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Link to original content: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31842478
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Message Content Plausibility Check for Platoons through Low-Power Beaconing - PubMed Skip to main page content
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. 2019 Dec 12;19(24):5493.
doi: 10.3390/s19245493.

Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Message Content Plausibility Check for Platoons through Low-Power Beaconing

Affiliations

Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Message Content Plausibility Check for Platoons through Low-Power Beaconing

Hyogon Kim et al. Sensors (Basel). .

Abstract

Although the IEEE Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) and 3GPP Cellular V2X deployments are imminent, their standards do not yet cover an important security aspect; the message content plausibility check. In safety-critical driving situations, vehicles cannot blindly trust the content of received safety messages, because an attacker may have forged false values in it in order to cause unsafe response from the receiving vehicles. In particular, the attacks mounted from remote, well-hidden positions around roads are considered the most apparent danger. So far, there have been three approaches to validating V2X message content: checking based on sensor fusion, behavior analysis, and communication constraints. This paper discusses the three existing approaches. In addition, it discusses a communication-based checking scheme that supplements the existing approaches. It uses low-power transmission of vehicle identifiers to identify remote attackers. We demonstrate its potential address in the case of an autonomous vehicle platooning application.

Keywords: V2V communication; message contents plausibility; power control.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest. The founding sponsors had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, and in the decision to publish the results.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Low-power beacon checking setup.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Distances in credit-based whisper.
Figure 3
Figure 3
Highway driving simulation scenarios (a) poor visibility (b) blocked line of sight.
Figure 4
Figure 4
Vehicle collision probabilities as functions of messaging rate and Tx power.
Figure 5
Figure 5
Elapsed time required for trust vs. whisper time allowed for the attacker, dW=170 m.
Figure 6
Figure 6
Attack scenario.
Figure 7
Figure 7
Successful attacks with basic safety message (BSM) only and with BSM + whisper.
Figure 8
Figure 8
Channel busy percentage (CBP) increase due to whispers.
Figure 9
Figure 9
Attack success probability with additional credit-based check.
Figure 10
Figure 10
Simulated platooning scenario.
Figure 11
Figure 11
Velocity changes of the non-platoon vehicles in the first vehicle group without forged message filtering.
Figure 12
Figure 12
Velocity changes of platoons without forged message filtering.
Figure 13
Figure 13
Velocity changes of platoons without forged message filtering.

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References

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