to be
representative, a function that is expressed in its being a specimen
or sample case. 7 The problem of inductive inquiry, and the pre-
cautions that have to be observed in conducting it, all have to do
with ascertaining that the given case is representative, or is a sample
or specimen. There is no doubt that some cases, several or many,
have to be examined in the course of inquiry: this is necessarily
6 The same criticism applies when the inference is said to hold of all "similar"
cases, the question of similarity being the point at issue.
7 The words "specimen" and "sample" are not exact equivalents. The differ-
ence in their meanings will be considered later. For the purpose of the present
point, they are, however, taken as sufHciendy synonymous.
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 437
involved in the function of comparison-contrast within inquiry.
But the validity of the inferred conclusion does not depend upon
their number. On the contrary, the survey and operational com-
parison of several cases is strictly instrumental to determination of
what actually takes place in any one case. The moment any one
case is determined to be such that it is an exemplary representative,
the problem in hand is solved. It is customary to infer from
examples and illustrations; from what Peirce calls diagrams or
"icons." That course has been frequently followed in the course
of previous discussions. But it should be clear without argument
that the entire value of such a mode of inference depends upon
whether or not the case is genuinely exemplary and illustrative.
If this point is here again emphasized, it is because the issue in-
volved is decisive as to the nature of inductive procedure.
3. Up to this point, the current view that the object of scien-
tific inquiry is establishment of general principles and laws, factual
and conceptual, has been taken for granted, since there is no
doubt that institution of such generalizations is an integral part of
the work of the natural sciences. But it is often further tacitly
assumed or expressly declared that institution of generalizations
exhausts the work of science. This statement denies to science any
part in determination of propositions referring to singulars as such.
It is admitted, of course, that propositions about singulars as of a
kind are required in order to reach a generalization, and also that
any proposed generalization must be tested by ascertaining
whether observation of singular occurrences yields results agree-
ing with its requirements. But when the generalization is once
reached, it is assumed that singular propositions have served their
whole logical purpose. This assumption is equivalent to denial that
use of a generalization to determine singulars has scientific purport.
It is, of course, recognized that generalizations are so employed, for
example, by engineers and medical men. But this use is regarded
as extra-scientific or merely "practical." This mode of concep-
tion both reflects and supports the invidious distinction between
theory and practice, the alleged difference being expressed in a
fixed logical difference between "pure" and "applied" sciences.
I shall not dwell here upon the fact that the invidious distinc-
tion in question is wholly an inheritance from a conception of
438 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD ^
logical method and forms which was appropriate to ancient cos-
mology, and which is now abandoned in the practice of science.
Nor shall I do more than suggest its arbitrary character, since there
is no way in which the procedures used by the competent engineer
or physician in solving problems of determination of singular
cases logically differ from the procedures used by another group of
men in establishing generalizations. 8 The point to be noted here
is that this conception rules out of the domain of science many
subjects that are ordinarily termed sciences. History, for example,
is to a very large extent concerned with establishing what hap-
pened at a given time and place. The question is not so much
whether or not history in the large is a science, or even whether or
not it is capable of becoming a science. It is whether the pro-
cedures employed by historians are precluded from having scientific
quality. The fact that the doctrine criticized logically involves
this denial is at least a comment upon it which demands considera-
tion. The question of the scientific status of history is, however,
the subject of so much controversy that this example may not seem
convincing. What, then, about geology and the biological
sciences? The question does not involve slurring over the im-
portance of generalization in these fields. It calls attention to the
fact that these sciences are largely occupied with determination of
singulars, and that generalizations do not merely grow out of de-
termination of singulars but that they constantly function in
further interpretation of singulars.
The fact seems to be that uncritical adherence to Aristotelian
conceptions has combined with the prestige of physics, especially
of mathematical physics, to generate the conception that physics
is not only the most advanced form of scientific inquiry (which it
undeniably is), but that it alone is scientific in nature. From a
popular standpoint, application of physical generalizations, as in
the technologies of the electric and chemical engineer and in the
methods used by "medical science" (if the term be allowed), ap-
peal chiefly because of their practical consequences. But from a
logical standpoint the applications are integral parts of the verifica-
tion of the generalizations themselves. The drainage of swamps
where anopheles mosquitoes breed is prized because it helps to
8 See on this point, K. Darrow, The Scientific Renaissance, Chap. I.
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 439
eliminate malaria. But from the scientific standpoint it is an ex-
periment which confirms a theory. In general, wide social ap-
plication of the results of physics and chemistry provides added
test and security for conclusions reached.
The issue involved is a far-reaching one. Dogmatic restriction
of science to generalizations compels denial of scientific traits and
value to every form of practice. It obliterates, logically, the
enormous difference that exists between activities that are routine
and those that are intelligent; between action dictated by caprice
and the conduct of arts that embody technologies and techniques
expressing systematically tested ideas. Even more to the point is
the fact that it involves logical suicide of the sciences with respect
even to generalizations. For there is no ground whatever upon
which a logical line can be drawn between the operations and
techniques of experimentation in the natural sciences and the
same operations and techniques employed for distinctively practical
ends. Nothing so fatal to science can be imagined as elimination
of experimentation, and experimentation is a form of doing and
making. Application of conceptions and hypotheses to existential
matters through the medium of doing and making is an intrinsic
constituent of scientific method. No hard and fast line can be
drawn between such forms of "practical" activity and those which
apply their conclusions to humane social ends without involving
disastrous consequences to science in its narrower sense.
4. Some of the topics discussed in this chapter may seem
somewhat remote from the topic of induction. If so, the seeming
is superficial. For in the present state of logical doctrine the
theory of induction is basically compromised by erroneous con-
ceptions proceeding from two sources. On the one hand, there is
the influence of a logic that was formulated before the rise of
modern science, and on the other hand, there is the influence of the
empiristic logic that endeavored to make logical theory correspond
to the procedures of modern science. The two influences com-
bined to support the conception that induction is a process which
infers from what happens in some observed cases to what happens
in all cases, unobserved as well as observed. When these theories
are critically analyzed, the sole element of truth in them is found
to be the fact that all inference involves extension beyond the
440 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
scope of already observed objects. Interpretation of this un-
deniable fact by both theories ignores the outstanding fact of
scientific inductive inference: — namely, controlled reconstitution
of the singulars which are the ground of generalizations. This
reconstitution is so effected as to determine what goes on
in the way of interaction in a singular case. Inference from one
to all is completely and exclusively determined by prior experi-
mental operations through which the one has been determined to
be an exemplary specimen of an order of interactions or of func-
tional correlations of variations. This order, when it is ascertained,
is the generalization. As far as the order of variations is such as to
be included within a more extensive order of changes, the result is
a generalization in terms of a relation of kinds, since the interactions
in question determine the observable characteristics which in their
conjunction describe kinds. As far as the order of interactions is
abstracted, it is capable of apprehension by means of development
of the symbols forming an if-then universal proposition in dis-
course. The outcome is generalization in the form of a non-
existential law or principle, which through execution of the opera-
tions it formulates organizes existential material.
The common logical source of both forms of generalization, the
generic and the abstract universal, is another instance of their
conjugate relationship. The fundamental defect of traditional
empiristic logic is its failure to recognize the necessity of abstract
hypotheses, involving deductive relations of propositions, for con-
trol of the operations by which the singulars are instituted that
sustain the evidential-testing burden. The inherent defects of the
traditional (formally rationalistic) theory are (1) its failure to
recognize that the procedures of experimental science transform
the singulars from which inductive generalization proceeds; and
(2) its failure to recognize the strictly instrumental relation born
by hypothesis to experimental determination of singulars.
The integral role of determination of modes of interaction in
scientific method involves processes to which the name causation
is applied. The distinguishing observable traits which determine
a proposition that this is one of specified kind, and the proposition
that the kind is included with other kinds in a more extensive kind,
provide warranted grounds for these conclusions only as the evi-
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 441
dential marks in question are actualizations of potentialities that
are constituted by modes of interaction. The mode or way of
interaction as such, when taken as an abstract possibility, forms the
content of a universal proposition, of an hypothesis.
Exposition of this theme in terms of causation is the subject of
the ensuing chapter. Very slight acquaintance with the topic of
induction is needed to appreciate the fundamental role which the
conception of causation has occupied in the theories which have
given interpretations of inductive inference. Since the time of Mill
and earlier, the problem of the nature of causation has been bound
up, however, with all sorts of traditional metaphysical and episte-
mological issues. The considerations adduced in this chapter will
enable us to disregard most of these issues. For acknowledgment of
the central place of interactions, limits discussion of the category
of causation to the logical function performed by the conception
of interactions.
CHAPTER XXII
SCIENTIFIC LAWS-
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES
I. Introductory: The Nature of Laws. Since the time of Mill,
the view that scientific laws are formulations of uniform and un-
conditional sequences of events has been generally adopted. Mill
has also been followed in defining causation in terms of such
sequences. The adoption of these positions does not, however,
imply general acceptance of Mill's particular interpretation. On
the contrary, critics of his view have no difficulty in showing that
the very conception of unconditioned or necessary sequence is
fundamentally incompatible with his conception that singulars as
such are the ground and content of all general propositions; or,
more generally, that the necessity or invariable connection that is
postulated is incompatible with the relation that holds between sin-
gulars. Since Mill himself had acknowledged that determination of
strict uniformity of sequence is ultimately dependent upon, or even
identical with, determination of its unconditional nature, it is clear
that the conception of laws as causal, and of causation as uncondi-
tioned sequence, requires, when it is accepted, a very different
logical foundation from that provided by Mill.
Much ingenuity has been expended in attempts to show how,
upon the basis of logical conceptions different from those of Mill,
the idea of uniformity in sequence of events may be united
with that of unconditionally. But it does not follow from the
validity of the criticism directed against Mill's doctrine that the
one offered in its place is valid, or that it in turn is free from con-
tradiction. On the contrary, little analysis is needed to show that
the conception of a necessary (or unconditional) existential se-
quence of events (and any sequence of temporal events is ex-
442
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 443
istential by description) stands in contradiction to other funda-
mental logical principles usually accepted. For it is recognized
on all hands that only universal propositions, which are nan-
existential in content, are necessary, and that any proposition hav-
ing contents of direct existential reference are / and O proposi-
tions, neither universal nor necessary.
Yet it is evident that certain constituents of the view criticized
are sound when taken severally. Necessary universal propositions
are involved in scientific method, nor can it be denied that de-
termination of an existential sequence is indispensable in many in-
quiries, as, for example, in the cases of malaria and dew discussed
in the previous chapter. It is also evident that there is some sort of
logical relation between a universal proposition, consisting of
interrelated abstract characters, and valid determination of an
ordered sequence. But it is just as evident that there is logical
distinction between the two kinds of propositions. For the latter
is existential, and as will appear in the sequel, ultimately individual
in reference, while the former is abstract. The doctrine criticized
thus involves a contradiction within itself. The junctional force
of the propositions whose contents are necessarily related to each
other (functional in determining an existential sequence), is mis-
takenly ascribed to the sequence it serves to determine, as if it
were the content of the law, while to the sequence in turn is
ascribed the necessary relational property -which belongs only to
the abstract if-then hypothetical universal proposition, by which
it is instituted.
The source of the logical confusion has been pointed out re-
peatedly. It occurs because generalizations of the generic and
universal form are identified with each other. Let us take a typical
scientific example. There are fundamental propositions in physics
in which time, distance and mass are interrelated with one an-
other. The propositions which formulate these interrelations are
equations and other mathematical functions. They purport to
state necessary relations of abstract characters, and so they are
non-existential in content. The meanings of T, L, and M are de-
termined in and by definition. As so determined, they are devoid
of material traits of date, place and mass. Inquiries into actual
changes and correlations of change have, on the other hand, con-
444 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
tents of direct existential import. They are concerned with con-
crete spatial-temporal courses of events. The very heart of
scientific inquiry is thus to maintain the distinction and the func-
tional relation (correspondence) of the two logical types of prop-
ositions mentioned — a statement in which "and" has "multiplica-
tive" force. The fallacy vitiating the view that scientific laws are
formulations of uniform unconditioned sequences of change arises
from taking the function of the universal proposition as if it were
part of the structural content of the existential propositions.
Neither a factual generalization as a law, nor a hypothetical
universal as a law, has a sequence of events for its subject-matter.
A law as a factual generalization has a set of interactions for its
content. These ways of interaction are selected, affirmatively and
negatively, m any given case, so that they will have as their
potential consequences the traits which inclusively and exclusively
determine a relation of kinds to one another. In logical ideal they
are conjunctively so extensive in scope that any singular event that
occurs can be determined to be of a specified kind, while the re-
lation of this kind to other kinds is such that extensive inference is
possible. For example, the conceptions of density, specific gravity,
point of liquefaction, change to gaseous and solid state, etc. etc.,
are determined, one by one for, say, each and every metal in
terms of some interaction of conditions. These different modes of
action are then so related to one another as to determine the con-
joint set of properties which respectively determine the kinds tin,
lead, silver, iron, etc. An abstract or universal if-then law, on the
other hand, has for its subject-matter an interrelation of characters
such that they are integral members of a comprehensive system of
interrelated characters. Ordered discourse, or "deduction," is then
possible.
It is universally recognized in the context of discussion of some
topics that the relation between the antecedent and the consequent
clauses of a universal proposition is strictly formal. It is not so
commonly recognized, at least in explicit statement, that with
respect to such propositions in the natural sciences — as in mathe-
matical physics — the contents of each such proposition are de-
termined by reference to the availability and force of the proposi-
tion in a system of related propositions. In this way, comprehen-
CAUSATION AND SEQUEXCES 445
sive transitivity in theoretical ideal is a relational property of every
such proposition, so that from the more basic propositions (e.g.,
those regarding the relations of T, L ? and M) propositions of less
comprehensive scope of applicability may be derived. They are
then applicable to the problems set by concrete existential changes
in a way in which the universal propositions of more compre-
hensive scope are not applicable.
II. "Causal Laws." The term "causal laws" is, accordingly, in
spite of its general use, a figure of speech. It is a case of metonymy
in which a law is designated not in terms of its own content but in
terms of consequences of execution of its function. By use of such
a figure of speech, a rod of metal is called a lever; a particular
arrangement of a piece of wood and metal is called a hammer; a
visible white material phenomenon is called sugar, etc., etc. As
has been previously noted, even the objects of common sense
experience are habitually designated in terms of the potential
consequences of their familiar interactions with other things.
Common sense, however, is given to ascribing these consequences
to some "power" inherent in the things themselves (an ingrediem
of the popular notion of substance), and to ignoring infraction
with other things as the determining factor. Since laws are ex-
pressly formulated as means to consequences (respectively, ma-
terial and procedural means), no harm need necessarily result
from describing them in terms of the existential temporal-spatial
orders of sequence-coexistence, which are constituted by their
operational application. But basic confusion has arisen, and is
bound to arise, in logical theory when the existential orders so
determined are taken to be literal constituents of the laws them-
selves — something which happens when they are not only called
causal laws but are taken to be formulations of regular sequences.
III. The Import of Sequential Linkage of Changes, The de-
termination of "causal" linkage between any two events is not
final nor logically complete. It is a means of instituting, in connec-
tion with deterrnination of other similar linkages, a single unique
continuous history. As a result of scientific inquiry, events that
had previously been experienced as separate and independent be-
come integral constituents of one and the same continuous occur-
rence. This latter determination, then, constitutes the resolved in-
446 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
dividual qualitative situation which is the final, or terminal, con-
clusion. When this institution of an individual situation which is
temporally and coexistentially continuous is attained, the concep-
tion of causation has served its purpose and drops out. Reference
to causation recurs only when there are grounds for doubt as to
whether the spatio-temporal linkage in the case of some set of
events is such as in fact constitutes an existential continuum.
A building is burnt. In direct experience, as then and there
constituted, this is an isolated event. The problem is to connect
it with other events so that it becomes an integral part of a more
extensive history. Common sense takes the problem to be resolved
by reference to an "antecedent" event, say, being set afire by some
one for revenge or for insurance money; or by a match carelessly
dropped, etc. Science resolves the gross qualitative events taken
by common sense as being sufficient for explanation into a set of in-
teractions, each one of which is so minute that it is capable of
uniting with others to form a continuous coexistential-sequential
whole without gaps and interruptions. With respect to generaliza-
tion, inquiry is content, therefore, to rest when it has determined
specific modes of interaction and the universal formulae by means
of which they may be related to one another. For example,
generalizations are reached regarding the gravity, density, fusing
point of a metal, such as are found in the scientific description of
each kind. They then serve, when needed, to identify and de-
marcate a given substance as a metal of such and such a specific
kind. On the side of universal propositions, gravity, heat and light
are defined in terms of contents such that their relations are so
formulated that deduction is possible.
The application of these generalizations is then left to be made
when special conditions call for the determination of special
existent phenomena. The general determinations have, indeed,
been instituted with reference to availability when an occasion
actually offers itself. What is added to this statement in the
present context is that when so applied they determine minute and
measured singulars such that they are capable of being linked to-
gether to form a continuum which is spatially and temporally an
extensive individual qualitative unity. The very fact that gener-
alizations of both forms are so expressly determined with reference
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 447
to their capacity to perform this function, is the reason why the
function gets so integrated into the content that its presence is
taken for granted and then ignored — resulting finally in the com-
plete separation of "theory" and "practice."
This formal consideration will be made more concrete by an
example. A man is found dead under such unusual circumstances
as to create suspicion, doubt and inquiry. Was it a case of murder,
accident or suicide? The problem is one of determining traits
which will enable the phenomenon in question to be securely re-
ferred to a determinate kind. The only way in which to discover
and adjudge traits that will be sufficiently differential as to fix the
kind is, as we ordinarily say, to find out "the cause" of the death
in question. Whatever else the word "cause" may or may not
mean in this context, it at least involves taking the event out of the
isolation in which it first presented itself, so as to link it up
with other events. As analytically transformed, it is then one
constituent in a much more extensive spread of events. When it
is so tied up, the "mystery" which originally surrounded it is
dissipated. What is involved in the inquiry that institutes the
required linkages?
1. In the first place, there is the thorough examination of the
dead body and its surrounding conditions. This investigation,
while strictly observational, is directed by the conceptions and
techniques which the science and arts of the period make available.
That these observations are directed with a view to discovering
traits which are differential with respect to possible kinds of death,
sudden natural death, death by suicide, by murder, by accident,
becomes practically a matter of established routines. From the
logical standpoint, they involve a set of disjunctive propositions,
theoretically exhaustive, while the formulation of each disjunctive
proposition takes the form of an vf-theji hypothesis. Then each
hypothesis is developed in ordered discourse, e.g., "If natural
death, then such and such related consequences." Examination
of existing conditions then occurs to ascertain whether the
theoretically deduced consequences are or are not actually present.
2. The resulting proposition as to the kind of death does not
solve the problem with respect to which inquiries are instituted. It
rather formulates it in a form that instigates and conditions further
448 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
inquiry. Suppose the proposition is: "This is a case of death by
violence inflicted by some other person." The proposition in-
stead of being final and complete is an initiation of inquiries
to discover the guilty person and the conditions under which he
committed the crime. The last consideration forms what is usually
called "motive"; it provides the differential traits for deciding of
what kind is the homicide in question: killing in self-defense, in a
fit of passion, by premeditated purpose, etc. Determination of its
specific kind then determines the further existential consequences
in accordance with the existing system of legal conceptions as
rules of action: — death, confinement in prison, release, etc.
The object in listing these various phases of the inquiry is to
bring out the logical force of the obvious fact that the investiga-
tion undertaken extends its scope far beyond examination of the
dead body and its immediately surrounding conditions. For the
necessity of instituting such investigations as ascertain the dead
man's previous state of health; his movements during the period
prior to the time at which his death is fixed; his relations with other
persons, such as his enemies, the persons who would benefit by his
death; the antecedent activities of other persons to whom suspicion
points; etc., is that the necessity proves the incomplete and partial
logical status, of the inferential propositions made regarding the
kind of death that has occurred. Stated in positive terms, this
determination is a condition of further inquiries that relate the facts
that have been ascertained with a set of other connected facts so
that the resulting complex of related events forms an individual
spatial-temporal continuum.
It remains to indicate the bearings of these considerations upon
the conception of causation as it operates in scientific inquiry. A
common conception, derived from loose common sense beliefs, is
that an event can be picked out as the antecedent of the event in
question, and that this antecedent is its cause. For example, it
would be said that the antecedent of the death of the murdered
person is a shot fired from a revolver by another person. But
examination shows that this event is not temporally antecedent,
leaving out the matter of its being the antecedent. For the mere
firing of the shot is not sufficiently close in temporal sequence to
be a "cause" of death. A shot may have missed the man entirely.
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 449
Only a bullet which actually enters some vital part of the organism
in such a way that the organic processes cease to function is
"causally" connected with the occurrence of death. Such an event
is not an antecedent of the event of dying, because it is an integral
constituent of that event.
The intellectual processes by which the common sense concep-
tion of the cause of an event (as a selected antecedent event) are
arrived at, may be described as follows: The start is made with
the fact of death. This phenomenon in its perceived isolation
sets the problem of discovering its connection, spatial-temporal,
with other events. The problem concerns an existential singu-
lar case, not the institution of a generalization, although it
cannot be solved without the use of generalizations as means. The
first step in determination of its connections is the discovery that a
bullet entered some vital part of the organism and that the bullet
was shot by another person. So far, so good. The analysis begins
to go astray when it is overlooked that such determinations form
the content of an event that then takes the place in inquiry of the
gross event originally observed. The latter is now described in
terms of a set of interactions into which the event of dying, as
originally perceived, has been analytically resolved.
Analysis into these interactions is effected by means of applica-
tions of certain generalized conceptions which are conclusions of
prior inquiries, such as conceptions, on one side, of physical laws
of velocity etc., regarding the bullet, and, on the other side, stand-
ardized conceptions regarding physiological processes. These
generalizations are about contents of traits and characters that are
logically related to one another. They are not about temporal
sequences. The event of the entrance of the bullet into, say, the
heart, is now a constituent element in the singular event of dying
undergoing investigation, not an antecedent of it.
The doctrine that causation consists of a relation between an
antecedent and a consequent event is thus the result of a confused
mixture of ideas of two different orders. There is the valid idea
that the gross event directly perceived can be understood only
through its resolution into minuter events (interactions) so that
some of the minuter events become constituent elements of a spatial-
temporal continuum. But, at the same time, dying is still treated
450 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
as if it were a gross event consequent upon another gross event,
the firing of a revolver. The combination of these two incom-
patible conceptions yields the notion of a relation between an event
as the consequent and another event as the antecedent.
The confusion is then completed by the notion that the gen-
eralizations, by means of which the unique continuous event is
ascertained, are formulations of some uniform sequence. This
confusion of operational means of procedure with the existential
result of their application thus represents a mixture of the common
sense conception of causation as a relation of two independent
events, and the scientific resolution of what happens into a single
continuous event. It does mark a refinement of the common sense
notion. But it retains its inherent inconsistencies. For there are
no such things as uniform sequences of events; while, on the other
side, when a generalized conjunction of characteristics or char-
acters is substituted for "events," the property of sequentiality
is eliminated.
Before discussing this point further, something will be said about
the historical origin of the idea. The fact that gross qualitative
objects (which are the objects of direct perception) are separated
from one another by their singular qualitative natures, led, when
philosophical reflection set in, to the feeling that something was
required to bridge the gap between them. The lighting of a
match is over with, for example, before the burning match is ap-
plied to a piece of paper so that the paper begins to burn. The
burning match and the burning paper are two distinct qualitative
objects. The conception of a force was introduced to get over the
difficulty constituted by this qualitative gap. The match was sup-
posed to have a certain calorific power. Similarly, a living body
was said to die because the vital spark, or some life-giving force,
had fled. Finally, forces were generalized. The force of gravity
caused things to move downwards; that of levity caused them to
move upwards; the force of electricity caused rubbed pieces of
amber to attract pieces of paper; the force of magnetism enabled a
magnet to attract iron, etc. The idea of forces is indeed so deeply
embedded in popular cultural beliefs that it is needless to give ex-
amples.
The intellectual source of the idea is that already stated. Events
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 451
are first observed as successive; the succession by its every* quali-
tative nature involves an interval or gap. Something outside
the events is then invoked to explain the fact that the events al-
though independent are nevertheless connected. The time came
when it was seen that forces by definition are such as to be in-
capable of experimental observation. They were then ruled out
of science along with other "occult" qualities and forms — of which
they were perhaps the most conspicuous example. Then there
grew up a hybrid notion which took from common sense the idea
of succession and from science the idea of invariability of conjunc-
tion. To all appearance, the satisfaction obtained by getting rid of
the unwelcome and unscientific notion of forces sufficed to pro-
tect the new ideas of laws as invariable sequences from the other-
wise obvious criticism that the contents which are invariably
related in a law are not events, and that their relation is not one of
sequence. Once the idea was formulated (in sceptical reference
by Hume and with constructive intent by Mill), it was accepted as
a matter of course as the next thing to a self-evident truth.
There are reasons for supposing that the idea that scientific laws
are formulations of invariable sequences is in considerable part the
product of the attempt to revise in important respects the common
sense use of the conception of causation without, however, aban-
doning the conception underlying this use. Common sense
abounds in such beliefs as "A good rain will cause the seeds that
have been planted to grow"; "Water quenches thirst"; "Heating
iron causes it to be more malleable"; and so on indefinitely. Some of
these popular beliefs, such as that changes of phases of the moon
cause changes in vegetable growth, are now relegated to the cate-
gory of superstitions. But there are many others constantly
depended upon in practical activities. Such "generalizations" are
of the nature of formulations of habitual expectations; they are of
the sort into which Hume resolved the entire conception of causa-
tion. As formulations of expectations they do concern a relation
of succession between antecedent and subsequent events. But
the formulation of an expectation, no matter how practically
useful nor how often confirmed, is not of the order of a law.
From the standpoint of scientific inquiry, these expectations are
but material of problems. Why is it and how is it, for example,
452 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
that they can be depended upon in practice? The answer can be
given only in objective terms that ground the expectations. The
statement of a habit of action has to be transposed into a statement
of a relation of objective subject-matters.
Take such a non-scientific belief as is expressed in the proposi-
tion "Taking arsenic into the system causes death." In linguistic
form it is a generalization and it is about a sequence that is
taken to be at least fairly uniform. But scientific inquiry pro-
ceeds by introducing qualifications. The amount of arsenic
taken has to be specified; the dose of arsenic has to be of suffi-
cient quantity. The conditions of the system into which it is taken
have to be determined. For some persons by repeatedly taking
small doses in increasing amounts become immune to doses that
would be fatal to other persons. The presence or absence of
"counteracting conditions" has to be taken into account, since, for
example, death may not follow if an antidote be taken.
The proposition that results when inquiry is carried only to this
point is not of a uniform sequence, but is of some such form as
"Taking arsenic into the system under certain conditions tends to
produce death." There is still a statement of a problem rather
than a final scientific conclusion. The business of scientific
inquiry in solving the problem is to discover existential grounds or
reasons that warrant the propositions so far made. Their determi-
nation effects a radical change in the content and form of the
propositions that constitute statement of a problem. The change
from the popular belief and the partial scientific proposition to a
determined scientific generalization is not just a matter of taking
away certain elements and adding on others. It involves institu-
tion of existential material of a new type. In this change, gross
qualitative events and immediately observed qualities such as form
the content of the ideas of arsenic and of death are transformed
into a determinate set of interactions. The result is a law, and the
law states a relation of traits that describe a specified kind. These
traits are logically conjunctive-disjunctive. There is no element
of sequence in their relations to one another. The conception that
a law is a formulation of a uniform (or invariable) sequence seems,
accordingly, to be an attempt to retain some elements of the popu-
lar conception in combination with some elements of the scientific
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 453
conception, without taking account of the radical transformation
wrought by the scientific formulation in the material of the popu-
lar belief.
Determination of the interactions which yield the traits that
constitute the non-temporal conjunction forming the scientific con-
ception is effected, moreover, through experimentation. It would
require several pages in a treatise on chemistry to set forth the ex-
periments, with the apparatus and techniques that are involved,
which are required in order to warrant the conjunctive-disjunctive
set of traits which are the content of the scientific generalization.
Now experiments that institute the required set of related traits
are dependent upon hypotheses formulated in if-then propositions.
It would require a chapter or chapters in a chemical treatise to set
forth explicitly the conceptions and interrelations of conceptions
that are directly and indirectly involved in the conduct of the
experiments by which the law or generalization in question is
warrantably arrived at. It is hardly necessary to add that the
content of these hypothetical propositions, as physical laws, does
not include any reference to sequences. For they state a relation
of characters, preferably in mathematical equations. While the
latter have ultimate existential reference, through the possible
operations they direct, they are non-existential (and hence non-
temporal) in their content.
In spite of what has been said, the notion that a scientific law is
about a sequence will probably persist in the minds of many read-
ers. It may be objected, for example, that the theory presented
goes contrary to the fact, since causal sequences are found in
scientific propositions about natural events. For example (to de-
velop the objection), in a case in which poisoning is suspected,
symptomatic traits are looked for which are indicative of the ac-
tion of some poison, say arsenic. If the traits are found, then
further inquiries are undertaken in order to determine a definite
sequential order — such as an antecedent purchase of arsenic and an
antecedent opportunity for some one to administer a dose of it.
The final conclusion is validated, it will be said, in just the degree
in which a close sequential order of events is established.
Now what has been said in no way contravenes the facts here
stated. On the contrary, it is the only view that provides a con-
454 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
sistent logical interpretation of thern, as well as having power
to indicate the exact place at which and the way in which sequential
determinations do enter in and function. For the instance cited
concerns a singular event, and the event is unique in its singu-
larity, occurring at one and only one time and place, so that,
at any rate, there is no recurrence in the event in its singu-
larity. Moreover, not only are no two deaths by arsenic poisoning
identical in time and place of occurrence, but there are always
specific qualities in which they differ. Laws (of both types) are
instrumental in determination of the sequences that, as established
in inquiry, form the content of the scientific account of what hap-
pened in the singular case. But the laws, while they are necessary
means of determining sequences in given singular cases, are not of
sequential contents, and the singular events determined by them
are not recurrent.
What recurs is the kind of event, say, death as an including kind
of deaths by poisoning, by assassination, from typhoid fever, etc.,
as subkinds. The view that is being criticized attempts to meet
the facts of the situation by saying it is true that events do not
recur but only certain traits or features, and hence the sequence
which is affirmed to constitute the law holds between these traits
or features. The element of constancy is certainly undeniable. 1
Otherwise, there would be no such conjunction of traits as de-
scribes a kind. But the more the soundness of this affirmation of
constancy is admitted (or insisted upon) the clearer it becomes that
the uniform or constant relation in question is not a temporal and
sequential one. For the traits are logically, not temporally, con-
joined. They are selected and ordered (related to one another)
by means of the operations that resolve a gross qualitative occur-
rence into a definite set of interactions. The law or generalization
that expresses the conjunction of traits determined by these inter-
actions contains no temporal and a fortiori no sequential relations.
The statement made above about sequences was to the effect
that laws, whether of traits determining a kind or of characters in
an if-then formula, are instrumentalities in determining, through
operations they prescribe and direct, the ordered sequences into
1 The fallacy is that previously noted: confusion of constancy of evidential
function with existential recurrence.
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 455
which gross qualitative events are resolved. It was also intimated
that this resolution explains the actual locus and function of the
so-called causal sequences. Before considering this point, I shall,
however, illustrate the logical conditions that are involved in for-
mulation of a law by consideration of another instantial case, that
of the observed succession of days and nights. Their succession
comes as near to being invariable as can possibly occur in the case
of gross events. Yet even if one event was taken to be the "cause"
of the other by the members of some savage tribe, as soon as scien-
tific attempts to interpret the succession began, the succession was
taken to set a problem, not as providing the content of a law. The
Ptolemaic theory was based upon taking the perceived fixity of the
earth and the movement of the sun as the ground for inference.
The theory then explained the succession of days and nights in
terms of the relations to each other of the general characters of
revolution and stationariness. It was a law of successive events
only in the sense that it was a law for them — not in the sense that
the succession provided its content. The Copernican theory also
took succession as a problem (including, however, a greater
variety of successions along with that of day and night and the
successive positions of the sun during the solar year, etc.), as the
problematic subject-matter under investigation. It sought for a
generalization that would cover all the planets and the successive
positions of their satellites, as well as a variety of other observed
successions. The astronomical laws that resulted applied to an
enormous variety of kinds of successions, including many that
were observed only because of the new order of conceptions. The
laws, on the side of hypothetical, were stated, as by Newton, in
the form of equations, free from elements in temporal succession.
On the factual or generic side laws consisted of conjunct traits of
extension in time and space, which were themselves conceived not
as changes but as means of determining the relations of actual
changes. The Newtonian formula of gravitation comprehended
the Copernican conceptions and the laws of Kepler in a more com-
prehensive theory.
Analysis from any point of view of the nature of the laws of
science bears out the conclusion that they are means, through the
media respectively of operations of reasoning (discourse) and of
456 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
observation, for determining existential (spatial-temporal) connec-
tion of concrete materials in such a way that the latter constitute
a coherent individualized situation. The functional nature of laws
is recognized in a partial way when it is said they are means of
prediction. But they are means of prediction only as far as they
operate as means of production of a given situation, through trans-
formations of antecedent problematic material brought about by
the operations to which they give direction. A prediction, say, of
an eclipse, is itself an if-then proposition. If certain operations are
performed, then certain phenomena having determinate properties
will be observed. Its hypothetical character shows that it is not
final and complete but intermediate and instrumental. This state-
ment does not mean that the event that is describable, if it be
known, as an eclipse, happens because of the execution of the
operations. Its bare occurrence is not the issue. What is predicted
is that a phenomenon marked by certain specified traits will be
observable at a given time and place. The prediction is not, then,
a completely warranted proposition until the required operations
are performed and are found to have as their consequence the ob-
served material whose occurrence has been predicted. 2
Another point of view from which the problem may be ap-
proached is that of the "plurality of causes." Deaths, as gross
qualitative events, have many antecedents or "causes." But no
given death in the concrete can have a plurality of possible causes;
while, in the case of doubt, a plurality of hypotheses assists in de-
termining what the single sequential continuum is of which it is a
part. Nor do the laws which respectively describe the kind death
and which define, through an interrelation of abstract characters,
what death is in the abstract vary, as far as they are valid, from
time to time and from place to place. The conjunct traits which
have been used to describe death and its sub-kinds have changed
historically; as science advances they may be expected to change
in the future. But the change is made for the sake of obtaining
a set of characters that will be applicable without change. The
2 "Prediction in science involves a specification of what steps to take if we
wish to observe a regularity of nature. . . . Predicting where a planet will be
at a certain date is equivalent to prescribing where to put a telescope at a
particular time if we wish to see it. It is, therefore, a recipe for correct con-
duct." Hogben, Retreat from Reason, p. 49, italics not in original text.
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 457
same statement holds of the definition of death in the abstract.
Mill's statement that "It is not true that one effect must be
connected with only one condition, or assemblage of conditions,"
holds when, and only when, "death" is taken at large, as a blanket
term. There is no actual case of dying which is of this vague
nature. On the conceptual side, the aim of scientific method is to
arrive at a comprehensive conjunctive-disjunctive system of re-
lated kinds such that it may be determined of just what kind is any
given death. This system constitutes a plurality of hypotheses
such that each hypothesis is a rule for the performance of specific
experimental observations. The consequences of all taken together
yield the summative and alternate logical traits which describe a
kind, positively and exclusively. The significance for logical
theory of "plurality of causes" is, then, the demonstration it af-
fords that the traits which are used to determine a popular com-
mon sense kind are indeterminate, since they arise from relatively
non-discriminative operations. Such traits as the cessation of
breathing, the temperature of the body, suffice to show that a
death has occurred. They throw no light upon the kind of death
that has taken place.
Scientific inquiry proceeds by regarding the change in question
as a complex of interactions that are ascertainable, severally and in
their conjunction, by analytic experimental operations. Traits
that are the differential consequences of these operations decide
the kind of death that has occurred. The particular inclusive-
exclusive set of interactions involved is systematically related by
means of universal propositions to other modes of interaction. If,
for example, this dying is inferred to be a case of typhoid fever,
the discovery of a certain bacillus as an interacting condition,
makes possible inference about preceding events of such a form
that inquiry is directed in a search for data confirming the in-
ference. The inference is possible because there is a generalization
in which the presence of this bacillus in a human organism is re-
lated to its presence in drinking water, milk, etc. The conception
that this relation is a sequential one arises, to repeat, from confu-
sion of the content of the generalization with the content of actual
existential histories which are determinable by its operational use.
The existential subject-matter to which the generalization is ap-
458 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
plied is thereby constituted a temporal historic continuum, and
every such sequence is just what it individually is.
IV. Propositions of Ordered Sequences. I return now to the
question of the actual locus and function of propositions about
ordered sequences. If an ordered sequence is not the content of a
law or generalization, of what kind of a proposition is it the con-
tent? The means of answering this question have, of course, been
set forth in the previous discussion, and it only remains to assemble
them. Ordered sequences are the subject-matter of propositions
in which the succession of gross qualitative events is resolved into
the constituents of a single continuous event. It has not escaped the
notice of writers on the methods of physical inquiry that experi-
mental inquiry resolves gross qualitative changes, which are di-
rectly observed, into sets of very minute changes. The theoretical
interpretation of the fact noted has, however, been vitiated by the
notion that the effect of the resolution is simply to substitute a more
complete and much more accurate generalization regarding a
sequential order for the loose generalizations regarding causal se-
quences that are entertained by common sense. The proper in-
terpretation is, on the contrary, that the minute changes in question
are such as, by instrumental operational application of generaliza-
tions consisting of non-temporal relations of events, enable events
that are qualitatively unlike to become constituents of a single
continuous event.
The qualitative unlikeness of gross observed events constitutes,
as was earlier pointed out, an apparent gap between them. Such
generalizations about traits as are determined by conceptions of in-
teraction provide the means for overcoming these gaps; and the
more minute, or "elementary, the modes of interaction which are
ascertained, the more complete is the elimination of gaps, and the
smoother are the singular (and ultimately) individual temporal-
spatial existential continua that are the final outcomes of scientific
knowledge of events.
These considerations justify the theoretical conclusion that
causation as ordered sequence is a logical category, in the sense
that it is an abstract conception of the indefinitely numerous exis-
tential sequences that are established in scientific inquiry: — estab-
lished by means of the use of generalizationed propositions as laws.
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 459
For when events are taken strictly existentidly , there is no event
which is antecedent or "cause'" any more than it is consequent or
"effect." Moreover, even when an event is taken to be an ante-
cedent or a consequent (an interpretation which is purely arbitrary
from an existential point of view in isolation from the procedures
of inquiry) , it has an indefinite number of antecedents and conse-
quents with which it is connected, since every event is existentially
connected with some other event without end. Consequently, the
only possible conclusion upon the basis of an existential or onto-
logical interpretation of causation is that everything in the universe
is cause and effect of everything else — a conclusion which renders
the category completely worthless for scientific purposes.
The same point may be stated in other words by saying that
no event comes to us labelled "cause" or "effect." An event has
to be deliberately taken to be cause or effect. Such taking would
be purely arbitrary if there were not a particular and differential
problem to be solved. Given the problem of resolving a gross and
indererminate succession of observed qualitative events into a sin-
gle continuous history, there is sufficient and necessary ground for
taking one event as "effect" or consequent, and some other as an-
tecedent or "cause." For the former is, for inquiry, the terminal
event of the history under determination and the latter is an initial
or intervening event in the same history. The events in question
are discriminatively selected from out of a total welter of events in
which there is no such thing as either an existential beginning or
an existential close. Events as existences neither begin nor cease
just because an inquirer is concerned with them. The evidence is
conclusive that the category of causation accrues to existential
subject-matter as a logical form when and because determinate
problems about such subject-matter are present. The problems
can be solved only by methods that select and order more elemen-
tary and minute changes as interactions that constitute, in their
linkage with one another, a unique history with its own beginning,
career and termination. While the category is logical, not
ontological, it is not an arbitrary logical postulate. 3 For only
through its use can antecedent existential subject-matters be trans-
3 The word "logical" is of course to be understood in the sense of accrual
within inquiry, not in an a priori or Kantian sense.
460 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
formed from a problematic into a resolved unified situation. The
determination of a sequential order of changes is the goal of every
scientific investigation that is occupied with singular phenomena.
The institution of just such temporal-spatial continuities is the
ultimate objective of any existential inquiry. When the objective
is realized, there is judgment, as distinct from propositions as means
of attaining judgment.
V. Causal Propositions, What has just been said gives the clew
to the kind of propositions that may properly be said to have
causational content in distinction from that of ordered temporal or
historical sequential events. For there is involved in what was
said the relation of means to consequences. Propositions that deal
explicitly with subject-matters that are connected with one another
as means to consequences have a claim to be called causal proposi-
tions in a distinctive sense. It is frequently pointed out that com-
mon sense employs causation in a practical and prospective refer-
ence. Every intelligent act involves selection of certain things
as means to other things as their consequences. If iron is to be
worked it must be heated; if a room is to be illuminated, a lamp is
lit or a button is pressed; if a fever is to be cured, a certain treat-
ment is employed, and so on indefinitely. The intended conse-
quence is the effect in relation to which the means used are
causative. In general, practical inquiry begins with an end to be
accomplished and then searches for the means by which it may be
achieved. The conception of effect is essentially teleological;
the effect is the end to be reached; the differential means to be
employed constitute its cause when they are selected and brought
into interaction with one another.
The import of the causal relation as one of means-consequences
is thus prospective. Once established, it is employed retrospec-
tively. If in order to kill a man, a bow and arrow are employed,
then, when a man is found dead with an arrow in his heart, death
is called the effect and the shooting of the arrow the cause. There
is no need to repeat the analysis and criticism that has already been
given. What may and should be noted is that in all inquiries in
which there is an end in view (consequences to be brought into
existence) there is a selective ordering of existing conditions as
means, and, if the conditions of inquiry are satisfied, a determination
CAUSATION AND SEQUENCES 461
of the end in terms of the means that are available. 4 If the name
"causal proposition" has any reference at all, it is to propositions
of this kind.
The theory about causal laws that has been criticized holds that
scientific propositions about causation differ from those just illus-
trated by having a strictly retrospective reference, and thus are
purely "theoretical." That fact that experimentation enters into
determination of every warranted proposition is sufficient to prove
the incorrectness of this view. Doing and making are involved.
The kind of doing and making is that which determines means —
material and procedural — of effecting a prospective end, a unified
situation, as a consequence. This unified situation is the ultimate
(although not proximate) goal of every inquiry. Hence causal
propositions (in the sense of propositions whose content is a
relation of conditions that are means to other conditions that are
consequences) are involved in every competently conducted in-
quiry. To bring about, to produce, to make, to generate, is to
effect, and that which serves this purpose is a cause in the only
legitimate existential sense of the word.
It is true that retrospective survey is more explicit and more
extensive in scientific inquiry than in common sense inquiries.
However, the retrospective reference is present in the latter for
conditions can be estimated or adjudged in their capacity as means
only on the basis of what has taken place in the past. It is also
true that in the case of scientific propositions the prospective refer-
ence is the more extensive and, logically, the more explicit. Take,
for instance, the case of a generic proposition. It is a proposition
that has a form that enables it to be applied in every future oc-
casion of inquiry when certain conditions are ascertained to be
present. Moreover, the propositions which result from its opera-
tional application have inherent logical import. For they are the
means by which the generic proposition in question is tested and,
whenever found inadequate, is revised and reformulated.
In short, all propositions about policies to be pursued, ends to
be striven for, consequences to be reached are propositions about
subject-matters having the formal relation means-consequences,
and are, in the sense defined, causal propositions. Propositions as
4 See, ante, pp. 9-10, 104-7.
462 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
to what it is better to observe and what conception it is better to
form and employ enter into the conduct of every inquiry; more
scrupulously and extensively so in scientific inquiry than in those of
common sense. They do not appear explicitly, however, in the
final conclusions. But there are propositions which explicitly con-
cern this relation, and if the term "causal propositions" has any
proper reference it is to such propositions. Causation in any exis-
tential, non-categorial, sense is practical and teleological through
and through.
Conclusion. The view that the category of causation is logical,
that it is a funct'onal means of regulating existential inquiry, not
ontological and that all existential cases that can be termed causal are
"practical", is not a view that will receive ready acceptance. But
there was a time when species and essences were also conceived to
be ontological. There was a time when purpose or end was taken
to be an ontological property of Nature. Again, there was a
time when simplicity was thought to be an ordering principle of
Nature. Nothing in science happened save relief of inquiry from
incubi when these notions were so changed that they were
understood to be directive methodological principles of inquiry—
logical rather than ontological. There is no risk in predicting a
similar thing will happen with the conception of causation. Al-
ready difficulties have arisen in actual scientific findings which
have caused some persons to believe that the whole idea of con-
ception must be thrown overboard. But this is a mistake. The
conclusion to be drawn is that the ontological interpretation is to
be abandoned. Recognition of the value of the causal category as
a leading principle of existential inquiry is in fact confirmed, and
the theory of causation is brought into consonance with scientific
practice. The institution of qualitative individual existential situ-
ations consisting of ordered sequences and coexistences is the goal
of all existential inquiry. "Causation" is a category that directs the
operations by which this goal is reached in the case of problematic
situations.
CHAPTER XXIII
SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER
[ ince conclusions form a body of organized subject-matter,
and since this body of subject-matter attains scientific stand-
ing only because of the methods that are used in arriving
at them, the systems of facts and principles of which science ma-
terially consists should disclose properties that conform to condi-
tions imposed by the methods. Examination of some of the main
features of natural science should, accordingly, provide a test of
the account that has been given of the logic of method. Prelimi-
nary to a survey of subject-matter I shall summarize some of the
outstanding conclusions concerning method that have a direct
bearing on interpretation of scientific subject-matter.
THE LOGICAL VERSUS EPISTEMOLOGICAL
I. The Significance of Experiment. The experimental phase of
method is an overt manifestation of the fact that inquiry effects
existential transformation of the existential material that instigates
inquiry. Experimentation is not just a practical convenience nor
yet a means of modifying states of mind. No other ground than
that of transformation of a problematic situation into a resolved
one, can be found for the necessary function exercised in inquiry
by experiment.
1. Experiment is required in order to institute the data which
warrant inferred propositions. Without deliberate variation of
given existential conditions, the latter as given neither circum-
scribe nor describe the problem to be solved by inquiry, nor
provide material that adequately tests any proposed solution. Con-
sequently, it may be expected, even in advance of detailed con-
463
464 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
sideration of actual scientific subject-matter, that the latter will
have the distinctive properties that must mark data which are
prepared to serve as the ground of warranted systematic infer-
ences. In other words, the subject-matter will necessarily be
marked by important differences from the subject-matter of any
direct perceptual field.
2. Since conceptions serve as the directive procedural means of
operations of experimentation, the system of ideas, conceptions
and categories constituting scientific subject-matter will have the
characters that have rendered them capable of instituting the opera-
tions by which material is discriminated and ordered. Hence, the
laws or principles constituting scientific subject-matter will have
a distinctive or differential character.
3. Experimentation endeavors to eliminate from antecedently
given subject-matter any and all material that is irrelevant to de-
termination of the definite problem which is involved in the situa-
tion, and that hence is obstructive to the mode of solution demanded.
In addition to elimination, experiment also provides new existential
materials with a view to satisfying these conditions. Negation-
affirmation, exclusion-inclusion, demarcation-identification are
thus inherently necessary functions in scientific method. Hence,
once more, we can anticipate in advance that scientific subject-
matter will be so differentially determined as to satisfy the condi-
tions of conjoint negation-affirmation.
II. The Alleged Epistemological Problem of Scientific Subject-
Matter. Before directly taking up the subject-matter of natural
science with a view to showing how it satisfies these logical condi-
tions of the method of inquiry, I shall discuss a matter which
would be irrelevant to the topic in hand if the position that has
been set forth were generally accepted, but which is germane in
the present state of philosophical opinion. On the ground of the
position taken in this treatise, there is no general problem involved
in the fact that the content (material and procedural) of scientific
subject-matter is very different from that of the fields of direct
perception and of common sense. It must differ in specified re-
spects if it is to satisfy the conditions of controlled inquiry in
resolution of problematic situations. Problems do arise. But they
are specific problems of inquiry; they have to do with the particu-
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 465
lar transformations that need to be effected in respect to the ma-
terial of particular problems. But on the ground of any other
theory than the one set forth there is a general problem to which
the name epistemological is usually given. Hence I shall state
some reasons for holding that the philosophical problems to which
the name of epistemology is given, are (when epistemology is re-
garded as anything else than a synonym for logic) gratuitous and
artificial; that such "problems" disappear when the characteristic
features of scientific subject-matter are interpreted from the
standpoint of satisfaction of logical conditions set by the require-
ments of controlled inquiry. I shall take two cases as exemplary
illustrations; one of them being concerned with the difference be-
tween the material of ordinary perception and the existential
contents of scientific subject-matter; and the other being con-
cerned with the nature of conceptual subject-matter in its relation
to the existential world.
1. Within the field of direct perception there are points of light
seen in the heavens. By means of telescopic instruments, other
dots of light, not ordinarily perceptible, are disclosed. In both
cases there is the specific problem of drawing inferences from
what is perceived in order to account for what is observed by plac-
ing it in an extensive temporal-spatial continuum. As a conclusion
of inquiry, these specks of light are finally affirmed to be suns of
systems situated so many light-years away from the observer on
this planet. Now, in itself, or immediately, the speck of light is
just the quality which it is. The alleged epistemological problem
arises when the quality in its immediacy as a directly given sense-
datum is set in opposition to the object (subject-matter), the dis-
tant sun which constitutes the scientific conclusion. It is pointed
out, for example, that the speck of light exists here and now, while
the object, the sun, may have ceased to exist in the period which
has elapsed since the light left the sun and "arrived" at the observer.
Hence the "problem" arises of a radical discrepancy between exis-
tential material and scientific objects— this particular case being
taken as strikingly exemplifying the difference found between
them as a result of every scientific undertaking.
When the theory of knowledge is framed on the ground ot
analysis of the method of inquiry employed in scientific practice,
466 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
or on logical grounds, the alleged problem simply does not present
itself. The visible light is taken as an evidential datum from
which, in conjunction with other evidential data, a grounded in-
ferred proposition is to be drawn. It, the light now existing, does
not purport to be a sun or to "represent" a sun: it presents a prob-
lem. An elaborate system of techniques of experimental observa-
tion, directed by an equally elaborate conceptual structure, results
in establishing an extensive temporal-spatial continuum, and by
placing the light in a definite position in this system solves the
problem presented by the existing datum. Within this inferred
continuum, a sun, so many light-years distant, is determined to be
the initial constituent and a light now and here existent to be the
terminal constituent. There are many special problems and specific
inquiries arising in the course of this determination. But there
is no general problem of the alleged epistemological type. From
the standpoint of inquiry and its method, the problem and its
method of solution are of the same sort as when a geologist, on the
ground of the traits of a rock here and now existent and here and
now perceived, infers the existence of an animal of a certain species
living so many hundreds of thousands of years ago. No inference
is possible from the observed rock in isolation to the object in-
ferred. But when it is ordered, by means of a complex conceptual
structure, in conjunction with a multitude of materially independ-
ent data, the inferred proposition is taken to be warranted. In
both of the instances given, the difference in subject-matter be-
tween what is observed here and now and the subject-matter of
the scientific object is inherent in satisfaction of conditions of con-
trolled inquiry. A general philosophical problem of the "episte-
mological" type could and would arise only if they were not
different in subject-matter.
2. The necessity for a system of related conceptions (stated
propositionally) for discriminative institution of relevant data and
for ordering them, has been mentioned in the case just discussed.
The instance now to be discussed involves interpretation of these
conceptions on the basis of the logic of inquiry in its contrast with
the epistemological interpretation. The "problem" which occa-
sions the epistemological interpretation arises when and because it
is supposed that conceptions, in general and in particular, ought to
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 46"
be in some fashion descriptive of existential material. The idea
that they should be descriptive is the only view possible when the
strictly intermediate instrumental function, operatively realized
of conceptions is ignored. The difference in subject-matter of the
existential and the scientifically conceptual is illustrated in the fol-
lowing quotation from Planck: "The physical definitions of
sound, color and temperature are in no way associated with im-
mediate perceptions due to the special senses, but color and sound
are defined respectively by the frequency of wave lengths of
oscillation, and temperature is measured theoretically on an abso-
lute temperature scale corresponding to the second law of thermo-
dynamics, or, in the kinetic theory of gases, as the kinetic energy
of molecular motion. ... It is in no way described as a feeling
of warmth." x
What is here stated holds universally of the subject-matter of
scientific conceptions in their contrast with the subject-matter of
existential material. Now, unless conceptual subject-matter is
interpreted solely and wholly on the ground of the function it
performs in the conduct of inquiry, this difference in dimensions
between the conceptual and the existential creates a basic philo-
sophic problem. For the only possible alternative interpretations
are either the (highly unsatisfactory) view that the conceptions
are mere devices of practical convenience, or that in some fashion
or other they are descriptive of something actually existing in the
material dealt with. From the standpoint of the junction that
conceptual subject-matters actually serve in inquiry, the problem
does not need to be "solved"; it simply does not exist.
The alleged epistemological problem is closely connected with
the ambiguity of "abstraction" that has previously been noticed.
For if conceptions are, in any assignable way, descriptive, then
they must be derived by "abstraction" in the sense in which ab-
straction means selective discrimination. Take the case of smooth
and smoothness. Smoothraew, as an instance of a scientific concep-
tion, is not capable of observation and hence not of selective dis-
crimination. For complete absence of resistance and friction
nowhere exists in nature. As a scientific conception, smoothness
is statable only in a mathematical equation. The conception is
1 Quoted by Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 405.
468 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
undoubtedly suggested by observation of variations in degrees of
friction found in nature. But derivation by means of suggestion
is of a different dimension from logical derivation. "Abstraction"
in the sense in which it yields an abstract universal proposition is
of a different logical form from the selective discriminations by
means of which generic propositions about kinds are instituted.
In the words of Peirce: "It is important to relieve the term 'ab-
stract' from staggering under the double burden of conveying the
idea of precission as well as the unrelated and very important idea
of creation of the ens rationis . . . this hypostatic abstraction that
gives mathematics half its power." 2 Recognition of the logical
difference in the two operations to which the name abstraction is
given makes clear the non-existential nature of the content of
propositions about relations of conceptual subject-matters. In fix-
ing attention upon their function in conduct of inquiry it elimi-
nates the alleged epistemological-metaphysical problem.
One more illustrative instance will be considered. It concerns
the nature of points (and instants) as conceptions of mathematical
physics, a problem also previously discussed. The importance of
the conceptions of points and instants is so manifest that it does not
have to be argued for. But anything that can be observed in
existence is extended in time and space, no matter how minute the
extension may be. Upon any basis except the functionally instru-
mental status of the subject-matters that are defined as points and
instants, there arises the "problem" of deriving them from existen-
tial material. The long accepted method of derivation (by dis-
criminative selection) was that a point is arrived at by selective
abstraction of a limit fixed by intersection of two lines. Since the
mathematical idea of a line as free of thickness was already in
existence, this limit was held to be the representative of the mathe-
matical point, and the latter to be the conceptual description of the
existential fact. When the inherent difficulties in this conception
became evident, the relations of a set of, say, boxes to one another
such that there was a series of enclosing and enclosed volumes, was
taken as the existential source from which the conception of a
mathematical point is derivable. That the relationship of en-
closure-enclosed may be taken to define a point is not denied. The
2 Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. V, p. 304.
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 469
matter at issue is that a relationship is of a different logical dimen-
sion from the relations which a set of enclosing and enclosed ob-
jects bear to one another. It is an abstraction as such. It may be
"derived" by way of suggestion from the material mentioned but
it is in no way logically important that it be so derived. Logically
speaking, the particular way in which it is suggested is indifferent.
The point at issue concerns the function of the conception in in-
quiry. Its justification is to be found in the consequences that
follow from its operational use. Theories about its derivation in
the sense of its origin may have psychological interest. But they
are logically irrelevant — unless it is assumed that conceptual sub-
ject-matter must in some way or other be representative in a de-
scriptive way of existential subject-matter — an idea which
ultimately goes back to ilristotelian logic and to the state of science
under which this logic was formulated.
III. Subject-matter with Respect to the Inquiry -Continuum.
The subject-matter of science notoriously undergoes revision from
time to time, almost day by day, with respect to details and at
historic intervals quite fundamentally. This fact is interpreted by
one logical school as evidence that the only secure and genuinely
logical factor is jormaL This formal character is said to be certified
in turn by reference to some ultimate fixed a priori truth as a final
premise. Even Mill, although he held that the conception of the
Uniformity of Nature is inductively arrived at, held that it was
a principle that had to be placed as an ultimate premise under all
inductive processes. Officially, however, he belongs to the school
that holds that probative value resides exclusively in existential
material.
The problem that then arises with reference to the relation of
subject-matter to form seems to me insoluble except on the ground
of the continuity of inquiry. For that alone explains the actual rela-
tion that form and subject-matter bear to one another in the
revision of scientific subject-matter. The problem involved is
indicated by the following quotation from Peirce: "No determina-
tion of things, no fact, can result in the validity of probable argu-
ment; nor, on the other hand, is such argument reducible to the
form which holds good whatever the facts may be." ° Here we
3 Op. cit., Vol. V. p. 217.
470 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
have, if not a dilemma, yet certainly the materials of a problem.
For if neither matter nor form affords the warrant for gen-
eralized propositions about existential subject-matter, what is the
connection between them by which reasonable warrant for in-
ductive conclusions is provided? The answer is indicated in a
further quotation from Peirce in which he says: "The justification
of it [a probable conclusion] is that though the conclusion at any
given state of the investigation may be more or less erroneous, yet
the further application of the same method must correct the
error." * Or, as he states the matter in another connection, "We
cannot say that the generality of inductions are probably true,
but only that in the long run they approximate the truth. We
only know that by accepting inductive conclusions in the long
run our errors balance each other." 5
Taken in connection with Peirce's theory of leading or guiding
principles of inquiry, the implications of these passages are that
the formal element is provided by method. The relation of form
and matter is that of the connection of methods with the existen-
tial material instituted and ordered by methods. Furthermore,
the question of relation of method to material is a long run issue.
For in what has been called the experiential continuum of inquiry,
methods are self -rectifying so that the conclusions they yield are
cumulatively determined. It follows that the validity of existential
propositions is a matter of probability and that the order of prob-
ability possessed is a function of continuity of inquiry. These
considerations supply the ground of transition to the first topic to
be discussed regarding scientific subject-matter proper.
PROBABILITY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH FREQUENCY
It was shown earlier that existential generic propositions are not
necessary. For they are grounded in observational material. The
experimental operations by which this material is selected and
ordered have, as their logical ground and intent, satisfaction of
exhaustive inclusion-exclusion in a conjunctive-disjunctive system.
But the logical conditions are directive principles and ideals. They
guide experimental operations in determination of existential sub-
4 Ibid, p. 90; italics not in original.
5 Ibid, p. 218.
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 47|
ject-matter, but the nature of the subject-matter Is such that
their realization can only be approximated, not completely ef-
fected. Hence all such propositions are of some order of
probability. This section of the discussion of subject-matter is
concerned, then, with the discussion of the probability-property
of existential propositions with reference to its connection with
the category of the long run in inquiry. Negatively, the po-
sition taken is contrary to any theory that interprets probability
on the ground of ignorance or any "subjective" factor. For it is
held to be a manifestation of the very nature of the existential
material that is dealt with. On the positive side, the category of
probability is held to admit of logical interpretation only in terms
of frequency. For if warranted existential conditions are de-
termined in the continuity of inquiry, by means of which errors
in special cases tend to cancel one another out, some mode of fre-
quency interpretation is involved. The discussion that follows is
not, then, directed to a technical development of the conceptions
of probability and frequency, but is intended to show their in-
herent connection with the position already developed concerning
the methods of natural science. The discussion will, accordingly,
be conducted on the basis of a number of illustrative instances of
probability propositions.
1. Take such a proposition as "It is probable that Julius Caesar
visited Great Britain." Ignorance undoubtedly enters into the
class of propositions of which this is a specimen; not ignorance in
general, but ignorance as a name for a specifiable insufficiency of
the data at hand. For there is an absence of records bearing spe-
cifically upon the particular inferred proposition. In spite of the
absence of these specific data, the proposition as to probability has
some logical standing; complete abstinence from making any in-
ference whatever is not logically required. Upon what ground
can such propositions be justified? One view is that they rest
ultimately upon an "intuition" of the -form of probability as such.
It certainly cannot be argued that the probability-form in ques-
tion rests upon ascertained material grounds of the given case, for
by description they are lacking. It is also clear that the proposition
is logically different from such a proposition as "It is probable that
Julius Caesar visited Great Britain such and such a number of
472 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
times during his various campaigns," for in the latter proposition
a frequency-ratio is explicitly involved, while in the given case
there is no frequency-coefficient in the data. How shall such
propositions logically be accounted for?
The interpretation here advanced is that the kind of situation
involved is such as, in the continuum of inquiry, to warrant a proba-
bility proposition. The probability in question is purely quali-
tative. It cannot be assigned a measured numerical index, even
roughly. Its measure is qualitative and is naturally expressed in
some such form as "All things considered, it is more likely than
not." The frequency factor is not found in the data of this partic-
ular case any more than it appears in the proposition itself. It
resides in the qualitative similarity of the total situation to other
qualitative situations (qualitative because not analyzed or capable
of analysis into definite material data) which in the long run (more
frequently than not) have been found to yield conclusions that
can be depended upon. The frequency factor might, then, be
expressed in some such form as the following: "More often than
not inferences drawn from the kind of situation of which this is
a specimen have turned out to be fruitful in spite of absence of
adequate material data." The frequency factor, in short, belongs
to the method that is employed in this type of case.
This manner of interpretation provides a simple explanation of
the "intuition" which is said to be involved. In a psychological
sense there is something that may be called intuitive. The method
employed is embodied in a habit operating in the case of those
qualitative situations that are assimilated to one another with
respect to the inferences drawn from them. The habit, in this
case as in other cases of habit, is depended upon until conditions
definitely block it. We may say then, either that the "intuition"
is of the quality of the situations involved and of the qualitative
similarity of this situation to others from which inferences have
been drawn; or, more directly, that it is a sense of the habit that
is operating. But it is the method, not the intuition, that gives to
such propositions whatever logical standing they possess.
2. I turn now to another kind of proposition which is like the
one just considered in being about a singular, but is unlike it in
that (1) it is based upon definite data of observation which, more-
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 473
over, are gathered and ordered with special reference to institution
of a proposition as to the probability of a specified event; and in
that (2) the data are ordered and interpreted by means of explicit
conceptual, or theoretical, propositions. The prediction of the
probability of the kind of which tomorrow's weather will be is an
exemplary specimen. The data in this case are provided by obser-
vation of existing conditions with respect to such matters as tem-
perature, direction and velocity of winds, rain and clouds, over a
wide range of territory and for a long period of time. The signifi-
cance of the data thus obtained, what they point to, does not, how-
ever, reside in the mere facts in their isolation. They are ordered
in relation to one another by a systematized conceptual structure
(of which the conception of areas of high and low pressure is an
instance), while the indicative force of the data thus ordered is
determined by certain physical laws, of which formulae regarding
relations of heat, pressure and motion are examples.
These physical laws have the form of universal propositions
since their content is an interrelation of abstract characters. No
one would dream of supposing that as such they "imply" the
state of weather that will probably be found the next day in some
specified area. They are not descriptive but instrumental. They
are operatively applied, in the first place, in deciding the special
sort of data to be observationally procured — the particular occur-
rences that are to be discriminated out of the total welter of events
actually occurring; and, in the second place, in interpretation of
what the recorded events signify. Neither of these applications
could be made on the basis simply of the data of a particular day's
observation. The latter are significant in connection with the
record of similar observations made in the past. The forecasts
are dependable in the measure in which there is a record of what
has taken place over wide areas during extensive periods of time.
While the proposition is about a singular, frequency -distributions
of conjunctions that have been observed in the past are the decisive
factor in determining the special application of conceptual material
to the case in hand.
The case thus illustrates not merely the instrumental function of
theory, and of calculations and discourse that are derived from
theoretical conceptions, but also has a definite bearing upon the
474 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
nature of the category of probability. On one side, it shows that
the probability in this instance is based upon knowledge of what
has actually taken place with respect to frequency-distributions,
not upon ignorance. Positively — and this point is the crucial one
— it indicates why and how any such proposition is affected with
a probability coefficient. It is due to the fact that the data (here
and in any case) are existential events and qualities discriminatively
selected from out of a total existential perceptual field; selected on
the ground of their evidential value with respect to a special prob-
lem — that of determining what will take place at some specified
time and place.
It is a simpler matter to predict the occurrence of an event in
the case of an astronomical phenomenon like an eclipse of the
moon than it is of tomorrow's weather in, say, San Francisco. For
in the former case, it is easier to select certain conditions as rele-
vant to the inferred proposition and to rule out others as irrelevant.
Greater approximation can be made in other words to a closed
system, so that the probability in the case of prediction of an
eclipse is of a higher order. But nonetheless there is a certain
arbitrary or contingent element in the case of the proposition
about the time and place of an eclipse. For, to take an extreme
example, there is no theoretical justification for the proposition
that the moon will even be in existence at the time to which the
prediction refers. The probability that it will be in existence is
of a very high order. But there is no logical necessity in the
matter. The proposition is after all grounded in existential spatio-
temporal conjunctions arrived at in past inquiries. It is therefore
subject to a condition inherent in the very nature of existential
conditions. For the existential conditions are such that a different
conjunction may occur in the future from those whose occurrence
in the past is the ground of the prediction. The probability co-
efficient, in other words, is rooted in the nature of the existential
conditions, not in the attitude of the inquirer towards them.
The connection of probability with determination of frequency-
distributions of existential conjunctions is evident in the fact that
even if it were infallibly assured that the data employed are both
genuinely existential facts and are exhaustive as far as the past
is concerned, their evidential bearing upon a new case is not
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 475
thereby completely guaranteed. If the conditions remain exactly
the same, then, tautologically, the predicted issue is like the past
cases. But the content of the if clause is existentially contingent;
it has not the logical force of the if clause in a universal hypotheti-
cal proposition.
Suppose the objection is raised that after all it comes back to
ignorance, since if, per what is practically impossible, the state of
the universe as a whole were known, the contingency and the
probability factor would vanish. This suppositious objection
involves two factors, which, when they are made explicit, throw
light upon the issue involved. In the first place, there is the as-
sumption that the universe is a complete and closed whole. This
proposition is purely metaphysical. It does not rest upon empirical
evidence. It is brought in from outside of logic and then used
to justify a certain logical doctrine. In the second place, even
if the metaphysical assumption is made, it does not apply to what
happens at a particular place and area at a specified time. Even
if the universe were a closed and complete unconditioned whole,
and even if, per the practically impossible, it were completely
known, the only proposition which would follow would be
one about the state of the universe as a whole at subsequent
times. The problem, however, is that of ascertaining what is likely
to happen in a specially designated locality at a specially desig-
nated date. Determination of this matter depends upon knowledge
of what is taking place in other localities at other local times. The
ordering and interpretation of this knowledge depends upon ex-
tensive records of observations of conjunctions that have occurred
in a great number of other areas at a great number of times —
which takes us back to probability grounded in actual existences
and to the frequency interpretation.
The positive logical import of these considerations is that any
determination of data is a matter of a selection which is controlled
by reference to evidential function in a determinate problem. The
discriminatively selected character of data as data is inherent in the
very nature of inquiries that are concerned with existences. It
does not arise from any source outside the logic of the case — such
as any psychological-epistemological state of affairs due to limita-
tions of the faculties and knowledge of the inquirer. Since the
476 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
necessity for selection of the material that provides evidential data
is intrinsic, inferred propositions are subject to the existential
conditions thereby imposed. The probability-character follows,
and also the place of propositions about frequency-distributions in
deciding the order of probability belonging to a given proposition.
For ascertained conjunctions of this type provide the ultimate
ground for the selection of some existences and qualities rather
than others to serve as data.
3. We now come to the instances in which propositions are
overtly about frequency ratios, with respect to their probability.
Throwing of a coin or of dice with respect to the probability of
heads or tails, or of a certain numbered face of a die, appearing a
given number of times in a series of throws, is the case that will be
examined. In subject-?natter, the case differs from those already
considered in that (1) the existential data are relatively definite
and complete, and in that (2) deduction from conceptions plays
a more important role. In the case of a series of throws of dice,
the existential conditions are determined in a way that satisfies to
an unusual degree the logical conditions of inclusion-exclusion.
The coin has but two sides; the die but six faces; and the conditions
are such that but one side, to the exclusion of others, can be
thrown at any given time. When these conditions are postulated
and it is also postulated that the coin or dice are homogeneous in
composition (or are not loaded), and that the successive acts of
throwing are such that the peculiarities which affect the result in
one case are offset, in the long run, by the peculiarities of other
acts of throwing (or that the mechanism for throwing is not
crooked), the mathematical theory comes into play and the ratio
of frequencies in a succession of throws can be theoretically cal-
culated.
Given the conditions in question as final, it is possible for
mathematical theory, in ordered discourse, to reach certain propo-
sitions about what will necessarily occur as a matter of frequency-
distributions in an indefinite series of throws. But no one today
would hold that these propositions "imply" what will existentially
take place, or that the theory guarantees that the conditions pos-
tulated actually exist. They are if-then propositions necessarily
related to one another. But they do not guarantee that the con-
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 477
ditions of the if clause existentially obtain. This is a matter-of-
fact capable of determination only by independent operations of
experimental observation. The point here made may be techni-
cally stated as follows: The probability of A or B with respect to
C is equal to the probability of A with respect to C plus the
probability of B with respect to C minus the probability of A and
B with respect to G This is a proposition in the calculus of prob-
ability. On the frequency interpretation, it is a proposition whose
contents have a necessary relation to one another. But the propo-
sitions that the probability of A or B with respect to C is U and
that the probability of A or B with respect to C is V 2 , are factual
in nature. They are dependent upon factual information for their
content.
The important logical consideration is that from the mathemati-
cal point of view the calculated frequency-distributions represent
the limit of a mathematical infinite series, while the ratio of exis-
tential distributions is a matter of a long-run finite series. Suppose,
for example, that at the close of n throws (n being a finite num-
ber), actual results have a one-hundred-percent agreement with
theoretically arrived at conclusions. The fallacy involved in stop-
ping at that point and saying the theoretical conclusion is now
completely verified is evident. For the very next throw r would
upset "verification" by complete agreement to an extent de-
pendent upon the number of previous throws. It is, accordingly,
impossible to give descriptive value to the mathematical concep-
tions and propositions. They have instrumental and functional
status. What applies in this case of conditions, so prepared in ad-
vance as to come as close to a closed system as is possible, applies
a fortiori to cases in which prior preparation of existential conditions
cannot be instituted in the same degree.
4. I now come to the type of case represented by life-
expectancy tables of an insurance company, with respect to the
office they serve. Here, too, the subject-matter is not the prob-
ability of a singular event but of the probable frequency ratio of
events of specified kinds to events of the kind in which they are
included as subkinds. The inclusive kind is constituted by the
conjunction of traits that describe the kind deaths. The included
kinds are deaths differentiated from one another, within the in-
478 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
elusive kind, by the age, within certain prescribed limits, at which
deaths occur. A physician examining John Smith may form a
proposition concerning the probable length of time John Smith
has to live. As an insuree, John Smith is simply one of a collection
of singulars marked off by the trait of being of the same age. As
one of a kind qua kind, not qua a singular, he has a certain probable
life-expectancy. The propositions are: that of persons of a given
age, a certain ratio die within the next year, a certain other
proportionate number within the next two years, and so on.
Both the data from which inferences are made, and propositions
inferred from them, are matters of frequency-distributions. The
validity of the data depends upon the extensive character of past
observations and the completeness and accuracy of records. They
are materially checked by the fact that life-insurance companies
have now been operating for a long time, and hence have a more
selected prepared set of data upon which to draw than are pro-
vided by records of deaths in general. It is a commonplace that
the actuarial phase of the business is mathematical in character.
But the slightest analysis shows that the mathematics in question
functions instrumentally, not descriptively. As far as the sub-
jective theory is concerned, it is obvious that the more extensive
and accurate the knowledge of relevant data, the more accurate
are the probability propositions formed.
5. It is perhaps advisable to say something about a question
more or less often discussed, namely, the probability that a given
theory or a given law is "true." According to the position here
taken it is meaningless to speak of the degree of probability of a
given law or theory save as that phrase is an elliptic or shorthand
(and also awkward) way of pointing to the probability-coefficients
of the subject-matters between which the laws, as means of transi-
tion, enable relations to be instituted. Some laws are more com-
prehensive than others; they apply to a wider range of cases. If
the degree of probability of a law had any literal meaning, it would
seem to apply only to the relative frequency of the valid applica-
tion of less comprehensive laws within the total system of laws of
which they are members. It is difficult to find a case in which
such a determination would have any importance. If it did have
meaning, it would exemplify the principle already stated, viz., that
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 479
the probability of a theory is measured by the relations its conse-
quences sustain to those of other theories in the continuity of in-
quiry.
In terminating this phase of the discussion of subject-matter, it
is pertinent to recur to the intent of this chapter. Its purpose is to
show the connection of the characteristic features of the body of
propositions that form the subject-matter of existential science
with the account previously given of the logic of method. The
discussion of probability is intended, then, only to indicate that
and how, the probable character of scientific propositions about
singulars, collections and kinds bears out conclusions that were
reached as to method, not to provide a technical discussion of the
whole subject. Its most intimate connection is with the discussion
of propositions having existential reference found in Chapter XV.
CASES AS REPRESENTATIVE
The net conclusion of the discussion of the inductive phase of
inquiry was that it is concerned to institute a case that is repre-
sentative of various phenomena in such a way that it warrants
a general proposition; or, negatively stated, that induction is not
a matter of inferring from some to all. Upon the side of subject-
matter, this conception of method accounts for the role played
by the category of specimens and samples. After checking prop-
ositions by experimental variation of conditions, the following
proposition is affirmed: The melting point of this substance is
125° C. This proposition in conjunction with other propositions
of independent material contents leads to the generalization "Any-
thing having this set of conjoined traits is sulphur": that is, it is a
case of the kind denominated sulphur. The determination of sin-
gulars as cases of a generalization or law is the result of operations
of selection and ordering of traits that have the function of being
determinately significant; that is, representative. The statement
that "the phenomenon is a case of a law," is elliptic. It cannot be
interpreted to mean that laws are inherently and ontologically
embodied in phenomena, or that the phenomena are "implied" by
the law. It means that a certain selected and ordered set of con-
480 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
joined traits is, or is taken to be, an adequate ground from which
to make a generalization, which when formulated, has the form
of a law; and that, given the law, the case thus constituted is a
secure ground for inference.
At this point, it is pertinent to distinguish the cases that are
samples, from those which are specimens. A case is a specimen
when its content is so constituted that its kind permits inferences
to be safely made from it to traits and objects which are not there
and then observed. This thing, for example, is determined to be
a specimen of rye, wheat or oats when it is ascertained to be
marked by a certain conjunction of distinctive traits. Its char-
acter as a specimen would not warrant inference to things and
properties outside the kind — for example, to things that are tem-
porally and spatially contiguous. When, however, the material
in question is determined to be a fair sample, the material becomes
something more than an exemplary case or specimen of a kind.
A given thing is a sample only when it is determined to be an ele-
ment in a homogeneous continuum. Whether or not a portion of
grain selected from a bin is or is not a sample of the contents of
the bin is a different question from whether or not it is an adequate
specimen of the kind wheat or of some subkind of wheat. It is a
fair sample only if homogeneity has been instituted by mixing, say,
all the contents of the bin so thoroughly that any given handful
will present in proportionate distribution, all the constituent
grains in the bin. It then becomes representative of them in the
sense that inference can be made from it to the properties of any
other handful, no matter of what kind or combination of kinds it
is, or from what part of the bin it is taken.
Determination of cases as samples thus has a distinctive logical
function. The scope of inferences from what I have called speci-
men cases is subject to a definite restriction. For determination
of singulars as being of a kind is dependent upon selection and
ordering of qualities. The qualities are not, as we have seen, taken
in their immediacy, for they are selected and ordered as marks or
signs of interactions of which they are consequences. The estab-
lishment of a specified interaction is identical with determination
of a correlation of changes or variations, and the formula of an
interaction in law or generic proposition is not in its content a
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 48J.
formulation of a notation of observed qualities. But reference to
the qualitative necessarily remains. This reference is not such
as to obstruct measurements of phenomena or calculations based
on measurements, since the very content of the law is such as to
promote and direct those measurements of selected material that
render calculations possible. But it does get in the way of ap-
plicatory use of abstract universal propositions or of mathematical
formulae as such. For kinds are heterogeneous, being marked off
on the ground of qualities; even subkinds within an inclusive kind
are demarcated by distinctions having qualitative reference. Hence
the application of calculations is restricted to relations within
kinds. Institution of a spatial-temporal continuum such that any
portion of it is homogtntoMS with every other portion is equiva-
lent to institution of a new type of kind which is existentially so
inclusive that its contents are related to one another not as quali-
tatively distinct kinds but as special interactions within a complex
single scheme of interactions, the latter being stated in terms free
from reference to anything but properties common to every in-
teraction. The bearing of this change upon the subject-matter of
natural science forms the special theme of the next section.
THE STANDARDIZED CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC
SUBJECT-MATTER
I. The subject-matter of physical science is constituted as far as
is possible in terms of constituents which lend themselves to
numerical measurements of such a sort that the measurements in
question are capable of systematic relation with one another; Le.,
comparisons that determine identities and differences which are
also numerically formulated. It is not enough just to measure.
The measurements must be such, in scientific ideal, as to be statable
in terms that are systematically comparable with one another; that
is, to be relatable in calculations.
1. This end is effected in scientific inquiry through the cate-
gories of space, time and mass so correlated with one another as
to enable changes that occur (which themselves are numerically
measured) to be stated in terms of differences of motion as an
inclusive category. For determination of change as motion means
formulation of it in terms of numerically measured mass in con-
482 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
junction with numerically measured time and distance or "length."
M, T, and L, are standard means of determining the units in which
physical phenomena are measured, since it is by their use that any
change is capable of formulation in terms of velocity and accelera-
tion of motions having vectorial properties. They are the means by
which homogeneity of data is established such that any portion of
a space-time continuum may be taken as a sample of a system of
interactions. Free interchange of data is thus made possible with
respect to extensive inferential functions.
On the negative side, this statement implies that the status
of the conceptions is logical, not ontological. Existential inter-
actions must have potentialities such that they are capable of for-
mulation in terms of motions defined by application of the con-
ceptions, M, T and L. Nevertheless, the classic formulation
in terms of qualitative changes, in which change of spatial po-
sitions and the time taken in the course of this change were
of no particular importance, was a more faithful descriptive
rendering of the direct field of perception than is modern physical
science. Interpretation on the basis of kinds of which particular
objects are more or less complete specimens, is also much closer to
what on its face is the report of common sense, than is the idea
of a homogeneous spatial-temporal continuum. But "science" that
was constructed in these terms did not lend itself either to fruitful
theoretical development or to extensive practical control of quali-
tative change. Constructive development of science has taken
place through treating the material of the perceived world in term?
of properties that accrue to natural objects on the ground of
their function in promoted and controlled processes of systematic
inquiry; that is, in terms of properties that are logical, rather than
directly ontological. Mass, time and length, as conceptions, are
contents of universal propositions whose application to existence is
functional.
2. Statement in terms of a homogeneous spatial-temporal con-
tinuum makes possible extensive systematic ordering of proposi-
tions in discourse as well as institution of measured data in ex-
tensive inference. The elimination of qualities as the ground of
scientific propositions made, as has been said, measurements and
calculations on the basis of those measurements possible. But
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 483
measurements and calculations do not of themselves alone provide
the means of completely systematic interpretation or ordering of
the data obtained. For the conjugate relation of data and con-
ceptions (which has so often been pointed out) requires for com-
plete organization of data a corresponding system of interrelated
conceptions capable of exclusive and inclusive (exhaustive) appli-
cation. The conceptions of mass, time and length in their interre-
lations with one another satisfy this condition. Transformation
of contents that are stated in their terms is possible in discourse
without limitation; or at least, it is the logical ideal that the ultimate
categories of physical inquiry be such that this unrestricted trans-
formability is possible. Phenomena as qualitatively unlike as those
of heat, light and electricity, are capable of statement in equations
that are capable of indefinite deductive development.
3. Nevertheless, there is a twofold convention involved in se-
lection of M, T and L, as standardized conceptions. One of them,
a minor one from the standpoint of the present theme, was pre-
viously discussed. The selection of a bar of platinum, kept in a
certain place under specified conditions, to serve as the unit of
measurement of lengths, is obviously a matter of social agreement.
But, as already indicated, while the particular content is a matter
of agreement, its function is not conventional, since the operation
of measurement is of such intrinsic importance that some effective
means must be found for its execution.
There is another and conceptual convention that has direct
logical import. The fact that M, T and L are logical rather than
ontological in nature indicates that there is no existential necessity
for choosing them. Mass, energy and density might, for example,
have been selected, in which case length and time would have been
derivatives. There are those who believe that, because of devel-
opment of quantum physics, mass, electric charge and angular
momentum will sometime become the standard conceptions. The
facilitation and control of inquiry is the criterion by which stand-
ard conceptions are instituted— a further indication that their
status is that of procedural means, as well as of the fact that the
convention involved is not arbitrary.
The discussion of the present topic will be concluded by recur-
ring to the correlation of inductive and deductive operations in
484 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
scientific inquiry. The subject-matter of physical science ex-
hibits in overt form the meaning of this correlation. Existential
determinations, which are inductive, are made in such a way as
to enable mathematical conceptions and relations to function ef-
fectively in deductively ordered discourse. In and of itself, the
existential world is such that an unlimited variety of selective
discriminations is possible. A problem decides the selection which
is actually instituted in any given case. In what is called common
sense ; the problem is that of some use-enjoyment. In science, the
generic problem is promotion of controlled inquiry. Since the
required control can be obtained only through the intermediation
of abstract interrelated conceptions, inductive existential deter-
minations are conducted with constant reference to institution and
application of conceptions deductively interrelated with one an-
other, while the conceptions are chosen and ordered with reference
to ultimate existential application.
This consideration qualifies the meaning of induction and de-
duction in their methodological significance. As far as processes
of inquiry are concerned, there is no difference between induction
and deduction. Sagacity in evaluation, scrupulous care in notation
and record, cherishing and development of suggestion, a keen eye
for relevant analogies, tentative experimentation, physical and
imaginative shaping of material so that it takes the form of a dia-
grammatic representation, are all demanded whether the subject-
matter is observational or conceptual; that is, whether the function
of the subject-matter in question is inductive or deductive. The
distinction between induction and deduction does not lie then in
the processes of inquiry but in the direction which the processes
take — according as the objective is determination of relevant and
effective existential data or relevant and effective interrelated con-
ceptions. A man traveling from New York to Chicago and from
Chicago to New York may use the same route and the same means
of transportation in each trip. His intended destination and his
direction of movement make the difference. The case is not dif-
ferent as far as processes involved in induction and deduction are
concerned.
The notion that there is one logic of induction and another of
deduction, and that the two logics are independent of each other,
SCIENTIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER 485
is an expression of a certain stage of intellectual history. It de-
veloped at the time when the classic logic was still supposed to
provide the norm of demonstrative discourse, and yet was found to
be inadequate for purposes of existential inquiries. It was then re-
tained as a valid logic of deduction and was supplemented by super-
imposition of an inductive logic supposed to formulate the methods
employed in physical investigations. In consequence, both the so-
called deductive and inductive logics suffered in their own con-
tents. The isolation of each from the other made it impossible to
state either of them on the ground and terms of the functions they
respectively performed. The attempt to obtain a complete logic
by addition of two distorted and defective logics is impossible of
execution.
It is pertinent to quote the following passage with reference to
the actual import of the more recent developments of the logic of
the deductive function. "The new logic offers the deductive pro-
cedure, not as a method of proof, but as a method of analysis.
Instead of taking the field of arithmetic or of logic as one in which
indispensable premises are to lead to previously uncertain or un-
discovered conclusions by a process of demonstration, it takes the
generally accepted facts of arithmetic, or of logic, as a problem
for analysis and orderly arrangement. In the process of making
such an analysis and reconstructing our facts upon the basis of its
results, we may — and most frequently do — come upon some pre-
viously unsuspected facts or principles which are required by those
more commonly recognized. But in general we accept the results
of previous experience; the need is not so much to substantiate as
to understand the results." 6 There are two considerations implied
in this statement that are pertinent to the present discussion. The
processes involved in the work of analyzing and reordering ac-
cepted material cannot, it seems to me, be any different from those
involved in any strictly existential inquiry. Thorough familiarity
with material, sagacity in discrimination, acuteness in detection of
leads or clews, persistence and thoroughness in following them
through, cherishing and developing suggestions that arise, are re-
quired in one as in the other. There are no set rules to be fol-
6 C. I. Lewis, "On the Structure of Logic and its Relation to Other Systems,"
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XVIII (1921), p. 514.
486 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
lowed. The only "rule," it might be said, is to be as intelligent
and honest as lies within one's power. The other implication is
that logic — and mathematics — has at any given time a body of
subject-matter which, in a historical sense, is existential, and with
which it works. The forms that result from the analysis and re-
ordering are relative to the subject-matter at hand. Change from
a theory of deduction as rational demonstration (a theory charac-
teristic of the classic theory), to such an interpretation as that
quoted above, did not itself arise or proceed from formal logical
considerations. On the contrary, the change in the formal con-
ceptions of logic was conditioned by the fact that change had
occurred in the methods used in inquiry and consequently in the
subject-matter arrived at. Analytic examination and reordering
of the subject-matter of method and conclusions resulted in a new
and immensely fruitful knowledge of forms and formal relations.
But forms are still relative to the continuum of inquiry from which
they derive, and to which they are still relevant even when they are
abstracted and independently formulated.
CHAPTER XXIV
SOCIAL INQUIRY
y w sjhe subject-matter of social problems is existential. In
I the broad sense of "natural," social sciences are, therefore,
JL branches of natural science. Social inquiry is, however,
relatively so backward in comparison with physical and biological
inquiry as to suggest need for special discussion. The question
is not whether the subject-matter of human relations is or can
ever become a science in the sense in which physics is now a
science, but whether it is such as to permit of the development of
methods which, as far as they go, satisfy the logical conditions
that have to be satisfied in other branches of inquiry. That there
are serious difficulties in the way is evidenced by the backward
state of social inquiry. One obvious source of the difficulty lies
in the fact that the subject-matter of the latter is so "complex"
and so intricately interwoven that the difficulty of instituting a
relatively closed system (a difficulty which exists in physical
science) is intensified. The very backwardness of social inquiry
may serve, then, to test the general logical conceptions that have
been reached. For the results of discussion of the topic may show
that failure to act in accord with the logical conditions which have
been pointed out throws light on its retarded state.
I. Introduction. Certain conclusions already arrived at form
an introduction to the discussion.
1. All inquiry proceeds within a cultural matrix which is ul-
timately determined by the nature of social relations. The subject-
matter of physical inquiry at any time falls within a larger social
field. The techniques available at a given time depend upon the
state of material and intellectual culture. When we look back at
earlier periods, it is evident that certain problems could not have
arisen in the context of institutions, customs, occupations and in-
487
488 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
terests that then existed, and that even if, per impossible, they had
been capable of detection and formulation, there were no means
available for solving them. If we do not see that this conditioning,
both negative and positive, exists at present, the failure to see it
is due to an illusion of perspective. For since conceptions stand-
ardized in previous culture provide the ideational means by which
problems are formulated and dealt with, even if certain problems
were felt at a particular period (past or present), the hypotheses re-
quired to suggest and guide methods of their solution would be ab-
sent. "There is an inalienable and ineradicable framework of
conceptions which is not of our own making, but given to us
ready-made by society — a whole apparatus of concepts and cate-
gories, within which and by which individual thinking, however
daring and original, is compelled to move." x
a. The impact of cultural conditions upon social inquiry is ob-
vious. Prejudices of race, nationality, class and sect play such an
important role that their influence is seen by any observer of the
field. We have only to recall the story of astronomy and of more
recent incidents in the doctrine of evolution to be aware that in
the past institutional vested interests have told upon the develop-
ment of physical and biological science. If they do not do so at
present to anything like the same extent, it is in large measure
because physics has now developed specialized subject-matters
and techniques. The result is that to many persons the "physi-
cal" seems not only relatively independent of social issues (which
it is) but inherently set apart from all social context. The appear-
ance of absence of conflict is to some extent a function of this
isolation. What has actually happened, however, is that the in-
fluence of cultural conditions has become indirect. The general
type of physical problems that are uppermost determines the order
of conceptions that are still dominant. Social tendencies and the
problems attending them evoke special emphasis upon certain
^-Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p. 45, quoted by Stebbing, A Mod-
ern Introduction to Logic, p. 16n. The latter author adds: "No thinker, not
even the physicist, is wholly independent of the context of experience provided
for him by the society within which he works." While this is especially true
of the relation of a given physicist to the smaller society of scientific workers
within which he works, it is also true that the activities of this group as a whole
are determined in their main features by the "context of experience provided"
by the wider contemporaneous community.
SOCIAL INQUIRY 489
orders of physical problems rather than upon others. It is not
possible, for example, to separate nineteenth century devotion to
exclusively mechanical conceptions from the needs of industry
in that period. "Evolutionary" ideas were active, on the othe'r
hand, in dealing with cultural-social material before they were
applied in biology. The notion of the complete separation of
science from the social environment is a fallacy which encourages
irresponsibility, on the part of scientists, regarding the social con-
sequences of their work.
b. That physical science and its conclusions do as a matter of
fact exercise an enormous influence upon social conditions need not
be argued. Technological developments are the direct result of
application of physical science. These technological applications
have profound and extensive consequences upon human relations.
Change in methods of production, distribution, and communica-
tion is the chief determining condition of social relationships and,
to a large extent, of actual cultural values in ever} 7 advanced in-
dustrial people, while they have reacted intensively into the lives
of all "backward" peoples. Moreover, only an arbitrary, or else
purely conventional point of view (itself a cultural heritage from
earlier periods), can rule out such consequences as these from the
scope of science itself. The convention in question posits a com-
plete separation between "pure" and "applied" science. 2 The ul-
timate ground of every valid proposition and warranted judgment
consists in some existential reconstruction ultimately effected.
When the logician or philosopher is faced by the reconstructions
resulting from physical discoveries, it is not possible for him to
say, like Canute to the tide, "Thus far shalt thou go and no fur-
ther."
2. One of the points discussed in an earlier chapter concerned
the experiential continuum and the continuity of inquiry. This
2 "The only valid distinction between pure and applied research in natural
science lies between inquiries concerned with issues w T hich may eventually and
issues which already do arise in the social practice of mankind." Hogben, Re-
treat -from Reason, p. 8. The following passage from the same author is pertinent
to the earlier remark concerning the tendency toward intellectual irresponsibility
bred by isolation of the field of physical inquiry from the needs and possibilities
inhering in the "social practice of mankind." "The education of the scientist
and technician leaves him indifferent to the social consequences of his own
activities." (Ibid, p. 3)
490 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
expressed the principle of the "long run" phase of knowledge con-
nected with the self-developing and self-correcting nature of
scientific inquiry. Just as the validity of a proposition in dis-
course, or of conceptual material generally, cannot be determined
short of the consequences to which its functional use gives rise,
so the sufficient warrant of a judgment as a claimant to knowledge
(in its eulogistic sense) cannot be determined apart from con-
nection with a widening circle of consequences. An inquirer in
a given special field appeals to the experiences of the community
of his fellow workers for confirmation and correction of his re-
sults. Until agreement upon consequences is reached by those
who reinstate the conditions set forth, the conclusions that are
announced by an individual inquirer have the status of an hy-
pothesis, especially if the findings fail to agree with the general
trend of already accepted results. 3 While agreement among the
activities and their consequences that are brought about in the
wider (technically non-scientific) public stands upon a different
plane, nevertheless such agreement is an integral part of a com-
plete test of physical conclusions wherever their public bear-
ings are relevant. 4 The point involved comes out clearly when
the social consequences of scientific conclusions invoke intensifi-
cation of social conflicts. For these conflicts provide presumptive
evidence of the insufficiency, or partiality, and incompleteness of
conclusions as they stand.
3. The conclusion that agreement of activities and their con-
sequences is a test and a moving force in scientific advance is in
3 C. S. Peirce is notable among writers on logical theory for his explicit
recognition of the necessity of the social factor in the determination of evidence
and its probative force. The following representative passage is cited: "The
next most vital factor of the method of modem science is that it has been made
social. On the one hand, what a scientific man recognizes as a fact of science
must be something open to anybody to observe, provided he fulfills the neces-
sary conditions, external and internal. As long as only one man has been able
to see a marking upon the planet Venus, it is not an established fact. . . .
On the other hand, the method of modern science is social in respect to the
solidarity of its efforts. The scientific world is like a colony of insects, in that
the individual strives to produce that which he himself cannot hope to enjoy."
—Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 502.
4 The "agreement" in question is agreement in activities, not intellectual ac-
ceptance of the same set of propositions. (Cf. ante, pp. 51-4.) A proposition
does not gain validity because of the number of persons who accept it. More-
over, continuity of inquiry as a going concern must be taken into account
rather than the exact state of belief at a given moment.
SOCIAL INQUIRY 491
harmony with the position that the ultimate end and test of all
inquiry is the transformation of a problematic situation (which in-
volves confusion and conflict) into a unified one. That it is much
more difficult to accomplish this end in social inquiry than in the
restricted field of physical inquiry is a fact. But it is not a fact
which constitutes an inherent logical or theoretical difference be-
tween the two kinds of inquiry. On the contrary, the presence
of practical difficulties should operate, as within physical inquiry
itself, as an intellectual stimulus and challenge to further applica-
tion.
4. That social inquiry must satisfy the conjoint conditions of
observational ascertainment of fact and of appropriate operational
conceptions may seem too evident to require explicit statement.
For they are obviously conditions of all scientific achievement with
respect to existential subject-matter. But the failure to satisfy the
requirement of institution of factual and conceptual subject-matter
in conjugate correspondence with each other is such a marked
characteristic of the present estate of the social disciplines (as is
shown in some detail later) that it is necessary to make the point
explicitly. On the positive side, the necessity of this conjugate re-
lation indicates the most important way in which physical science
serves as a model for social inquiry. For if there is one lesson more
than any other taught by the methods of the physical sciences, it is
the strict correlativity of fact and ideas. Until social inquiry suc-
ceeds in establishing methods of observing, discriminating and ar-
ranging data that evoke and test correlated ideas, and until, on the
other side, ideas formed and used are (1) employed as hypotheses,
and are (2) of a form to direct and prescribe operations of analytic-
synthetic determination of facts, social inquiry has no chance of
satisfying the logical conditions for attainment of scientific status.
5. One further point will be mentioned before we come to dis-
cussion of social inquiry in its own terms. The wide field and
intricate constitution of social phenomena, as compared with
physical phenomena, is more than a source of practical difficulties
in their scientific treatment. It has a definite theoretical import.
For the existential conditions which form the physical environ-
ment enter at every point into the constitution of socio-cultural
phenomena. No individual person and no group does anything
492 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
except in interaction with physical conditions. There are no
consequences taking place, there are no social events that can be
referred to the human factor exclusively. Let desires, skills, pur-
poses, beliefs be what they will, what happens is the product of the
interacting intervention of physical conditions like soil, sea, moun-
tains, climate, tools and machines, in all their vast variety, with
the human factor. 5 The theoretical bearing of this consideration
is that social phenomena cannot be understood except as there is
prior understanding of physical conditions and the laws of their
interactions. Social phenomena cannot be attacked, qua social,
directly. Inquiry into them, with respect both to data that are
significant and to their relations or proper ordering, is conditioned
upon extensive prior knowledge of physical phenomena and their
laws. This fact accounts in part for the retarded and immature
state of social subjects. Only recently has there been sufficient un-
derstanding of physical relations (including the biological under
this caption) to provide the necessary intellectual instrumentalities
for effective intellectual attack upon social phenomena. Without
physical knowledge there are no means of analytic resolution of
complex and grossly macroscopic social phenomena into simpler
forms. We now come to discussion of the bearing of logical
principles of inquiry upon distinctive social subject-matter.
II. Social Inquiry and Judgments of Practice. It was shown in
the course of earlier discussions that there are judgments which
are formed with express reference to entering integrally into the
reconstitution of the very existential material which they are ulti-
mately about, or concern. It was also shown that the judgments
in which this phase is explicit — namely, judgments of practice and
historical judgments, — are special instances of the reconstructive
transformation of antecedent problematic subject-matter which is
the end-in-view and the objective consequence of all inquiry.
These considerations have a peculiar bearing upon social inquiry
in its present condition. For the idea commonly prevails that
such inquiry is genuinely scientific only as it deliberately and
systematically abstains from all concern with matters of social
practice. The special lesson which the logic of the methods of
5 This consideration is fatal to the view that social sciences are exclusively,
or even dominantly, psychological.
SOCIAL INQUIRY 493
physical inquiry has to teach to social inquiry is, accordingly,
that social inquiry, as inquiry, involves the necessity of operations
which existentially modify actual conditions that, as they exist,
are the occasions of genuine inquiry and that provide its subject-
matter. For, as we have seen, this lesson is the logical import of
the experimental method.
Physical inquiry to a considerable extent and mathematics to an
even greater extent have now reached the point where problems are
mainly set by subject-matter already prepared by the results of
prior inquiries, so that further inquiries have a store of scientific
data, conceptions and methods already at hand. This is not the
case with the material of social inquiry. This material exists chiefly
in a crude qualitative state. The problem of institution of methods
by which the material of existential situations may be converted
into the prepared materials which facilitate and control inquiry
is, therefore, the primary and urgent problem of social inquiry.
It is then to this phase of the logic of social inquiry that further
discussion will be particularly directed.
1. Most current social inquiry is marked, as analytic examination
will disclose, by the dominance of one or the other of two modes
of procedure, which, in their contrast with one another, illustrate
the separation of practice and theory. On the practical side, or
among persons directly occupied with management of practical
affairs, it is commonly assumed that the problems which exist are
already definite in their main features. When this assumption is
made, it follows that the business of inquiry is but to ascertain the
best method of solving them. The consequence of this assumption
is that the work of analytic discrimination, which is necessary to
convert a problematic situation into a set of conditions forming a
definite problem, is largely foregone. The inevitable result is that
methods for resolving problematic situations are proposed without
any clear conception of the material in which projects and plans
are to be applied and to take effect. The further result is that often
difficulties are intensified. For additional obstructions to intelli-
gent action are created; or else, in alleviating some symptoms, new
troubles are generated. Survey of political problems and the
methods by which they are dealt with, in both domestic and inter-
national fields, will disclose any number of pertinent illustrations.
494 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
The contrast at this point with methods in physical inquiry is
striking. For, in the latter, a large part of the techniques employed
have to do with determination of the nature of the problem by
means of methods that procure a wide range of data, that deter-
mine their pertinency as evidential, that ensure their accuracy by
devices of measurement, and that arrange them in the order which
past inquiry has shown to be most likely to indicate appropriate
modes of procedure. Controlled analytic observation, involving
systematic comparison-contrast, is accordingly a matter of course
in the subjects that have achieved scientific status. The futility
of attempting to solve a problem whose conditions have not been
determined is taken for granted.
The analogy between social practice and medical practice as it
was conducted before the rise of techniques of clinical observation
and record, is close enough to be instructive. In both, there is the
assumption that gross observation suffices to ascertain the nature of
the trouble. Except in unusually obscure cases, symptoms suf-
ficiently large and coarse to be readily observable sufficed in
medical practice to supply the data that were used as means of
diagnosis. It is now recognized that choice of remedial measures
looking to restoration of health is haphazard until the conditions
which constitute the trouble or disease have been determined as
completely and accurately as possible. The primary problem is,
then, to institute the techniques of observation and record that
provide the data taken to be evidential and testing. The lesson,
as far as method of social inquiry is concerned, is the prime neces-
sity for development of techniques of analytic observation and
comparison, so that problematic social situations may be resolved
into definitely formulated problems.
One of the many obstructions in the way of satisfying the logi-
cal conditions of scientific method should receive special notice.
Serious social troubles tend to be interpreted in moral terms.
That the situations themselves are profoundly moral in their causes
and consequences, in the genuine sense of moral, need not be de-
nied. But conversion of the situations investigated into definite
problems, that can be intelligently dealt with, demands objective
intellectual formulation of conditions; and such a formulation de-
mands in turn complete abstraction from the qualities of sin and
SOCIAL INQUIRY 495
righteousness, of vicious and virtuous motives, that are so readily at-
tributed to individuals, groups, classes, nations. There was a time
when desirable and obnoxious physical phenomena were attrib-
uted to the benevolence and malevolence of overruling powers.
There was a time when diseases were attributed to the machina-
tions of personal enemies. Spinoza's contention that the occur-
rence of moral evils should be treated upon the same basis and
plane as the occurrence of thunderstorms is justifiable on the
ground of the requirements of scientific method, independently
of its context in his own philosophic system. For such procedure
is the only way in which they can be formulated objectively or in
terms of selected and ordered conditions. And such formulation
is the sole mode of approach through which plans of remedial
procedure can be projected in objective terms. Approach to hu-
man problems in terms of moral blame and moral approbation, of
wickedness or righteousness, is probably the greatest single ob-
stacle now existing to development of competent methods in the
field of social subject-matter.
2. When we turn from consideration of the methods of inquiry
currently employed in political and many administrative matters,
to the methods that are adopted in the professed name of social
science, we find quite an opposite state of affairs. We come upon
an assumption which if it were made explicitly formulated would
take some such shape as "The facts are out there and only need
to be observed, assembled and arranged to give rise to suitable and
grounded generalizations." Investigators of physical phenomena
often speak and write in similar fashion. But analysis of what they
do as distinct from what they say yields a very different result. Be-
fore, however, considering this point I shall discuss a closely con-
nected assumption, namely the assumption that in order to base
conclusions upon the facts and only the facts, all evaluative pro-
cedures must be strictly ruled out.
This assumption on the part of those engaged, in the name of
science, in social investigation derives in the minds of those who
entertain it from a sound principle. It springs, at least in large
measure, from realization of the harm that has been wrought by
forming social judgments on the ground of moral preconceptions,
conceptions of what is right and wrong, vicious and virtuous. As
496 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
has just been stated, this procedure inevitably prejudices the institu-
tion of relevant significant data, the statement of the problems that
are to be solved, and the methods by which they may be solved.
The soundness of the principle that moral condemnation and
approbation should be excluded from the operations of obtaining
and weighing material data and from the operations by which
conceptions for dealing with the data are instituted, is, however,
often converted into the notion that all evaluations should be
excluded. This conversion is, however, effected only through the
intermediary of a thoroughly fallacious notion; the notion, namely,
that the moral blames and approvals in question are evaluative
and that they exhaust the field of evaluation. For they are not
evaluative in any logical sense of evaluation. They are not even
judgments in the logical sense of judgment. For they rest upon
some preconception of ends that should or ought to be attained,
This preconception excludes ends (consequences) from the field
of inquiry and reduces inquiry at its very best to the truncated and
distorted business of finding out means for realizing objectives al-
ready settled upon. Judgment which is actually judgment (that
satisfies the logical conditions of judgment) institutes means-
consequences (ends) in strict conjugate relation to each other.
Ends have to adjudged (evaluated) on the basis of the available
means by which they can be attained just as much as existential
materials have to be adjudged (evaluated) with respect to their
function as material means of effecting a resolved situation. For
an end-in-view is itself a means, namely, a procedural means.
The idea that "the end justifies the means" is in as bad repute
in moral theory as its adoption is a commonplace of political prac-
tice. The doctrine may be given a strictly logical formulation,
and when so formulated its inherent defect becomes evident.
From the logical standpoint, it rests upon the postulate that some
end is already so fixedly given that it is outside the scope of in-
quiry, so that the only problem for inquiry is to ascertain and
manipulate the materials by which the end may be attained. The
hypothetical and directive function of ends-in-view as procedural
means is thus ignored and a fundamental logical condition of in-
quiry is violated. Only an end-in-view that is treated as a hy-
pothesis (by which discrimination and ordering of existential ma-
SOCIAL INQUIRY 497
terial is operatively effected) can by any logical possibility deter-
mine the existential materials that are means. In all fields' but the
social, the notion that the correct solution is already given and
that it only remains to find the facts that prove it is so thoroughly
discredited that those who act upon it are regarded as pretenders,
or as cranks who are trying to impose some pet notion upon
facts. But in social matters, those who claim that they are in
possession of the one sure solution of social problems often set
themselves up as being peculiarly scientific while others are floun-
dering around in an "empirical" morass. Only recognition in
both theory and practice that ends to be attained (ends-in-view)
are of the nature of hypotheses and that hypotheses have to be
formed and tested in strict correlativity with existential conditions
as means, can alter current habits of dealing with social issues.
What has been said indicates the valid meaning of evaluation in
inquiry in general and also shows the necessity of evaluative
judgments in social inquiry. The need for selective discrimination
of certain existential or factual material to be data proves that an
evaluative estimate is operating. The notion that evaluation is
concerned only with ends and that, with the ruling out of moral
ends, evaluative judgments are ruled out rests, then, upon a pro-
found misconception of the nature of the logical conditions and
constituents of all scientific inquiry. All competent and authentic
inquiry demands that out of the complex welter of existential and
potentially observable and recordable material, certain material
be selected and weighed as data or the "facts of the case." This
process is one of adjudgment, of appraisal or evaluation. On the
other end, there is, as has been just stated, no evaluation when
ends are taken to be already given. An idea of an end to be
reached, an end-in-view, is logically indispensable in discrimination
of existential material as the evidential and testing facts of the case.
Without it, there is no guide for observation; without it, one can
have no conception of what one should look for or even is looking
for. One "fact" would be just as good as another—that is, good
for nothing in control of inquiry and formation and in settlement
of a problem.
3. What has been said has direct bearing upon another assumption
which underlies a considerable part of allegedly scientific social
498 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
inquiry; the idea, namely, that facts are just there and need only
to be observed accurately and be assembled in sufficient number
to warrant generalizations. A generalization in the form of a
hypothesis is a prerequisite condition of selection and ordering of
material as facts. A generalization is quite as much an antecedent
of observation and assemblage of facts as it is a consequence of
observing and assembling them. Or, more correctly stated, no
generalization can emerge as a warranted conclusion unless a
generalization in the form of a hypothesis has previously exercised
control of the operations of discriminative selection and (synthetic)
ordering of material to form the facts of and for a problem. To
return to the point suggested earlier: What scientific inquirers do,
as distinct from what they say, is to execute certain operations of
experimentation — which are operations of doing and making—
that modify antecedently given existential conditions so that the
results of the transformation are facts which are relevant and
weighty in solution of a given problem. Operations of experimen-
tation are cases of blind trial and error which at best only succeed
in suggesting a hypothesis to be later tried except as they are them-
selves directed by a hypothesis about a solution.
The assumption that social inquiry is scientific if proper tech-
niques of observation and record (preferably statistical) are em-
ployed (the standard of propriety being set by borrowing from
techniques used in physical science), thus fails to observe the
logical conditions which in physical science give the techniques of
observing and measuring their standing and force. This point
will be developed by considering the idea, which is current, that
social inquiry is scientific only when complete renunciation of
any reference to practical affairs is made its precondition. Discus-
sion of this fallacy (fallacious from the strictly logical point of
view) will start from a consideration of the nature of the problems
of social inquiry.
III. Institution of Problems. A genuine problem is one set by
existential problematic situations. In social inquiry, genuine prob-
lems are set only by actual social situations which are themselves
conflicting and confused. Social conflicts and confusions exist
in fact before problems for inquiry exist. The latter are intel-
lectualizations in inquiry of these "practical" troubles and dif-
SOCIAL INQUIRY 499
ficulties. The intellectual determinations can be tested and war-
ranted only by doing something about the problematic existential
situations out of which they arise, so as to transform it in the
direction of an ordered situation. The connection of social inquiry,
as to social data and as to conceptual generalizations, with practice
is intrinsic not external. Any problem of scientific inquiry that
does not grow out of actual (or "practical") social conditions is
factitious; it is arbitrarily set by the inquirer instead of being ob-
jectively produced and controlled. All the techniques of observa-
tion employed in the advanced sciences may be conformed to,
including the use of the best statistical methods to calculate
probable errors, etc., and yet the material ascertained be scien-
tifically "dead," i.e., irrelevant to a genuine issue, so that concern
with it is hardly more than a form of intellectual busy work. That
which is observed, no matter how carefully and no matter how ac-
curate the record, is capable of being understood only in terms of
projected consequences of activities. In fine, problems with which
inquiry into social subject-matter is concerned must, if they satisfy
the conditions of scientific method, (1) grow out of actual social
tensions, needs, "troubles"; (2) have their subject-matter de-
termined by the conditions that are material means of bringing
about a unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis,
which is a plan and policy for existential resolution of the conflict-
ing social situation.
IV. Determination of Facts in Social Inquiry. This topic has,
of necessity, been anticipated in the foregoing discussion which has
shown that facts are such in a logical sense only as they serve to
delimit a problem in a way that affords indication and test of
proposed solutions. Two involved considerations will, however,
be explicitly dealt with it.
1. Since transformation of a problematic situation (a confused
situation whose constituents conflict with one another) is effected
by interaction of specially discriminated existential conditions,
facts have to be determined in their dual function as obstacles
and as resources; that is, with reference to operations of negation
(elimination) and affirmation, the latter being determination of
materials as positively agreeing with or reinforcing one another.
No existing situation can be modified without counteracting ob-
500 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
structive and deflecting forces that render a given situation con-
fused and conflicting. Operations of elimination are indispensable.
Nor can an objectively unified situation be instituted except as
the positive factors of existing conditions are released and ordered
so as to move in the direction of the objective consequence desired.
Otherwise, ends-in-view are Utopian and "idealistic," in the senti-
mental sense of the latter word.
Realistic social thinking is precisely the mode of observation
which discriminates adverse and favorable conditions in an existing
situation, "adverse" and "favorable" being understood in connec-
tion with the end proposed. "Realism" does not mean appre-
hension of the existing situation in toto, but selective discrimina-
tion of conditions as obstructive and as resources; i.e., as negative
and positive. When it is said "We must take conditions as they
are" the statement is either a logical truism or a fallacy which
then operates as an excuse for inaction. It is a truism if it is
understood to mean that existing conditions are the material, and
the only material, of analytic observation. But if it is taken to
mean that "conditions as they are" are final for judgment as to
what can or should be done, there results complete abnegation of
intelligent direction of both observation and action. For condi-
tions in any doubtful and undesirable situation are never all of a
piece — otherwise there would be no conflict or confusion involved
— and, moreover, they are never so fixed that no change in them
can be effected. In actual fact, they are themselves changing any-
how in some direction, so that the problem is to institute modes of
interaction among them which will produce changes in the direc-
tion that leads to the proposed objective consequence.
2. That conditions are never completely fixed means that they
are in process — that, in any case, they are moving toward the
production of a state of affairs which is going to be different in
some respect. The purpose of the operations of observation which
differentiate conditions into obstructive factors and positive re-
sources is precisely to indicate the intervening activities which
will give the movement (and hence its consequences) a different
form from what it would take if it were left to itself; that is, move-
ment toward a proposed unified existential situation.
The result of taking facts as finished and over with is more
SOCIAL INQUIRY 501
serious in inquiry into social phenomena than it is with respect to
physical objects. For the former phenomena are inherently his-
torical. But in physics, although universal conceptions are defined
and kinds are described in reference to some final existential applica-
tion, they are free from the necessity of any immediate application.
Every social phenomenon, however, is itself a sequential course of
changes, and hence a fact isolated from the history of which it is a
moving constituent loses the qualities that make it distinctively so-
cial. Generic propositions are indispensable in order to determine
the unique sequence of events, but as far as the latter is interpreted
wholly in terms of general and universal propositions, it loses that
unique individuality in virtue of which it is a historic and social
fact. A physical fact may be treated as a "case." Any account of,
say, the assassination of Julius Caesar assuredly involves the generic
conceptions of assassination, conspiracy, political ambition, human
beings, of which it is an exemplifying case and it cannot be re-
ported and accounted for without the use of such general concep-
tions. But treatment of it as just and merely a case eliminates its
qualities that make it a social fact. The conceptions are indis-
pensable but they are indispensable as means for determining a
non-recurring temporal sequence. Even in physics "laws" are in
their logical import ultimately means of selecting and linking to-
gether events which form an individual temporal sequence.
It was just affirmed that social phenomena are historical, or of
the nature of individual temporal sequences. Argument in sup-
port of this assumption is superfluous if "history" is understood to
include the present. No one would dream of questioning that the
social phenomena which constitute the rise of the papacy, the
industrial revolution, the rise of cultural and political nationalism,
are historical. It cannot be denied that what is now going on in
the countries of the world, in their domestic institutions and
foreign relations, will be the material of history in the future. It is
absurd to suppose that history includes events that happened up to
yesterday but does not take in those occurring today. As there
are no temporal gaps in a historically determined sequence, so there
are none in social phenomena that are determined by inquiry for
the latter constitute a developing course of events. Hence, al-
6 See, ante, pp. 445-7.
502 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
though observation and assemblage of materials in isolation from
their movement into an eventual consequence may yield "facts" of
some sort, the latter will not be facts in any social sense of that
word, since they will be non-historical.
This consideration reinforces the conclusion already drawn:
Inquiry into social phenomena involves judgments of evaluation,
for they can be understood only in terms of eventuations to which
they are capable of moving. Hence, there are as many possible
interpretations in the abstract as there are possible kinds of conse-
quences. This statement does not entail carrying over into social
phenomena a teleology that has been outmoded in the case of
physical phenomena. It does not imply that there is some purpose
ruling social events or that they are moving to a predetermined
goal. The meaning is that any problematic situation, 'when it is
analyzed, presents, in connection with the idea of operations to be
performed, alternative possible ends in the sense of terminating
consequences. Even in physical inquiry, what the inquirer ob-
serves and the conceptions he entertains are controlled by an
objective purpose — that of attaining a resolved situation. The
difference between physical and social inquiry does not reside in
the presence or absence of an end-in-view, formulated in terms of
possible consequences. It consists in the respective subject-matters
of the purposes. This difference makes a great practical difference
in the conduct of inquiry: a difference in the kind of operations
to be performed in instituting the subject-matters that in their
interactions will resolve a situation. In the case of social inquiry,
associated activities are directly involved in the operations to be
performed; these associated activities enter into the idea of any
proposed solution. The practical difficulties in the way of secur-
ing the agreements in actual association that are necessary for the
required activity are great. In physical matters, the inquirer may
reach the outcome in his laboratory or observatory. Utilization of
the conclusions of others is indispensable, and others must be able
to attain similar conclusions by use of materials and methods similar
to those employed by the individual investigator. His activity is
socially conditioned in its beginning and close. But in physical
inquiry the conditioning social factors are relatively indirect, while
in solution of social problems they are directly involved. Any
SOCI AL INQUIRY 503
hypothesis as to a social end must include as part of itself the idea
of organized association among those who are to execute the opera-
tions it formulates and directs.
Evaluative judgments, judgments of better and worse about the
means to be employed, material and procedural, are required.
The evils in current social judgments of ends and policies arise,
as has been said, from importations of judgments of value from
outside of inquiry. The evils spring from the fact that the values
employed are not determined in and by the process of inquiry:
for it is assumed that certain ends have an inherent value so
unquestionable that they regulate and validate the means em-
ployed, instead of ends being determined on the basis of existing
conditions as obstacles-resources. Social inquiry, in order to satisfy
the conditions of scientific method, must judge certain objective
consequences to be the end which is worth attaining under the
given conditions. But, to repeat, this statement does not mean
what it is often said to mean: Namely, that ends and values can be
assumed outside of scientific inquiry so that the latter is then
confined to determination of the means best calculated to arrive
at the realization of such values. On the contrary, it means that
ends in their capacity of values can be validly determined only on
the basis of the tensions, obstructions and positive potentialities
that are found, by controlled observation, to exist in the actual
situation.
V. Conceptual Subject-matter in Social Inquiry. This theme
was necessarily touched upon in the consideration of the first point,
the nature of problems. It was also treated in the foregoing sec-
tion regarding "fact-findings" that are carried on in isolation from
conceptions of an end to be attained. For it was pointed out that
such conceptions, while they need to be tested and revised in terms
of observed facts, are required to control the selection, arrangement
and interpretation of facts. Consideration of the present theme
will, accordingly, be confined for the most part, to pointing out the
logical mistake of those methods that treat conceptual subject-
matter as if it consisted of first and ultimate, self -validating truths,
principles, norms. As so often happens with contrary one-sided
views, the defects of the factual, so called "positivistic" school and
of the conceptual school, provide arguments by which each evokes
504 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
and supports the views of the other. It cannot be said that the con-
ceptual or "rationalistic" school pays no attention whatever to facts.
But it can be stated that it places its entire emphasis upon concep-
tions, so that facts are subsumed directly under "principles," the
latter being regarded as fixed norms that decide the legitimacy or il-
legitimacy of existing phenomena and that prescribe the ends to-
wards which endeavor should be directed.
There can be no doubt that in some form or other the past
history of social thought has been dominated by the conceptual ap-
proach. There have existed (to mention merely some outstanding
phases) first, the conception, in classical, moral and political theory
of ends-in-themselves that are fixed in and by Nature (and hence
ontological and cosmological) ; secondly, the doctrine of "Natural
Laws," which itself assumed a variety of forms in successive epochs;
thirdly, the theory of intuitions of a priori necessary truths, and,
finally, as in contemporary thought, the doctrine of an intrinsic
hierarchy of fixed values. It is no part of the present task to
examine these various historical manifestations of identification of
ends having objective status with a priori conceptual material. An
illustration, exemplary as to the logic involved although not ex-
emplary as to its material, will be given.
Classical political economy, with respect to its logical form,
claimed to be a science in virtue, first, of certain ultimate first
truths, and, secondly, in virtue of the possibility of rigorous "de-
duction" of actual economic phenomena from these truths. From
these "premises," it followed, in the third place, that the first
truths provided the norms of practical activity in the field of
economic phenomena; or that actual measures were right or
wrong, and actual economic phenomena normal or abnormal, in
the degree of their correspondence with deductions made from
the system of conceptions forming the premises. The members of
this school, from Adam Smith to the Mills and their contemporary
followers, differed of course from the traditional rationalistic
school. For they held that first principles were themselves derived
inductively, instead of being established by a priori intuition. But
once arrived at, they were regarded as unquestionable truths, or as
axioms with respect to any further truths, since the latter should be
deductively derived from them. The actual content of the fixed
SOCIAL INQUIRY 505
premises was taken to be certain truths regarding human nature,
such as the universal desire of each individual to better his condi-
tion; the desire to do so with the least effort (since effort con-
stituted cost in the sense of pain to be minimized); the impulse to
exchange of goods and services in maximum satisfaction of wants
at least cost, etc.
We are not concerned with the question of the validity or in-
validity of the content of these premises. The point at issue con-
cerns the import of the logic of the method involved. The net
consequence of the procedure of classic economics was reinstate-
ment of the older conception of "natural laws" by means of a
reinterpretation of their content. For it was concluded that the
"laws" of human activity in the economic field, which were
theoretically deducible, were the norms of proper or right human
activity in that field. The laws were supposed to "govern" the
phenomena in the sense that all phenomena which failed to con-
form to them were abnormal or "unnatural" — were a vicious at-
tempt to suspend the working of natural laws or to escape from
their inevitable consequences. Any attempt to regulate economic
phenomena by control of the social conditions under which pro-
duction and distribution of goods and services occur was thereby
judged to be a violation of natural laws, an "interference" with
the normal order, so that ensuing consequences were bound to be
as disastrous as are the consequences of an attempt to suspend or
interfere with the working of any physical law, say, the law of
gravitation.
Discussion of this position is concerned only with its inherent
logic, not with the fact that its practical product was a system of
laissez-faire "individualism" and a denial of the validity of at-
tempts at social control of economic phenomena. From the
standpoint of logical method, the conceptions involved were not
regarded as hypotheses to be employed in observation and order-
ing of phenomena, and hence to be tested by the consequences
produced by acting upon them. They were regarded as truths
already established and therefore unquestionable. Furthermore,
it is evident that the conceptions were not framed with reference
to the needs and tensions existing at a particular time and place,
or as methods of resolving ills then and there existing, but as
506 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
universal principles applicable anywhere and everywhere. A
strong case might be made out for the position that if they had
been framed and interpreted on the ground of applicability to
conditions existing under specified spatio-temporal conditions,
say, in the first half of the nineteenth century in Great Britain,
they were to a considerable extent directive operational hypotheses
relevant to those historical conditions. But the method that was
employed forbade an interpretation in specified spatio-temporal
terms.
In consequence, the three indispensable logical conditions of
conceptual subject-matter in scientific method were ignored;
namely, (1) the status of theoretical conceptions as hypotheses
which (2) have a directive function in control of observation and
ultimate practical transformation of antecedent phenomena, and
which (3) are tested and continually revised on the ground of the
consequences they produce in existential application.
A further illustration of the demands of logical method may be
found in other current theories about social phenomena, such as
the supposed issue of "individualism" versus "collectivism" or
"socialism," or the theory that all social phenomena are to be en-
visaged in terms of the class-conflict of the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. From the standpoint of method, such conceptual
generalizations, no matter which one of the opposed conceptions is
adopted, prejudge the characteristic traits and the kinds of actual
phenomena that the proposed plans of action are to deal with.
Hence the work of analytic observations by which actual phe-
nomena will be reduced to terms of definite problems that may be
dealt with by means of determinate specified operations is in-
trinsically compromised from the start. The "generalizations" are
of the nature of all-or-none contradictory "truths." Like all such
sweeping universals, they do not delimit the field so as to determine
problems that may be attacked one by one, but are of such a
nature that, from the standpoint of theory, one theory must be
accepted and the other rejected in toto.
One of the simplest ways of grasping the logical difference be-
tween social inquiry that rests upon fixed conceptual principles
and physical inquiry, is to note that in the latter the theoretical
controversies which exist concern the efficacy of different concep-
SOCIAL INQUIRY 507
tions of procedure, while in the former they are about the question
of an alleged intrinsic truth or falsity. This attitude is generative
of conflict in opinion, and clash in action, instead of promoting in-
quiries into observable and verifiable facts. If one looks at the
early stage of what is now the body of facts and ideas that
constitute physics, chemistry, biology and medicine, one finds that
at some earlier period controversy in those fields was also mainly
about the intrinsic truth and falsity of certain conceptions. As
these sciences have advanced in genuine scientific quality, doubt
and inquiry have centered upon the efficacy of different methods
of procedure. The result has been that instead of a state of rigid
alternatives of which one must be accepted and the other re-
jected, a plurality of hypotheses is positively welcome. For the
plurality of alternatives is the effective means of rendering in-
quiry more extensive (sufficient) and more flexible, more capable
of taking cognizance of all facts that are discovered.
In fine, fact-finding procedures are necessary for (1) determina-
tion of problems and for (2) provision of data that indicate and
test hypotheses; while formulation of conceptual structures and
frames of reference is necessary to guide observation in dis-
criminating and ordering data. The immature state of social in-
quiry may thus be measured by the extent to which these two
operations of fact-finding and of setting up theoretical ends are
carried on independently of each other, with the consequence that
factual propositions on one side and conceptual or theoretical
structures on the other are regarded each as final and complete in
itself by one or another school. With reference to the conceptual
framework, some additional considerations are appended.
1. Directing conceptions tend to be taken for granted after they
have once come into general currency. In consequence they
either remain implicit or unstated, or else are propositionally
formulated in a way which is static instead of functional. Failure
to examine the conceptual structures and frames of reference
which are unconsciously implicated in even the seemingly most
innocent factual inquiries is the greatest single defect that can be
found in any field of inquiry. Even in physical matters, after a
certain conceptual frame of reference has once become habitual, it
508 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
tends to become finally obstructive with reference to new lines of
investigation. In biology and in the social disciplines, law, politics,
economics and morals, the danger is more acute and more dis-
astrous. Failure to encourage fertility and flexibility in formation
of hypotheses as frames of reference is closer to a death warrant of
a science than any other one thing.
2. With respect to social subject-matter in particular, failure to
translate influential conceptions into formulated propositions is
especially harmful. For only explicit formulation stimulates ex-
amination of their meanings in terms of the consequences to which
they lead and promotes critical comparison of alternative hy-
potheses. Without systematic formulation of ruling ideas, inquiry
is kept in the domain of opinion and action in the realm of conflict.
For ultimately the only logical alternative to open and above-
board propositional formulation of conceptual alternatives (as
many as possible) is formation of controlling ideas on the ground
of either custom and tradition or some special interest. The result
is dichotomization of a social field into conservatives and progres-
sives, "reactionaries" and "radicals," etc.
3. One of the chief practical obstacles to the development of
social inquiry is the existing division of social phenomena into a
number of compartmentalized and supposedly independent non-
interacting fields, as in the different provinces assigned, for ex-
ample to economics, politics, jurisprudence, morals, anthropology,
etc. It is no part of a general logical theory to indicate special
methods and devices by which existing barriers may be broken
down. That task is the business of inquirers in the several fields.
But a survey from the logical point of view of the historical de-
velopment of the social disciplines instructively discloses the causes
of splitting up social phenomena into a number of relatively closed
compartments and the injurious effects of the division. It is legiti-
mate to suggest that there is an urgent need for breaking down
these conceptual barriers so as to promote cross-fertilization of
ideas, and greater scope, variety and flexibility of hypotheses.
4. The practical difficulties in the way of experimental method
in the case of social phenomena as compared with physical in-
vestigations do not need elaborate exposition. Nevertheless, every
measure of policy put into operation is, logically, and should be
SOCIAL INQUIRY 509
actually, of the nature of an experiment. For (1) it represents the
adoption of one out of a number of alternative conceptions as
possible plans of action, and (2) its execution is followed by
consequences which, while not as capable of definite or exclusive
differentiation as in the case of physical experimentation, are
none the less observable within limits, so they may serve as
tests of the validity of the conception acted upon. The idea that
because social phenomena do not permit the controlled variation of
sets of conditions in a one-by-one series of operations, therefore,
the experimental method has no application at all, stands in the way
of taking advantage of the experimental method to the extent that
is practicable. Suppose, for example, it is a question of the intro-
duction of some legislative policy. Recognition of its experimental
character would demand, on the side of its contents, that they be
rendered as definite as possible in terms of a number of well thought
out alternatives, or as members of a disjunctive system. That is, fail-
ure to recognize its experimental character encourages treatment
of a policy as an isolated independent measure. This relative isola-
tion puts a premium upon formation of policies in a comparatively
improvised way, influenced by immediate conditions and pressures
rather than by surveys of conditions and consequences. On the
other side, failure to take into account the experimental nature of
policies undertaken, encourages laxity and discontinuity in dis-
criminative observation of the consequences that result from its
adoption. The result is merely that it works or it does not work
as a gross whole, and some other policy is then improvised. Lack
of careful, selectiye, continued observation of conditions promotes
indefmiteness in formation of policies, and this indefmiteness reacts
in turn to obstruct definiteness of the observations relevant to its
test and revision.
Finally, it may be pointed out that the present state of social in-
quiry provides a test of the adequacy of general logical theory, and
in this respect furnishes confirmation of the validity of the general
theory which has been developed. To consider in detail its value
as a test of logical theories held regarding facts and conception and
their relation to each other would be to repeat what has already
been said. A word may be added about its value as a test of
formalistic logical theories. A logic of forms in isolation from
510 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD ^
matter is confined in social inquiry to the function of forms in
locating formal fallacies in discourse, especially in giving warning
against the confusion of words having emotional immediate prac-
tical effect, (so called "expressive sentences") with those having
objective meaning. This purging of reasoning from formal fal-
lacies is a valuable service. But it rarely requires any elaborate
formal scheme to enable them to be detected. The important fal-
lacies are the material ones. They spring from lack of proper
methods of observation on one hand, and, on the other, from lack
of methods for forming and testing hypotheses. With respect to
these material concerns, f ormalistic logic is necessarily silent. The
silence is sometimes defended on the ground that propositions about
social matters and about what is to be done with respect to them
involve valuations (which is correct), and then holding that
propositions about values are pseudo-propositions, expressing
merely resolutions to act in certain ways. That an element of
practical resolution exists need not be denied; it is found also in
every conception as to how to operate in physical science. The
point which is important is that formalistic logic provides no
possible ground for deciding upon one practical policy rather
than another, and none for following out the consequences of a
policy when put into operation as a test of its validity. The net
effect is to throw the very field in which intelligent control is of
the utmost importance wholly outside the scope of scientific
method. There are those to whom this result will present itself as a
reductio ad absurdum of the theory in question. In any case,
the formalistic position is very likely to provoke a reaction that
contributes to strengthening the theory of fixed a priori schemes
of value, known by direct rational intuition. For any denial of
the possibility of application of a scientific method is bound to
encourage resort, in a matter of such importance, to use of non-
scientific and even anti-scientific procedures.
I conclude discussion of the topic of the logic of social inquiry
by referring again to the point which is fundamental in the fore-
going discussion — its intrinsic reference to practice. This ref-
erence has been shown to be involved in determination of genuine
problems, in discriminating, weighing and ordering facts as evi-
dential, and in formation and test of the hypotheses that are
SOCIAL INQUIRY 511
entertained. I add a few words upon the special topic of under-
standing facts. Understanding or interpretation is a matter of the
ordering of those materials that are ascertained to be facts; that is,
determination of their relations. In any given subject-matter there
exist many relations of many kinds. That particular set of rela-
tions which is relevant to the problem in hand has to be determined.
Relevant theoretical conceptions come into play only as the prob-
lem in hand is clear and definite; that is, theory alone cannot de-
cide what set of relations is to be instituted, or how a given body
of facts is to be understood. A mechanic, for example, under-
stands the various parts of a machine, say an automobile, when and
only when he knows how the parts work together; it is the way
in which they work together that provides the principle of order
upon and by which they are related to one another. The concep-
tion of "working together" involves the conception of conse-
quences: the significance of things resides in the consequences they
produce when they interact with other specified things. The
heart of the experimental method is determination of the signifi-
cance of observed things by means of deliberate institution of
modes of interaction.
It follows that in social inquiry "facts" may be carefully as-
certained and assembled without being understood. They are
capable of being ordered or related in the way that constitutes
understanding of them only when their bearing is seen, and "bear-
ing" is a matter of connection with consequences. Social phe-
nomena are so interwoven with one another that it is impossible
to assign special consequences (and hence bearing and significance)
to any given body of facts unless the special consequences are of
the latter differentially determined. This differential determina-
tion can be affected only by active or "practical" operations con-
ducted according to an idea which is a plan. Social phenomena
are not unique in being complexly interwoven with another. All
existential events, as existential, are in a similar state. But methods
of experimentation and their directive conceptions are now so
well established in the case of physical phenomena that vast bodies
of facts seem to carry their significance with them almost on
their face as soon as they are ascertained. For prior experimental
operations have shown what their probable consequences will be
512 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
under specified conditions to a high degree of accuracy. No such
state of affairs exists with reference to social phenomena and facts.
A like state of affairs can be brought into existence, even ap-
proximately, only as social facts are related together and hence
understood, on the basis of their connection with differential
consequences that are effected by definite plans of dealing prac-
tically with the phenomena: — the plans, once more, being hypoth-
eses directive of practical operations, not truths or dogmas.
CHAPTER XXV
THE LOGIC OF INQUIRY AND PHILOSOPHIES
OF KNOWLEDGE
A two-way connection exists between logic and philo-
sophical systems. On the one hand, the history of philos-
ophy shows that every main type of philosophic system
has developed its own special interpretation of logical forms and
relations. Indeed, it is almost a convention to divide philosophy
in general and special systems in particular into ontology or
metaphysics on one side and a corresponding epistemology or
theory of knowledge, on the other side. From another point of
view, logic, esthetics and ethics are the traditional main branches
of philosophy. It is not accidental that spiritualistic and ma-
terialistic, monistic, dualistic and pluralistic, idealistic and realistic
philosophies have evinced predilections for one or another type of
logical doctrine; and as they have become aware of the relations
between their first principles and their methods, have developed a
type of logical theory consonant with their theories of nature and
man. It is to the credit of each main type of philosophy that it
has attempted to make explicit its underlying logic.
It is, however, the other line of connection with which this
chapter is concerned. In order to gain adherents and to endure, a
philosophical system must not only maintain a reasonable degree of
internal dialectical consistency but must square itself with some
phases and conditions of the method? by which the beliefs that
are entertained about the world have been reached. It does not
suffice that a system have a consistent logic of discourse. It must
also have a considerable measure of plausibility in application to
things of the world if it is to gain and hold adherents. It follows
that every main philosophical theory of knowledge must not
513
514 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
merely avoid fallacies from its own standpoint, but must borrow
its leading principles from some phase of the logical pattern of
inquiry in order that its conclusions may seem to avoid material
fallacies. More than meticulous consistency in discourse is re-
quired to produce and sustain recurring types of philosophies of
knowledge. The fact that there is a limited number of types and
that they do recur in history (with modifications of subject-matter
appropriate to the culture of an epoch) of itself suggests that they
have laid hold of some features of the logic of competent inquiry
as the ground of their appeal. Wishful thinking may enter into
the special features selected; these may be chosen in order to sup-
port in advance certain conclusions rather than others. But the
logical features cannot be themselves invented ad hoc. If they
were, the theories would be paranoic constructions.
The purpose of this chapter is, then, to consider some of the
main types of epistemological theory which mark the course of
philosophy with a view to showing that each type represents a
selective extraction of some conditions and some factors out of
the actual pattern of controlled inquiry. It will be shown that
this borrowing is what gives them their plausibility and appeal,
while the source of their invalidity is arbitrary isolation of the
elements selected from the inquiry-context in which they function.
They will not be_ criticized, then, on the ground that they violate
all conditions of inquiry as means of attaining knowledge, but on
the ground that the selections are so one-sided as to ignore and
thereby virtually deny other conditions which give those that are
selected their cognitive force and which also prescribe the limits
under which the selected elements validly apply.
To undertake a complete exposition of the selected logical char-
acteristics that make each typical theory of knowledge just what
it is would demand a book, not a chapter. The pattern of in-
quiry, in and by which knowledge is instituted, fixes attention, how-
ever, upon the logical conditions that knowledge must satisfy, and
thereby furnishes us a clew that will guide us through the maze of
theories. If the theories are not wholly arbitrary but are one-
sided emphases selected from the total context of the pattern, the
pattern presents us with the total set of logical conditions out of
which some are extracted and then set over against one another.
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE si s
This possibility of selection has been actualized. The result is the
various types of epistemological theory that mark the history of
thought^ While the material of further discussion is, then, neces-
sarily critical and controversial the purpose is not controversial
It is to throw light upon the directing logical motif of each system
and also to provide indirect confirmation of conclusions already set
forth. J
1. The pattern of inquiry involves actively cooperating divisions
of labor between perceptual and ideational subject-matters. Em-
phasis upon one of these conditions at the expense of the other
will necessarily result in conflicting theories of knowledge. Those
who make one factor supreme and final will necessarily attempt to
explain the other in its own terms or else to explain it away. More-
over, the inadequacy of each view will also necessarily give re-
newed life and vigor to the opposed theory. The history of
thought from Greek times on is marked by the continued con-
troversy between sensationalistic empiricism and abstract ra-
tionalism.
2. Again, the pattern of inquiry is marked both by the presence
of immediate qualitative elements which determine the problem of
inquiry; which determine the material that is relevant; and which
test any proposed solution; and by mediate factors. Here again,
one-sided selection is possible.
While the theory of immediate knowledge has been discussed
and rejected, yet that discussion does not fully cover the points
which are relevant to the issue in hand. For there are theories
that admit that the processes of mediation are preliminary to ob-
taining knowledge but are themselves extra-logical; e.g., the
theories which hold that induction and inference are merely pre-
paratory psychological adjustments. On the other hand, there
are theories whose recognition of the necessity of mediation leads
them to the conclusion that in the final object of knowledge every-
thing stands in mediated relation to everything else. From this
point of view the only genuine object of knowledge is the uni-
verse as an unconditioned whole so that what ordinarily passes for
knowledge, science included, is only of "phenomena" or appear-
ances, since they are fragmentary bits of ultimate "Reality." Al-
though the final conclusion is metaphysical, in modern times the
516 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
metaphysical conclusion is reached by what purports to be a criti-
cal examination of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge.
The difference between idealistic and realistic theories of knowl-
edge ultimately depends upon the attitude taken towards imme-
diate and mediate elements in knowledge.
3. There is the question as to the relation between form and
matter. One aspect of this question has also been already dis-
cussed; namely, the view that logic is concerned with forms to the
exclusion of matter. But, again, this view does not exhaust the
issue. There are theories, such as traditional rationalism, which
hold that forms completely determine the ultimate matter of
knowledge; there are other theories which hold that while forms,
as essences, are wholly independent of material existence, yet from
time to time some of them descend and lay hold of existence as a
mere flux and thus render it, in so far, knowledge. One type of
traditional rationalism, absolute idealism, holds that logical forms
are characteristic only of human knowing and are completely ab-
sorbed within the material of absolute knowledge.
This aspect of the issue calls attention to the fact that various
permutations and combinations of the various conditions of the
total pattern of inquiry exist, so that (apart from the view that
forms are characteristic of a realm of abstract possibilities), the
issue of form and matter has historically operated as a qualifying
factor of other theories, rather than as an independent basis of
theories. For example, denial of the necessity of logical forms is
characteristic of both traditional empiricism and materialism, and
different views as to their nature play an important role in pro-
ducing the difference between monistic, dualistic and pluralistic
theories.
I. Traditional Empiricism and Rationalism. These theories of
knowledge may be considered together as each offers a typical case
of selective emphasis of one of two subject-matters that are
formally involved in any complete act of inquiry. Empiricism in
all its varieties has insisted upon the necessity of perceptual ma-
terial in knowledge; historical rationalism has held that only con-
ceptual subject-matter is capable of providing knowledge in its
full sense. There is no need to repeat here the previous analyses
which have shown that the distinction and relation between ob-
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 517
served data and directive ideas represent a functional division of
labor within inquiry in order that the latter rnav meet the logical
requirements of warranted assertibility. It is for this reason that
the controversy is interminable. Each type of theory of knowl-
edge has flourished in virtue of the weakness of the 'other. The
special characteristic of traditional empiricism is its extreme im-
mediatism. It engaged in one-sided selection of perceptual ma-
terial, but it also interpreted this material in an unqualified
particularistic way. It held that the immediately given consists of
qualitative discrete atoms that have no intrinsic connection with
one another. Our earlier discussion has shown that the immedi-
ately given is an extensive qualitative situation, and that emergence
of separate qualities is the result of operations of observation which
discriminates elements to serve as means of delimiting the special
problem involved and as means of providing tests for proposed
solutions. In other words, they are functional distinctions made
by inquiry within a total field for the sake of control of conclu-
sions. Traditional empiricism thus affords a striking exhibition of
what happens when genuine conditions in the pattern of controlled
inquiry are isolated from their context and in consequence are
given a non-functional interpretation.
The development of this type of empiricism with its denial of
the reality of relations (except those of external contiguity) led to
that type of modern rationalism which selected the relational func-
tion and made relations the center and heart of all knowledge.
Since this rationalism admitted the premise of sensationalism — that
qualities as such are discrete unitary elements — the necessary pres-
ence of relations in knowledge was attributed to the "synthetic"
activity of "thought" as an independent factor. Such rationalism
was hard put to it to account for the presence of elements to be
related, and, as we shall see in the sequel, this serious difficulty was
a chief factor in transforming an earlier rationalism into later ideal-
ism. No careful reader of Mill's Logic— the typical representative
of logical empiricism of the type in question — can fail to be struck
by the continually recurrent contrast between his official doctrine
of independently given disconnected sensory qualities and his
constant falling back upon objects which are groups or sets of re-
lated qualities. The reader of T. H. Green's devastating critique
518 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
of sensationalistic empiricism, on the other hand, is equally struck
by his recurrent embarrassment when he is obliged to deal with
the "elements" which "thought" relates. 1
Kant, with his earlier leanings to the rationalistic side, began a
new departure when he affirmed that conception without percep-
tion is empty and perception without conception blind, so that a
union of the two is required for any knowledge of nature. How-
ever, his doctrine held that the two materials proceed from two
different and independent sources, not seeing that they emerge as
cooperative conjugate functions in those processes of inquiry by
which problematic situations are analyzed with a view to trans-
formation into unified situations. In consequence, Kant was not
only compelled to have recourse to an artificial mechanism to bring
two entirely different kinds of subject-matter into connection with
one another, but to conclude (given his premises) that the percep-
tual material, while necessary, gets completely in the way of
knowledge of things as they "really" are, so that everything which
can lay claim to be knowledge is but of phenomenal appearance.
It is worth noting that development of the particularism of tradi-
tional empiricism led, when it was applied in the social field, to an
atomic "individualism" which dissolved all intrinsic ties of associa-
tion, leaving only self-interest in economic matters and coercion in
political affairs to hold human beings together. The way in which
one-sided empiricism evoked one-sided rationalism and provided it
with its chief arguments is especially conspicuous in this field.
"Organic" theories of the state with subordination of all human
relations to the political nexus was the logical response to atomic
individualism. This philosophy supplied the groundwork for a
revival of authoritarianism and provided one of the theoretical
foundations of modern totalitarian states. On the other hand, the
historic involvement of democratic theories of the state with the
older "individualistic" atomism has been a chief source of the grow-
1 Not till the time of William James was the common premise of both
sensationalistic empiricism and the type of rationalism in question openly
challenged by denial that the empirically given consists of disconnected ele-
ments. See his Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 244-248. It may be re-
called in this context that realistic logical atomism also rests upon acceptance of
the doctrine of disconnected elements as ultimate, although not mental, data
and consequently must introduce a form.il a priori rational "logical factor to ex-
plain the existence of generalizations. (See, ante, pp. 147-151.)
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 5 19
ing weakness of "liberal" national and local communities.
Popular positivism with its claim to be strictly scientific is an
offshoot of traditional empiricism and, like its parent, has done
valiant service in pointing out and rooting out the harmful pres-
ence in common sense and science of conceptions for which no
confirmatory experiential meaning or test can be found. 2 This
positivism has the advantage, however, of freedom from entangle-
ment with highly dubious psychological theories about sensations
and the involved epistemological doctrines concerning particulars.
It is quite willing to admit that generalizations are valid provided
they have the sanction of science. But it inherited from traditional
empiricism its contempt for general ideas and for theories that pre-
tend to be anything else than summary records of ascertained
facts. Its logic has no recognized place for hypotheses which at a
given time outrun the scope of already determined "facts," and
which, indeed, may not be capable of verification at the time or of
direct factual verification at any time.
Popular positivism's one-sided grasp of the method of inquiry is
evident when it is noted that the history of science shows that
many hypotheses have played a great role in the advancement of
science which were at the time of their origin purely speculative,
and would have been condemned by a consistent positivism as
merely "metaphysical"; e.g., the ideas of the conservation of
energy and of evolutionary development The history of science,
as an exemplification of the method of inquiry, shows that the
verifiability (as positivism understands it) of hypotheses is not
nearly as important as is their directive power. As a broad state-
ment, no important scientific hypothesis has ever been verified in
the form in which it was originally presented nor without very
considerable revisions and modifications. The justification of such
hypotheses has lain in their power to direct new orders of experi-
mental observation and to open up new problems and new fields
of subject-matter. In doing these things, they have not only
provided new facts but have often radically altered what were
previously taken to be facts. Popular positivism, in spite of its
2 The word "popular" is introduced because many of the criticisms passed
upon positivism do not apply to some of the more carefully formulated newer
types.
520 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD ^
claims to be strictly scientific, has been in some respects the heir
of an older metaphysical view which attributed to ideas inherent
truth-falsity properties. A sense for the actual pattern of inquiry
will assign to ideas as ideas the intrinsic function of being opera-
tional means. On this ground alone, the positivistic theory of
knowledge falls short. This criticism also applies to any form of
positivistic theory that confines the scope of logic to transforma-
tion of pre-existing materials with no provision for production of
new hypotheses whose operative use supplies new materials which
reconstruct those already at hand. It applies to "logical positivism"
as far as that theory limits logical theory to transformation of
propositions in separation from the operations by which proposi-
tions are formed.
II. Realistic Theories of Knowledge. A distinction was made
earlier between subject-matter, content, and objects in inquiry. 3
As a broad term, "subject-matter' ' is that which is investigated, the
problematic situation together with all material relevant to its solu-
tion. The word "content" is used in a restricted sense. It desig-
nates the subject-matters, existential and conceptual, which are
provisionally taken and used in the course of investigation. They
may be genuinely objective in their reference, but their value as
the material and procedural means of reaching a resolved situation
is conditional, or else hypothetical until the transformed situation
is instituted. For they may be genuinely objective in some con-
text and yet not be capable of functioning to effect the trans-
formation required in the given situation. An object, logically
speaking, is that set of connected distinctions or characteristics
which emerges as a definite constituent of a resolved situation and
is confirmed in the continuity of inquiry. This definition applies
to objects as existential. Since, and when, sets of interrelated ab-
stract characters emerge and are recurrently confirmed in conjuga-
tion with such existential objects, ideational or "rational" objects
come into being.
Now such objects, existential and ideational, are constantly used
in further inquiries. Indeed, the continuity of inquiry depends
upon their being taken and used as means in subsequent inquiries.
Old objects may undergo modification through the tests which are
3 See, ante, pp. 119-20.
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 521
put upon them in new problems— just as the set of related distinc-
tions which once were taken without question to be objects have
altered with progress in scientific knowledge. Primarily, however,
the objects instituted in continued previous inquiries are accepted
"as is," just as tools that have repeatedly proved effective are em-
ployed in new undertaking. Now when this direct taking and
using is treated as itself a case of knowledge, the "realistic" philos-
ophy of knowledge is the logical outcome. The objects that are
used are known objects. If, then, the operations of inquiry
through which they have been instituted as known are ignored,
there is a selective emphasis upon one phase of the actual pattern
of inquiry which, while valid as far as it goes, is so one-sided as to
yield a fallacious theory. The act of referring to an object which
is a knoivn object only because of operations quite independent of
the act of referring is taken to be itself a case of representative
knowledge for the purpose of a theory of knowledge.
The necessary presence of definite objects repeatedly and
familiarly employed as means to further knowledge gives the real-
istic theory its plausibility; a plausibility so great that any other
theory seems like a departure from common sense made only to
meet the exigencies of some preconceived theory. That stones,
stars, trees, cats and dogs, etc., exist independently of the particular
processes of a knower at a given time is as groundedly established
fact of knowledge as anything can well be. For as sets of con-
nected existential distinctions, they have emerged and been tested
over and over again in the inquiries of individuals and of the race.
In most cases it would be a gratuitous waste of energy to repeat
the operations by which they have been instituted and confirmed.
For the individual knower to suppose that he constructed them in
his immediate mental processes is as absurd as it would be for him
to suppose that he created the streets and houses he sees as he
travels through a city. Nevertheless, the streets and houses have
been made, although by existential operations exercised upon in-
dependently existing materials, not by "mental" processes. When
once instituted, objects, like streets and houses, are directly used
in new undertakings.
It is at this point that confusion as to the nature of the "given"
522 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
adds plausibility to the realistic theory. 4 Existences are immedi-
ately given in experience; that is what experience primarily is.
They are not given to experience but their giveness is experience.
But such immediate qualitative experience is not itself cognitive; it
fulfils none of the logical conditions of knowledge and of objects
qua known. When inquiry occurs, these materials are given to be
known — a truistic or tautological statement, since inquiry is the
subjection of the given experience to operations of inquiry with
the intent of institution of objects as known. The realistic
theory of knowledge thus represents a merger of two considera-
tions both of which in themselves are valid. One of them is the
necessity (just mentioned) of referring to objects already known
in conducting operations of inquiry to arrive at further knowledge.
The other consideration is the fact that inquiry always depends
upon the immediate presence of directly (but non-cognitively)
experienced existential subject-matters. Were the assertions of the
realistic theory of knowledge confined to this latter point, it would
be as naive and as groundedly a matter of common sense as it pro-
fesses to be. But by mixing this field of non-cognitive, directly
enjoyed and suffered, subject-matter with an act of direct refer-
ence (taking and using) to objects already known (known as the
consequence of prior tested and testing operations of inquiry) the
realism that results, is misplaced.
So far I have been dealing with realistic theories of the direct,
or as they are sometimes called "monistic," variety. The confu-
sion of two different things just mentioned, arising from mixing
them in a blend which is then alleged to be the simple and single
act of knowing, results in certain difficulties, of which the exist-
ence of errors, mistakes, illusions and delusions is a significant
aspect. The consistent realist of the type just criticized is com-
pelled logically to attribute independent subsistence — if not exist-
ence — to the subject-matter of all false knowledge as well as of
true, thus obliterating the distinctive logical meaning of knowl-
edge. For by this theory false knowing is also a case of the direct
referring or "pointing" by the knowing subject to subject-matters
that are what they are in independence of operations of knowing.
I shall not go into this point by way of further criticism, since it
4 Cf . ante, pp. 124, 228.
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 523
is the logical consequence of the confused merger pointed out. I
refer to it in connection with another type of realistic theory, so-
called dualistic or "representative" realism.
According to this view, the direct or given object of cognition
is always a mental state, whether "sensation" or "idea," and the
existential physical object is known through a mental state taken
to be a representation of an external object. As in the case of
other theories under examination, the present discussion is con-
cerned with this view only as far as it has a basis in the actual pat-
tern of inquiry. It is due to extraction of the inferential phase of
inquiry, while the isolation of this phase from the total inquiry-
context results in conversion of functional values into the kind of
ontological existence that is then called mental. In inquiry, im-
mediate qualities are discriminated with reference to use as signs
or indications of a possible inferred conclusion. For example, a
pain is directly had. It is interpreted as a toothache, and thereby
judged to be a singular of a specified kind. The pain, in conjunc-
tion with a set of other observable qualities, is taken to constitute
an object of which it is an evidential mark. In this capacity, the
pain-quality represents an object. Now if its special function in
inquiry is ignored, this representative function is hypostatized.
The pain is then taken not just for what it is, namely a quality
which at first has a problematic or doubtful reference, but as a
mental existence which somehow represents a physical object. By
a figure of speech its representative function in resolution of a
problem is converted into a representation.
The same line of consideration applies to ideas as distinct from
direct qualities. An idea as it operates in inquiry is the possible
significance of given qualities that are problematic in their signifi-
cance. As such, it has representative capacity since it stands for a
possible solution. Being a possibility, it is not immediately ac-
cepted if genuine inquiry occurs, but is employed as a directive of
further operations of observation that yield new data. If its opera-
tive function is ignored, then the idea is also taken to be inherently
a mental representation of an object. In the illustration just given,
a pain suggests a toothache. Premature judgment (so premature
that it is not judgment at all in a logical sense), accepts and affirms
the suggestion. But inquiry uses it to initiate and direct additional
524 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
observations which determine whether or not other qualities exist
which are the describing characters of a toothache. In this capac-
ity, the suggestion of a toothache is an idea, a possible hypothetical
meaning. It is representative, but is not a representation. Its
hypothetical status is what is meant by calling it an idea. But this
status is a logical property not an ontological property that can be
set over against the object as a mental existence.
The basic fallacy in representative realism is that while it actu-
ally depends upon the inferential phase (as defined) of inquiry,
it fails to interpret the immediate quality and the related idea in
terms of their functions in inquiry. On the contrary, it views
representative power as an inherent property of sensations and
ideas as such, treating them as "representations" in and of them-
selves. Dualism or bifurcation of mental and physical existence,
is a necessary result, presented, however, not as a result but as a
given fact. Failure to place the representative capacity of im-
mediate qualities as signs and of meanings as possible significances
in their context in inquiry leads to their being supposed to be
psychical or mental existences, which are then endowed with the
miraculous power of standing for and pointing to existences of a
different order.
With reference to the matter of errors, false beliefs and halluci-
nations, representative realism accounts for their occurrence in
general without being compelled to resort to peopling the realm
of Being with all kinds of subsistences, which are said to be pointed
to by the knowing subject just as real things may also happen to
be pointed to. According to the representative theory, the pos-
sibility of mistake is inherent in the very nature of sensations and
ideas as representations. Being of a different order of existence
from the external objects they represent, there is no assurance that
they will be taken to be the representation of just the external
things of which they are in fact the mental surrogates. This con-
ception, while it accounts for the abstract possibility of errors and
falsities, is impotent to explain the difference between true and
false beliefs in any particular case. To decide, for example,
whether a given idea is a representation of a sea-serpent or a whale,
of a ghost or a sheeted figure, the theory is obliged to go outside
the idea and outside of everything that examination of the idea
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 525
will disclose. It is obliged to have recourse to ordinary competent
operations of inquiry, and these operations are wholly independent
of the alleged nature of the idea as a mental representation. Now
the important thing is always the validity or invalidity of the
specific interpretation assigned to an immediate quality and to a
suggested meaning. Since to determine this question, representa-
tive realism must have recourse to the normal operations of in-
quiry, it is useless and irrelevant in the one matter that is of logi-
cal importance. It would be simpler and more direct, to say the
least, to begin and continue with consideration of the operations
of inquiry which are what is finally depended upon. If this were
done, the whole conception of qualities and ideas as modes of
mental existence would automatically drop out.
A more detailed examination would confirm the point that has
been made more than once, namely, that episternology, so called,
is a mixture of logical conceptions, derived from analysis of com-
petent inquiry, and irrelevant psychological and metaphysical pre-
conceptions. It would confirm the validity of the position that
the genuine element in every typical "epistemological" theory is
logical. It may be added that if one wishes to interpret the "men-
tal" as that subject-matter of experience which has, for the pur-
poses of inquiry and in its conduct, a strictly conditional and
hypothetical status (a status that must be given to qualities and
meaning while any inquiry is still in progress) there can be no
objection. But this interpretation of the "mental" differs radically
from the doctrine that there is involved in knowledge an order of
existence which in and of itself is psychical or mental. That there
are certain existential qualities like emotions, which are referable
to persons as a distinctive kind of existence (in the same sense in
which stones, stars, oysters and monkeys, are kinds of existence
with their own distinctive qualities), is a valid proposition. But
this differential objective reference has nothing to do with the
alleged subjective characters of qualities and ideas as they function
in knowledge. A person is an object, not a "mind" nor con-
sciousness, even though because of his capacity for inquiry he may
be said to have mind.
In the case of an emotion, "subjective" is simply a synonym
for personal. Whether such qualities as characterize hope, fear,
526 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
anger, love, describe a kind of objects that are distinctively per-
sonal is a question of fact to be settled by the same methods as
determine whether distinctive traits mark off clams and oysters
from one another. The properties that mark inquiry constitute
knowledge to be of a different kind from ignorance, mere opinion
and delusion. A person, or, more genencally, an organism, be-
comes a knowing subject in virtue of engaging in operations of
controlled inquiry. The theory criticized holds that there is a
cognitive subject antecedent to and independent of inquiry, a sub-
ject which is inherently a knowing being. Since it is impossible
to verify this assumption by any empirical means, it is a metaphysi-
cal preconception which is then mixed with logical conditions to
create a mode of "epistemology."
III. Idealistic Theories of Knowledge. There are three types
of theories of knowledge to which the word "idealist" is currently
applied. They may be identified as the perceptual, of which the
Berkeleyan is representative; the rationalistic, and the absolutistic.
The difference between the first two mentioned is constituted by
interception of idealistic ontologies with the separation, already
discussed, of the empirically perceived and the conceptually
ideated. The third theory represents an attempt to overcome the
division by reference to an experience in which the perceptual
and rational are completely fused, an absolute experience.
1. Perceptual Idealism. In classic theory as it was maintained
throughout the medieval period, a species, or the essential form
which determines a species, was termed an Idea — "species' 7 being
in fact the Latin transcription of the Greek eidos or idea. The
psychological trend of modern thought tended to conceive of ideas
as mental states. Locke retained the notion that an idea or species
is "the immediate object" of mind or thought and gave it a status
set over against real external objects. Knowledge proper con-
sisted in the relation between ideas, a relation capable of taking
different forms. Locke thus provided the background of the
theory of representative realism. Locke attempted to get over the
difficulty of finding a ground, on the basis of his premises, for be-
lief in the existence of a world external to the ideas by drawing
a distinction between primary qualities, solidity, size, motion,
which are properties of objects, and secondary qualities, like color,
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 527
sound, odor and pain, which are purely effects of the impact of
objective primary properties upon a subject. Berkeley cut under
this theory by pointing out the impossibility of separating primary
and secondary qualities in perception. The consequence was
denial of the existence of any material substance behind ideas,
since by description it was not an object of perception.
Mind to which ideas belong and of which they are properties
was thus taken to be the only substance. Berkeley accepted
Locke's theory that the object of knowledge is a relation of ideas.
His originality consisted in interpreting this relation as one of sig-
nifying or pointing — as the qualities of smoke point to those of
fire. Nature as an object of knowledge is thus a book or language,
while knowledge is understanding of what is inscribed in the book.
Certain ideas, moreover, are forced upon us, and the relation of
indicating or signifying which holds between them is permanent
and stable. The fact that primary ideas and the fixed relations
existing between them are beyond our control shows that they do
not originate in our minds but are the manifestation of a Divine
Mind and Will.
As far as the basic assumption of the original mental nature of
"ideas" is concerned, the criticism made of representative realism
applies as well to this theory. The distinctive logical feature of
perceptual idealism is the identification of the relation which con-
stitutes knowledge with that of signifying. This aspect of the
theory evidently represents a genuine apprehension of a necessary
condition of controlled inquiry: — that in which qualities directly
had are taken as evidential signs of something beyond themselves.
The one-sided character of the selective emphasis consists in ignor-
ing the fact that the qualities in question are discriminated from
out of an inclusive field in order to serve a special function in
inquiry — namely, determination of the problem to be solved.
Consequently, a purely functional status of perceived qualities is
treated as something inhering in them in and by their inherent na-
ture. The theory thus affords an exemplification of what happens
in the theory of knowledge when certain logical conditions are
isolated from their inquiry-context.
It is worth noting that by dropping the assumption that primary
"ideas" or qualities are mental, the theory can be given a purely
528 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
realistic epistemological version. For then it follows that qualities
and the signifying relation between them exist in rerum natura,
and that both are directly apprehended. This version, however,
neglects and denies the following traits of the inquiry-context:
(1) That qualities as indicative or signifying are deliberately se-
lected for the purpose of inquiry out of a complex that is directly
had in experience; and (2) that the existence of the problematic
situation to be resolved exercises control over the selective dis-
crimination of relevant and effective evidential qualities as means.
When these considerations are noted, it is at once clear that the
signifying property is not inherent but accrues to natural qualities
in virtue of the special function they perform in inquiry.
Take the illustrative case already mentioned — that smoke means
fire. Because of the recurrence of a certain problem in common
sense, this particular signifying connection becomes familiar and
habitual. It may then be taken for granted and directly referred
to (or taken and used) in solution of new problems as they present
themselves. But (1) discriminating observational inquiries are
required to determine that the qualities in question are those of
smoke; they may, for example, be those of steam. Moreover,
(2) the fire which is indicated is not just fire in general but some
particular fire, and the particular fires may be as different from
one another as are a forest conflagration, the burning of a cigar, and
the domestic cheer associated with smoke coming at dusk from
the chimney of a house. Inquiry is required to determine the kind
of object of which that which has been determined by controlled
observations to be smoke, is a sign. In any case, (3) smoke is not
the warranted sign of fire. For example, take the scientific idea
of fire as combustion. In this finally warranted case, 'mioke does
not appear at all. Characteristics which describe fires from a
scientific point of view are such as to prove the relativity of the
signifying function of objects to inquiry. The notion that this
function is a relation which inheres in the structure of nature (or
is structural, not functional) originates in the fact that in matters
of familiar use and enjoyment past habits have instituted a relation
that can be immediately referred to. Beyond a limited range of
common sense uses, however, the same objects signify different
things in different cultures— a fact sufficient to show that it is not
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 529
an inherent structural relation capable of direct apprehension.
That significance is inherent is a holdover from idealism.
2. Rationalistic Idealism. Classic Greek ontologies and meta-
physics were realistic in their theories of knowledge. But the
"real" element in Nature was taken to be the rational or ideal.
Sensory qualities characterizing changing things, and change itself,
were a mark of the presence of an element of Non-Being — of in-
complete or imperfect Being. The development of modern physi-
cal science eliminated ideal forms and rational ends from Nature
as known. In accord with the subjective tendency of modern
philosophy, philosophers of the rationalistic school endeavored to
reinstate the intrinsic rationality of the universe via the route of
examination of the conditions under which knowledge is possible.
These philosophers had no difficulty in showing that knowledge
is not possible without the presence of conceptions, and that con-
ceptions cannot be derived from sensory qualities either as their
weakened copies or as their compounds. Rationalistic idealism was
the outcome. It holds that the real world consists of a system
of relations which are of the nature of an objective comprehensive
Mind or Spirit, while knowing in the case of human subjects con-
sists in piecemeal reproduction of the constitution of this objective
Mind.
The theory, like the traditional rationalism of which it is the
offspring, represents a selective emphasis of the ideational functions
in controlled inquiry, when the latter is isolated from their opera-
tion as means of transformation of problematic situations. About
this aspect of the theory, it is, accordingly not necessary to say
anything further. The feature of this theory which is relevant to
the present discussion is that it arrives at its final idealistic ontology
by means of a logical theory of the process of knowledge. It is
this phase of the theory which will be examined.
Viewed from this angle, the theory recognizes that judgment
is the means of knowledge; that it proceeds by mediation, and that
the movement of judgment is towards transformation of ante-
cedently given material in the direction of unification. So far it
depends for its conclusion upon selection of logical conditions that
genuinely mark the pattern of inquiry. But, as has just been ob-
served, it ignores and denies the existence of individual qualitative
530 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
situations whose problematic quality evokes inquiry. In conse-
quence of this ignoring of a fundamental condition of knowledge
no account is taken (1) of the existential operations of observation
and (2) of the directive experimental function of conceptual
subject-matter. Because the theory is not based upon examination
of the actual practices by which knowledge is obtained, it is com-
pelled to hypostatize "thought," whose strictly "mental" activity,
according to its own immanent constitution, is then taken to be
the source of both the structure of the universe and of knowledge
of it. Instead of interpreting "thought" on the ground of exami-
nation of the actual operations of inquiry, as they are empirically
ascertained, something called thought is postulated at the outset as
an independent original all-inclusive activity or force. The purely
metaphysical or empirically unveriflable nature of this assumption
is acknowledged by the theory itself in its insistence that thought
is strictly a priori.
The theory must be given credit for acknowledging the neces-
sity of mediation in attainment of knowledge. Its strong point is
insistence upon the presence of reflection (which is the mediating
aspect of inquiry) in all knowledge and an accompanying implicit
or overt criticism of all immediate theories of knowledge. But,
for the reason just stated, reflection is taken to be something which
descends upon existence out of the blue and operates in a whole-
sale manner. The a priori categories or synthetic modes of con-
ception which, according to it, constitute the structure of
"thought," operate in a wholesale manner. They descend equally
upon that which is finally ascertained to be valid knowledge and
that which is specious and turns out to be false — as the rain from
heaven descends equally upon the just and the unjust. Hypostiza-
tion of "thought" into a substantial entity is the result of ignoring
the operations of inquiry by which alone "thought" can be em-
pirically identified. The hypostization precludes the theory from
ability to account (given its premises) for the difference between
true and false beliefs, since the categories of "thought" are equally
operative in both. Now the genuine logical problem is found at
precisely this point — the grounding and testing of specific beliefs
as to their warrant. Since the theory in question must go outside
its own set of premises in order to effect this differentiation, and
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 531
since it must fall back upon the actual operations of inquiry by
which beliefs are grounded and tested, it is clear that its premises
are gratuitous and that the theory should begin with the considera-
tions with which it is compelled to end.
The empirical confirmation to which the theory appears to ap-
peal is derived from the fact that reflection or mediation is in-
volved in the attainment of whatever can claim to be knowledge
as distinct from mere opinion. But it ignores the fundamental
considerations which define reflective operations and which con-
stitute their actual force in inquiry: — The occurrence of existential
problematic situations, and the occurrence of existential operations
which are directed by ideas and whose consequences test the
validity of ideas. The theory thus radically misconstrues the uni-
fication towards which inquiry in its mediate reflective phase
actually moves. In actual inquiry, movement toward a unified
ordered situation exists. But it is always a unification of the sub-
ject-matter which constitutes an individual problematic situation.
It is not unification at large. But because reflective operations are
hypostatized into an entity of a wholesale nature called Thought
or Reason, the feature of unification is generalized beyond the
limits in which it takes place, namely, resolution of specific prob-
lematic situations. Knowledge is then supposed to consist in at-
tainment of a final all-comprehensive Unity, equivalent to the
Universe as an unconditioned whole — a demand which accounts
for the absolute idealism which is considered below. It is true
that problematic situations are such because of the existence of
conditions which conflict as to their significance, thus constituting
a disordered situation. Hence, a universal property of any inquiry
is transformation into a situation unified or continuous in signifi-
cance. But the theory under examination generalizes this move-
ment beyond empirically verifiable limits.
Rationalistic idealism claims that the world is rational through
and through since science is the disclosure of an order of uniform,
because necessary, laws. Leaving out of consideration the fact
that laws of uniform relations are ultimately instrumentalities for
control of individualized situations, and taking the claim in its own
terms, the alleged rationality of the universe as a whole is another
case of generalization beyond the limiting conditions of grounded
532 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
inquiry. That problematic situations are resolvable (though the
means of attaining solutions may not be practically available at a
given time) is certainly a working postulate of inquiry, and it is
true that such resolution renders intelligible what was previously
unintelligible. But extension of these principles beyond the bounds
of a plurality of problematic situations has no warrant. The exist-
ence of problematic situations is a challenge to inquiry — that is, to
operative intelligence. The idea that the intelligibility effected by
scientific or controlled inquiry proves the antecedent existence of
an a priori rational world puts the cart before the horse. More-
over, it renders the appearance of blind and unordered situations
an insoluble problem save by drawing a hard and fast metaphysical
line between the world of phenomenal appearances and the world
in its reality. . Finally, the challenge to make the world more
reasonable is one that is ever-renewed, since it is a challenge to
execute concrete operations at definite places and times. The
working scientific faith is the belief that concern for objective con-
tinual inquiry, with assiduity and courage in its performance, is
capable of becoming habitual with an ever-increasing number of
human beings. The idea that the faith of science is a belief that
the world is already in itself completely rational is not so much in-
spiration to work as it is a justification of acquiescence.
3. Absolute Idealism. It was noted that idealisms of the type
just considered have great difficulty in accounting for the existence
of immediate qualitative elements. Every theory which is derived,
even at a distance, from Kant, is compelled to hold that the "cate-
gories" of a priori thought operate upon a given sensuous material
which simply has to be accepted as given. The difficulty thus
occasioned is the source of the third type of idealistic theory of
knowledge. This theory takes a derogatory attitude towards ab-
stract conceptual and reflective functions. The Absolute which
is the Unconditioned Whole, the object of knowledge in its logi-
cally proper sense and the goal of human knowing, is, according
to this view, a complete interpenetration and interfusion of the
elements of the immediate and of the conceptual and reflective.
Since what has been said about the fallacy of an all comprehensive
unification applies equally to this theory, discussion will be con-
fined to the conception of the interpenetration of the immediate
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 533
(represented by feeling and sensory qualities) and relational
thought as judgment.
The gist of the criticism passed by this type of idealistic episte-
mology upon rationalistic idealism concerns the relational charac-
ter belonging to judgment as such. All reflection and all judgment
as such, according to absolutistic idealism, involves a self -contra-
dictory process. For judgment proceeds in terms of relations and
every relation institutes a distinction as well as a connection.
Therefore, judgment, while being the only way in which human
subjects can proceed, necessarily stands in the way of attaining the
required goal of final unification. Reflection is thus said to pre-
suppose an all-inclusive experience — an Absolute Experience — in
which there is no distinction of the immediate and the mediate.
This Experience is of the nature of qualitative feelings which have
so completely absorbed rational and relational properties into
themselves that the latter have no existence. But the material con-
tent of this ultimate whole (which is the only "Reality") is com-
pletely inaccessible to us, since <we "know" only by means of
judgment which is reflective and mediate.
This theory also rests upon one-sided selection of what actually
takes place in controlled inquiry. For every resolved situation
which is the terminal state of inquiry exists directly as it is ex-
perienced. It is a qualitative individual situation in which are
directly incorporated and absorbed the results of the mediating
processes of inquiry. As an existential situation it is had as the
consummation and fulfilment of the operations of inquiry. 5 The
related distinctions which are effected by the operations of inquiry
exist as definite objects distinguished in inquiry and for the pur-
poses of inquiry. But the experienced situation as a qualitative
situation is not an object or a set of objects. It is just the qualita-
tive siaiation which it is. It can be referred to, taken and used in
subsequent inquiries, and then it presents itself as an object or
ordered set of objects. But to treat it as an object involves con-
fusion of two things which are experientially different: viz, an ob-
ject of cognition and a situation that is non-cognitively had. Ideal-
ism of the type under consideration thus presents a selection of an
undeniable aspect of every successful inquiry. But it is guilty of
5 Cf, the discussion of appreciation, ante, pp. 174-7.
534 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
a fundamental fallacy of generalization of this aspect beyond the
limits of consummatory outcomes of inquiry. For these issues are
resolutions of unique existential problematic situations.
The discussions and conclusions of the present chapter are con-
trolled by the theory of the pattern of inquiry which has been
developed. Their import cannot be understood apart from that
theory. They are undertaken in order to provide an indirect con-
firmation of the position taken in the book. I shall not repeat what
has been said to the effect that selective emphases from the actual
pattern of inquiry are fallacious because their material is extracted
from their context, and thereby made structural instead of func-
tional, ontological instead of logical. It is appropriate to conclude
with reference to the total neglect and consequent denial of the
operational conditions and consequences of inquiry. All of the
procedures and techniques of inquiry that yield stabilized beliefs,
upon both the common sense and the scientific level, are operations
existentially executed. The operations of common sense are re-
stricted because of their dependence upon limited instrumentali-
ties, namely, bodily organs supplemented by instrumental apparatus
that was invented to attain practical utilities and enjoyments rather
than for the sake of conducting inquiry. The cumulative effect of
these operations conducted for a practical end is to give authority
to a set of conceptions made familiar in a given culture. Com-
petent science begins when the instrumentalities employed in
operations of inquiry are adapted and invented to serve the purpose
of inquiry as such, involving development of a special language or
set of symbols.
Theories of knowledge that constitute what are now called
epistemologies have arisen because knowledge and obtaining
knowledge have not been conceived in terms of the operations by
which, in the continuum of experiential inquiry, stable beliefs are
progressively obtained and utilized. Because they are not con-
structed upon the ground of operations and conceived in terms of
their actual procedures and consequences, they are necessarily
formed in terms of preconceptions derived from various sources,
mainly cosmological in ancient and mainly psychological (directly
PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 535
or indirectly) in modern theory. Logic thus loses its autonomy, a
fact which signifies more than that a formal theory has been
crippled. The loss signifies that logic as the generalized account
of the means by which sound beliefs on any subject are attained
and tested has parted company with the actual practices by means
of which such beliefs are established. Failure to institute a logic
based inclusively and exclusively upon the operations of inquiry
has enormous cultural consequences. It encourages obscurantism;
it promotes acceptance of beliefs formed before methods of in-
quiry had reached their present estate; and it tends to relegate scien-
tific (that is, competent) methods of inquiry to a specialized
technical field. Since scientific methods simply exhibit free in-
telligence operating in the best manner available at a given time,
the cultural waste, confusion and distortion that results from the
failure to use these methods, in all fields in connection with all
problems, is incalculable. These considerations reinforce the claim
of logical theory, as the theory of inquiry, to assume and to hold a
position of primary human importance.
INDEX
Note: Certain terms that recur frequently, like determine, existential, inquiry,
meaning, operation, problem, situation, are indexed only in special cases.
"About," knowledge as, 151; double
meaning of, 166, 179, 473
Absolute, 38, 215-6, 532-4
Abstract, abstraction, 18, 117, 132, 135,
256 seq., Ch. XIV passim, 301 seq.,
330, 339, 356-391, 443, 467 seq.; mathe-
matical, 396-7, 404. See Hypothesis,
Universal
Accident, logical, nature of, 89, 135-8,
200
Acquaintance, as knowledge, 151-2
Action, activity, biological, Ch. II pas-
sim; cultural, Ch. Ill passim; and con-
sequences, 47, 51-4; as "pure," 58, 73,
87, 91, 490; overt, as close of inquiry,
60, 143, 165, 169; as general, 250-1,
271. See Operation, Practical
Acknowledgment, as recognition, 152
Actuality, 89n, 107, 135, 182, 253, 272,
288, 339-40, 399-400; of forms, 388
seq. See Potentiality
Added determinants, 322
Addition, logical, 338 seq.
Affirmation, distinguished from asser-
tion, 120; nature of, Ch. X passim;
427, 464. See Agreement, Ground,
Identification, Inclusion
Agreement, of consequences, 17, 47, 51-
4, 483; and affirmation, 183 seq., 264,
432
Aggregates, and collections, 203, 208,
209, 362 seq., 413
"All," different meanings of, 193^-, 199,
208 seq., 256 seq., 296, 326-7; as quali-
tative, 202-3, 207. See Generic and
Universal
Alternation, logical, 339 seq.
Analysis, see Discrimination, Selection,
Data
"And," 338 seq., 444
Application, applicability, see Opera-
tions, Reference
Appreciation, 174-7. See Consumma-
tion
Apprehension, as immediate, Ch. viii
passim, 86, 143, 167, 182, 423
A priori, the, 10, 16, 21, 24, 40, 44, 102,
144, 155, 392, 469, 504, 510, 530-2
Arts, influence of, upon methods, 72-
74. See Techniques
Assertibility, warranted, as end of in-
quiry, 4, 7, 9, 11, 22, 104, 118, 139,
143, 154 seq., 172, 195, 262, 329
Assertion, distinguished from affirma-
tion, 129 seq. See Judgment
Asymmetry of terms, 333-4
Atomic propositions, 147-51
Attributes, attributive, 296, 298, 356, 360
Autonomy of logical theory, 20-1, 156n,
390
Axioms, as self-evident truths, 10, 141.
See Postulate
Bacon, F., 38
Balance, imbalance, 27 seq. See Inte-
gration
Being, in Greek logic, 84, 188, 424 seq.,
524. See Ontological
Belief, ambiguity of word, 7
Berkeley, Bishop, 526 seq.
Biological, as matrix of inquiry, Ch. II;
foreshadowing pattern of inquiry, 33
seq., 60, 198, 245, 264, 387-8
Bosanquet, B., on interrogatives, 169-
70; on comparison, 184-5
Brackets, as logical symbols, 306, 409
Bradley, F. H., 133n, 535
Bridgman, F. W., 364n
Calculation, 162, 213, 218, 278, 417, 473,
481
537
538
INDEX
Canons, logical, 343-8
Case, 292; as representative, 431, 436,
440, 449, 479-81. See Induction
Category, defined 255 seq.; relation to
"class" 273 seq., 297, 342, 361, 383, 462;
cause as, 458 seq.
Causal propositions, means-consequences
of, 460-2
Cause, causal laws, Ch. XXII
Change of environment, 34; in Greek
logic, 83 seq.; in modern science,
134-5, 182, 461 seq.; and negation,
188-91; and particulars, 201, 212, 217,
296, 342; as cyclical, 221 seq., 236; as
vectorial, 234, 238; qualitative, 458
seq. See Interactions, Transforma-
tion
Characteristics, see Traits
Characters, distinguished from traits,
260, 342, 356, 379, 444, 453. See Ab-
stract, Universal
Circles, as logical symbols, 306, 362
Circular reasoning, 265
Class, see Category, Kind, Species
Classification, in Aristotelian logic, 86,
179, 253; nature of, 295, 306-7, 342.
See Category
Close, as termination, 31, 90, 158, 176,
221-2, 388. See End
Closed system, 320, 412, 476, 487. See
Contingent
Collection, collective terms, 203, 208,
363-5
Common qualities, and generality, 250
seq., 263, 266, 269 seq., 352 seq.
Common sense, 50, Ch. IV, 114-5, 160,
265, 461 seq., 482; and causation, 450
seq. See Meanings, Science
Communication, 46; and sentences, 172-
3, 284. See Language
Comparison, contrast, nature of, 183-6;
a measurement, 202 seq., 319; im-
portance of, 207, 212, 217-8, 249, 268,
283, 337, 353
Compound propositions, 336, 342
Comprehension, as understanding, 144,
153 seq.; of terms, 342, 361-2, 422
Complex, the, 122, 152, 487, 511
Conception, conceptual, as operational,
15, 130, 216, 350, 394 seq., 464, 501-7;
and perception, 67, 160, 515, 518; in
history, 233; propositional, Ch. XV,
especially 288 seq.; not descriptive,
Conception {Continued) :
467 seq., 473. See Hypothesis, Opera-
tions, Universal
Conceptualism, 262-3
Concrete, 115, 403; terms, 351-3
Condition, conditional, 134, 168, 293,
342, 452, 463, 494
Conflict, and problems, 7, 27, 29 seq.,
120, 176, 185-6, 218
Conford, F. M., 488n
Conjugate relation, of facts and con-
ceptions, 117, 124, 126, 133, 316 seq.,
327, 394, 405, 427, 490, 491, 498 seq.;
of affirmation-negation, 181, 186, 190,
337, 408; of generic-universal, 261 seq.,
273-6, 440; of singular-generic, 358-
9, 367; of form-matter, Ch. XIX pas-
sim: of induction-deduction, Ch.
XXI passi?n, 428, 432, 483
Conjunction, logical, 334 seq., 354, 429,
450, 452, 457, 473, 523
Connection, as existential relation, 51,
54, 173, 220. See Interaction, Involve-
ment
Connectivity of terms, 335 seq.
Connotation, 356 seq.
Consequences, as test, 112, 131, 176,
267, 317 ^?. 3 429 seq., 438-9, 461, 49G;
and significance, 499, 511-2, 534. See
E?id, Means-Consequence, Relation,
Instrumental
Consistency, 54, 225, 430, 513-4
Consummation, 32, 35, 63, 172, 176-8,
534
Contact activities, 29
Content, defined, 119, 524; mathemati-
cal, 398 seq., 406
Context, importance of, 52, 66, 135, 150,
223-5, 284, 287, 293, 339, 396-7, 428,
523, 527
Contingency, contingent, of existential
propositions and particulars, 138, 195,
200, 222, 226, 251, 255, 264, 298-300,
321, 383, 42 In, 442 seq., 457, 470 seq.
Continuity, nature of, 19, 23, 245; of
development, 24, 35-6, 40; temporal,
Ch. XIX passim, 445 seq., 461 seq.,
481. See Series
Continuum of inquiry, 8-9, 11, 140,
147, 226, 311, 316, 489-90; relations to
generality and kinds, Ch. XIII, 246
seq., 262-3, 331, 467-70, 486, 535; and
probability, 469-79; and objects, 520
seq.
INDEX
539
Contradiction, contradictory, 182, 195-
8, 345-6
Contrariety, contrary, 182, 190-1
Control, in inquiry, 11, 105, 117n, 133,
210, 218, 238; of direction of dis-
course, 314 seq., 318, 320, 464 seq.,
489
Convention, in language, 46-48; of
measures, 204, of scientific postulates,
483 seq.
Copula, nature of, 125, 132-3, 312; am-
biguity of, 135n. See "Is," Verb
Correlation, of changes in science, 82,
129, 138, 481 seq.; functional, 130,
162, 212, 234, 278; of data, 318; as
logical form, 334-5. See Corre-
spondence
Correspondence, words and things, 47,
53; facts and conceptions, 109, 126,
130, 212, 341. See Conjugate Rela-
tion
Cosmology, effect of ancient, on logi-
cal theory, 83, 93, 136, 201, 343, 397,
420-2, 504, 534. See Ontological
Culture, cultural, as matrix of inquiry,
Ch. Ill, 246, 487 seq.; and traditional
logic, Ch. V; and history, 233 seq.;
and meanings, 265. See Common
Sense
Darrow, K., 43 8n
Darwin, C, 92
Data, defined, 124 seq., 150, 160, 184,
228-9, 231 seq., Ill, 249, 288 seq., 317
seq., 424-6, 472 seq., 482 seq.; in math-
ematics, 404-5. See Facts, Sense Data
Dating, 224-5
Declarative propositions, 160 seq., 239
Deduction, 11, Ch. XIV passim, espe-
cially 314 seq., 323; Ch. XXI passim,
especially 421-2, 427-30, 464, 476,
483-5, 504. See Discourse, Hypothe-
sis, Universals
Definition, in Aristotelian logic, 137,
240; nature of, 256, 261, 272, 320, 340,
407-8; as ideal, 303-4; and concep-
tions, 343, 355, 359, 444, 456
Deliberation, 57, 162 seq., 170-1, 274
Demonstration, and description, 355
seq., as rational proof, 243, 421. See
Proof, Syllogism
Demonstrative, the, see Singular, This
Description, descriptive, 126, 128; scien-
Description (Continued):
tific, 130; theory of, Ch. XII passim,
especially 228 seq.; partial, 241; and
kinds, Ch. XIII passim; and singulars,
359; and conceptions, 417-8, 467 seq.,
482, 485. See Kinds, Traits
Designations, see Names
Development, 23-4, 32
Dewey, J., 374n
Differences, see Exclusion, Negation
Dirac, P. A.M., 176
Discourse, and symbols, 52, 56; con-
trolled by situation, 68 seq.; in Greek
logic, 94; and reasoning, 149, 155,
278, Ch. XVI passim, 314, 381 seq.,
432, 444; mathematical, Ch. XX. See
Mathematics, Reasoning
Discovery, and Greek logic, 87-8
Discrimination, see Data, Elimination,
Selection
Disjunction, disjunctive, 170-1, 190, 196;
contingent and necessary, 301-307;
342 seq., 447, 457. See Exclusion
Distance activities, 29-31
Distinctions, 128, 134
Division, logical, 342 seq.
Doubt, and inquiry, 1, 105-6, 160, 227.
See Problem
Dualism, of logic and methodology, 4-
5; of physical and mental, 36; of
theory and practice, 58-9, 73-4, 437
seq. See Empirical, Rational
Dyadic terms, 312-3, 315
Either-or reasoning, 192, 345, 506. See
Excluded Middle
Elements, 122, 152-3, 342, 458 seq.;
mathematical, 406-7
Elimination, 181, 183, 186, 203, 264, 319,
376, 431, 500. See Exclusion, Nega-
tion
Empirical, ambiguity of word, 9, 37; ra-
tional, 10, 73, 193-4, 252, 279-80,
304-5, 424
Empiristic logic, 103, 110, 132, 144-5,
149, 295, 352, 376, 392, 439, 515, 517-8
Enclosure, as relationship, 468
End, 35, 57, 117n; of inquiry, 157, 219,
388; "in itself," 168, 177-8, 215n; dou-
ble meaning of, 166-7, 176; correlative
with means, 496-7. See Close, Con-
sequences
Environment, and organic activity, 25
seq.; and inquiry, 33; cultural, 42 seq.;
540
INDEX
Environment (Continued):
inclusive of perceived objects, 68,
150
Epistemology, 23, 63, 65-6, 89n, 109n,
390, 463-9, Ch. XXV
Equivalence, as basic category, 313-7,
319, 334, 343, 410-3
'Essence, in Greek logic, 11, 86, 127,
136-7, 151, 252, 262, 359, 407, 422n;
defined, 89
Esthetic language, qualitative, 70; ef-
fect on Greek cosmology, 84; logical
influence, 84, 96, 175, 177, 205, 240;
and forms, 374
Euclidean geometry, 10, 141, 397, 413,
416. See Self -evident
Evaluation, as partial judgment, 123
seq.; of facts as data, 127, 133-4; as
judgment of practice, Ch. IX, 224,
235, 461-2; in social inquiry, 496 seq.,
502-3
Evidence, evidential, 45, 52, 129, 161,
183, 188, 225-6, 243, 249, 320, 474
seq., 527 seq. See Data, Signs
Excluded middle, canon of, 346-7
Exclusion, 85, 90, Ch. X passim, 195,
221, 250-1, 332, 337, 435. See Nega-
tion
Existence, existential, and discourse, 54;
and reference, 55, 135, 187; and judg-
ment, 121, 164; and denotative, 355
seq., 466 seq. See Contingent, Ge-
neric, Particular Propositions
Expectation, 250-1, 451, 453
Experience, and environment, Ch. II
passim; and "practical," 72-3; uni-
verse of, 68; as sense data, 157; con-
tinuum of, 251, 274, 489-91; as "abso-
lute," 533
Experiment, 94-5, 118, 131, 148, 181
seq., 189, 318, 424, 430 seq., 461, 470,
530; in social inquiry, 508-9
Extension, logical, 199, 296, 342, 359
seq.
Extension, of magnitudes, 210-1
Extensive abstraction, 415-6, 468-9
Facts, "dead," 70, 499; of the case, 108
seq., 114, 184, 497; and observation,
110-4, Ch. VII passim; provisional,
142; and proof, 469, 477; as given,
495, 501; in social inquiry, 498 seq.
Fallacy, 203-4, 257, 264, 285, 319, 331,
381, 444, 477, 498, 510
Fallibilism, 40
Field, perceptual, 67, 150
Final cause, see Teleology
"Following," "going from," 271-2, 299
314, 347-8, 419-22, 432-3
Force, as cause, 450-1
Formalistic logic, and Aristotelian, 83-
87; its transformation, 88, 182, 197,
200-1, 218, 285, 367; failure of, 374-
86; and social inquiry, 509-10
Forms, logical, accrue in inquiry, 4, 22,
102, 129, 156-7, 372 seq., 386; of ma-
terial, 102 seq., 157, 236, 285 seq., Ch.
XVII passim, 350, 434; abstracted,
193; mathematical, Ch. XX passim
Formulation, necessity of, 13, 18, 246,
251-2, 264-6, 508. 'Sec Propositions,
Sy?nbols
Frequency distribution, 226, 470-9
Functions, functional, biological, 25-9;
forms as, 135, 198, 270; made existen-
tial, 117, 149, 455; propositions as,
310, 367; formal, Ch. XVII; physical
and logical, 334, 414-5; laws as, 433
seq.; theory as, 473. See Instnimcntal,
Operational
Generality, generalization, cultural ori-
gin of, 43-5; how instituted, 196-7,
200, 437, 498; two forms of, 254 seq.,
354, 426, 433 seq. Sec Generic and
Universal Propositions, Kinds
Generic propositions, 255 seq,, Ch. XIV,
especially 268-71, 275, Ch. XV, espe-
cially 293-8; confused with universals,
255 seq., 379 seq., 443; terms, 353-6
Genetic, classification, 296
Genus, 36-7, 293
Geometry, 74, 92, 141, 211
Given, the, ambiguity of, 124, 228, 242,
425, 521-2; facts as, 495 seq.
Grammatical, and logical, 285 seq., 308
Greek thought, 73-4, Ch. V
Green, T. H., 154, 417
Ground, grounded, 110-3, 116, 131, 138,
141-2, 148, 173, 180, 183, 188, 225, 231,
246, 251, 264-5, 268, 288, 305, 311, 333,
341, 426, 470, 490-1
Habit, of inference, 12; generality of,
13; and knowledge, 143, 165, 224, 245,
251, 472
Heterogeneity, homogeneity, 90-1, 210-
1, 217, 480 seq.
INDEX
541
Heteronomy of logic, see Autonomy,
Ontological
History, logic and, 230-9, 438, 445, 459.
See Sequence
Hogben, L., 73n, 456n, 489n
Hook, S., vii
Hughes, Percy, 278n
Hume, David, 12n, 39, 151, 154, 245,
251, 451
Hypostatization, of means, 10, 58, 129,
132, 171, 530; of ends, 177-8, 215n
Hypothesis, hypothetical propositions,
conditions of, 3; and symbols, 53; and
experiment, 112, 129; as predicate, Ch.
VII passim; function of, 142, 162-3,
172-3, 189, 264 seq., 316, 491, 505 seq.;
contingent and necessary, 298-307;
hypothetic-deductive method, 427-8,
See Conception, Formulation, Predi-
cate, Universal
Idea, ideation, and symbols, 53; defined,
109 seq.; nature of, 133, 166, 185, 233,
289. See Possibility
Ideals, as directive, 178, 320, 471
Idealism, 8, 184, 206-7; perceptual, 526-
9; rationalistic, 529-32; absolute, 532-4
Identity, identification, 123, 184, 230,
240, 268, 349, 426, 432, 457, 464. See
Agree?nent, Inclusion
Identity, canon of, 11, 343-5
If-then propositions, see Hypothesis,
Universals
Ignorance, and probability, 471, 474
Immediate, immediacy, 62, 152, 227,
249; and epistemologies, 515 seq. See
Qualities
Immediate inference, 322
Immediate knowledge, Ch. VIII
Impersonal propositions, 190
Implication, 11, 54, 135, 272, 301, 311,
317, 330, 347, 376, 381, 428, 473, 476-7.
See Discourse, Involvement
Inclusion, 85, 90, Ch. X passim, 222,
251, 306-7, 332, 337; ambiguity of,
260-1. See Agreement
Indeterminate, the, and inquiry, 104 seq.,
106-7, 120-1, 135, 161, 183, 208, 242.
See Problems, Situation
Individual, the, as qualitative whole, 68,
105-7, 122, 220, 283, 353, 446
Induction, 267, Ch. XXI; in Aristotelian
logic, 420, 424-4; object of, 431-2,
Induction {Continued):
436-440; mathematical, 408-9; as psy-
chological, 423, 515
Inference, 2, 45, 54, 56, 11 In, 130, 139,
144, 148, 157, 228, 243, 249, 311, 347,
480, 523; and kinds, 268; and system,
294; and proof, 428-9. See Data,
Implication
Infinitation of negative, 192
Infinity, as non-terminating, 408, 413
seq.; as correspondence, 413-4
Inquiry, and logic, 4-6, 8, 18, 21, 88, 102
seq., 129, 156, 482; biological basis,
Ch. II; cultural basis, Ch. Ill; of
common sense and science, Ch. IV;
and judgment, Ch. VII; affirmation
and negation as functions of, Ch. X;
quantity as function of, Ch. XI; con-
tinuum of, Ch. XII; mathematical,
Ch. XX; physical, Chs. XXII, XXIII;
social, Ch. XXIV; and epistemological
theory, Ch. XXV. See Methods,
Operations
Instant, 405, 468-9
Instrumental, and operational, 14n; ma-
terial and procedural, 15, 103, 124,
136, 141, 162, 164-6, 171, 230, 240, 350,
438; formed material and, 385 seq.,
440, 473
Integration, biological, 25-35 passim;
cultural, 79 seq.; importance of, 106,
198, 391
Intension, logical, 199, 293, 359-62
Intensive magnitudes, 203-5
Interaction, biological, 25-33 passim;
and determination of kinds, 107, 113,
130, 150, 163-4, 174, 220, 253, 289,
333; and causation, 440 seq., 445, 452,
458 seq.
Interception, 408 seq.
Interrogatives, 168-70
Interval, see Point
Intuition, 19, 21, 24, 88, 103, 144^5, 227,
505; as empirical, 204, 472
Invariants, 390-1
Involvement, 54n, 278 seq., 311, 330.
See Connections, Inference
"Is," double meaning of, 134-5, 289,
307
Isomorphism, 400-2, 410
James, Wm., 317n, 331n, 518n
Jevons, W. S., 366
Johnson, W. E., 125
542
INDEX
Joseph, J. W., 82, 299n, 423-4
Judgment, structure of, Part II, espe-
cially Ch. VII; and propositions, 283;
and the individual, 105-7, 283; as
evaluative, Ch. IX; as requalification,
Ch. X; and comparison, Ch. XI; and
historical sequences, Ch. XII; con-
tinuum of, Ch. XIII. See Operations,
'Propositions, Situation
Kant, I., 81, 111, 154, 189, 416, 518
Kinds, and generalization, 196, Ch. XIII
passim, especially 209-12, Ch. XIV
passim, especially 270 seq., 276, 332,
353 seq., 360 seq.; and induction, 429-
33
Knowledge, as end of inquiry, 7-9, 21;
perception and, 67, 463-4, 482; in
Greek science, Ch. V, 254; as im-
mediate, Ch. VIII; as acquaintance
and "about," 152-3; theory of, 462
seq.; epistemological theories of, Ch.
XXV. See Assertibility, Ground
Laissez-faire, and deductive logic, 505
Language, importance in logical theory,
19-20, 39, 43 seq., 65-7, 101; and mean-
ings, 77, 187, 213, 223; and definition,
343. See Formulation, Symbols
Law, legal, and forms, 17, 101-2, 187,
372-3
Laws, scientific, 354, 435, 372-3, 398, Ch.
XXII passim, especially 442, 444; as
instrumental, 531. See Induction
Length, as scientific unit, 443, 481 seq.
Lewis, C. I., 485
Limits, 207-9, 219, 221 seq., 398, 415, 477
Liberalism, 519
Locke, John, 38, 69, 109, 116, 150, 526-7;
his theory of science, 146-7
Logical positivism, 284 seq., 520
Logical product, 338 seq.
Logical sum, 338 seq.
Logical theory, its subject-matter, Ch.
I; of common sense and science, Ch.
IV; reform of, Ch. V; two-valued,
107n; scope of, 280; as both inductive
and deductive, 484-5; and philosophy,
513 seq. See Aristotle, Mill, Inquiry
Logos, as hypostatized discourse, 58
Long-run, principle of, see Continuum
of inquiry
A4agnitudes, Ch. XI passim
Major, minor, see Premises, Syllogism
Many-many relation, 335-6
Map, illustration of, 400-4
Marx, K., 237
Mass, as scientific unit, 481 seq.
Matching, 213, 217-8. See Correspond-
ence
Mathematical physics, 11, 55, 355, 357,
398, 444
Adathematics, 74, 79, 92, 104, 239, 285,
317, 330, 335, 352, 357, 361, 391-2;
and probability, 478 seq., Ch. XX.
See Discourse
A4atrix of inquiry, Part I; biological, Ch.
II; cultural, Ch. Ill
Matter, in Aristotelian logic, 86, 91, 423;
and form, 102, 129, 156-7, 285 seq.,
Ill seq., 386; Ch. XIX
Alead, G. H., 41 7n
Aleaning and symbols, 46 seq.; and sig-
nificance, 52; two systems of, 49-50,
60, 115, 216, 425, 484; and discourse,
111 seq., 153-4, Ch. XVIII passim;
in mathematics, 398-9. See Conse-
quences, Conception^ Discourse
Means, facts and conceptions as ma-
terial and procedural, 136, 140, 160,
166, 174, 288 seq., 387, 405, 520; meas-
urement as, 200 seq., 209
iMeans-consequence relation, as funda-
mental category of inquiry, 9-10, 16,
104, 107, 384, 445; and causal proposi-
tions, 455-6, 460 seq.; predicament of,
39
Measurement, absent in ancient science,
90-1, 200-1; as qualitative and nu-
merical, 204 seq., Ch. XI passim, 319,
347. See Comparison
Mediation, organic basis, 34-5; neces-
sary, 139, Ch. VIII passim, 157 seq.,
189, 217, 249, 322, 515, 529 seq. See
Ground
Mental, mentalistic, 33, 36, 57n, 81, 103,
106, 159, 162, 185, 287, 523, 524, 527
seq.
Metaphysics, and logic, 23, 65-6, 286,
515, 524. See Ontological
Methodology, and logic, 4-5; of his-
tory, 231
Methods, and logical forms, 5-6, 103
seq., 463; and knowledge, 11; "norms"
of, 103 seq.; scientific, Part IV; in-
ductive and deductive, Ch. XXI. See
Inquiry, Science
INDEX
543
Middle term, as logos, 85, 203
Mill, J. S., 12n, 38, 81, 144-5, 154, 158,
258-60, 266 seq., 325-6, 355-8, 376,
382, 442 seq., 457, 469, 516
Mind-body problem, 23
Morals, 167-8, 216, 495 seq.
Motion, and science, 80-1, 212, 481. See
Correlation of Changes
Multiplication logical, 338 seq., 361, 444
Nagel, E., vii, 293n
Names, as terms, 350-1; proper, 357-8,
366-7
Narration, Ch. XII
Naturalism, and logical theory, 18-9,
Chs. II, III passim
Nature, in Greek logic, 82, 93
Necessary, necessity, logical, 85, 200,
279, 313, 319, 340, 380, 423, 442 seq.,
476. See Contingent, Implication,
Universals
Need, 27-8. See Conflict
Negation, negative propositions, in an-
cient logic, 85, 181; theory of, Ch. X,
221, 264. See Comparison, Disjunc-
tion, Elimination, Exclusion
Neo-Scholasticism, 9
Newton, Sir Isaac, 116, 127, 197, 204,
398, 455
Nominalism, 262-3
Non-being, 84, 421, 424, 529
Non-existential, see Hypothesis, Idea,
Possibility, Universals
Norms, normative, 4, 6, 10, 62, 103, 178,
505
Notation, see Symbols
Novelty, in reasoning, 314 seq.
Null Class, 380-1
Number, 200, 204, 209 seq., 319, 363,
397, 405, 409, 412 seq.; transflnite,
409
Object, objectivity, social origin of,
43-5; involved in situations, 66; re-
versal of meaning, 84; defined, 119,
129, 520 seq.; and substances, 127 seq.;
ambiguous use of, 362
Observation, 15, 38; function of, 70, 108-
10, 133, 150, 166, 377, 382, 425, 447,
524; of qualities, 207; in history, 231.
See Data, Experiment, Subject of
judgment
Ogden and Richards, 53
One, the, 198
One-to-one correspondence of words
and things, 53; of knowledge and ex-
istence, 390; as relationship, 335
"Only," 189, 240, 264, 273, 309, 430-1.
See Conjunction, Disjunction
Ontological, and logical, 23, 36, 87, 128,
177, 182, 188, 200-1, 215n, 262, 305,
359, 389, 397, 459 seq., 504, 534
Operations, operational, 11, 14-5, 48,
58, 102; facts and meanings as, 112-4;
and judgment, Ch. VII passim; are
instrumental, 164 seq., 177, 197-8, 226,
252 seq., 341, 400-3, 425, 456, 521,
534; combined, 407 seq. See Activity,
Experiment
Opinion, 123
Opposition, square of, 190
"Or," 338. See Alternation, Disjunc-
tion
Order, fundamental logical category,
221, 237, Ch. XV passim, 376, 388,
394, 417, 454, 460, 483. See Series
Organism, organic action, Ch. II passim,
60, 106, 159, 186
Origins, relativity of, 221, 459 seq.
Paradox, logical, of reflexive collec-
tions, 363-5; its origin, 383 seq.
Particulars, particularity, in Mill, 144
seq.; in Locke, 146; sense data as,
155-6; in Aristotle, 84, 89, 182; change,
189, 201, 220, 342, 421 seq.; proposi-
tions, 289-90. See Problem
Pattern of inquiry, biological basis, 33
seq., Part II, especially Ch. VI; com-
mon, 66, 79, 101, 114 seq., 246; and
judgment, Ch. VII, 437, 468, 470, 490;
and mathematics, 394-7; and episte-
mological theories, Ch. XX passim
Peirce, C. S., 9n, 12, 14, 156, 468, 470
Periodicity, 221, 411
Perception, and conception, 66-7, 515—
8; not directively cognitive, 67, 463-4,
482; psychological theory of, 150;
and epistemology, 526-7
Person, 83 seq., 106, 525-6
Philosophy, and logic, 2, 8, 66, Ch. XXV
passim; and science, 35, 77
Physics, physical, Aristotelian concep-
tion of, 83 seq.; Ch. XXIII passim
Planck, M., 467
Pluralism, 532
Plurality of causes, 456 seq.
Poincare, R., 408
544
INDEX
Point, 415, 468
Pointing, at and out, 124-5, 148, 243.
See This
Polyadic terms, 312-3
Positive propositions in Aristotle, 85;
Ch. IX passim. See Agreement, Com-
parison, Conjunction
Positivism, 519-20
Possibility "pure," 2, 48; and ideas, 109,
113, 131, 266, 271, 280, 289, 302, 339-
40, 343, 395, 427, 441; as ontological
realm, 399-404
Postulate, postulational, and logic, 16-9;
and mathematics, 404-8
Potentiality, 107, 129, 162, 239, 288-9,
333, 388 seq., 482. See Interaction,
Kinds
Practice, practical, and theory, 58-9,
437 seq., 461, 493 seq., 498 seq., 511
seq.; judgments of, Ch. IX. See Ex-
periment, Operations
Predicables, 89 seq., 136 seq.
Predicate, predication, 91, 124 seq., 131-
2, 166, 240, 253, 275-7, 285; lacking in
propositions, 307 seq.
Prediction, 110, 455, 474
Premises, and logical principles, 13, 156;
in Aristotle, 85; nature of, 142 seq.,
165, 311-2, 323-4, 424
Primitive propositions, 148, 155, 316,
406 seq. See Postulate
Principles, "first," 11; leading, 12-3, 156,
317, 337n, 470
Probability, 222n, 226, 256, 319-20, 381,
392, 412, 431; and continuum of in-
quiry, 470-9; of singulars, 470-5; of
distribution of kinds, 476-8. See Con-
tingent, Frequency
Problematic situation, basis of inquiry,
35, 232, 246, 280; in mathematics, 405
Problems, objectives of inquiry in com-
mon sense and science, 66, 79, 425-6;
formation of, 107 seq., 120; in social
inquiry, 493, 494, 498 seq.; and data,
124, 166, 170-3, 196, 201, 205, 222, 252,
328, 332, 424, 459; and sub -contraries,
193-6; and existential propositions,
288, 299-300, 376, 427, 451; "episte-
mological," 461 seq.
Proof, 110-4; Mill's theory of, 144, 392;
nature of, 157, 229, 243, 318, 325,
460, 485. See Demonstration, Conse-
quences
Proper names, 357-8, 366-7. See Singu-
lar, This
Property, as predicable, 136-7
Proposition, nature of, 110-4, 135; as
operational, 141, 166-7, 181, 197-8,
203, 206, 219, 232; declarative, 160
seq.; contrary, 190-1; subcontrary,
192-4; subalternate, 194-5; contradic-
tory, 196-8; narrative and descriptive,
Ch. XII passim; general theory of,
Part III; forms of, Ch. XV; existential
and non-existential, Ch. XVI; func-
tions of, Ch. XVII; and terms, Ch.
XIX; contingent hypothetical, 298-
300; necessary hypothetical, 300 seq.;
disjunctive, 305-7; relational, 307-9;
causal, 459 seq.
Psychology, and logic, 21-2, 36; effect
upon logical theories, 67-8, 106, 150-1,
285; induction and, 423, 515. See
Mental
Qualitative the, and common sense,
63-6; situations as, 68 seq., 190, 353,
367, 446; as individual, 200 seq., 210,
218, 5^^; science and, 65 seq., 250
Qualities, as signs, 71, 129, 147, 241, 250,
253, 270, 481; and science, 78, 116,
149, 215; and change, 134, 296; unique,
270, 296, 320, 352; of propositions,
Ch. X; and quantity, 206-7
Quantity, as "accident," 89-90, 200; of
propositions, Ch. XI, especially 206
seq. See Mathe?natics, Measurement
Rational, and empirical, 9, 18, 38, 73, 75,
193-4, 252, 278-80, 304-5, 430
Rationalism, rationalistic, 111, 132, 139,
160, 440, 504, 515 seq. See A priori
Ratner, J., vii, 409n
Realism, atomic, 147-50; of apprehen-
sion, 8, 167, 262-3, 500; epistemologi-
cal, 520-6; monistic, 521-2, 528; "rep-
resentative," 523-6
Reason, as "pure," 10, 24, 59, 73, 87
Reasoning, as ordered discourse, 54,
110 seq., 162; by disjunction, 192. See
Discourse, Meaning, Symbols
Recognition, 152-3
Recollection, as mediated, 223-8
Recurrence, nature of, 248 seq.
Reductio ad absurdum, 301, 510
Reference existential, 54, 74, 173, 256,
284, 314, 356, 377, 380, 422, 428, 481;
INDEX
545
Reference existential (Continued):
of negatives, 187, 521, 525; of mathe-
matical conceptions, 415-8
Reflective thought, see Inquiry
Reflexive propositions, 363-5
Relations, relational, ambiguity of,
word, 54, 329, 400-1; in Greek logic,
91; of meanings, 111 seq., 135; of sci-
entific objects, 116; all propositions as,
307-9; terms as, 349-50; mathematical,
430, Ch. XX passim
Relationship, 330, 333, 400 seq., 469. See
Isomorphism
Relative, 329, 403 seq.
Relevancy, 111-2, 236, 204. See Data
Representation, representative, 52, 114,
119, 175, 292, 436, 479-81; as "mental,"
523-8
Richards, I. A., 53
Rignano, 27-8
Rigor, of discourse, 314 seq., 319, 343
Russell, B. A. W., 154-5
Sample, 480-81. See Case
Satisfaction, as objective, 27-8. See
Consequences
Santayana, G., 69
Scale, 190
Science, and common sense, Ch. IV;
and the qualitative, 65 seq., 71, 250;
ancient and modern, 82, Ch. V passim;
as historical, 243-4, Ch. XXII passim;
and "practical," 161, 174, 178; and
change, 461 seq.; units of, 481 seq.;
mathematical, Ch. XX; physical, Chs.
XXI, XXII; social, Ch. XXIV. See
Correlation of Changes, Deduction,
Experiment, Induction
Scottish school, 62
Selection, necessity for, 123, 126 seq.,
133, 149, 183-4, 202, 232 seq., 268, 320,
367, 376, 394, 424, 460, 467, 475-6, 497,
499-500, 506-9, 527-8. See Data
Self-evident, the, 10, 17, 141, 145, 155,
407
Sensations, and knowledge, 86, 144, 146,
423, 523
Sense data, as objects of knowledge,
147, 151, 155, 157
Sense perception, propositions of, 290,
467
Sentence, and proposition, 172-3, 225,
284 seq. See Language
Sequence, Ch. XXII passim. See Order,
Series
Series, serial, organic, 29-30, 34-5, 50;
temporal as, 225 seq., 246, 318, 331
seq., 387 seq. See Temporal
Sets and series of propositions, Ch. XVI.
See Generic, Universal
Settled, 8, 120-2, 185, 188, 220
Signs, significance, and meanings, 51
seq,, 318, 325, 360n, 473; qualities as,
71, 250; and consequences, 511 seq.;
and epistemology, 523, 527 seq. See
Evidence
Sigwart, C, 187
Similarity, 185. See Comparison
Simple Depositions, 336, 342. See
Atomic Propositions
Simplicity of nature, 462
Singular propositions, 251, 257 seq., 268-
9, 290-3
Singular, the, 67, 123, 126-7, 189, 196,
200, 208, 220, 243, 248; and science,
437-8, 448 seq. See This
Situation, defined, 66 seq.; as control of
inquiry, 104 seq., 161, 166, 202, 207,
220, 445, 461, 472. See Individual,
Qualitative
Skipped intermediaries, 317
Social, influence on inquiry, 19-20,
Ch. Ill passim, 487-90; inquiry into,
Ch. XXIV
"Some," 182, 192 seq., 199, 207, 337. See
Particular
Space, spatial, 217, 239 seq., 312-3, 481
seq.; units of, 481-3; continuum of,
446 seq.
Species, Aristotelian, 86 seq., 127, 137,
170, 181-2, 256, 295, 421. See Kinds
Specimen, 436, 440, 480-1. See Case,
Sample
Spinoza, B., 495
Square of opposition, 182
Standards, see Norms
Standardized material, 15, 112, 126, 168,
171, 246, 293, 385, 431, 481 seq.
Stebbing, L. S., 21, 467, 488
Stimulus-Response, nature of, 29-31
Stipulation, and postulate, 17
Subalternation, 182, 194-5
Subcontraries, 182, 192-4, 204
Subimplication, 322-3
"Subject," reversal of meaning, 84
Subject, of judgment, 123 seq., 127 seq.
See Data, Existential Proposition
546
INDEX
Subjective, subjectivism, 33, 106; proba-
bility as, 471, 474. See Mental
Subject-matter, of logic, Ch. I; of sci-
ence, Ch. XXII; defined, 118-9, 520
Substance, substantive, 81-4, 127 seq.,
249, 285. See Object
Subsumption, 421, 433, 504
Substitution, see Equivalence
Succession, 27, 331, 451
Suggestion, necessity of, 110-1; inade-
quacy of, 144, 224, 228, 253, 277, 301,
313, 323, 434, 467, 498. See Formu-
lation
Supernatural, 24-5, 40-1, 43
Syllogism, in Aristotle, 85, 88, 95, 421;
nature of, 323 seq.
Symbols, symbolization, and logic, 2,
19, 39; defined, 51 seq.; necessity for,
74, 110, 114, 218; and propositions,
120, 134-6, 207n, 213, 246, 262, 342,
428
Symmetry, of terms, 333-4
System, two forms of, 49 seq., 301-2,
313, 316, 335, 425, 473, 484; and in-
ference, 294
Tautology, 314
Taxonomy, 170-1, 254, 295
Technology, and science, 71-2, 74, 94,
129, 148, 210, 391, 435, 487 seq.
Teleology, and science, 76-8, 92, 176;
event as, 233, 460, 462. See Conse-
quence, End
Tension, see Conflict
Terms, Ch. XIX; defined, 349; dyadic
and polyadic, 312-3; relational, 328
seq., 336; concrete, 351-3; abstract,
258 seq., 351-3; singular-general, 353-
5; denotative-connotative, 355-9; in
extension, intension, comprehension,
359-62; collective, 363-5
Test, see Consequences, Ground, Proof
Theory, see Empirical, Practical, Ra-
tional
This, 67, 123, 148, 189, 241, 247, 250-1,
292, 354, 363-5, 473. See Selection,
Singular
Thought, reflective, and inquiry, 21;
and language, 48
Time, temporal, and organi cacti vity, 45;
and inquiry, 106, 117-8, 133, 217, Ch.
XII passim, continuum, 447 seq., 455
seq., 481 seq. See Sequence, Series,
Transformation
Tradition, 50, 62-3, 77, 265
Traits, defined, 256 seq., Ch. XIV
passim, 353 seq., Ill seq., 389, 429
457. See Characters, Kind
Transformation, transformability, 34; of
biological, by culture, 43-5; necessity
for warranted conclusion, 104, 118
121, 135, 228, 239, 246, 287, 321-3, 4?4
432, 445, 483, 491, 498; in mathematics'
394-6, 404, 409, 410, 412, 416-8
Transitivity, 328, 330-3
Transposition of terms, 321-3
Truth, defined, 345n. See Assertibility
Warranted
Unconditional, see Universal
Understanding, as agreement, 47; as
knowledge, Ch. VIII passmi, espe-
cially, 153 seq., 174; and consequences,
499, 511 seq.
Unification, nature of, 531
Unique, see Individual, Qualities
Units, 204, 217-8, 365; of science, 481
seq.
Universal, Aristotelian, 85, 137-8, 182;
and the generic, Ch. XIV, 255 seq.,
379 seq.; abstract, Ch. XV, 258, 271-
5, 300-44, 339-41, 418; terms, 353-5;
two types of abstract universals, 397-
9; "concrete," 184n. See Operation,
Possibility
Validity, defined, 287, 492; and conse-
quences, 13, 68, 75, 142, 154, 175, 192,
196-7, 224, 319, 321, 343, 403, 427 seq.
Value, valuation, 77, 96, Ch. IX, espe-
cially 172-8; in social inquiry, 469
seq., 478
Vera Causa, as hypothesis, 34, 102, 160,
372
Verbs, temporal, 134-5, 224, 334
Verification, 157, 438, 519. See Conse-
quences, Hypothesis
Whitehead, A. N., 391n
Whole-part relation, 203-5
Whole the, qualitative, 84, 204, 218, 475.
See Individual, Situation
Words, and things, 47, 51-4; and terms,
285-6; ambiguity of, 292, 304
Zeno, 92
Zero, 412
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