Euthyphro.
Socrates, Euthyphro.
Soc. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
Euth. No; that is the reason.
Soc. And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
Euth. True.
Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?
Euth. Yes.
The latter is the truer account, and therefore we can only say that what is loved by all the gods is in a state to be loved by them; but holiness has a wider meaning than this. Soc. And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
Euth. No, that is the reason.
Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
